Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents

Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents

ML031050372
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date:	03/12/1997
From:	Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-97-008, NUDOCS 9703140142
Download: ML031050372 (13)

KJ

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 12, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-08: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC

MAGNE-BLAST CIRCUIT BREAKER

SUBCOMPONENTS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to potential failures of six subcomponents in General Electric (GE) type AM or

AMH 4.16-kV circuit breakers that can render the breakers inoperable. The subcomponents

in question are (1) the trip crank, (2) the CR2940 contact blocks that make up the power

switch assembly, (3) the manual trip lever and its supporting "L" bracket in the AMH

horizontal drawout breakers, (4) the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in place,

(5) the spring charging motor tie bolts, and (6) the type HMA control relay. It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is

required.

DescriDtion of Circumstances

Trip Crank Failures

The NRC has learned that several plants have experienced failures of the trip crank (GE Part

No. 105C9316G1, Piece No. 28 of Figure 1 in GE ML-13 Mechanism Renewal Parts Bulletin

GEF-4379) in Magne-Blast circuit breakers. These failures occurred when the pin at the end

of the crank broke off. The pin may break off the crank when the trip coil is energized. The

trip crank pin inserts into a hole in the lower end of the link between the trip crank and the

trip coil armature. If the pin breaks off before the trip crank can successfully rotate the trip

shaft (which has been the case in most instances), the breaker will fail to trip electrically

(although it can still be tripped with its local manual pushbutton).

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IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion

Trip Crank Failures

GE has attributed the broken pins to three principal factors: (1) lack of adequate control of

one of the critical machined dimensions on the pin during the early 1970s, (2) lack of

adequate fusion in some of the pin-to-plate welds, and (3) grinding of the weld

reinforcements flush on the back of the trip crank plates. Upon being informed of the first

instances of pin failure in 1988 (at Tennessee Valley Authority's Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant),

GE instituted more rigorous quality control checks on the pins and finished trip cranks. GE

also revised the pin weld detail on is trip crank fabrication drawing (105C9316) and added

"DO NOT GRIND FLUSH." Several failures were reported after the initial Watts Bar report, and many potentially susceptible breakers were found in the field, all with their original trip

cranks made in the early 1970s. However, no instances of failures of trip cranks

manufactured after 1988 have been reported.

Also, if the remote trip signal (either from a protective relay or a manual hand switch) is

applied for more than a few seconds (which it normally is) and the breaker fails to trip (such

as it would if the trip crank pin broke), neither the breaker-mounted auxiliary switch nor the

stationary (cubicle-mounted) auxiliary switch will signal control circuits that the breaker has

opened, and thus the trip signal will normally remain applied. Energizing the trip coil (which

is normally energized only momentarily) for an extended period may open-circuit the coil, thereby rendering it permanently inoperable.

Trip cranks that are potentially susceptible to this failure can be identified without

disassembly of the breaker mechanism. With the mechanism front cover removed, the gap

between the trip crank and the right side of the mechanism frame may be seen. It is then

possible to see whether the weld reinforcement has been ground off. GE is preparing a

service advisory letter (SAL) on this problem in which it intends to recommend replacement

of any trip cranks that do not have the proper thickness of pin weld reinforcement (1/32-1/16 inch). GE Philadelphia Operation (GE PO) can furnish replacement cranks.

DescriDtion of Circumstances

Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance

On February 12, 1996, the FitzPatrick licensee experienced failure of two residual heat

removal service water (RHRSW) pumps to start, on demand because their supply breakers

failed to close. RHRSW pump C failed to start on demand during monthly surveillance

testing and RHRSW pump A failed to start when attempting to place it in service as part of a

suppression pool cooling evolution. The licensee's investigation found that the Magne-Blast

breakers failed to close because high resistance across one of the power switch assembly

contacts prevented the closing coil from being energized.

I IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 Discussion

Contact Block CR2940 Contact Resistance

The power switch assembly consists of three GE type CR2940 contact blocks stacked

together so that all three sets of contacts are actuated by a single striker. Two of the

contacts (1-2 and 3-4) are normally open and are held closed by the striker during the spring

charging operation. When the charging cycle is complete, the contacts spring-return to the

open position to cut off power to the spring charging motor and the control (anti-pump) relay

(52Y). The third set of contacts (5-6) is normally closed and is included as an option to allow

remote indication of the closing spring status (charg.d/discharged), usually by means of a

white indicator light in the control room. This third contact is often called the "white lighr'

contact for this reason. This contact is wired Into the breaker control circuitry such that

failure of the contact to close will prevent the breaker closing coil (52X) from being energized

and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.

