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WTED ConRESPong                      00CKgT[0 JOHN H. BAY 2    DOROTHY THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CENTER                                lb ss 10 N056 3    6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 Los Angeles, California 90048 Telephone:    (415) 393-9234                        cFFICE g (F 5ERV E sECB 4                                                        00CKElggggkcs (213) 653-3973 5    Attorneys for Intervenor (Contention XX)
Committee to Bridge the Gap 6
7 8
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 10 11 IN THE MATTER OF                      )
12                                          )  Doc. No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY        )
13    OF CALIFORNIA                        )  (Proposed Renewal
                                                      )  of Facility 14    (UCLA Research Reactor)              )  License No. R-71) 15 INTERVENOR BRIDGE THE GAP'S 16                        RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S MOTION FOR
 
==SUMMARY==
DISPOSITION AS TO 17                        THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 10 CFR 73.60 AND THE NEED 18                            TO PROTECT AGAINST SABOTAGE 19 On March 20, 1981, the Licensing Board ruled that 20 intervention by Committee to Bridge The Gap ("BTG") was appro-21 priate on the issue of adequacy of the Applicant's proposed 22 physical security plan and actual physical security at its 23 facility. Intervenor contends that the proposed security plan 24 and security measures at the facility do not comply with the 25 guidelines and regulations applicable to the Applicant's proposed 26 license activities. On April 13, 1981 the NRC Staf f moved for 27 summary disposition on the entire matter of Applicant's fixed site physical security (" Staff's Motion"). On July 26, 1982 the 116 820907 8209 DOCK 05000142 ""
L So"      ..
9503
 
Board, in an attempt to expedite the hearing process, requested an initial response by BTG to Staff's motion, limited to the issues of whether Applicant must protect against readiological sabotage and whether Applicant must meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.                                                            Pursuant to the Board's request BTG submits the following response.
1.
7 8
Applicant is seeking a twenty year renewal of its 9
perating license and seeking a license to possess 4700 grams of 10 93% enriched fresh U-235, 4700 grams of 93% enriched irradiated U-235 and a 32 gram (2 curie) Pu-239 Neutron source.                                                            The NRC staff in its Motion for Summary Disposition on Contention XX asserts that despite the fact that Applicant is seeking a license for bomb-grade Special Nuclear Material (SNM), it is not required g    to protect its facility against radiological sabotage.                                                            This y    assertion not only has frightening implications for a facility 1    ated in the center of a major university campus, but is 18 g    totally contrary to the provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-20 tions which require all licensees to protect against radiological g    sabotage.
The NRC Staf f asserts in its Motion that Applicant is 22 23 n t required to meet the physical security requirements of 10 CFR 24 S 73.60 for licensees possessing formula quantities of SNM.                                                            This 25 assertion is based on the quantity of SNM allegedly possessed by 26 Applicant and the self-protection qualities of the irradiated U-27 235 in the reactor core.                                                            However, for virtually the entire 28  period of the last ten years Applicant has been in possession of 2.
I k                                                                                                                                        . . . -
 
                                                                            )
1 formula quantities of SNM without having an adequate security 2
plan. Applicant is still in possession of a formula quantity of 3
SNM despite its recent off-site shipment of SNM. And Applicant's 4
reactor operation is physically incapable of sustaining self-5 protecting conditions for the irradiated SNM in the reactor core.
6 Finally, Staff's Motion also asserts that as a matter 7
of law, Applicant has met the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67.
8 While the Board has not requested a response to this assertion 9
and BTG does not make such a response herein, BTG does contend 10 that there are clear issues of fact concerning Applicant's 11 compliance wth 10 CFR S 73.67 which will not be obviated by the 12 disposition of this limited response. BTG will respond accord-13 ingly regarding these issues at such time as the Board so 14 directs.
15 In sum, Bil will show: First, that Applicant must 16 protect against radiological sabotage; Second, that Applicant is 17 seeking a license for formula quantities of SNM; Third, that 18 Applicant currently possesses a formula quantity of SNM; and 19 Fourth, that according to Applicant's own calculations, its 20 reactor operation is physically incapable of maintaining the 21 radiation levels of the core fuel high enough to qualify it for 22 the self-protection exemption  from the requirements of 10 CFR 23 S 73.60. Therefore, Applicant must either have a security plan 24 which meets the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60 or its authorized 25 possession of SNM must be limited to less than 5000 grams total 26 SNM whether or not irradiated.
27
        ///
28
        ///
j                                    3.
 
l 1
For these reasons, and because Staff has not demon-2 strated as a matter of law that it is entitled to summary dispo-3 sition on these issues Staff's motion should be denied.
4
                                          'II 5
10 C.P.R. S 73.40 REQUIRES 6                    APPLICANT TO PROVIDE PHYSICAL PROTECTION AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE 7
The NRC Staf f has overlooked the sabotage protection 8
requirements of 10 CFR S 73.40.      In their Motion they assert that 9
10 CFR S 73.67 contains no requirement for protection against 10 sabotage, but only requires early detection and assessment of 11 unauthorized access or activities and therefore Applicant's 12 security plan need not protect against sabotage.      Staff Motion, 13
: p. 11. However, it is not necessary to reach the question of the 14 requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 in order to resolve the sabotage 15 protection issue. The requirements of 10 CFR S 73.40 are clear 16 and unequivocal on this point:
17 Physical protection:    General Requirements at Fixed 18      Sites:
19            (a) Each licensee shall provide physical protection against radiological sabotage and' 20      against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed sites where licensed activities are 21      conducted. Physical security systems shall be established and maintained by the licensee in 22      accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 10 CFR S 73.40(a) 23      (emphasis added).
24  There are no exemptions to the provisions of S 73.40(a) for any 25  type of licensee. 10 CFR S 73.6.
26              If Applicant is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 27  S 73.60 then 10 CFR S 50.34(d) requires plans for dealing with 28  sabotage. If Applicant is not subject to 10 CFR S 73.60 then it 4
 
l 4
1 still must have a security plan dealing with sabotage, despite 2
the lack of specific regulatory criteria.                  The adequacy of such a 3
plan is a matter for Board determination.                  Columbia Reactor 4
Case.          Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the issue of the 5
applicability of 10 CPR S 73.60 to this facility, there is no 6
question that Applicant must provide protection against radiolo-gical sabotage.1/
8 The clear and unambiguous language of the regulations 9
is supported by the text of the 1979 and 1980 Annual Reports of 10 the NRC to Congress.                The 1980 report provides:
11 Status of Safeguards at Non-Power Reactors.                        All 12                        licensed non-power reactors have operative security
:                                plans as required by 10 CFR S 73.40 (" Physical 13                        Protection: General Requirements at Fixed Sites")
for protection against sabotage.        In addition, 14                        licensees possessing less than formula quantities of SSNM have submitted security plans in accordance 15                        with the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 . . .                        for review and approval by the NRC. 1980 Annual 16                        Report: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pp.
120-121.  (emphasis added) 17 Staff's assertion that Applicant need not protect 18 against sabotage is, as a matter of law, clearly erroneous.
19 Staf f is not entitled to Summary Disposition as a matter of law 20 on Applicant's Security Plan and its Motion must therefore be
,      21 denied.
. 22 1
23 24        --1/          As noted above NRC Staf f has argued that early detection and assessment capabilities provide adequate security at Appli-25                        cant's facility.        In the context of sabotage this assertion is absurd.        Unlike theft and diversion, the danger to the 26                        public health and safety engendered by sabotage will have already occurred prior to early assessment and detection. No 27                        prevention is no protection. Therefore, an adequate plan must include sabotage prevention measures, sufficient so as 28                        to not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the public health and safety.
5.
 
E l
1 III 2
APPLICANT IS SUBJECT TO THE 3                  PROVISIONS OF 10 C.F.R. S 73.60.
4    A. Introduction.
5            NRC Staff's Motion asserts that the application is not 6 subject to the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60. The applicability 7 of the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 is determined by the amount 8 of SNM not subject to the exemption provided for in 10 CFR 9 S 73.60. Thus, the two primary issues herein are the amounts of 10 SNM requested by the license, and the capability of the Applicant 11 to operate its reactor in such a manner as to achieve exempt, 12 i.e. self-protection, status for SNM in the reactor core. NRC 13 Staff has raised a third issue by claiming that the recent 14 reduction of SNM inventory at the facility moots the entire 15 issue.
16            DTG will demonstrate below that Applicant must have a 17 security plan which meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 by 18 virtue of the facts; (1) that Applicant is seeking a license for 19 5000 grams or more of non-exempt SNM; (2) that Applicant 20 currently has on site at least 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM; and 21 (3) that the fuel in the core of Applicant's reactor loses its 22 self-protection characteristics af ter a shutdown of only eight 23 hours, making self-protection of any amount of SNM at this 24 facility impossible. On the basis of these facts Staff's Motion 25 should be denied and discovery commenced to determine the ade-26 quacy of Applicant's physical security.
27 ///
28 ///
6.
 
  ,                                                                                =
1 B. Applicant Has 5000 grams of 2            Non-exempt SNM At the Facility and is Therefore Subject To The 3            Requirements of 10 CFR S 73.50.
4              Applicant, according to Dr. Wegst's August 8,1982 5 letter to the NRC's Hal Bernard (Exhibit A) possesses 3.53 6 kilograms irradiated SNM, and 1.39 kilograms of unirradiated SNM 7 at the facility. Applicant also possesses a 32 gram (2 curie) 8 Pu-239 neutron start up source.      According to the formula 9 provided in 10 CPR S 73.60, an applicant which possesses 5000 10 grams or more of non-exempt SNM computed by adding the grams at 11 U-235 (3.53 + 1.39 = 4920) to 2.5 times the grams of plutonium 12 (2.5 X 32 = 80) which gives a total guantity (4920 + 80 = 5000 13 grams) of SNM at Applicant's facility, is subject to its provi-14 sions. Therefore, Applicant possesses a formula quantity of SNM 15 and is subject to the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60, unless some 16 portion of the irradiated SNM qualifies for the self-protection 17 exemption. As will be shown below none of the irradiated SNM so 18 qualifies.
19              NRC Staf f's Motion argues that the Pu-239 neutron 20 source is exempt from the computation which determines the l      21 applicability of 10 CFR S 73.60.      To make this argument staff has 22 tortured the plain meaning of the regulations.      10 CFR S 73.60 l
l      23 provides that each non-power reactor licensee who possesses 5000 24 grams or more ot SNM computed according to the formula provided 25 therein  . .
26    ". . . shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diversion pursuant to the require-27    ments of S 73.67 (a), (b), (c), and (d) and as follows, except that a licensee is exempt from the 28    requirements of this section to the exent that he possesses or uses special nuclear material which is 7.
 
j l
1 not readily separable from other radioactive 2    material and which has a total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3      three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding. 10 CFR S 73.60 (emphasis 4    added) 5 Thus, the only SNM which is exempt f rom the requirements of 10 6 CFR S 73.60 is that which meets the 100 rem external dose rate.
7            10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) provides:
8    A licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses or 9      transports:  (i) special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive 10    material and which has a total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 11      feet from any accessible surface without interven-ing shielding, or (ii) sealed plutonium-beryllium 12      neutron sources totalling 500 grams or less con-tained plutoniuim at any one site or contiguous 13      sites, or (iii) plutonium with an isotopic concen-tration of exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.
14      10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) (emphasis added) 15            Staff argues that 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1)(ii) creates an 16  exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 for Applicant's 17  Pu-239 neutron source. This argument is incorrect.
18            10 CFR S 73.60 provides a specific exemption for 10 CFR 19  5 73.60. 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) by its own terms applies only to 20  "this section", 10 CFR S 73.67.      If the Commission desired to 21  broaden the exemptions under 10 CFR S 73.60 they could have done 22  so by adding specific exemptions to 10 CFR S 73.60.      Furthermore, 23  if they intended for the exemptions of 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) to t      24  apply to 10 CFR S 73.60 they would not have provided the specific
/
25  exemption in 10 CFR S 73.60. This is evident because of the fact 26  that 10 CFR S 73.67(b)(1)(i) provides an identical exemption to
;      27  the one found in 10 CFR S 73.60.      Finally, the incorporation of 28  10 CFR S 73.67(b) into 10 CFR S 73.60 is conjunctive:
i I
8.
 
1 "Each licensee . . . shall protect . . . pursuant 2      to the requirements of 10 CPR S 73.67(a),(b),(c),
and (d) and as follows . . . 10 CFR S 73.60.
3 Therefore, even if Applicant's Pu-239 neutron source is exempt 4
from the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 it is not exempt from the 5
requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.
6 The construction of these provisions while appearing 7
complicated on the surface merely requires a plain reading of the 8
language of the regulations. The proper construction of the 9
regulations, contrary to Staf f's assertion, makes it clear that 10 Applicant has at least 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM in its 11 possession at this time and thus must have a security plan which 12 meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.      Therefore, Staff's 13 motion should be denied.
14 15 C. The Application Must Be Judged 16            By The Amount Of SNM For Which A License is Being Sought.
17 Even if the amount of SNM possessed by Applicant at 18 this time was not at least 5000 grams, Applicant would still be 19 subject to the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60.      The Applicant is 20 seeking a license for the possession and use of 9400 grams of 93%
21 enriched U-235 and a 32 gram (2 curie) PU-239 neutron source.      In
;    22 order to obtain such a license the Applicant's proposed physical 23 security plan and measures must be capable of meeting the regula-i    24 tory requirements for protecting the foregoing quantities of SNM.
25 On August 6,1982 Applicant informed the NRC that it 26 i
had shipped 2.36 kilograms of SNM of f-site, allegedly reducing 27 its SNM inventory to 4.92 kilograms. One of the stated purposes 28
:          of this transfer was to avoid being subject to the requirements i                                      ^
 
1 of 10 CFR S 73.60.                                                          August 6, 1982 letter Wegst to Bernard 2
attached hereto as Exhibit A.                                                              However, Applicant has represented 3
that it has no plans to amend its license to reflect the SNM 4
reductions.                                                          In fact, Applicant'is attempting to have its cake S
and eat it too by reducing its inventory six weeks before summary 6
disposition, arguing that it is therefore now exempt from 10 CFR 7
S 73.60 and retaining its authorization to bring the SNM back on 8
site, perhaps shortly after the motion is disposed of or the 9
hearings are finally concluded.                                                              The NRC Staff has made the same 10 argument in the amendments to its Motion.                                                              Staff's Motion, Hand 11 Corrections p. 11.                                                          Such an argument from an applicant seeking a 12 twenty year license is untenable, unacceptable and an attempt to 13 remove from its jurisdiction issues properly before the Licensing 14 Board.
15 Applicant has applied for a twenty-year renewal of its 16 facility license.                                                          The granting of the application is dependent 17 upon Applicant providing reasonable assurances to the Licensing 18 Board that it will, over the next twenty years, comply with NRC 19 regulations and that the issuance of the license will not be 20 inimical to the common defense or endanger the public health and 21 safety.                                                          This is not an enforcement proceeding under 10 C.F.R.
22 2.200 e t. seg.                                                        It is a licensing proceeding.      Therefore, the 23 adequacy of Applicant's application must be judged on the basis 24 of the content thereof not on the ancillary promises and inten-25 tions of the Applicant.
26 Making an analogy to a new license proceeding provides 27 a good illustration of the fallacy of the Applicant's and NRC 28 staff's position that the regulatory criteria applicable to this in
 
I license application are determined by the amount of SNM in 2
Applicant's possession this week rather than the amount possessed 3
six weeks ago or six weeks from now. In an original license 4
proceeding an applicant possesses no SNM. Therefore, the appli-5 cation is judged according to the amount of SNM sought.      It would 6
not be acceptable for an Applicant to represent to a licensing 7
board that while they were seeking a license for 9.4 kilograms of 8
SNM and would thus be subject to the security requirements of 10 9
CFR 7 3.60, that they only really intended to bring 4.92 kilograms 10 of SNM on site and thus a lesser security plan should provide a 11 sufficient basis for approving the license for the full 9.4 12 kilograms. This approach makes a mockery of the concept of 13 licensing.
14 The licensing process is designed to provide a 15 periodic, complete, thorough and public review of a facility's 16 operations and compliance capabilities.      The NRC review policy 17 and the meaningful public input embodied therein would be frus-18 trated by allowing a license for 9.4 kilograms of SNM to be 19 issued on the basis of meeting the standards for possession of 20 4.92 kilograms of SNM. Arguments such as the footnote to Staff's l
Motion (p. 11) which states that Applicant will have to report 22
!            the receipt of any SNM miss the point at issue.      A reasonable 23 construction of the regulations taken as a whole and the further-24 ance of the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act require that the 25 applicability of the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60      be determined l            with reference to the content of the license application.
t 27 Finally, approving a license for possession of a formula quantity of SNM where such is not needed and where there i
t.
11
 
1 is no security plan in place to protect such a quantity is 2
contrary to the general policy of the Commission to reduce 3
proliferation and security risks at research reactors.                                                        SECY              4 376 states that:
5 In SECY 79-1878, 22 manpower reactor licensees were 6        listed as having licenses to possess a formula quLatity or more of SSNM. Of these 22, seven have 7        taken or are taking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC 8        will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession authorization below a formula 9        quantity.      [UCLA is included in this list]-SECY                        -76, Williamn J. Dircks, Executive' Director for 10        Operations, p. 2 (June 12, 1981).                                    Rele' van t portions of which are attached hereto _.as Exhibit B.
Consistent with this statement by' NRC_ Staff and because as will 12 be shown below, Applicant's reactor operation cannot provide 13 self-protection, the Applicant must either submit a plan which 14                                                                                      '
;                meets the requirements of 10 CFR~S 73.60' or emend its licensed 15                                          - *                        -
e authorization to less than'5000 grams 'SNM.                                                                              _ - -
16                                                                                                                  7" D. The Requested Amounts                            '                  ~
17              Of SNM Require Applicant                                      _
s To Comply With 10 C.'F.R. 73.60.                                                                  f s
,          18                        ,                                                                                          .      ,A \
10 C.F.R 73.60, provides specific physical protection
                                ~'~4
                                                          ~
19 i
j requirements for non-power reactor licensees in possessi n of                                    '
20                                                                                                                        t I
5,000 grams or more of SNM, exempting any SNM which is n'ot                                                            ''                -
21                                                                                                                            ;            -
readily separable from other radioactive materia?. and which has at
                                                                                            '                                                      ^
22                    ~
s total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a                                                                        S 23                                                                          -
distance of three feet fromiany accensible surface without 24                                                                              1 intervening shielding.                  In simple terms,I the exemption considers                                                    i 25                                                    N' the radiation level of the smal'lest unit of SNM which can be 26                                        -
separately removed by                  a., thief or a. diverter (in an Argonaut                                                              .
27                                                    -
                                                                                                                                    ~
reactor this is a fuel bundle).                            This exempt-lon is based o~n the                                                e 28                                                s.    .          -
x                                                          '
assumption that ifthatunitishighlyeirradiated(theradio'                                                                                    -
s                                    ,  .
                                                                                                              '5
                                  , _                        m xm.
p
    ,  -.        --    x.            - - . - . _ .                  -                                                - - -
 
I activity itself will provide protectica against theft and diver-2 sion. If a licensee possesses less than 5,000 grams of non-3 exempt SNM, they are subject only to the requirements of 10 4
C.F.R. $ 73.67.
5 Applicant is seeking a license for 4,700 grams of fresh 6
SNM, all non-exempt, and 4,700 grams of irradiated SNM, only 7
exempt if its has an external radiation does rate in' excess of 8
100 rems per hour at three feet unshielded.      The external dose 9
rate of the irradiated SNM is determined primarily by the 10 frequency, duration and power level of the reactor operation.
11 Under the licensed amounts then, Applicant would have 5,000 grams 12 or more of non-exempt SNM at any point in time when more than 300 13 grams of irradiated fuel in the reactor core or storage holes had 14
          " cooled off" to a point where the external dose rate was less 15 than 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded.      Therefore, in 16 order for the application to be judged according to the require-17 ments of 10 C.F.R. S 73.67, Applicant must be licensed to either 18 have less than 5,000 grams of SNM on site, or have procedures 19 within their license sufficient to assure that the irradiated SNM 20 will at all times have an external dose rate in excess of 100 rem 21 per hour at three feet unshielded.      As will be detailed below, 22 for the greater portion of the last 10 years, up until 6 weeks 23 ago and even today Applicant has more than 5,000 grams of non-24 exempt SNM at the reactor f acility.
25
: 1. The reactor core must be sufficiently 26                    irradiated to provide self protection for the fuel bundles.
27 As stated above the two central factors in determining the applicability of 10 CFR 73.60 are the quantity of the unir-13.
k
 
L I
1 radiated SNM and the self-protection characteristics of the 2
irradiated SNM.                                  The " Inventory of U-235 Isotope in Fuel," chart 3
(Exhibit C) provided by Applicant in response to Intervenors 4
i First Set of Interrogatories on' Contention XX                                                    (" Contention XX 5
Interrogatories") (Exhibit D) nicely illustrates the issue.                                                        From 6
12/31/71 to 9/30/80 Applicant had more than 5000 grams of SNM 7
outside of the reactor core.                                      Those quantities were non-exempt or 8
in other words were not ef fected by the self-protection of 9
operating the reactor.2/                                  For the period 9/30/80 to 7/2/82 10 however, the self-protection features of the SNM in the reactor 11 core become critical to determining the applicability of 10 CFR 12 S 73.60 because the quantity of SNM outside the core was less 13 than 5000 grams.                                  We will focus on this period to demonstrate why 14 it is imperative that this licensee either have a security plan                                                          '
15 which meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 in effect at all 16 times or amends its license, reducing the total licensed amount 17 of SNM below 5000 grams.
18
: 2.        This reactor cannot operate in 19                                      such a manner as to provide self-protection for the SNM in the core.
20 Applicant cannot, based upon its own calculations, 21 operate the reactor in such a manner as to assure that the SNM in q
22 the reactor core will maintain an external radiation dose rate in 23 excess of 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded during 24 periods of shutdown, including vacations, weekends and mainten-25 ance shutdowns.
26 l
27 l                            --2/  The irradiated fuel in the pits would have an external dose l                        28        rate of less than 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded within a relatively short priod of time.
I I
1 4
 
1 In response to Intervenors Contention XX Interroga-2 tories, Applicant provided calculations showing the external dose 3
rates for the reactor core following perieds of normal reactor operation.                      (Exhibit H)              Applicant concluded from these calcula-5 tions that the reactor core would would retain sufficient radia-6 tion to be self-protecting for a period of one to two weeks after 7
shutdown.                However, Applicant's calculations are based on a 8
misinterpretation of the regulatory exemption.                                                      When the error is 9
corrected, the calculation determines that, in fact, the SNM is 10 only self-protected for a period of less than eight hours.
11 Applicant's error was in calculating the external dose 12 rate for the entire reactor core.                                                  10 CFR 73.60 provides an
:              13 4
exemption for sufficiently irradiated SNM which is not readily i                  separable from other irradiated SNM.                                                      In other words one must 15 measure the external radiation dose rate of the smallest discreet 16 unit of SNM, in this case a single fuel bundle.                                                      The logic of 17 this requirement is clear.                                            One seeking to steal SNM will not 18 seize the entire reactor core at one time. One would remove                                                                    the 19 smallest readily separable unit, the fuel bundle, and carry it 20 l
away separately, the precise procedure used by Applicant to load 21 and unload the fuel.                            This interpretation of the exemption 22 portion of 10 CFR 73.60 was confirmed by a Mr.                                                    G.K. Knulsen, 23
;                  listed in SECY-81-376A, as the NRC contact person for proposed 24 amendments to 10 CFR 73.67.                                              In a recent phone conversation he i            25 stated that the current rule regarding the exemption calls for a 26 calculation for each discreet fuel element, i.e. bundle that can l                  be readily removed.                        See Declaration of Daniel O. Hirsch attached l            28 l                  hereto as Exhibit I.                        This interpretation is also evident in the
[
l 15.
 
1 "Special Nuclear Material Self Protection Criteria Investigation i
2
( December 27, 1980) conducted by the Los Alamos 3cientific          >
l I          3 1
Laboratory, a summary of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J.
4 (Special attention on this point should be directed to para aphs e
5 2 and 4.)
6 The core of Applicant's reactor is made up of 24 7
separate, unconnected fuel bundles.      Each bundle is removed by 8
hooking a simple hand held gaffing hook through the metal ring on 9
the top of the bundle and lifting it out of the core.      Therefore, 10 the unit of SNM the external radiation dose rate of which must be 4
measured for determining exemption from 10 CFR S 73.60 at Appli-12 cant's facility, is the fuel bundle.
13 The calculations provided by Applicant measure the dose 14 rate of the entire core. To determine the external dose rate of 15 a single bundle one must divide the dose rate of the entire core 16 by 24, the number of bundles in the core.      One must also adjust 17 the calculation for the fact that it was based on the dose rate 18 at four feet from the core center, to compensate for the thick-19 ness of the core, rather than three feet from the single 20 bundle. Making this adjustment the external dose rate of a i      21 single bundle would be approximately one fourteenth that of the i      22 entire reactor core. Declaration of Roger Kohn, attached hereto 23 as Exhibit K; see also paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Dave 24 Hafemeister, attached hereto as Exhibit L.
25 Using the formula provided by Applicant for determining 26 external dose rates after periods of normal operation and apply-27 i            ing it to single fuel bundle one finds that the fuel bundle dips 28 below the 100 rem exemption threshhold in less than eight (8)
;                                        16.
L
 
J I  hours after the reactor shuts down.                          Declaration of Roger Kohn, 2  Exhibit K.
3                Assuming the accuracy of Applicant's own equation and 4
assumptions, the SNM loses its inherent self-protection ability 5  af ter a shutdown of less than eight hours.                          This reactor 6
presently averages only about 2 hours of operation a week.                                                  The 7
Technical Specifications limit it to 8.5 hours operation per 8
average week, in order to assure compliance with 10 CPR part 20 9
emissions standards.            Under these conditions Applicant cannot 10 operate its reactor in such a manner as assure that the SNM in 11 the core will at all times qualify for the 10 CFR S 73.60 exemp-12  tion. Therefore, unless Applicant's security measures are 13 capable of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.60, Applicant 14 cannot have more than 5000 grams of SNM on site and cannot be 15 licensed to possess such amounts.
1' 16
: 3. Applicant's past record does not indicate compliance with 77 self-protection standards.
18 '
Even if it were possible for Applicant to avoid the 19 requirements of 10 CFR 73.60 by maintaining self-protecting 20 levels of SNM radiation, their past record suggests that they 21 cannot assure that such self-protection procedures will be 22 implemented.
23 On January 12, 1981 Applicant was explicitly informed by the NRC Staff that it must maintain self-protecting radiation 25 levels in the core or meet the requirements of 73.60.                                          See 1/12/81 letter Miller to Wegst attached hereto as Exhibit M.                                                  On 27 Janua ry 29, 1981 Applicant responded that it was scheduling 28  reactor operations to meet self-protection criteria and was 17.
 
i I
planning to ship SNM off-site. See 1/29/81 letter Wegst to 2
Miller attached hereto as Exhibit N. On July 21, 1982, 18 months 3
thereaf ter, Applicant allegedly reduced its SNM inventory to 4.92 4
kilograms. Let us examine the self protection efforts undertaken 5
by Applicant during this 18 month period.
6 In response to Intervenor's Contention XX Interroga-7 tories, Interrogatory No. 13, which asked:
8 Have any rules or procedures regarding the opera-9    tion or use of the reactor been imposed to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is at all times 10      in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded? If 11    so, please describe:
12      (a)  Each such rule or procedure; 13      (b)  When each such rule or procedure was imple-mented.
14 Applicant answered:
15 There are no written rules or procedures. However, 16      the reactor is operated an average at 200 KWH per week which provides a conservative margin for 17      meeting the self-protecting conditions.
18            (a)    See response above.
19            (b)    Specific attention was made to observing the self-protecting conditions beginning 20                  in January 1981.
21              (copies of Intervenors Interrogatories and Applicant's 22  answers are attached hereto as Exhibits D and E respectively).
23  In response to Intervenors follow up questions in which it asked:
24      E(2)    Please provide all other calculations or computer runs, if any, from January 1981 to 25            the present that were conducted to, or that could be used to, estimate operating condi-26            tions necessary to maintain the fuel at 100 rem / hour.
27
        ///
28
        ///
18.
 
1  The response:
2      E(2)  No previous calculations were formalized or retained.
3 (copies of the follow-up questions and answers are attached 4
hereto as Exhibits F and G respectively.)
5 The conclusion to be drawn from these answers appears 6
to be that despite explicit direction from NRC Staff, Applicant 7
did not perform any calculations to determine what measures would 8
be necessary to maintain a self-protecting condition until 18 9
months after the fact. Applicant did not institute any proce-10 dures for insuring that whatever efforts it was making would be 11 implemented, and when the calculation was finally formalized it 12 reflected a tremendously significant error based on a misinter-13 pretation of the regulatory requirements. .This is not a record 3/
14
          ///
15 16 17 3/  Applicant's record over the entire license period was no better. In 1959 Applicant was licensed for 4000 grams of U-18        235 and actually had 3500 grams on site. In October of 1970 the AEC issued Amendment 8 to Applicanth license authorizing 19        an increase from 4000 grams to 10,000 grams U-235. The increase was requested to fabricate a new fuel loading. In 20        October of 1974 after receipt of additional SNM, Applicant was in possession of 5.094 kilograms of non-exempt SNM.
21        Ashbaugh to Goller letter 10/28/74, exhibit O. In November Applicant was reminded that it might be in violation of 10 i    22        CFR part 73. Lear to Regents (Hicks) letter 1/28/74, exhibit P. On December 12, 1979 Applicant shipped 340 grams offsite 23        in order to comply with the 5 Kg limit and approval of their security plan. Asbaugh to Goller letters 11/27/74 and 24        12/12/74, exhibits Q and R respectively. Sometime thereafter a routine security investigation by the NRC discovered that 25        Applicant still had more SNM on site than was consistent with their security plan. Catton to Rogasa letter 11/9/78, 26        exhibit S. Six months later the material was still on site. Catton to Berger letter 3/1/79, exhibit T. The actual 27        shipment offsite of 730 grams was not accomplished until June of 1980. In January 1981 Applicant was once again notified 28        that it was in possession of formula quantities of SNM.
19.
w n    =--=~m
 
N I
upon which to issue a license for possession of formula quantity 2
SNM.
3 There are other disturbing features of this record 4
which have significant implications for the Board's consideration 5
of these issues.        In 1980 BTG submitted its contentions alleging 6
inter alia that Applicant was subject to the requirements of 10 7
CFR S 73.60.        On January 12, 1981 three weeks prior to the pre-8 hearing conference scheduled to rule on the admissibility of l              9 BTG's contentions, the NRC's Jim Miller informed Applicant that 10 it possessed formula quantities of SNM and must meet the require-11 ments of 10 CFR S 73.60 and 73.67.        On January 29, 1982 Applicant 12 responded that it would temporarily schedule reactor operations 13 to conform with self-protection criteria and would attempt to 14 reduce its inventory.        On February 4, 1981, the NRC Staff in 15 pleadings filed beforehand, argued before the Board that Appli-16 cant did not have sufficient SNM to be subject to 10 CFR 17 S 73.60. No mention was made of Miller's letter to Applicant, 18 only three weeks prior, which essentially confirmed BTG's conten-19 tion. A few months later, in April of 1981, NRC Staf f moved for 20 summary disposition on the security contention,            this motion 21 included an affidavit from Miller stating that he had personally 22 confirmed that the external dose rate of the fuel in the core was 23 in excess of 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded.                    This 24 paragraph was deleted in the most recent amendments.                Over a year 25 later Applicant's responses to BTG's Interrogatories strongly 26 suggest that Applicant had done little or nothing to insure that 27 the reactor fuel was being meintained in a self-protecting 28 condition.        Finally, one wggk before the most recent pre-hearing
 
I conferent  Applicant ships 2.36 kg of SNM off-site. No mention 2
of this is made at the pre-hearing conference despite the fact 3
thac coe applicability of 10 CFR S 73.60 is a major topic of 4
discussion. Now Applicant and Staff are raising the argument 5
that the recent shipment obviates the need to meet the require-6 ments of 10 CFR S 73.60, ef fectively removing from the Board's 7
jurisdiction the question of Applicant's ability to adequately 8
protect the amount of SNM for which it is seeking a license.
9 The Board has jurisdiction to rule on the ability of 10 the Applicant to assure that it will comply with the regulations 11 and that the issuance of a license will not be inimical to the 12 common defensa and security and will not endanger the public 13 health and safety. This constant subterfuge to the hearing 14 process -is contrary to the policies of the Commission and to the 15 purposes of the Atomic Energy Act and should be stopped.
16 IV 17 CONCLUSION 18 In order to prevail on this portion of its Motion for 19 Summary Disposition NRC Staf f must demonstrate that as a matter 20 of law, Applicant is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 21 S 73.40(a) (sabotage) and 10 CFR S 73.60 (thef t or diversion) .
22 Staff has not done so and its Motion must be denied.
23 Intervenor BTG has shown hereinf that pursuant to 10 CFR 24 S 73.40, Applicant's proposed security plan must provide protec-25 tion against sabotage. There are no facts showing that the plan 26 provides such protection, indeed all of the Staff's arguments 27 suggest that it does not. Therefore, Staff's motion must be 28 denied as to sabotage protection.
91
 
