ML17309A559

Forwards Response to NRC 940901 RAI Re Eals,Eals Annotated Classification Criteria Based on Response to NRC Rais,Rev 1 to OSSI-92-402A-4-REG, Re Ginna EALs Technical Bases & Rev 1 to Ossi 92-402A-2-REG, Fission Product Barrier....

ML17309A559
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	11/07/1994
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	JOHNSON A R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17263A834	List: ML17263A833 ML17263A835 ML17309A559
References
TAC-M89506, NUDOCS 9411090265
Download: ML17309A559 (53)

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PRIGRITY1ACCELERATEDRIDSPROCESSING)REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RXDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9411090265DOC.DATE:94/11/07NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGi.nnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterGAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas6ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFXLIATIONJOHNSON,A.R.ProjectDirectorateI-3DOCKETg05000244PR

SUBJECT:

ForwardsresponsetoNRC940901RAIreEALs,EALsannotatedclassificationcriteriabasedonresponsetoNRCRAXs,Rev1toOSSI-92-402A-4-REG,"REGinnaEALsTechnicalBases"&Rev1toOSSI92-402A-2-REG,"FissionProductBarrier...."DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLtSIZE:5i~~4TITLE:ORSubmittal:EmergencyPreparednessPlas,Implement'gProcedures,CNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244IXNTERNAL:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDCENTE01OCCTEXTERNAL:NOAC~Pz.c>7$g(Q<4&COPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECXPIENTIDCODE/NAMEJOHNSON,ANRR/DRSS/PEPBNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111Y'CNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEiViiSTE!CONTACT'I'HEDOCL'ifEN'rCON'rROLDESK,ROO!ifPl-37(EXT.04-DOS3)TOELI!iflNATEYOURNAifLFROifDISTRIIIUI'IONLIS'I'SFORDOCI:b,fEN'I'SYOL'ON"I'L'ED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPXESREQUIRED:LTTR7ENCL7 V1I1'y

~P4NDROCHESTERGASANDElECTRICCORPORAllON~89EASTAVENUE;ROCHESTER,N.Y146rI9-000IAREACODE716546-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidenthlvcieorOperationsNovember7,1994U.S.Nuclear,RegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

EmergencyActionLevelsResponsetoRequestforAdditionalInformationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Ref.(a):LetterfromA.R.Johnson(NRC),toR.C.Mecredy(RG&E),

Subject:

"RequestforAdditionalInformationonR.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevels(TACNo.M89506),"datedSept.1,1994(b):LetterfromR.C.Mecredy(RG&E),toA.R.Johnson(NRC),samesubject,datedOctober5,1994

DearMr.Johnson:

Reference(a)requestedwithin30daysthatRG&EprovideadditionalinformationwithregardtotheproposedEmergencyActionLevels(EAL)fortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Reference(b)requestedanextensionofanadditional30daysinordertocoordinateourproposedEALswiththoseofothernuclearutilitiesinthestateofNewYork.AttachedarethefollowinginresponsetoReference(a):AttachmentA-ResponsetotheRequestforAdditionalInformation:AresponsetoeachgeneralandspecificNRCcommenthasbeenprovided.AttachmentB-R.E.Ginna"EmergencyActionLevels:AnnotatedClassificationCriteriaBasedonResponsetoNRCRAI.AttachmentC-EmergencyActionLevelsTechnicalBases,Revision1.AttachmentD-FissionProductBarrierEvaluation,Revision1..AttachmentE-R.E.GinnaPlantSpecificEALGuideline(PEG),Revision1.'1ForthepurposeofthissubmittaltheEALTables,AttachmentB,containannotatedcross-referencestotheNUMARCICgs,suchas[SA2],[SS2],[SG2].Wedonotplan,however,toincludethese0891357g7gK/2>k~resrroeo2ee'st41107OS000244PDR

referenceswithintheEALimplementingprocedures.TheNUMARCICgsareincludedaspartoftheTechnicalBases(AttachmentC).Very'trulyyours,RobertC.MecredyGAHK352xc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector TV 50-244GINNARG5EC,RESPONSETORE(VESTFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONRE,EMERGENCYACTIONLEVELS.';REC'DM/LTRDTDll/7/94...9411090265-NOTICE-THEATTACHEDFILESAREOFFICIAL'ECORDSOFTHEINFORMATION&REPORTSMANAGEMENTBRANCH.THEYHAVEBEENCHARGEDTOYOUFORALIMITEDTIMEPERIODANDMUSTBERETURNEDTOTHERE-CORDS&ARCHIVESSERVICESSEC-TIONP1-22WHITEFLINT.PLEASEDONOTSENDDOCUMENTSCHARGEDOUTTHROUGHTHEMAIL.REMOVALOFANYPAGE(S)FROMDOCUMENTFORREPRODUCTIONMUST,BERE-FERREDTOFILEPERSONNEL..

AttachmentA'>>";;.'R.E.GinnaEmergency.Ac@po~~yelsRESPONSPTORKQUEBe7+FORADDITIONALINFQRP~YXON.Docket50-244

R.E:GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION1"TheR.E.GinnaEALtables(bothCategoriesandSubcategories)omittedthefulltextoftheNUMARCInitiatingConditions.Forexample...""InaccordancewithNUMARC/NESP-007,ICsare:"oneofapredeterminedsubsetofnuclearpowerplantconditionswhereeitherthepotentialexistsforaradiologicalemergency,orsuchanemergencyhasoccurred."EALsare:"apre-determined,site-specific,observablethresholdforaplantICthatplacestheplantinagivenemergencyclass."TheuseofICsisadvantageousfromahumanfactorsperspective.GroupingEALsunderICswillindicatetothosewhomustuseEALshowanEAL(orseveraldiverseEALs)isrelatedtotheplantconditionofconcern.Thiswillassisttheemergencydirectorintheuseofjudgmentinmakingthecorrecteventclassification.ThelackofICsforlossoffissionproductbarriersisofparticularconcerntothestaff.Itisimportantthatpersonnelwhoperformeventclassification,andthosewhocommunicatetheclassificationtooffsiteauthorities,clearlyunderstandtheconditionofeachfissionproductbarrierasreQectedintheEAL.ThisassociationbetweenbarriersandEALsisnotreadilyapparentintheGinnamethodology.""ThelackofICsinthelicensee'sclassificationschemerepresentsasignificantdeparturefromtheNUMARCguidanceandisunacceptable.ThelicenseeshouldincludeICswiththeirEALstodemonstratetherelationshipbetweentheEALsandtheirassociatedclassification"AsstatedintheRAI,ICsareasubsetofpowerplantconditionswhichrepresentapotentialoractualradiologicalemergency.EALsare"apre-determined,site-specific,observablethresholdforaplantICthatplacestheplantinagivenemergencyclass."Whenasite-specific,observablethreshold(EAL)isreached,entryintoitsassociatedemergencyclassisrequiredirrespectiveoftheIC&omwhichtheEALisderived.AsstatedintheRAI,ICsprovidecriteriathatmayberelevanttoemergencyclassificationbasedontheusers"judgment,"Therefore,itfollowsthatuseofjudgmentmayberequiredforthoseconditionsinwhichno"pre-determined,site-specific,observablethreshold"canbedefined.SinceICslack"site-specific,observablethresholds"foremergencyclassification,forthosepostulatedconditionsinwhichnositespecificobservablethresholdexists,theusersjudgmentmustbebasedonthegenericdefinitionoftheassociatedemergencyclassification.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONEALCategory9.0"Other"definesEALsineachemergencyclasswhicharebasedupontheuser'sjudgment.Category9.0isusedwhentheplantconditiondoesnotmeetanyoftheEALthresholdsofCategory1.0throughCategory8.0butitisdeterminedthattheplantconditionmeetseithertheemergencyclassdefinitioncriteriaortheMBrIARC/NESP-007fissionproductbarrierlossorpotentiallosscriteria.'nhini'nfnr"AbsentfromtheR.E.GinnaICandthesupportingEALweretheNUMARCcriteriaof"ActualorImminent"and"UsingActualMeteorology."Thebasisdocumentincludedthecriteriaregardingmeteorology,butwouldhavetobereferredtobytheclassifierinadditiontoaclassificationimplementingprocedure.ThelicenseeshouldassurethatcrossreferencingrequirementsareminimizedbyincludingallnecessaryattributesofICsandEALsinonelocation."Thoughnotspecificallystated,itisinferredthatthisRAIisinreferencetoEALs5.2.4and5.2.5.Foranyactualorimminentrelease,doseprojectionsperformedin'accordancewithEPIP2-18,"ControlRoomDoseAssessment,EPIP2-4"EmergencyDoseProjections-ManualMethod,EPIP2-5"EmergencyDoseProjections-PersonalComputerMethod,orEPIP2-6"EmergencyDoseProjections-MIDASProgram,useofactualmeteorologyisspecified.Therefore,implicitintheperformanceofanydoseprojectionistheuseofactualmeteorology.'m'nn~~immi R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOgEQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION[para.1]"Thelicensee'sfailuretoincludeafissionproductbarrierevaluationmatrixconstitutesasignificantdeparturefromthemethodologyinNUMARC/NESP-007.NESP-007specificallyincludedbarrierevaluationinitsclassificationmethodologytocomplementthesymptomaticandevent-basedICs,especiallyforthehigherclassifications.Thefissionproductbarriermatrixprovidesmultipleindicatorstooperatorstoassessthestatusofeachofthebarriersandclassifytheemergencybasedupontheirintegrity.Thematrixalsoprovidestheabilitytodynamicallyassesshowfarpresentconditionsarefromescalatingtothenexthigheremergencyclass."Forexample,ifFuelCladbarrierandRCSbarrier'Loss'ALsexisted,ThiswouldindicatetotheEmergencyDirectorthat,inadditiontooffsitedoseassessments,continualassessmentsofradioactiveinventoryandcontainmentintegritymustbefocusedon.If,ontheotherhand,bothfuelcladbarrierandRCSbarrier'PotentialLoss'ALsexisted,theEmergencyDirectorwouldhavemoreassurancethattherewasnoimmediateneedtoescalate..."."[para.2]"ThelicenseehasindicatedthattheirproposedfissionproductbarrierEALsreducetheburdenontheoperatorsinevaluatingthefissionproductbarriers,however,theuseofnineseparatecategoriesofEALsbythelicenseewillstillrequiresomeonetorefertoseveraldifferentcategoriestoperformadynamicassessmentofthefissionproductbarriers.Further,theschemeisinternallyconQictingbecauseofthemultiplecategories.Forexample,ifcoolantactivitywas>300p,Ci/ccDEI-131andprimarysystemleakagewas>46gpm,eitheroftheseconditionswouldbeanAlertperthelicensee'sEALtables.However,thecollectivefailureswouldnotnecessarilyresultinasiteareaemergency(SAE)declaration,asisrequiredbyNUMARCcriteria.[para.3]"Intheboundinganalysisthatwasperformedtoevaluatethenumerouscombinationsofconditionsofthethreefissionproductbarriers,severalassumptionsweremadethatwerenotadequatelyjustifiedorledtotheeliminationofsomecombinationsthatwereboundedbythecondition.Forexample,undertheremarkssectionoftheGinnaFissionProductBarrierEvaluation:[Subpara.1]3.Theinitiationsignal...Containmentisolationsignalscanalsooccurduetolossofcontainmentcoolingorfaultedsteamgenerator4 R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION[Subpara.2]4.Inordertoreach...NotechnicalsupportinginformationwasprovidedtosupporttheassertionthatacorecoolingorheatsinkREDpathmustexist.Thelicenseealsodidnotadequatelydemonstratethatthisconditionisindicativeofalossofthefuelcladbarrier.[Subpara.3]10.ACoreExitThermocouplereading...EntryintoCoreCooling-REDpathalsorequiresthelossofallRCPsandisnotindicativeofapotentiallossofcontainment.Therefore,declarationofaGeneralEmergencywouldbeunwarranted.[Subpara.4]11....Thus,entryintoCore...TheNUMARCguidanceforpotentiallossofthecontainmentduetodegradationintheCoreCoolingCSFspecificallyrequiresthatfunctionalrecoveryprocedureshavebeenineffectivefor15minutes.Severeaccidentanalyseshaveconcludedthatfunctionalrestorationprocedurescanarrestcoredegradationwithinthereactorvesselinasignificantfractionofthecoredamagescenarios,andthatthelikelihoodofcontainmentfailureisverysmallintheseevents.Therefore,itisappropriatetoprovideareasonableperiodoftimetoallowfunctionrestorationprocedurestoarrestthecoremeltsequence.Whetherornottheprocedureswillbeeffectiveshouldbeapparentwithin15minutes.[Subpara.5]12.CoreCooling-OrangeontheCSFST...The"Loss"EALfortheRCSbarrierinNU1KARC/NESP-007thataddressesRCSleakageisundertheheading"RCSLeakRate."Thewordingis"RCSleakrateGREATERthanmakeupcapacityasindicatedbyalossofRCSsubcooling."InNUMARC'stechnicalbasisitstatesthe"lossofsubcoolingisafundamentalindicationthattheinventorycontrolsystemsareinadequateinmaintainingRCSpressureandinventoryagainstthevolumelossthroughtheleak."Thus,lossofsubcoolingisavalidindicatorforlossoftheRCSbarrier~xi~MJMARCdoesnotstatethatlossofsubcoolingcanonlyoccurduetoalossoftheRCSpressureboundaryasisimpliedbythestatementabove.ThelicenseemusttechnicallyjustifythatalossofsubcoolingcanonlyoccurwhenthereisabreachoftheRCSbarrier.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION[Subpara.6]22.Thiscombinationofconditionswouldproduce...TheNtBrIARCguidancehasbeendevelopedtospecificallyprovideformultipleredundantindicationsoflossorpotentiallossofthethreefissionproductbarriers,ItisunacceptabletosimplyeliminateacombinationofconditionsbecauseofitsredundancytootherEALs.[Subpara.7]23.EAIPFC6.1isequivalentto...ThiscommentappliestothecombinationofalossoftheRCSbarrierasindicatedbycontainmentradiationmonitorreadingsandalossofthefuelcladasindicatedbyothersite-specificindications.ThelicenseehaseliminateditbaseduponitsredundancytoancontainmentradiationmonitorEALforlossoftheRCSandFuelClad.Asstatedinthepreviouscomment,itisunacceptabletosimplyeliminateacombinationofconditionsbecauseofitsredundancytootherEALs.[Subpara.8]45.AnycombinationofPC4.1andeither...PC4.1states,"Releaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakagegreaterthantechspec.allowable."ThisconditionisnotrefiectiveofalossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.Thus,declarationofaGeneralEmergencywouldnotbewarrantedinconjunctionwithalossofthefuelclad.[Para.4]BoththeMMARCguidanceandAppendixEto10CFRPart50requiretheuseofmultipleindicatorsforevaluatingplantconditions.Thelicenseeshouldconsideradifferentformat(Barrieranalysis)forthefissionproductbarrierEALsthatmaximizesthenumberofparametersorindicatorsavailable,minimizesthetimetoclassify,andassuresmultipleconditionsarereadilyevaluatedandproperlyclassified.

