05000387/FIN-2013005-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Missed Technical Specification Surveillance for Secondary Containment Drawdown Testing |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because PPL did not ensure all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, PPLs procedure used to implement the requirements of TS Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 did not ensure that secondary containment integrity was tested in all required configurations. PPLs immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into their CAP as CR-2013-03891 and applied a status control tag to the railroad access bay door-101 as an administrative control until corrective actions can be completed and the configuration tested satisfactorily. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inadequate surveillance procedure resulted in missed surveillances for SRs 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5. Additionally, it was similar to example 3.d in IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that the failure to implement the TS SR as required is not minor if the surveillance had not been conducted. In this case, the surveillance requirement had not been completed for all configurations of secondary containment. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the Standby Gas Treatment system. This finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance Resources area because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, those necessary for: complete, accurate and up-to-date design documentation, procedures, and work packages, and correct labeling of components H.2(c). |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2013005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Nicholson R Rolph S Barr T Daun T Hedigan A Turilin D Kern F Bower J D'Antonio J Grieves |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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