1 Intervenor BTG has also shown that the Applicant is not 2
physically capable of operating the reactor every eight hours, 3
the amount determined by its own calculations to be necessary to 4
maintain self-protecting dose rates in the reactor fuel 5
bundles.      Consequently, possession of the requested amount of 6
SNM, 4700 grams unirradiated and 4700 grams irradiated but not 7
self-protecting, would ncessarily and in all case subject Appli-8 cant to the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60.                      Therefore, Applicant 9
must either have a plan which meets the requirements of 10 CFR 10 S 73.60 or amend its license request to less than 5000 grams of 11 SNM.      If the Board decides otherwise, it will be authorizing 12 possession of formula quantities of SNM without reasonable 13 assurance that the regulations will be complied with and the SNM 14 adequately protected.
15 Finally, Intervenor Bridge the Gap has shown that with 16 the inclusion of the Pu-239 neutron source in its SNM inventory 17 pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60, Applicant without 18 question presently possesses 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM and 19 must meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.
20 Therefore, and without move, NRC Staff's motion should 21 be denied.
22 DATED:        f/ 7
                                                    ~
                                                                    , 1982.
23                                    'I 24                                                Respectfully submitted, Committee To Bridge The Gap i
25 26                                                By              ,              4,
                                                                                      ~ gr 1
Johd#E. Bay 27                                                    Nuclear Law Center Attorneys for Intervenor Bridge 28                                                    The Gap (Contention XX) 22.
l i
i  _.  .        .      - - _              _. .      _ _ _ _
 
        ?          .
UNIVEllSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES                                                                                                          UCLA ce ne s e t          i>o n . sRuw . un ANCt M%                      RIM M Wt' * $4 N IHEUD S AN tu nOSO)                        $4NT4 84RR4R4 5 4NT4 0RUZ f
                                                                                                                                  $ay
                                                                                                                                  'L, i
COhthfUNITY SAFETY DEPARThf ENT OFFICE OF RESEARCil & OCCUPAT!ONAL SAFETY        n LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90024 6 August 1982 3
Mr. Hal Bernard, Acting Branch Chief Standardization and Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing U.S.fluclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.                                      20555                                              Docket 50-142
 
==Dear Mr. Bernard:==
 
This is to advise you that UCLA recently transferred off-site a quantity of unirradiated U-235 reactor fuel sufficient to reduce the total inventory of U-235 at the UCLA facility to 4.92 kilograms - 3.53 kilograms irradiated, and 1.39 kilograms unirradiated. The off-site transfer was completed on July 21, 1982. I have enclosed copies of the fuel transfer forms for this shipment.
l                        As you know, UCLA had been planning for some time to make this fuel transfer in order to remove an unnecessary constraint on future facility operations. In connection with this, in January 1981, the Commission informed UCLA that in order for UCLA to
;                remain exempt from the Commission's upgraded safeguards regulations which became effective in tiovember 1979, UCLA would either have to mainta.in the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel (100 Rem /hr at 3 feet, unshielded) or reduce its inventory of " fresh" fuel in storage [J. R. Miller letter to W. F. Wegst, January 12, 1981].                In response, UCLA informed the Commission that reactor operations were being scheduled to maintain the self-protecting conditions for the in-core fuel but that UCLA was also planning to reduce its unirradiated fuel inventory [W. F. Wegst letter to J. R. Miller, January 29,1981].
UCLA has determined that under normal reactor operating conditions the self-protection criteria are generally satisfied. However, now that the total inventory of reactor fuel at the facility has been reduced to below 5 kilograms, UCLA need not maintain the self-protecting conditions to remain exempt from the safeguards requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.60. As a result UCLA need not be concerned with the possibility that the reactor iay have to be shut down for an extended period of time at some time in the future.
Sincerely, f$                    h i
Walter F. Wegst, Director Office of Research & Occupational
,                                                                                                                              Safety WFW/jb enc.
EXHIBIT A
 
  - _ J.:3 h a:.    .:; m :;:-
:u.a.? :-. ,igrAd.-l:c;GQv.yr: :. FW.WK. :?PP.TC=:T""'"C'T:wW "I .V
_a= w ' u-c Ms asum
                                                                                        -n. = x x ;: n      ---        -
        '                                                        ,f %,
: f.        A  -
id    f j
                                                                ?. .AdsE g .k /jf
: m. -
RULEMAKING ISSUE                            '
June 12, 1981                                    (Affirmation)
SECY-81-376 f
For:                            The Commissioners From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
 
==Subject:==
 
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NONPOWER REACTO POSSESSING A FCRMULA QUANTITY OF SSNM Purcose:
To provide the Commissioners with (1) a status report on the 22 nonpower reactor licensees listed in SECY 79-1878; (2) a reso-lution of the issues listed in SECY 79-187C; (3) a discussion of alternative physical security requirements for nonpower reactors possessing a formula quantity or greater of SSNM; and (4) a recom-mendation on the preferred alternative.
Discussion:                  Backorcund On July 24, 1979, the Commission approved a recommendation that nonpower reactor (NPR) licensees be deferred from implementing the requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule, and that in the
                              ~
interim new Category II (973.67) physical protection requirements as well as previous existing requirements (S73.60) be applied to nonpower reactor licensees who possess formula quantities of SSNM. -
The interim requirements were to continue in force until certain nonpower reactor issues were resolved and a determination was made on what physical protection requirements are actually needed at these particular nonpower reactor facilities, given the unique type, form, and enrichment levels of the reactor fuel. The Commission asked the staff for an interim status report in 120 days which would give a more definitive explanation of the nonpower
 
==Contact:==
C. K. Nulsen, SGRI                                                    '
42-74181 e
8 EXHIBIT B Cf                    ..
 
i          :.                                                                                                              -
The Commissioners                                                  2 reactor problem and actions being taken to determine the appropriate physical protection requirements for these facilities.            The interim status report was published on December 19, 1979, as SECY 79-187C.
The four paper    areissues        identified in SECY the determination  of:  79-187C and addressed in this 1.
What radiation dose rate levels are needed for exemption purposes, (review the l'00 rem /hr at 3 feet standard),
2.
What safeguards credit should be given for fuel type and reactor design, 3.
What constitutes " contiguous site" based on reasonable applica-tion of 10 CFR 73.60,
: 4.      What safeguards credit should be given for intermediate enrichments of fuel.
Nonpower Reactor Status Report                                  .
In SECY 79-1878, 22 nonpower reactor licensees were listed as haJvin ] licenses to possess a formula quantity or more of SSNM. Of those 22, seven have taken 6F~ dye ~taking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession authoriza-tion _below a formula quantity. These seven licensees are:
o      Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia o      Pennsylvania State University o      University of Missouri (Rolla)                ~
o      University of Washington o      Rensselear Polytechnical Institute o      Westinghouse, Zion, Illinois                                          ,
                                  , , -    o      University of California (Los Angeles)
The remaining fifteen nonpower reactor licensees will continue to possess 5 kgs or more of highly enriched uranium (HEU) casite and the determination of the appropriate safeguares category for each of these reactors is contingent upon the resolution of the issues addressed in this paper. These fifteen nonpower reactors are:
o        General Electric, Vallecitos, California o        Georgia Tech o        Massachusetts Institute of Technology o        Union Carbide, Tuxedo, New York o        Rhode Island AEC                            .
o        University of Michigan o        University of Virginia O
y    ,.- ,,                  r,    .m-_.~ , .- ,
 
                                                                -                    ~
f      es The Commissioners                          3 o    Oregon State University o    Texas A&M University o    University of Wisconsin o    Washington State University o    Virginia Polytechnical Institute o    General Atomic, La Jolla, California o    University of Missouri (Columbia) o National Bureau of Standards (NBS)
Resolution of Issues
: 1. Radiation Levels. Los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory (LASL) has performed a study to assist in determining if a technical basis exists for exempting certain facilities from Category I physical security requirements because of fuel irradiation levels.
As a part of the study, LASL examined the time it would take an adversary to steal a formula quantity of SSNM in the form of irradiated fuel from a reactor facility in order to calculate total exposure of an adversary to a source having a radiation dose rate of 100 rem /hr at 3 feet." It also discussed the likelihood that an adversary would be detected if certain radiation detection systems were in place. A detailed summary of the findings of this study is provided in Enclosure B. The following is a synopsis of the major points made by the study.
Radiation. The study found no strong technical basis for changing NRC policy on the 100 rem /hr dose rate exemption level and made several interesting observations without endorsing any particular level of radiation as an exemption standard. It pointed out that a dose rate level of 10,000 rems /hr would be necessary to cause immediate incapacitation and certain death within hours, and a dose rate level of about 2000 rem /hr would give high assurance of eventual death based on short exposure time. However, it further stated that although the_100 rem /hr dose rate level may not result
                                                              ~
in an incapacitatino dose, it does provide a deterrence based on the potentially hazardous health effects of nuclear radiation.
Whereas this deterrence applies to any radiation dose rate level, the present e'xemption criterion establishes a degree of certainty that the radiation dose rates for material qualifying the licensee for exemption will be at least at the 100 rem /hr level and therefore offers more assurance of deterrence and detection than would the absence of a specified level of radiation.' Additionally, it was pointed out that there is a cumulative dose effect of radiation when multiple fuel rods are handled individually over a period of
        " Presently, a licensee is exempt frca most physical protection requirements at fixed sites (e.g., 573.6(e) and $73.67(b)(1)(1)) to the extent he possesses not readily separable SSNM with a total external radiation dose rate exceeding 100 rems per hour at 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding - hereinafter referred to as the 100 rem /hr dose rate level. Other dose rate levels are defined and referred to similarly.
 
g    .*
The Commissioners                            4 time.
This radiation    adds anlevel.
exposure  increased deterrence factor because of increased In support of the present exemption, the 100 rem /hr at 3 feet (1 meter for IAEA) radiation dose rate exemption criterion is an internationally accepted standard and substantial proof of the need to alter the radiation levels for        '
purposas of defining self protecting nuclear material should exist before it is abandoned. In addition, the 100 rem /hr criterion also applies for exemption purposes to other than just NPR licensees.
It presently applies to fuel-away-from power-reactor storage-sites and serves as a threshold level for determining the type of protec-tion required for irradiated fuel in transit. Fuel with a dose rate above the 100 rem /hr level is treated as irradiated; fuel at /j or below this level is treated as unirradiated.
Also, irradiating fuel beyond the 100 rem /hr dose rate level for the sole purpose of obtaining higher assurance of protecting fuel rods against theft rather than for operational necessity, is contrary to health and safety management practices as expressed in the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle. Maintaining higher radiation leveIs also in, creases the potential consequences of sabotage.
Time.
The minimum time for obtaining access to a formula quantity of SSNM and removing it is a function of fuel type, reactor design and building layout and is thus site specific. The time is dependent on the shielding of the reactor; the difficulty of removal of the fuel elements from the reactor core; the number of elements that must be removed; the distance the elements must be moved to reach a get-away vehicle; the difficulty of neutralizing doors and alarms that must be bypassed, and the number of such obstacles; the number of individuals involved in the theft; and the process by which the vehicle is loaded. According to LASL the total time necessary for the theft from a typical NPR up to the time the .
vehicle leaves the site is from 1.25 to 1.5 hours, if all of the fuel elements taken are from the reactor. Most of that time is spent in removing the elements from the pool rather than in the
                    -  transfer from the pool to the vehicle, which could be acccmplished in less than 1/2 hour. If a minimum number of fuel elements are taken from the core and the majority are taken from a storage vault, the total time for the theft would be reduced but probably
                      , would take at least 1/2 hour.
Since in most cases it would take the adversary over an hour to remove the formula quantity of SSNM from the core and storage vault, and in many cases considerably longer, it would appear prudent to allow the facility's physical protection system to depend upon offsite response forces to prevent the successful removal of a formula quantity. Most local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) would be able to respond effectively within a half-hour.
The proposed requirement for offsite response capability could be
 
' *I                                                                                          Los ANGELLW EClioub or ENGINEERING
* AMD APPLIED SCIENCE f4EMORAtlDUf4 25 August 1982 T0:    W. Cormier 2241 fiurphy FROM: il. Ostrander 2567 Boelter Hall SUBJ: flEL Fuel Inventory Since 1970 I have constructed the attached inventory record for your response to Mr. Bay's request of August 18, 1982. Inventorial practices have changed over the several AEC-ERDA-f4RC administrations and even within the lifetime of the flRC. The general trend has been tE add detail by distributing                                              -
inventory into an increasing number of categories. Descriptive words have been replaced by a three symbol code. There have been several generations of such codes, and no assurance that they are one-for-one translatable.
For example, one can translate " encapsulated, enriched, unirradiated, uranium-alloy scrap" into the category " uranium" but the inverse
        'transfonnation is not possible.
All of this goes to say-that I have made a best effort to provide a complete record, but I have had to make some interpretations based upon continuity of category by continuity of numbers. I cannot attest to the absolute accuracy of the record. I think it is a reasonable, but not necessarily unique interpretation of the available records.          ,
IrlVErlTORY OF U-235 ISOT0'PE,Ifl FUEL, kg Irradiated fuel                            Fresh. Fuel TOTAL DATE In-Core        In Pits              Useful            Scrap                                  .
3-31-70              3.50            -                    -
0.02              3.52 6-30-71              3.50            -
2.53            0.02          --
16.~  05 n.
12-31-71                3.56            0.73                3.74            0.94            i,8. 97 12-21-74                3.55            0.73                3.74              0.60          (862}
9-30-80              3.53              -                  3.74              0.60          7J7h 7
9-30-81              3.53              -
3.75                -
                                                                                                        }7$.28j7 8-25-82              3.53              -
1.39                -
4.92
                                                          *7 Except for th'e small burn-up M. egym                    pEr&-yea7 $)h, the inventories are constant over any interval between afijaceritTates. E.g., from 12-31-74 to 9-30-80, the total inventory was approximately 8.62 kilograms. The dates are inventorial record dates and not the actual dates of the material transfer.
EXHIBIT C I'Niver# CITV n F (* 4 f TFOVINI A W!.etterhead f or interdettertinental use)
 
r .*
JOHN H. BAY DOROTilY THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CENTER 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 Los Angeles, Califo rnia 90048 Telephone:        (415) 393-9234 (213) 453-3973 Attorneys For Intervenor (Contention XX)
Committee To Bridge The Gap UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD IN THE MATTER OF                                      )
                                                                  )    Doc. No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY                          )
OF CALIFORNIA                                          )
                                                                  )    (Proposed Renewal
( UCLA Research Reactor)                              )      of Facility
                                                                  )        License No. R-71)
INTERVENORS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER TO: APPLICANT, THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
Intervenor, Committee to Bridge the Gap, requests that applican t, The Regents of the University of California, answer i
the following interrogatories separately and fully under oath, pursuant to Section 2.740b of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reg ulations, and that the answers be signed by the person making them and served on intervenor on August 9,                      1982        These in terrog-atories are served pursuant to court order at the Pre-hearing Conference held on Wednesday, June 30, 1982.
In answering these interrogatories, please furnish all info rmation that is available to applican t,                    including , without l imi ta tion , information in possession of applicant's attorneys, s
EXHIBIT D
_ . .      . , .. n.._..        ..        . . . .  . w..n -. .
 
t  s agents and employees, not merely information known to the per-sonal knowledge of the person making the answers. If the person making the answers cannot answer any of the following in te rrog -
atories in f ull af ter exercising the reasonable diligence to secure the information, please so state, and then answer the interrogatories to the f ullest extent possible, specifying the reasons for the inability to answer, and further describing the ef forts undertaken to secure the information, and setting forth any knowledge applicant may have concerning the unanswered portions.
I.
DEFINITION OF TERMS As used in the following inte rroga torie s,  the following terms shall have the following meanings.
: 1. The term "UCLA/NEL" means the Regents of the University of California, the University of California at Los Angeles, the Nuclear Energy Laboratory at UCLA, their agents, employees and representa tive s.
: 2. The terms "you" and "your" shall mean UCLA/NEL.
: 3. The te rm " the reactor" shall mean the Argonaut type nuclear reactor located in Boelter Hall on the UCLA campus.
: 4. The term " reactor facility" shall mean the build-i ng , room s , and structures, containing and surrounding the reactor which are related to the operation, maintenance and fuel storage of the reactor.
: 5. The te rm " SNM" shall mean special nuclear materials as that te rm is defined in 10 CFR Section 73.2(x).
: 6. The te rm "U-2 3 5" shall mean Uranimum in the U-235 2.
            - ~ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
 
I r            .*
i so tope .
: 7.      The term " communication" shall mean any transfer of                                                                          !
l l
information be tween two or more parties.
: 8.      The term " application" shall mean the application for relicensing of the UCIA Research Reactor filed by the Regents 4
of the Univeristy of California en February 28, 1980 and the amendments thereto.
: 9.      The term "present" shall mean as of the date of applicant's response to these in terroga tories .
II.
1 INTERROGATORIES
)                                INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
l                                                                                                                                                  .
Please provide a table or data for the period of January 1,                    1970 to the present, which indicates for each day dur ing tha t pe riod , the amount of U-235 enriched more than 20%,
which was at the reactor facility, and not in the core of the reactor.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
Please provide a table or data for the period of January 1,                  1970 to the present, which indicates for each day during that period, the amount of U-235 enriched more than 20%,
1 which was in the core of the reactor.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
Please provide a table or data for the period from January          1, 1970 to the present, which indicates for each day dur ing that period the amoun t of U-235 enriched more than 20%
which was in the fuel storage holes.
3.
i
                    ; e. . < .. m. , y,,. :. . . . . . r 7 ,. y , ;.
                                                                .          ..s. . :      x.    , . ,        .      ;.      ..
                                                                                                                                  . . a_. ., , % , x _3, m      , y , ,,
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__-.___"_._,                                                          e6w r                  **          #
                        .  ,-          _.                                                        _                  _ , _          . . -    _'eie.-        . . _
                                                                                                                                                                  =,.'..aC-
 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
lias UCLA/NEL ever had more than 5,000 grams of U-235 enriched more than 20%, with a total external radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rems per hour at a distance of three feet unshielded, at the reactor facility?    If it has, please indicate:
(a)  The dates upon which this condition occurred; (b)  The circumstances which resulted in this condi-tion; and (c)  Precisely how you were able to determine that the condition existed.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
Please indicate, for the period January 1, 1970 to the present, each date upon which the U-235 in the reactor core had an ex ternal radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshield ed .
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
Please describe how the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the reactor core is determined.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
If the answer to Interrogatory No. 6 indicates that the determination is made by direct measurement, please indicate:
(a)    At what frequency the measurements are taken; (b)    Whether measurements are taken for each plate, each bundle, or for the whole core; (c)    Each date upon which such measurement has been take n , and the results thereof; (d)    The accuracy of the measurement instrument and the basis upon which you make this assessment of its accuracy.
4.
 
t      .*
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:
If the answer to Interrogatory No. 6 indicates that the determination is made by some method other than direct measure-the calculations, data, and ment,        please describe such method and                                                            ,
resource materials used as a basis for using such a method making                              :.: -
the de termination.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
NY$hhh?
Describe the operating conditions necessary to keep the in a state of having an external                        . m. .r . :.
U-235 in the reactor core radiation dose rate of greater than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded, including but not limited to:
(a)  The power at which the reactor must be operated; (b)  The amount of time which the reactor must be operated.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:
how many Af ter a period of normal operating conditions,                          .:;; e days of non operation does it require for the U-235 in the reactor core to drop below an external radiation dose rate of 100 dWns.q.-
Rem per ho ur a t 3 feet unshielded?
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:
increase or Please describe any f actors which would in the answer to Interroga-decrease the number of days indicated tory No . 10.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
i
:}k@@
                                                                                                        .. a In order to maintain the external radiation dose rate                    m/= -
,                                                                                                  as;;g of the U-235 in the reactor core at a level greater than 100 Rem                        . . .
day shutdown ,
          - per hour at three feet unshielded , during a three
              ///
5.
ef;y
                                              . . . - - - . ,    . . .    ..      a.    .  .
 
e            ..
for how many hours and at what power would the reactor have to run prior to that shutdown?
INTERROGATORY NO. 13:
Have any rules or procedures regarding the operation 1
and use of the reactor been imposed to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is at all times in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded?                If so, please describe :
(a)            Each such rule or procedure; (b)          When each such rule or procedure was implemented .
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
Please describe the procedures that exist in order to insure that the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the reactor core is maintained a t ove r 100 Rem pe r hour a t 3 fee t unshield ed , for each of the following situations; (a)          Long weeke nd s ;
(b)          Holidays or vacations; (c)          Final examination periods; i
(d)          Quarter breaks; (e)          Ref ueling ;
( f)          In-core maintenance; (g)            Experiments requiring in core placement; (h)            Experiments requiring reactor shutdown several days prior to or af ter the experiment;
( i)          Maintenance or calibration requiring a reactor shutdown of several days; (j)            Unintentional SCRAMS or other malfunctions, the cause or repair of which cannot be determined or accomplished 6.
 
t    .*
within several days; (k)      Lack of business or other reason to operate the reactor other than for the purpose of maintaining the radiation level of the f uel .
INTERROGATORY NO. 15:
Has UCLA/NEL made any commitment to the NRC to keep the U-235 in the reactor core in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded? If so, please indicate how the commitment was communicated , e.g. ,
license amendment, letter, oral communication, and give the dates for each such communication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16:
If the answer to Interrogatory No.14 is in the affir-mative , please indicate each date af ter such a committment                was made, on which the U-235 in the reactor core had an external dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour three feet unshield ed .
INTERROGATORY NO. 17:
Does the proposed Technical Specifications contained in the Application include a three week cooling of f period for the reactor prior to fuel operations?                  If they do, please indicate what procedures would be used to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is kept in a state of having an external radiation dose rate of greater than 100 Rem per hour at three fee t unshielded , dur ing this cooling of f period .
INTERROGATORY NO. 18:
In the event of a reactor malfunction or SCRAM which would normally require shutting down the reactor for a sufficient period of time for the U-235 in the core of the reactor to reach 7.
MM4kN            .hw4e e e.+e      em a"    =  *4  e            "N es
 
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a state of having an external radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour 3 feet unshielded, which would take precedence,
                                                      ~
the need to maintain the radiation level, or the need to evaluate and repair the malfunction?
INTERROGATORY NO. 19:
Has the NRC ever canmunicated to UCLA/NEL that UCLA/NEL needed to reduce its SNM inventory in order to insure that it wa s in compliance with NRC regulations?    If so, please describe each such communication and the date on which it occurred.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20:
Has UCLA/NEL ever been found in non-compliance with NRC security or safeguard regulations?    If so, please describe each such viola tion and the date on which it occurred .
INTERROGATORY NO. 21:
i What is the highest dose rate for irradiated U-235 pe rmitted to be stored in the spent fuel storage holes by    _-
UCLA/NEL's current license?
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:
i Does UCLA/NEL assert that from the present to the year 2000, the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the core    A
                                                                            /
of the reactor will never be less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet /
unshialded?    If not, please indicate under what circumstances theE dose rate is expected to be less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshield ed .
INTERROGATORY NO. 23:
Please indicate the minimum quantity of U-235 which is necessary to operate the reactor and still have it able to
        ///
8.
 
em the functions, experiments and tasks which it now per-
                                                                                                                      .a
  .ROGATORY NO. 24:
Please indicate the maximum quantity of U-235 which can sintained in the reactor core under current and proposed
                                                                                          **%1>~.,*, . . . - l J ' * -;,
ases.
RROGATORY NO. 25_:
in response to        khk[hh5hh57}
Please provide all facts not provided above interrogatories which indicate under UCLA/NEL's pro-                            :#. w . x w .y                    .
c.y, that UCLA/NEL's inventory of SNM at the
  .d operating license,
: tor f acility will not exceed 5,000 grams of U-235 enriched in excess of 100                .
a than 20% not having ar. external dose rate per hour at 3 feet unshield ed .                                                                  -
                                                              /
DATED:  July 20, 1982.                        ,f            ,
                                                          /          ,
                                                                                                                        ~
By              [    ~
                                                                    ,/      f'                  -        -
                                                                        ~
4 John li. 4 Bay                                                              . .
Attorneys for Intervenor                            '' . .'. . '"" Yd'#
(Contention XX) f55 h$rEOhbs5p l
i s  \n >YN.'~ 5l& s ., ,
q    Q
                                                                                              % -f.M Wit
                                                                                                !:G 2 9 2 0 .:g w w q e.~g.w w .
                                                                                                            ,          , ; .-e-9          a 9.
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                                        - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - .          . . . ..
 
  ; .a                                                -
UNITED STATES OF AFERICA UUCLEAR RECULATCRY CCMMSSION
                                ,      BEFCRE . TEE ATOMIC SAFCY AND LICENS1UC EGARD In the Matter of                                      )                  Docket No. 50-142 OL          ,
TIE RECENTS CF TIE UNIVERSITY                                            (Proposed Renewal of OF CALIFORNIA                                          )                  Facility License)
                                                        .      )
(UCLA Research Reacter) ,[                            )
[.            CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached:                              Intervenors' First Set of Interrogatoriss on Contention XX Pursuant to                                              .
_ Board Order in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States          mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated.
on this date:            July 20, 1982                                      ,
John H. Frye, III, Chairman Christine Helwick Clenn R. Woods Atomic Safety & Licensing Bo'ard                                      Office of Ceneral Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                    590 university Hall Washington, D.C. 20555                                      '
2200 University Avenue Berkeley, CA 94720 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge                                                  Sarah Shirley Atomic Safety & Licensing B6ard                                      Deputy City Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                    Office of the City Attorney Washington, D.C. 20555                                                City Hall Dr. Oscar H. Paris                      '
1685 Fain Street Santa Monica, CA 90401 Administrative JudCe Atomic Safety and Licensing Board                                    Committee to Bridge the Gap U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                    1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Washington, D.C. 20555              .    ,                          Los Ar,3eles, California 90025 Chief. Docketing and Service Section (3)                              Daniel Hirsch
!      Office of the Secretary ..                                            P.O. Box 1186                            ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                    een Lomond, CA 95005 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dorothy Thompson Counsel for NRC Staff                        .
Nuclear Law Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co:t. mission Wanhington, D.C. 20555                                                6300 Wilshire Blvd.. Suite 1200        .
Los Angeles, CA 90048            .
attention:          Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead William H. Cormier                                                                      -
* l      Office of Administrative Vice Chancellor i      Universitya6f California
[          [
* l      405' Hilgard Avenue                '*
John gay Los Angeles, California 90024                                        Counsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE 'IO BRDCE THE GAP
 
t  ,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!1 MISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAPD In the Matter of                )
                                          )        Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OP TIIE UNIVERSITY  )  (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA                  )        License Number R-71)
                                          )
(UCLA Research Reactor)          )        August 9, 1982
                                          )
UNIVERSITY'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX PROPOUNDING PARTY:                    Intervenor Committee to Bridge the Gap RESPONDING PARTY:                      Applicant The Regents of the University of California SET NUMBER:                            One DONALD L. REIDHAAR GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE HELWICK 590 University Hall 2200 University Avenue Berkeley, California 94720 Telephone:    (415) 642-2822 Attorneys for Applicant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA EXHIBIT E
 
                                                                                      --j
                                                                        , ,                          g-Nh                                                                    R s
3                                .s x                    ,        A TifE REGENTS OF TIIE UNIVERSITY -OF CAI,IFORNIQ 4 University) r~
responds' to the Committee to Bridge the Gap's first sot of inter-m                                                                                                                                              . ,
rogatories cin Contention XX as followdi                                                            '
                                                              ~,w a        ''                        "
x.
                                    -                                                                                  q  G.
3_,  j'            t l
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1
(                              '
University objects to the qucistion to-the ' extent that the question seeks specific figures on the ' quantity of t.Se' fuer M
                                                                                                                                                                ~
present at,' the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds; that the compilatidn of such specific informatio,n would be unreasonably burde some, would require the release of protected _
information and that such specific information is, ncin" reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidpnce admissible on.
the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the' scope of' discovery that has been permitted by the Board.                              Nc twithstanding , and~ with$ut                                                                    '
                          ~                                                                                  '
waiving, the aforesaid objectionsc, Univiirditiy J. answers as follows :
s,                                          ,
For each day of the periodflers than 6 kilcgrams of U-235 enriched more than 20% ,was at the reactor ;facil'ity and not in the core 'of_                                                                                                        _
the reactor except for periods o$ major _ ''in core"                              z                            maintenance when the "in-core" fuel was removed from the core.                                                                  The'last s
period of major "in-core" maintenance occurred in 1974.-                                                                            As a result of the most recent transfer ' of fu'el of f-si te, unirradiated fuel in storge on-site ha's bien reducrN1 to 'l.39, kilograms.                                                                                                N Irradiated fuel in the core is .3'.53 kilograms.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2                              -
University objects, to' th.m.' question t o the extent that the question seeks specific figures on thejquantity o,fsthe fuel 6
s A
9
_m.      ,,,__s            -  -    - - + - - - - -                    ~r      .a,    . - , , - - -                sen
 
t e present at the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds that the compilation of such specific information would be un-reasonably burdensome, would require the release of protected information and that such specific information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board.      Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:
For each day of the period, less than 3.6 kilograms of U-235 enriched more than 20% was in the core of the reactor.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3 University objects to the question to the extent that the question seeks specific figures on the quantity of the fuel present at the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds that the compilation os such specific information would be un-reasonably burdensome, would require the release of protected information and that such specific information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence dismissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CPR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:
For each day of the period, less than 4700 grams of U-235 enriched more than 20% was in the fuel storage holes.      In general, irradiated fuel is either in the core or in the storage pits, and the total quantity of irradiated fuel in the reactor room has not exceeded 4700 grams.
2-
 
t  s RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4 University objects to this question to the extent that the question seeks to explore operating conditions that may have occurred in the period prior to the adoption of the upgraded safeguards regulations applicable to University's facility which became effective November 21, 1979 on the grounds that such information is not relevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:    To the knowledge, of University's staff for the period since November 21, 1979, no.
(a) Not applicable (b) Not applicable (c) Not applicable RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5 See the objections stated and the response given to Interrogatory No. 4, above.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6 The precise dose rate is not determined except that calculations have been made to determine the conditions that would result in an external dose rate of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet, unshielded. The basic calculation is presented in the attached Exhibit "A".
t              ,
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7 Not applicable.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8 See response to Interrogatory No. 6, above.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9 See response to Interrogatory No. 6, above.                                                              .
1 i                              RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10 Approximately 14 days.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Level of operations or schedule of operations or other variations in power history.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 The parameters of the problem have been incompletely described        but in any case, the answer involves a complex calculation that has not been made.                                    See response to Interrogatories Nos. 6,10 and 11, above.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13 l
There are no written rules or procedures.                                                However, the reactor is operated an average 200 KWH per week which provides a conservative operating margin for meeting the self-protecting conditions.
(a) See response above
]                                                  (b) Specific attention was made to observing the self -protecting conditions beginning in January 1981.
i
    - - ~        ---        -          --4          .  , , . . - - _ _ _ _ , _ , - . . _      ,m      - - . - . _ _ . , - - _ .          - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _
 
1
* RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14 As a result of the recent reduction in total fuel inventory at UCLA, the University is no longer concerned with maintaining the self-protecting conditions.
(a) through (k), not applicable, j
.                                RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15 4
University agreed to maintain the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel or to reduce its fuel inventory.
The committment was communicated by letter from Wegst to Miller, dated January 29, 1981, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
RESPONSE.TO INTERROGATORY No. 16 Assuming "No. 14" should read "No. 15", the answer is there are no such dates.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17 Yes.      There are no such procedures; see response to Interrogatory No. 14, above.
1 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18 University cannot speculate on such hypothetical situations except to note that there is no requirement to maintain the radiation level given the current fuel inventory 1
at the UCLA facility.
l RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19 t
Not to the knowledge of University's staff but see the Miller to Wegst letter, dated January 12, 1982, attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
i i
 
t  * -
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20 University objects to the question to the extent that the question seeks security information unrelated to radiation dose rate of the irradiated fuel on the grounds that such information is protected information and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board.            Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:                    With respect to maintaining the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel, University has never been found in non-ccmpliance with NRC security or safeguard regulations.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21 There are no specific dose rate limitations.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22 No. During period of major "in-core" maintenance and lower than average operational intensity.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23 The precise minimum quantity is unknown.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24 The precise maximum is unknown.          Under the present configuration with the presently available fuel composition no more than 4 kilograms U-235.
l t
l l
i
 
v s -
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25 University objects to the question on the grounds that it is unclear, ambiguons and imprecise in that it seems to require that the University speculate on what regulatory requirements will be in effect throughout the proposed relicensing period.
Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:  There are no additional facts not provided in response to-the interrogatories above.
Dated:  August 9, 1982 DONALD L. REIDlIARR GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE IIELWICK By        s' William 11. Cormier UCLA Representative i
l s
VERIFICATI0fl fleill C. Ostrander, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Manager of the Nuclear Energy Laboratory of University, The Regents of the University of California; that he has read the annexed " University's Response to Intervenor's First Set of Interrogatories on Contention XX" and knows the contents thereof; and that the same are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
haUe.Osw &
Neill C. Ostrander Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of January,1982
            ,.      8 7.-      -
                                          'A Notary Public                  ,j OrF#CI AL F 8 A L.            (
f[ h5O 'A q
              .f TONIV0 GEL PUPUC C#Ur0Rfil4 l      ?;')ll;)tt778RY PM.%CsVan OtttCt 1N i            e-      LOS ANGELEG COtJr.Ty d*"'      My Comm. (sp, hov. 20, t%5
        } ::::::::-:::::::
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S -
The conservative (under-estimating) nature of the dose rate calculation resides in the fact that the assumed five year annual power of about 15 f4wh/yr has been exceeded for every year since 1976, and is currently running at a rate greater than 20 th,h/yr.
Neill C. Ostrander fluclear Energy Laboratory UCLA    .
July 1982 6
 
