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| {{#Wiki_filter:Ku UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY | | {{#Wiki_filter:Ku |
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| COMMISSION
| | UNITED STATES |
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| ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September
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| 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
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| NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS | | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND |
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| FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
| | OUTAGE MANAGEMENT PILOT TEAM INSPECTIONS |
| | |
| ===PILOT TEAM INSPECTIONS===
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| All holders of operating | | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power |
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| licenses or construction
| | reactors. |
| | |
| permits for nuclear power reactors.
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| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information |
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| Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
| | notice to inform addressees of observations from recent shutdown risk and |
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| notice to inform addressees
| | outage management pilot team inspections. It is expected that recipients will |
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| of observations
| | review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider |
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| from recent shutdown risk and outage management
| | actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions |
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| pilot team inspections.
| | contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no |
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| It is expected that recipients
| | specific action or written response is required. |
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| will review the information
| | Background |
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| for applicability
| | Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff |
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| to their facilities | | to be increasingly concerned about plant safety during shutdown operations. |
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| and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
| | The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor |
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| ===However, suggestions===
| | coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted the fact that |
| contained
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| in this information
| | operation of a pressurized-water reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system |
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| notice are not NRC requirements;
| | (RCS) inventory is a particularly sensitive condition. Based on its review of |
| therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
| |
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| Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff to be increasingly
| | that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat |
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| concerned
| | Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested that licensees address certain |
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| about plant safety during shutdown operations.
| | generic deficiencies to improve safety during operations with a reduced RCS |
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| The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted
| | inventory. More recently, Incident Investigation Team report, NUREG-1410, |
| | "Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop |
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| the fact that operation | | Operations at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized the need for |
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| of a pressurized-water | | risk management of shutdown operations. Discussions with foreign regulatory |
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| reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory
| | organizations support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency for |
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| is a particularly
| | shutdown operations may be a substantial fraction of the total core-damage |
| | |
| sensitive
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| | |
| condition.
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| Based on its review of that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested
| |
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| that licensees
| |
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| address certain generic deficiencies
| |
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| to improve safety during operations
| |
| | |
| with a reduced RCS inventory.
| |
| | |
| More recently, Incident Investigation
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| | |
| Team report, NUREG-1410,"Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop Operations
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| | |
| at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized
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| the need for risk management
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| of shutdown operations.
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| Discussions
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| with foreign regulatory
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| organizations
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| support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency
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| for shutdown operations
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| may be a substantial | |
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| fraction of the total core-damage | |
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| frequency. | | frequency. |
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| Description | | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| | | Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted five pilot team |
| of Circumstances | |
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| Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted | |
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| five pilot team inspections | |
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| to assess the effectiveness
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| of industry initiatives
| |
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| for improving shutdown safety. The inspections
| |
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| were performed
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| at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection
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| | |
| Report (IR) 50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear 9309090243
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| -U 1?-.crn-9
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| .3 IN 93-72 September
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| 14, 1993 Generating
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| Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
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| Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201;
| | inspections to assess the effectiveness of industry initiatives for improving |
| 50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station (IR 50-298/93-201).
| |
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| Approximately
| | shutdown safety. The inspections were performed at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection Report (IR)50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear |
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| one week of each inspection
| | 9309090243 |
| | - U 1?-.crn-9 |
| | 3 . |
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| focused on licensee pre-outage
| | IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Generating Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201; 50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station |
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| planning and control processes
| | (IR 50-298/93-201). Approximately one week of each inspection focused on |
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| and 8 to 10 days focused on licensee implementation | | licensee pre-outage planning and control processes and 8 to 10 days focused on |
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| of the outage.In the pre-outage | | licensee implementation of the outage. |
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| portion of the inspection, the inspectors | | In the pre-outage portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated the |
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| evaluated
| | following: (1) management involvement in and oversight of the outage planning |
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| the following:
| | process, (2) planning and scheduling of outage activities, especially the |
| (1) management | |
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| involvement
| | relationships between significant work activities and the availability of |
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| in and oversight
| | electrical power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system |
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| of the outage planning process, (2) planning and scheduling
| | RCS inventory and containment integrity, (3) the process for developing |
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| of outage activities, especially
| | individual work packages to ensure coordination with other activities, and (4) |
| | operator response procedures, contingency plans and training for mitigation of |
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| the relationships
| | loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory and loss of |
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| between significant
| | electrical power sources during shutdown conditions. |
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| work activities
| | The inspectors walked through procedures related to shutdown safety to |
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| and the availability
| | determine if the specified activities could be accomplished in the allotted |
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| of electrical
| | time frames and to verify that the procedures could be implemented considering |
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| power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system RCS inventory
| | probable equipment availability. The inspectors reviewed training records on |
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| and containment | | outage procedures to determine if the training was adequate and that, when |
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| integrity, (3) the process for developing
| | appropriate, additional training was provided as the procedures were revised. |
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| individual
| | The inspectors also evaluated the probable effects of environmental conditions |
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| work packages to ensure coordination
| | such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance of activities that |
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| with other activities, and (4)operator response procedures, contingency
| | would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events. |
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| plans and training for mitigation
| | In the implementation portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated: |
| | (1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships and |
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| of loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory
| | communication channels between operations, maintenance and other plant support |
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| and loss of electrical | | personnel, (3) the conduct of operations personnel both inside and outside of |
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| power sources during shutdown conditions.