The licensee determined that the CR2940 contacts were misapplied in the Magne-Blast

breaker control circuitry because the contacts are rated for only 2.2 amps dc and are

required to interrupt 6.0 amps dc (Licensee Event Report 50/333 96-002, Accession No.

960410298). The licensee also observed that the contacts seemed to show signs of arcing

(blackened, pitted surface) after about 2,000 operations, even though the recommended

breaker service life is 10,000 operations. General maintenance Instructions in GE Technical

Manual GEI-88771D, "Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker," states that the 1,200-amp breakers are

capable of performing up to 5,000 operations and the 2,000-amp breakers are capable of

performing 3,000 operations before any replacement of parts should be necessary.

Resistance measurements across the failed contacts varied between 200-1000 ohms.

Contacts with 1,500 operations or less did not have the arcing indications, nor did they have

high resistance readings. The licensee also noted that there were no recommendations to

check the contact resistance during periodic preventive maintenance in the vendor's

maintenance manual. There was disagreement between the plant's drawings and the

manufacturer's wiring diagrams. The manufacturer's wiring diagram indicates that the 5-6 contact should be jumpered out when not used. One of the plant drawings shows that when

the 5-6 contact is "not fumished," it should be jumpered. The 5-6 contact is not shown at all

on the plant RHRSW pump circuit breaker elementary drawing.

The FitzPatrick licensee has also experienced failure of CR2940 contact blocks used as latch

checking switches in Magne-Blast breakers, even though the contacts do not experience

significant "make" or "break" current. The licensee believes that these failures could be

related to aging or the number of operations and is evaluating whether periodic replacement

may be necessary.

In a letter dated June 14, 1996, GE Nuclear Energy informed the FitzPatrick licensee that the

suitability of the CR2940 contact blocks in the ML-1 3 operating mechanism for the Magne- Blast breaker was confirmed by testing the breaker in accordance with applicable American

National Standards Institute (ANSI) and National Electrical Manufacturers Association

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 (NEMA) standards. Operability of the contacts was demonstrated by breaker life cycle testing

of 10,000 operations with no failure of the contact blocks, and there is no requirement to

replace the contacts on the basis of age or the number of operations. However, GE stated

that according to applicable NEMA standards, the maximum number of operations between

servicing is 2,000. The operations are listed on the basis of servicing at intervals of

6 months or less. GE also stated that although the published instructions do not specifically

address the contact block resistance, instructions for checking the control power during

servicing include measuring the operating voltage at the closing coil, the trip coil, and the

charging motor terminals. GE believes that this type of testing would reveal whether the

contacts required replacement. GE stated that the wiring diagram clearly indicates that the

5-6 contact should be jumpered out when the 'White light" function is not utilized. In addition, the drawing shows that another CR2940 contact used as a latch check switch in the closing

coil circuit should also be jumpered out when this feature is not used.

GE concluded that although the contact blocks were suitable for use in the Magne-Blast

breakers, the operability demands of the nuclear po~wer industry and the recently reported

problems from the field indicated that the contact blocks were a weak link in the design of the

control circuitry. GE recommended the following actions in the June 14, 1996 letter

• In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed but not utilized, it

should be jumpered out of the circuit.

• In control schemes where the "52 SM/LS" (5-6) contact is installed and utilized for

"white light" indication, but the "auto reclose" function is not used, the wiring should be

revised to remove the contact from the close coil circuit. GE can furnish a revised

wiring diagram and nameplate.

• For the CL/MS application, where the contact block is used to break charging motor

current, GE is evaluating a replacement device. The new switch will have a higher de

interrupting rating and will be furnished for those applications where breaker

applications require the increased durability.

GE plans to issue a SAL concerning the CR2940 contact blocks in March- 1997.