Exhibit "A" s  -
Fuel Self Protectiun Calculation 1
The radiation intensity 0 at distance r from the core center after.
* an operational history P(T) extending over a time interval T followed by a down time t is approximately                                                  ,            ;
                                              ^
D=          2                    P(T)(T + t - T)-I ?-2                    dT' I
43r                  0                                                                    o '  m
                                                                      ~
1            -. a    -s,
                                                                                                                ~
l                  This formulation assumes that all of the delayed gammas are emitteli at the core center, and the numerical calculations assume that three feet-from the nearest accessible surface is equivalently four feet from the core center.              The constant A depends upon the units chosen but represents the conversion from the energy release P(T)dt at T to the incremental dose dD at t.                                                                                            -
The precise evaluation of the equation over the entire operating i                  history of the reactor amounts to a summation of all contributions to the i                  integral for those times for which P(1) > 0. The results shown below are i                  based upon the following simplified model which underestimates the actual radiation level.
i                        1) fleglect all contribution from the history prior to 5 years ago.
l                      ,
Thus, today, T=0 corresponds to approximately August 1, 1977.
;                        2) Assume 3 years (say 8-1-77 through 7-31-80) at an. average uniform power level of 15 Mwh per year.
: 3) Assume that the subsequent 2 years (say 8-1-80 through 7-31-82) i                                can be characterized by two components:
i                                a) a periodic component produced by a 200 kwh energy generation (treated as a Dirac delta function) every seven days, 'and superposed thereupon; b) a random, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Mwh/yr.
!                                llote that the sum of (a) and (b) is equivalently 15.4 Mwh/yr.
These assumptions lead to the following radiation dose rates at 3 feet from the nearest accessible surface following a shat down of t weeks.
i Time, t (weeks)                                            Dose Rate (R/hr) at 3 feet
:                                                    1                                                                      142.
I                                                                                                                              v 2                                                                      107.
3                                                                      91' 4                                                                      83 r                        The dates indicated in assumptions (1),(2) and (3) are arbitrary and
;                  could have been represented by phrases such as five years ago and two years ago to reflect the moving average aspect of a calculation which is not l
actually performed on a day-by-day or any other periodic basis.
l l
1 of 2 i
i
 
t              *                                                                                                                                        ,
UNIVEllSI'IT OF CALIFOllNIA, LOS ANGELES                                                                                                                                                                                        UCLA
                                                                                                                                                                      .g#. g , p.o.s
                                                                                                                                                                                -~
e tnke.i ty . p u is - ent is t.            . tro n cLL n        un inslot                  a m tise co . sss o n oca .co                            ,,
54str eaansi.g                                .      S nr4 cm;g
                                                                                                                                          .                          9:g.:.y s ,.... y
                      *                                                                                                  .                                                          CO3IMUNITY SA FETY DEPAliT\ LENT OFHCE OF ftESEABCit te OCCUPATIONAL SAk't::TY -
LOS ANCELES. CAL 1}OHNLV.4An4 January 29, 1981 d
r James R. Miller, Chief                                                                                                                                                                                                      '
Standardization and Special Projects Branch r                                  Division of Licensing
!                                  U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.                                    20555
 
==Dear Mr. Miller:==
 
In reference to your letter of January 12, 1981: We are
<                                    scheduling reactor operations to conform with the self-protection
-                                    criteria for the in-core fuel. As this represents a temporary
,                                  arrangement, we are proceeding to identify viable options for the I                                  reduction of our unirradiated Sf;M inventory.                                                                                                              ,
Two options have been identified; (1) transfer to the DOE Lawrence Livermore flational Laboratory (LLl!L), and (2) return to 00E, Idaho Falls. The DOE and LLi!L have tentatively indicated I
the acceptability of either destination, subject to approval of final plans.
1 ll Very truly yours, N            itT [ bb.:.h                                    /
Walter F. Wegst, Director j                                                                                                                                  ,
Research & Occupational Sa fety i
UFtl/flC0/lc I
j                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .
)
  ,,,____,__,....__,_yr-__,                __
_____,.,_-__..,m_,
                                                                                                                                                  , , ,    -__._....m__..___..                  - , _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ . _ . . _ , _ _ , _ . . . . _ _ ,
 
Exhibit "C"
            %    =                  '
[s,.o necq 'o                                  '
UNITED STATES 8 D ., 't                                            NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E,
: f. E*                                                    WASHirJG TOtJ, D. C. 20555
                ~
og<        d                                                  .                                                                                                                            .
                            %****(/                                                                                                          .
JAN J1 393 7 Dr. Wal ter F. Wegst                                                    .
University of California at Los Angeles Director of Research and                                                                                                                                                  "
Occupational Safety                                                                                                                                                  ,
Office of Environmental llealth and Safety Los Angeles, California 90024
 
==Dear Dr. yegst:==
 
i                                      Following a site visit and review of your Physical Security Plan by HRC, we have determined that the UCLA reactor operating and SNM storage sites are contiguous. As such the facility must implement interim Category I physical security requirements. These requirements are currently contained in 10 CFR Parts 73.67(a)(b)(c)(d) and 73.60.
I In order to be exempt from the above requirements, the fuel in storage would have to be shipped to another location or the reactor would have to be operated to maintain the fuel irradiation level at a dose rate of 100 rem /hr at 3 feet fron any accessible surface.
(See 10 CFR 73.6(b) and 73.67(b)(1)(i)).
}                                        By January 31, 1981, please indicate your confirmation' of the above and- your j                                        plan for compliance with this temporary adjustment.
l                                                                                                                                    Sincerely,                                      .
  \
  )
                                                                                                                                                                  $/ ' 4t ,,/    ,
                                                                                                                                    )f-n p,,f* f''U.f
                                                                                                                                        !                                            1
                                                                                                                        / James R. Miller, Chief
                                                                                                                              / Standardization & Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing 4
i 1
1 i
e---,                                              _.,,,,n 3-,,-.-,,--.-,w.,..,-                          -,--m
                                                                , , ,,  7,.,  ,.,,n,_---  , , , _ . , - , , . - ,            .,-g,,    ma  w - , , _ , -  en -
_w.~ -
                                                                                                                                                                            - ,__e,e.    . , , _ - . _.n.n_a      ,,-  s,e,
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of                    )
                                          )                Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY      )          (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA                    )                License Number R-71
                                          )
(UCLA Research Reactor)            )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached: UNTVERSTTY'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date:Auaust 9, 1982.
John H. Frye, III, Chairman                    Mr. Daniel Hirsch Administrative Judge                          Cte. to Bridge the Gap ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD              1637 Butler Avenue, #203 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission              Los Angeles, CA 90025 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. John Bay, Esq.
Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke                            3755 Divisadero #203 Administrative Judge                          San Francisco, CA 94123 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission            Mr. Daniel Hirsch Washington, D.C. 20555                        Box 1186 Ben Lomond, CA 95005 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Administrative Judge                          Nuclear Law Center ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD              c/o Dorothy Thomson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission              6300 Wilshire Blvd., #1200 Washington, D.C. 20555                        Los Angeles, CA 90048 Counsel for the NRC Staff                      Ms. Sarah Shirley OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR        Deputy City Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission            City Hall Washington, D.C. 20555                        1685 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90401 Chief, Docketing and Service Section OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l            "
WILLIAM H. CORMIER UCLA Representative THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
 
t .
Questions and Clarification as to " Fuel Self Protection Calculation", by lieill Ostrander, dated July 1962("F.xhibit A")
A. As to the equation in sentence 1:
(1) 'dhat is the source of the equation?
(a) If the source is a book, article, report or other document, i
give its title, author, publisher, dats, page number, and other appropriate identifying infornation and indicate why you believe it is the appropriate equation to use.
(b) If derived by your staff or personnel, how was it derived and what assumptions were used in its derivation?
(2) What is the source of the nunerical exponential          "-1.2", and why is it enployed in said equation?
(a) If the source of the exponential is a book, article, report or other document, give its title, author, publisher, date, page number, and other appropriate identifying information and indicate why it is appropriate to use it.
i b) If derived by your staff or personnel, how was it derived and what assumptions were used in its derivation?
(3) 'lhat is the value which was used for the constant "A" in the equation, and what are the units in which it is expressed, as used to obtain the results in paragraph 3?
j                    (a) If the source of the constant is a document, please identify the document as above, and indicate why you think it is the appropriate value to use.
(b) If derived, how was it derived, and what assumptions were used in its derivation?
(c) '.las the constant obtained by actual measurement or by calculation? What approxinations and assumptions are nade in so obtaining the constant?
B. As to part 3a of the calculation:
                'das the periodic component of 200k1 energy generation every seven days assumed to be regular with tino or to be variable with time?
(i.e., did you assune 200Mih output on day 1, 200kdh on day 8, 200kJh on day 15, etc.: or did you assume, e.g.100Mih on day 1, 75k.ih on day 5,130Mih on day 16, etc. , which would average out to be 200kWh each week?)
C. As to the "randon, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Dih per year" identified in part 3b of the calculation (1) Precisely what is neant by "randon, smoothed, average"?
(a) Is the power function P(T) implied by this sentence a EXHIBIT F
 
1 -
constant power level of Sidh per year (i.e., was it "straightlined"?) or was some randonly generated function used for the calculation?
If the power function P(t) was not meant by this sentence to be a constant in tino, then describe the function used and the means to generate it. Include in the description of the function used in addition to the mean power level, the constants or parameters and their values and units whien indicate the temporal characteristics, that is, the rato of change of the function with timo, and those that exnross the amplitudo varinoility and deviation from the average power level.
(b) How was the randon power level " smoothed"? Please provide the functions used to smooth it.
D. By tne reactor being " shut down", as used in paragrapn 3, do you meaa zoro power generation from both the periodic impulso conponent and the randon smooth component?
(1) Aro thoro any assumptions used in ;he calculation in question which would nako the equation invalit for downtimes of less tnan one week? If so, please identify uid assumptions.
(2) Please provido dose rato esti=atos for 1 ca; and 3 days after shut down or for similar T values or less than one week.
E. If the calculation was computer assisted, please provide the computer progran and printouts.
(1) For those portions or the calculation not conputer assisted, please show tho actual calculations that resulted in the doso rate conclusions summarized in the table at the botton of page 1 of " Exhibit A".
(2) Please provide all other calculations or computer runs, ir any, from January 1901 to the present that were conducted to, or that could be used to, estimate operating conditions necessary to maintain the ruel at 100 rem /hr.
 
1            -
UNIVEllSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES                                                                                                                                                                  UCLA st hkt i t) . De ss      insisE . s os A%cELES                                kts tasstzt . g o tis t r,o                                        s a t R W.1%t D                I    5B h B4RB4R4 $ 6 7 4 0 R L'Z sh19l
                                                                                                                                                                                              'ygp/
OFFICE OF TIIE CliANCELLOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFOHNIA 9th24 August 26, 1982 Mr. John H. Bay, Esq.
                              # Embarcadero Center Twenty-Third Floor San Francisco, California                                                                                94111
 
==Dear Mr. Bay:==
 
In response to our agreement reached over the telephone on August 18, 1982 and recorded in your letter to me of the same date, I have enclosed the following information:
                                                    - a table representing the fuel inventory by various category at the UCLA facility since 1970 contained in memo, Ostrander to Cormier; and
                                                    - answers to the written questions on the
                                                            " Fuel Self-Protection Calculations" which you had hand-delivered to ray office on August 23rd; these questions were essentially follow-up questions to our interrogatory responses of August 9th.
I trust that you will find our responses to your discovery requests both complete and timely.
Very truly yours, f}&O k,00l' William H. Cormier
!                                                                                                                                                                                    UCLA Representative l                            Enclosure cc:        Service List k
i i
P EX1tIBIT G i
 
      . ..                                    -      ..                          .-                  --            .  , = _ _ . - _  __            . .            -. -      -                ._
                                        ~
LOS ANGELES: SCllOOL OF ENGINEERING
            %                            e                                                                                                                                  AND APPLIED SCIENCE MEMORANDUM 25 August 1982 T0:      W. Cormier 2241 fiurphy FROM: 11. Ostrander 2567 Boelter Hall SUBJ: flEL Fuel Inventory Since 1970 I have constructed the attached inventory record for your response to Mr. Bay's request of August 18, 1982. Inventorial practices have changed
.                                                over the several AEC-ERDA-flRC administrations and even within the lifetime of the NRC. The general trend has been to add detail by distributing j                                                inventory into an increasing number of categories. Descriptive words have been replaced by a three symbol code. There have been several generations i                                                of such codes, and no assurance that they are one-for-one translatable.
For example, one can translate " encapsulated, enriched, unirradiated, uranium-alloy scrap" into the category " uranium" but the inverse transformation is not possible.
i All of this goes to say that I have made a best effort to provide a complete record, .but I have had to make some interpretations based upon continuity of category by continuity of numbers. I cannot attest to the absolute accuracy of the record. I think it is a reasonable, but not necessarily unique interpretation of the available records.
IflVEflTORY OF U-235 IS0 TOPE Ifl FUEL, kg 3
Irradiated fuel                      Fresh Fuel DATE
                                                                                        --                                                                                  TOTAL In-Core    In pits              Useful-            Scrap 3-31-70                      3.50        -                    -
0.02                                  3.52
:                                                    6-30-71                      3.50        -
2.53                  0.02                                6.05 12-31-71                      3.56      0.73                3.74                  0.94                                8.97 l
12-21-74                      3.55      0.73                3.74                  0.60                                8.62 9-30-80                      3.53        -
3.74                  0.60                                7.87 9-30-81                      3.53        -
3.75                      -
7.28 8-25-82                      3.53        -
1.39                      -
4.92 i
!                                                    Except for the small burn-up (~ l gm per yearf, the inventories are constant over any interval between adjacent dates. E.g., from 12-31-74 to 9-30-80, the total inventory was approximately 8.62 kilograms. The dates are inventorial record dates and not the actual dates of the material transfer.
UNIVF.RSITY OF CALIFORNI AHLetterhead for interdepartmental use)
  . - _ . . _ . - - _ - . , - _ . _ . . . . _              _ . , . .      _ - _                          . _ _                              . _ . _ _ - . ~ . , - _ - -      _        _  - . -
 
s  .
FUEL SELF PROTECTION CALCULATION Response to Intervenor's questions, Bay to Cormier, 8/23/82 A.  (1)  The equation was synthesized from several source documents and physical principles.
(a ) 1. Effects of Atomic Weapons, S. Glasstone (ed.),
U.S. Government Printing Office,1950, pages 251 and 13.
2    Nuclear Power Systems, Gregg-King, MacMillan Co.,
1964, page 169.
(b) Equation 8.12.2 of Reference 1 for a nominal bomb can be converted to gamma ray energy rate (mev/sec) per kwh using the equivalences of page 13 of Reference 1. The gamma ray energy is assumed to be isotropically emitted by a point source to 2
yield an energy flux I        E in mev/sec per cm              at distance r (cm) from the point source (the 1/4nr factor). The conversion of gamma ray energy flux to radiation units is given in Reference 2.
(2)  The exponent arises from the decay law expressed by equation 8.12.2 of Reference 1. It is a commonly used, simple expression.
Neither of the cited references is particularly unique, they happened to be the ones I used.
(a) See above.
(b) See above.
(3)  With power in kilowatts, r in centimeters, and dose rate in r/hr, and all times in hours; the constant is approximately 1.18 x 107 . The calculations were performed with A/4nr2 = 63.
The constant follows from the cited references and the appro-priate conversion of units, primarily one hour equals 3600 seconds.
(a) See above.
(b) No additional assumptions were made.
(c) It was not measured. See above.
B. The component was strictly periodic in time and amplitude--200 kwh at 168 hour (one week) intervals.
                                  -n      , , ,--        --,-m w,,, -. --  + - - -    ,,  ,4--y,--s- e --- ,.. y
 
s  a C.  (1)    As used in the calculation, the random components of actual operations appear in the calculation as a constant (smoothed) average P(r) = constant.
(a) See above.
(b) It was " smoothed" by using an average value lower than any annual average value of the post-1976 era.
D. Yes.
(1)    Yes. The equation is rot valid as t + 0, and does not de-scribe the transition from the operating state to the shutdown state.
The equation is said to be fairly accurate .for t > 100 seconds
( ANL 5800, 2nd Ed., USAEC, July 1963, page 634-635).
(2)    The calculation has not been done, but the decay law with n = -1.2 could yield no lower values than those calculated for one week.
E. All calculations were performed with a hand-held Hewlett-Packard, HP-25      The computer is programable but non-printing. There are no printouts. I did not save any program.
(1) Almost all engineering calculations are " computer assisted,"
whether by analog slide rule or IBM machine. The evaluation of the integrals involved under assumptions 2) and 2)b) with P(:) constant, is straight forward algebra and I do not recall precisely how I evaluated the algebraic solution. Assumption 2)a) was treated by summing a series of 104 tenas. Each incremental contribution was accumulated in the computer memory without recording the partial sums. The contributions arising from assumptions 2, 3a, and 3b were:
T                    r/hr (weeks)        2      3a        3b              Total 1            6      97        39                142 2            6      70        31                107 3            6      59        26                91 4            6      52        25                83 (2) No previous calculations were formalized or retained.
Neill C. Ostrander 8/25/82
 
L'xhibit u p, n i    .
fuel Self Protection Colculation The radiation intensity D at distance r from the core center af ter
* an operational history P(r ) extending over a tinje interval T followed by a down time t is approximately                    ,
T                              ,
                                                          '2 [jT.;
0=        2      P(T)(T + t - T)    -
r 44r    0                    .
o  '  -
                                                            . I                                    eb  . \    IS This formulation assumes that all of the' delayed garunas are emitte[i at the core center, and the numerical calculations assume that three feet-from the nearest accessible surface is equivalently four feet from the core center. The constant A depends upon the units chosen but represents the conversion from the energy release P(T)dt at T to the incremental dose dD at t.                                            '
The precise evaluation of the equation over the entire operating                        -
history of the reactor amounts to a sun: nation of all contributions to the integral for those times for which P(a ) > 0. The results shown below are based upon the following simplified model which underestimates the actual radiation level.
: 1) lleglect all contribution from the history prior to S years ago.
Thus, today, T:-0 corresponds to approximately August 1,1977
: 2) Assume 3 years (say 8-1-77 through 7-31-80) at an average uniform power level of 15 Mwh per year.
: 3) Assume that the subsequent 2 years '(say 8-1-80 through 7-31-82).
can be characterized by two component s:
a) a periodic component produced by a 200 kwh energy generation (treated as a Dirac delta function) every seven days, and superposed thereupon; b) a random, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Mwh/yr.
flote that the sum of (a) and (b) is equiv51ently 15.4 Mwh/yr.                                .
These assumptions lead to the following radiation dose rates at 3 feet from the nearest accessible surface following a shut down of t weeks.
Time, t (weeks)              Dose Rate (R/hr) at 3 feet 1                                    142.
                                                                          /
2                                      107, 3                                        91 4                                        83 The dates indicated in assumptions (1),(2) and (3) are arbitrary and could have been represented by phrases such as five years ago and two years ago to reflect the moving average aspect of a calculation which is not actually perfonned on a day-by-day or any other periodic basis.
1 of 2 EXilIBIT II
 
s ^
The conservative (under-estimating) nature of the dose rate calculation resides in the fact that the assumed five year annual po'.ier of about 15 iMi/yr has been exceeded for every year since 1976, and is currently running at a rate greater than 2014ah/yr.                        ,
Heill C. Ostrander fluclear Energy l.aboratory UCLA    .
July 1932 e
4 h
e O
9
  . g
 
s .
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REUIATORY COP}ilSSION BEFORE ThE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA                                  (Proposed Renewal of Facility License)
(UCLAResearchReactor)
DECLARATION OF DANIEL 0. HIRSCH I, Daniel 0. Hirsch, declare as follows:
1    On August 13, 1982, I had a telephone conversation with Mr. C.K. Nulsen of the U.S. NRC.
2    A copy of a memorandum I prepared that diy regarding the conversation is attached hereto.
: 3. Said memorandum represents a true and correct summary of my conversation.
1 I, Daniel 0. Hirsch, swear under penalty of perjugy under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.                        /,
Executed on September 5, 1982              -
at Ben Iomond, California                          .        6I'(7 Daniel 0. Hirsch i
EXIIIBIT I
 
                              ~.              .
s .
10 CFR 73.60 vs. .67              100R/hrexemption August 13, 1982 I spoke today by phone with Mr. C. K. Nulsen, 301-427-4181, who is listed in 1ECY-81-376A as the contact person for proposed regulation amendments to 10 CFR 73.67, security for non-power reactors' 3UM.
He said he is no longer working on that project, but that the proposals have been revised and are soon to te published for another round of public comment.
Final rule would thus be some time away.
i He said that the current rule regarding exemption for 100 R/h 3NK is per fuel element, not the entire core.              The reason the proposed rule looked at the TRICA' cluster was a question as to uhether it was "readily separable."
All other fuel would be, and is, based on 100 R/hr for each discrete fuel element, i.e. each bundle that can be readily removed. Thus that each of the 24 Argonaut fuel bundles must meet the 100hrR/(dh)                  it is clear standard.
A new Reg Guide to te published with the proposed, rule, when adopted, will make that clear, but it is currently the policy and is understood as such within IF C, he says.
The new rule may average the dose across the core--i.e. take the average dose of each fuel element, as opposed to requiring k that each element meet the 100 R limit                1.e. a few elements might be at 85 while all the rest are at 150, and under the new rule the facility would still te exempt (although not now. )
i l
1 i
 
  .i        .
1 1
1 6
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SELF PROTECTION CRITERIA INVESTIGATION
 
==SUMMARY==
 
los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory was tasked by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the technical aspects of exempting trem certain physical protection requirements SNM possessed by nonpower reactor licensees due to its radiation levels. In addition, the Laboratory was tasked to consider alterna-tives to the 100 rem / hour standard. The "100 rem /hr at a distance of 3' from any accessible surface without intervening shielding" exemption was established to provide a deterrence against theft of SSNM.                                      <
The los Alamos study found no strong technical basis for changing NRC policy on the 100 rem / hour exception. In Phase I of the study, six areas of concern were identified as impacting the criterion. A summary of the discussions and conclusions of Phase I of the study for each concern is given below.
: 1. Analysis of the equipment, expertise, and time required to remove fuel from the core of nonpower reactors.
This discussion is based upon removal of irradiated fuel from open pool-type reactors. The open pool-type represents a worse-case situation in comparison to tank-type reactors which have inherent safeguards, i.e.,
massive shielding plugs requiring cranes for removal: The minimum equip-ment required to remove fuel frem an open pool reactor includes a fuel handling tool, a truck and radiation shielding. The fuel handling tool could be the simple fabrication of a hook on the end of a rope. The size of the truck or transport vehicle is determined by the amount of shielding the adversary decides is necessary. Five kilograms of uranium in plate-type fuel or TRIGA fuel can be stored in a 0.6 mx 0.6mx 1m volume. The simplest form of shielding in a vehicle is concrete block. Attenuation factors of 10 or 100 could be provided in a small moving truck or heavy duty pickup or van by providing 910 Kg or 1820 Kg of concrete block shielding, respectively. The probability of successful theft would be further increased with the assistance of a knowledgeable insider. Such an individual may have knowledge of type and location of fuel, and opera-tion of intrusion alarm detectors. The time required to complete a successful thef t depends on many factors including people involved, equipment used, shielding used, distance from the fuel storage area to the vehicle, etc. Assuming that reactor security has been breached by a group of two or three, a knowledgeable estimate of time for removal of 5 Kg of fuel from the core and storage, load it into a vehicle by hand and depart is 3.5 hours. This time could probably be minimized to one to two hours if additional inside manpower is utilized. This assumes no early detection of and interference with the theft occurs.
: 2.      Estimate the range of doses likely to be received by an adversary in attempting to remove material.
The most likely dose a careful group of adversaries will receive in        ;
attempting to remove 5 Kg of uranium ts in the 50 to 100 rem range. This  .
1 EXIIIBIT J          osure B
 
      .i    .
  *      =
t i
4 estimate assumes the following: a) a person with a grappling hook pulling fuel from a storage pool, b) 30 elements moved, c) mean exposure time to a single element in air - 1 minute, d) mean exposure time to elements stored in truck - 1 minute, e) no shielding for single elements, f) shielding in truck to reduce dose by a factor of 100, g) dose rate 100 rem per hour per element and h) 30 minute drive in truck. This range is not an incapacitating dose especially when distributed among several people. Maintaining an incapacitating dose (est. 10,000 rem /hr at 3 feet)      ,
is not a practical alternative for most nonpower reactors.
: 3. The technical feasibility of providing tamper proof radiation detection to prevent the theft of irradiated NPR fuel.
Tamper proof radiation detectors offering the following capabilities (with slight modification) are commercially available and are a feasible approach:
: a. alarm at an off site location if the radiation exceeds a present level,
: b. alarm at an off site location if an attempt is made to change the alarm set point or to disable the device,
: c. not shielded readily,                .
: d. not interfere with the normal operation of the facility, and
: e. offer an advantage to nonpower reactors as compa' red to maintaining fuel at 100 rem /hr.
I
: 4. Evaluation of the physical separability of fuel elements before the theft of various NPR fuels.
Physical separability refers to the physical breakdown of a fuel element assembly into fuel elements. Three types of assemblies are of concern:
: 1) plate-type fuel element assemblies normally containing 10-20 plate-type fuel elements, each swaged into end pieces, 2) four rod cluster TRIGA fuel assemblies and 3) special containers constructed to contain elements that do not meet the self protection criteria.      These fuel element assemblies are not considered separable for the folicwing reasons:
: 1) to achieve significant dose reduction, the assemblies must be separated under water which would require the design of special tools, 2) the adversary gains nothing by separating the assemblies because although each piece is not as radioactive as the whole, the adversary must handle more pieces and 3) the adversary increases his probability of detection because of the additional time expended in separating the assemblies.
: 5. The appropriateness of using radiation levels based on a deterrence rather than an incapacitating dose.
2                            Enclosure B
 
  .      o It is apparent and documented through actual experience that in order to assure a true "immediate incapacitation dose" to a group of adversaries, the dose rate per element must reach approximately several thousand rem at three feet. Increasing the self protection value above 100 rem /hr at three feet is beyond the capability of nearly all nonpower reactors for any significant decay times. Therefore, the study concludes that the determination of radiation levels based upon deterrence are more appro-priate than those based upon incapacitating dose.
: 6. Estimation of the quality and quantity of SSNM that will be allowed relative to the definition of " formula quantity."
The NRC defines a formula quantity as U-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233 or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 +
grams plutonium). This formula puts the same significance on 20% enriched fuel as it does 93% enriched fuel. The functional relationship between critical mass and enrichment has been well documented and variation of enrichment critical        should be used in criterion related to the construction of a device.
Furthermore, the 100 rem /hr dose level is used withou't reference to quantity of U-235. Five kilogramt with a dose rate of 100 rem /hr is treated the same as. ten 0.5 kg sources, each with a dose rate of 100 rem /hr. In the latter case, one woulo have to handle all of the pieces of SNM and be exposed to ten times the dose involved in the former case.
Therefore, the amount of fuel per fuel element should.be considered in the self protection criterion.
Phase II of the los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory study examined alternatives other than the present exemption criteria of 100 rem /hr or more at 3 feet. The alternatives and their advantages and disadvantages are summarized below. Although the study indicated some relationship to prefer-ence in the ordering of the alternatives, there was no attempt to conclude that one alternative was better than any of the others.
: 1. Exemotion Based on Integrated Dose.        For this alternative, the rute would j
be written to specify that an adversary removing the SSNM would receive a given amount of radiation in so doing.
: a. Advantages.
(1) The rule can be written to allow flexibility in dose estimates based on the facility design.
(2) Would be advantageous to those sites having a large distance between the fuel and the location of the removal vehicle.
                                          ~
(3) Would be advantageous to those sites which have additional barriers, doors or other hindrances which increase the time to      e move the material from its location to the removal vehicle.
3                      Enclosure 8
 
                                                . _ .      -          . _ =__                            .
a
: b.            Disadvantages.
(1)  This alternative has little physical significance.
(2) Could conflict with the ALARA standard depending on how the dose is set.
: 2. Exemption Based on Detection.                  For this a!ternative, the rule would be written requiring that an alarm signal be t ansmitted to a security force if an attempt is made to remove radioactive material from the facility.
: a.              Advantages.
(1) Will allow fuel to be kept at the lowest possible level of radiation depending on the location of the detectors and thus meets ALARA standard.
(2) Allows flexibility to the facility.
: b.              Disadvantages.
(1) Depends on ability to implace detectors that can not be overridden by an adversary group or an insider.
(2) Facility must demonstrate that alarm system is tamper proof and will detect the unauthorized removal of material.
: 3. Retain the 100 rem /hr Exemption but give Credit for Fuel Enrichment and Mass.              For this alternative; the rule would be written to take into account the fuel form, the enrichment or the connection between the dose rate and the quantity of fuel. This would take into . account that an adversary forced to move more fuel of a given dose rate would receive more of a dose than if he moved less fuel at the same dose rate. If we were to select as our basis a reactor that contained fuel elements with a mass of 175 grams, then a formula of 100;5re h XmE2 = .57mE2 rem /hr at 3 l        3 ft would be used to determine the required dose rate for an exemption.
i (E is the fractional enrichment, and m is the U235 mass in grams of the fuel element at the NPR under consideration where the fuel element used i
as a basis has a mass of 175 grams.)
: a.            Advantages.
1 (1)  Includes fuel form in regulation.
(2)~ Is closer to a function of real world exposure than other alternatives.
: b.            Disadvantages.
l (1) Facilities with greater than 175 g. fuel elements will be                          :
required to maintain radiation greater than 100 rem /hr.                          *
!                                                        4                        Enclosure 8
 
I i
1 (2)    Is contrary to ALARA standards.
: 4. Retain 100 rem /hr Exemotion as Presently Specified in 10 CFR 73.67(b) j and 10 CFR /3.6(b). This. alternative is the rule that presently applies i                      to NPRs. Most of the NPRs have adjusted their inventories and procedures to accommodate this rule.
i
  ;                    a.          Advantages.
(1) No additional action required by NRC.
(2) No additional action required by facility.
: b.          Disadvantages.
(1) To meet the standard is difficult for some facilities.
(2) The standard is not a physical deterent.
!                                  (3)    It is contrary to ALARA.
I i
                                  .(4) Makes facilities more attractive for sabotage.
: 5.      Exemot Irradiated Fuel.                          For this alternative, the rule would be written to exempt all fuel that has been irradiated in a reactor.                                                This was the              -
rule in 10 CFR 73.50 in the past but it was questioned because it had little physical basis.
;                      a.          Advantages.
(1)    It would be a psychological deterence.
(2) Does not require that dose rate be measured.
i                                    (3) Meets ALARA standards.
(4) Will allow fuel to cool below 100 rems /hr and thus reduces
;                                            danger of sabotage.
: b.          Disadvantages.
(1) No physical basis for rule.
(2) Dose received by adversary could be very low.
In conclusion, there appears to be insufficient reason to increase the level of radiation in order to exempt nonpower reactors from Category I requirements.
i The alternatives suggested by los Alamos Scientific Laboratory are such that even less than 100 rem /hr at 3 feet 'can be sufficient. However, it would be contrary to international agreements to adopt less than 100 rem /hr. Since 5                              Enclosure 8 1                                                                                                              .
                            . _ _ _ . _ _ _          . . ~ . _ _ _ . . . __        _ . _ , _ . . . _. .      . . _ , _ - _ _ . . _ _ , . . _            _ _ . . - - - . . -
 
there is insufficient evidence to support a change from the 100 reh/hr, a:UI since more technical evidence should be available to change a regulation, thC 100 rem /hr at 3 feet exemption for irradiated fuel should be maintained.                                ,
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4                        s'                            ,
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE_THE_ ATCMIC_ SAFETY _ AND LICENSING BOARD i
In the Matter of                      )
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY              Docket No. 50-142 OL OF CALIFORNIA                      )
(Proposed Renewal of (UCLA Research Reactor)              1        Facility License)
DECLARATION OF ROGER _ L. KOHN in Support of Intervenor Committee to Bridge the Gan's Brief on the Apelicability of Physical Security Regulations to this Licensing Proceeding I, Roger L. Kohn, declare as follows:
: 1. I am presently a third-year law student at UCLA School of Law, and expect to receive a J.D. degree in May 1983.
: 2. I an also a physicist and systems analyst. I received a B.A. de6rce with honors in physics from Haverford College in 1963, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University in 1965 and 1968, respectively.      I have completed coursework and employment in both experimental and theoretical nuclear physics, and have had twenty years experience in various applications of physics, mathematics, and computer programming.      My professional resume, giving my credentials prior to law school, is attached.
: 3. I have read University's Response to Intervenor's First Set of InterroSatories on Contention XX, August 9,1982, and Neill C. Ostrander's Fuel Self Protection Calculation dated August 25, 1982, attached to UCLA Representative William H. Cormier's response letter of AuSust 26, 1982.
: 4. Assuming the values, assumptions, approximations, and equations used in the first two paragraphs of Exhibit "A" of University's Response to Intervenor a First Set of Interrogatories on Contention XX (hereinafter cited as Exhibit "A") or cited in Neill C. Ostrander's Fuel Self Protection Calculation dated 8/25/82, to be correct, I have constructed a calculator program which is capable of calculating dose rates for various times following shutdown. The program produces substantially the same dose rates at delay times of 1, 2, 3, and 4 weeks as those given in paragraph three of Exhibit "A".
i
: 5. The match is appreciably better if I assume that the delta-function ener6y pulse occurs at the end of each week rather than, say, at the beginning of each week (i.e . ,
if the reactor is shut down immediately after a delta-function ener6y pulse rather than if it is shut down FYitTATP W
 
just before the next one is due). Neither Exhibit "A" nor the 8/25/82 response letter indicates which assump-tion was made in the model used to produce the numbers in paragraph three of Exhibit "A". I then used this sate program to calculate dose rates for delays other than 1, 2, 3, or 4 weeks.
: 6. The fi6ures in Exhibit              "A" are relevant for doses from the (presumed) entire unshielded reactor core. However, on the assumption that the appropriate dose relevant to theft is the dose from a sinale detached fuel bundle of the twenty-four total bundles in the core , the doses must be redetermined. The Exhioit "A" calculation assumed exposure at a distance of three feet from the core surface and thus four feet frcm the core conter. It also apparent-ly approximated the dose as originatin6 entirely at the core center instead of distributed throughout tne core.
l                (It is likely, acccrding to my calculations, that this l                last approximation will indeed cause less than a ten l
percent error. )
: 7. I have assumed in subsequent calculations that, upon separating a sin 61 e one of the twenty-four core fuel bundles from the remainder of the core, one-twentyfourth of the radioactivity accompanies the bundle. It is possible that in fact some bundles are more radioactive than others at the time of a shutdown.              In the absence of any data in the supplied information regarding radioactivity distribution in the core, I have assumed the distribution to be homo 6eneous. This is conservative with respect to fuel self-protection since the thief, equally uninformed, might reasonably assume the outer bundles to be safest and remove them; my assumption of homo 5encity produces a bundle dose rate higher than these possibly below-average outer-bundle dose rates.
: 8. The exposure due to a single fuel bundle at a distance of three feet from that bundle will then be less than that due to the whole core by a factor of twenty but it will also be greater by a factor of (4/3)grour;        due to the decrecsed distance to the center of the radiating source, assuming (as does Exhibit "A") that all radiation equivalently originates at the source center.
: 9. My results are as follows (please see next page):
 
I time after      seconds                    }                      100 shutdown        hours                                          8 days                28  21    14    7  1  ,
I          i I
dose rate,      Exhibit "A"        83    91  107  142 whole core (for compar-r/hr at          ison) three feet      core, end-        88    98  114  149 452 of-week pulse core, begin-      83    91  102  122 174 ning-of-week pulse single fuel                            33.5  92 bundle, end-of week pulse single fuel                                        34 bundle, beginning-of-week pulse
: 10. All other things being equal, it is more conservative to assume pulses in the beginnings of the weeks, since this yields lower dose rates. The conservative single fuel bundle dose at three feet is only (approximately) 34 r/hr at the shortest delay following shutdown for which the equation in Exhibit "A" is valid, i.e. 100 seconds. For the least conservative situation, i.e.
where the reactor is shut down immediately after a delta-function energy pulse, a dose rate of 100 r/hr at three feet occurs for a single fuel bundle only following delay times after shutdown of less than approximately eight hours.
: 11. If the weekly-period model is used in lieu of an actual operating schedule, the safest assumption would be the conservative one, i.e. that each week's non-constant fraction of the reactor energy is generated early in the week, and that if the reactor is suddenly shut down and the fuel bundles removed, the energy for the most
 
                                ~4-recent week was generated nearly a week previous to that shutdown. In such a case, using the same numbers, equations, and approximations as those in Exhibit "A" and the subsequent letter, a single detached fuel bundle cannot be considered theft-proof by virtue of a sufficiently high dose rate, to wit, one of at least 100 r/ hour at three feet.
: 12. The weekly-periodic function assumed in Exhibit "A", 3a),
is only a reasonable, conservative approximation to the real operation if the reactor is in fact operated to generate at least 200 kWh of energy in each of the weeks proceeding the shutdown.
: 13. I have not at this time independently verified the accuracy or applicability of the equation and numbers supplied by Exhibit "A" and the subsequent letter. I here only determine the dose rate from a single detached fuel bundle based on their assumed accuracy and applic-ability to the whole core.
I declare under penalty of perjury that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on September 4, 1982, at Manhattan Beach,        f                  /
California
[
Roger'L. Kohn, Ph.D.
 
