ML20006B179

Town of Hampton & Necnp Brief on Appeal of LBP-89-32.* Requests ASLB to Vacate LBP-89-32 & to Order Applicant to Conduct Remedial Exercise to Address Deficiencies in Toh/Necnp EX-1.W/statement of Issues & Certificate of Svc

ML20006B179
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/24/1990
From:	Curran D, Mceachern P HAMPTON, NH, HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG & EISENBERG, LLP., NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION, SHAINES & MCEACHERN
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#190-9728 ALAB-900, LBP-89-32, OL, NUDOCS 9002010054
Download: ML20006B179 (36)

Text

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912 i DOChLTED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSTON

% At 25 P3 2.4 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD grs!CE Of SECRETARY (9vitt Before Administrative Judges: OChligt G. Paul Bollwerk III, Chairman Alan S. Rosenthal Howard A. Wilber

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY )

3 OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, EI AL. )

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

)

TOWN OF HAMPTON AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION BRIEF ON APPEAL CF LBP-89-32 TOWN OF HAMPTON, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NEW HAMPSHIRE NUCLEAR POLLUTION Paul McEachern Diane Curran Shaines &McEachern Harmon, Curran, & Tousley 25 Maplewood Avenue suite 430 P.O. Box 360 2001 S. Street, N.W.

Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20008 DATED: January 24, 1990

$c kk>kkh. )

[J 36

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TABLE OF CONTENTS l

r

1. Table of Authorities..................................... 11 l

2. Statement of Issues..................................... 111 t

3. Introduction.............................................. 1 l

4. Scope of the Exercise..................................... 2

5. A. S t a t eme nt o f Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 l 1

6. B. Applicants' Panel.................................... 5

7. C. School Personne1..................................... 8

8. D. Traffic Control Police.............................. 18

9. E. Transportation Resourceo............................ 22

10. TOH/NECNP EX-2..................................<........ 27

11. Conclusion............................................... 29

_j. >

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES NUCfFAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DECISIONS Lona Island Liahtina comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-32, 26 NRC 479 . . . .5, cassin Lona Island Liahtina Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275 (1988) . 4, passim Public Service Co. of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, __ NRC __(1989) . . 2, passim Public Service Co. of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-924, __ NRC (1989) . . . . . .10 REGULATIONS 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.IV. (1) . . . . . .2, cassin 10 C.F.R. $50.47 (a) (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 10 C.F.R. 650.47 (b) (10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10 C.F.R. 550.47 (b) (14 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 I

l STATEMENT OF ISSUES l t

1. Whether the Li-sensing Board violated the mandate of ALAB-900 by ruling tha; the scope of the 1988 FEMA graded  ;

exercise was sufficie,itt I A) to verify the capability of New Hampshire school i

personnel to adequ',tely protect students in a radiological emergency, LBP-89-32 $$12.57 to 12.71; b) to verify the capability of New Hampshire state police to adequately and timely staff traffic and access control posts to facilitate and evacuation, LBP-89-32 $$ 12.21 to 12.35; and i c) to verify the capability and availability of transportation resources to respond to a radiological emergency, LBP-89-32 $$12.72 to 12.90;

2. Whether the Licensing Board committed reversible error by excluding, without hearing, Intervenors' contention and proferred testimony asserting that the exercise performance of New Hampshire officals revealed that procedures and personnel <

are not available to provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect school children in a radiological emergency. Tr. 25189-25222.

?

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Before Administrative Judgest G. Paul Bollwerk III , Chairman Alan S. Rosenthal Howard A. Wilber

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

, ) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY )

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET &L. )

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) January 24, 1990

__ )

TOWN OF HAMPTON AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCTRAR POTTUTION BRIEP ON APPEAL OF LBP-89-32 The Town of Hampton and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("Intervenors") previously filed contentions challenging the scope of the June 28 and 29, 1988 FEMA graded exercise (" Exercise") as inadequate to meet NRC regulatory requirements,1/ and challenging the Exercise performance of New Hampshire officials for failure to adequately protect school children.2/

The Licensing Board predictably rejected these contentions.

1/ TOH/NECNP EX 1.

2/ TOH/NECNP EX 2.

i LBP-89-32; Tr. 25189-25222. Intervenors herein appeal from these errors of law.

ECOPE OF THE EXERCISE As asserted by Intervenorst The scope of the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise of the New England Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results regarding the capability to implemant that plan, as required by 10 C.F.R. $ 50. 47 (a) (1) and (a) (2) , in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to implement the NHRERP.

In addition, the exclusion of these entities from the Exercise precludes =a finding that the Exercise evaluated major portions of emergency response capabilities, as required by 10 C.F.R. 5 50. 47 (b) (14) and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E(F) (1) . Other than limited participation by State of New Hampshire personnel, the majority of the organizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the NMRERP for implementation of that plan did not participate in the Exercise. Thus, the Exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in Bases a to g below, each of which is necessary to. implement the portions of the NHRERP referenced therein. Accordingly, the NHRERP is fundamentally flawed. TOH/NECNP EX 1.

Intervenork then identified, in contention bases, specific deficiencies in the scope of the Exercise including, inter alia, inadequate participation involving New Hampshire school personnel,2/ traffic control police,S/ and transportation resources.EI 1/ TOH/NECNP Ex. 1(a) and (b).

1/ TOH/NECNP Ex. 1(d).

E/ TOH/NECNP Ex. 1(f) and (g). ,

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__- -.._m--___________..___m._ . - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ - _ - _ _ - . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ .

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On November 9, 1989, the Licensing Board, yet again, j disregarded controlling law from this agency, rejected l Intervenors' scope contention and all supporting bases, and ruled that the scope of the Exercise was adequate to meet NRC regulations. LBP-89-32. To place the Licensing Board's gross deviation from law and reason in context requires a preliminary discussion of the NRC's requirements for a prelicense qualifying exercise.

)

A. Statement of Law By regulation, the Commission requires Applicants to conduct a " full participation" Exercise of the emergency response plans for Seabrook Station as a precondition for full power licensing.

A full carticination exercise which tests as much of the licensee. State and local eneroency olans as is l

reasonably achievable without mandatory Dublic garticination shall be conducted for each site . . . .