Description of Circumstances

Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket

During surveillance testing in June and July 1996, the licensee for Calvert Cliffs identified two

problems with type AMH-4.76-250 (horizontal drawout) Magne-Blast circuit breakers. In the

first case, a low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump breaker failed to close. The licensee

found that the trip lever was bent and there was no gap between the trip lever and the

manual trip rod. Although no gap value is given in the vendor manual, there is generally a

small gap between the trip lever paddle and the manual trip rod. The bent trip lever

prevented the trip latch from fully rotating onto the stop pin, resulting in a less than optimal

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 area of contact (wipe) between the latch and the stop pin. As a result, the breaker would

experience intermittent failure to close.

A second LPSI pump circuit breaker failed to close during monthly testing at Calvert Cliffs in

July 1996. Investigation found that in addition to the trip levers being bent, the "L" bracket

support for the trip lever was also cracked. The "L"bracket is designed to support the trip

lever and provide additional stiffness. A subsequent inspection of other breakers at Calvert

Cliffs found that one other breaker had a bent trip lever and two other breakers had cracked

"L" brackets.

Discussion

Bent Manual Trip Lever and Cracked "L" Bracket

GE performed extensive testing on one of the failed Calvert Cliffs breakers and concluded

that the most probable cause was insufficient trip latch reset spring force caused by either

incorrect or damaged springs originally installed at the factory. GE recommended a

modification to the Calvert Cliffs breakers to prevent further cases of trip lever bending and

"L" bracket failures. The modification consists of replacing the trip paddles, the support

bracket, and the spring discharge link. The trip lever material was changed from American

Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 1005 carbon steel to AISI 1018 carbon steel. The "L" bracket

was changed from AISI 1005 steel to aluminum. The configuration of the components was

also changed.

The modification corrects for the weak spring and allows the breaker to retain operability with

the weak spring installed. Replacement of the trip latch reset spring is not part of the normal

maintenance or overhaul activity. Replacement of the spring requires that a V-notch be cut

into the breaker angle support to allow removal of the trip shaft. The Calvert Cliffs licensee

plans to replace the weak springs in the breakers during the next scheduled overhaul.

The modification kit is available as Catalog No. 0172C8186G001. GE plans to issue a SAL

on this issue by April 30, 1997.

Description of Circumstances

Cotter Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts

On September 13, 1996, the licensee for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station discovered

during a tagging procedure that the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) was inoperable.

The EDG output circuit breaker (GE type AMA4.16 kV Magne-Blast) was found in its normally

open position, but its closing springs were discharged. With the springs discharged, the

breaker was incapable of closing.

Subsequent investigation by the Vermont Yankee licensee determined that the spring

charging motor had run to failure because the cotter pin that holds the latch pawl hinge pin in

position broke. The ears of the cotter pin had apparently broken and allowed the cotter pin

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 to fall out, thus allowing the hinge pin to work its way out of position and prevent the latch

pawls from holding the ratchet wheel in place during the charging operation. The charging

springs were not compressed, and the charging motor continued to run until it overheated

and the motor winding open-circuited. Three of the four charging motor tie bolts that connect

the motor portion to the gear housing were also found lying on the floor of the breaker cell.

Vermont Yankee personnel inspected other similar breakers and found that 18 cotter pins

were either degraded (one or both "ears" broken off) or undersized, and in one case a cotter

pin was missing from the latch pawl hinge pin. Three breakers were also found with one or

more loose charging motor tie bolts.

On November 25, 1996, after learning of the event at Vermont Yankee, the licensee for

FitzPatrick performed an inspection and identified 10 out of 18 safety-related Magne-Blast

breakers with degraded coffer pins latch pawl hinge pins. Similar to the failure at Vermont

Yankee, the cotter pins had one or both ears broken off. One undersized cotter pin was also

found, but it was not broken and the licensee determined that it had been installed by plant

personnel.

Discussion

Coffer Pins for the Latch Pawl Hinge Pin and Charging Motor Tie Bolts

The latch pawl hinge pin was originally designed in 1962 to be held in place by cotter pins at

either end. In 1979, GE enhanced the design of the hinge pin assembly by tapping an

existing hole in the hinge pin support bracket and installing a bolt with a washer large enough

to overlap the hinge pin. Using the bolt and washer to hold the hinge pin in place precluded

the need for coffer pins. According to GE, this enhancement was made only to aid in

disassembly and reassembly of the breaker during maintenance, and not because of any

perceived problem with the cotter pins. As a result, GE did not deem it necessary to inform

customers of the change in 1979. Testing performed by GE in 1996 demonstrated that the

cotter pins may experience damage after approximately 2,000 operations. GE plans to issue

a SAL on this issue in March 1997.