| | the control room regarding awareness of plant status, control of plant |
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| The inspectors
| | evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the |
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| walked through procedures
| | completeness and effectiveness of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance and |
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| related to shutdown safety to determine
| | modification work was performed in accordance with current written and |
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| if the specified
| | approved procedures and appropriate post-maintenance testing was required and |
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| activities
| | performed, and (6) the adequacy of management involvement and oversight of the |
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| could be accomplished
| | conduct of the outage as it progressed. |
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| in the allotted time frames and to verify that the procedures
| | Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency plant |
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| could be implemented
| | lighting, configuration control, radiological controls, equipment labeling and |
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| considering
| | status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee |
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| probable equipment
| | control of contractor work including contractor training and qualifications. |
| | |
| availability.
| |
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| The inspectors
| |
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| reviewed training records on outage procedures
| |
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| to determine
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| | |
| if the training was adequate and that, when appropriate, additional
| |
| | |
| training was provided as the procedures
| |
| | |
| were revised.The inspectors
| |
| | |
| also evaluated
| |
| | |
| the probable effects of environmental
| |
| | |
| conditions
| |
| | |
| such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance
| |
| | |
| of activities
| |
| | |
| that would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events.In the implementation
| |
| | |
| portion of the inspection, the inspectors
| |
| | |
| evaluated:
| |
| (1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships
| |
| | |
| and communication
| |
| | |
| channels between operations, maintenance
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| and other plant support personnel, (3) the conduct of operations
| |
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| personnel
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| both inside and outside of the control room regarding
| |
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| awareness
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| of plant status, control of plant evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the completeness
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| and effectiveness
| |
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| of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance
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| and modification
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| work was performed
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| in accordance
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| with current written and approved procedures
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| and appropriate
| |
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| post-maintenance
| |
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| testing was required and performed, and (6) the adequacy of management
| |
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| involvement
| |
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| and oversight
| |
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| of the conduct of the outage as it progressed.
| |
| | |
| Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency
| |
| | |
| plant lighting, configuration
| |
| | |
| control, radiological
| |
| | |
| controls, equipment
| |
| | |
| labeling and status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee control of contractor
| |
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| work including | |
| | |
| contractor | |
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| training and qualifications. | |
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|
| Discussion | | Discussion |
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|
| In general, the inspectors | | In general, the inspectors found that licensees had instituted programmatic |
| | |
| found that licensees | |
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| had instituted | |
| | |
| programmatic | |
| | |
| changes developed
| |
| | |
| from guidance contained
| |
| | |
| in a Nuclear Management
| |
| | |
| and Resources
| |
| | |
| Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines
| |
| | |
| for Industry Actions to
| |
| | |
| TV IN 93-72 September
| |
| | |
| 14, 1993 Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors
| |
| | |
| found individual
| |
| | |
| examples of licensee failure to follow procedures
| |
| | |
| but more importantly
| |
| | |
| the inspectors
| |
| | |
| identified
| |
| | |
| two areas of more general concern: (1) risk assessment
| |
| | |
| for pre-outage
| |
| | |
| planning, emergent work and schedule changes, and (2)implementation
| |
| | |
| of defense-in-depth
| |
| | |
| methodologies
| |
| | |
| for equipment
| |
| | |
| availability.