R.E:GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION[Para.1]MJMARC/NESP-007neitherstatesnorinfersthatthegenericfissionproductbarriermatrixisintendedorrequiredtobeimplementedonasite-specificbasis.OnSeptember22-23,1992theEmergencyActionLevelsImplementationWorkshopwasconductedbyNUSGQ(C.Specificallystatedinpresentationsandintheworkshoptrainingmaterials(Section3pagePF-39,pageBF-30andthePWRFissionProductBarrierMatrixBreakoutSessionGuideSection7)attached,wasthefactthatthematrixformatisnotrequired.Itonlyrequiresthatcompliancewithallcombinationsaredocumented.NKMARC/NESP-007doesnotprecludethedevelopmentofEALsbasedonanevaluationoffissionproductbarrierloss/potentiallossconditionsaspartofthedevelopmentprocess.ThefissionproductbarrierlossmatrixaspresentedinNU1NARC/NESP-007was"chosentoclearlyshowthesynergismamongtheEALsandsupportmoreaccuratedynamicassessments."Further,NUMARC/NESP-007states"Theguidancepresentedhereisnotintendedtobeappliedtoplantsas-is.TheEALguidanceisintendedtogivethelogicfordevelopingsite-specificEALsusingsite-specificEALpresentationmethods."TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationandthesubsequentbinningoftheGinnafissionproductbarrierbasedEALsintocategorieswasspecificallyperformedtosupporttheuser'sabilityto"dynamicallyassesshowfarpresentconditionsarefromescalatingtothenexthigheremergencyclass."BydefininglogicaleventcategoriesandsubcategoriesinwhichtoplacetheseEALs,theabilitytoperformadynamicassessmentisenhanced.TheusabilityandcorrectnessoftheGinnamethodofEALpresentationhasbeendemonstratedanddocumentedinnumerousdynamicsimulatorscenariosduringEALvalidationexercises.TheNUMARC/NESP-007matrixformatrequirestheusertoevaluatethousandsofcombinationsofconditionsthatmayhavenologicalrelationship.Suchaformatisahindrance,notanaid,inmakingtimely,accurate,andconsistentemergencyeventclassifications.Toourknowledge,neitherNUNCnorplantsthathaveadoptedtheMJMARC/NESP-007fissionproductbarriermatrixformathaveattemptedadynamictestoftheirEALsforthepurposeofdemonstratingandassessingtheirusabilitycharacteristics.Tothecontrary,itisrecognizedthatsomeBWRandPWRplantshavesuspendedimplementationofMB~C/NESP-007basedEALsorhavecanceledtheirimplementationbecausetheirusersfindtheformatconfusing,unworkable,andpronetomisclassification.TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationdemonstratesthattheGinnafissionproductbarrier-basedEALsaretechnicallycorrectandmeettheintentofNUMARC/NESP-007.hrifrmhFiiPBrrirnhnhfiiIni'nhmnhnr'n1rrrirlnllimri R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION[Para.2]NUMARC/NESP-007states"ThepresentationmethodshownforFissionProductBarrierswaschosentoclearlyshowthesynergismamongtheEALsandtosupportmoreaccuratedynamicassessments."Itdoesnotstateorimplythatthismethodofpresentationisnecessaryeithertodepictthesynergismortoprovidetheabilityfordynamicassessments.Rather,itisprovidedasaguidefortheEALwritertoensurethattheselectedpresentationmethodologyproperlyreflectsthedesiredsynergisticqualityandassessmentcapability.WhileNUMARC/NESP-007doesnotdefinetheterm"dynamicassessment",itisassumedthatitmeanstheabilitytoevaluatefissionproductbarrierlossandpotentiallossindicatorsunder'volvingplantconditions.UnliketheMJMARC/NESP-007matrixformat,theGinnaEALpresentationmethodplacessimilarEALsintocategoriesandsubcategoriesthatfocustheuser'sattentiontothespecificEALthresholdthatcorrespondstotheplantconditionofconcern.Thisprovidesalogicalclassificationandescalationpathofrelatedindicatorsandthusallowsforrapidassessmentofemergencyconditionsassociatedwithfissionproductbarrierloss.ItisimportanttonotethattheGinnaEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesarenotsimplyrepresentationsorabbreviationsoftheMMARC/NESP-007ICs.Rather,eachGinnacategoryandassociatedsubcategoryisapathwayfrombroadindicatorsofpotentialemergencyeventstoasetofspecificthresholdconditionsthatrequireemergencyclassification.TheEALsderivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationtakeintoaccounttheintended'synergism'fthefissionproductbarrierbasisinformationwhichcannotbeadequatelyaddressedbytheNUMARC/NESP-007matrixformat.AnexamplewouldbeaconditioninwhichRCSleakageintocontainmentisinexcessofnormalmakeupcapacity(RCSpotentialloss)inconjunctionwithasecondarysidereleasewithprimarytosecondaryleakageinexcessoftechnicalspecifications(Containmentloss).Underamatrixformat,thiscombinationofconditionswouldrequireaSiteAreaEmergency(SAE)declarationbecauseNUMARC/NESP-007requiresanSAEforthepotentiallossofthefuelcladorRCSwiththelossofanotherbarrier.Thisisclearlynotintended.MB~C/NESP-007containmentlossindicatorC4basisstatesthattheSiteAreaEmergencyassociatedwiththecontainmentlossindicationisintendedtobeescalatoryfromRCSbreachesassociatedwithSGtuberuptures.TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationdoesnotrelyonsingleindicationsasstatedintheRAI.ForthemajorityoftheboundingconditionsdefinedintheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationtheindicatorssubsumedintoothercombinationsofconditionsconsistofthoseindicatorswhichareeither:~Completelyboundedbyanothercombinationforthesameindicator,or~Areasubsetofanotherindicator.