ROGER L. KOHN 524 Eleventh Street, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 (213)  379-3956 Education:
Ph.D. Applied Physics 1968          Stanford University        1963-1968 M.S. Applied Physics 1965          Stanford, California B.A. Physics (llonors) 1963        llaverford College          1959-1963 ilaverford, Pennsylvania Professional experience:
Research and development Laboratory experiments Computer simulation Systems and mission analysis Performance analysis Test design and evaluation Fields of specialization:
Laser and optical systems and applications Communication Atmospheric propagation Object detection, tracking, and ranging Atmospheric pollution measurement Image transmission and display Lasers and optical devices Solid-state, gas, and vapor-phase lasers Dye lasers and fluorescence spectroscopy Short optical pulses, modulation, and mode-locking Photodetectors Deflectors and scanners Retroreflectors Frequency doublers and nonlinear affects Xerography and electrophotography Electronic devices Gascous discharges Nuclear-particle detectors A _d
 
                                                                                      -g-b 1
Roger L. Kohn (cont'd) f                                    Employment:
l Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation                Senior Scientist I
1456 Cloverfield Boulevard                          1978 - 1980 Santa Monica, California 90404 i
* Responsible for performance analysis, and design, supervision, and evaluation of tests of optical systems and components. Specifically,
  ;                                  laser rangefinders and trackcrs have been modeled, the effects of atmos-pheric turbulence and acrosol scatter analyzed, and interesting targets characterized. The utility of various lasers-- tunable dye, neodymium, and carbon dioxide-- for use in such applications as air to ground, air
!                                      to sea, and ground to ground has been inveatigate(,                      Key individual com-                        ,
}                                    ponents have been studied and, in some cases, characterized through lab-oratory measurements. These optical elements include heterodyne detec-l                                    tors, wide-field optical filters, visible and infrared lasers, and retro-I reflective devices. Changes in device or system designs or test proce-i                                    dures are recommended through agency or contractor personnel briefings and reports.
The Aerospace Corporation                          Member of Technical Staff                              '
Electronics Research Laboratory                    1973 - 1978 El Segundo, California (P.O. Box 92957, Los Angeles, CA 90009)
Involved in laser research, development, and the application of op-tics and lasers to mission-oriented programs. Responsibilities included development of new concepts and devices, conducting of laboratory pro-jects, maintenance of expertise on present and future lasers, systems, and applications, and briefing of agency personnel.
Laser research included study of new dye and vapor-phase lasers with emphasis on small-scale, visible devices, and the investigation of laser noise sources. Applications of optics included the measurement of atmos-pheric pollutants, transmission spectrum of the atmosphere, and the anal-ysis of precision rangefinders for satellite positioning (e.g. for pro-posed solar-power stations). Laser lifetime tests were designed for the USAF communication satellite program. Novel concepts were pursued: small particles were levitated by radiation pressure with the aim of rotating the suspended beads for numerous research and device purposes.
i                                          Bell Laboratories                                  Member of Technical Staff
.                                          Active Optical Device Department                    1968 - 1972 Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974 and Coherent Optics Research Department Holmdel, New Jersey 07733
 
Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)
Conducted research into fluorescence and lasing properties of dyes and their interactions, excitation, and decay. Computerized data proces-sing and automated spectroscopic equipment were developed to assure reli-able results.
Proposed and developed a unique continuously-operating dye laser, independently of other groups previously equipped and working toward this goal, and introduced fundamental design now incorporated in all commer-cial and most experimental cw dye lasers.
Involved in the development of a high-resolution facsimile recording system, including research and development in gas-discharge and laser image recording, optics and deflection devices, and laser image scanners (the proprietary nature of this work precluded publication).
Microuave Laboratory                    Research Assistant W.W. Hansen Laboratories of Physics    1963 - 1968 Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 Conducted research into the mechanirm and applications of mode-locking of ruby lasers. A model for phase- and amplitude-modulated transient mode-coupling of lasers was developed and computer calcula-tions compared with experimental results. Mode-locking was proposed and shown to increase nonlinearly-generated power, and second-harmon-ic enhancement was used to study locking.
Experimental Reactor Division          Research Assistant Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory        1963 (summer)
Los Alamos, New Mexico Research involved the study of ganma-ray noise mechanisms in nuclear-particle detectors in the vicinity of nuclear reactors.
Bell Telephone Laboratories            Technical Aide Murray Hill, New Jersey                1961 (summer)
Continued the development and testing of a newly-devised nuclear-particle detector.
Radiation Laboratory                    Laboratory Assistant Johns Hopkins University                1959, 1960 (summer)
Baltimore, Maryland Modified, calibrated, and operated an infrared spectrometer.
 
t j            .                      .                                                                                                                                                    1 i              a
!                                                          Roger L. Kohn (cont'd) a i
j                                                            Publications:
                                                            " Internal Modulation of Ruby Lasers and Second-Harmonic Generation,"                                                        I 1966 International Quantum Electronics Conference, Phoenix, April, 1966.(with R.H. Pantell).
                                                            "Second-Harmonic Enhancement with an Internally-Modulated Ruby Laser,"
{                                                                          Appl. Phys. Letters 8, 231 (1 dby 1966) (with R.H. Pantell).
;                                                            " Mode Coupling in an External Raman Resonator," Appl. Phys. Letters 9, j                                                                          104 (1 August 1966) (with R.H. Pantell, B.C. Huth, H.E. Puthoff).                                            '
                                                            " Mode Coupling in a Ruby Laser," IEEE J. Quantum Electr. QE-1, 306
!                                                                          (August 1966) (with R.H. Pantell).
l                                                          " Mode-Coupling Effects with Ruby Lasers," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stan-
)                                                                          ford University, May 1968; Microwave Laboratory Report 1636.
4 4
                                                            "An Intracavity-Pumped CW Dye Laser," Opt. Commun.                                      3,,    177 (May 1971) l                                                                          (with C.V. Shank, E.P. Ippen, A. Dienes).
                                                            " Observation of Inhomogeneity in the Gain Spectrum of a Coumarin Laser
;                                                                          Dye," Opt. Commun. 7, 309 (April 1973) (with C.V. Shank, A. Dienes).                                          !
                                                            " Characteristics of the 4-Methylumbelliferone Laser Dye," IEEE J.
j                                                                          Quantum Electr. QE-9, 833 (August 1973) (with A. Dienes, C.V. Shank).
1 l                                                            " Automated System for Measuring Gains in Organic Dyes," Appl. Opt. 12,
;                                                                          2939 (December 1973) (with C.D. Lingel, C.V. Shank, A. Dienes).
I 1
1 Aerospace Corporation technical reports i
l                                                            " Laser Transmitter for NASA Satellite Rangefinder," 8 May 1974.
                                                            " Laser Trimming of Precision Resistors for Aerospace Applications," 17 October 1974.
                                                            " Angular Acceleration of Neutral Particles with Laser Radiation," 15
;                                                                          October 1975 (with M. Birnbaum).
]                                                            " Low Frequency Pulsation Noise in Continuous Argon-Ion Lasers," 24 October 1975.
                                                            "Short-Range Satellite-to-Satellite Lidar: Cooperative vs. Uncooperative Targets." 3 February 1976.
t 1
  ,,---3        -- , - - .                                  - , - , - - -
                                                        .n4                    .g--,,-    - . - -            .--            -
 
                                ..                                        .              . - _    - - .                  _ _ _ _ - - _ _                . = .
  .  .          o Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)
                      "Retroreflectors for Precision Optical Ranging," 17 February 1976.
                      " Laser Rangefinder for Use with Satellite Elements of Adaptive Station-kept Array," 30 July 1976.
j q
                      " Aerospace 405B Laser Communications Laboratory," 13 October 1976.
                      " Measurement of Off-Axis Beam Intensity of 405-B Downlink," 7 January 1977.
                      " Dye Laser for KrF-Pumped Formaldehyde Isotope-Separation Applica-tions," 15 August 1977.
                      " Cerenkov Radiation in Optical Systems," 22 August 1977.
Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation technical reports
                      " Considerations for a Narrowband Optical Filter for ODCS," July 1978,
                      " Initial Assesment of OCCULT Performance," July 1978 (with R. Lutomirski),
                      " Compass llammer Parametric Tests. Part                                  I," September 1978                          .
                      " Application of an OCCULT-Type Laser System to an Electro-Optical Countermeasure," April 1979                                      .
                      " Geometric Considerations when Using an Optical Scintillometer," Jan-uary 1979.
                      " Measurement of Plastic Retroreflector Arrays for Some Radiometric Applications," March 1979.
Patents:
i
                      " Dye Laser with Pump Cavity Mode Matched to Laser Resonator" Inventor: R.L. Kohn.                            #3 766 488, October 16, 1973.
Others submitted to employers for further action.
5 l
8
                            ,_n,                  -
 
Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)
Professional affiliations:
American Physical Society, IEEE, AAAS, Sigma Xi.
Personal data:
Born          - 1 December 1941,        Baltimore, Maryland Citizenship    -
U.S.A.
O e
e
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR R20UIATORY CO G!ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING ECARD In the Matter of THE RECENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY        )    Docket No. 50-142 OL CF CALIFORNIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCIA Research Reactor)                                        License)
DECLARATION CF DAVTD V. HAFEMSISTER I, David W. Hafemeister, declare as follous:
1    I an presently Professor of Physics at the California Polytechnic University in San Luis Obispo, California.      PJ professional qualifications are attached.
2    During the period 1975-1979, I uas intimately involved uith the development and adninistration of this nation's nuclear non-proliferation policy, both in the U.S. Senate ard in the U.S. State Department.
This work included donestic and foreign policy matters related to the use of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) in research reactors and methods to reduce the associated proliferation ricks.
: 3. The proliferation risk associated with HEU is that it can be used direct 3y to make nuclear weapons, unlike the low cnriched uranium used, for exarple, in power reactors. No further enrichment, generally very costly and difficult, would be necessary in order to utilice the mterial in a clandestine fission explosive, thus making it a potentially attractive target for theft or diversion. For this ani related reasons, it has been the policy, both nationally and internationally, to attempt to minimize the amount of HEU in use.
4    93% enriched uranium in flat plate Aluminum-Uranium fuel would clearly fit within the category of Highly Enriched Uranium.      In fact, 93% would be near the upper limit of HEU norcally used in reactors, and is clearly "weaponn-grade." That is, it could be used directly to fashion a clandestine fission explosive. Furthermore, because the critical mss Coos down as enrichment goes up, one would need significantly less U-235 if 93% enriched than, say, 205 for which the critical rass of U-235 is roughly three times as large.      Thus, 93% enriched uraniun poses significant proliferation risks ard requires significant safe 6uards if its use is essential, a
EXHIBIT L
: 5. The prevention of nuclear proliferation is a matter which has long been recognized as essential to U.S. Interests ard the common defense and security. The solutions to nuclear nonproliferation are not simple: The office of Technology Assessment report on Nuclear Proliferation (1977) says that:
It is not too late to contain proliferation at a level which can be assiMlated by the international political system.
However, there are no single or all-purpose solutions; no short-cuts. A:. viable nonproliferation policy will require the coordinated, planned use of a wide variety of measures...
: 6. In recognition'of the threat to common defense and security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation, the Congress passed (virtually unanimously) the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
Ani, beginning in 1977, the United States Government established a policy designed to reduce the threat of proliferation by attempting to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of HEU, in part by attempting to reduce the amount of HEU in use throughout the world, particularly for research reactors. This policy of reducing the threat of theft or diversion by reducing the amount of HEU available for theft or diversion has had as a concommitant element the attempt to reduce the enrichment of research reactor fuels. This program, known as the Reduced-Enrichment Research ard Test Reactor Program (RERTR), represents the' official policy of the United States in attempting to reduce enrichments of research reactor fuels ard thus the amount of EEU in use.
: 7. The sum Ary report of the International Nuclear Fuel O/cle Evaluation (1980) has stated that it is feasible to mrkedly reduce the uranium enrichment of a great majority of research reactors; INFCE endorsed    '
the conversion of HEU fueled research reactors to louer enrichment.
As C. Worthington Eateman, Acting Under Secretary of Energy in 1980, testified to the Congress that with fuel fabrication technology presently available in the U.S. and Europe enrichment reduction is possible for a great rany reactors.      Ard John M. Deutch, then-i Director of Enorgy Research at DOE, told Congress in 1979 that fuel i          fabrication and core technology currently available in the U.S. and Europe permits enrichment reduction from 90-93 percent to below 20 percent in most reactors. Mr. ::Bateman indicated in his testimony that the easiest reactors to make use of reduced enrichment fuels are low power reactors. The Department of Energy's NASAP Progran stated in 1980 that for those reactors where conversion using current technology mi$ ht be difficult, substitution of higher uranium density fuels with lower enrichment should'be possible. In this way the density (g/cc)ofU-235wouldremainessentiallyaconstant, but the additional U-238 atoms would dilute the U-235 so that it would be less useable as a raterial for nuclear weapons.
y  8  Given the official U.S. policy of reducing the anount of HIU in use to that absolutely essential, and the policy of reducing research r          reactor fuel enrichments, it is my opinion that UCIA's reqLest for a license for 93% enriched fuel should not be granted unless the applicant can show definitely that it carnot adequately operate the reactor uithout HEU cf that enrichnent.
: 9. Likewise, UCIA's request for a licence to possess, as I u*4erstand it, 9400 grams of U-235 at 93% enrichnent scens to ce to necessitate a very. substantial showing on the Applicant's part why such a very large amount of such cemitive raterial could ever be needed on site.
If it is true that the core loading is about 3600 grams, it seems to me an unnecescary risk for the facility to be permitted to have on site cuch more than a few hurdred grarc beyond that. Eurnup would appear to be niniml; The rule of thumb is that 1 gram of fissionable caterial is burned up per E4D of hoat produced; given a rarimum pcuer level of 100 kuth ard a restriction to 5% of the year operating factor, which I am told the reactor is restricted to, in 20 years a naximum of about 36 r/D of thermal energy could be produced. If this is so, a maximum of less than 40 grans of U-235 uill be consumed through burn-up, a far cry from the thousands of grams requested in the licensa..
10    I understard that the Environmental Inpact Appraisal for this reactor indicatos that a total of about 700 grarc of U-235 have been "used" in the past twenty years. If this is true, ard assumin6 that part of that 700 grams coratitutos damged fuel as opposed to burnup, operating experience would irdicate approxirately 700 grans spare fuel would be sufficient, and even then, there is no reason of which I an'auare that a full twenty years' supply needs to be on site all the time or at any one time. In my opinion, nore than 4300-4500 grans U-235 permitted on site and granted through a license would be excessive, absent a substantial showing of need, and would pose an unnecessary threat to conmon defense and security through risk of diversion or theft.
: 11. I have reviewed a July 1982 calculation by 17o111 C. Cstrander of the I!uclear Energy Iaboratory entitled " Fuel Self Protection Calculation."
If he is correct that after seven days of shutdown the radiation dose at four feet from the core center without intervening shielding is 142 Rem / hour, then each individual fuel' bundle (of uhich I understand there are twent be about 10 Ren/y-four,    each containing eleven fuel houratthreefeet(unshicided). Thus plates) would it would' appear neccesary to raise these radiation levels by more frequent (short-term) operation of the reactor to approach the 100 Rem / hour level for each fuel burdle and would appear prudent to do so if the radiation level of the fuel is being relied upon as a deterrent to theft.
: 12. ' Ny conclusions are that the Applicant, in order to obtain a license, should :      (a) reduce the total amount of U-235 permitted on site to about 4 kg,-
(b) louer the enrichment of U-235 significantly unless the Applicant can cicar demonstrate that this is infeasible, and (c) institute an operation schedule which would raise the radiation level of the fuel bundles.
In addition, the security neasures taken to protect what raterial is pernitted on site need to be substantial, particularly if the above manures are not taken. 9700 grans of 93% enriched uranium are by no neans de ninirun; nor for that natter are 4900 grans. Theft or g        dlversion of such material could have grave effects for our common defence and security, as well as public health and safety.
 
                                                  -4
: 13.      The above suggestions would be concictent with U.S. policy and prudent in terms of protecting against the very worrisome prospect of an unnecessarily large quantity and unnecessarily high enrichment of uranium uithout adequate cafeguards being stolen or diverted for use in a clandestine fission explosive.      Furthermore, however, failure to take the above precautions, without substantial shouing of good cause not to, uould danage'U.S. foreign policy interests by undercutting our government's attempts to reduce international commerce in EU and convince other nations of the need to reduce their EU holdings and the enrichment of their research reactor fuels.
I know from personal experienco in representing the State Department in such interactions with Chilean nuclear officials Andirepresentatives of Atomic Energy Commissions of other nations that it will be much more difficult for the U.S. to succeed in its policy of reduced enrichmente and EU holdings abroad if the policyfic not vigorously pursued at home.
The inconsistency of the U3, on the ono hand, denying EU to foreign research reactors while, at the same time, oversupplying research reactors at home with HEU that is not properly safeguarded, would not be lost on the nations ue are trying to influence.
14      Instly, it should be stated that it is both national ard international policy that kilogram quantities of EU nust be safeguarded.          While timely warning, after the fact, of theft or diversion is a key element in such safeguards, post-loss reporting is not sufficient protection andp in my opinion, fails to nect the standard of taking neasures to minimise the possibilities for unauthorized renoval of such material consictent with the consequences of such removal. The removal of 9400 grams of 93% enriched U-235 would have extraordimrily serious potential consequences; the removal of 4900 grams of such mterial would have potential consequences rany, rany times greater than removal of 1000 grams of 20% enriched uranium. But even 1000 grams of such material, given the world situation with regards pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation, is not de minimus.
J I, David W. Fafemeister, swear under penalty of perjdry under the laws of the U.E that the foregoing in true and correct to the test of my knowledge and belief.
Executed en August 25, 1982, at Santa Crac, California            }          p),
                                                    / David W. HafemeiMter, Ph.D.
J
 
W David W. Hafeteister Professor of Physics California State Polytechnic University Profassional qualifications
: 1. Education;
: a. Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Northwestern University,1957
: b. M3. and Ph.D. in Physics, University of Illinois, 1959, 1964
: c. Post-Doctoral Fellowships:
Los Alamos Scientific Inboratory (1964-66)
American Association for the Advancement of Science Congressional Fellowship (1975-1976)
: 2. Enployment
: a. Mechanical
: b. Physicist,  LosEngineer,  ArgonneIaboratory Alamos Scientific    National Lab (1957-58) )
(1964-66
: c. Assistant Professor of Physics, Carnegie-Mellow University (1966-69)
: d. Associate Professor of Physics (1969-72)
Professor of Physics (1972-        )
California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, CA
: e. Visiting Professor of Physics University of Groningen, The Netherlands (1972,1980)
: f. Legislative Assistant and Science Advisor to Senator John Glenn U.S. Senate (1975-77)
: g. Special Assistant to Under 3ecretary of Stato Lucy Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Joseph Nye, U.S. Departnent of State (1977-1979)
: 3. Experience with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Patters
: a. U.S. Sena te : After the detonation by India of a nuclear device in 1974, the Connittee on Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate held extensive hearings on the " Export Reorganization Act of 1975" which dealt with nuclear nonproliferation. It was my job to be the full-time staffperson to the Ad-hoe Chairman of the Conmittee, Senator Glenn, on hearings and nark-up of the act.      I was Senator Glenn's main adviser on nuclear non-proliferation matters.
: b. Department of State: In 1977, I was appointed as one of two              l Special Assistant on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation to Under-Secretary Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Nye.      Dr. Nye had the lead role for nuclcar non-proliferation in the Executive Branch and at the London Nuclear Supplier Negotiations.
During this tine, I uas intinately involved with the drafting and pass 2Ge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, participating in the Department of Energy's Non-proliferation Alternative Systens Assessment Progran (NASAP), and dealing as a rupresentative of the
    -A            Under Secretary with officials of other nations' nuclear programs.
l
 
r In addition, I van the lead State Department delegate to Workin6 Croup 8 (Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts) of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which was held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, subgroup C of this Working Group had as its cole task the assessment of methods of reducing proliferation risks associated with research reactors.
: 4. Publications
: a. Nuclear Non-Prcliferation:
: 1. " Nonproliferation and Alternative Nuclear Technologies".
Technolom/ Revieu 81, 58 (December 1978).
: 11. " Science and Society Test V:    Nuclear Non-American Journal of Physics  48,112 (19c0)reliferation",
iii. prime author / editor of the Presidential Report to the Congress on the environmental impacts associated with nuclear exports abroad (1980) iv. co-author / editor of the Supplement Nuclear Research and Development Ercort Activities to ERDA 1542 (U.S. Nuclear Export Activities),
September 1979.
: b. Solid State and Nuclear Physica:
20 articles; four book chapteres one book
: c. Ences Technology and Policy:
10 articles
        /
 
r                .
                            ,                    ,                      g...                      .,
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                                                                                                                              .                                                              1 JAN l'2 21 Dr. Walter F. Wegst University of California                                                                                                .
at Los Angeles Director of Research and Occupational Safety
* Office of Environmental Health and Safety                                                                                                          .
Los Angeles, California 90024
 
==Dear Dr. Wegst:==
i Following a site visit and review of your Physical Security Plan by HRC, we have detemined that the UCLA reactor operating and SNM storage sites are contiguous. As such the facility must implement interim Category I physical security requirements. These requirements are currently conte r.ed in 10' s
CFR Parts 73.67(a)(b)(c)(d) and 73.60.
        ~
In order to be exempt from the above requirements, the fuel ir . orage would have to be shipped to another location or the reactor would he                                                                    to be operated to maintain the fuel irradiation level at a dose ratt                                                                  ' 100 rem /hr at 3 feet frc.: any accessible surface. (See10CFR73.6(b)ar                                                                      ~3.67(b)(1)(1)).
By January 31, 1981, please indicate your confirmatic'n of the ecove and your plan for. compliance with this temporary adjustment.                                                                  '
Sincerely, 7        uucn:. w = ^
                                                                                            ..V 2 & :.r.  ==~;XS'-  -
Y;p
                                                                                  .#y                  James R. Miller, Chief Standardization & Special
[7y                          Projects Branch .
Division of Licensing DISTRIBUTION:
Central Files SSPB Reading                                              -
TERA H. Bernard wL n remp @                                                                                                                                                        .
J. m iler R. Tedesco D. Carlson D. Kers                                                          EXIIIBIT M
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  ; roso sie no e:.ocu eno OFFICIAL RECORD COPY                                                                                    ""*o""-'
 
N '%
ITY OF CALIFOllNIA. LOS ANGELES                                                                                      UCLA
                                                                                                    .6 -Q
              . .u,  i m. i . ., . u . . . , . . . sun , n i . . . .. . n . . . u is. . .
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                                                -
Washington, D.C.                  20555
 
==Dear Mr.JMiller:==
 
In reference to your letter of January 12, 1981: We are scheduling reactor operations to conform with tne self-protection criteria for the in-core fuel. As tnis represents a temporary arrangement, we are proceeding to identify viable options for the reduction of our unirradiated SNM inventory.
Two options have been identified; (1) transfer to the DOE Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and (2) return to DOE, Idaho Falls. The DOE and LLNL have tentatively indicated the acceptability of either destination, subject to approval of final plans.
Very truly yours, Walter F. Wegst, Director Research & Occupational Safety                            ,
WFW/NC0/lc N O o%
: g. .
[O  hbb                                          f                    EXIIIBIT N
 
b October 28, 1974 Karl R. Coller Annistant Director for                          '
Operating Reactora                                                          ,"
Directorate of Licensing USAEC k'ashington, D. C. 90545
 
==Dear Sir:==
 
Due to the censitive nature of the contents of this letter, vc request that this document be withheld from public disclosure purcuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.
Upon redoing our calculations on the Special Nuclear Material inventory, we found that our scrap quoted to you vas the total uranium content, not the U-235 content. Therefore, vc have nt our facility a total S: M inventory of 9.387 kg. Of thic, 4.293 kg. are egenpt and 5.094 kg, are non-excrept.
                                              .c.s -
In order to cocply with the 5 kn. limit and approval of our accurity systc=,
vc request permission to ship 340 grc=s o'f U-235 to Oak Ridge - Y-12 facility. This vould bring our non-exc=pt SNM inventory down to 4.754 kg.
and our total SNM inventory down to 9.047 kg.
Forns OR-650C cn'd Forms OR-653A have been acnt to:
Joe Hahler Product Division                                                                  ,
          , USAEC Oak Ridge Operations Offico
* P. O. Box "E" Oak Ridge Tennessee      37831 Sincerely, Charles E. Ashbaugh III Reactor Supervisor EXHIBIT O
 
r
  ,y    =
k a
r s.k,titr'''b' UNITF:D ST ATCS
                  ,' /                        ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
          \
            . {' .a.
            ,\    -.-        q                      W ASHING T ON O C. 2 0 'a 4 f
Sh''Es D I ,, /
Docke t l'o.          50-142                        HQY l B E'4 The Regents of the University
* of California
* Nuclear Energy Laboratory ATTN:        Mr. Thomas E. Hicks Director Los Angles, California Centlemen:
Your letter of October 28, 1974 stated that UCLA was considering methods to reduce their Spec:al Nuclear Material inventory below the formula quantity specified in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulat. ions, Part 73.
As of this date we have not received a written confirmation that you have reduced your Special Nuclear Material inventory nor have we received a request to review your security plan assuming the inventory was reduced.
You are reminded that your original plan, as submitted, was not acceptable and that you may be in violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73. Moncompliance with the Regulations would require that appropriate enforcement action be taken by us.
Your response is requested within seven days of the receipt of this letter.
Sincer,ely,          f                  ,
                                                              .L _, m. ) ,      b b'  #
George Lear, Chief 5
Operating Reactors Branch #3 Directorate of Licensing e
e EXHIBIT P
 
1 November 27, 1974 Earl R. Coller' Aasictant Director for                                                        .
Operating Reactors                                                          -
Directorate of Licensing USAEC Washington, D. C. 90545
                                                            ~
Dear Sirs
* Due to the censitive nature of the contento of thio letter, uc requent that this docenent be withheld from public dinclosure purouant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.
In order to comply uith the 5 Eg. limit and approval of our occurity synten, ve have finally contacted socconc who vould ship our 340 gra n U-235 froa UCLA to Oak Ridge-Y-12 facility.
The rccciver is:
Union Carbide Corp. Nuclear Division Y-12 Plant Poot Office Eox Y Oak Ridge, Tenneesce    37830 Attn:    H.C. Bayo/E.R. Pulley For Recovery The shipping coepany is:                              -
Concolidated Freightwaya                                                            ~
12903 Lakeland Rd.                                              .
Santa Fe Springs, Calif. 90670 Due to their company policy and DOT regulationn, they vill try to pick it up today, or cloc coccti=o during the first veck in Decc=ber. Their policy cr.d DOT regulationa otate that if our package is cent by truck thero cuot be no food or clothing along with the shipment. That is the reason for the tino delay.
When the ficaile naccrial 10 finally of f cenpun and all required forun have aircady been filled, our total non-c.xcapt SNM inventory vill be 4.754 Kg.
We request verification and ap' proval of our occurity systco.
Sincerely, Charles E. Anhbaugh III Reactor Supervisor CEA:vl EXIIIBIT Q
 
e                .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,
                    .                                                                                      .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      \
s
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                - Deccaber 12, 1974
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~
                                                                                                                                                                                      . .                .          .                          e                                                                                  s                        .
* Mr. M. C. Bays                                                                          '
Mr. E. R.* Pulley
                                            .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .'4-    .
Union Carbide Corporation .                                                                                                                                            '        '
Nuc1 car Division                                                                                                                                      *                              '
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    '4 ,
Y-12 Plant                                                                                                  -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              . -'..                  'f'                                  4 Post Office Bor. Y                                                                                                                                                      ,
3 J-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .'  s.
Oak Ridge, Tennessee                                                                                  37830                                                                                                          .                                -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    , . .                                                                s -                        i.
 