This exercise shall be conducted within two years before the issuance of the first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5% of rated power) of the first reactor and shall include participation by each State and local government with the plume exposure pathway EPZ '

and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

" Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at the commercial nuclear power '

plant. "rull participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of state. local and licensee

i norsonnel and oth<n yg.Lources in sufficient numbers to [

verify the canability to resnond to the accident scenario. l 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E IV.F.1. (enphasis supplied).  ;

Prior to issuance of LBP-89-32, this Board provided detailed guidance on the proper reach and content of the " full participation" Exercise regulations. ALAB-900.5/

The regulation involved here, section IV.F.1 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, states that " full participation" is  !

required for the initial emergency exercise to be conducted i during.the two-year period preceding license issuance.

Among other things, a full participation exercise must test "the major observable portions" of the onsite and offsite "

emergency plans and mobilize " sufficient numbers" of state, local, and licensee / applicant personnel and other resources '

so as to permit verification of their " integrated capability" to respond to the particular accident scenario  ;

being tested. A further gloss on the meaning of full particip9 tion is added in the texts such an exercise .

should test "as much of the licensee racolicant1, State and local emeraency olans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory oublic narticination." ALAB-900, 28 NRC at 288-289. (emphasis supplied). i As relevant to this appeal, ALAB-900 established additional  ;

I parameters to determine whether the scope of a prelicense, qualifying exercise meets NRC regulations.

1) Applicants have the burden of proof to establish that l

the Exercise conforms to regulatory requirements. ALAB-900 at 296-297. This includes the burden to establish that Exercise l

l' g/ Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, i Unit 1 ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275 (1988). Nevertheless, the Licensing Board invented factual distinctions to conclude that ALAB-900 was not the " guiding light" for the Board on Intervanor 's scope contentions. Eat LBP-89-32 at 544. As discussed infra, however, the failure to exercise certain ,

emergency response personnel and procedures at Seabrook was even more truncated.than parallel failures found deficient by this Board in the Shoreham exercise. ALAB-900.

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" participation that did take place was all that was reasonably achievable." Id, affirming LBP-87-32, 26 NRC 479, 496-497.2/ Once challenged by contention, Applicants' =

failure to offer evidence on this issue dictates a finding that the scope of the Exercise was not adequate. Id. ]l

2) Although FEMA may decline to grade an exercise failure as a " deficiency", that grade is not controlling. The scope of the exercise nevertheless may be judged inadequate to support licensing.E/ I B. Aeolicants' Panel -

In an attempt to meet its burden of proof that the New Hampshire exercise was adequate in scope, Applicants offered a i panel of three witnesses who, the record establishes, were singularly unqualified to render an opinion either as to how

.the scope of the Seabrook Exercise was developed or the extent of actual participation by those charged with emergency _

response duties under the NHRERP.

2/ . "LILCO has the burden of proof and therefore was obliged to .

J establish why greater school participation was not reasonably achievable. LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 496-497. LILCO having failed to do so, the Board thus concluded that the Exercise was deficient for insufficient school participation . . . "

ALAB-900 at 296. Although this Board affirmed this holding, ALAB-900 at 297, the Seabrook Licensing Board found it-inconvenient and rejected this principle of law. See LBP-89-32 at 505-506, E11.22, infra.

1/ ALAB-900 at 290-292 (FEMA's judgment, customary practice or -

assessment rating must yield to NRC regulations).

i j

Mr. Baer was not involved in the development of the scope of the Exercise, extent of play, or the Exercise objectivas.

Tr. 22708. Mr. Callendrello was not involv,ed in these issues, except as to exploring a statistical approach for Exercise sample sizes, which was ultimately rejected. Tr. 22715. j Although allegedly involved, Mr. Gram had repeated difficulty i

in recalling the process of the scenario and extent of play j l

development. Egg, e.g., Tr. 22728-9, 22731-2, 22733, 22735. I l

Mr. Callendrello did not observe the New Hampshire exercise I performance. Tr. 22715-16. Mr. Gram had a limited role in the exercise. Tr. 22779-80. He was generally floating and observing during the Exercise. Tr. 22780. Mr. Baer's observations were confined to ths IF0, and only with respect to activities from the Division of Puolic Health Services. Tr. ,

22706.

This panel presented prefiled testimony which conc 2aded that the scope of the Exercise, for a host of emergency ,

response capabilities, was adequate. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr.

22702. These opinions were unsupported by personal knowledge, and typically failed even to provide specific citation as to ,

the basis for the opinions. Id.E/

In commenting on the proper scope of an exercise, however, the panel's prefiled testimony (apparently parroting FEMA) does ,.

i 2/ Nevertheless, the Board concluded that "(w)e find these l witnesses well qualified to give the testimony they presented." LBP-89-32 511.9.

L l

provide certain yardsticks against which to measure the 1988 Exercise inadequacies. According to Applicants' panel Development of the extent of play for the Seabrook exercise involved the design of exercise activities that would demonstrate, test, and verify the capability of particular offsite emergency responss functions relied upon in the offsite response plans for Seabrook Station. The extent of olav for the Exercise was desianed to conform with FEMA auidance which states: "The dearea of demonstration of individual exercise obiectives should test the workability of that annect of the olan." (emphasis supplied.) GM EX-3 Amendment, page 3. App. Reb. No.

23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 12.

Those components of the major observable portions of the plans found to be impacted by external influences were reviewed and discussed by the organizations' representatives to ensure that these conoonents would be demonstrated to the extent " reasonably achievable or necessary to test their ability to be imolemented.

App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 17.12/ (emphasis supplied).

Participants in the development of the extent of play for the Exercise determined that the ability to implement protective actions would be demonstrated by nerformina the followina functionst

• the protective action decision making process;

• the initial notification of all companies

,i . providing special transportation resources; f

• notification of special facilities by contact with participating facilities or by simulated contact of non- participating facilities by calls to the NHY Control Cell; and k( "

• the assignment of transportation resources to meet the identified. requirements.

App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 25-26.

