05000388/FIN-2013007-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain Adequate Feedwater Procedures |
Description | Inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, related to the requirement to operate the feedwater system in accordance with procedures and implement the procedure change process. The PPL procedures implementing these requirements state that if an approved document that addresses the circumstances does not exist, then create a procedure or perform the task using another approved method (i.e., troubleshooting plan or work order). Contrary to this requirement, on December 19, 2012, Pennsylvania Power and Light (PPLs) operators opened the breaker to the A Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) discharge isolation valve (3A) valve motor operator (i.e., when the 3A valve failed to open as expected) without establishing or implementing procedural guidance or implementing another process such as a troubleshooting plan or work order. This action resulted in the feedwater control system logic causing closure of other feedwater valves, isolating all normal feedwater flow to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), and a subsequent automatic reactor shutdown (scram) on low water level. The PPL staff entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1668242, and conducted sitewide training on procedural use and adherence standards. The inspectors identified a performance deficiency because on December 19, 2012, PPL did not implement an approved procedure to open the breaker to the 3A valve motor operator, which resulted in a subsequent unplanned reactor scram. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Additionally, this finding was similar to example 4.b of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The finding was evaluated using NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A, User Guidance for Significance Determination for At- Power Situations, and the Station Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model for a detailed risk assessment. Based upon the detailed risk assessment, the change in core damage frequency associated with this performance deficiency was in the low E-7 range, or of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control, because PPL operators did not appropriately plan work activities associated with opening the 3A valve manually by incorporating the need for planned contingencies, compensatory actions and abort criteria consistent with nuclear safety. |
Site: | Susquehanna |
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Report | IR 05000388/2013007 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Caruso J Richmond D Jackson J Hawkins C Miller V Gaddy B Larson C Steely D Strickland T Farina |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000388/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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