Two different styles of charging motors are used in Magne-Blast breakers. Initially, GE used

motors manufactured by the Sioux Tool Company of Sioux City, Iowa. In the early 1970s, GE switched to motors made by Millers Falls (later bought by Ingersoll/Rand). In the late

1970s, GE went back to using the Sioux Tool Company as the charging motor supplier for

the Magne-Blast breakers and still uses it today when customers order replacements.

The two different types of charging motor can be easily identified. Two black cover plates

conceal the tie bolts on the Sioux motors, and thus the bolts are not visible from the outside.

The cover plates have to be removed to gain access to the four bolt heads, and the tie bolts

are inserted from the motor housing into the gear housing. In contrast, the tie bolts on the

Millers Falls (Ingersoll/Rand) motors have exposed heads and are inserted from the gear

housing into the motor housing. The motors with the loose bolts at Vermont Yankee were

Millers Falls motors.

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997

Description of Circumstances

Type HMA Control Relay

On December 1, 1996, a Magne-Blast breaker serving as a vital bus feed breaker failed to

close on demand during surveillance testing at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. The

licensee determined that the HMA control relay (the anti-pump relay [52YJ) normally closed

contacts failed to reclose when the relay was deenergized because of binding of the

armature against the molded phenolic post. With the contacts stuck in the open position, the

closing circuit cannot be completed and the breaker cannot be closed electrically.

Discussion

Type HMA Control Relay

The relay was sent to the vendor (GE Power Management [GE PM], Malvem, Pennsylvania)

for detailed failure analysis. The vendor found that there was no clearance between one side

of the armature tailpiece and the molded post. Normally, when an HMA relay is assembled

at the factory, the armature is centered between the two molded posts with a gap of

0.005 inch on each side.

The vendor recalled that a similar situation occurred in 1982 and prompted the issuance of

SAL 721-PSM No. 171.1, "HMA Relay Armature Binding," on December 17, 1982. The

original SAL stated that a tool problem at the factory in 1974 caused several relays to have

improper clearance between the armature and the molded posts. The SAL suggested that

the proper clearance could be achieved by first removing the armature stop clamping nut and

lifting the stop and armature tailpiece from between the molded posts, and then removing

some of the phenolic post material.

The NRC discussed this issue with GE PM. The vendor stated that the armature could be

checked for the proper clearance between the armature and the molded posts by use of

feeler gauges. A gap of less than 0.002 inch on either side indicates an adjustment is

needed. However, the original SAL stated that the solution was to remove some of the

phenolic material from the posts and did not mention that customers could first try to adjust

the armature to achieve the proper clearance. If the relay does not have the proper

clearance, usually all that is needed is to loosen the armature stop clamping nut, center the

armature between the two posts, retighten the nut, and then check the clearances again.

The vendor also stated that although the recommended minimum gap given in the original

SAL is 0.005 inch on each side, a gap of 0.002 inch is considered adequate for reliable

operation.

Related Generic Communications

GE issued SAL 073-352.1, "Latest Design Configuration: GE Type AM Circuit Breakers and

Medium Voltage Switchgear," on July 7, 1995, to alert customers to design changes made in

the circuit breakers, their operating mechanisms, and the switchgear. Some of the listed

design changes were discussed in previous SALs, while other changes were not originally

conveyed to customers because the changes were made to facilitate assembly, maintenance,

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item

listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.

Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:

IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit

Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.

IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their

Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.

IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued

August 1, 1994.

IN 96-43, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,

1996.

IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in

Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Direct

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR

(301) 415-2980

E-mail: kmenrc.gov

Stephen Alexander, NRR

(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dIs@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

v72kVVLPU J

Attachment

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

97-07 Problems Identified 03/06/97 All holders of OLs

During Generic Letter or CPs for nuclear

89-10 Closeout power reactors

Inspections

97-06 Weaknesses in Plant- 03/04/97 All holders of OLs

Specific Emergency or CPs for nuclear

Operating Procedures power reactors with

for Refilling the with once-through

Secondary Side of Dry steam generators

Once-Through Steam

Generators

91-85, Potential Failures of 02/27/97 All holders of OLs

Rev. 1 Thermostatic Control or CPs for nuclear

Valves or Diesel power reactors

Generator Jacket

Cooling Water

97-05 Offsite Notification 02/27/97 All holders of OLs

Capabilities or CPs for nuclear

power reactors and

test and research

reactors

97-04 Implementation of a New 02/24/97 All materials, fuel

Constraint on Radioactive cycle, and non-power

Air Effluents reactor licensees

97-03 Defacing of Labels to 02/20/97 All material licensees

Comply with 10 CFR involved with disposal

20.1904(b) of medical waste

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 97-08 March 12, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item

listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.

Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:

IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit

Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.

IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their

Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.

IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," Issued

August 1, 1994.

IN 96-43, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,

1996.

IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in

Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by M.M. Slosson

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR

(301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: km@nrc.gov E-mail: sda@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor has reviewed and concurred on 02/26/07 DOCUMENT NAME: G:XDLS\IN97-XX.BKR *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document, bIdicate I the box: 'C' - Copy w/o

attachmentfenclosure SEw - Copy w/attachment/enclosure NT - No copy .

OFFICE TECH CONTS I C/PECB:DRPM LD/DRPM I - l

NAME KNaidu* AChaffee* TMartin

SAlexander*3 DATE

DAE DSkeen*

02/27/97 02/27/97 j03/_ _ __ _ _

__97_

__ _ __ _ _ __ _ _

OFFICIA REORCOPY

IN 97-XX

March XX, 1997 or operation of the equipment. The SAL states that customers should evaluate each item

listed and consider the applicability to their particular equipment.

Recent NRC information notices (Ins) concerning Magne-Blast circuit breakers are as follows:

IN 90-41, "Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and AK Circuit

Breakers," issued June 12, 1990.

IN 93-91, "Misadjustment Between General Electric 4.16-kV Circuit Breakers and Their

Associated Cubicles," issued December 3, 1993.

IN 94-54, "Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed," issued

August 1, 1994.

IN 9643, "Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers," issued August 12,

1996.

IN 96-46, "Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal Parts and Removal of Protective Coatings in

Refurbished Circuit Breakers," issued August 12, 1996.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you, have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR Stephen Alexander, NRR

(301) 415-2980 (301) 415-2995 E-mail: kmenrc.gov E-mail: sda@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OFC PECB:DRPM PSIB:DISP CIPSIB:DISP JCIPECB:DRPM

NAME D. Skeene K. Naidu R. Gallo A. Chaffed

DATE IA 97 02 125197 02/25197 ,94R97 t  : In AL -

OFC I DIDRPM 4r.v 9LS7/6W77 NAME IT. Martin

DATE I /97 UFFIUIAL RECORDU LCVYJ DOCUMENT NAME: G:MDLSXIN97-XX.BKR

IN 97-XX

February XX, 1997 Page 8of 8 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kamalaka Naidu, NRR

(301) 415-2980

E-mail: km@nrc.gov

Stephen Alexander, NRR

(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OFC PECB:DRPM PSIB:DISP CIPSIB:DISP C/PECB:DRPM

NAM l DSke K. Naidu R. Gallo l 9F l

DATE k .Q797 02 /25/97 02/25/97 , G97 -JK9

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OFC D/DRPM

NAM T. Martin

E I_/97 DATE / /97

[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]

DOCUMENT NAME: G:%DLS\IN97-XX.BKR

U-

K> IN 97-XX

February XX, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts

listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Thomas T. Martin, Director

Division of Reactor Program anagement

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kamalakar Naidu, NRR

(301) 415-2980

E-mail: km@nrc.gov

Stephen Alexander, NRR

(301) 415-2995 E-mail: sda@nrc.gov

David Skeen, NRR

(301) 415-1174 E-mail: dls@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OFC PECB:DRPM j PSIB:DISP C/PSIB:DISP C/PECB:DRPM

NAM l

eViu ,dGF A. Chaffee

DATE 24. 97 l, /7g97 97 I/ /97 OFC D/DRPM

NAM T. Martin

DATE / /97

[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DLSUlN97-XX.BKR