19/ Applicants, with the Licensing Board's blessing, in fact abandoned the " reasonably achievable" standard mandated by regulation in favor of what, in Applicants' view, was merely "necessary" to verify the response capabilities. Predictably, the "necessary" standard devolved into mere tokenism and led to an extremely truncated Exercise. For example, it was D21 "necessary", according to Applicants, for school personnel to ,

participate in the Exercise in order to demonstrate the capability of more than 100 New Hampshire EPZ schools to ,

respond to an emergency. Infra. )

l Having committed to conduct an exercise to demonstrate the PAR process, actual notification to key transportation providers, and petual contact with all EPZ special facilities, Applicants failed to keep these commitments during the Exercise.

C. School Personnel Intervenors' contention regarding school personnel 12/

11/ TOH/NECNEP Ex-1(a) and (b) providest (a) None of the teachers relied upon under the NHRERP to implement protective actions for school children, 333, e.g.,

NHRERP Vol. 18A, Appendix F, participated in the Exercise.

Necessarily, the Exercise failed to meet a primary objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to adequately protect students in an emergency. Exercise Report, p. 172.

Since hundreds of teachers through their representatives, and by petition, have already provided evidence in this proceeding of their intent net to implement the NMRERP, failure to test for the availability and participation of New Hampshire teachers represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.

(b) Since none of the New Hampshire teachers participated in the Exercise, FEMA could not observe any adequate demonstration of the organizational ability or resources necessary to effect an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation, of the school children, even though this demonstration was one of the Exercise objectives. Exercise Report, p. 172. Under the NHRERP, early dismissal, sheltering and evacuation are the EnlY protective actions for school children. Egg (e.g.) NHRERP Vol. 18A, App. F. 1-3, F. 1-4.

All of these protective actions assume, and rely upon, teachers for implementation. Id. Failure to observe or test necessary personnel or procedures to protect students represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.

12/ Over Intervenors' objection , the Licensing Board ruled that TOH/NECNP EX 1(a) and (b) only challenged the scope of the Exercise for lack of school teacher participation, and did not extend to challenge the exercise scope for lack of participation by school personnel such as ad;ainistrators. Tr.

22276-77. By prefiled testimony, Applicants subsequently reintroduced the issue of school administrator participation to defend against the contention, claiming that this participation (footnote continued)

5 alleged, inter alia, that the scope of the Exercise for New Hampshire's public, day care, and private schools

' was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results rogarding the capability . . . to adequately protect students in an emergency . . . .

Failure to observe or test necessary personnel or procedures to protect students represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.

Under the NMRERP, each of the 17 towns in the New Hampshire EPZ, has a separate emergency response plan. Set forth in

\ppendix F to each town plan is an individual schoci plan for each_public,-day care, and private school located in the particular town. There are 113 schools in the New Hampshire (footnote continued)

(although later proven to be virtually nonexistent, infra) 1 supported a finding that the scope of the exercise for-New Hampshire schools was adequate. App., Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr. 22702 at 50-51. These issues were the subject of extensive cross-

' examination, Tr. 22941-86, and Applicants offered no objection to admission of Intervenor Exhibits which addressed these l issues. -MAG EX 104, 105, 106. As asserted by'Intervenors in proposed findings, therefore, MAG P.F. 12.145.H, the issue of inadequate participation of school personnel, both administrators and teachers, is now properly before this agency for decision. The Licensing Board appeared to concede this point, See LBP-89-32 at $12.61 (Intervenors' challenge runs to "both teachers and. administrators"), and Applicants 1did not dispute it in response to Intervenors' proposed findings.- Egg APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RULINGS OF OTHER

-PARTIES, August 30, 1989. For this reason, the Licensing Board's' initial error in unduly limiting the contention to teachers is harmless, which otherwise would be grounds for reversal for reasons previously prese to the Board. Egg RESPONSE OF THE MASS AG TO APPLICANTS' O ION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION IN LIMINE TO PORTIONS OF THE PREFILED TESTIMONY OF GEARY W. SVKICH AND JOHN PAOLILLO REGARDING TO TOH/NECNP EX 1 (a) and (b) (May_22, 1989), see also Mass AG Proposed Findings 12.1.45.B to 12.1.45.H.

EPZ,ocomprised of 35 public schools and 78 private and day care schools.- NHRERP Vol. 4, pp 18B-1 to 18B-23. 4 Under the emergency procedures for each school the superintendent (for each public school) cn: the responsibleL administrator ~(for the private or day care school) receive notification and protective action recommendations (PAR) from-state and_ local emergency response personnel. _See e.g. NHRERP Vol. 18A App. F. School officials, however, have ultimate decision making authority in selecting PARS for their students.12/ This includes overseeing PAR implementation and providing transportation resources for the individual schools

=under their jurisdiction.

-EPZ teachers are charged with the separate and significant responsibility for actually supervising and directing students

~in implementing PARS.. Egg e.g. NHRERP Vol. 18A Appendix F pp F. 1-1 to=F .

1-5. This can require teachers to travel with evacuating students and to supervise them at reception centers. Id. at p F. 1-6.1A/

12/ See!LBP-89-32 at 512.68 (" decision regarding school protective actions is made by the superintendent or facility

-administrator who, in turn, directs its implementation").

lAf The Appeal Board has already recognized the significance

.of the teacher role to emergency response under the NHRERP. .

'ALAB-924 pp 7-11. This Board has remanded the issue of whether LOAs for teachers must be obtained in view of the teachers' assigned responsibilities for student safety. Id.

- .~. - - . - - . . . , . . . . _ .

Incredibly, there was no evidence that even a sinale school sunarintandant. administrator or teacher from the 113 New Hamnshire EPZ schools carticinated in the Exercise, as reauired by rouulations. See MAG Ex 104, 105, 106. See also LBP-89-32 at and 12.58. (No teachers participated). Applicants also

. failed to offer any justification as to why greater school participation was not reasonably achievable. Therefore, Applicants failed to meet their burden of proof on this issue.

ALAB-900 at 296-297.

Applicants did testify that 2 out of 113 New Hampshire EPZ

-schools did " participate" in the exercise, although this

" participation" consisted of a single telephone call from government officials to the two schools. Tr. 22964-5. In response to the first call, or.e school (Swazy School) stated there was "no school" that day, while the other school (Country Kids) provided-a census of 8 students. MAG Ex. 104 (letter from Geoffrey C. Cook to Matthew T. Brock p.2, and Attachment 1

(#13).

