05000387/FIN-2013003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Procedure to Control and Monitor RCS Heatup Rate |
| Description | Inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because PPL did not adequately incorporate the acceptance criteria for heatup rate specified in the plant TSs, as amplified in its basis, into the surveillance test implementing procedure for monitoring adherence to pressure and temperature requirements during plant heatup and cooldown. Based on this procedure inadequacy, operators exceeded the TS limit during a plant startup on May 28, 2013. PPL entered the issue into their CAP as CR 1709058 and revised plant procedures to appropriately incorporate the acceptance criteria. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance and procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system (RCS), and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that this issue required a detailed risk evaluation. In consultation with a Region I Senior Reactor Analyst, the inspectors completed a qualitative risk assessment and determined this issue is of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, there was no impact on the integrity of the reactor vessel due to the short duration temperature gradient imposed by exceeding the TS heatup rate. Consistent with PPLs evaluation, the observed heatup rate minimally exceeded the specified limit during plant startup and remained within the acceptable bounds of the current plant pressure and temperature analysis. The finding is related to the cross-cutting area of PI&R, Corrective Actions, in that PPL did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity. Specifically, PPL did not take effective corrective actions to correct an inadequate procedure for monitoring adherence to pressure/temperature (P/T) limits after it was identified by inspectors. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2013003 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Greives A Bolger M Gray F Arner J Laughlin P Finney D Orr S Barber R Rolph D Dodson |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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