R.E.Ginna'mergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONInthecasecited(>300pCi/ccDEI-131inconjunctionwithprimarysystemleakage>46gpm),thecombinationwasomittedintheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationbecausethisconditionwouldresultinexceedin'gthe100R/hrSAEEAL.The1008/hrSAEEALisbasedon>300p,Ci/ccDEI-131inconjunctionwithprimarysystemleakageintocontainment.in'ThisEALhasbeenaddedinlightoftheassumptionswhicharemadeinthederivationofthecontainmentradiationmonitorvalueassociatedwiththefuelcladlossEALaswellasvariablesintheboundingassumptions(i.e.diQerencesintimeaftershutdownandcoolantvolumereleased).[Para.3][Subpara.1],Lossofcontainmentcoolingwillnotresultinacontainmentpressure(4.0psig)sufBcienttoresultinacontainmentisolation,Inaddition,proceduralrequirementsrequirethecontainmenttobeventedunderthisconditiontomaintainpressurewellbelowtheisolationsetpoint.Afaultedsteamgeneratorcouldresultinacontainmentisolationsignal.~hni'ninhii1fhninm1ifi'1mni1[Subpara.2]NUMARC/NESP-007statesinthebasisforcontainmentbarrierlossN1:"ConditionsleadingtocontainmentREDpathresultfromRCSbarrierand/orFuelCladBarrierLoss.Thus,thisEALisprimarilyadiscriminatorbetweenSiteAreaEmergencyandGeneralEmergencyrepresentingapotentiallossofthethirdbarrier."Therefore,entryintoContainmentREDpathbyitselfisintendedtoresultinaGeneralEmergency.frn'hn11AsstatedintheGinnaPEG,inordertoreachcontainmentREDpath,acontainmentpressureof60psigmustbereached.ThispressureiswellinexcessofthemaximumpressureattainedfromtheDBALOCAandisgreaterthanthemaximumpressureattainedforallanalyzedsteamlinebreaksinsidecontainmentspecifiedintheGinnaFSAR.Therefore,toattainsuchacontainmentpressure,theenergysourcemustbeasaresultofaseverelydegradedcore(metalwaterreaction)inconjunctionwithRCSbreachorasevereATWSconditioninconjunctionwithRCSbreach.PerNUMARC/NESP-007ICSS2suchanATWSleadstoimminentorpotentiallossoffuelclad.rinAr'n11i'

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONifinFiinnE1Dh[Subpara.3]PertheGinnaEALs,'corecoolingREDonlyrequiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.Justification¹10intheFissionProductBarrierEvaluationreferencedinthisRAIwasinerrorandshouldhaveread"...andwarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency."ifii[Subpara.4]PertheGinnaEALs,corecoolingREDandfunctionalrestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15minutesisthethresholdforaGeneralEmergency.[Subpara.5]ThejustificationwasnotintendedtoinferthatalossofRCSsubcoolingcanonlyoccurfromalossofRCS.Rather,thatanycorecoolingORANGEorREDpathrepresentsalossofsubcoolingresultingfromalossofRCS.Justification¹12hasbeenrewordedtoreflectthefollowingbasis.ORANGEpathcorecoolingisenteredwheneitherCET>700'ForRVLISwaterlevel<topoffuel(REDpathifbothconditionsexistorCETs>1200'F).TheRCSpressurecorrespondingto700'Fisapproximately3100psig.Thispressureismorethan600psiggreaterthanthepressurizersafetyvalveliftpressureand365psiggreaterthantheRCSsafetylimit.IftheRCSisintactunderthiscondition,RCSbarrierlossisimminent.RCSinventoryisneverintentionally.reducedtothetopoffuel(43%RVLIS)underhotconditionsorpoweroperations.AreductioninRCSvolumeofthismagnitudeindicatesasignificantbr'eachoftheRCSbarriersincenointentionalvalvingconfigurationwouldresultinsuchadecrease.AnyconditionwhichresultsinaninventorylossofthismagnitudemustbeattributedtoanRCSbreachcausedbyaRCSlinebreakorunisolatedprimarysystemdischarginginexcessofmakeupcapacity.ItwouldbeextremelypoorjudgmenttoassumethatalossoftheRCSbarrierhasnotoccurredundereitheroftheseconditions.ItshouldbenotedthatvesselwaterlevelbelowthetopoffuelisconsideredaRCSbarrierlossintheBWRfissionproductEALs.ThereisnodifferenceinthemechanismswhichcouldcausevesselleveltodropbelowthetopoffuelbetweenBWRsandPWRs.Importanttothisbasisis,forthepurposeofemergencydeclaration,thepotentialreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironment.Inthecasewherethefuelcladisactuallyorpotentiallybreached,theassumptionthatthefissionproductswouldbecontained,evenintheabsenceofotherRCSlossindicatorsnotimmediatelyapparent,withvessellevelbelowthetopoffuelisinappropriate.Figure4.16ofNUREG1228"SourceTermEstimationDuringResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents"showshoweachofthecriticalsafetyfunctionsisrelatedtofissionproductbarriermaintenanceasregardspreventingradioactivity R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONreleases.Coreheatremoval(corecooling)alongwithRCSpressurecontrolandRCSheatremoval(heatsink)areshowntobedirectlyrelatedtoRCS.boundarymaintenance.ItshouldalsobenotedthatNUMARC/NESP-007considersREDpathheatsinkapotentiallossofRCS,yettheconditionsrequiringentryintothispatharebasedoninsufBcientSGlevelandfeedwaterflow.TheseconditionsarenotdirectthreatstoRCSbarrierintegritybutmayleadtoRCSpressureconditionswhichinturnmayleadtoRCSbarrierbreach.NUMARC/NESP-007providesnotechnicalbasistosupporthowaREDpathheatsinkrepresentsapotentiallossofRCSboundary.ItwouldappearthattheRCSinventorylossconditionsrequiringentryintocorecoolingORANGEorREDpatharemuchmoredirectlyindicativeofactualorpotentialRCSbreachthanisentryintoREDpathheatsink.[Subpara.6]mininrfrnhmiin1hlk[Subpara.7]inm'nlinmi[Subpara.8]ggzrgg~TheconditionsreferencedbythisjustificationrepresentalossofRCSinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentandthuswererevisedtoreflectaSiteAreaEmergency.EALsderivedfromcombinationsofunisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureincombinationwithanyfuelcladloss/potentiallossindicatorsresultinaGeneralEmergency.[Para.4]Itisstillappropriatetodefine,wherepossible,distinctEALswhichareindicativeofmultiplebarrierloss/potentialloss.Thisminimizesthetimetoclassifywhileassuringmultipleconditionsarereadilyevaluatedandproperlyclassified.Basedonexhaustiveoperatorinterviews,theuseofafission-productbarriermatrixformathasbeendeterminedtobeoverlyburdensomeandconfusingfortheuserresultinginmissedorincorrectclassifications.ThisconcernhasbeenexpressedbyotherlicenseeswhohaveattemptedtoimplementNUMARC/NESP-007fissionproductbarrierEALswithonlyamatrixformat.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONBecauseofthecomplexityoftheNUMiARC/NESP-007fissionproductbarrierloss/potentiallossdefinitionoftheSiteAreaEmergency,somelicenseeshaveattemptedtodeviatefromIGB~Candsimplifythefissionproductbarrierloss/potentiallossdefinitionbyremovingtheintendedreducedweightingofthecontainment.ThereducedweightingofthecontainmentattheSAEclassificationisasignificantpartofthebasisintheintendedsynergismbetweenbarrierlossindicators.TheGinnaFissionProductBarrierEvaluationmaintainsthisintendedsynergismofNUMARCwhileeliminatingtheinherentcomplexity.TheGinnaEALformathasbeenvalidatedbyoperatingcrewsutilizingscenariosintheplant-specificsimulatortotesteachEAL.TheresultsofthisvalidationhavebeendocumentedandfeedbackincorporatedintotheEALstofurtherensuretheirusability."Inseveralinstancesthatarespecificallycommentedon,thelicenseehasdepartedfromtheNUMARCguidanceofbasingclassificationsuponobservingtheintegrityofthethreefissionproductbarriers,andmadeclassificationsbasedononeindicator,especiallyinthecaseofCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)status.Forexample,iftheCSFforcontainmentisonaREDpath,ageneralemergencyisdeclared.ThisapproachisinconsistentwithNUMARCguidancethatrequiresevaluationofeachbarrier.Thelicenseeshouldassurethatallbarriersareevaluatedwhenarrivingataclassificationratherthansimplyobservingonestatusindicator.Thiscommentrelatestothecommentabove.NUMARC/NESP-007Section3.9states:"Plantemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs)aredesignedtomaintainand/orrestoreasetofCSFswhicharelistedintheorderofpriorityofrestorationeffortsduringaccidentconditions."...TherearediverseandredundantplantsystemstosupporteachCSF.BymonitoringtheCFSsinsteadoftheindividualsystemcomponentstatus,theimpactofmultipleeventsisinherentlyaddressed,e.g.thenumberofoperablecomponentsavailabletomaintainthefunction.TheEOPscontaindetailedinstructionsregardingthemonitoringofthesefunctionsandprovidesaschemeforclassifyingthesignificanceofthechallengetothefunctions.InprovidingEALsbasedontheseschemes,theemergencyclassificationcanflowfromtheEOPassessmentratherthanbeingbasedonaseparate R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONEALassessment.Thisisdesirableasitreducesambiguityandreducesthetimenecessarytoclassifytheevent."AsstatedbyTABAC,eachCSFissupportedbydiverseandredundantplantsystems.TheentryconditionsforCSFSTsarealsosupportedbydiverseandredundantinstrumentation.ContainmentREDpathisnotasingleindicatorbutadefined,measurableandoperationallysignificantconditionwhichisknowntobeindicativeofmultiplefissionproductbarrierlosses.TheGinnaEALschemedoesnotrelysolelyonthisconditiontodeterminewhenageneralemergencyduetothelossoffissionproductbarriersmustbedeclared.NordoesitprecludethedeclarationofageneralemergencybasedonotherfissionproductbarrierlossEALswhichmayormaynotmanifestthemselvesunderagivencondition.TheGinnaEALschemedoesrequireclassificationofaGeneralEmergencybecause,inandofitself,thisconditionrepresentsalossofthefuelclad,RCSbarriersandapotentiallossofcontainmentbarrier.Thetechnicalbasesforthosesite-specificEALsproposedbythelicenseeconcerningsecondarysidereleasesconsiderthecondenserairejectorasapotentialreleasepathway.The"QuestionsandAnswersonNUMARC/NESP-007,publishedinJuneof1993,specificallyexcludethecondenserairejectorsasaprolongedsecondarysidereleasepathway.ThelicenseeshouldprovidejustificationforincludingthispathwayasadiscriminatorforthoseEALsorrevisetheirtechnicalbasestoeliminatethereference.Thinin'fiffmiInseveralEALsproposedbythelicensee,entryintoaCore-CoolingORANGEorREDpathwasconsideredtobeatleastapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.However,thecorecoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionwasnotconsideredbyNUIKARC/NESP-007asadiscriminatorfortheRCSbarrierintegrityanditsusebythelicenseewasnotadequatelyjustified.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionalinformationthatclearlydemonstratesthatacorecoolingORANGEorREDpathisindicativeofafailureoftheRCSbarrierorrevisethoseEALsthatincorporatethisconcepttobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCguidance.RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI¹3[Para.3l[Subpara.5]