| |
| | |
| A general discussion
| |
| | |
| of these areas is provided below. Specific details of the findings are contained
| |
| | |
| in the inspection
| |
| | |
| reports referenced
| |
|
| |
|
| above.Risk Assessment
| | changes developed from guidance contained in a Nuclear Management and |
|
| |
|
| for Pre-Outage | | Resources Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to |
|
| |
|
| Planning, Emergent Work and Schedule Changes The inspectors
| | TV |
|
| |
|
| found that licensees
| | IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 individual examples of |
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| used various programmatic
| | Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors found the inspectors |
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| controls to assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes. Assessment
| | licensee failure to follow procedures but more importantly assessment for |
|
| |
|
| methodologies
| | identified two areas of more general concern: (1) risk |
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| |
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| used for initial outage planning ranged from following
| | and (2) |
| | pre-outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes, availability. |
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|
| minimum guidelines
| | methodologies for equipment |
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| |
|
| for equipment
| | implementation of defense-in-depth Specific details of |
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|
| availability
| | A general discussion of these areas is provided below. |
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|
| to performing
| | above. |
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| a probabilistic
| | the findings are contained in the inspection reports referenced |
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| risk assessment
| | and Schedule Changes |
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|
| of scheduled
| | Risk Assessment for Pre-Outage Planning, Emergent Work |
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|
| outage activities.
| | controls to |
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| |
|
| The inspection | | The inspectors found that licensees used various programmatic emergent work and |
|
| |
|
| team found that the risk assessment
| | assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, outage planning |
|
| |
|
| aided the licensee in identifying
| | schedule changes. Assessment methodologies used for initial availability to |
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| |
|
| activities | | ranged from following minimum guidelines for equipment outage activities. |
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| |
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| that would be subject to high risk during the sched led outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment
| | performing a probabilistic risk assessment of scheduled the licensee in |
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| |
|
| became less valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage schedule occurreda In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the inspectors
| | The inspection team found that the risk assessment aided during the sched led |
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| |
|
| found that three of the plants had a proceduralized
| | identifying activities that would be subject to high risk became less |
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|
| process to assess the effect of \emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. The other two plants relied on a functional
| | outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment schedule occurreda |
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| |
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| review by planners, schedulers, and operators
| | valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage |
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| |
|
| to adjust the schedule appropriately
| | inspectors found that |
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| |
|
| to reduce risk.The inspectors | | In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the effect of \ |
| | three of the plants had a proceduralized process to assess the two plants relied |
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| |
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| found that all of the plants maintained
| | other |
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| |
|
| status boards or checklists
| | emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. Theoperators to adjust the |
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| in the control room to assist the operators
| | on a functional review by planners, schedulers, and |
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| in tracking the configuration
| | schedule appropriately to reduce risk. |
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| |
|
| status of plant systems and to help identify potential risk-significant | | status boards or |
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| activities.
| | The inspectors found that all of the plants maintained in tracking the |
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| Implementation
| | checklists in the control room to assist the operators |
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|
| of Defense-in-Depth
| | potential |
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| |
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| for Equipment
| | configuration status of plant systems and to help identify |
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| |
|
| ===Availability===
| | risk-significant activities. |
| The inspection
| |
|
| |
|
| teams found that licensee implementation
| | Implementation of Defense-in-Depth for Equipment Availability |
|
| |
|
| of defense-in-depth | | of defense-in-depth |
|
| |
|
| for equipment
| | The inspection teams found that licensee implementation industry guidelines for |
| | |
| availability
| |
| | |
| was inconsistent.
| |
| | |
| Although industry guidelines
| |
| | |
| for declaring
| |
| | |
| equipment "available" exist, the inspectors
| |
| | |
| found that the criteria for declaring
| |
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| |
|
| equipment | | for equipment availability was inconsistent. Although |
|
| |
|
| needed to ensure an appropriate
| | that the criteria |
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| |
|
| margin of safety"available" varied from licensee to licensee.