Therefore, even for the two identified schools, the single telephone call did not rise ~to level of participation sufficient to verify the capacity to respond to the accident scenerio, 10 CFR Part 50 App. E IV. F. 1, since there was no showing that any school personnel in the entire EPZ is cognizant of his emergency plan, or the PAR process.

Communications and coordiation with special facility personnel concerning the arrival time of LERO's vehicles is patently essential to the effective implementation of an evacuation and hence should be tested in an exercise. ALAB- 900 128 at NRC at 300.11/ <

Accordingly,'it was undisputed that no teachers participated in the exercise, that 111 out of 113 Erz schools did not participate at all, and that the 2 " participating" r schools were not asked, and did not provide, any meaningful verification of their emergency response capabilities. This violates the mandate of this Board.

There is no dispute that the potential evacuation of schools within the emergency planning zone (EPZ) is a major element of offsite emergency planning. Egg FEMA Objectives, No. 19 see also 10 CFR 550.47 (b) (10) . &

sufficient number of school and related nersonnel must therefore carticinate in a full carticination exercise so as to nermit verification of their intearated canability to resoond to the accident scenario. 10 CFR Part 50-, Appendix E, SIV.F.1 n.4 . . . .- Indeed, FEMA strongly recommended that in the future all schools (presumably in the 10 mile plume EPZ) be included in offsite Exercise.15/ (emphasis supplied.) ALAB-900 at 297.

. Notwithstanding this Board's clear rule of law requiring school participation, and a record establishing beyond dispute that that participation did not occur during the Exercise, the Licensing Board found that emergency response' capabilities for schools had been adequately demonstrated. The Licensing Board 11/ As suggested by this Board, a bare telephone contact, without meaningful interchange, is inadequate to demonstrate a coordinated emergency response.

If/ FEMA Region 1, under new management, backed off this commitment to the point of approving the Exercise (Objective 19, App. Ex. 43F p 172) with ng participation by the 113 New Hampshire EPZ schools. FEMA's abdication of its oversight role for exercises is also apparent by comparison of the FEMA review for the 1986 exercise, conducted by now departed FEMA officials, who found a record number of 55 exercise deficiencies. Although many of these identical inadequacies reappeared in the 1988 Exercise, FEMA elected to ignore them. l Infra.

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lff ,

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om rejected LLAB-900 as the " guiding light" on this issue, LBP-89-32 512.62, and rejected Intervenors' school contention.

Id.

'The Licensing Board's disregard of ALAB-900, and its perfunctory efforts to manufacture factual distinctions from the Shoreham exercise found deficient by this Board, suggests.a deliberate effort'to ignore controlling law in order to promote licensing. Although the Board's incoherent' opinion is difficult to penetrate, in part because the Board did not even address significant issues raised in Intervenor proposed

. findings, see Mass AG P.F. 12.1.49 to 12.1.50.CC., the following. issues. highlight the extent to which the Board has deviated from reason and law.

1. FEMA Guidance Memorandum, GM EV-2, MAG Ex, 91, provides specific guidance as to the appropriate scope of participation in.an exercise by those personnel and organizations responsible for protecting the health and safety of school children during a radiological emergency. Although the public (gig., school children) is not required to participate in exercises, GM EV-2 provides for participation by school personnel, administrators, and teachers, in an' exercise.

The evacuation of school children under the continuous supervision of teachers and administrators from a school to a relocation center is a viable and reasonable approach when confronted with a radiological emergency.

[O)rganizations with assigned responsibilities for protecting students are required to demonstrate through exercises their ability to implement emergency procedures contained in their emergency response plans.

.An exercise evaluator will interview the relevant

_ personnel at the EOC's, the School Superintendent's office, the School Principal's

, office, and.the Dispatcher's office, as well as the-bus driver to determine their awareness of

.and preparedness for the evacuation of the school children. MAG EX. 91 pp 2, 8. ,

As contemplated by GM EV-2, FEMA interviews of school personnel concerning the Exercise are designed to assess the knowledge of school personnel, how they were notified of the radiological emergency, how they selected and then implemented their particular protective actions, how they inventoried and then allotted their resources, and how they ensured that children in their custody would be taken to the correct reception center location. Id. at 8-11. These capabilities are recognized as-

" major elements of an organization's emergency response plan".

Id at p. 7.

There is no evidence, however, that FEMA conducted interviews with any New Hampshire school personnel regarding

-the June, 1988 Exercise. There is no evidence that FEMA followed its own guidance in evaluating the implementability of the New' Hampshire school plans.12/

2. As acknowledged by Applicants, the Exercise extent of play is "the extent to which objectives or major portions of the plans should be demonstrated . . . the extent of required

< demonstrations. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr. 22702 p 6; See also LBP-89-32 and 11.10.

12/ Unlike the Seabrook exercise, FEMA officials, in conformance with FEMA guidance, did conduct interviews with school officials as part of the Shoreham exercise. See LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 496. Nevertheless, this Board found the overall participation of Shoreham area schools inadequate. l ALAB-900. The Seabrook exercise, without benefit of ADY interviews of school personnel, was even more deficient.

4 Based on the hearing record,-the Seabrook Exercise for New Hampshire schools did not conform to the extent of' play, Sea App. Ex. 61 li 3.3.1, 3.3.2, in these material respects:

a. "(P)articipating school superintendents will contact the appropriate schools in their districts per their procedures". This did nat occur for any of the 113 New Hampshire EPZ schools. Tr. 22970.

b. School census data was n21 Provided live. Tr.

22970-72.

c. Local EOC school rep contacts and DPHS day care notification personnel did ngt contact affected day care centers. Tr. 22972-73,

d. A state DOE representative did D2t contact all affected. school superintendents in epi and Host Towns. MAG EX 104 (Applicants' Response to Interrogatory 5).

-e. Local EOC school representatives did Det contact affected school superintendents or principals. MAG EX 104

'(Applicants' Response to Interrogatory 5).