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNUMARCexampleAUl-1statesinpart;"Avalidreading..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforeBluentmonitors,UnusualEvent,5.1.1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."NUMARCspecifiesthatasitespecificprocedurebeusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee'sPEGprovidedproceduresforreleaseassessment,buttheseprocedureswerenotincorporatedintotheEALsnorincludedinthetechnicalbases.TheNUMARCnoteregardingdeclarationiftheassessmentisnotaccomplishedwithin60minuteswasnotincludedintheEAL,butwasdiscussedinthetechnicalbases.Itisimportantthatadoseassessmentisperformedusingactualmeteorologyandabestestimateoftheactualradionuclidemixtodetermineiftheeffluentreleasewillleadtoescalationoftheemergencyduetoadverseconditions.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMJMARCcriteria,orprovidete'chnicaljustificationforthedeviation.hr1ThLhllrinifhrfrnrrirTheNUNCexampleAAl-1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforeffluentmonitors,Alert,5.1.2statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."NUMARCspecifiesthatasitespecificprocedurebeusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee'sPEGprovidedproceduresforreleaseassessment,buttheseprocedureswerenotincorporatedintotheEALsnorincludedinthetechnicalbases.TheNUMARCnoteregardingdeclarationiftheassessmentisnotaccomplishedwithin15minuteswasnotincludedintheEAL,nordiscussedinthetechnicalbases.Itisimportantthatadoseassessmentisperformedusingactualmeteorologyandabestestimateoftheactual R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONradionuclidemixtodetermineiftheeKuentreleasewillleadtoescalationoftheemergencyduetoadverseconditions.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMB~Ccriteria,orprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.L421rii'im'heNUIKARCcr'iteriaforInitiatingConditionAA3statesinpart:"Releaseofradioactive..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforAreaRadiationLevels,Alert,5.3.3statesinpart:"Sustainedabnormalarearadiationlevels>8Rlhr..."Thelicensee'sEALdidnotincludetheNUMARCcriteriaforestablishingormaintainingcoldshutdownconditions.Thereferencedtable5.3wasnotincludedintheEAL,butwasinthetechnicalbases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtobeconsistentwiththeNUNCcriteriaandprovidethereferencedtableintheEALorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.inlhrin"rirminin1h"Thrfrn1hnnlTheNUMARCexampleAS1-1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforeffluentmonitors,SiteAreaEmergency,5.1.3statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."NUMARCspecifiesthatasitespecificprocedurebeusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee'sPEGprovidedproceduresforreleaseassessment,however,thiswasnotincorporatedintotheEALs.TheNARCnote R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONregardingdeclarationiftheassessmentisnotaccomplishedwithin15minuteswasnotincludedintheEALandnotdiscussedinthetechnicalbases.TheeffluentsetpointsforthesiteareaemergencyEALarebaseduponFSARsourcetermsandaverageannualmeteorologyand,therefore,maysignificantlydifferfromtheactualreleaseconditions.Thus,escalationtoasiteareaemergencyduetoeffluentreleasesshouldbebaseduponanassessmentofpotentialoffsitedosesasdeterminedbyactualsourcetermandmeteorology.Theprimarypurposeoftheeffluentsetpointistotriggerthisassessment,nottoupgradetheemergencyclass.Classificationthroughuseoftheeffluentmonitorreadingaloneisonlyexpectedwhendoseassessmentscannotbecompletedwithintherequiredtime.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMB~Ccriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformationonthesourceterms(s)utilizedtodeterminethevaluesintable5.1.ThAhlThesourcetermsutilizedtodeterminethevalueinTable5.1arethoseutilizedintheGinnadoseprojectionprocedureEPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment.TheEPIP,2-18doseassessmentmethodologyuseseffluentmonitordoseconversionfactorswhichwerederivedusingNUREG-1228Table2.2fissionproductinventoriesandassumedreleasefractionsspecifiedintable3.12ofNUREG1465"AccidentSourceTermsforLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant"forin-vesselseverecoredamage.TheNU)rIARCcriteriaforInitiatingConditionAG1statesinpart:"BoundaryDoseResultingfromanActual..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforeffluentmonitors,GeneralEmergency,5.2.5statesinpart:"Doseprojectionsorfieldsurveyswhich..."NUMARCspecifiestheuseofactualmeteorologyforthedoseprojections.ThelicenseeEALdidnotreflecttheuseofactualmeteorologyfordoseprojections,howeverthelicenseediscussedtherequirementforuseofactualmeteorologyinthetechnicalbases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUNCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONThesitespecificprocedureswhichmaybeutilizedtoassessareleaseEPIP2-18,"ControlRoomDoseAssessment,EPIP2-4"EmergencyDoseProjections-ManualMethod,EPIP2-5"EmergencyDoseProjections-PersonalComputerMethod,orEPIP2-6"EmergencyDoseProjections-MIDASProgramallspecifytheuseofactualmeteorology.Thereforespecificreferencetoitsuseisunnecessary.TheNUMARCexampleAG1-1states:"Avalidreading..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforeffluentmonitors,GeneralEmergency,5.1.4statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."NUMARCspecifiesthatasitespecificprocedurebeusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee'sPEGprovidedproceduresforreleaseassessmentwhichwasnotincorporatedintotheEALs.TheNUMARCnoteregardingdeclarationiftheassessmentisnotaccomplishedwithin15minuteswasnotincludedintheEALnordiscussedinthetechnicalbases.TheefQuentsetpointsforthegeneralemergencyEALarebaseduponFSARsourcetermsandaverageannualmeteorologyand,therefore,maysignificantlydifferfromtheactualreleaseconditions.Thus,escalationtoageneralemergencyduetoefHuentreleasesshouldbebaseduponanassessmentofpotentialoffsitedosesasdeterminedbyactualsourcetermandmeteorology.Theprimarypurposeoftheeffluentsetpointistotriggerthisassessment,nottoupgradetheemergencyclass.ClassificationthroughuseoftheefHuentmonitorreadingaloneisonlyexpectedwhendoseassessmentscannotbecompletedwithintherequiredtime.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMJMARCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformationonthesourceterms(s)utilizedtodeterminethevaluesintable5.1.fnrmnfnhrlThEALh1nrin1riririn1ininimiThesourcetermsutilizedtodeterminethevalueinTable5.1arethoseutilizedintheGinnadoseprojectionprocedureEPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment.TheEPIP2-18doseassessmentmethodologyusesefHuentmonitordoseconversionfactorswhichwerederivedusingNUREG-1228Table2.2fissionproductinventoriesandassumedreleasefractionsspecified R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONinTable3.12ofI%KEG1465"AccidentSourceTermsforLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant"forin-vesselseverecoredamage.Thelicensee'sEAL4.1.3,"ContainmentIntegrityStatus,"states:"Either:CIorCVIvalve(s).~."TherelationshipbetweenCIandCVIvalveswasnotexplainedinthetechnicalbasestodemonstratehowfailureofeitheronetoclosewillprovideapathwayoutsidecontainment.Thelicenseeshouldprovideinformationonthesetwosystemsandtheirinterfaces,ifany.ThelicenseeshouldprovideinformationontheentryconditionsforaLOCAtodemonstratetheseentryconditionsarecommensuratewithapotentiallossorlossoftheRCSbarrier.Thesecondargumentdoesnotprovideathresholdfortheamountofprimarysystemleakageoutsidecontainment.ThelicenseeshouldincludeathresholdthatoperatorscanutilizetoevaluatethisargumentagainsttheguidanceinNUMARC/NESP-007forlossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.ContainmentIsolation(CI)andContainmentVentilationIsolation(CVI)valvesarethosevalvesassociatedwiththeCIandCVIlogic.CIandCVIareprotectivesystemsdesignedtoclosecontainmentisolationvalvesinthosesystemswhicheithercomeintodirectcontactwithprimarypressure(CI)orthecontainmentatmosphere(CVI)andpenetratethecontainmentbarrier.ThesevalvesaredesignedtocloseunderconditionswhichareindicativeofaLOCA(anyautomaticSIsignal).FailureofoneormoreofthesevalvestoclosefollowingaconfirmedLOCAdoesnotbyitselfprovideapathwayoutsidecontainment.Aslongasonevalveinthelineisclosed,orifbothvalvesfailtoclosebutnodownstreampathwayexists,classificationunderthisEALwouldnotberequired,Thecriterion"ANDRadiologicalpathwaytotheenvironmentexists"providesthisdiscriminator.ThereisnointerfacebetweentheCIandCVIsystemsbuteachiscomprisedofdiversesystemswhichprovidethecontainmentisolationfunctionunderLOCAconditions.ThedeterminationoftheexistenceofaLOCAisconsistentwiththediagnosticactivitiesspecifiedinE-0'ReactorTriporSafetyInjection'.Thecriterion"Inabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainment"addressesanybreachoftheRCSandcontainmentwhichisnotprotectedbytheCIorCVIsystemsorwhichresultsfromaninterfacingsystemLOCA(notaddressedbyNUMARC).Noleakagethresholdisspecifiedsinceleaksoutsidecontainment,particularlyunderdynamicconditions,aredificulttoquantifyandmaymanifestthemselveswithdiversesymptoms.Symptomsofaprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentmaybeindicatedviamassbalance,decreasingRCSinventorywithoutcorrespondingcontainmentresponse,orareatemperaturesand R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONradiationlevelsoutsidecontainment.ItisforthisreasonthatShikSupervisor/EmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentisintendedtobeusedinevaluatingthiscriteria.TheNU)~Ccriteriafor"FuelCladBarrierExampleEALs"(Table4,FissionProductBarrierReferenceTable),"rii1fnistatesinpart:PIALCoreCooling-RedMB~CTable4alsostates:CoreCooling-OrangeORHeatSink-RedALERT:AnyLossorANY...ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,CSFSTstatus,1.2CoreCoolingforSAEstatesinpart:ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGThephrase"ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling,"wasinconsisteritwiththetextofNUNCTable4inthatanOrangeorRedpathforcorecoolingwasnotconsideredintheguidanceasalossorpotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier.Thebasisdocumentprovidedthefollowingjustificationforthisdeparture:"CSFSTCoreCooling-ORANGE..."TheassumptionthattheRCSbarrierislostwhenaCore-CoolingOrangeorRedpathexistswasnotadequatelyjustified.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionaljustificationtoshowthattheadditionalconservatismaffordedbyrelyingonthesingularCSFofthisEALclearlydemonstratesachallengetoboththeRCSandFuelCladbarriers,ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCcriteria.RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI43[Para.3][Subpara.51forjustificationofuseofORANGEorREDpathcorecoolingasaRCSlossindicator.UseofthisCSFasaRCSlossindicatorisnotaconservatism,butratheroneofmultipleindicationsofpotentialFuelCladandRCSbarrierlossavailabletotheuser.WhilethisCSFindicatorbyitselfrequiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency,itisnotinconsistentwithMB~C.Forexample,NUMARC/NESP-007specifiesREDpathHeatSinkasbothapotentiallossoffuelcladandRCSbarriers.EventhoughMB~C/NESP-007doesnot R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONprovideabasisforhowREDpathheatsinkrelatestoRCSbarrierpotentialloss,nonetheless,aSiteAreaEmergencyisrequiredbasedonthissingularCSF.TheNUMARCcriteriafor"FuelCladBarrierExampleEALs"(Table4.FissionProductBarrierReferenceTable),"ll"statesinpart:NotApplicableLevelLESSthan(site-specific)valueNUMARCTable4alsostates:ALERT:AnyLossorANY...ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,Category3.0,ReactorCoolantSystem,forSAE3.1.3statesinpart:"RVLIScannotbemaintained..."~lllMEIhlfthEALthhldb'*dd,thMB~CcriteriaprovidesfordeclarationofanAlertonlossofonebarrier,i.e.,whenwaterleveldropstotopofactivefuel.Thelicensee'sEALsrequiredadeclarationofaSAE.ThisinconsistencywiththeMB~Ccriteriawasnottechnicallyjustifiedinthebasesdocument.Furthermore,thelicenseetreatedreactorvessellevelasanEALreflectingReactorCoolantSystemintegrity,whereastheNUMARCcriteriautilizeslevelasafuelintegrityEAL.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionaljustificationtoshowthattheaddedconservatismaffordedbyrelyingonthesingularEALofreactorvesselwaterlevelfordeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted,ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCcriteria.AsdescribedinResponsetoGeneralRAI¹3[Para.3][Subpara.5],RCSinventoryisneverintentionallyreducedtothetopoffuel(43%RVLIS)underhotconditionsorpoweroperations.AreductioninRCSvolumeofthismagnitudeindicatesasignificantbreachoftheRCSbarriersincenointentionalvalvingconfigurationwouldresultinsuchadecrease.AnyconditionwhichresultsinaninventorylossofthismagnitudemustbeattributedtoaRCSbreachcausedbyaRCSlinebreakorunisolatedprimarysystemdischarginginexcessofmakeupcapacity.ItwouldbeextremelypoorjudgmenttoassumethatalossoftheRCSbarrierhasnotoccurredunderthiscondition.Importanttothisbasisis,forthepurposeofemergency R,E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONdeclaration,thepotentialreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironment.Inthecasewherethefuelcladisactuallyorpotentiallybreached,theassumptionthatthefissionproductswouldbecontained,evenintheabsenceofotherRCSlossindicators,withvessellevelbelowthetopoffuelisinappropriate.Asstatedabove,itrequiresasignificantRCSinventorylosstoattainthislevel.Therefore,consideringvessellevelbelowthetopoffuelalossofRCSisnotconservative,butappropriate.ItshouldalsobenotedthatvesselwaterlevelbelowthetopoffuelisconsideredaRCSbarrierlossintheBWRfissionproductbarrierEALs.ThereisnodifFerenceinthemechanismswhichcouldcausevesselleveltodropbelowthetopoffuelbetweenBWRsandPWRs.ThereisalsoaconflictwithinNUIT/NESP-007regardingvesselwaterlevel.AsstatedintheRAI,NUMARC/NESP-007wouldonlyrequiredeclarationofanAlertduetovessellevelbelowthetopoffuelbasedonfissionproductbarrierloss.ThefissionproductbarrierlossEALsonlyapplyunderpoweroperationsandhotcondition.YetsystemmalfunctionICSS5requiresdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyforvessellevelresultingincoreuncoverywhenincoldshutdownorrefuelingmodes.ThiswouldmeanthatwithoutotherRCSlossindicators,ifthevesselleveldroppedtobelowthefuelunderhotconditions,theemergencywouldhavetobeupgradedtoaSiteAreaEmergencyiftheplantachievedcoldconditions.Table4inNUIVCARC/NESP-007requiresthedeclarationofaGeneralEmergencywhenthereis:LossofANYTwoBarriersANDPotentialLossofThirdBarrierThelicensee'sEAL4.2.2,"SGTubeRupturew/SecondaryRelease,"statestheaGeneralEmergencywillbedeclaredwhen:"Releaseofsecondarysidetoatmosphere..."ThisEALprovidesindicationsoflossofthefuelcladbarrierandlossofthecontainmentbarrier.Thelicensee'suseof0.1gpmprimarytosecondaryleakageasanindicationofapotentiallossoftheRCSbarrierwasnotadequatelyjustified.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionalinformationthatdemonstratestheadequacyofthisthresholdforpotentiallossoftheRCSorrevisetheEALtobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCguidance.Thini1rh~rr~~Theconditionsreferencedbythisjustificationrepresentalossof'CSinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentandthuswererevisedto R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONreflectaSiteAreaEmergency.EALsderivedfromcombinationsofunisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureincombinationwithanyfuelcladloss/potentiallossindicatorsresultinaGeneralEmergency.TheNUMARCcriteriafor"ContainmentBarrierExampleEALs"(Table4,FissionProductBarrierReferenceTable),"ri~~statesinpart:8NotapplicableNUMARCTable4alsostates:Containment-RedUNUSUALEVE%X:ANYLossorANYPotentialLossofContainment"ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,CSFSTstatus,1.5ContainmentforGEstatesinpart:"REDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENT"Thebasesdocumentstatesinpart:"CSFSTContainment-REDpathisentered..."Section3.9oftheNUMARCdiscussionconcerningEmergencyActionLevelsstatesinpart:"ItreasonablyfollowsthatifanyCSFentersaRED..."However,thelicenseestatedinthebasisdocument,itisnotpossibletoreachthatconditionwithoutotherindicators.ClassificationsbasedupontheNUMARCguidancearenotmadebaseduponsoleindicatorssuchas"CSFSTContainment-RED,"butratheracombinationofindicators.Therefore,thelicenseeshouldprovideadditionaljusti6cationtoshowthattheaddedconservatismafFordedbyrelyingonthesingularCSFofthisEALfordeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyiswarranted,ormodifytheEALschemetoconsistencywiththeNUM%BCcriteria.ThiscommentalsoappliestoEAL4.3.1,"CombustibleGasConcentration."RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI03[Para.3][Subpara.2].ItwouldbeinappropriatenottodeclareaGeneralEmergencybasedonavalidindicationofcontainmentpressureinexcessof60psigresultingfromalossofreactorcoolant,regardlessoftheavailabilityofotherfuelcladandRCSbarrierlossEALs.ItisunderstoodthatifotherapplicablefuelcladandRCSbarrierloss R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONindicatorsareavailable,theywouldservetoconfirmtheirrespectivebarrierlosses.ButMQ~C/NESP-007doesnotrequireconfirmationbymultiplebarrierlossindicatorsforasinglebarrier.Thatis,anyonevalidbarrierlossindicatorissufBcienttoconsiderthatbarrierlost.ThebasissupportingdeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyuponentryintoREDpathcontainmentisthatitisindicativeoflossofbothfuelcladandRCSwithpotentiallossofcontainment.Theonlysourceofsignificanthydrogenconcentrationincontainmentisseverefueldamageresulting&ommetal-waterreactionandsubsequentdischargeintothecontainmentatmosphere.Acontainmenthydrogenconcentrationof4%correspondstoatleast25%metal-waterreaction(Figure3EPIP2-16"CoreDamageEstimation")andis'ellintothepossibleuncoolablecoregeometryregion(FigureB-10NUREG/BR-0150,Vol.1,Rev.2).FailuretodeclareaGeneralEmergency,basedonavalidindication,undertheseconditionsisinappropriate.Thelicensee'sPEGbasesforRCSLeakRate,RCS2.2statesinpart:"...twochargingpumpsarerequiredfornormalliquidinventorycontrol."ThePEGbasesforSGTubeRupture,RCS3.2statesinpart:"...onechargingpumpisrequiredfornormalinventorycontrol."ThelicenseeshouldcorrecttheinconsistencyandassurethatanydeviationfromNUIKARCcriteriaof'exceedingthecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmodearetechnicallyjustified.Th2nrnin'Ginna,bydesign,normallyhastwochargingpumpsrunning.ThespecifiedleakrateisthecapacityofonechargingpumpasspecifiedbyNUNARC/NESP-007sincebothpumpsarerequiredtomaintainnormalCVCSoperation.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONThelicenseeusedTable4.1,FuelCladLossIndicators,andTable4.2,FuelClad.DamageIndicators,intheEALsasfollows:Table4.1FuelCladLossIndicators1.Coolantactivity...Table4.2FuelCladDamageIndicatorsORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,..~COdtdddtddSRII'I't,IISAR,IIemergency4.1.4referredtoTable4.1asfuelclad"loss"indicators;generalemergency,4.1.5referredtoTable4.2asfuelclad"damage"indicators.Nodistinctionbetween"loss"and"damage"usedintheEALtabletitleswasmade.Thelicenseeshouldclarifythedifferencebetweenfuelcladlossandfuelcladdamage.Table4.1identifiesfuelcladlossindicatorsforuseincombinationwiththeRSSIdttt'~idlt("SKIS'tlsignalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainmentheatremovalequipment").Table4.2includesfuelcladlossandpotentiallossindicatorsforuseincombinationwithRCS~andcontainment~indicators.Ehlinh1l'nirlinin'hhfiinrrrirmrixTheterm"fuelcladdamageindicators"wasusedtorepresentbothfuelcladlossandpotentiallossindictors,Theterm'fuelcladlossindicators"wasusedtorepresentfuelcladlossindicatorsonly.TheNUMARCcriteriaforFuelCladandRCSBarrierExampleEALsutilizingContainmentRadiationMonitoringastheEALthresholdsstateinpart""FUELCLADBARRIEREXAMPLEEALs...".~.TheequivalentR.E.GinnaEALs(Category2.0,ReactorFuel)stateinpart:"2.3ContainmentRadiation...""2.3.1Alert...""2.3.2SiteAreaEmergency..."