==Dear Sirs:==
 
                                                                                                                                                        ?,                                                                    ,
340 gen, of U # ,uan cent to you from the University of California Nuclear Energy Laboratory 2567 Boclter 1:all Los Angeles, California 90024 on Deccaber 11, 1974 via Consolidated Freightlinco, package No. 12345. You should receive it soon.
Sincerely,                                                      ,
Charlen E. Achbaugh III:
Reactor Supervisor
                                                            .                                                                                                                                      ..                                                                                                              Nuclear Energy Lab S
g    .-
j                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            -
l EXHIBIT R                                                                              -
g                                                                                                a
    - - - ,            .-e..            ,.,.-                      .r--,nr-                              - - - - ,                a  .---r,          ,          ,-g    --                , , -                                              - - - - , - - - , ,                    - - , , - -                      .,-.-a                -
 
                                                                                                                                                                    *  (,      -1 L = '                (E,, p ?, '
VERSITY OF CAIJFOHNIA.1.0S ANCEl.ES s'              . - - -
                                                                                                                                                  ..: ' ' *u .
e
                      ~ . n i i t s . in , n
: n. is : . i o, . . e e i s . nn e e.
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p            pq      .
                                                                                                                                                          ,,>f,__s,,n.........,,,,,,
x,                                                                                                                                            ,,                        .
                                                                                                                                                      '$I.gI M us =#L or i.NCINL i H Nc .gND at rL!rt) %rtt tst.L LoS A NCl.LI9. CAltFCftNI A p'JO2e
        ^
Itoe l t e r 11. J ] M67 November 9, 1973 Mr. George L. Rogosa, Directoy Division of Nuclear Physics                            '-
s
* Of fice of Iligh Energy and Nuclear Physics                                                        Reactor Fuel Cycle A:.sistance Depa r t reen t of Energy k'a c h in g t on , D.C.                                                                          DOEt          EY-76-S-0034 20545 Project Agreement 192                                  *
 
==Dear Mr. Hogosa:==
 
I have received your letter of October ")I, 1973 regarding the return
                        ~ ,
of irradiated
                                      'our      fuel                fuel elements to the U.S. Government. The return will reduce                                                                                  ,
      ' '                                                inventory to a Icvel commensurate with our ecurity provisions and
* will    eliminate inspector during            an " aunresolved recent routine  item" noted by a Nuclear !tegulatory Commis*:fon t
_ _                                                                                securi ty inspection.                                          *
                                                                                                                                                                                                                ~
Penalties An est  due    imate      df thebeyond to delays      minimum      the cost control    of return of UCLA      is-@own could increase f u At t acliment 1.
        ,                            to something over $4000.                                                                                                              the cost Our request                                                                      .
Cycle Assistance contract.forDOEfundingofthereturnisbaseduponourReactorFue(
That agreement stipulat es under part A-11(h)(2);                                                            ,
that, among items to be contributed by the government and, (iii) during the term of this Project Agreement 192, the Commission .... will:
(B) Reimburse the University for costs incurred in returning spent f'u e l                                                                    .
elements for reprocessing, including rental of or fabrication charges for ship' ping containers as mutually agreed to by the parties.
The University supports the normal on-going cost of reactor operations.
Because of    fuel return.of Project Agreement 192, the University has never hudgeted the cost matter to the School                Under andthe      tight budgets to today, $4000 represents a major a serious            matter to the Nuclear Energy Facility.
I believe the gnvernment should honor t he remmi t nent of PA 192 and the current Mad 7 supplement. I respect fully request DOE raepport of the cont of t h i t. lueI returu.
                                                                                                                                                        )
::ioces v1.y ,
                                                                                                      , . (~
(, / (I.1 -          I. k          w([],
H. Dhillon                                                              1. catton, Director Contract and Crant Office,r                                              !!uclear Energy Laboratory IC/NCO/li                                            '
cc:          C. A. lle r ge r , DOE / SAN D. G. McIntosh, DOE / SAN                                            EXIIIBIT S R.      R. O't:cil1, Dean. IICI.A / S EAS                                                                                                              -
A
 
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                                    ,                                                                                        y
          \ f.l.NliY Uf CAI.lFOliNI A,1.0S A. vel F.S
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                                                                                                                                  **NT*
                                                                                                                                            '''h*'    4*'4N14
* PL Z
                                                                                                            ,y. _ 3 , , ;, ,
[ ;
M 1400L OF E%C'.e' t Pl%C AND g r r1 IT D ACILNCE I of A % r $ L L5, C A t.it ( P '.'? A r.oo 2 4 Boelter Hall 2567 fiarch 1, 1979 lir. C. A. Berger, Contracts Branch U.S. Department of Energy San Francisco Operations Office 1333 Broadsay Oakland, California                      94612 Re:        Contract EY-76-03-034, P.A. 192
 
==Dear fir. Berger:==
 
By copy of our letter of flovember 9,1978 to Dr. Rogosa; you were advised o-f our request to DOE for support of the cost of shipping some excess irradiated fuel to the Idaho Chemical Repro-cessing Plant. The estimated cost of the operation is approximately
                  $4000, and support was sought under the subject contract.
14r. D. G.11cintosh (DOE /SAti) has been helpful in arranging for the physical transfer and shipment. These plans are going forward.
Paragraph 3 of our letter to Dr. Rogosa outlined the basis of                                                                              --'
our request. We have not yet received a response. He are presently in technical violation of our Sf;!i possession limit, and further                                                                                  '.
delay could invite a riotice of Violation by the tJuclear Regulatory                                                                                -
Commission. Your immediate action is now requested. Please call us if you have any questions.
Since rely ,                -
w /
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                            % A f f#:                                                                  W( A.                                'A' C
Kardy Dhi p'on                                                            ~1 van Catton, Professor and Director Contract and Grant Officer                                                fluclear Energy Laboratory (213) 825-0695                                                              (213) 825-2040 IC/li cc:        D..G. I1cIntosh, DOE /SAti                                                                      -
                          /G. L. Rogosa, DOE, Division of fluclear Physics R. R. O'tieill , Dean , UCLA/ SEAS C. E. Ashbaugh, UCLA/ SEAS /fiEL R. H. Engelken, USliRC, Region V EXIIIBIT T
 
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UtilTED 'ffAThii OF AMEltICA fiUCISAit HRCulNiC!tY C0hh!3310N i
BIVORM THE ATOMIC SAFEfY AtlD LICEte.31t!G TDARD in the Matter of                      )                  Docket tio. $0-112 4 OL TliM HEChriTd & TiiM UIIIVFif31TY                          (Proponed Honoual of 0F cal.iFOBi1IA                                            Facility Licennu)
(UCl.APoncarchHeactor)                )
CFifrIFICATM OF 'iEllVICE I herchy certify that copics of the attached:                      ItiTURVEnon BRIDGr Tile GAP 'S RESDOIISE TO !!RC STAFF'S IIOTIOff FOR SUTUIAPY DISPOSITIO!!
AS TO Tile ISSUE OF Tl!E APPLICABILITY OF 10 CFR 73.60 ATID TIIE flEED TO PROTECT AGAIllST SADOT?'E                _
in the above-captionco proceeding ha e teen served on the following by deposit In the Uni ted 'itaten nail, firnt clan ., pontago prepaid, addrenned an inlicated, on thin dates            SEPTCf1 ben 7,    1982              _.
John 11. Frye, III,                                    Christine !!alwick Chairman                                              Glenn H. Wootn Atomic ;afety & Licensing Board c
Office of General Counnel U.9. fluclear lierula tory Comc.innion                590 !!niversity 1h11 Manhington, D.C. 20555                                2200 Univernity Avenue Berkeley, CA 91720  6 Dr. Emmoth A. Luubko Administra tivo Judgo                                  Sarah Shirley Atomic 'hfety & Licensing Board                        Deputy City Attorney U.9, riucle r Regulatory Commisnion                    Offico of the City Attorney Wanhingto... D.C. 20555                                City Itall 1685 tain street Dr. Oscar li. Parin                                    Santa Monica, CA 90101  4 Adminintrative Judge Atomic Gafety and Licensing Poani                      Committee to Bridge the Cap U.S. fluclear Itegula tory Commisalon                  1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Vanhington, D.C. 20555                                Los Ardelen, California 90025 Chief, Docketing and 'icrvice Section (3)              Ihniel Hirsch Office of the Secretary                                P.O. Box 1186 U.S. fluelcar Regulatory Comminnlon                    Pen Lomond, CA 95005 Vanhington, D.C. 20555 Dorothy Thonpnon Counnel for !!BC Staff                                fluclear Inw Center U.S. !!uelcar Pegulatory Comminnion                    6300 Wilshiro Blvd., Suite 1200 Wanhington, D.C. 20555                                Los Angelen, CA 900148 attention:    En. Colleen P. Woodhead                              7 W1111am it. Cormier Office of Adminintrative Vice Chanecilor                      ['      /            .
liniverni tyn6f California                                  I        ' / /[- [/
Is05 Illigan! Avenue                                  Johg ihy                  [/
lon Angelen, California 900214                        Cou'nsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE 'IO HitIDCU THE CAP' 1
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Revision as of 10:45, 6 January 2021

Response Opposing NRC 810413 Motion for Summary Disposition Re Applicability of Sabotage,Theft & Diversion Requirements. NRC Failed to Show Applicant Not Subj to Such Requirements. W/Certificate of Svc.Related Correspondence
ML20065A052
Person / Time
Site: 05000142
Issue date: 09/07/1982
From: Bay J
COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, NUCLEAR LAW CENTER
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8209130116
Download: ML20065A052 (93)
v • d • e


Text

. .

WTED ConRESPong 00CKgT[0 JOHN H. BAY 2 DOROTHY THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CENTER lb ss 10 N056 3 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 Los Angeles, California 90048 Telephone: (415) 393-9234 cFFICE g (F 5ERV E sECB 4 00CKElggggkcs (213) 653-3973 5 Attorneys for Intervenor (Contention XX)

Committee to Bridge the Gap 6

7 8

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 10 11 IN THE MATTER OF )

12 ) Doc. No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY )

13 OF CALIFORNIA ) (Proposed Renewal

) of Facility 14 (UCLA Research Reactor) ) License No. R-71) 15 INTERVENOR BRIDGE THE GAP'S 16 RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION AS TO 17 THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 10 CFR 73.60 AND THE NEED 18 TO PROTECT AGAINST SABOTAGE 19 On March 20, 1981, the Licensing Board ruled that 20 intervention by Committee to Bridge The Gap ("BTG") was appro-21 priate on the issue of adequacy of the Applicant's proposed 22 physical security plan and actual physical security at its 23 facility. Intervenor contends that the proposed security plan 24 and security measures at the facility do not comply with the 25 guidelines and regulations applicable to the Applicant's proposed 26 license activities. On April 13, 1981 the NRC Staf f moved for 27 summary disposition on the entire matter of Applicant's fixed site physical security (" Staff's Motion"). On July 26, 1982 the 116 820907 8209 DOCK 05000142 ""

L So" ..

9503

Board, in an attempt to expedite the hearing process, requested an initial response by BTG to Staff's motion, limited to the issues of whether Applicant must protect against readiological sabotage and whether Applicant must meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60. Pursuant to the Board's request BTG submits the following response.

1.

7 8

Applicant is seeking a twenty year renewal of its 9

perating license and seeking a license to possess 4700 grams of 10 93% enriched fresh U-235, 4700 grams of 93% enriched irradiated U-235 and a 32 gram (2 curie) Pu-239 Neutron source. The NRC staff in its Motion for Summary Disposition on Contention XX asserts that despite the fact that Applicant is seeking a license for bomb-grade Special Nuclear Material (SNM), it is not required g to protect its facility against radiological sabotage. This y assertion not only has frightening implications for a facility 1 ated in the center of a major university campus, but is 18 g totally contrary to the provisions of the Code of Federal Regula-20 tions which require all licensees to protect against radiological g sabotage.

The NRC Staf f asserts in its Motion that Applicant is 22 23 n t required to meet the physical security requirements of 10 CFR 24 S 73.60 for licensees possessing formula quantities of SNM. This 25 assertion is based on the quantity of SNM allegedly possessed by 26 Applicant and the self-protection qualities of the irradiated U-27 235 in the reactor core. However, for virtually the entire 28 period of the last ten years Applicant has been in possession of 2.

I k . . . -

)

1 formula quantities of SNM without having an adequate security 2

plan. Applicant is still in possession of a formula quantity of 3

SNM despite its recent off-site shipment of SNM. And Applicant's 4

reactor operation is physically incapable of sustaining self-5 protecting conditions for the irradiated SNM in the reactor core.

6 Finally, Staff's Motion also asserts that as a matter 7

of law, Applicant has met the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67.

8 While the Board has not requested a response to this assertion 9

and BTG does not make such a response herein, BTG does contend 10 that there are clear issues of fact concerning Applicant's 11 compliance wth 10 CFR S 73.67 which will not be obviated by the 12 disposition of this limited response. BTG will respond accord-13 ingly regarding these issues at such time as the Board so 14 directs.

15 In sum, Bil will show: First, that Applicant must 16 protect against radiological sabotage; Second, that Applicant is 17 seeking a license for formula quantities of SNM; Third, that 18 Applicant currently possesses a formula quantity of SNM; and 19 Fourth, that according to Applicant's own calculations, its 20 reactor operation is physically incapable of maintaining the 21 radiation levels of the core fuel high enough to qualify it for 22 the self-protection exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 23 S 73.60. Therefore, Applicant must either have a security plan 24 which meets the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60 or its authorized 25 possession of SNM must be limited to less than 5000 grams total 26 SNM whether or not irradiated.

27

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28

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j 3.

l 1

For these reasons, and because Staff has not demon-2 strated as a matter of law that it is entitled to summary dispo-3 sition on these issues Staff's motion should be denied.

4

'II 5

10 C.P.R. S 73.40 REQUIRES 6 APPLICANT TO PROVIDE PHYSICAL PROTECTION AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE 7

The NRC Staf f has overlooked the sabotage protection 8

requirements of 10 CFR S 73.40. In their Motion they assert that 9

10 CFR S 73.67 contains no requirement for protection against 10 sabotage, but only requires early detection and assessment of 11 unauthorized access or activities and therefore Applicant's 12 security plan need not protect against sabotage. Staff Motion, 13

p. 11. However, it is not necessary to reach the question of the 14 requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 in order to resolve the sabotage 15 protection issue. The requirements of 10 CFR S 73.40 are clear 16 and unequivocal on this point:

17 Physical protection: General Requirements at Fixed 18 Sites:

19 (a) Each licensee shall provide physical protection against radiological sabotage and' 20 against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed sites where licensed activities are 21 conducted. Physical security systems shall be established and maintained by the licensee in 22 accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 10 CFR S 73.40(a) 23 (emphasis added).

24 There are no exemptions to the provisions of S 73.40(a) for any 25 type of licensee. 10 CFR S 73.6.

26 If Applicant is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 27 S 73.60 then 10 CFR S 50.34(d) requires plans for dealing with 28 sabotage. If Applicant is not subject to 10 CFR S 73.60 then it 4

l 4

1 still must have a security plan dealing with sabotage, despite 2

the lack of specific regulatory criteria. The adequacy of such a 3

plan is a matter for Board determination. Columbia Reactor 4

Case. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the issue of the 5

applicability of 10 CPR S 73.60 to this facility, there is no 6

question that Applicant must provide protection against radiolo-gical sabotage.1/

8 The clear and unambiguous language of the regulations 9

is supported by the text of the 1979 and 1980 Annual Reports of 10 the NRC to Congress. The 1980 report provides:

11 Status of Safeguards at Non-Power Reactors. All 12 licensed non-power reactors have operative security

plans as required by 10 CFR S 73.40 (" Physical 13 Protection: General Requirements at Fixed Sites")

for protection against sabotage. In addition, 14 licensees possessing less than formula quantities of SSNM have submitted security plans in accordance 15 with the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 . . . for review and approval by the NRC. 1980 Annual 16 Report: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pp.

120-121. (emphasis added) 17 Staff's assertion that Applicant need not protect 18 against sabotage is, as a matter of law, clearly erroneous.

19 Staf f is not entitled to Summary Disposition as a matter of law 20 on Applicant's Security Plan and its Motion must therefore be

, 21 denied.

. 22 1

23 24 --1/ As noted above NRC Staf f has argued that early detection and assessment capabilities provide adequate security at Appli-25 cant's facility. In the context of sabotage this assertion is absurd. Unlike theft and diversion, the danger to the 26 public health and safety engendered by sabotage will have already occurred prior to early assessment and detection. No 27 prevention is no protection. Therefore, an adequate plan must include sabotage prevention measures, sufficient so as 28 to not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the public health and safety.

5.

E l

1 III 2

APPLICANT IS SUBJECT TO THE 3 PROVISIONS OF 10 C.F.R. S 73.60.

4 A. Introduction.

5 NRC Staff's Motion asserts that the application is not 6 subject to the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60. The applicability 7 of the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 is determined by the amount 8 of SNM not subject to the exemption provided for in 10 CFR 9 S 73.60. Thus, the two primary issues herein are the amounts of 10 SNM requested by the license, and the capability of the Applicant 11 to operate its reactor in such a manner as to achieve exempt, 12 i.e. self-protection, status for SNM in the reactor core. NRC 13 Staff has raised a third issue by claiming that the recent 14 reduction of SNM inventory at the facility moots the entire 15 issue.

16 DTG will demonstrate below that Applicant must have a 17 security plan which meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 by 18 virtue of the facts; (1) that Applicant is seeking a license for 19 5000 grams or more of non-exempt SNM; (2) that Applicant 20 currently has on site at least 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM; and 21 (3) that the fuel in the core of Applicant's reactor loses its 22 self-protection characteristics af ter a shutdown of only eight 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />, making self-protection of any amount of SNM at this 24 facility impossible. On the basis of these facts Staff's Motion 25 should be denied and discovery commenced to determine the ade-26 quacy of Applicant's physical security.

27 ///

28 ///

6.

, =

1 B. Applicant Has 5000 grams of 2 Non-exempt SNM At the Facility and is Therefore Subject To The 3 Requirements of 10 CFR S 73.50.

4 Applicant, according to Dr. Wegst's August 8,1982 5 letter to the NRC's Hal Bernard (Exhibit A) possesses 3.53 6 kilograms irradiated SNM, and 1.39 kilograms of unirradiated SNM 7 at the facility. Applicant also possesses a 32 gram (2 curie) 8 Pu-239 neutron start up source. According to the formula 9 provided in 10 CPR S 73.60, an applicant which possesses 5000 10 grams or more of non-exempt SNM computed by adding the grams at 11 U-235 (3.53 + 1.39 = 4920) to 2.5 times the grams of plutonium 12 (2.5 X 32 = 80) which gives a total guantity (4920 + 80 = 5000 13 grams) of SNM at Applicant's facility, is subject to its provi-14 sions. Therefore, Applicant possesses a formula quantity of SNM 15 and is subject to the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60, unless some 16 portion of the irradiated SNM qualifies for the self-protection 17 exemption. As will be shown below none of the irradiated SNM so 18 qualifies.

19 NRC Staf f's Motion argues that the Pu-239 neutron 20 source is exempt from the computation which determines the l 21 applicability of 10 CFR S 73.60. To make this argument staff has 22 tortured the plain meaning of the regulations. 10 CFR S 73.60 l

l 23 provides that each non-power reactor licensee who possesses 5000 24 grams or more ot SNM computed according to the formula provided 25 therein . .

26 ". . . shall protect the special nuclear material from theft or diversion pursuant to the require-27 ments of S 73.67 (a), (b), (c), and (d) and as follows, except that a licensee is exempt from the 28 requirements of this section to the exent that he possesses or uses special nuclear material which is 7.

j l

1 not readily separable from other radioactive 2 material and which has a total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding. 10 CFR S 73.60 (emphasis 4 added) 5 Thus, the only SNM which is exempt f rom the requirements of 10 6 CFR S 73.60 is that which meets the 100 rem external dose rate.

7 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) provides:

8 A licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses or 9 transports: (i) special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive 10 material and which has a total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 11 feet from any accessible surface without interven-ing shielding, or (ii) sealed plutonium-beryllium 12 neutron sources totalling 500 grams or less con-tained plutoniuim at any one site or contiguous 13 sites, or (iii) plutonium with an isotopic concen-tration of exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.

14 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) (emphasis added) 15 Staff argues that 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1)(ii) creates an 16 exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 for Applicant's 17 Pu-239 neutron source. This argument is incorrect.

18 10 CFR S 73.60 provides a specific exemption for 10 CFR 19 5 73.60. 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) by its own terms applies only to 20 "this section", 10 CFR S 73.67. If the Commission desired to 21 broaden the exemptions under 10 CFR S 73.60 they could have done 22 so by adding specific exemptions to 10 CFR S 73.60. Furthermore, 23 if they intended for the exemptions of 10 CFR S 73.67 (b)(1) to t 24 apply to 10 CFR S 73.60 they would not have provided the specific

/

25 exemption in 10 CFR S 73.60. This is evident because of the fact 26 that 10 CFR S 73.67(b)(1)(i) provides an identical exemption to

27 the one found in 10 CFR S 73.60. Finally, the incorporation of 28 10 CFR S 73.67(b) into 10 CFR S 73.60 is conjunctive

i I

8.

1 "Each licensee . . . shall protect . . . pursuant 2 to the requirements of 10 CPR S 73.67(a),(b),(c),

and (d) and as follows . . . 10 CFR S 73.60.

3 Therefore, even if Applicant's Pu-239 neutron source is exempt 4

from the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.67 it is not exempt from the 5

requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.

6 The construction of these provisions while appearing 7

complicated on the surface merely requires a plain reading of the 8

language of the regulations. The proper construction of the 9

regulations, contrary to Staf f's assertion, makes it clear that 10 Applicant has at least 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM in its 11 possession at this time and thus must have a security plan which 12 meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60. Therefore, Staff's 13 motion should be denied.

14 15 C. The Application Must Be Judged 16 By The Amount Of SNM For Which A License is Being Sought.

17 Even if the amount of SNM possessed by Applicant at 18 this time was not at least 5000 grams, Applicant would still be 19 subject to the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60. The Applicant is 20 seeking a license for the possession and use of 9400 grams of 93%

21 enriched U-235 and a 32 gram (2 curie) PU-239 neutron source. In

22 order to obtain such a license the Applicant's proposed physical 23 security plan and measures must be capable of meeting the regula-i 24 tory requirements for protecting the foregoing quantities of SNM.

25 On August 6,1982 Applicant informed the NRC that it 26 i

had shipped 2.36 kilograms of SNM of f-site, allegedly reducing 27 its SNM inventory to 4.92 kilograms. One of the stated purposes 28

of this transfer was to avoid being subject to the requirements i ^

1 of 10 CFR S 73.60. August 6, 1982 letter Wegst to Bernard 2

attached hereto as Exhibit A. However, Applicant has represented 3

that it has no plans to amend its license to reflect the SNM 4

reductions. In fact, Applicant'is attempting to have its cake S

and eat it too by reducing its inventory six weeks before summary 6

disposition, arguing that it is therefore now exempt from 10 CFR 7

S 73.60 and retaining its authorization to bring the SNM back on 8

site, perhaps shortly after the motion is disposed of or the 9

hearings are finally concluded. The NRC Staff has made the same 10 argument in the amendments to its Motion. Staff's Motion, Hand 11 Corrections p. 11. Such an argument from an applicant seeking a 12 twenty year license is untenable, unacceptable and an attempt to 13 remove from its jurisdiction issues properly before the Licensing 14 Board.

15 Applicant has applied for a twenty-year renewal of its 16 facility license. The granting of the application is dependent 17 upon Applicant providing reasonable assurances to the Licensing 18 Board that it will, over the next twenty years, comply with NRC 19 regulations and that the issuance of the license will not be 20 inimical to the common defense or endanger the public health and 21 safety. This is not an enforcement proceeding under 10 C.F.R. 22 2.200 e t. seg. It is a licensing proceeding. Therefore, the 23 adequacy of Applicant's application must be judged on the basis 24 of the content thereof not on the ancillary promises and inten-25 tions of the Applicant.

26 Making an analogy to a new license proceeding provides 27 a good illustration of the fallacy of the Applicant's and NRC 28 staff's position that the regulatory criteria applicable to this in

I license application are determined by the amount of SNM in 2

Applicant's possession this week rather than the amount possessed 3

six weeks ago or six weeks from now. In an original license 4

proceeding an applicant possesses no SNM. Therefore, the appli-5 cation is judged according to the amount of SNM sought. It would 6

not be acceptable for an Applicant to represent to a licensing 7

board that while they were seeking a license for 9.4 kilograms of 8

SNM and would thus be subject to the security requirements of 10 9

CFR 7 3.60, that they only really intended to bring 4.92 kilograms 10 of SNM on site and thus a lesser security plan should provide a 11 sufficient basis for approving the license for the full 9.4 12 kilograms. This approach makes a mockery of the concept of 13 licensing.

14 The licensing process is designed to provide a 15 periodic, complete, thorough and public review of a facility's 16 operations and compliance capabilities. The NRC review policy 17 and the meaningful public input embodied therein would be frus-18 trated by allowing a license for 9.4 kilograms of SNM to be 19 issued on the basis of meeting the standards for possession of 20 4.92 kilograms of SNM. Arguments such as the footnote to Staff's l

Motion (p. 11) which states that Applicant will have to report 22

! the receipt of any SNM miss the point at issue. A reasonable 23 construction of the regulations taken as a whole and the further-24 ance of the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act require that the 25 applicability of the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60 be determined l with reference to the content of the license application.

t 27 Finally, approving a license for possession of a formula quantity of SNM where such is not needed and where there i

t.

11

1 is no security plan in place to protect such a quantity is 2

contrary to the general policy of the Commission to reduce 3

proliferation and security risks at research reactors. SECY 4 376 states that:

5 In SECY 79-1878, 22 manpower reactor licensees were 6 listed as having licenses to possess a formula quLatity or more of SSNM. Of these 22, seven have 7 taken or are taking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC 8 will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession authorization below a formula 9 quantity. [UCLA is included in this list]-SECY -76, Williamn J. Dircks, Executive' Director for 10 Operations, p. 2 (June 12, 1981). Rele' van t portions of which are attached hereto _.as Exhibit B.

Consistent with this statement by' NRC_ Staff and because as will 12 be shown below, Applicant's reactor operation cannot provide 13 self-protection, the Applicant must either submit a plan which 14 '

meets the requirements of 10 CFR~S 73.60' or emend its licensed 15 - * -

e authorization to less than'5000 grams 'SNM. _ - -

16 7" D. The Requested Amounts ' ~

17 Of SNM Require Applicant _

s To Comply With 10 C.'F.R. 73.60. f s

, 18 , . ,A \

10 C.F.R 73.60, provides specific physical protection

~'~4

~

19 i

j requirements for non-power reactor licensees in possessi n of '

20 t I

5,000 grams or more of SNM, exempting any SNM which is n'ot -

21  ; -

readily separable from other radioactive materia?. and which has at

' ^

22 ~

s total external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a S 23 -

distance of three feet fromiany accensible surface without 24 1 intervening shielding. In simple terms,I the exemption considers i 25 N' the radiation level of the smal'lest unit of SNM which can be 26 -

separately removed by a., thief or a. diverter (in an Argonaut .

27 -

~

reactor this is a fuel bundle). This exempt-lon is based o~n the e 28 s. . -

x '

assumption that ifthatunitishighlyeirradiated(theradio' -

s , .

'5

, _ m xm.

p

, -. -- x. - - . - . _ . - - - -

I activity itself will provide protectica against theft and diver-2 sion. If a licensee possesses less than 5,000 grams of non-3 exempt SNM, they are subject only to the requirements of 10 4

C.F.R. $ 73.67.

5 Applicant is seeking a license for 4,700 grams of fresh 6

SNM, all non-exempt, and 4,700 grams of irradiated SNM, only 7

exempt if its has an external radiation does rate in' excess of 8

100 rems per hour at three feet unshielded. The external dose 9

rate of the irradiated SNM is determined primarily by the 10 frequency, duration and power level of the reactor operation.

11 Under the licensed amounts then, Applicant would have 5,000 grams 12 or more of non-exempt SNM at any point in time when more than 300 13 grams of irradiated fuel in the reactor core or storage holes had 14

" cooled off" to a point where the external dose rate was less 15 than 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded. Therefore, in 16 order for the application to be judged according to the require-17 ments of 10 C.F.R. S 73.67, Applicant must be licensed to either 18 have less than 5,000 grams of SNM on site, or have procedures 19 within their license sufficient to assure that the irradiated SNM 20 will at all times have an external dose rate in excess of 100 rem 21 per hour at three feet unshielded. As will be detailed below, 22 for the greater portion of the last 10 years, up until 6 weeks 23 ago and even today Applicant has more than 5,000 grams of non-24 exempt SNM at the reactor f acility.

25

1. The reactor core must be sufficiently 26 irradiated to provide self protection for the fuel bundles.

27 As stated above the two central factors in determining the applicability of 10 CFR 73.60 are the quantity of the unir-13.

k

L I

1 radiated SNM and the self-protection characteristics of the 2

irradiated SNM. The " Inventory of U-235 Isotope in Fuel," chart 3

(Exhibit C) provided by Applicant in response to Intervenors 4

i First Set of Interrogatories on' Contention XX (" Contention XX 5

Interrogatories") (Exhibit D) nicely illustrates the issue. From 6

12/31/71 to 9/30/80 Applicant had more than 5000 grams of SNM 7

outside of the reactor core. Those quantities were non-exempt or 8

in other words were not ef fected by the self-protection of 9

operating the reactor.2/ For the period 9/30/80 to 7/2/82 10 however, the self-protection features of the SNM in the reactor 11 core become critical to determining the applicability of 10 CFR 12 S 73.60 because the quantity of SNM outside the core was less 13 than 5000 grams. We will focus on this period to demonstrate why 14 it is imperative that this licensee either have a security plan '

15 which meets the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60 in effect at all 16 times or amends its license, reducing the total licensed amount 17 of SNM below 5000 grams.

18

2. This reactor cannot operate in 19 such a manner as to provide self-protection for the SNM in the core.

20 Applicant cannot, based upon its own calculations, 21 operate the reactor in such a manner as to assure that the SNM in q

22 the reactor core will maintain an external radiation dose rate in 23 excess of 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded during 24 periods of shutdown, including vacations, weekends and mainten-25 ance shutdowns.

26 l

27 l --2/ The irradiated fuel in the pits would have an external dose l 28 rate of less than 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded within a relatively short priod of time.

I I

1 4

1 In response to Intervenors Contention XX Interroga-2 tories, Applicant provided calculations showing the external dose 3

rates for the reactor core following perieds of normal reactor operation. (Exhibit H) Applicant concluded from these calcula-5 tions that the reactor core would would retain sufficient radia-6 tion to be self-protecting for a period of one to two weeks after 7

shutdown. However, Applicant's calculations are based on a 8

misinterpretation of the regulatory exemption. When the error is 9

corrected, the calculation determines that, in fact, the SNM is 10 only self-protected for a period of less than eight hours.

11 Applicant's error was in calculating the external dose 12 rate for the entire reactor core. 10 CFR 73.60 provides an

13 4

exemption for sufficiently irradiated SNM which is not readily i separable from other irradiated SNM. In other words one must 15 measure the external radiation dose rate of the smallest discreet 16 unit of SNM, in this case a single fuel bundle. The logic of 17 this requirement is clear. One seeking to steal SNM will not 18 seize the entire reactor core at one time. One would remove the 19 smallest readily separable unit, the fuel bundle, and carry it 20 l

away separately, the precise procedure used by Applicant to load 21 and unload the fuel. This interpretation of the exemption 22 portion of 10 CFR 73.60 was confirmed by a Mr. G.K. Knulsen, 23

listed in SECY-81-376A, as the NRC contact person for proposed 24 amendments to 10 CFR 73.67. In a recent phone conversation he i 25 stated that the current rule regarding the exemption calls for a 26 calculation for each discreet fuel element, i.e. bundle that can l be readily removed. See Declaration of Daniel O. Hirsch attached l 28 l hereto as Exhibit I. This interpretation is also evident in the

[

l 15.

1 "Special Nuclear Material Self Protection Criteria Investigation i

2

( December 27, 1980) conducted by the Los Alamos 3cientific >

l I 3 1

Laboratory, a summary of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J.

4 (Special attention on this point should be directed to para aphs e

5 2 and 4.)

6 The core of Applicant's reactor is made up of 24 7

separate, unconnected fuel bundles. Each bundle is removed by 8

hooking a simple hand held gaffing hook through the metal ring on 9

the top of the bundle and lifting it out of the core. Therefore, 10 the unit of SNM the external radiation dose rate of which must be 4

measured for determining exemption from 10 CFR S 73.60 at Appli-12 cant's facility, is the fuel bundle.

13 The calculations provided by Applicant measure the dose 14 rate of the entire core. To determine the external dose rate of 15 a single bundle one must divide the dose rate of the entire core 16 by 24, the number of bundles in the core. One must also adjust 17 the calculation for the fact that it was based on the dose rate 18 at four feet from the core center, to compensate for the thick-19 ness of the core, rather than three feet from the single 20 bundle. Making this adjustment the external dose rate of a i 21 single bundle would be approximately one fourteenth that of the i 22 entire reactor core. Declaration of Roger Kohn, attached hereto 23 as Exhibit K; see also paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Dave 24 Hafemeister, attached hereto as Exhibit L.

25 Using the formula provided by Applicant for determining 26 external dose rates after periods of normal operation and apply-27 i ing it to single fuel bundle one finds that the fuel bundle dips 28 below the 100 rem exemption threshhold in less than eight (8)

16.

L

J I hours after the reactor shuts down. Declaration of Roger Kohn, 2 Exhibit K.

3 Assuming the accuracy of Applicant's own equation and 4

assumptions, the SNM loses its inherent self-protection ability 5 af ter a shutdown of less than eight hours. This reactor 6

presently averages only about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of operation a week. The 7

Technical Specifications limit it to 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> operation per 8

average week, in order to assure compliance with 10 CPR part 20 9

emissions standards. Under these conditions Applicant cannot 10 operate its reactor in such a manner as assure that the SNM in 11 the core will at all times qualify for the 10 CFR S 73.60 exemp-12 tion. Therefore, unless Applicant's security measures are 13 capable of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.60, Applicant 14 cannot have more than 5000 grams of SNM on site and cannot be 15 licensed to possess such amounts.

1' 16

3. Applicant's past record does not indicate compliance with 77 self-protection standards.

18 '

Even if it were possible for Applicant to avoid the 19 requirements of 10 CFR 73.60 by maintaining self-protecting 20 levels of SNM radiation, their past record suggests that they 21 cannot assure that such self-protection procedures will be 22 implemented.

23 On January 12, 1981 Applicant was explicitly informed by the NRC Staff that it must maintain self-protecting radiation 25 levels in the core or meet the requirements of 73.60. See 1/12/81 letter Miller to Wegst attached hereto as Exhibit M. On 27 Janua ry 29, 1981 Applicant responded that it was scheduling 28 reactor operations to meet self-protection criteria and was 17.

i I

planning to ship SNM off-site. See 1/29/81 letter Wegst to 2

Miller attached hereto as Exhibit N. On July 21, 1982, 18 months 3

thereaf ter, Applicant allegedly reduced its SNM inventory to 4.92 4

kilograms. Let us examine the self protection efforts undertaken 5

by Applicant during this 18 month period.

6 In response to Intervenor's Contention XX Interroga-7 tories, Interrogatory No. 13, which asked:

8 Have any rules or procedures regarding the opera-9 tion or use of the reactor been imposed to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is at all times 10 in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded? If 11 so, please describe:

12 (a) Each such rule or procedure; 13 (b) When each such rule or procedure was imple-mented.

14 Applicant answered:

15 There are no written rules or procedures. However, 16 the reactor is operated an average at 200 KWH per week which provides a conservative margin for 17 meeting the self-protecting conditions.

18 (a) See response above.

19 (b) Specific attention was made to observing the self-protecting conditions beginning 20 in January 1981.

21 (copies of Intervenors Interrogatories and Applicant's 22 answers are attached hereto as Exhibits D and E respectively).

23 In response to Intervenors follow up questions in which it asked:

24 E(2) Please provide all other calculations or computer runs, if any, from January 1981 to 25 the present that were conducted to, or that could be used to, estimate operating condi-26 tions necessary to maintain the fuel at 100 rem / hour.

27

///

28

///

18.