'The only other " participation" cited by Applicants .

involving New Hampshire school personnel in the Exercise is that an." administrative representative" for each of the 5 Supervisory Administrative Units (SAUs) " received at least one telephone call from New Hampshire emergency response personnel during the Exercise." MAG Ex. 104, pp. 2-3.1EI 13/ SAUs are administrative offices for public schools, with no jurisdiction over the other 78 private and daycare schools in the New Hampshire EPZ, Egg App. Reb. No. 23. ff. 22702, pp.

52-53, MAG P.F. 12.1.49A.

1

t n' .

4

. Applicants do not know who these " representatives" were who

! were. contacted, although the individual could have been a secretary or other person without decision making authority.-

Applicants do not know the content of the communications, and do not know'what response, if any, the " administrative representative" took in response to the call. Tr. 22958, 22963, 23049-50. The record is devoid of evidence on these issues. In addition, since public schools were not in session during the Exercise, LBP-89-32 at 12.64, it is equally plausible that the individual receiving the call at the.SAU may have had nothing at all to do with emergency response.

3,- According to FEMA, the scope of the 1111 Exercise for Seabrook' Station involving New Hampshire schools was n2t adequate. App. Ex 43 F, Appendix B. The deficiencies in part arose due to inadequate participation by school personnel.

The capability to demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of

. schools,- which was an exercise objective (D.8) ,

was hampered by the extent of simulated school

. participation.- Since schools were not in session on'the day.of the exercise, school notification, and requests for.an activation of. school bus resources could not be evaluated. (2.1.1. 7-D)

DEFICIENCY App. Ex. 43F (FEMA Report) Appendix B-10.

FEMA therefore determined that adequate corrective actions must be demonstrated in the 1988 Exercise, for this, and all 1 deficiencies, found in.the 1986 Exercise. App. Ex. 43F at p.

viii. This represented an additional. objective of the 1988 Exercise. Id.

As in 1986, public schools were not in session during the 1988 exercise. LBP-89-32 512.64. Although there is no

o l

regulatory requirement that exercises be conducted when public schools are open, Applicants were required to obtain, or make a good faith effort _to obtain, participation by administrators and teachers to the extent reasonably achievable. ALAB-900 at

~ 297. LBP-87-32, 27 NRC at 497. N.8. There is no evidence that Applicants made this effort; indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. MAG Ex. 104 (Cook letter p.2 and Attachment 1).

5) The virtually non-existent participation by school personnel in 1988 clearly demonstrates that the 1986 deficiency identified by FEMA, App. Ex. 43F, Appendix B-10 (quoted supra),.

was not cured by the 1988 Exercise. FEMA, under new management, nevertheless found 1988 school participation adequate. App. Ex. 43F, p. 172-173.

Mr.. Donovan of FEMA, who did not personally participate in the Exercise, presented FEMA's views as to the level of

. participation by New Hampshire school personnel in the Exercise. App. Ex. 43F, p. 172-173. In that report, Mr.

Donovan states, inaccurately, that "EPZ schools . . . were

-promptly notified of changes in the situation by phone from the Department of Education." Id. at 173. Applicants cited.this finding in its defense to contentions. MAG P.F. 12.1.45.E.

Mr.' Donovan knew or should have known that this statement suggesting extensive participation by New Hampshire school personnel through contacts with DOE, or through " direct contacts" with IFO to determine transportation needs for students, see Id. at 173, was false and beyond FEMA's knowledge. In response to Intervenor discovery requests, FEMA stated:

w V

.The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) did not observe or evaluate the participation of school teachers in the exercise of offsite emergency response. plans for Seabrook Station held on June 28 and 29,

'1988. It was'not the purpose of the

-Exercise to evaluate their-performance . . .

FEMA did not observe or evaluate the=

performance of school administrators or other school personnel in carrying out protective actions for school children. MAG Ex.;106, pp. 2-3.

FEMA has no knowledge, and has presented no basis for an opinion, as to the level, character, or quality of participation by New Hampshire school personnel in the Exercise. FEMA's finding on this issue should have been given no, weight.= Since the FEMA finding supported licensing, however, the Licensing Board approved it, thereby-endorsing HFEMA's failure to conduct any meaningful review of school personnel and procedures. See LBP-89-32 5512.59-12-60.

Finally, the Licensing Board made no rational attempt to reconcile its patently erroneous. ruling with ALAB-900, and has ignored the mandate of that decision.1EI

.D. Traffic' Control PoliceAEI Intervenors challenged the scope of the Exercise as inadequate to verify the capability to staff and manage traffic 12/ The Board's " factual distinctions" approach the absurd.

-Apparently, for the. Board, the test of only.1 out of 48 schools at Shoreham may not be adequate, (see ALAB-900) yet the test

~(by 1 phone call) of 2 of 113 New Hampshire schools verified the capability off all EPZ schools to respond to a radiological emergency. See LBP-89-32 at $12.63.

22/ TOH/NECNEP Ex-1(d) provides:

(d) Although at least 45 traffic control guides are to be provided by the New Hampshire State Police to all Towns under (footnote continued)

. r..

1 control posts (TCPs) and access control posts (ACPs) with State police.21/ Intervanors also focused on the irrationality of the FEMA' finding that State Police could or did " handle beach closing", that police showed the capability to regulate evacuation traffic, or,that the time necessary for staffing i

ACPs and TCPs-was demonstrated in the Exercise. See App. Ex.

43F, p. 182 (discussed, infra).AA/

I

_(footnote continued) the NHRERP, Id. at Tables 3.1-2, 3.1-3, only two troopers actually assumed that function during the exercise. Egg, Exhibit 1, attached.- Accordingly, there is no factual basis to support FEMA's finding that State Police could or did properly

" handle beach closing," and the time frames for staffing of traffic control points relied on by-FEMA are wholly speculative. Egg, Exercise Report, p. 182. In addition, the NHRERP requires State Police to provide- 28 traffic guides to staff access control posts within-the New Hampshire EPZ.

Volume 6, pp. 9-12. Only two troopers were actually deployed to staff ACPs during the Exercise. Exhibit 1. FEMA's conclusion.that, by 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />, State-Police =had adequately shown the capability to deploy all 89 troopers for ACP/TCPs is without foundation. Exercise Report, p.'182. Failure to adequately demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to regulate evacuation traffic and EPZ access represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP. Exercise Report, p. 182.

