05000387/FIN-2013005-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71114.06 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71114.06 | ||
| Inspector = J Nicholson, R Rolph, S Barr, T Daun, T Hedigan, A Turilin, D Kern, F Bower, J D, | | Inspector = J Nicholson, R Rolph, S Barr, T Daun, T Hedigan, A Turilin, D Kern, F Bower, J D'Antonio, J Grieves | ||
| CCA = H.1 | | CCA = H.1 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.1 | | INPO aspect = LA.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.54, Conditions of Licenses, paragraph (q), because PPL did not maintain the Emergency Plan to adequately meet the standards of 50.47(b). Specifically, PPL did not have temperature indication installed in some areas of the reactor building that are required to support assessment and determination of entry conditions into the fission product barrier emergency action levels (EALs). PPL entered this issue into their CAP as CR 1727229. The inspectors determined that the failure to have temperature indication installed in certain areas of the reactor building was a performance deficiency that was within PPLs ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that a licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the lack of installed temperature instrumentation and the reliance on local temperature indications were insufficient to ensure a timely and accurate EAL classification could be made. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, section 5.4, the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was determined to be an example of an ineffective EAL initiating condition, such that a Site Area Emergency would be declared in a degraded manner. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance Resources because PPL did not ensure that facilities and equipment were adequate and available, including emergency facilities and equipment. Specifically, PPL did not provide temperature instrumentation to operators to ensure a timely and accurate declaration of an emergency for an un-isolable reactor coolant leak in the reactor building. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.54, Conditions of Licenses, paragraph (q), because PPL did not maintain the Emergency Plan to adequately meet the standards of 50.47(b). Specifically, PPL did not have temperature indication installed in some areas of the reactor building that are required to support assessment and determination of entry conditions into the fission product barrier emergency action levels (EALs). PPL entered this issue into their CAP as CR 1727229. The inspectors determined that the failure to have temperature indication installed in certain areas of the reactor building was a performance deficiency that was within PPLs ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that a licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the lack of installed temperature instrumentation and the reliance on local temperature indications were insufficient to ensure a timely and accurate EAL classification could be made. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, section 5.4, the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was determined to be an example of an ineffective EAL initiating condition, such that a Site Area Emergency would be declared in a degraded manner. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance Resources because PPL did not ensure that facilities and equipment were adequate and available, including emergency facilities and equipment. Specifically, PPL did not provide temperature instrumentation to operators to ensure a timely and accurate declaration of an emergency for an un-isolable reactor coolant leak in the reactor building. | ||
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Latest revision as of 00:20, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2013005 Section 1EP6 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71114.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Nicholson R Rolph S Barr T Daun T Hedigan A Turilin D Kern F Bower J D'Antonio J Grieves |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.54 |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
| ' | |