| | declaring equipment "available" exist, the inspectors found of safety |
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| |
|
| For example, declaring
| | an appropriate margin |
|
| |
|
| that equipment | | for declaring equipment needed to ensure declaring that |
|
| |
|
| was "available" did not always include ensuring that support systems (e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation
| | "available" varied from licensee to licensee. For example, include ensuring that support systems |
|
| |
|
| and air conditioning)
| | equipment was "available" did not always conditioning) were also |
| were also available. | |
|
| |
|
| At times, after maintenance
| | (e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation and air |
|
| |
|
| had been performed, equipment | | had been performed, equipment was |
|
| |
|
| was listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance
| | available. At times, after maintenance functional |
|
| |
|
| functional
| | listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance considered to be |
|
| |
|
| test. The inspectors | | test. The inspectors also found that some equipment was |
|
| |
|
| also found that some equipment
| | as removal of clearances or realignment |
|
| |
|
| was considered
| | "available" even though actions, such perform its function. |
|
| |
|
| to be"available" even though actions, such as removal of clearances
| | of valves, would be required before the equipment could |
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| |
|
| or realignment
| | the team inspectors |
|
| |
|
| of valves, would be required before the equipment | | In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants restrictions |
|
| |
|
| could perform its function.In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants the team inspectors
| | found examples of failures to comply with technical specification |
|
| |
|
| found examples of failures to comply with technical
| | to exceed overtime limits was |
|
| |
|
| specification
| | on overtime work in that management approval |
|
| |
|
| restrictions
| | inadequately documented. |
|
| |
|
| on overtime work in that management
| | K-, |
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| approval to exceed overtime limits was inadequately
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| documented.
| | the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear |
|
| |
|
| K-, This information
| | Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | Brian K. Grimes, Director |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | Division of Operating Reactor Support |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| | (301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
| | RSIB:DRIL:NRR RSIB:DRIL:NRR AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR D/DRIL:NRR |
|
| |
|
| ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
| | JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi |
| Technical
| |
|
| |
|
| contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:
| | 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C70MO:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | NBeeson JLBirmingham iGHMarcus BKGrimes |
|
| |
|
| JDWilcox 07/02/93 RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | 08/10/93 08 /1/ 93 J9 PT |
|
| |
|
| SSanders 07/02/93 OGCB:DORS:NRR
| | ;S/Al/93 09/ /93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR |
|
| |
|
| ===JLBirmingham===
| | PSKoltay |
| 08 /1/ 93 J9 AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| |
|
| |
|
| DNorkin 07/02/93 C70MO:DORS:NRR
| | 07/06/93 |
|
| |
|
| iGHMarcus PT ;S/Al/93 D/DRIL:NRR
| | - IN 93-xx |
|
| |
|
| CERossi 07/10/93 D/DORS:NRR
| | September xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| BKGrimes 09/ /93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| PSKoltay 07/06/93
| | the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear |
| -IN 93-xx September
| |
|
| |
|
| xx, 1993 This information
| | Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | Brian K. Grimes, Director |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | Division of Operating Reactor Support |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| | (301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
| | *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE |
|
| |
|
| ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
| | *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR |
| Technical
| |
|
| |
|
| contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:
| | JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
| | 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 |
| | *RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR > C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR |
|
| |
|
| *RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen BKGrimes |
|
| |
|
| | 08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 09/ /93 |
| *RSIB:DRIL:NRR | | *RSIB:DRIL:NRR |
|
| |
|
| JDWilcox SSanders 07/02/93 07/02/93*AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | PSKoltay |
| | |
| DNorkin 07/02/93> C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
| |
| | |
| GHMarcus/Wen
| |
| | |
| 08/27/93*D/DRIL:NRR
| |
| | |
| CERossi 07/10/93 D/DORS:NRR
| |
| | |
| BKGrimes 09/ /93*RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93*OGCB:DORS:NRR
| |
| | |
| ===JLBirmingham===
| |
| 08/27/93*RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| |
| | |
| PSKoltay 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB | |
| | |
| '-vJ IN 93-72 September
| |
| | |
| 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection
| |
| | |
| teams concluded
| |
| | |
| that NRC actions and industry initiatives
| |
| | |
| have increased
| |
|
| |
|
| licensee awareness
| | 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB |
|
| |
|
| of the risk associated
| | '-vJ |
|
| |
|
| with shutdown and low power conditions.
| | IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that |
|
| |
|
| The inspection
| | NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the |
|
| |
|
| teams found that licensees | | risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams |
|
| |
|
| were aware of the necessity | | found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required |
|
| |
|
| for ensuring that required systems be available
| | systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup |
|
| |
|
| and of the need to maintain the capability
| | equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee |
|
| |
|
| of backup equipment | | interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied |
|
| |
|
| during an outage. However, the inspection
| | greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of |
|
| |
|
| teams found that licensee interpretations
| | industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available." |
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| of industry initiatives
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| for addressing
| | the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear |
|
| |
|
| shutdown risk varied greatly. This was demonstrated
| | Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
|
| |
|
| by the various licensee interpretations | | Original signed by |
|
| |
|
| of industry guidelines
| | Brian K.Grimes |
|
| |
|
| for declaring
| | Brian K. Grimes, Director |
|
| |
|
| equipment "available." This information
| | Division of Operating Reactor Support |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | (301) 504-1262 Attachment: |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | ===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices=== |
| | *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| | *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR |
|
| |
|
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Original signed by Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
| | JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi |
|
| |
|
| ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
| | 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/1 dJ3 (qy |
| Technical
| |
|
| |
|
| contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:
| | *RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR *C/OGCB:DORS:NRR |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
| | NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen |
|
| |
|
| | 08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 |
| *RSIB:DRIL:NRR | | *RSIB:DRIL:NRR |
|
| |
|
| *RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | PSKoltay |
|
| |
|
| JDWilcox SSanders 07/02/93 07/02/93*AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| | 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN |
|
| |
|
| DNorkin 07/02/93*C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
| | IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that |
|
| |
|
| GHMarcus/Wen
| | NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the |
|
| |
|
| 08/27/93*D/DRIL:NRR
| | risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams |
|
| |
|
| CERossi 07/1 dJ3 (qy*RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93*OGCB:DORS:NRR
| | found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required |
|
| |
|
| ===JLBirmingham===
| | systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup |
| 08/27/93*RSIB:DRIL:NRR
| |
|
| |
|
| PSKoltay 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN
| | equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee |
|
| |
|
| IN 93-72 September
| | interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied |
|
| |
|
| 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection
| | greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of |
|
| |
|
| teams concluded
| | industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available." |
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| that NRC actions and industry initiatives
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| have increased
| | the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear |
|
| |
|
| licensee awareness
| | Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
|
| |
|
| of the risk associated
| | C- |
| | Brian K. Grimes, Director |
|
| |
|
| with shutdown and low power conditions.
| | Division of Operating Reactor Support |
|
| |
|
| The inspection
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| teams found that licensees
| | Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR |
|
| |
|
| were aware of the necessity
| | (301) 504-1262 Attachment: |
|
| |
|
| for ensuring that required systems be available
| | ===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices=== |
|
| |
|
| and of the need to maintain the capability
| | KJ |
|
| |
|
| of backup equipment
| | Attachment |
|
| |
|
| during an outage. However, the inspection
| | IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
|
| |
|
| teams found that licensee interpretations
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES |
|
| |
|
| of industry initiatives | | Information Date of |
|
| |
|
| for addressing
| | Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to |
|
| |
|
| shutdown risk varied greatly. This was demonstrated
| | 93-71 Fire at Chernobyl Unit 2 09/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| by the various licensee interpretations
| | for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| of industry guidelines | | 93-70 Degradation of Boraflex 09/10/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| for declaring | | Neutron Absorber Coupons for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| equipment "available." This information
| | 93-69 Radiography Events at 09/02/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | Operating Power Reactors for nuclear power reactors |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | and all radiography |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | licensees. |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact the technical
| | 93-68 Failure of Pump Shaft 09/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| contact listed below or the appropriate
| | Coupling Caused by for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.C-Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
| | Temper Embrittlement |
|
| |
|
| ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
| | during Manufacture |
| Technical
| |
| | |
| contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:
| |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
| | |
| Notices
| |
| | |
| ===KJ Attachment===
| |
| IN 93-72 September
| |
|
| |
|
| 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
| | 92-16, Loss of Flow from the 08/23/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| NOTICES Information
| | Supp. 2 Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-71 93-70 93-69 93-68 92-16, Supp. 2 93-67 93-66 93-65 Fire at Chernobyl
| | Pump during Refueling |
|
| |
|
| Unit 2 Degradation
| | Cavity Draindown |
|
| |
|
| of Boraflex Neutron Absorber Coupons Radiography | | 93-67 Bursting of High 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| Events at Operating
| | Pressure Coolant for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| Power Reactors Failure of Pump Shaft Coupling Caused by Temper Embrittlement
| | Injection Steam Line |
|
| |
|
| during Manufacture
| | Rupture Discs Injures |
|
| |
|
| Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump during Refueling Cavity Draindown Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection
| | Plant Personnel |
|
| |
|
| Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel Switchover
| | 93-66 Switchover to Hot-Leg 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| to Hot-Leg Injection
| | Injection Following for pressurized water |
|
| |
|
| Following A Loss-of-Coolant
| | A Loss-of-Coolant reactors. |
|
| |
|
| Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection | | Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors |
|
| |
|
| Bypassed 09/13/93 09/10/93 09/02/93 09/01/93 08/23/93 08/16/93 08/16/93 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all radiography
| | 93-65 Reactor Trips Caused 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs |
|
| |
|
| licensees.