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION"2.3.2GeneralEmergency..."TherewerenoequivalentCategory3.0ReactorCoolantSystemEALs.However,thePEGfortheRCSBarrierEALs(RCS4.1)utilizingContainmentRadiationMonitoringastheEALthresholdstatesinpart:"Containmentradiationmonitoring..."ThePEGBasesinformationaccompanyingtheEALstatesinpart;"The~1f~rreadingisa..."TheTechnicalBasisinformationforCategory2.0ReactorFuel,EAL2.3.1,statesinpart:"The10R/hrreadingisavalue..."Noadditionaljustificationinformationwasincludedineitherofthebases'informationastowhyaRCSleakEALwasincludedintheReactorFuelcategory,andomittedfromtheReactorCoolantSystemcategory.ThelicenseeshouldincludetheNUMARCcriteriafordiscerningreactorcoolantsystemleaksutilizingcontainmentradiationmonitoringorprovidejustificationforomittingitfromtheRCScategory.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidethesitespecificanalysesforcalculatingthesecontainmentradiationmonitorsetpoints.AsdiscussedinResponsetoGeneralRAIC3[Para.3][Subpara.2],theGinnaEALpresentationmethodplacessimilarEALsintocategoriesandsubcategoriesthatfocustheuser'sattentiontothespecificEALthresholdthatcorrespondstotheplantconditionofconcern.Thisprovidesalogicalclassificationandescalationpathofrelatedindicatorsandthusallowsforrapidassessmentofemergencyconditionsassociatedwithfissionproductbarrierloss.ItisimportanttonotethattheGinnaEALcategoriesandsubcategoriesarenotrepresentationsorabbreviationsoftheNUNARC/NESP-007ICs.Rather,eachGinnacategoryandassociatedsubcategoryisapathwayfrombroadindicatorsofpotentialemergencyeventstoasetofspecificthresholdconditionsthatrequireemergencyclassification.rhn1il'lfiinnnnhrrnThevaluesforEALs2.3.1,2.3.2and2.3.3werederivedfromtheR-29/R-30"DoseRateversusTimeAfterShutdown"curves,Attachment10toEPIP2-16 R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION"CoreDamageEstimation."Thesecurvesaretakenfrom"TechnologyforEnergyReportNo.R-81-012."EAL2.3.1:Usingthe100%coolantreleaseline,thecorrespondingdoserateisapproximately10R/hrat1houraftershutdown.Thisvaluewasalsoselectedbecauseofit'soperationalsignificance,entryintoFR-Z.3"ResponsetoHighContainmentRadiationLevel"EALs2.3.2and2.3.3:UsingtheRG1.25100%gapreleaselineand4hoursaftershutdown,thecorrespondingdoserateisapproximately5000R/hr.TheEAL2.3.3valueof1000Rfhrrepresents20%ofthe100%value.TheEAL2.3.2valueof100R/hrrepresents2%ofthe100%value.Fourhoursaftershutdownwasconservativelyassumedsinceactualcontainmentsamplesresultswouldlikelybeavailabletoassesscoredamagewithinthistimeframe.Also,therateofdecayofcontainmentdoserateswithtimebeyondfourhoursisminimal.TheMB~CcriteriaforContainmentBarrierExampleEALsutilizingContainmentRadiationMonitoringastheEALthresholdsstate:CONTAINMENTBARRIEREXAMPLEEALsiiniTheequivalentR.E.GinnaEALs(category2.0,ReactorFuel)stated:"2.3ContainmentRadiation..."TherewerenoequivalentCategory4.0ContainmentEALs.However,thePEGfortheContainmentBarrierEALs(PC5.1)utilizingContainmentRadiationMonitoringastheEALthresholdstated:"Containmentradiationmonitoring..."ThePEGandTechnicalBasesinformationaccompanyingthisEALstated:"The~i~Qgreadingisavalue..."Section3.8oftheIGBdARCdiscussionconcerningEmergencyClassThresholdsaddressedthesubjectofsignificantradioactiveinventorywithincontainmentisnotpossibleunlessamajorfuelcladdingfailurehasoccurred.ThusitispossibletoconsideracceptinganEALthatisinconsistentwith'able4(i.e.,aGEvs.UE)forthesamerationaleasinComment¹9.Thatis,suchanEALisconservativelyanticipatorysincethecontainmentwithlargeradioactiveinventoryis"...anextremechallengetoaplantfunctionnecessary R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevels'ESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONfortheprotectionofthepublic..."However,asthelicenseestatedinthebasisdocument,itisnotpossibletoreachthisconditionwithoutotherindicators.ClassificationsbasedontheNUMARCguidancearenotmadebaseduponsoleindicatorssuchasContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>1000H/hr,butratheracombinationofindicators.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionaljustificationtoshowthattheaddedconservatismaffordedbyrelyingonthesingularradiationmonitorreadingofthisEALfordeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyiswarranted,ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCcriteria.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidethesitespecificanalysesusedtodeterminethecontainmentradiationmonitorsetpoints.RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI¹14.Thevalueof1000H/hr,whichisindicativeofsignificantradioactiveinventoryincontainment(20%claddamage),boundsthevaluesofboththeRCSloss(10H/hr)andthefuelcladloss(100H/hr)EALs.ExceedingthisvaluerequiresdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.MB~C/NESP-007doesnotspecifythatmultiplefissionproductbarrierlossindicatorsmustbepresenttoconsiderthatbarrierlost.Thelogictermusedbetweeneachfissionproductbarrierloss/potentiallossindicatorinTable4is"OR".Thismeansthatanyoneindicatorissuf6cienttoconsiderthebarrierlostorpotentiallylost.Furthermore,NUMARC/NESP-007doesnotstatethatthesameindicatorshouldnotbeusedtoindicatethelossofmorethanonefissionproductbarrier.NUINARC/NESP-007alsostatesinpart:"5.SignifzcantRadioactiveInventoryinContainment""The(site-specijic)readingisavaluewhichindicatessignif'scantfueldamagewellinexcessoftheEAIsassociatedwithbothlossofFuelCladandlossofRCSbarriers.Asst'atedinSection3.8,amqjorreleaseofradioactivityrequiringoffsiteprotectiveactionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamqjorfailureoffuelcladdingallowsradioactive'aterialtobereleasedfromthecoreintothereactorcoolant.Regardlessofwhethercontainmentischallenged,thisamountofactivityincontainment,ifreleased,couldhavesuchsevereconsequencesthatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotentiallossofcontainment,suchthataGeneralEmergencydeclarationiswarranted..~."Itisalsoimportanttonotethatitisnotexpectedthatemergencyclassification'wouldbebasedoncontainmentradiationalone.Providedthatotherindicatorsareavailable,classificationwouldbeconfirmedbythoseredundantindicators.But,intheeventofasevereaccident,manyoftheotherindicatorsofmultiplefissionproductbarrierlossmaynotbeavailable.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTherefore,itwouldbeappropriatetorelyonthissingleindicatorsinceitisindicativeofmultiplefissionproductbarrierloss/potentialloss.TheNUMARCexampleforSU4-1states:(site-specific)radiationmonitor..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALsunder2.1.1,"CoolantActivity,"and2.2.1,"FailedFuelDetectors"state:"Coolantsampleactivity..."Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditionalinformationtojustifythe~logicinthesecondargumentofEAL2.1.1.ThelicenseeshouldalsodemonstratehowEAL2.2.1isequivalenttoEAL2.1.1.GinnaTechnicalSpecification3.1.4.1forcoolantactivityspecifiestwolimits.Thefirstlimitisspecifiedas84/E-barpCi/cctotalspecificactivity.Thesecondlimitisdefinedas>0.2p,Ci/ccI-131equivalentandtheconditionsofsection3.1.4.3bareexceeded.Section3.1.4.3.ballowscontinuedoperationunderthisconditionforupto168hoursprovidedtheI-131equivalentactivityisbelowthelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1.TheFigure3.1.4-1activitylimitisafunctionofratedthermalpower.EAL2.2.1specifiesaLetdownmonitorR-9readingof>2R/hr.EPIP2-16"CoreDamageAssessment"Section6.2.1specifiesthatthisvaluecorrespondsto1%fuelrodcladdingdefects.TheGinnaTechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.4coolantactivitybasisstatesinpart:"Thetotalactivitylimitfortheprimarysystemcorrespondstooperationwiththeplantdesignbasisof1%fueldefects."(FSARTable9.2-5).NUMARCICSS5,"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel,"providesthefollowingexampleEALfordeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency:LossofReactorVessel..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALunder2.4.3,"RefuelingaccidentsorOtherRadiationMonitors,"states,foranAlert:"Reportofvisual..."Thelicensee'stechnicalbasisforthisEALspecificallyincludesdeclarationsforfueluncoveryinthereactorvessel.ThisdeviationfromNUMARCwas R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevels"RESPONSETO.REQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONnotjustified.ThelicenseealsodidnotincludetheanticipatorywordingofMBrIARCwhichrequiresdeclarationwhenindicatorsshowthatthefuelwillbeuncovered.ThelicenseeshouldprovidejustificationforthesedeviationsorrevisetheEALtobeconsistentwiththeNUMARCguidance.EAL2.4.3isnottheequivalentofNUMARCICSS5.ThetechnicalbasisINIttttNEALId'dNEINAECIEAA22.ENN111inrrviTheEALderivedfromMJMARCICSS5is3.1.3"RVLIScannotbemaintained>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorv'esselisdroppinginanuncontrolledmannerandcoreuncoveryislikely."ThisEALprovidestheanticipatorywordingofNUMARCICSS5.Theterm"cannotbemaintained"isdefinedinthedefinitionsectionofthetechnicalbases:"Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s)..."ThemodeapplicabilitywasexpandedtoALLinconsiderationfortheinclusionofwaterlevelbelowtopoffuelasanRCSpotentiallossindicator(refertoResponsetoSpecificRAI49).TheNUMARCexamplesAA2-3andAA2-4werenotaddressedinthelicensee'sclassificationscheme.TheseexampleEALsstate:"Waterlevellessthan..."Thelicenseeshouldincludesite-specificEALfortheseexamplesorprovidetechnicaljustificationfortheiromission.AsstatedinthebasisforICAA2intheGinnaPEG:"Thereisnoindicationthatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolorrefuelingcavityhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservation.SinceAA2.2addressesvisualobservationoffueluncovery,EALAA2.3isunnecessary.Sincethereisnolevelindicatingsysteminthefueltransfercanal,visualobservationoflossofwaterlevelwouldalsoberequired,EALAA2.4isunnecessary."Therefore,EAL2.4.3addressestheconcernsoftheseexampleEALs.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNUMARCexampleforSU1-1states:"Thefollowingconditionsexist,"Thelicensee'sequivalentEALforLossofACPowerSources,UnusualEvent.6.1.1stated:"Lossofabilitytosupply..."TheNUMARCcriteriaspecificallyrequiresasitespecificminimumemergencygeneratorsupplytotheemergencybusses.ThelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificminimumemergencygeneratorelectricalsupplytotheemergencybusesintheEAL.ThePEGspecifiedthatbothemergencydieselgeneratorsarecapableofsupplyingpowertothesafeguardbuses.TheNUMARCcriteriarequiresthatemergencygeneratorsareactuallysupplyingpower.ThelicenseeshouldprovideadditionaljustificationforthedeviationfromtheNUINARCcriteriaorrevisethatEALtoachieveconsistency.Thestatement"Atleast(site-specific)emergencygeneratoraresupplyingpowertoemergencybuses"servesnopurpose.ThisEALisconcernedonlywiththelossofoff-siteACpowercapability.IfoneoftheemergencydieselsisnotsupplyingitsemergencybusunderhotconditionsthenanAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL6.1.3(SA5).NUMARCprovidesnocriteriafortheconditioninwhichoffsiteACpowercapabilityislostandoneemergencydieselgeneratorisnotsupplyingit'semergencybusundercoldconditions.Ifneitheremergencydieselsaresupplyingtheiremergencybusses,eitheranAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL6.1.2oraSAEbasedonEAL6.1.4,dependingonplantoperatingmode.TheNUMARCexampleSU7-1states:"1.Eitherofthefollowingconditions..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforlossofDCpower,UnusualEvent,6.2.1stated:"<105vdcbusvoltage..."TheMBrIARCcriteriaspecifiesthatthelossofDCvoltageisunplanned.ThisEALappliestocoldshutdownandrefueling,andplannedworkthatde-energizestheDCbusesshouldnottriggeradeclaration.4ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNU)rIARCcriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONBothDCbuseswouldneverbede-energizedforanyplannedactivityunlessthereactorwasdefueled.TheNU1NARCexampleSA1-1states:"1.Thefollowingconditionsexist:..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforLossofACPowerSources,Alert,6.1.2stated."Lossofallsafeguardsbus..."TheNUIKARCcriteriaspecifiesasitespecificlistoftransformersandgenerators.ThelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificlistinthisEAL,butdidspecifythesitespecificpowerrequirementsinthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMB~Ccriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.TheconcernofNUMARCICSA1andthisEAListhelossofabilitytoprovideACpowertothesafeguardsbussesandtheirvitalloads.Aconditioncanexistwherethesupplytransformersand/oremergencydieselgeneratorsareavailablebutafaultonthebusprecludespoweringvitalloads.ThereforeitismoreappropriateandinclusivetodefinetheEALbytheinabilitytopowerthesafeguardsbusesratherthanthelossofthepowersources.TheMB~CexampleSA2-1states:(Site-specific)indication(s)existthatindicate..."LicenseeequivalentInitiatingConditioninthePEGstated:"SA2FailureofReactorProtection..."ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,CSFSTstatus,1.1.1Alertstated:"ORANGEorREDpathF-O.l..."ThelicenseeInitiatingConditionandEALdeviatedfromtheNUMARCcriteria.NUINARCbasestheAlertonthefailureoftheautomaticprotectionsystemtorespondtotheestablishedsetpoint.Thelicenseeaddedtheadditional,inappropriateconditionthatamanualscramwasalsoineffective,whichshouldescalatetheeventtoaSAE.Thelicensee'stechnicalbasis R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONstates,ThisEALaddressesanymanualtriporautomatictripsignalfollowedbymanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentrequiringemergencyboration.ThelicenseeidentifiedthisdifFerenceasadeviationinthePEGbutdidnotprovidejustificationforthedeviationinthetechnicalbases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethatEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMiARCcriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.ForadditionalguidanceonthisICthelicenseeshouldreferencethe"QuestionsandAnswers"onNUMARC/NESP-007,publishedinJune1993.AsstatedinthePEG:"ThisICandresultingEALhavebeenspecificallymodifiedtomoreaccuratelydefinetheconditiondescribedbythegenericbasesasappliedtopressurizedwaterreactors.ThefailureofautomaticinitiationofareactortripfollowedbysuccessfulmanualinitiationactionswhichcanberapidlytakenatthereactorcontrolconsoledoesnotposeapotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSboundaries.ItisthecontinuedcriticalityunderconditionsrequiringareactorscramwhichposesthepotentialthreattoRSCorfuelcladintegrity.IfanORANGEpathexistsonF-0.1,CRITICALITYafterimmediateattemptstotripthereactorhavebeentaken,therehasbeenafailuretoshutdownthereactor,butwithoutsubstantialheatgeneration.IfaREDpathexistsonF-0.1,CRITICALITYaRerimmediateattemptstotripthereactorhavebeentaken,therehasbeenafailuretoshutdownthereactor,withsubstantialheatgeneration.Eitheroftheseconditionsmayrepresentapotentiallossofthefuelcladboundary,andthuswarrantadeclarationofALERT.Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s)atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical(e.g.,reactortripbutton).Itisimportanttonotethatthefailureofthereactorprotectionsystemtoinitiateanautomatictripdoesnotinferactualorpotentialfailuresofothersystemsnorisit,inandofitself,aprecursortofissionproductbarrierdegradation.TheRPSservesnoothersafetyfunctionbuttoinitiatereactortrips.Therefore,oncethereactorhasbeensuccessfullytripped,failuresintheRPSsystemcanhavenoplantsafetyimpact.Ifimmediatemanualactionstotripthereactoraresuccessfulfollowingrecognitionofanautomatictripfailure,thereisnothreattoeitherplantsafetyorfissionproductbarrierintegrityrelatedtotheautomatictripfailure.Thisdeviationisconsistentwiththephilosophyofmakingaccuratevs.conservativeclassifications."ItisalsoimportanttonotetheresponsetoNUMARC/NESP-007"Questions&Answers"Generalquestion09:Q:If,aRerthefact,itisdiscoveredthataneventhasoccurredthatcausedanEALtobereachedwithoutadverseconsequences,shouldaclassificationdeclarationbemade?A:Ifanemergencyconditionnolongerexists,thereisnoreasontodeclareanemergency.TheNRCshallbenotifiedakerdiscoverywithin1hour,meeting10CFR50.72reportingcriteria...."

