05000387/FIN-2013013-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow RCA Egress Requirements |
Description | The contractors actions caused PPL to violate the SSES operating license. Specifically, SSES License Condition 2.C(2) requires that PPL will operate SSES in accordance with the TS. SSES TS 5.4.1, in part, requires that written procedures shall be implemented covering the procedures recommended in RG 1.33, Rev 2, App A, February 1978. RG 1.33, Rev 2, App A, recommends the establishment of radiation protection procedures for access control to radiation areas and for contamination control. Pertaining to the second OI Investigation (1-2012-043), PPL implementing procedure NDAP-QA-0626, Radiologically Controlled Area Access and Radiation Work Permit System states that individuals are not allowed to move radiological postings, barricades, and barriers and to contact HP if there is a need to have any of these items moved or modified. Contrary to the above, on March 30, 2012, a contract carpenter did not contact the SSES HP department and, instead, moved an HRA posting on his own. Pertaining to the third OI Investigation (1-2011-030), PPL implementing procedure NDAP-QA- 0623, Radiation Protection Standards and Responsibilities requires individuals to not leave the RCA until they can successfully pass through a PCM and a PM. Contrary to the above, on April 6 and April 7, 2011, contract employees left the SSES RCA without successfully passing through both a PCM and a PM. Because the violations associated with the second and third OI investigations were caused by the willful actions of contract employees, they were evaluated under the NRCs traditional enforcement process using the factors set forth in Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. After careful consideration of these factors, the NRC concluded that these violations should be classified at Severity Level IV. In reaching this decision, the NRC considered that the significance of the underlying violations was minor because: (1) pertaining to OI investigation 1-2012-043, the HRA was conservatively posted and physical access into the actual HRA overhead did not occur; and, (2) pertaining to OI investigation 1-2011-030, both individuals successfully cleared other contamination monitors and the issue did not involve the spread of radioactive contamination into an uncontrolled area. However, the NRC decided to increase the significance of the violations since they were willful and the NRC regulatory program is based, in part, on licensees and their contractors acting with integrity. |
Site: | Susquehanna |
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Report | IR 05000387/2013013 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Lorson D Holody D Roberts J Noggle J Teator M Gray M Mclaughlin |
Violation of: | License Condition Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2013013 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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