1 The response:

2 E(2) No previous calculations were formalized or retained.

3 (copies of the follow-up questions and answers are attached 4

hereto as Exhibits F and G respectively.)

5 The conclusion to be drawn from these answers appears 6

to be that despite explicit direction from NRC Staff, Applicant 7

did not perform any calculations to determine what measures would 8

be necessary to maintain a self-protecting condition until 18 9

months after the fact. Applicant did not institute any proce-10 dures for insuring that whatever efforts it was making would be 11 implemented, and when the calculation was finally formalized it 12 reflected a tremendously significant error based on a misinter-13 pretation of the regulatory requirements. .This is not a record 3/

14

///

15 16 17 3/ Applicant's record over the entire license period was no better. In 1959 Applicant was licensed for 4000 grams of U-18 235 and actually had 3500 grams on site. In October of 1970 the AEC issued Amendment 8 to Applicanth license authorizing 19 an increase from 4000 grams to 10,000 grams U-235. The increase was requested to fabricate a new fuel loading. In 20 October of 1974 after receipt of additional SNM, Applicant was in possession of 5.094 kilograms of non-exempt SNM.

21 Ashbaugh to Goller letter 10/28/74, exhibit O. In November Applicant was reminded that it might be in violation of 10 i 22 CFR part 73. Lear to Regents (Hicks) letter 1/28/74, exhibit P. On December 12, 1979 Applicant shipped 340 grams offsite 23 in order to comply with the 5 Kg limit and approval of their security plan. Asbaugh to Goller letters 11/27/74 and 24 12/12/74, exhibits Q and R respectively. Sometime thereafter a routine security investigation by the NRC discovered that 25 Applicant still had more SNM on site than was consistent with their security plan. Catton to Rogasa letter 11/9/78, 26 exhibit S. Six months later the material was still on site. Catton to Berger letter 3/1/79, exhibit T. The actual 27 shipment offsite of 730 grams was not accomplished until June of 1980. In January 1981 Applicant was once again notified 28 that it was in possession of formula quantities of SNM.

19.

w n =--=~m

N I

upon which to issue a license for possession of formula quantity 2

SNM.

3 There are other disturbing features of this record 4

which have significant implications for the Board's consideration 5

of these issues. In 1980 BTG submitted its contentions alleging 6

inter alia that Applicant was subject to the requirements of 10 7

CFR S 73.60. On January 12, 1981 three weeks prior to the pre-8 hearing conference scheduled to rule on the admissibility of l 9 BTG's contentions, the NRC's Jim Miller informed Applicant that 10 it possessed formula quantities of SNM and must meet the require-11 ments of 10 CFR S 73.60 and 73.67. On January 29, 1982 Applicant 12 responded that it would temporarily schedule reactor operations 13 to conform with self-protection criteria and would attempt to 14 reduce its inventory. On February 4, 1981, the NRC Staff in 15 pleadings filed beforehand, argued before the Board that Appli-16 cant did not have sufficient SNM to be subject to 10 CFR 17 S 73.60. No mention was made of Miller's letter to Applicant, 18 only three weeks prior, which essentially confirmed BTG's conten-19 tion. A few months later, in April of 1981, NRC Staf f moved for 20 summary disposition on the security contention, this motion 21 included an affidavit from Miller stating that he had personally 22 confirmed that the external dose rate of the fuel in the core was 23 in excess of 100 rem per hour at three feet unshielded. This 24 paragraph was deleted in the most recent amendments. Over a year 25 later Applicant's responses to BTG's Interrogatories strongly 26 suggest that Applicant had done little or nothing to insure that 27 the reactor fuel was being meintained in a self-protecting 28 condition. Finally, one wggk before the most recent pre-hearing

I conferent Applicant ships 2.36 kg of SNM off-site. No mention 2

of this is made at the pre-hearing conference despite the fact 3

thac coe applicability of 10 CFR S 73.60 is a major topic of 4

discussion. Now Applicant and Staff are raising the argument 5

that the recent shipment obviates the need to meet the require-6 ments of 10 CFR S 73.60, ef fectively removing from the Board's 7

jurisdiction the question of Applicant's ability to adequately 8

protect the amount of SNM for which it is seeking a license.

9 The Board has jurisdiction to rule on the ability of 10 the Applicant to assure that it will comply with the regulations 11 and that the issuance of a license will not be inimical to the 12 common defensa and security and will not endanger the public 13 health and safety. This constant subterfuge to the hearing 14 process -is contrary to the policies of the Commission and to the 15 purposes of the Atomic Energy Act and should be stopped.

16 IV 17 CONCLUSION 18 In order to prevail on this portion of its Motion for 19 Summary Disposition NRC Staf f must demonstrate that as a matter 20 of law, Applicant is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 21 S 73.40(a) (sabotage) and 10 CFR S 73.60 (thef t or diversion) .

22 Staff has not done so and its Motion must be denied.

23 Intervenor BTG has shown hereinf that pursuant to 10 CFR 24 S 73.40, Applicant's proposed security plan must provide protec-25 tion against sabotage. There are no facts showing that the plan 26 provides such protection, indeed all of the Staff's arguments 27 suggest that it does not. Therefore, Staff's motion must be 28 denied as to sabotage protection.

91

1 Intervenor BTG has also shown that the Applicant is not 2

physically capable of operating the reactor every eight hours, 3

the amount determined by its own calculations to be necessary to 4

maintain self-protecting dose rates in the reactor fuel 5

bundles. Consequently, possession of the requested amount of 6

SNM, 4700 grams unirradiated and 4700 grams irradiated but not 7

self-protecting, would ncessarily and in all case subject Appli-8 cant to the requirements at 10 CFR S 73.60. Therefore, Applicant 9

must either have a plan which meets the requirements of 10 CFR 10 S 73.60 or amend its license request to less than 5000 grams of 11 SNM. If the Board decides otherwise, it will be authorizing 12 possession of formula quantities of SNM without reasonable 13 assurance that the regulations will be complied with and the SNM 14 adequately protected.

15 Finally, Intervenor Bridge the Gap has shown that with 16 the inclusion of the Pu-239 neutron source in its SNM inventory 17 pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR S 73.60, Applicant without 18 question presently possesses 5000 grams of non-exempt SNM and 19 must meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.60.

20 Therefore, and without move, NRC Staff's motion should 21 be denied.

22 DATED: f/ 7

~

, 1982.

23 'I 24 Respectfully submitted, Committee To Bridge The Gap i

25 26 By , 4,

~ gr 1

Johd#E. Bay 27 Nuclear Law Center Attorneys for Intervenor Bridge 28 The Gap (Contention XX) 22.

l i

i _. . . - - _ _. . _ _ _ _

? .

UNIVEllSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA ce ne s e t i>o n . sRuw . un ANCt M% RIM M Wt' * $4 N IHEUD S AN tu nOSO) $4NT4 84RR4R4 5 4NT4 0RUZ f

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'L, i

COhthfUNITY SAFETY DEPARThf ENT OFFICE OF RESEARCil & OCCUPAT!ONAL SAFETY n LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90024 6 August 1982 3

Mr. Hal Bernard, Acting Branch Chief Standardization and Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing U.S.fluclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket 50-142

Dear Mr. Bernard:

This is to advise you that UCLA recently transferred off-site a quantity of unirradiated U-235 reactor fuel sufficient to reduce the total inventory of U-235 at the UCLA facility to 4.92 kilograms - 3.53 kilograms irradiated, and 1.39 kilograms unirradiated. The off-site transfer was completed on July 21, 1982. I have enclosed copies of the fuel transfer forms for this shipment.

l As you know, UCLA had been planning for some time to make this fuel transfer in order to remove an unnecessary constraint on future facility operations. In connection with this, in January 1981, the Commission informed UCLA that in order for UCLA to

remain exempt from the Commission's upgraded safeguards regulations which became effective in tiovember 1979, UCLA would either have to mainta.in the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel (100 Rem /hr at 3 feet, unshielded) or reduce its inventory of " fresh" fuel in storage [J. R. Miller letter to W. F. Wegst, January 12, 1981]. In response, UCLA informed the Commission that reactor operations were being scheduled to maintain the self-protecting conditions for the in-core fuel but that UCLA was also planning to reduce its unirradiated fuel inventory [W. F. Wegst letter to J. R. Miller, January 29,1981].

UCLA has determined that under normal reactor operating conditions the self-protection criteria are generally satisfied. However, now that the total inventory of reactor fuel at the facility has been reduced to below 5 kilograms, UCLA need not maintain the self-protecting conditions to remain exempt from the safeguards requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.60. As a result UCLA need not be concerned with the possibility that the reactor iay have to be shut down for an extended period of time at some time in the future.

Sincerely, f$ h i

Walter F. Wegst, Director Office of Research & Occupational

, Safety WFW/jb enc.

EXHIBIT A

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u.a.? :-. ,igrAd.-l:c;GQv.yr: :. FW.WK. :?PP.TC=:T""'"C'T:wW "I .V

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RULEMAKING ISSUE '

June 12, 1981 (Affirmation)

SECY-81-376 f

For: The Commissioners From:

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NONPOWER REACTO POSSESSING A FCRMULA QUANTITY OF SSNM Purcose:

To provide the Commissioners with (1) a status report on the 22 nonpower reactor licensees listed in SECY 79-1878; (2) a reso-lution of the issues listed in SECY 79-187C; (3) a discussion of alternative physical security requirements for nonpower reactors possessing a formula quantity or greater of SSNM; and (4) a recom-mendation on the preferred alternative.

Discussion: Backorcund On July 24, 1979, the Commission approved a recommendation that nonpower reactor (NPR) licensees be deferred from implementing the requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule, and that in the

~

interim new Category II (973.67) physical protection requirements as well as previous existing requirements (S73.60) be applied to nonpower reactor licensees who possess formula quantities of SSNM. -

The interim requirements were to continue in force until certain nonpower reactor issues were resolved and a determination was made on what physical protection requirements are actually needed at these particular nonpower reactor facilities, given the unique type, form, and enrichment levels of the reactor fuel. The Commission asked the staff for an interim status report in 120 days which would give a more definitive explanation of the nonpower

Contact:

C. K. Nulsen, SGRI '

42-74181 e

8 EXHIBIT B Cf ..

i  :. -

The Commissioners 2 reactor problem and actions being taken to determine the appropriate physical protection requirements for these facilities. The interim status report was published on December 19, 1979, as SECY 79-187C.

The four paper areissues identified in SECY the determination of: 79-187C and addressed in this 1.

What radiation dose rate levels are needed for exemption purposes, (review the l'00 rem /hr at 3 feet standard),

2.

What safeguards credit should be given for fuel type and reactor design, 3.

What constitutes " contiguous site" based on reasonable applica-tion of 10 CFR 73.60,

4. What safeguards credit should be given for intermediate enrichments of fuel.

Nonpower Reactor Status Report .

In SECY 79-1878, 22 nonpower reactor licensees were listed as haJvin ] licenses to possess a formula quantity or more of SSNM. Of those 22, seven have taken 6F~ dye ~taking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession authoriza-tion _below a formula quantity. These seven licensees are:

o Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia o Pennsylvania State University o University of Missouri (Rolla) ~

o University of Washington o Rensselear Polytechnical Institute o Westinghouse, Zion, Illinois ,

, , - o University of California (Los Angeles)

The remaining fifteen nonpower reactor licensees will continue to possess 5 kgs or more of highly enriched uranium (HEU) casite and the determination of the appropriate safeguares category for each of these reactors is contingent upon the resolution of the issues addressed in this paper. These fifteen nonpower reactors are:

o General Electric, Vallecitos, California o Georgia Tech o Massachusetts Institute of Technology o Union Carbide, Tuxedo, New York o Rhode Island AEC .

o University of Michigan o University of Virginia O

y ,.- ,, r, .m-_.~ , .- ,

- ~

f es The Commissioners 3 o Oregon State University o Texas A&M University o University of Wisconsin o Washington State University o Virginia Polytechnical Institute o General Atomic, La Jolla, California o University of Missouri (Columbia) o National Bureau of Standards (NBS)

Resolution of Issues

1. Radiation Levels. Los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory (LASL) has performed a study to assist in determining if a technical basis exists for exempting certain facilities from Category I physical security requirements because of fuel irradiation levels.

As a part of the study, LASL examined the time it would take an adversary to steal a formula quantity of SSNM in the form of irradiated fuel from a reactor facility in order to calculate total exposure of an adversary to a source having a radiation dose rate of 100 rem /hr at 3 feet." It also discussed the likelihood that an adversary would be detected if certain radiation detection systems were in place. A detailed summary of the findings of this study is provided in Enclosure B. The following is a synopsis of the major points made by the study.

Radiation. The study found no strong technical basis for changing NRC policy on the 100 rem /hr dose rate exemption level and made several interesting observations without endorsing any particular level of radiation as an exemption standard. It pointed out that a dose rate level of 10,000 rems /hr would be necessary to cause immediate incapacitation and certain death within hours, and a dose rate level of about 2000 rem /hr would give high assurance of eventual death based on short exposure time. However, it further stated that although the_100 rem /hr dose rate level may not result

~

in an incapacitatino dose, it does provide a deterrence based on the potentially hazardous health effects of nuclear radiation.

Whereas this deterrence applies to any radiation dose rate level, the present e'xemption criterion establishes a degree of certainty that the radiation dose rates for material qualifying the licensee for exemption will be at least at the 100 rem /hr level and therefore offers more assurance of deterrence and detection than would the absence of a specified level of radiation.' Additionally, it was pointed out that there is a cumulative dose effect of radiation when multiple fuel rods are handled individually over a period of

" Presently, a licensee is exempt frca most physical protection requirements at fixed sites (e.g., 573.6(e) and $73.67(b)(1)(1)) to the extent he possesses not readily separable SSNM with a total external radiation dose rate exceeding 100 rems per hour at 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding - hereinafter referred to as the 100 rem /hr dose rate level. Other dose rate levels are defined and referred to similarly.

g .*

The Commissioners 4 time.

This radiation adds anlevel.

exposure increased deterrence factor because of increased In support of the present exemption, the 100 rem /hr at 3 feet (1 meter for IAEA) radiation dose rate exemption criterion is an internationally accepted standard and substantial proof of the need to alter the radiation levels for '

purposas of defining self protecting nuclear material should exist before it is abandoned. In addition, the 100 rem /hr criterion also applies for exemption purposes to other than just NPR licensees.

It presently applies to fuel-away-from power-reactor storage-sites and serves as a threshold level for determining the type of protec-tion required for irradiated fuel in transit. Fuel with a dose rate above the 100 rem /hr level is treated as irradiated; fuel at /j or below this level is treated as unirradiated.

Also, irradiating fuel beyond the 100 rem /hr dose rate level for the sole purpose of obtaining higher assurance of protecting fuel rods against theft rather than for operational necessity, is contrary to health and safety management practices as expressed in the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle. Maintaining higher radiation leveIs also in, creases the potential consequences of sabotage.

Time.

The minimum time for obtaining access to a formula quantity of SSNM and removing it is a function of fuel type, reactor design and building layout and is thus site specific. The time is dependent on the shielding of the reactor; the difficulty of removal of the fuel elements from the reactor core; the number of elements that must be removed; the distance the elements must be moved to reach a get-away vehicle; the difficulty of neutralizing doors and alarms that must be bypassed, and the number of such obstacles; the number of individuals involved in the theft; and the process by which the vehicle is loaded. According to LASL the total time necessary for the theft from a typical NPR up to the time the .

vehicle leaves the site is from 1.25 to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, if all of the fuel elements taken are from the reactor. Most of that time is spent in removing the elements from the pool rather than in the

- transfer from the pool to the vehicle, which could be acccmplished in less than 1/2 hour. If a minimum number of fuel elements are taken from the core and the majority are taken from a storage vault, the total time for the theft would be reduced but probably

, would take at least 1/2 hour.

Since in most cases it would take the adversary over an hour to remove the formula quantity of SSNM from the core and storage vault, and in many cases considerably longer, it would appear prudent to allow the facility's physical protection system to depend upon offsite response forces to prevent the successful removal of a formula quantity. Most local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) would be able to respond effectively within a half-hour.

The proposed requirement for offsite response capability could be

' *I Los ANGELLW EClioub or ENGINEERING

  • AMD APPLIED SCIENCE f4EMORAtlDUf4 25 August 1982 T0: W. Cormier 2241 fiurphy FROM: il. Ostrander 2567 Boelter Hall SUBJ: flEL Fuel Inventory Since 1970 I have constructed the attached inventory record for your response to Mr. Bay's request of August 18, 1982. Inventorial practices have changed over the several AEC-ERDA-f4RC administrations and even within the lifetime of the flRC. The general trend has been tE add detail by distributing -

inventory into an increasing number of categories. Descriptive words have been replaced by a three symbol code. There have been several generations of such codes, and no assurance that they are one-for-one translatable.

For example, one can translate " encapsulated, enriched, unirradiated, uranium-alloy scrap" into the category " uranium" but the inverse

'transfonnation is not possible.

All of this goes to say-that I have made a best effort to provide a complete record, but I have had to make some interpretations based upon continuity of category by continuity of numbers. I cannot attest to the absolute accuracy of the record. I think it is a reasonable, but not necessarily unique interpretation of the available records. ,

IrlVErlTORY OF U-235 ISOT0'PE,Ifl FUEL, kg Irradiated fuel Fresh. Fuel TOTAL DATE In-Core In Pits Useful Scrap .

3-31-70 3.50 - -

0.02 3.52 6-30-71 3.50 -

2.53 0.02 --

16.~ 05 n.

12-31-71 3.56 0.73 3.74 0.94 i,8. 97 12-21-74 3.55 0.73 3.74 0.60 (862}

9-30-80 3.53 - 3.74 0.60 7J7h 7

9-30-81 3.53 -

3.75 -

}7$.28j7 8-25-82 3.53 -

1.39 -

4.92

  • 7 Except for th'e small burn-up M. egym pEr&-yea7 $)h, the inventories are constant over any interval between afijaceritTates. E.g., from 12-31-74 to 9-30-80, the total inventory was approximately 8.62 kilograms. The dates are inventorial record dates and not the actual dates of the material transfer.

EXHIBIT C I'Niver# CITV n F (* 4 f TFOVINI A W!.etterhead f or interdettertinental use)

r .*

JOHN H. BAY DOROTilY THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CENTER 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 Los Angeles, Califo rnia 90048 Telephone: (415) 393-9234 (213) 453-3973 Attorneys For Intervenor (Contention XX)

Committee To Bridge The Gap UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD IN THE MATTER OF )

) Doc. No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY )

OF CALIFORNIA )

) (Proposed Renewal

( UCLA Research Reactor) ) of Facility

) License No. R-71)

INTERVENORS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER TO: APPLICANT, THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Intervenor, Committee to Bridge the Gap, requests that applican t, The Regents of the University of California, answer i

the following interrogatories separately and fully under oath, pursuant to Section 2.740b of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reg ulations, and that the answers be signed by the person making them and served on intervenor on August 9, 1982 These in terrog-atories are served pursuant to court order at the Pre-hearing Conference held on Wednesday, June 30, 1982.

In answering these interrogatories, please furnish all info rmation that is available to applican t, including , without l imi ta tion , information in possession of applicant's attorneys, s

EXHIBIT D

_ . . . , .. n.._.. .. . . . . . w..n -. .

t s agents and employees, not merely information known to the per-sonal knowledge of the person making the answers. If the person making the answers cannot answer any of the following in te rrog -

atories in f ull af ter exercising the reasonable diligence to secure the information, please so state, and then answer the interrogatories to the f ullest extent possible, specifying the reasons for the inability to answer, and further describing the ef forts undertaken to secure the information, and setting forth any knowledge applicant may have concerning the unanswered portions.

I.

DEFINITION OF TERMS As used in the following inte rroga torie s, the following terms shall have the following meanings.

1. The term "UCLA/NEL" means the Regents of the University of California, the University of California at Los Angeles, the Nuclear Energy Laboratory at UCLA, their agents, employees and representa tive s.
2. The terms "you" and "your" shall mean UCLA/NEL.
3. The te rm " the reactor" shall mean the Argonaut type nuclear reactor located in Boelter Hall on the UCLA campus.
4. The term " reactor facility" shall mean the build-i ng , room s , and structures, containing and surrounding the reactor which are related to the operation, maintenance and fuel storage of the reactor.
5. The te rm " SNM" shall mean special nuclear materials as that te rm is defined in 10 CFR Section 73.2(x).
6. The te rm "U-2 3 5" shall mean Uranimum in the U-235 2.

- ~ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

I r .*

i so tope .

7. The term " communication" shall mean any transfer of  !

l l

information be tween two or more parties.

8. The term " application" shall mean the application for relicensing of the UCIA Research Reactor filed by the Regents 4

of the Univeristy of California en February 28, 1980 and the amendments thereto.

9. The term "present" shall mean as of the date of applicant's response to these in terroga tories .

II.

1 INTERROGATORIES

) INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

l .

Please provide a table or data for the period of January 1, 1970 to the present, which indicates for each day dur ing tha t pe riod , the amount of U-235 enriched more than 20%,

which was at the reactor facility, and not in the core of the reactor.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Please provide a table or data for the period of January 1, 1970 to the present, which indicates for each day during that period, the amount of U-235 enriched more than 20%,

1 which was in the core of the reactor.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Please provide a table or data for the period from January 1, 1970 to the present, which indicates for each day dur ing that period the amoun t of U-235 enriched more than 20%

which was in the fuel storage holes.

3.

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INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

lias UCLA/NEL ever had more than 5,000 grams of U-235 enriched more than 20%, with a total external radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rems per hour at a distance of three feet unshielded, at the reactor facility? If it has, please indicate:

(a) The dates upon which this condition occurred; (b) The circumstances which resulted in this condi-tion; and (c) Precisely how you were able to determine that the condition existed.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Please indicate, for the period January 1, 1970 to the present, each date upon which the U-235 in the reactor core had an ex ternal radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshield ed .

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Please describe how the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the reactor core is determined.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

If the answer to Interrogatory No. 6 indicates that the determination is made by direct measurement, please indicate:

(a) At what frequency the measurements are taken; (b) Whether measurements are taken for each plate, each bundle, or for the whole core; (c) Each date upon which such measurement has been take n , and the results thereof; (d) The accuracy of the measurement instrument and the basis upon which you make this assessment of its accuracy.

4.

t .*

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

If the answer to Interrogatory No. 6 indicates that the determination is made by some method other than direct measure-the calculations, data, and ment, please describe such method and ,

resource materials used as a basis for using such a method making  :.: -

the de termination.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

NY$hhh?

Describe the operating conditions necessary to keep the in a state of having an external . m. .r . :.

U-235 in the reactor core radiation dose rate of greater than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded, including but not limited to:

(a) The power at which the reactor must be operated; (b) The amount of time which the reactor must be operated.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

how many Af ter a period of normal operating conditions, .:;; e days of non operation does it require for the U-235 in the reactor core to drop below an external radiation dose rate of 100 dWns.q.-

Rem per ho ur a t 3 feet unshielded?

INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

increase or Please describe any f actors which would in the answer to Interroga-decrease the number of days indicated tory No . 10.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

i

}k@@

.. a In order to maintain the external radiation dose rate m/= -

, as;;g of the U-235 in the reactor core at a level greater than 100 Rem . . .

day shutdown ,

- per hour at three feet unshielded , during a three

///

5.

ef;y

. . . - - - . , . . . .. a. . .

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for how many hours and at what power would the reactor have to run prior to that shutdown?

INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Have any rules or procedures regarding the operation 1

and use of the reactor been imposed to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is at all times in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded? If so, please describe :

(a) Each such rule or procedure; (b) When each such rule or procedure was implemented .

INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

Please describe the procedures that exist in order to insure that the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the reactor core is maintained a t ove r 100 Rem pe r hour a t 3 fee t unshield ed , for each of the following situations; (a) Long weeke nd s ;

(b) Holidays or vacations; (c) Final examination periods; i

(d) Quarter breaks; (e) Ref ueling ;

( f) In-core maintenance; (g) Experiments requiring in core placement; (h) Experiments requiring reactor shutdown several days prior to or af ter the experiment;

( i) Maintenance or calibration requiring a reactor shutdown of several days; (j) Unintentional SCRAMS or other malfunctions, the cause or repair of which cannot be determined or accomplished 6.

t .*

within several days; (k) Lack of business or other reason to operate the reactor other than for the purpose of maintaining the radiation level of the f uel .

INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

Has UCLA/NEL made any commitment to the NRC to keep the U-235 in the reactor core in a state of having an external dose rate in excess of 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshielded? If so, please indicate how the commitment was communicated , e.g. ,

license amendment, letter, oral communication, and give the dates for each such communication.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

If the answer to Interrogatory No.14 is in the affir-mative , please indicate each date af ter such a committment was made, on which the U-235 in the reactor core had an external dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour three feet unshield ed .

INTERROGATORY NO. 17:

Does the proposed Technical Specifications contained in the Application include a three week cooling of f period for the reactor prior to fuel operations? If they do, please indicate what procedures would be used to insure that the U-235 in the reactor core is kept in a state of having an external radiation dose rate of greater than 100 Rem per hour at three fee t unshielded , dur ing this cooling of f period .

INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

In the event of a reactor malfunction or SCRAM which would normally require shutting down the reactor for a sufficient period of time for the U-235 in the core of the reactor to reach 7.

MM4kN .hw4e e e.+e em a" = *4 e "N es

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a state of having an external radiation dose rate of less than 100 Rem per hour 3 feet unshielded, which would take precedence,

~

the need to maintain the radiation level, or the need to evaluate and repair the malfunction?

INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Has the NRC ever canmunicated to UCLA/NEL that UCLA/NEL needed to reduce its SNM inventory in order to insure that it wa s in compliance with NRC regulations? If so, please describe each such communication and the date on which it occurred.

INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

Has UCLA/NEL ever been found in non-compliance with NRC security or safeguard regulations? If so, please describe each such viola tion and the date on which it occurred .

INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

i What is the highest dose rate for irradiated U-235 pe rmitted to be stored in the spent fuel storage holes by _-

UCLA/NEL's current license?

INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

i Does UCLA/NEL assert that from the present to the year 2000, the external radiation dose rate of the U-235 in the core A

/

of the reactor will never be less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet /

unshialded? If not, please indicate under what circumstances theE dose rate is expected to be less than 100 Rem per hour at 3 feet unshield ed .

INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

Please indicate the minimum quantity of U-235 which is necessary to operate the reactor and still have it able to

///

8.

em the functions, experiments and tasks which it now per-

.a

.ROGATORY NO. 24:

Please indicate the maximum quantity of U-235 which can sintained in the reactor core under current and proposed

    • %1>~.,*, . . . - l J ' * -;,

ases.

RROGATORY NO. 25_:

in response to khk[hh5hh57}

Please provide all facts not provided above interrogatories which indicate under UCLA/NEL's pro-  :#. w . x w .y .

c.y, that UCLA/NEL's inventory of SNM at the

.d operating license,

tor f acility will not exceed 5,000 grams of U-235 enriched in excess of 100 .

a than 20% not having ar. external dose rate per hour at 3 feet unshield ed . -

/

DATED: July 20, 1982. ,f ,

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4 John li. 4 Bay . .

Attorneys for Intervenor . .'. . '"" Yd'#

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UNITED STATES OF AFERICA UUCLEAR RECULATCRY CCMMSSION

, BEFCRE . TEE ATOMIC SAFCY AND LICENS1UC EGARD In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-142 OL ,

TIE RECENTS CF TIE UNIVERSITY (Proposed Renewal of OF CALIFORNIA ) Facility License)

. )

(UCLA Research Reacter) ,[ )

[. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached: Intervenors' First Set of Interrogatoriss on Contention XX Pursuant to .

_ Board Order in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated.

on this date: July 20, 1982 ,

John H. Frye, III, Chairman Christine Helwick Clenn R. Woods Atomic Safety & Licensing Bo'ard Office of Ceneral Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 590 university Hall Washington, D.C. 20555 '

2200 University Avenue Berkeley, CA 94720 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge Sarah Shirley Atomic Safety & Licensing B6ard Deputy City Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the City Attorney Washington, D.C. 20555 City Hall Dr. Oscar H. Paris '

1685 Fain Street Santa Monica, CA 90401 Administrative JudCe Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Committee to Bridge the Gap U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Washington, D.C. 20555 . , Los Ar,3eles, California 90025 Chief. Docketing and Service Section (3) Daniel Hirsch

! Office of the Secretary .. P.O. Box 1186 ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission een Lomond, CA 95005 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dorothy Thompson Counsel for NRC Staff .

Nuclear Law Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co:t. mission Wanhington, D.C. 20555 6300 Wilshire Blvd.. Suite 1200 .

Los Angeles, CA 90048 .

attention: Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead William H. Cormier -

  • l Office of Administrative Vice Chancellor i Universitya6f California

[ [

  • l 405' Hilgard Avenue '*

John gay Los Angeles, California 90024 Counsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE 'IO BRDCE THE GAP

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!1 MISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAPD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OP TIIE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) ) August 9, 1982

)

UNIVERSITY'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX PROPOUNDING PARTY: Intervenor Committee to Bridge the Gap RESPONDING PARTY: Applicant The Regents of the University of California SET NUMBER: One DONALD L. REIDHAAR GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE HELWICK 590 University Hall 2200 University Avenue Berkeley, California 94720 Telephone: (415) 642-2822 Attorneys for Applicant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA EXHIBIT E

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3 .s x , A TifE REGENTS OF TIIE UNIVERSITY -OF CAI,IFORNIQ 4 University) r~

responds' to the Committee to Bridge the Gap's first sot of inter-m . ,

rogatories cin Contention XX as followdi '

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1

( '

University objects to the qucistion to-the ' extent that the question seeks specific figures on the ' quantity of t.Se' fuer M

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present at,' the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds; that the compilatidn of such specific informatio,n would be unreasonably burde some, would require the release of protected _

information and that such specific information is, ncin" reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidpnce admissible on.

the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the' scope of' discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Nc twithstanding , and~ with$ut '

~ '

waiving, the aforesaid objectionsc, Univiirditiy J. answers as follows :

s, ,

For each day of the periodflers than 6 kilcgrams of U-235 enriched more than 20% ,was at the reactor ;facil'ity and not in the core 'of_ _

the reactor except for periods o$ major _ in core" z maintenance when the "in-core" fuel was removed from the core. The'last s

period of major "in-core" maintenance occurred in 1974.- As a result of the most recent transfer ' of fu'el of f-si te, unirradiated fuel in storge on-site ha's bien reducrN1 to 'l.39, kilograms. N Irradiated fuel in the core is .3'.53 kilograms.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2 -

University objects, to' th.m.' question t o the extent that the question seeks specific figures on thejquantity o,fsthe fuel 6

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t e present at the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds that the compilation of such specific information would be un-reasonably burdensome, would require the release of protected information and that such specific information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:

For each day of the period, less than 3.6 kilograms of U-235 enriched more than 20% was in the core of the reactor.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3 University objects to the question to the extent that the question seeks specific figures on the quantity of the fuel present at the facility for each day since 1970 on the grounds that the compilation os such specific information would be un-reasonably burdensome, would require the release of protected information and that such specific information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence dismissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CPR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows:

For each day of the period, less than 4700 grams of U-235 enriched more than 20% was in the fuel storage holes. In general, irradiated fuel is either in the core or in the storage pits, and the total quantity of irradiated fuel in the reactor room has not exceeded 4700 grams.

2-

t s RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4 University objects to this question to the extent that the question seeks to explore operating conditions that may have occurred in the period prior to the adoption of the upgraded safeguards regulations applicable to University's facility which became effective November 21, 1979 on the grounds that such information is not relevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows: To the knowledge, of University's staff for the period since November 21, 1979, no.

(a) Not applicable (b) Not applicable (c) Not applicable RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5 See the objections stated and the response given to Interrogatory No. 4, above.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6 The precise dose rate is not determined except that calculations have been made to determine the conditions that would result in an external dose rate of 100 rem per hour at 3 feet, unshielded. The basic calculation is presented in the attached Exhibit "A".

t ,

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7 Not applicable.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8 See response to Interrogatory No. 6, above.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9 See response to Interrogatory No. 6, above. .

1 i RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10 Approximately 14 days.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Level of operations or schedule of operations or other variations in power history.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 The parameters of the problem have been incompletely described but in any case, the answer involves a complex calculation that has not been made. See response to Interrogatories Nos. 6,10 and 11, above.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13 l

There are no written rules or procedures. However, the reactor is operated an average 200 KWH per week which provides a conservative operating margin for meeting the self-protecting conditions.

(a) See response above

] (b) Specific attention was made to observing the self -protecting conditions beginning in January 1981.

i

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1

  • RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14 As a result of the recent reduction in total fuel inventory at UCLA, the University is no longer concerned with maintaining the self-protecting conditions.

(a) through (k), not applicable, j

. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15 4

University agreed to maintain the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel or to reduce its fuel inventory.

The committment was communicated by letter from Wegst to Miller, dated January 29, 1981, attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

RESPONSE.TO INTERROGATORY No. 16 Assuming "No. 14" should read "No. 15", the answer is there are no such dates.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17 Yes. There are no such procedures; see response to Interrogatory No. 14, above.

1 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18 University cannot speculate on such hypothetical situations except to note that there is no requirement to maintain the radiation level given the current fuel inventory 1

at the UCLA facility.

l RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19 t

Not to the knowledge of University's staff but see the Miller to Wegst letter, dated January 12, 1982, attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

i i

t * -

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20 University objects to the question to the extent that the question seeks security information unrelated to radiation dose rate of the irradiated fuel on the grounds that such information is protected information and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible on the question of the applicability of 10 CFR Part 73 safeguards regulations, which is the extent of the scope of discovery that has been permitted by the Board. Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows: With respect to maintaining the self-protecting conditions for the "in-core" fuel, University has never been found in non-ccmpliance with NRC security or safeguard regulations.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21 There are no specific dose rate limitations.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22 No. During period of major "in-core" maintenance and lower than average operational intensity.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23 The precise minimum quantity is unknown.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24 The precise maximum is unknown. Under the present configuration with the presently available fuel composition no more than 4 kilograms U-235.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25 University objects to the question on the grounds that it is unclear, ambiguons and imprecise in that it seems to require that the University speculate on what regulatory requirements will be in effect throughout the proposed relicensing period.