| | by Breaker Testing for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
| | with Fault Protection |
|
| |
|
| water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
| | Bypassed |
|
| |
|
| License CP = Construction | | OL = Operating License |
|
| |
|
| Permit}} | | CP = Construction Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team InspectionsML031070092 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Issue date: |
09/14/1993 |
---|
From: |
Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-93-072, NUDOCS 9309090243 |
Download: ML031070092 (8) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
Ku
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT PILOT TEAM INSPECTIONS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to inform addressees of observations from recent shutdown risk and
outage management pilot team inspections. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Background
Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff
to be increasingly concerned about plant safety during shutdown operations.
The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor
coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted the fact that
operation of a pressurized-water reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system
(RCS) inventory is a particularly sensitive condition. Based on its review of
that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat
Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested that licensees address certain
generic deficiencies to improve safety during operations with a reduced RCS
inventory. More recently, Incident Investigation Team report, NUREG-1410,
"Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop
Operations at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized the need for
risk management of shutdown operations. Discussions with foreign regulatory
organizations support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency for
shutdown operations may be a substantial fraction of the total core-damage
frequency.
Description of Circumstances
Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted five pilot team
inspections to assess the effectiveness of industry initiatives for improving
shutdown safety. The inspections were performed at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection Report (IR)50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear
9309090243
- U 1?-.crn-9
3 .
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Generating Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201; 50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station
(IR 50-298/93-201). Approximately one week of each inspection focused on
licensee pre-outage planning and control processes and 8 to 10 days focused on
licensee implementation of the outage.
In the pre-outage portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated the
following: (1) management involvement in and oversight of the outage planning
process, (2) planning and scheduling of outage activities, especially the
relationships between significant work activities and the availability of
electrical power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system
RCS inventory and containment integrity, (3) the process for developing
individual work packages to ensure coordination with other activities, and (4)
operator response procedures, contingency plans and training for mitigation of
loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory and loss of
electrical power sources during shutdown conditions.
The inspectors walked through procedures related to shutdown safety to
determine if the specified activities could be accomplished in the allotted
time frames and to verify that the procedures could be implemented considering
probable equipment availability. The inspectors reviewed training records on
outage procedures to determine if the training was adequate and that, when
appropriate, additional training was provided as the procedures were revised.
The inspectors also evaluated the probable effects of environmental conditions
such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance of activities that
would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events.
In the implementation portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated:
(1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships and
communication channels between operations, maintenance and other plant support
personnel, (3) the conduct of operations personnel both inside and outside of
the control room regarding awareness of plant status, control of plant
evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the
completeness and effectiveness of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance and
modification work was performed in accordance with current written and
approved procedures and appropriate post-maintenance testing was required and
performed, and (6) the adequacy of management involvement and oversight of the
conduct of the outage as it progressed.
Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency plant
lighting, configuration control, radiological controls, equipment labeling and
status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee
control of contractor work including contractor training and qualifications.
Discussion
In general, the inspectors found that licensees had instituted programmatic
changes developed from guidance contained in a Nuclear Management and
Resources Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to
TV
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 individual examples of
Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors found the inspectors
licensee failure to follow procedures but more importantly assessment for
identified two areas of more general concern: (1) risk
and (2)
pre-outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes, availability.
methodologies for equipment
implementation of defense-in-depth Specific details of
A general discussion of these areas is provided below.
above.
the findings are contained in the inspection reports referenced
and Schedule Changes
Risk Assessment for Pre-Outage Planning, Emergent Work
controls to
The inspectors found that licensees used various programmatic emergent work and
assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, outage planning
schedule changes. Assessment methodologies used for initial availability to
ranged from following minimum guidelines for equipment outage activities.
performing a probabilistic risk assessment of scheduled the licensee in
The inspection team found that the risk assessment aided during the sched led
identifying activities that would be subject to high risk became less
outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment schedule occurreda
valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage
inspectors found that
In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the effect of \
three of the plants had a proceduralized process to assess the two plants relied
other
emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. Theoperators to adjust the
on a functional review by planners, schedulers, and
schedule appropriately to reduce risk.
status boards or
The inspectors found that all of the plants maintained in tracking the
checklists in the control room to assist the operators
potential
configuration status of plant systems and to help identify
risk-significant activities.