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNlB/IARCEALSA2,aswritten,wouldnothavetobedeclared,basedonthiscriteria,absentexceedinganotherfuelcladorRCSbarrierbreachEAL.GiventhattheNUMARC/NESP-007EALSA2representsneitherfissionproductbarrierlossorpotentiallossnorinvolveactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,itisinappropriate=todeclareanAlertclassification.TheNURLARCexampleSA3-1states:"1.Thefollowingconditionsexist..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforsystemfailures,Alert,7.2.4stated:"Reactorcoolanttemperature.~."ThelicenseeEALdidnotincludetherequiredtechnicalspecificationfunctionstomaintaincoldshutdownanddidnotincludetheanticipatoryphilosophyrelatedtoanuncontrolledtemperaturerise.ThelicenseejustifiedtheomissionoftheseattributesintheTechnicalBasisdocumentwiththestatement:"Areactorcoolant..."Withouttheanticipatorydeclarationthatwouldoccurwiththelossofshutdownfunctionsoruncontrolledriseintemperature,theEALisinadequate.Therefore,thelicenseeshouldmodifytheEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteria,orprovideadditionaljustificationforthedeviation.TheGinnaTechnicalSpecificationsdonotspecifyrequiredfunctionstomaintaincoldshutdown.EAL7.2.4isderivedfromICSA3whichstates:"InabilitytoMaintainPlantinColdShutdown."Theanticipatorycriteriaisprovidedintheuseoftheterm"cannotbemaintained."ThedefinitionsectionoftheTechnicalBasesDocumentdefinesthetermasfollows:"Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Neitherimpliesthattheparametermustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached."NUMARC/NESP-007"QuestionsandAnswers"publishedinJune1993definestheterm'function's:"Theactionwhichasystem,subsystemorcomponentisdesignedtoperform."Theevaluationofbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance(function)isinherentinthisdefinitionof"cannotbemaintained.",