Notwithstanding, and without waiving, the aforesaid objections, University answers as follows: There are no additional facts not provided in response to-the interrogatories above.

Dated: August 9, 1982 DONALD L. REIDlIARR GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE IIELWICK By s' William 11. Cormier UCLA Representative i

l s

VERIFICATI0fl fleill C. Ostrander, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Manager of the Nuclear Energy Laboratory of University, The Regents of the University of California; that he has read the annexed " University's Response to Intervenor's First Set of Interrogatories on Contention XX" and knows the contents thereof; and that the same are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

haUe.Osw &

Neill C. Ostrander Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of January,1982

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'A Notary Public ,j OrF#CI AL F 8 A L. (

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.f TONIV0 GEL PUPUC C#Ur0Rfil4 l  ?;')ll;)tt778RY PM.%CsVan OtttCt 1N i e- LOS ANGELEG COtJr.Ty d*"' My Comm. (sp, hov. 20, t%5

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The conservative (under-estimating) nature of the dose rate calculation resides in the fact that the assumed five year annual power of about 15 f4wh/yr has been exceeded for every year since 1976, and is currently running at a rate greater than 20 th,h/yr.

Neill C. Ostrander fluclear Energy Laboratory UCLA .

July 1982 6

Exhibit "A" s -

Fuel Self Protectiun Calculation 1

The radiation intensity 0 at distance r from the core center after.

  • an operational history P(T) extending over a time interval T followed by a down time t is approximately ,  ;

^

D= 2 P(T)(T + t - T)-I ?-2 dT' I

43r 0 o ' m

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1 -. a -s,

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l This formulation assumes that all of the delayed gammas are emitteli at the core center, and the numerical calculations assume that three feet-from the nearest accessible surface is equivalently four feet from the core center. The constant A depends upon the units chosen but represents the conversion from the energy release P(T)dt at T to the incremental dose dD at t. -

The precise evaluation of the equation over the entire operating i history of the reactor amounts to a summation of all contributions to the i integral for those times for which P(1) > 0. The results shown below are i based upon the following simplified model which underestimates the actual radiation level.

i 1) fleglect all contribution from the history prior to 5 years ago.

l ,

Thus, today, T=0 corresponds to approximately August 1, 1977.

2) Assume 3 years (say 8-1-77 through 7-31-80) at an. average uniform power level of 15 Mwh per year.
3) Assume that the subsequent 2 years (say 8-1-80 through 7-31-82) i can be characterized by two components:

i a) a periodic component produced by a 200 kwh energy generation (treated as a Dirac delta function) every seven days, 'and superposed thereupon; b) a random, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Mwh/yr.

! llote that the sum of (a) and (b) is equivalently 15.4 Mwh/yr.

These assumptions lead to the following radiation dose rates at 3 feet from the nearest accessible surface following a shat down of t weeks.

i Time, t (weeks) Dose Rate (R/hr) at 3 feet

1 142.

I v 2 107.

3 91' 4 83 r The dates indicated in assumptions (1),(2) and (3) are arbitrary and

could have been represented by phrases such as five years ago and two years ago to reflect the moving average aspect of a calculation which is not l

actually performed on a day-by-day or any other periodic basis.

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UNIVEllSI'IT OF CALIFOllNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA

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  • . CO3IMUNITY SA FETY DEPAliT\ LENT OFHCE OF ftESEABCit te OCCUPATIONAL SAk't::TY -

LOS ANCELES. CAL 1}OHNLV.4An4 January 29, 1981 d

r James R. Miller, Chief '

Standardization and Special Projects Branch r Division of Licensing

! U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Miller:

In reference to your letter of January 12, 1981: We are

< scheduling reactor operations to conform with the self-protection

- criteria for the in-core fuel. As this represents a temporary

, arrangement, we are proceeding to identify viable options for the I reduction of our unirradiated Sf;M inventory. ,

Two options have been identified; (1) transfer to the DOE Lawrence Livermore flational Laboratory (LLl!L), and (2) return to 00E, Idaho Falls. The DOE and LLi!L have tentatively indicated I

the acceptability of either destination, subject to approval of final plans.

1 ll Very truly yours, N itT [ bb.:.h /

Walter F. Wegst, Director j ,

Research & Occupational Sa fety i

UFtl/flC0/lc I

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Exhibit "C"

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UNITED STATES 8 D ., 't NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E,

f. E* WASHirJG TOtJ, D. C. 20555

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JAN J1 393 7 Dr. Wal ter F. Wegst .

University of California at Los Angeles Director of Research and "

Occupational Safety ,

Office of Environmental llealth and Safety Los Angeles, California 90024

Dear Dr. yegst:

i Following a site visit and review of your Physical Security Plan by HRC, we have determined that the UCLA reactor operating and SNM storage sites are contiguous. As such the facility must implement interim Category I physical security requirements. These requirements are currently contained in 10 CFR Parts 73.67(a)(b)(c)(d) and 73.60.

I In order to be exempt from the above requirements, the fuel in storage would have to be shipped to another location or the reactor would have to be operated to maintain the fuel irradiation level at a dose rate of 100 rem /hr at 3 feet fron any accessible surface.

(See 10 CFR 73.6(b) and 73.67(b)(1)(i)).

} By January 31, 1981, please indicate your confirmation' of the above and- your j plan for compliance with this temporary adjustment.

l Sincerely, .

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/ James R. Miller, Chief

/ Standardization & Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing 4

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached: UNTVERSTTY'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON CONTENTION XX in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date:Auaust 9, 1982.

John H. Frye, III, Chairman Mr. Daniel Hirsch Administrative Judge Cte. to Bridge the Gap ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1637 Butler Avenue, #203 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Los Angeles, CA 90025 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. John Bay, Esq.

Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke 3755 Divisadero #203 Administrative Judge San Francisco, CA 94123 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Daniel Hirsch Washington, D.C. 20555 Box 1186 Ben Lomond, CA 95005 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Administrative Judge Nuclear Law Center ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD c/o Dorothy Thomson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6300 Wilshire Blvd., #1200 Washington, D.C. 20555 Los Angeles, CA 90048 Counsel for the NRC Staff Ms. Sarah Shirley OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR Deputy City Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Hall Washington, D.C. 20555 1685 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90401 Chief, Docketing and Service Section OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l "

WILLIAM H. CORMIER UCLA Representative THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

t .

Questions and Clarification as to " Fuel Self Protection Calculation", by lieill Ostrander, dated July 1962("F.xhibit A")

A. As to the equation in sentence 1:

(1) 'dhat is the source of the equation?

(a) If the source is a book, article, report or other document, i

give its title, author, publisher, dats, page number, and other appropriate identifying infornation and indicate why you believe it is the appropriate equation to use.

(b) If derived by your staff or personnel, how was it derived and what assumptions were used in its derivation?

(2) What is the source of the nunerical exponential "-1.2", and why is it enployed in said equation?

(a) If the source of the exponential is a book, article, report or other document, give its title, author, publisher, date, page number, and other appropriate identifying information and indicate why it is appropriate to use it.

i b) If derived by your staff or personnel, how was it derived and what assumptions were used in its derivation?

(3) 'lhat is the value which was used for the constant "A" in the equation, and what are the units in which it is expressed, as used to obtain the results in paragraph 3?

j (a) If the source of the constant is a document, please identify the document as above, and indicate why you think it is the appropriate value to use.

(b) If derived, how was it derived, and what assumptions were used in its derivation?

(c) '.las the constant obtained by actual measurement or by calculation? What approxinations and assumptions are nade in so obtaining the constant?

B. As to part 3a of the calculation:

'das the periodic component of 200k1 energy generation every seven days assumed to be regular with tino or to be variable with time?

(i.e., did you assune 200Mih output on day 1, 200kdh on day 8, 200kJh on day 15, etc.: or did you assume, e.g.100Mih on day 1, 75k.ih on day 5,130Mih on day 16, etc. , which would average out to be 200kWh each week?)

C. As to the "randon, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Dih per year" identified in part 3b of the calculation (1) Precisely what is neant by "randon, smoothed, average"?

(a) Is the power function P(T) implied by this sentence a EXHIBIT F

1 -

constant power level of Sidh per year (i.e., was it "straightlined"?) or was some randonly generated function used for the calculation?

If the power function P(t) was not meant by this sentence to be a constant in tino, then describe the function used and the means to generate it. Include in the description of the function used in addition to the mean power level, the constants or parameters and their values and units whien indicate the temporal characteristics, that is, the rato of change of the function with timo, and those that exnross the amplitudo varinoility and deviation from the average power level.

(b) How was the randon power level " smoothed"? Please provide the functions used to smooth it.

D. By tne reactor being " shut down", as used in paragrapn 3, do you meaa zoro power generation from both the periodic impulso conponent and the randon smooth component?

(1) Aro thoro any assumptions used in ;he calculation in question which would nako the equation invalit for downtimes of less tnan one week? If so, please identify uid assumptions.

(2) Please provido dose rato esti=atos for 1 ca; and 3 days after shut down or for similar T values or less than one week.

E. If the calculation was computer assisted, please provide the computer progran and printouts.

(1) For those portions or the calculation not conputer assisted, please show tho actual calculations that resulted in the doso rate conclusions summarized in the table at the botton of page 1 of " Exhibit A".

(2) Please provide all other calculations or computer runs, ir any, from January 1901 to the present that were conducted to, or that could be used to, estimate operating conditions necessary to maintain the ruel at 100 rem /hr.

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UNIVEllSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA st hkt i t) . De ss insisE . s os A%cELES kts tasstzt . g o tis t r,o s a t R W.1%t D I 5B h B4RB4R4 $ 6 7 4 0 R L'Z sh19l

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OFFICE OF TIIE CliANCELLOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFOHNIA 9th24 August 26, 1982 Mr. John H. Bay, Esq.

  1. Embarcadero Center Twenty-Third Floor San Francisco, California 94111

Dear Mr. Bay:

In response to our agreement reached over the telephone on August 18, 1982 and recorded in your letter to me of the same date, I have enclosed the following information:

- a table representing the fuel inventory by various category at the UCLA facility since 1970 contained in memo, Ostrander to Cormier; and

- answers to the written questions on the

" Fuel Self-Protection Calculations" which you had hand-delivered to ray office on August 23rd; these questions were essentially follow-up questions to our interrogatory responses of August 9th.

I trust that you will find our responses to your discovery requests both complete and timely.

Very truly yours, f}&O k,00l' William H. Cormier

! UCLA Representative l Enclosure cc: Service List k

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P EX1tIBIT G i

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LOS ANGELES: SCllOOL OF ENGINEERING

% e AND APPLIED SCIENCE MEMORANDUM 25 August 1982 T0: W. Cormier 2241 fiurphy FROM: 11. Ostrander 2567 Boelter Hall SUBJ: flEL Fuel Inventory Since 1970 I have constructed the attached inventory record for your response to Mr. Bay's request of August 18, 1982. Inventorial practices have changed

. over the several AEC-ERDA-flRC administrations and even within the lifetime of the NRC. The general trend has been to add detail by distributing j inventory into an increasing number of categories. Descriptive words have been replaced by a three symbol code. There have been several generations i of such codes, and no assurance that they are one-for-one translatable.

For example, one can translate " encapsulated, enriched, unirradiated, uranium-alloy scrap" into the category " uranium" but the inverse transformation is not possible.

i All of this goes to say that I have made a best effort to provide a complete record, .but I have had to make some interpretations based upon continuity of category by continuity of numbers. I cannot attest to the absolute accuracy of the record. I think it is a reasonable, but not necessarily unique interpretation of the available records.

IflVEflTORY OF U-235 IS0 TOPE Ifl FUEL, kg 3

Irradiated fuel Fresh Fuel DATE

-- TOTAL In-Core In pits Useful- Scrap 3-31-70 3.50 - -

0.02 3.52

6-30-71 3.50 -

2.53 0.02 6.05 12-31-71 3.56 0.73 3.74 0.94 8.97 l

12-21-74 3.55 0.73 3.74 0.60 8.62 9-30-80 3.53 -

3.74 0.60 7.87 9-30-81 3.53 -

3.75 -

7.28 8-25-82 3.53 -

1.39 -

4.92 i

! Except for the small burn-up (~ l gm per yearf, the inventories are constant over any interval between adjacent dates. E.g., from 12-31-74 to 9-30-80, the total inventory was approximately 8.62 kilograms. The dates are inventorial record dates and not the actual dates of the material transfer.

UNIVF.RSITY OF CALIFORNI AHLetterhead for interdepartmental use)

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FUEL SELF PROTECTION CALCULATION Response to Intervenor's questions, Bay to Cormier, 8/23/82 A. (1) The equation was synthesized from several source documents and physical principles.

(a ) 1. Effects of Atomic Weapons, S. Glasstone (ed.),

U.S. Government Printing Office,1950, pages 251 and 13.

2 Nuclear Power Systems, Gregg-King, MacMillan Co.,

1964, page 169.

(b) Equation 8.12.2 of Reference 1 for a nominal bomb can be converted to gamma ray energy rate (mev/sec) per kwh using the equivalences of page 13 of Reference 1. The gamma ray energy is assumed to be isotropically emitted by a point source to 2

yield an energy flux I E in mev/sec per cm at distance r (cm) from the point source (the 1/4nr factor). The conversion of gamma ray energy flux to radiation units is given in Reference 2.

(2) The exponent arises from the decay law expressed by equation 8.12.2 of Reference 1. It is a commonly used, simple expression.

Neither of the cited references is particularly unique, they happened to be the ones I used.

(a) See above.

(b) See above.

(3) With power in kilowatts, r in centimeters, and dose rate in r/hr, and all times in hours; the constant is approximately 1.18 x 107 . The calculations were performed with A/4nr2 = 63.

The constant follows from the cited references and the appro-priate conversion of units, primarily one hour equals 3600 seconds.

(a) See above.

(b) No additional assumptions were made.

(c) It was not measured. See above.

B. The component was strictly periodic in time and amplitude--200 kwh at 168 hour0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> (one week) intervals.

-n , , ,-- --,-m w,,, -. -- + - - - ,, ,4--y,--s- e --- ,.. y

s a C. (1) As used in the calculation, the random components of actual operations appear in the calculation as a constant (smoothed) average P(r) = constant.

(a) See above.

(b) It was " smoothed" by using an average value lower than any annual average value of the post-1976 era.

D. Yes.

(1) Yes. The equation is rot valid as t + 0, and does not de-scribe the transition from the operating state to the shutdown state.

The equation is said to be fairly accurate .for t > 100 seconds

( ANL 5800, 2nd Ed., USAEC, July 1963, page 634-635).

(2) The calculation has not been done, but the decay law with n = -1.2 could yield no lower values than those calculated for one week.

E. All calculations were performed with a hand-held Hewlett-Packard, HP-25 The computer is programable but non-printing. There are no printouts. I did not save any program.

(1) Almost all engineering calculations are " computer assisted,"

whether by analog slide rule or IBM machine. The evaluation of the integrals involved under assumptions 2) and 2)b) with P(:) constant, is straight forward algebra and I do not recall precisely how I evaluated the algebraic solution. Assumption 2)a) was treated by summing a series of 104 tenas. Each incremental contribution was accumulated in the computer memory without recording the partial sums. The contributions arising from assumptions 2, 3a, and 3b were:

T r/hr (weeks) 2 3a 3b Total 1 6 97 39 142 2 6 70 31 107 3 6 59 26 91 4 6 52 25 83 (2) No previous calculations were formalized or retained.

Neill C. Ostrander 8/25/82

L'xhibit u p, n i .

fuel Self Protection Colculation The radiation intensity D at distance r from the core center af ter

  • an operational history P(r ) extending over a tinje interval T followed by a down time t is approximately ,

T ,

'2 [jT.;

0= 2 P(T)(T + t - T) -

r 44r 0 .

o ' -

. I eb . \ IS This formulation assumes that all of the' delayed garunas are emitte[i at the core center, and the numerical calculations assume that three feet-from the nearest accessible surface is equivalently four feet from the core center. The constant A depends upon the units chosen but represents the conversion from the energy release P(T)dt at T to the incremental dose dD at t. '

The precise evaluation of the equation over the entire operating -

history of the reactor amounts to a sun: nation of all contributions to the integral for those times for which P(a ) > 0. The results shown below are based upon the following simplified model which underestimates the actual radiation level.

1) lleglect all contribution from the history prior to S years ago.

Thus, today, T:-0 corresponds to approximately August 1,1977

2) Assume 3 years (say 8-1-77 through 7-31-80) at an average uniform power level of 15 Mwh per year.
3) Assume that the subsequent 2 years '(say 8-1-80 through 7-31-82).

can be characterized by two component s:

a) a periodic component produced by a 200 kwh energy generation (treated as a Dirac delta function) every seven days, and superposed thereupon; b) a random, smoothed, average power level of 5.0 Mwh/yr.

flote that the sum of (a) and (b) is equiv51ently 15.4 Mwh/yr. .

These assumptions lead to the following radiation dose rates at 3 feet from the nearest accessible surface following a shut down of t weeks.

Time, t (weeks) Dose Rate (R/hr) at 3 feet 1 142.

/

2 107, 3 91 4 83 The dates indicated in assumptions (1),(2) and (3) are arbitrary and could have been represented by phrases such as five years ago and two years ago to reflect the moving average aspect of a calculation which is not actually perfonned on a day-by-day or any other periodic basis.

1 of 2 EXilIBIT II

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The conservative (under-estimating) nature of the dose rate calculation resides in the fact that the assumed five year annual po'.ier of about 15 iMi/yr has been exceeded for every year since 1976, and is currently running at a rate greater than 2014ah/yr. ,

Heill C. Ostrander fluclear Energy l.aboratory UCLA .

July 1932 e

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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REUIATORY COP}ilSSION BEFORE ThE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility License)

(UCLAResearchReactor)

DECLARATION OF DANIEL 0. HIRSCH I, Daniel 0. Hirsch, declare as follows:

1 On August 13, 1982, I had a telephone conversation with Mr. C.K. Nulsen of the U.S. NRC.

2 A copy of a memorandum I prepared that diy regarding the conversation is attached hereto.

3. Said memorandum represents a true and correct summary of my conversation.

1 I, Daniel 0. Hirsch, swear under penalty of perjugy under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. /,

Executed on September 5, 1982 -

at Ben Iomond, California . 6I'(7 Daniel 0. Hirsch i

EXIIIBIT I

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10 CFR 73.60 vs. .67 100R/hrexemption August 13, 1982 I spoke today by phone with Mr. C. K. Nulsen, 301-427-4181, who is listed in 1ECY-81-376A as the contact person for proposed regulation amendments to 10 CFR 73.67, security for non-power reactors' 3UM.

He said he is no longer working on that project, but that the proposals have been revised and are soon to te published for another round of public comment.

Final rule would thus be some time away.

i He said that the current rule regarding exemption for 100 R/h 3NK is per fuel element, not the entire core. The reason the proposed rule looked at the TRICA' cluster was a question as to uhether it was "readily separable."

All other fuel would be, and is, based on 100 R/hr for each discrete fuel element, i.e. each bundle that can be readily removed. Thus that each of the 24 Argonaut fuel bundles must meet the 100hrR/(dh) it is clear standard.

A new Reg Guide to te published with the proposed, rule, when adopted, will make that clear, but it is currently the policy and is understood as such within IF C, he says.

The new rule may average the dose across the core--i.e. take the average dose of each fuel element, as opposed to requiring k that each element meet the 100 R limit 1.e. a few elements might be at 85 while all the rest are at 150, and under the new rule the facility would still te exempt (although not now. )

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SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SELF PROTECTION CRITERIA INVESTIGATION

SUMMARY

los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory was tasked by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to examine the technical aspects of exempting trem certain physical protection requirements SNM possessed by nonpower reactor licensees due to its radiation levels. In addition, the Laboratory was tasked to consider alterna-tives to the 100 rem / hour standard. The "100 rem /hr at a distance of 3' from any accessible surface without intervening shielding" exemption was established to provide a deterrence against theft of SSNM. <

The los Alamos study found no strong technical basis for changing NRC policy on the 100 rem / hour exception. In Phase I of the study, six areas of concern were identified as impacting the criterion. A summary of the discussions and conclusions of Phase I of the study for each concern is given below.

1. Analysis of the equipment, expertise, and time required to remove fuel from the core of nonpower reactors.

This discussion is based upon removal of irradiated fuel from open pool-type reactors. The open pool-type represents a worse-case situation in comparison to tank-type reactors which have inherent safeguards, i.e.,

massive shielding plugs requiring cranes for removal: The minimum equip-ment required to remove fuel frem an open pool reactor includes a fuel handling tool, a truck and radiation shielding. The fuel handling tool could be the simple fabrication of a hook on the end of a rope. The size of the truck or transport vehicle is determined by the amount of shielding the adversary decides is necessary. Five kilograms of uranium in plate-type fuel or TRIGA fuel can be stored in a 0.6 mx 0.6mx 1m volume. The simplest form of shielding in a vehicle is concrete block. Attenuation factors of 10 or 100 could be provided in a small moving truck or heavy duty pickup or van by providing 910 Kg or 1820 Kg of concrete block shielding, respectively. The probability of successful theft would be further increased with the assistance of a knowledgeable insider. Such an individual may have knowledge of type and location of fuel, and opera-tion of intrusion alarm detectors. The time required to complete a successful thef t depends on many factors including people involved, equipment used, shielding used, distance from the fuel storage area to the vehicle, etc. Assuming that reactor security has been breached by a group of two or three, a knowledgeable estimate of time for removal of 5 Kg of fuel from the core and storage, load it into a vehicle by hand and depart is 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This time could probably be minimized to one to two hours if additional inside manpower is utilized. This assumes no early detection of and interference with the theft occurs.

2. Estimate the range of doses likely to be received by an adversary in attempting to remove material.

The most likely dose a careful group of adversaries will receive in  ;

attempting to remove 5 Kg of uranium ts in the 50 to 100 rem range. This .

1 EXIIIBIT J osure B

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  • =

t i

4 estimate assumes the following: a) a person with a grappling hook pulling fuel from a storage pool, b) 30 elements moved, c) mean exposure time to a single element in air - 1 minute, d) mean exposure time to elements stored in truck - 1 minute, e) no shielding for single elements, f) shielding in truck to reduce dose by a factor of 100, g) dose rate 100 rem per hour per element and h) 30 minute drive in truck. This range is not an incapacitating dose especially when distributed among several people. Maintaining an incapacitating dose (est. 10,000 rem /hr at 3 feet) ,

is not a practical alternative for most nonpower reactors.

3. The technical feasibility of providing tamper proof radiation detection to prevent the theft of irradiated NPR fuel.

Tamper proof radiation detectors offering the following capabilities (with slight modification) are commercially available and are a feasible approach:

a. alarm at an off site location if the radiation exceeds a present level,
b. alarm at an off site location if an attempt is made to change the alarm set point or to disable the device,
c. not shielded readily, .
d. not interfere with the normal operation of the facility, and
e. offer an advantage to nonpower reactors as compa' red to maintaining fuel at 100 rem /hr.

I

4. Evaluation of the physical separability of fuel elements before the theft of various NPR fuels.

Physical separability refers to the physical breakdown of a fuel element assembly into fuel elements. Three types of assemblies are of concern:

1) plate-type fuel element assemblies normally containing 10-20 plate-type fuel elements, each swaged into end pieces, 2) four rod cluster TRIGA fuel assemblies and 3) special containers constructed to contain elements that do not meet the self protection criteria. These fuel element assemblies are not considered separable for the folicwing reasons:
1) to achieve significant dose reduction, the assemblies must be separated under water which would require the design of special tools, 2) the adversary gains nothing by separating the assemblies because although each piece is not as radioactive as the whole, the adversary must handle more pieces and 3) the adversary increases his probability of detection because of the additional time expended in separating the assemblies.
5. The appropriateness of using radiation levels based on a deterrence rather than an incapacitating dose.

2 Enclosure B

. o It is apparent and documented through actual experience that in order to assure a true "immediate incapacitation dose" to a group of adversaries, the dose rate per element must reach approximately several thousand rem at three feet. Increasing the self protection value above 100 rem /hr at three feet is beyond the capability of nearly all nonpower reactors for any significant decay times. Therefore, the study concludes that the determination of radiation levels based upon deterrence are more appro-priate than those based upon incapacitating dose.

6. Estimation of the quality and quantity of SSNM that will be allowed relative to the definition of " formula quantity."

The NRC defines a formula quantity as U-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233 or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 +

grams plutonium). This formula puts the same significance on 20% enriched fuel as it does 93% enriched fuel. The functional relationship between critical mass and enrichment has been well documented and variation of enrichment critical should be used in criterion related to the construction of a device.

Furthermore, the 100 rem /hr dose level is used withou't reference to quantity of U-235. Five kilogramt with a dose rate of 100 rem /hr is treated the same as. ten 0.5 kg sources, each with a dose rate of 100 rem /hr. In the latter case, one woulo have to handle all of the pieces of SNM and be exposed to ten times the dose involved in the former case.

Therefore, the amount of fuel per fuel element should.be considered in the self protection criterion.

Phase II of the los Alamos National Scientific Laboratory study examined alternatives other than the present exemption criteria of 100 rem /hr or more at 3 feet. The alternatives and their advantages and disadvantages are summarized below. Although the study indicated some relationship to prefer-ence in the ordering of the alternatives, there was no attempt to conclude that one alternative was better than any of the others.

1. Exemotion Based on Integrated Dose. For this alternative, the rute would j

be written to specify that an adversary removing the SSNM would receive a given amount of radiation in so doing.

a. Advantages.

(1) The rule can be written to allow flexibility in dose estimates based on the facility design.

(2) Would be advantageous to those sites having a large distance between the fuel and the location of the removal vehicle.

~

(3) Would be advantageous to those sites which have additional barriers, doors or other hindrances which increase the time to e move the material from its location to the removal vehicle.

3 Enclosure 8

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a

b. Disadvantages.

(1) This alternative has little physical significance.

(2) Could conflict with the ALARA standard depending on how the dose is set.

2. Exemption Based on Detection. For this a!ternative, the rule would be written requiring that an alarm signal be t ansmitted to a security force if an attempt is made to remove radioactive material from the facility.
a. Advantages.

(1) Will allow fuel to be kept at the lowest possible level of radiation depending on the location of the detectors and thus meets ALARA standard.

(2) Allows flexibility to the facility.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Depends on ability to implace detectors that can not be overridden by an adversary group or an insider.

(2) Facility must demonstrate that alarm system is tamper proof and will detect the unauthorized removal of material.

3. Retain the 100 rem /hr Exemption but give Credit for Fuel Enrichment and Mass. For this alternative; the rule would be written to take into account the fuel form, the enrichment or the connection between the dose rate and the quantity of fuel. This would take into . account that an adversary forced to move more fuel of a given dose rate would receive more of a dose than if he moved less fuel at the same dose rate. If we were to select as our basis a reactor that contained fuel elements with a mass of 175 grams, then a formula of 100;5re h XmE2 = .57mE2 rem /hr at 3 l 3 ft would be used to determine the required dose rate for an exemption.

i (E is the fractional enrichment, and m is the U235 mass in grams of the fuel element at the NPR under consideration where the fuel element used i

as a basis has a mass of 175 grams.)

a. Advantages.

1 (1) Includes fuel form in regulation.

(2)~ Is closer to a function of real world exposure than other alternatives.

b. Disadvantages.

l (1) Facilities with greater than 175 g. fuel elements will be  :

required to maintain radiation greater than 100 rem /hr. *

! 4 Enclosure 8

I i

1 (2) Is contrary to ALARA standards.

4. Retain 100 rem /hr Exemotion as Presently Specified in 10 CFR 73.67(b) j and 10 CFR /3.6(b). This. alternative is the rule that presently applies i to NPRs. Most of the NPRs have adjusted their inventories and procedures to accommodate this rule.

i

a. Advantages.

(1) No additional action required by NRC.

(2) No additional action required by facility.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) To meet the standard is difficult for some facilities.

(2) The standard is not a physical deterent.

! (3) It is contrary to ALARA.

I i

.(4) Makes facilities more attractive for sabotage.

5. Exemot Irradiated Fuel. For this alternative, the rule would be written to exempt all fuel that has been irradiated in a reactor. This was the -

rule in 10 CFR 73.50 in the past but it was questioned because it had little physical basis.

a. Advantages.

(1) It would be a psychological deterence.

(2) Does not require that dose rate be measured.

i (3) Meets ALARA standards.

(4) Will allow fuel to cool below 100 rems /hr and thus reduces

danger of sabotage.
b. Disadvantages.

(1) No physical basis for rule.

(2) Dose received by adversary could be very low.

In conclusion, there appears to be insufficient reason to increase the level of radiation in order to exempt nonpower reactors from Category I requirements.

i The alternatives suggested by los Alamos Scientific Laboratory are such that even less than 100 rem /hr at 3 feet 'can be sufficient. However, it would be contrary to international agreements to adopt less than 100 rem /hr. Since 5 Enclosure 8 1 .

. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ . . . __ _ . _ , _ . . . _. . . . _ , _ - _ _ . . _ _ , . . _ _ _ . . - - - . . -

there is insufficient evidence to support a change from the 100 reh/hr, a:UI since more technical evidence should be available to change a regulation, thC 100 rem /hr at 3 feet exemption for irradiated fuel should be maintained. ,

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE_THE_ ATCMIC_ SAFETY _ AND LICENSING BOARD i

In the Matter of )

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY Docket No. 50-142 OL OF CALIFORNIA )

(Proposed Renewal of (UCLA Research Reactor) 1 Facility License)

DECLARATION OF ROGER _ L. KOHN in Support of Intervenor Committee to Bridge the Gan's Brief on the Apelicability of Physical Security Regulations to this Licensing Proceeding I, Roger L. Kohn, declare as follows:

1. I am presently a third-year law student at UCLA School of Law, and expect to receive a J.D. degree in May 1983.
2. I an also a physicist and systems analyst. I received a B.A. de6rce with honors in physics from Haverford College in 1963, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Stanford University in 1965 and 1968, respectively. I have completed coursework and employment in both experimental and theoretical nuclear physics, and have had twenty years experience in various applications of physics, mathematics, and computer programming. My professional resume, giving my credentials prior to law school, is attached.
3. I have read University's Response to Intervenor's First Set of InterroSatories on Contention XX, August 9,1982, and Neill C. Ostrander's Fuel Self Protection Calculation dated August 25, 1982, attached to UCLA Representative William H. Cormier's response letter of AuSust 26, 1982.
4. Assuming the values, assumptions, approximations, and equations used in the first two paragraphs of Exhibit "A" of University's Response to Intervenor a First Set of Interrogatories on Contention XX (hereinafter cited as Exhibit "A") or cited in Neill C. Ostrander's Fuel Self Protection Calculation dated 8/25/82, to be correct, I have constructed a calculator program which is capable of calculating dose rates for various times following shutdown. The program produces substantially the same dose rates at delay times of 1, 2, 3, and 4 weeks as those given in paragraph three of Exhibit "A".

i

5. The match is appreciably better if I assume that the delta-function ener6y pulse occurs at the end of each week rather than, say, at the beginning of each week (i.e . ,

if the reactor is shut down immediately after a delta-function ener6y pulse rather than if it is shut down FYitTATP W

just before the next one is due). Neither Exhibit "A" nor the 8/25/82 response letter indicates which assump-tion was made in the model used to produce the numbers in paragraph three of Exhibit "A". I then used this sate program to calculate dose rates for delays other than 1, 2, 3, or 4 weeks.

6. The fi6ures in Exhibit "A" are relevant for doses from the (presumed) entire unshielded reactor core. However, on the assumption that the appropriate dose relevant to theft is the dose from a sinale detached fuel bundle of the twenty-four total bundles in the core , the doses must be redetermined. The Exhioit "A" calculation assumed exposure at a distance of three feet from the core surface and thus four feet frcm the core conter. It also apparent-ly approximated the dose as originatin6 entirely at the core center instead of distributed throughout tne core.

l (It is likely, acccrding to my calculations, that this l last approximation will indeed cause less than a ten l

percent error. )

7. I have assumed in subsequent calculations that, upon separating a sin 61 e one of the twenty-four core fuel bundles from the remainder of the core, one-twentyfourth of the radioactivity accompanies the bundle. It is possible that in fact some bundles are more radioactive than others at the time of a shutdown. In the absence of any data in the supplied information regarding radioactivity distribution in the core, I have assumed the distribution to be homo 6eneous. This is conservative with respect to fuel self-protection since the thief, equally uninformed, might reasonably assume the outer bundles to be safest and remove them; my assumption of homo 5encity produces a bundle dose rate higher than these possibly below-average outer-bundle dose rates.
8. The exposure due to a single fuel bundle at a distance of three feet from that bundle will then be less than that due to the whole core by a factor of twenty but it will also be greater by a factor of (4/3)grour; due to the decrecsed distance to the center of the radiating source, assuming (as does Exhibit "A") that all radiation equivalently originates at the source center.
9. My results are as follows (please see next page):

I time after seconds } 100 shutdown hours 8 days 28 21 14 7 1 ,

I i I

dose rate, Exhibit "A" 83 91 107 142 whole core (for compar-r/hr at ison) three feet core, end- 88 98 114 149 452 of-week pulse core, begin- 83 91 102 122 174 ning-of-week pulse single fuel 33.5 92 bundle, end-of week pulse single fuel 34 bundle, beginning-of-week pulse

10. All other things being equal, it is more conservative to assume pulses in the beginnings of the weeks, since this yields lower dose rates. The conservative single fuel bundle dose at three feet is only (approximately) 34 r/hr at the shortest delay following shutdown for which the equation in Exhibit "A" is valid, i.e. 100 seconds. For the least conservative situation, i.e.

where the reactor is shut down immediately after a delta-function energy pulse, a dose rate of 100 r/hr at three feet occurs for a single fuel bundle only following delay times after shutdown of less than approximately eight hours.