21/ Generally, TCPs are located at certain potential traffic bottlenecks within the EPZ, while ACPs are established at the perimeter of the EPZ to regulate ingress and~ egress to the EPZ during an emergency. Egg NHRERP, Vol. 6, p. 9-1, p. 8-1, 8-11 and 8-12.

111/ _This issue represents again that FEMA, under new management, has eviscerated its own review process.

m a, l

e N' ,

Among the 55 Exercise deficiencies, with additional .

inadequacies, found by FEMA in 1986:

State Police Troop A does not alone have sufficient personnel to control access to the entire 10-mile EPZ.

perimeter. During the exercise it was determined that 44 State Police officers would be required to staff all access 1 control points. This would have exhausted the State-Police -;

H Troop A resources of the day shift and.some of the night ,

I  !

shift. Even with help from other troops, the' force could be seriously depleted and law enforcement possible impaired.

(2.1. 5.1-D) . DEFICIENCY l-State Police troopers indicated that better' maps were needed, especially for troopers who are not familiar with the area.

1 App. Ex. 43F Appendix B-33, 36.

L These inadequacies clearly concerned the failure to demonstrate a sufficient number of available state police for traffic control, and-the apparent difficulty, by those troopers actually participating, in locating designated traffic posts.A2/ FEMA's own Exercise objectives for 1988 required verification that these inadequacies had been resolved. App.

Ex. 43F, p. viii.

i l

(-

l 22/ .This difficulty is understandable since the NHRERP relies o upon-state police "from anywhere in the state." Tr. 23039.

Obviously, most of these police would n2t be familiar Nith the

'New Hampshire EPZ,'nor would these police routinely cover the ,

EPZ=in'their day to day responsibilities. The Licensing L Board's (and FEMA's) efforts to justify very limited police participation in the Exercise, on-grounds their emergency roles are what "they normally do in their regular employment," see LBP-89-32 at 512.30, is not supported by the evidence, and ignores prior inadequacies where the troopers had difficulty reaching their posts.

'Under the 1988 Exercise scenario, therefore, Applicants were requ'.' red to demonstrate the capability to provide 89 troopers to staff ACPs and TCPS. App. Ex. 43F, p. 182.

Instead,.only 4 troopers participated in the Exercise, and all came from Troop A, which has normal responsibility for policing the New Hampshire EPZ. See App. Ex. 43F at Appendix B-33. No testing of troopers from other troops throughout the state was attempted. Those troopers who did participate-(4 of 89 needed) did not staff any of the TCPs in Hampton Beach, the most popular resort area in the Seabrook EPZ. Tr. 23038. None of the three-TCPs, including the two in Hampton Beach which Applicants have identified as "most important" to enhancing roadway capacity for evacuation, were staffed or exercised.

Tr. 23036-37.

Although the Board appeared to acknowledge that greater police participation was possible, the Board-found the actual, de minimis participation adequate since troopers would have only performed their " regular employment" duties, LBP-89-32 at 512.30, and a " daily trooper roster" represented an adequate substitute for trooper participation. Id. at 512.31.

The first assertionLis inaccurate as a matter of fact,2SI 11/- Egg preceding note. Intervenors also dispute that performi ng traffic control.in a radiological emergency can reasonably be viewed as a " regular employment" duty sufficient to excuse exerci se participation.

1

s c

I while the second fails as a matter of law.25/

Finally, the absurdity of relying upon rosters, instead of a meaningful sample of earticinatino troopers from across the State, is heightened by FEMA's complete speculation as to deployment times for troopers to enter and staff the EPZ.

There was simply no rational basis to support these calculations. There was no rational basis on the record to conclude that_the 1986 Exercise deficiency _had been resolved.ASI E. Transoortation ResourcesI2!

Intervenors challenged the scope of the Exercise as inadequate.since there was an insufficient demonstration of 21/ The Licensing Board appears to substitute its own view of Exercise participation that, even assuming emergency

. responsibilities mirror " normal daily duties", an Exercise "does not require an extensive deployment of resources."

LBP-89-32 at 511.11. This is not the law. See 10 C.F.R. Part 5'0 : App . : E IV . F .1. (requiring participation to the extent

" reasonably achievable"). Indeed,'the very purpose of demonstrating a unified and coordinated response by Exercise would be substantially undermined (as it was at Seabrook in 1988) if participation-is reduced from what is " reasonably achievable" to a few token participants. At a mininum, a

" sufficient number" of troopers requires participation by a

. sample size from each troop throughout the state relied on to support an emergency response. Four local troopers (who actually participated) does not approach this " sufficient number" or meet the requirement for " reasonably achievable" participation.

21/ For example, on the basis of a roster and 4 locally deployed troopers, FEMA baldly concluded that deployment of 89 troopers was completed by 1530. App. Ex. 43F, p. 182. FEMA found these troopers handled beach closing, although not a single trooper ever even went to the beach area. Tr. 23038.

12/ TOH/NECNEP Ex-1(f) and (g) provides:

(f). 15 o(f) 18 (83%) of the bus companies relied upon

'under_the NHRERP for emergency and special needs transportation did not provide any drivers or buses for the Exercise. Even l

'(footnote continued) '

7 transportation resources, including only.18 of 453 regular buses, 2 of 71 special-needs buses, 1 of 48 ambulances, and 1 wheel chair van. LBP-89-32 at $12.74; App. Ex. 61 (Extent of Play) $3.3.7, cf Applicants Direct Testimony No. 2 pp. 13-15, (October 21, 1987.2EI L Like its test of traffic control police, Applicants' q severely truncated Exercise did not even attempt to test these

(:

transportation resources to the extent reasonably achievable, l

L (footnote continued) the three companies who did provide resources deployed only 18 l regular buses (44) of the 453 required for implementation of I the NHRERP.- Sag, Exhibit 2, Attached; Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 2, p. 13, October 21,.1987. The Exercise also .

' utilized only- (orse) of 48 ambulances-(2%), and two of 71  !

special needs buses (3%), deemed necessary for implementation l D of the Plan. Egg, Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 2, pp. l l 15, October 21, 1987; Exhibit 2. The adequacy of l transportation resources, particularly bus drivers, has been -t seriously disputed in these proceedings. The failure to i demonstrate the availability of any meaningful number of these i resources represents a fundamental flaw in the NHRERP.  !