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheMBrfARCexampleSS1-1states:"1LossofalloffsiteandonsiteAC..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforLossofACPowerSources,SAE,6.1.4stated:"Lossofallsafeguards..."TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifiesasitespecificlistoftransformersandgenerators.Thelicenseeomittedasitespecificlistoftransformersandgenerators.ThelicenseeomittedasitespecificlistintheEAL,butdidspecifythesitespecificpowerrequirementsinthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNIJMARCcriteriaorprovidejustificationforthedeviation.RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI021TheNUMARCexampleSS2-1states:"1.(Site-specific)indicationexistthat..."ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,CSFSTstatus,1.1.2stated:"REDpathF-0.1..."TheSubcriticalityRedPathisenteredbaseduponfailureofpowerrangeindicationtodecreasebelow5%followingareactortrip.ThisconditionbyitselfwouldbeanadequateEALexceptthelicenseehasaddedotherconditionsthatwereinconsistentwiththeNUMARCcriteria.Therefore,thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMB~Ccriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.AsstatedinthePEG:"CSFSTSubcriticality-REDpathisenteredbasedonfailureofpowerrangeindicationtodecreasebelow5%followingareactortrip.ThisportionoftheEALaddressesanymanualtriporautomatictripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentthatthereactorisproducingmoreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.Thisconditionindicatesfailureofboththeautomaticandmanualprotectionsystemstotripthereactorinconjunctionwithafailureofalternateborationsystemstoreducereactorpowerbelowdecayheatlevels.Thecombinationoffailureofbothfrontlineandbackupprotectionsystemstofunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient,alongwiththecontinuedproductionofheatposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCS

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONintegrityandthuswarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.15minutesisspecifiedtoallowtimeforemergencyborationtobeeffectiveandprovidesadiscriminatorbetweenSA2.1andSS2.1.Theclassificationshouldbemadeassoonasitisapparentthatemergencyborationisnotorwillnotbeeffectiveinreducingreactorpowerbelow5%."Itisthefailureofbothprimaryandbackupmeansofreactorshutdownsystemswhichrepresentsaneventwhichinvolvesactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctionsneededfortheprotectionofthepublic.TheNUMARCexampleforSS4-1states:"1.Completelossofany..."ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,RCSLeakage1.3.1,forSAEstated:"REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK"TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifiescompletelossoffunctionsrequiredforhotshutdown,includingtheultimateheatsinkandreactivitycontrol.ThelicenseeEALdidnotaddressthelossoffunctionsrequiredforhotshutdown.EntryintoCSFSTRedPathdidnotprovidetheanticipatorydeclarationthatlossoffunctionswould.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeIAJMARCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.ThelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformationontheirdispositionofthefunctionofcorecoolinginrelationtothisIC.GinnaTechnicalSpecificationsSection1.2defineshotshutdownas:ReactivityLQdk%5-1andTavg2540'F.Sincethehotshutdownmodehasnoupperdefininglimitforcoolanttemperature,theabilitytoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownisonlyafunctionofreactivitycontrol.EAL1.1.2addresseslossofreactivitycontrol.TheNUMARC/NESP-007basisforSS4,whilenotsupportingtheICorexampleEAL,doesstatethattheEALisintendedaddresseslossoffunctions,includingultimateheatsink.Noreferencetocorecoolingismade.'However,EAL1.2.1andEAL3.1.3provideforthedeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyunderconditionswhichlossoffunctionsthreatencorecooling.ItisalsoimportanttodiQerentiatebetweenfunctionandoperabilityofcomponentsorequipmentwhichsupportafunction.IAB~C/NESP-007"QuestionsandAnswers"publishedinJune1993defines'function's:"Theactionwhichasystem,subsystemorcomponentis,designedtoperform.Safetyfunctions,asappliedtoPWRsarereactivitycontrol,RCSinventorycontrolandsecondaryheatremoval."MBrIARC/NESP-007Section3.9states"TherearediverseandredundantplantsystemstosupporteachCSF.BymonitoringtheCSFsinsteadoftheindividualsystemcomponentstatus,theimpactofmultipleeventsis R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONinherentlyaddressed,e.g.,thenumberofoperablecomponentsavailabletomaintainthefunction."Sinceitwouldbeimpossibletodefineallpossiblelossesofsystemcomponentoperabilityunderwhichlossoffunctionmayoccur,consistentwithSection3.9ofNUNARC/NESP-007,thelossoffunctionisdefinedbyCSFstatus.Forsecondaryheatremoval,thatCSFisREDpathheatsink.ThThnilnr'221nlTheNUMARCexampleSS5-1states:"OPERABILITYMODEAPPLICABILITY:ColdShutdown..."ThelicenseeequivalentEAL,RCSLeakage3.1.3forSAEstated:"RVLIScannotbemaintained..."TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifiesevaluationofdecayheatremovalforthiseventsincethecriteriaappliesfortheshutdowncondition.ThelicenseedidnotincludethiscriteriaintheEALsincetheEALwasintendedtoapplytoalloperatingmodes.However,theEALwasself-contradictoryinthemodeapplicabilitycannotbeALL...Withthereactorvesselheadremoved.Therefore,thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUNCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.TheMB~CICfromwhichEAL3.1.3isderivedisNUMARCICSS5:"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel."TherearenumerousconditionswhichcanleadtoalossofRCSinventorytotheextentresultingincoreuncoverywhileincoldshutdownorrefuelmodes.TheoneaddressedinthegenericbasesforPWRsis"sequencessuchasprolongedboilingfollowinglossofdecayheatremoval."Lossofinventorycanalsooccurasaresultofdraindownevents.TheconcernofthisICandEALisuncoveryofthefuel,regardlessofthecause.Thereforethecriteriaregardinglossofdecayheatremovalservesnofunction.TheEALwordingprovidesfortheanticipatorycriteria.ThemodeapplicabilitywasexpandedtoincludetheinabilitytomaintainRVLISabovetopoffuelconsistentwithuseofRVLISlevelasaRCSbarrierlossindicator.RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI49.TheEALdoesnotimplythatthereactorvesselheadcanberemovedwhileinhotcondition.Sincethisconfigurationwouldneveroccurunderhotconditions,thatportionoftheEALbasedonvisualobservationwouldnotapplyorbeevaluated.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNI.JMARCexampleSS6-1states:"1.Thefollowingconditionsexist:..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforEquipmentFailures,SAE,7.3.4stated:"Lossofannunciatorsorindications..."TheNUMARCcriteriaspeci6esthatCompensatorynon-alarmingindicationsareunavailable.AlthoughthePEGreflecteda"modified"EALof~PA'IAl,tl'pecificitywaslostinthetranslationtotheTechnicalBasesandtheEALCategories.(Baseduponlimitedinformationavailable,thereviewerhadtoassumethePPCSandSASwerenotlocatedonthepanelsofTable7.3).Nojustificationwasprovidedinthetechnicalbasesfortheomission.Therefore,thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.Items(b.)and(c.)ofthisEALintheGinnaPEGwerecombinedintoasinglestatement"Completelossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatus."AsstatedintheRAI,PPCSandSASarecompensatorynon-alarmingindications.Ifeitherofthesesourcesarefunctional,criticalsafetyfunctionmonitoringisavailable.TheNUMARCexampleSG1-1states:"Prolongedlossofalloffsiteandonsite..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforLossofACPowerSources,GE,6.1.5stated:"LossofallsafeguardbusAC..."NUMARCemploysthewordingthatRestoration......isNOTlikely.Thelicenseeusedthewording"Powercannotberestored...".TheNUMAHC"notlikely"impliesthatassoonasitisknownthatpowerwillnotberestoredthethresholdhasbeenexceeded,whereasthelicensee"cannot":impliesthatpowerrestorationmustbea"known"quantitybeforealicenseedeclaration.TheNUlrfARCintentisthattheconditionismetassoonasitisknownthatpowerrestorationisnotlikelywithinthespeci6ctimelimit.Further,the'icenseedidnotemploytheconceptofIMMINENTreferredtoinNUII~CTable4anddiscussedintheNUINARCbasedinformationforthisInitiatingCondition.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNU1KARCcriteriaspecifiesasitespecificlistoftransformersandgenerators.ThelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificlistinthisEALalthoughsitespecificpowerrequirementswerespecifiedinthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustification.-forthedeviation.~Q]ffrwr~44TheconcernofNUITICSG1andthisEAListhelossofabilitytoprovideACpowertothesafeguardsbusesandtheirvitalloads.Aconditioncanexistwherethesupplytransformersand/oremergencydieselgeneratorsareavailablebutafaultonthebusprecludespoweringvitalloads.ThereforeitismoreappropriateandinclusivetodefinetheEALbytheinabilitytopowerthesafeguardsbusesratherthanthelossofthepowersourcesTheNUMARCexamplesSG2-1and-2state:"1.(Site-specific)indicationsexistthatautomatic..."TheequivalentlicenseeEALwasfoundinCategory1.0,CSFSTStatus,1.3.2GeneralEmergency,whichstated:"REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK.."TheNUINARClogicofcorecoolingORheatremovalwasomittedfromthelicenseesEALs(andtheTechnicalBasesDocument)notwithstandingthatthelogicwasincludedinthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMJMARCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.2h R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNUMARCexampleHU1-3states:"Assessmentbythecontrolroom.~."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforHazards,UnusualEvent,8.4.3stated:"AssessmentbyControlRoompersonnel.~."TheNUMARCcriteriaisunrestrictedwiththemodifyingverbiage"precludingaccesstoaplantvitalarea,Table8.3."Thelicenseerestrictsthedeclarationtonaturaleventsthatprecludeaccesstovitalareaswithoutjustificationinthetechnicalbases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeIAJMARCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationin'thetechnicalbases.EAL4TheNtB~CexampleHU4-1and-2states:"1.Bombdevicediscoveredwithinplant..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforhazards,UnusualEvent,8.1.1stated:"Bombdeviceorother..."TheNUINAHCcriteriasuggeststhatothersecurityeventswhichmaypotentiallyimpactplantsafetyshouldbethesubjectofadeclaration,howevertheadditionalEALwasomittedfromthelicensee'sEALcategory.TheTechnicalBasesDocumentstated,"ThisEALisbasedontheREGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresentatleastapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantarereportedunder10CFR73.71orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72"Aswritten,theEALdidnotpermitanemergencydeclarationforothersecurityeventsthatmugrepresentapotentialdegradationofsafetywhichisinconsistentwiththeMJMARCcriteria.ThisdiscussionisalsoapplicabletotheAlertandSAEEALsbutwillnotberepeated.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUNCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATION11inEALh1li1fiTheIKJNIARCexampleHA1-3states:"3.Reportofanyvisiblestructural..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforHazards,Alert,8.4.7stated:"AssessmentbyControlRoompersonnelthat..."TheNUMARCcriteriadoesnotlimitthethresholdofdeclarationto"resultedindamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation."TheintentoftheNARCEAListhatifvisiblestructuraldamagehasoccurredtothebuilding,theeventwassignificantandhasahighpotentialfordamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation.Thelicensee'sTechnicalBasesdocumentrecognizedthispotentialwiththefollowing."ThisEALaddresseseventsthat..."However,thisrecognitiondidnotcarrythroughtotheplantEAL.Anticipatingtheggfg<igldamage,thedeclarationshouldbemadebaseduponvisiblestructuraldamage,not"Assessment....damagetoequipmentneeded...safeplantoperation."ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeMJMARCcriteria,orprovideadequatejustificationforthedeviation.4n'hin1nrTheNUIMAHCexampleHA2-1states:Thefollowingconditionexists:~.."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforHazards,Alert,8.2.2stated:"Fireorexplosioninanyplantarea,..."

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNUlVfARCcriteriaincludestheconditionthat"Affectedsystemparameterindicationsshowdegradedperformance."ThelicenseeEALdidnotclearlyconveythisNU)~Ccriteria.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteriaortechnicallyjustifythedeviation.22TheNUMARCexamplesHA3-1and2state:"1.Reportordetectionoftoxicgases.~."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforHazards,Alert,8.3.5stated:"Reportordetectionoftoxic..."Thelicenseedidnotprovideorreferencemeasurablecriteriatotheemergencydirectorforestablishingconcentrationsthataffectsafeoperationoftheplant.Withoutsuchinformationreadilyavailable,classificationwouldbedifBcult.Thelicenseeshouldprovidemeasurablecriteriatotheclassifiertodeterminewhenlifethreateningandflammableconcentrationthresholdshavebeenexceeded.Toxicorflammablegasesdonotinthemselvesposeanythreattothesafeoperationoftheplantbutmayprecludeaccesstoareasnecessaryforsafeoperationoftheplant.ThereforetheconcernofthisEALareconcentrationswhichareeitherlifethreateningorprecludeaccesstoareasneededforsafeplantoperation.Nospecificthresholdshavebeendefinedsincespecificthresholdsaredependentuponthetypeoftoxicorflammablegasinvolvedaswellastheamountandtypeofpersonalprotectiveequipmentavailabletothoseindividualsrequiringaccess.Therefore,thedeterminationastowhetherconcentrationsaresuQicienttobelifethreateningorprecludeaccesstoareasrequiredforsafeoperationisleRtothejudgmentoftheuser.Wherespecificcriteriaareavailabletotheuseritisexpectedthatcriteriawouldbeconsideredinthisevaluation.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONTheNUMARCexampleHA5-1states:"Entryinto(site-specific)procedure..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforEquipmentFailures,Alert,7.2.3stated:"ControlRoomevacuation"TheMB~Ccriteriaspecificallyinitiatesthedeclarationatthetimeofentryintothecontrolroomevacuationprocedure.Thelicensee'sEALwasnotspecificaboutthetimeofdeclarationanddidnotidentifytheprocedureuponwhichdeclarationwouldbebased.ThelicenseeshouldrevisetheEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.TheNUNCexampleHS2-1states:"1.Thefollowingconditionsexist:..."TheNUlNARCBasisinformationgoesontostate:"(Site-specific)timefortransferbased.~."TheequivalentlicenseeEAL,7.2.5,SAEstated:"ControlRoomevacuation..."ThelicenseeTechnicalBasesDocumentstated:"Thetimeintervalfortransferisbased..."Ifthereviewerunderstandsthelicensee'sbasisinformationcorrectly,thebasisinformationstatesthatunderworstcaseconditionsitcouldtakeupto20minutestoregaincontrolofsafetysystemsfromremoteshutdownfacilities.Thissaysnothingaboutwhethercoreuncoveringand/orcoredamagecouldoccurduringthetransferperiod.TheintentoftheMVrfARCguidanceisthatadeclarationofSAEshouldbemadeafterthetimeelapseswheresafetysystemsmaybe"unattended",andnotincuruncoveringand/ordamage.Thelicenseebasisinformationdidnotindicatethisunattendedtime,andthedeviationof20minutesfromtheinaximumcriteriaof15minuteswasnotadequatelyjustified.

R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONALINFORMATIONThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNU1NARCcriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation.minrlhrfn"nn'm"Thi'fTheAppendixRanalysissaysthat20minutesisthemaximumtimeforwhichcontrolofplantsafetysystemsshouldoccurunderworstcaseconditions.Therefore,20minutesiswithinthedesigncriteriaoftheremoteshutdownequipment.TheNU1NARCexamplesHG1-1and-2states:"1.Lossofphysicalcontrolofthecontrolroom..."ThelicenseeequivalentEALforHazards,GE8.1.4stated:Securityeventwhichresultin:..."TheNUMARCcriteriautilizedORlogicfortheEALswhereasthelicenseeutilizedANDlogic.TheinconsistencywiththeNU1NARCcriteriawasnotjustifiedintheTechnicalBasesDocument.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistencywiththeNUMARCcriteriaorprovidetechnicaljustificationforthedeviation