11. If the weekly-period model is used in lieu of an actual operating schedule, the safest assumption would be the conservative one, i.e. that each week's non-constant fraction of the reactor energy is generated early in the week, and that if the reactor is suddenly shut down and the fuel bundles removed, the energy for the most

~4-recent week was generated nearly a week previous to that shutdown. In such a case, using the same numbers, equations, and approximations as those in Exhibit "A" and the subsequent letter, a single detached fuel bundle cannot be considered theft-proof by virtue of a sufficiently high dose rate, to wit, one of at least 100 r/ hour at three feet.

12. The weekly-periodic function assumed in Exhibit "A", 3a),

is only a reasonable, conservative approximation to the real operation if the reactor is in fact operated to generate at least 200 kWh of energy in each of the weeks proceeding the shutdown.

13. I have not at this time independently verified the accuracy or applicability of the equation and numbers supplied by Exhibit "A" and the subsequent letter. I here only determine the dose rate from a single detached fuel bundle based on their assumed accuracy and applic-ability to the whole core.

I declare under penalty of perjury that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 4, 1982, at Manhattan Beach, f /

California

[

Roger'L. Kohn, Ph.D.

ROGER L. KOHN 524 Eleventh Street, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 (213) 379-3956 Education:

Ph.D. Applied Physics 1968 Stanford University 1963-1968 M.S. Applied Physics 1965 Stanford, California B.A. Physics (llonors) 1963 llaverford College 1959-1963 ilaverford, Pennsylvania Professional experience:

Research and development Laboratory experiments Computer simulation Systems and mission analysis Performance analysis Test design and evaluation Fields of specialization:

Laser and optical systems and applications Communication Atmospheric propagation Object detection, tracking, and ranging Atmospheric pollution measurement Image transmission and display Lasers and optical devices Solid-state, gas, and vapor-phase lasers Dye lasers and fluorescence spectroscopy Short optical pulses, modulation, and mode-locking Photodetectors Deflectors and scanners Retroreflectors Frequency doublers and nonlinear affects Xerography and electrophotography Electronic devices Gascous discharges Nuclear-particle detectors A _d

-g-b 1

Roger L. Kohn (cont'd) f Employment:

l Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation Senior Scientist I

1456 Cloverfield Boulevard 1978 - 1980 Santa Monica, California 90404 i

  • Responsible for performance analysis, and design, supervision, and evaluation of tests of optical systems and components. Specifically,
laser rangefinders and trackcrs have been modeled, the effects of atmos-pheric turbulence and acrosol scatter analyzed, and interesting targets characterized. The utility of various lasers-- tunable dye, neodymium, and carbon dioxide-- for use in such applications as air to ground, air

! to sea, and ground to ground has been inveatigate(, Key individual com- ,

} ponents have been studied and, in some cases, characterized through lab-oratory measurements. These optical elements include heterodyne detec-l tors, wide-field optical filters, visible and infrared lasers, and retro-I reflective devices. Changes in device or system designs or test proce-i dures are recommended through agency or contractor personnel briefings and reports.

The Aerospace Corporation Member of Technical Staff '

Electronics Research Laboratory 1973 - 1978 El Segundo, California (P.O. Box 92957, Los Angeles, CA 90009)

Involved in laser research, development, and the application of op-tics and lasers to mission-oriented programs. Responsibilities included development of new concepts and devices, conducting of laboratory pro-jects, maintenance of expertise on present and future lasers, systems, and applications, and briefing of agency personnel.

Laser research included study of new dye and vapor-phase lasers with emphasis on small-scale, visible devices, and the investigation of laser noise sources. Applications of optics included the measurement of atmos-pheric pollutants, transmission spectrum of the atmosphere, and the anal-ysis of precision rangefinders for satellite positioning (e.g. for pro-posed solar-power stations). Laser lifetime tests were designed for the USAF communication satellite program. Novel concepts were pursued: small particles were levitated by radiation pressure with the aim of rotating the suspended beads for numerous research and device purposes.

i Bell Laboratories Member of Technical Staff

. Active Optical Device Department 1968 - 1972 Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974 and Coherent Optics Research Department Holmdel, New Jersey 07733

Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)

Conducted research into fluorescence and lasing properties of dyes and their interactions, excitation, and decay. Computerized data proces-sing and automated spectroscopic equipment were developed to assure reli-able results.

Proposed and developed a unique continuously-operating dye laser, independently of other groups previously equipped and working toward this goal, and introduced fundamental design now incorporated in all commer-cial and most experimental cw dye lasers.

Involved in the development of a high-resolution facsimile recording system, including research and development in gas-discharge and laser image recording, optics and deflection devices, and laser image scanners (the proprietary nature of this work precluded publication).

Microuave Laboratory Research Assistant W.W. Hansen Laboratories of Physics 1963 - 1968 Stanford University Stanford, California 94305 Conducted research into the mechanirm and applications of mode-locking of ruby lasers. A model for phase- and amplitude-modulated transient mode-coupling of lasers was developed and computer calcula-tions compared with experimental results. Mode-locking was proposed and shown to increase nonlinearly-generated power, and second-harmon-ic enhancement was used to study locking.

Experimental Reactor Division Research Assistant Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1963 (summer)

Los Alamos, New Mexico Research involved the study of ganma-ray noise mechanisms in nuclear-particle detectors in the vicinity of nuclear reactors.

Bell Telephone Laboratories Technical Aide Murray Hill, New Jersey 1961 (summer)

Continued the development and testing of a newly-devised nuclear-particle detector.

Radiation Laboratory Laboratory Assistant Johns Hopkins University 1959, 1960 (summer)

Baltimore, Maryland Modified, calibrated, and operated an infrared spectrometer.

t j . . 1 i a

! Roger L. Kohn (cont'd) a i

j Publications:

" Internal Modulation of Ruby Lasers and Second-Harmonic Generation," I 1966 International Quantum Electronics Conference, Phoenix, April, 1966.(with R.H. Pantell).

"Second-Harmonic Enhancement with an Internally-Modulated Ruby Laser,"

{ Appl. Phys. Letters 8, 231 (1 dby 1966) (with R.H. Pantell).

" Mode Coupling in an External Raman Resonator," Appl. Phys. Letters 9, j 104 (1 August 1966) (with R.H. Pantell, B.C. Huth, H.E. Puthoff). '

" Mode Coupling in a Ruby Laser," IEEE J. Quantum Electr. QE-1, 306

! (August 1966) (with R.H. Pantell).

l " Mode-Coupling Effects with Ruby Lasers," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stan-

) ford University, May 1968; Microwave Laboratory Report 1636.

4 4

"An Intracavity-Pumped CW Dye Laser," Opt. Commun. 3,, 177 (May 1971) l (with C.V. Shank, E.P. Ippen, A. Dienes).

" Observation of Inhomogeneity in the Gain Spectrum of a Coumarin Laser

Dye," Opt. Commun. 7, 309 (April 1973) (with C.V. Shank, A. Dienes).  !

" Characteristics of the 4-Methylumbelliferone Laser Dye," IEEE J.

j Quantum Electr. QE-9, 833 (August 1973) (with A. Dienes, C.V. Shank).

1 l " Automated System for Measuring Gains in Organic Dyes," Appl. Opt. 12,

2939 (December 1973) (with C.D. Lingel, C.V. Shank, A. Dienes).

I 1

1 Aerospace Corporation technical reports i

l " Laser Transmitter for NASA Satellite Rangefinder," 8 May 1974.

" Laser Trimming of Precision Resistors for Aerospace Applications," 17 October 1974.

" Angular Acceleration of Neutral Particles with Laser Radiation," 15

October 1975 (with M. Birnbaum).

] " Low Frequency Pulsation Noise in Continuous Argon-Ion Lasers," 24 October 1975.

"Short-Range Satellite-to-Satellite Lidar: Cooperative vs. Uncooperative Targets." 3 February 1976.

t 1

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. . o Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)

"Retroreflectors for Precision Optical Ranging," 17 February 1976.

" Laser Rangefinder for Use with Satellite Elements of Adaptive Station-kept Array," 30 July 1976.

j q

" Aerospace 405B Laser Communications Laboratory," 13 October 1976.

" Measurement of Off-Axis Beam Intensity of 405-B Downlink," 7 January 1977.

" Dye Laser for KrF-Pumped Formaldehyde Isotope-Separation Applica-tions," 15 August 1977.

" Cerenkov Radiation in Optical Systems," 22 August 1977.

Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation technical reports

" Considerations for a Narrowband Optical Filter for ODCS," July 1978,

" Initial Assesment of OCCULT Performance," July 1978 (with R. Lutomirski),

" Compass llammer Parametric Tests. Part I," September 1978 .

" Application of an OCCULT-Type Laser System to an Electro-Optical Countermeasure," April 1979 .

" Geometric Considerations when Using an Optical Scintillometer," Jan-uary 1979.

" Measurement of Plastic Retroreflector Arrays for Some Radiometric Applications," March 1979.

Patents:

i

" Dye Laser with Pump Cavity Mode Matched to Laser Resonator" Inventor: R.L. Kohn. #3 766 488, October 16, 1973.

Others submitted to employers for further action.

5 l

8

,_n, -

Roger L. Kohn (cont'd)

Professional affiliations:

American Physical Society, IEEE, AAAS, Sigma Xi.

Personal data:

Born - 1 December 1941, Baltimore, Maryland Citizenship -

U.S.A.

O e

e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR R20UIATORY CO G!ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING ECARD In the Matter of THE RECENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) Docket No. 50-142 OL CF CALIFORNIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCIA Research Reactor) License)

DECLARATION CF DAVTD V. HAFEMSISTER I, David W. Hafemeister, declare as follous:

1 I an presently Professor of Physics at the California Polytechnic University in San Luis Obispo, California. PJ professional qualifications are attached.

2 During the period 1975-1979, I uas intimately involved uith the development and adninistration of this nation's nuclear non-proliferation policy, both in the U.S. Senate ard in the U.S. State Department.

This work included donestic and foreign policy matters related to the use of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) in research reactors and methods to reduce the associated proliferation ricks.

3. The proliferation risk associated with HEU is that it can be used direct 3y to make nuclear weapons, unlike the low cnriched uranium used, for exarple, in power reactors. No further enrichment, generally very costly and difficult, would be necessary in order to utilice the mterial in a clandestine fission explosive, thus making it a potentially attractive target for theft or diversion. For this ani related reasons, it has been the policy, both nationally and internationally, to attempt to minimize the amount of HEU in use.

4 93% enriched uranium in flat plate Aluminum-Uranium fuel would clearly fit within the category of Highly Enriched Uranium. In fact, 93% would be near the upper limit of HEU norcally used in reactors, and is clearly "weaponn-grade." That is, it could be used directly to fashion a clandestine fission explosive. Furthermore, because the critical mss Coos down as enrichment goes up, one would need significantly less U-235 if 93% enriched than, say, 205 for which the critical rass of U-235 is roughly three times as large. Thus, 93% enriched uraniun poses significant proliferation risks ard requires significant safe 6uards if its use is essential, a

EXHIBIT L

5. The prevention of nuclear proliferation is a matter which has long been recognized as essential to U.S. Interests ard the common defense and security. The solutions to nuclear nonproliferation are not simple: The office of Technology Assessment report on Nuclear Proliferation (1977) says that:

It is not too late to contain proliferation at a level which can be assiMlated by the international political system.

However, there are no single or all-purpose solutions; no short-cuts. A:. viable nonproliferation policy will require the coordinated, planned use of a wide variety of measures...

6. In recognition'of the threat to common defense and security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation, the Congress passed (virtually unanimously) the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

Ani, beginning in 1977, the United States Government established a policy designed to reduce the threat of proliferation by attempting to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of HEU, in part by attempting to reduce the amount of HEU in use throughout the world, particularly for research reactors. This policy of reducing the threat of theft or diversion by reducing the amount of HEU available for theft or diversion has had as a concommitant element the attempt to reduce the enrichment of research reactor fuels. This program, known as the Reduced-Enrichment Research ard Test Reactor Program (RERTR), represents the' official policy of the United States in attempting to reduce enrichments of research reactor fuels ard thus the amount of EEU in use.

7. The sum Ary report of the International Nuclear Fuel O/cle Evaluation (1980) has stated that it is feasible to mrkedly reduce the uranium enrichment of a great majority of research reactors; INFCE endorsed '

the conversion of HEU fueled research reactors to louer enrichment.

As C. Worthington Eateman, Acting Under Secretary of Energy in 1980, testified to the Congress that with fuel fabrication technology presently available in the U.S. and Europe enrichment reduction is possible for a great rany reactors. Ard John M. Deutch, then-i Director of Enorgy Research at DOE, told Congress in 1979 that fuel i fabrication and core technology currently available in the U.S. and Europe permits enrichment reduction from 90-93 percent to below 20 percent in most reactors. Mr. ::Bateman indicated in his testimony that the easiest reactors to make use of reduced enrichment fuels are low power reactors. The Department of Energy's NASAP Progran stated in 1980 that for those reactors where conversion using current technology mi$ ht be difficult, substitution of higher uranium density fuels with lower enrichment should'be possible. In this way the density (g/cc)ofU-235wouldremainessentiallyaconstant, but the additional U-238 atoms would dilute the U-235 so that it would be less useable as a raterial for nuclear weapons.

y 8 Given the official U.S. policy of reducing the anount of HIU in use to that absolutely essential, and the policy of reducing research r reactor fuel enrichments, it is my opinion that UCIA's reqLest for a license for 93% enriched fuel should not be granted unless the applicant can show definitely that it carnot adequately operate the reactor uithout HEU cf that enrichnent.

9. Likewise, UCIA's request for a licence to possess, as I u*4erstand it, 9400 grams of U-235 at 93% enrichnent scens to ce to necessitate a very. substantial showing on the Applicant's part why such a very large amount of such cemitive raterial could ever be needed on site.

If it is true that the core loading is about 3600 grams, it seems to me an unnecescary risk for the facility to be permitted to have on site cuch more than a few hurdred grarc beyond that. Eurnup would appear to be niniml; The rule of thumb is that 1 gram of fissionable caterial is burned up per E4D of hoat produced; given a rarimum pcuer level of 100 kuth ard a restriction to 5% of the year operating factor, which I am told the reactor is restricted to, in 20 years a naximum of about 36 r/D of thermal energy could be produced. If this is so, a maximum of less than 40 grans of U-235 uill be consumed through burn-up, a far cry from the thousands of grams requested in the licensa..

10 I understard that the Environmental Inpact Appraisal for this reactor indicatos that a total of about 700 grarc of U-235 have been "used" in the past twenty years. If this is true, ard assumin6 that part of that 700 grams coratitutos damged fuel as opposed to burnup, operating experience would irdicate approxirately 700 grans spare fuel would be sufficient, and even then, there is no reason of which I an'auare that a full twenty years' supply needs to be on site all the time or at any one time. In my opinion, nore than 4300-4500 grans U-235 permitted on site and granted through a license would be excessive, absent a substantial showing of need, and would pose an unnecessary threat to conmon defense and security through risk of diversion or theft.

11. I have reviewed a July 1982 calculation by 17o111 C. Cstrander of the I!uclear Energy Iaboratory entitled " Fuel Self Protection Calculation."

If he is correct that after seven days of shutdown the radiation dose at four feet from the core center without intervening shielding is 142 Rem / hour, then each individual fuel' bundle (of uhich I understand there are twent be about 10 Ren/y-four, each containing eleven fuel houratthreefeet(unshicided). Thus plates) would it would' appear neccesary to raise these radiation levels by more frequent (short-term) operation of the reactor to approach the 100 Rem / hour level for each fuel burdle and would appear prudent to do so if the radiation level of the fuel is being relied upon as a deterrent to theft.

12. ' Ny conclusions are that the Applicant, in order to obtain a license, should : (a) reduce the total amount of U-235 permitted on site to about 4 kg,-

(b) louer the enrichment of U-235 significantly unless the Applicant can cicar demonstrate that this is infeasible, and (c) institute an operation schedule which would raise the radiation level of the fuel bundles.

In addition, the security neasures taken to protect what raterial is pernitted on site need to be substantial, particularly if the above manures are not taken. 9700 grans of 93% enriched uranium are by no neans de ninirun; nor for that natter are 4900 grans. Theft or g dlversion of such material could have grave effects for our common defence and security, as well as public health and safety.

-4

13. The above suggestions would be concictent with U.S. policy and prudent in terms of protecting against the very worrisome prospect of an unnecessarily large quantity and unnecessarily high enrichment of uranium uithout adequate cafeguards being stolen or diverted for use in a clandestine fission explosive. Furthermore, however, failure to take the above precautions, without substantial shouing of good cause not to, uould danage'U.S. foreign policy interests by undercutting our government's attempts to reduce international commerce in EU and convince other nations of the need to reduce their EU holdings and the enrichment of their research reactor fuels.

I know from personal experienco in representing the State Department in such interactions with Chilean nuclear officials Andirepresentatives of Atomic Energy Commissions of other nations that it will be much more difficult for the U.S. to succeed in its policy of reduced enrichmente and EU holdings abroad if the policyfic not vigorously pursued at home.

The inconsistency of the U3, on the ono hand, denying EU to foreign research reactors while, at the same time, oversupplying research reactors at home with HEU that is not properly safeguarded, would not be lost on the nations ue are trying to influence.

14 Instly, it should be stated that it is both national ard international policy that kilogram quantities of EU nust be safeguarded. While timely warning, after the fact, of theft or diversion is a key element in such safeguards, post-loss reporting is not sufficient protection andp in my opinion, fails to nect the standard of taking neasures to minimise the possibilities for unauthorized renoval of such material consictent with the consequences of such removal. The removal of 9400 grams of 93% enriched U-235 would have extraordimrily serious potential consequences; the removal of 4900 grams of such mterial would have potential consequences rany, rany times greater than removal of 1000 grams of 20% enriched uranium. But even 1000 grams of such material, given the world situation with regards pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation, is not de minimus.

J I, David W. Fafemeister, swear under penalty of perjdry under the laws of the U.E that the foregoing in true and correct to the test of my knowledge and belief.

Executed en August 25, 1982, at Santa Crac, California } p),

/ David W. HafemeiMter, Ph.D.

J

W David W. Hafeteister Professor of Physics California State Polytechnic University Profassional qualifications

1. Education;
a. Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Northwestern University,1957
b. M3. and Ph.D. in Physics, University of Illinois, 1959, 1964
c. Post-Doctoral Fellowships:

Los Alamos Scientific Inboratory (1964-66)

American Association for the Advancement of Science Congressional Fellowship (1975-1976)

2. Enployment
a. Mechanical
b. Physicist, LosEngineer, ArgonneIaboratory Alamos Scientific National Lab (1957-58) )

(1964-66

c. Assistant Professor of Physics, Carnegie-Mellow University (1966-69)
d. Associate Professor of Physics (1969-72)

Professor of Physics (1972- )

California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, CA

e. Visiting Professor of Physics University of Groningen, The Netherlands (1972,1980)
f. Legislative Assistant and Science Advisor to Senator John Glenn U.S. Senate (1975-77)
g. Special Assistant to Under 3ecretary of Stato Lucy Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Joseph Nye, U.S. Departnent of State (1977-1979)
3. Experience with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Patters
a. U.S. Sena te : After the detonation by India of a nuclear device in 1974, the Connittee on Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate held extensive hearings on the " Export Reorganization Act of 1975" which dealt with nuclear nonproliferation. It was my job to be the full-time staffperson to the Ad-hoe Chairman of the Conmittee, Senator Glenn, on hearings and nark-up of the act. I was Senator Glenn's main adviser on nuclear non-proliferation matters.
b. Department of State: In 1977, I was appointed as one of two l Special Assistant on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation to Under-Secretary Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Nye. Dr. Nye had the lead role for nuclcar non-proliferation in the Executive Branch and at the London Nuclear Supplier Negotiations.

During this tine, I uas intinately involved with the drafting and pass 2Ge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, participating in the Department of Energy's Non-proliferation Alternative Systens Assessment Progran (NASAP), and dealing as a rupresentative of the

-A Under Secretary with officials of other nations' nuclear programs.

l

r In addition, I van the lead State Department delegate to Workin6 Croup 8 (Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts) of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which was held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, subgroup C of this Working Group had as its cole task the assessment of methods of reducing proliferation risks associated with research reactors.

4. Publications
a. Nuclear Non-Prcliferation:
1. " Nonproliferation and Alternative Nuclear Technologies".

Technolom/ Revieu 81, 58 (December 1978).

11. " Science and Society Test V: Nuclear Non-American Journal of Physics 48,112 (19c0)reliferation",

iii. prime author / editor of the Presidential Report to the Congress on the environmental impacts associated with nuclear exports abroad (1980) iv. co-author / editor of the Supplement Nuclear Research and Development Ercort Activities to ERDA 1542 (U.S. Nuclear Export Activities),

September 1979.

b. Solid State and Nuclear Physica:

20 articles; four book chapteres one book

c. Ences Technology and Policy:

10 articles

/

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. 1 JAN l'2 21 Dr. Walter F. Wegst University of California .

at Los Angeles Director of Research and Occupational Safety

  • Office of Environmental Health and Safety .

Los Angeles, California 90024

Dear Dr. Wegst:

i Following a site visit and review of your Physical Security Plan by HRC, we have detemined that the UCLA reactor operating and SNM storage sites are contiguous. As such the facility must implement interim Category I physical security requirements. These requirements are currently conte r.ed in 10' s

CFR Parts 73.67(a)(b)(c)(d) and 73.60.

~

In order to be exempt from the above requirements, the fuel ir . orage would have to be shipped to another location or the reactor would he to be operated to maintain the fuel irradiation level at a dose ratt ' 100 rem /hr at 3 feet frc.: any accessible surface. (See10CFR73.6(b)ar ~3.67(b)(1)(1)).

By January 31, 1981, please indicate your confirmatic'n of the ecove and your plan for. compliance with this temporary adjustment. '

Sincerely, 7 uucn:. w = ^

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.#y James R. Miller, Chief Standardization & Special

[7y Projects Branch .

Division of Licensing DISTRIBUTION:

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ITY OF CALIFOllNIA. LOS ANGELES UCLA

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' f f- ..u........ u u. .. .i s Y, w.u$Y COMMUNITY $AFETY DEP ART \fENT OFFICE OF RESEARCll & OCCUP ATION AL %AFE1Y LOS ANGELES.CAUFORNL4 924 January 29, 1981 James R. Miller, Chief Standardization and Special Projects Branch Division of Licensing .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr.JMiller:

In reference to your letter of January 12, 1981: We are scheduling reactor operations to conform with tne self-protection criteria for the in-core fuel. As tnis represents a temporary arrangement, we are proceeding to identify viable options for the reduction of our unirradiated SNM inventory.

Two options have been identified; (1) transfer to the DOE Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and (2) return to DOE, Idaho Falls. The DOE and LLNL have tentatively indicated the acceptability of either destination, subject to approval of final plans.

Very truly yours, Walter F. Wegst, Director Research & Occupational Safety ,

WFW/NC0/lc N O o%

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[O hbb f EXIIIBIT N

b October 28, 1974 Karl R. Coller Annistant Director for '

Operating Reactora ,"

Directorate of Licensing USAEC k'ashington, D. C. 90545

Dear Sir:

Due to the censitive nature of the contents of this letter, vc request that this document be withheld from public disclosure purcuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.

Upon redoing our calculations on the Special Nuclear Material inventory, we found that our scrap quoted to you vas the total uranium content, not the U-235 content. Therefore, vc have nt our facility a total S: M inventory of 9.387 kg. Of thic, 4.293 kg. are egenpt and 5.094 kg, are non-excrept.

.c.s -

In order to cocply with the 5 kn. limit and approval of our accurity systc=,

vc request permission to ship 340 grc=s o'f U-235 to Oak Ridge - Y-12 facility. This vould bring our non-exc=pt SNM inventory down to 4.754 kg.

and our total SNM inventory down to 9.047 kg.

Forns OR-650C cn'd Forms OR-653A have been acnt to:

Joe Hahler Product Division ,

, USAEC Oak Ridge Operations Offico

  • P. O. Box "E" Oak Ridge Tennessee 37831 Sincerely, Charles E. Ashbaugh III Reactor Supervisor EXHIBIT O

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Docke t l'o. 50-142 HQY l B E'4 The Regents of the University

  • Nuclear Energy Laboratory ATTN: Mr. Thomas E. Hicks Director Los Angles, California Centlemen:

Your letter of October 28, 1974 stated that UCLA was considering methods to reduce their Spec:al Nuclear Material inventory below the formula quantity specified in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulat. ions, Part 73.

As of this date we have not received a written confirmation that you have reduced your Special Nuclear Material inventory nor have we received a request to review your security plan assuming the inventory was reduced.

You are reminded that your original plan, as submitted, was not acceptable and that you may be in violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73. Moncompliance with the Regulations would require that appropriate enforcement action be taken by us.

Your response is requested within seven days of the receipt of this letter.

Sincer,ely, f ,

.L _, m. ) , b b' #

George Lear, Chief 5

Operating Reactors Branch #3 Directorate of Licensing e

e EXHIBIT P

1 November 27, 1974 Earl R. Coller' Aasictant Director for .

Operating Reactors -

Directorate of Licensing USAEC Washington, D. C. 90545

~

Dear Sirs

  • Due to the censitive nature of the contento of thio letter, uc requent that this docenent be withheld from public dinclosure purouant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.

In order to comply uith the 5 Eg. limit and approval of our occurity synten, ve have finally contacted socconc who vould ship our 340 gra n U-235 froa UCLA to Oak Ridge-Y-12 facility.

The rccciver is:

Union Carbide Corp. Nuclear Division Y-12 Plant Poot Office Eox Y Oak Ridge, Tenneesce 37830 Attn: H.C. Bayo/E.R. Pulley For Recovery The shipping coepany is: -

Concolidated Freightwaya ~

12903 Lakeland Rd. .

Santa Fe Springs, Calif. 90670 Due to their company policy and DOT regulationn, they vill try to pick it up today, or cloc coccti=o during the first veck in Decc=ber. Their policy cr.d DOT regulationa otate that if our package is cent by truck thero cuot be no food or clothing along with the shipment. That is the reason for the tino delay.

When the ficaile naccrial 10 finally of f cenpun and all required forun have aircady been filled, our total non-c.xcapt SNM inventory vill be 4.754 Kg.

We request verification and ap' proval of our occurity systco.

Sincerely, Charles E. Anhbaugh III Reactor Supervisor CEA:vl EXIIIBIT Q

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- Deccaber 12, 1974

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  • Mr. M. C. Bays '

Mr. E. R.* Pulley

. .'4- .

Union Carbide Corporation . ' '

Nuc1 car Division * '

'4 ,

Y-12 Plant -

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Dear Sirs:

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340 gen, of U # ,uan cent to you from the University of California Nuclear Energy Laboratory 2567 Boclter 1:all Los Angeles, California 90024 on Deccaber 11, 1974 via Consolidated Freightlinco, package No. 12345. You should receive it soon.

Sincerely, ,

Charlen E. Achbaugh III:

Reactor Supervisor

. .. Nuclear Energy Lab S

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Itoe l t e r 11. J ] M67 November 9, 1973 Mr. George L. Rogosa, Directoy Division of Nuclear Physics '-

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  • Of fice of Iligh Energy and Nuclear Physics Reactor Fuel Cycle A:.sistance Depa r t reen t of Energy k'a c h in g t on , D.C. DOEt EY-76-S-0034 20545 Project Agreement 192 *

Dear Mr. Hogosa:

I have received your letter of October ")I, 1973 regarding the return

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of irradiated

'our fuel fuel elements to the U.S. Government. The return will reduce ,

' ' inventory to a Icvel commensurate with our ecurity provisions and

  • will eliminate inspector during an " aunresolved recent routine item" noted by a Nuclear !tegulatory Commis*:fon t

_ _ securi ty inspection. *

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Penalties An est due imate df thebeyond to delays minimum the cost control of return of UCLA is-@own could increase f u At t acliment 1.

, to something over $4000. the cost Our request .

Cycle Assistance contract.forDOEfundingofthereturnisbaseduponourReactorFue(

That agreement stipulat es under part A-11(h)(2); ,

that, among items to be contributed by the government and, (iii) during the term of this Project Agreement 192, the Commission .... will:

(B) Reimburse the University for costs incurred in returning spent f'u e l .

elements for reprocessing, including rental of or fabrication charges for ship' ping containers as mutually agreed to by the parties.

The University supports the normal on-going cost of reactor operations.

Because of fuel return.of Project Agreement 192, the University has never hudgeted the cost matter to the School Under andthe tight budgets to today, $4000 represents a major a serious matter to the Nuclear Energy Facility.

I believe the gnvernment should honor t he remmi t nent of PA 192 and the current Mad 7 supplement. I respect fully request DOE raepport of the cont of t h i t. lueI returu.

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H. Dhillon 1. catton, Director Contract and Crant Office,r  !!uclear Energy Laboratory IC/NCO/li '

cc: C. A. lle r ge r , DOE / SAN D. G. McIntosh, DOE / SAN EXIIIBIT S R. R. O't:cil1, Dean. IICI.A / S EAS -

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M 1400L OF E%C'.e' t Pl%C AND g r r1 IT D ACILNCE I of A % r $ L L5, C A t.it ( P '.'? A r.oo 2 4 Boelter Hall 2567 fiarch 1, 1979 lir. C. A. Berger, Contracts Branch U.S. Department of Energy San Francisco Operations Office 1333 Broadsay Oakland, California 94612 Re: Contract EY-76-03-034, P.A. 192

Dear fir. Berger:

By copy of our letter of flovember 9,1978 to Dr. Rogosa; you were advised o-f our request to DOE for support of the cost of shipping some excess irradiated fuel to the Idaho Chemical Repro-cessing Plant. The estimated cost of the operation is approximately

$4000, and support was sought under the subject contract.

14r. D. G.11cintosh (DOE /SAti) has been helpful in arranging for the physical transfer and shipment. These plans are going forward.

Paragraph 3 of our letter to Dr. Rogosa outlined the basis of --'

our request. We have not yet received a response. He are presently in technical violation of our Sf;!i possession limit, and further '.

delay could invite a riotice of Violation by the tJuclear Regulatory -

Commission. Your immediate action is now requested. Please call us if you have any questions.

Since rely , -

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Kardy Dhi p'on ~1 van Catton, Professor and Director Contract and Grant Officer fluclear Energy Laboratory (213) 825-0695 (213) 825-2040 IC/li cc: D..G. I1cIntosh, DOE /SAti -

/G. L. Rogosa, DOE, Division of fluclear Physics R. R. O'tieill , Dean , UCLA/ SEAS C. E. Ashbaugh, UCLA/ SEAS /fiEL R. H. Engelken, USliRC, Region V EXIIIBIT T

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UtilTED 'ffAThii OF AMEltICA fiUCISAit HRCulNiC!tY C0hh!3310N i

BIVORM THE ATOMIC SAFEfY AtlD LICEte.31t!G TDARD in the Matter of ) Docket tio. $0-112 4 OL TliM HEChriTd & TiiM UIIIVFif31TY (Proponed Honoual of 0F cal.iFOBi1IA Facility Licennu)

(UCl.APoncarchHeactor) )

CFifrIFICATM OF 'iEllVICE I herchy certify that copics of the attached: ItiTURVEnon BRIDGr Tile GAP 'S RESDOIISE TO !!RC STAFF'S IIOTIOff FOR SUTUIAPY DISPOSITIO!!

AS TO Tile ISSUE OF Tl!E APPLICABILITY OF 10 CFR 73.60 ATID TIIE flEED TO PROTECT AGAIllST SADOT?'E _

in the above-captionco proceeding ha e teen served on the following by deposit In the Uni ted 'itaten nail, firnt clan ., pontago prepaid, addrenned an inlicated, on thin dates SEPTCf1 ben 7, 1982 _.

John 11. Frye, III, Christine !!alwick Chairman Glenn H. Wootn Atomic ;afety & Licensing Board c

Office of General Counnel U.9. fluclear lierula tory Comc.innion 590 !!niversity 1h11 Manhington, D.C. 20555 2200 Univernity Avenue Berkeley, CA 91720 6 Dr. Emmoth A. Luubko Administra tivo Judgo Sarah Shirley Atomic 'hfety & Licensing Board Deputy City Attorney U.9, riucle r Regulatory Commisnion Offico of the City Attorney Wanhingto... D.C. 20555 City Itall 1685 tain street Dr. Oscar li. Parin Santa Monica, CA 90101 4 Adminintrative Judge Atomic Gafety and Licensing Poani Committee to Bridge the Cap U.S. fluclear Itegula tory Commisalon 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Vanhington, D.C. 20555 Los Ardelen, California 90025 Chief, Docketing and 'icrvice Section (3) Ihniel Hirsch Office of the Secretary P.O. Box 1186 U.S. fluelcar Regulatory Comminnlon Pen Lomond, CA 95005 Vanhington, D.C. 20555 Dorothy Thonpnon Counnel for !!BC Staff fluclear Inw Center U.S. !!uelcar Pegulatory Comminnion 6300 Wilshiro Blvd., Suite 1200 Wanhington, D.C. 20555 Los Angelen, CA 900148 attention: En. Colleen P. Woodhead 7 W1111am it. Cormier Office of Adminintrative Vice Chanecilor [' / .

liniverni tyn6f California I ' / /[- [/

Is05 Illigan! Avenue Johg ihy [/

lon Angelen, California 900214 Cou'nsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE 'IO HitIDCU THE CAP' 1

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