05000387/FIN-2013004-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Procedure Failed to Verify Design Requirements for RHR Suction Piping |
Description | The inspectors identified a green, self-revealing, non-cited NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 5, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, in part, that procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The inspectors determined that PPLs residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling procedure failed to ensure that water properties (pressure and temperature) in the suction piping was controlled to ensure water hammer event would not happen when establishing a low pressure injection standby lineup. As a result, a water hammer occurred in the piping which caused the suction relief valve to fail open. PPLs immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into their CAP as CRs 1746612 and 1754913, replacing the relief valve, walking down the piping and associated supports and communicating to operations personnel to declare RHR inoperable when aligned to shutdown cooling (SDC) while reactor coolant temperature is above 200 degrees Fahrenheit. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the water hammer event resulted in a stuck open relief valve on the RHR suction piping whose leak rate exceeded the assumed leakage from engineered safeguard systems in PPLs post-event control room dose calculations. Because conditions for RHR system operation had been established, the team assessed this finding in accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, using Attachment 1, Checklist 5. The finding did not require a quantitative assessment because none of the checksheet guidelines requiring a phase 2 analysis were affected. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross cutting aspect in the problem identification and resolution area associated with operating experience because PPL did not implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs. Specifically, PPLs review of IN 2010-11 did not ensure the transition of RHR from SDC to LPCI standby was completed successfully by incorporating adequate steps into the operating procedure. |
Site: | Susquehanna |
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Report | IR 05000387/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Greives A Turilin K Mangan S Kennedy J Laughlin P Finney F Bower E Burket |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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