(g) There is no basis for FEMA's assertion that the State, I

-during the Exercise, adequately demonstrated or " identified", l sufficient manned vehicles to evacuate the' entire EPZ. See I Exercise Report, p. 165. That identification process apparently consisted.only of phcne calls to bus companies to  ;

restate the number of drivers specified in each company's letter of agreement. Apparently, no determination of the number of-drivers actually available to drive, was provided by .

! the. companies or required by the Exercise. The failure to 1 L demonstrate the actual. availability of necessary transportation I

resources,. including at least 96% (435 of 453) of the drivers i

L required to implement the NHRERP, represents a fundamental flaw l in the NHRERP. Exhibit 2.

i i L

23/ The twenty participating buses represented less than 3% of the 728 buses alleged by Applicants to be under agreement to respond to a Seabrook emergency. See MAG Ex. 107.

(

h l-(I l

- - - - - - . . . ~ ~ , .

W'

\

=as required bycrogulations. 10 C.F.R. part 50 Appendix

'E.IV.F.1.

To compensate for this deficiency, the Licensing Board ignored the regulations, and substituted its own,

, Applicant-friendly test. l The bus drivers, as with teachers and ambulance drivers, do not have to be tested in what they do professionally. It 1 is reasonable to assume that they will do their job. I L LBP-89-32 at $12.89 (p. 559). l If this logic were adopted, the obvious question is why bother with an exercise at all since, presumably, virtually all l-emergency responders are given assignments that they l

professionally are equipped to perform, by training and experience.2E/ r Unfortunately.for the Board, its test for Exercise

' participation violates the plain meaning of the Commission's i

U

" full participation" requirements, supra. It also ignores, again,. controlling law from this Board.2E/

L

• ZE/ The Licensina Board therefore renders the Exercise a pointless gesture. A " sufficient number" of personnel is equated with token participation. There is no attempt to

--verifv a coordinated response capability at all. The Licensing-Board does not justify its decision, since there was no evidence to support'it, that further participation was not reasonably achievable.

1Q/ 'See.ALAB-900 at 299-300 (actual performance of only one

' ambulance and one;ambulette.was inadequate, and does not  :

constitute the "suf.ticient number" contemolated by the t I

reculation recuirina a full oarticioation ore-license exerc(gg.)

t 4

. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ._,_m ., ,_ _ , . - _ , , .-..~...,,.,--,m,

1 1

1 In addition to blatantly altering the legal standard to

{

}

. evaluate the scope of a pre-license Exercise, the Licensing j- Board failed to properly consider: -

R

)

3 1. Transportation providers did D2t make available resources in accordance with the extent of play and NHRERP procedures. For schools, transportation needs were to be 1 1

determined by actual contact with public, private, and day care j personnel to provide census data.- App. Ex. 65, 553.3.1, 3.3.2, j 3.3.7.

(" Actual supply / demand calculations will be made per RERP procedures"). Instead, New Hampshire officials made virtually no effort to contact schools, and instead used ,

l default values to compute transportation needs. MAG Exc. 104, 105; see' App. P.F. 12.1.48.

Most transportation providers did n2t determine actual 1 supply of transportation resources as required by extent of j

. play. jul, at App. Ex. 61, 53.3.7. Indeed,110 of 18 transoortation oroviders refused to carticinate in the exercise at all, and an additional 2 comoanies could not even be contacted. MAG Ex. 107, Tr. 23188-91.

2.

The 1111 Exercise revealed a deficiency in the ability ,

of drivers.to reach their destinations, due to.the poor quality

'of maps and lack of training. Tr. 22993; App. Ex. 43F App.

B-29.11I The Licensing Board apparently recognized this

~21/ As defined by FEMA, a " deficiency" is an Exercise inadequacy that precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that can beappropriate taken in anmeasures emergency. to protect public health and safety l

identical defect in the 1988 Exercise, gag LBP-89-32 at

$$12.89, 12.90 (p. 562), yet brushes it aside, under its newly eviscerated standard.22/

3.- only 3 of 18 bus companies actually provided buses r during the Exercise. Tr. 22995. .These buses had been precontracted, and the companies had made advance arrangements for deployment to pre-identified locations. Tr. 22995-97.

Therefore, during the Exercise, not any of the 18 bus companies were actually required, in conformance with NHRERP procedures, -!

to determine the number of vehicles actually available and to  ;

deploy these resources to facilities identified at the time of emergency. Id.; Tr. 23006-07. According to Applicants, the scope.of the Exercise-did not require any bus company to L - -

. 'i determine the actual availability of. transportation resources.

Tr. 23006. Therefore, the Exerciso did not verify the

-capability to actually deploy needed transportation resources b-

'in an emergency.

The issue of transportation resources is yet another example that the 1988 Exercise was a sham, and did not even attempt to verify critical components of the emergency response.

12/ In this, FEMA joins the Board. FEMA again has altered and lessened its standard of review to change " deficiency" ratings from 1986, although the facts are substantially identical. See e.g. Tr. 23007. (During the 1988 Exercise, FEMA did not even attempt to evaluate how many buses were actually available-for emergency response.)

TOH/NECNP EX-2 22/ )

Although the scope of the Exercise involving New Hampshire schools was absurdly truncated,2S/ even the minimal participation by State and local officials charged with H preparing school PARS was so inept that these officials mimolv foraot about school children still shelterina in schools in 5- .

out of'17 New Hamoshire towns, and forgot to provide further PARS to protect these students. Egg Tr. 25198-25210.

Intervenors presented a witness, Sandra Fowler Mitchell, who then served as Emergency Management Director for the town of Kensington,-New Hampshire, which is located in the EPZ. Ms.

Mitchell, through prefiled testimony, provided her personal observations of the Incident Field Office (IFO) during the

. _ Exercise. MAG EX 115. The IFO generally serves to coordinate

.and' direct information between State and local emergency l response officials concerning plant status, emergency classifications, PARS, and resource allocations. Id. at 2. ,

In summary, the Mitchell testimony focused upon an observed pattern of confusion and miscommunication in the IFO, and concluded by noting that State officials, after providing an 22/ TOH/NECNP EX-2 provides: "The exercise demonstrated that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be.taken to protect school children during a radiological

, . emergency at Seabrook."

l L 2A/ See TOH/NECNP EX-1(a) and (b), discussed, supra.

l b

I initial PAR, simply forgot about students then sheltering in 5 of 17 New Hampshire towns. This represented hundreds of child r..

