05000387/FIN-2013002-07
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On March 27, 2012, PPL determined, during a CAP follow-up review into the failure of the B CS chiller compressor guide vane linkage, that it had likely occurred on February 16, 2012, while the A CS chiller was OOS for maintenance. The result was that both CS chillers had been inoperable simultaneously for a total of 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br />. PPL determined that this had resulted in a condition prohibited by TS. Specifically, TS 3.7.4 action D.1 requires the immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 during the time the two control room floor cooling subsystems were inoperable. Contrary to the above, PPL had not recognized the failure of the in-service B chiller and, therefore, had not taken the appropriate action. Traditional enforcement applies in accordance with IMC 0612, sections 0612-09 and 0612-13 and Enforcement Policy section 2.2.4.d, because the inspectors did not identify an associated performance deficiency. A review of historical equipment performance had not shown the ball-joint connector to be a notable failure mode for the chillers and there were no prior trends of failures of the CS chiller compressor ball joint connectors. Additionally, the inspectors determined that the failure of the chiller compressor guide vanes with the chiller in operation would not have been readily apparent due to minimal changes in chiller demand required at the time of the failure. This issue was considered to be an SLIV violation of TS 3.7.4 in accordance with Enforcement Policy section 6.1.d. In addition, IMC 0612, Appendix B, Figures 1 and 2, Issue Screening, were referenced in documenting this SLIV licensee-identified NCV. There was no actual safety consequence as the B CS chiller was able to support its cooling load to maintain the CS room temperatures within normal operating bands in the position where the vanes had failed. Additionally, although not considered operable for design conditions, the B chiller was able to provide some minimal cooling to its respective loads during the limited exposure time where both trains were considered inoperable. This severity level IV licensee-identified NCV was entered into PPLs CAP as CR1548540. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2013002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Kaufman M Gray F Arner P Finney J Ayala J Greives C Lally |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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