'At 6:30 p.m., a half hour before the exercise anded, it talso became apparent that New Hampshire officials had forgotten that a significant number of children were still in school awaiting late dismissal (i.e. those children in New Hampshire towns that had been ordered to shelter).

Intervenor observers heard conversations between various officials who were unsure how many children were left in the schools and whether they would be bused.or picked up by-their parents. Nine minutes before the scheduled 7 p.m.

dismissal, Intervenors heard the IFO call the State EOC and ask what transportation arrangement had been made for these children; the EOC responded that arrangements had been made, but EOC did not know what they were.25/ MAG EX 115

-at 5.

The Licensing Board initially admitted this contention and then, reversing field, summarily rejected the contention. Egg Tr. 25189 to 25222.

In Intervenors' view,_the failure of the State to remain

-informed about hundreds of school children, and the failure to provide updated PARS for this vulnerable population, represents' gross-breach of public safety by State officials, was pervasive

.in its implication of the highest PAR decision makers and its

, impact on the public, and meets the test for a fundamental flaw. Yet the Seabrook Licensing Board did not even consider the issue worthy of a hearing. See TR. 25189 to 25222.

4 y

25/ This testimony was also supported by the PAR chronology in the FEMA report. Egg Tr. 25214.

CONCLUSION y ..

L By-LBP-89-32, tho Liconning Board dirsctly disregardsd tha mandate of'ALAB-9001and has rendered exercise regulations meaningless. The Board's summary dismissal of Intervenors' school performance contention equally compromises public safety.

Intervenors therefore request this Board:

a) to vacate LBP-89-32, as to the issues raised herein;

-b) to order Applicants to conduct a remedial exercise to address the deficiencies identified in TOH/NECNP EX-1 prior to full power operation, or if extant, to revoke the license pending this excercise; and-c) to admit the Mitchell testimony and to order a hearing m

on TOH/NECNP EX-2.

Respectfully submitted,

. TOWN O HAMPTON NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR' POLLUTION N Y ld/

aul McEachern, Esq. Diane Curran, Esquire Shaines & McEachern Harmon, Curran & Tousley 25 Maplewood' Avenue 2001 S Street, N.W.

P. O. Box 360 Suite 430 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20009-1125 (202) 328-3500 DATED: January 24, 1990 I

4cj . ,.

n

(

r UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA $$hRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD TO JE 25: P3 :44 -

Before Administrative Judges:

rlCE OF SECRETARY OCKEllHG & Sti<VICL G. Paul Bollwerk, Chairman BRANCH Alan S. Rosenthal i

Howard A. Wilber-

)

In the Matter of- ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY )

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

)

-(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) January 24, 1990

)

g CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, .I, Paul McEachern, hereby certify that on Janaury 24, 1990, s

I made service of the enclosed TOWN OF HAMPTON AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION'ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION BRIEF ON APPEAL OF LBP-89-32 via Federal ~ Express as indicated by (*), and by first class mail to:

lIvan W.-Smith, Chairman Kenneth A. McCollom Atomic Safety & Licensing Board 1107 W. Knapp St.-

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stillwater, OK 74075 East West Towers Building s

4350 East West Highway Bethesda,LMD 20814 Dr. Richard F. Cole Robert R. Pierce, Esq.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- East West Towers Building East West Towers Building

.4350 East West' Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 h

t

5 i

• Docketing and Service

• Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ropes & Gray Washington, DC 20555 One International Place Boston, MA 02110

• Mitzi A. Young, Esq. Phillip Ahrens, Esq.

Edwin J. Reis, Esq. Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of the Attorney General Office of the General Counsel Augusta, ME 04333 11555 Rockville Pike, 15th Floor Rockville, MD 20852 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Atomic Safety & Licensing Assistant General Counsel Appeal Board Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Federal Emergency Management Washington, DC 20555 Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, DC 20472 Robert A. Backus, Esq. Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 116 Lowell Street- Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 516 Manchester, NH 03106 Jane Doughty .

John Traficonte, Esq.

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Ansistant Attorney General Five Market Street Department of the Attorney General Portsmouth,-NH 03801 1 Ashburton Place Washington, DC 20008 Boston, MA 02108 Barbara St. Andre, Esq. Judith Mizner, Esq.

Kopelman & Paige, P.C. 79 State Street 77 Franklin Street Second Floor Boston, MA 02110 Newburyport, MA 01950 Charles P. Graham, Esq. R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq; Murphy & Graham Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton & Rotondi 33 Low Street 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Newburyport, MA 01950 Ashod !!. Amirian, Esq. Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 145 South Main Street U.S. Senate

.P.O. Box 38 Washington, DC 20510 Bradford, MA 01835 (Attn: Tom Burack)

-Senator'Gordon J. Humphrey John F. Arnold, Attorney General One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Office of the Attorney General Concord, NH 03301 25 Capitol Street (Attn: Herb Boynton) Concord, NH 03301 E

Diana Curran, Esq. . William S. Lord Harmon, Curran & Tousley Board of Selectmen 2001 S St. N.W., Suite 430 Town Hall - Friend Street '

Fashington,- DC 20555 Amesbury, MA 01913 L *G. Paul Bollwerk, Chairman

• Alan S. Rosenthal L Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing L Appeal Board Appeal Board L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 10555 Washington, D.C. 10555 -

• Howard A. Wilber Jack Dolan f,tomic Safety & Licensing Federal Emergency Management Agency Appeal Board Region 1 U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission J.W. McCormack Post Office &

Washington, D.C. 10555 Courthouse Building, Room 442 Boston, MA 02109 George Iverson, Director N.H. Office of Emergency Management State House Office Park South 107 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 Respectfully submitted, l

aul McEachern Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 (603) 436-3110 Dated: January 24, 1990 a _ _ - _ - - __ _ _ _____- .. ~ - . . . .- . ._ . . - . .. . -.-