Implementation of Defense-in-Depth for Equipment Availability
of defense-in-depth
The inspection teams found that licensee implementation industry guidelines for
for equipment availability was inconsistent. Although
that the criteria
declaring equipment "available" exist, the inspectors found of safety
an appropriate margin
for declaring equipment needed to ensure declaring that
"available" varied from licensee to licensee. For example, include ensuring that support systems
equipment was "available" did not always conditioning) were also
(e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation and air
had been performed, equipment was
available. At times, after maintenance functional
listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance considered to be
test. The inspectors also found that some equipment was
as removal of clearances or realignment
"available" even though actions, such perform its function.
of valves, would be required before the equipment could
the team inspectors
In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants restrictions
found examples of failures to comply with technical specification
to exceed overtime limits was
on overtime work in that management approval
inadequately documented.
K-,
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
RSIB:DRIL:NRR RSIB:DRIL:NRR AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C70MO:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham iGHMarcus BKGrimes
08/10/93 08 /1/ 93 J9 PT
- S/Al/93 09/ /93 RSIB
- DRIL:NRR
PSKoltay
07/06/93
- IN 93-xx
September xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93
- RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR > C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen BKGrimes
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 09/ /93
PSKoltay
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB
'-vJ
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available."
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Original signed by
Brian K.Grimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/1 dJ3 (qy
- RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR *C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93
PSKoltay
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available."
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
C-
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
KJ
Attachment
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
93-71 Fire at Chernobyl Unit 2 09/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
93-70 Degradation of Boraflex 09/10/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Neutron Absorber Coupons for nuclear power reactors.
93-69 Radiography Events at 09/02/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Operating Power Reactors for nuclear power reactors
and all radiography
licensees.
93-68 Failure of Pump Shaft 09/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Coupling Caused by for nuclear power reactors.
Temper Embrittlement
during Manufacture
92-16, Loss of Flow from the 08/23/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 2 Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors.
Pump during Refueling
Cavity Draindown
93-67 Bursting of High 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Pressure Coolant for nuclear power reactors.
Injection Steam Line
Rupture Discs Injures
Plant Personnel
93-66 Switchover to Hot-Leg 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Injection Following for pressurized water
A Loss-of-Coolant reactors.
Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors
93-65 Reactor Trips Caused 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
by Breaker Testing for nuclear power reactors.
with Fault Protection
Bypassed
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1993-01, Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment Manufactured by Liberty Technologies (4 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-02, Malfunction of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve (4 January 1993, Topic: Loop seal)
- Information Notice 1993-04, Investigation and Reporting of Misadministrations by the Radiation Safety Officer (7 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-05, Locking of Radiography Exposure Devices (14 January 1993, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1993-06, Potential Bypass Leakage Paths Around Filters Installed in Ventilation Systems (22 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-07, Classification of Transportation Emergencies (1 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-08, Failure of Residual Heat Removal Pump Bearings Due to High Thrust Loading (1 February 1993, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1993-09, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment on Westinghouse Model DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-10, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-11, Single Failure Vulnerability of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (4 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-12, Off-Gassing in Auxiliary Feedwater System Raw Water Sources (11 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-13, Undetected Modification of Flow Characteristics in High Pressure Safety Injection System (16 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-14, Clarification of 10 CFR 40.22, Small Quantities of Source Material (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-15, Failure to Verify the Continuity of Shunt Trip Attachment Contacts in Manual Safety Injection and Reactor Trip Switches (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-16, Failures of Not-Locking Devices in Check Valves (19 February 1993, Topic: Anchor Darling, Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1993-17, Safety Systems Response to Loss of Coolant and Loss of Offsite Power (25 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1993-18, Portable Moisture-Density Gauge User Responsibilities During Field Operations (10 March 1993, Topic: Moisture Density Gauge, Moisture-Density Gauge, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1993-19, Slab Hopper Bulging (17 March 1993, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1993-20, Thermal Fatigue Cracking of Feedwater Piping to Steam Generators (24 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-21, Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs (25 March 1993, Topic: Weld Overlay)
- Information Notice 1993-22, Tripping of Klockner-Moeller Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Due to Support Lever Failure (26 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-23, Weschler Instruments Model 252 Switchboard Meters (31 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-24, Distribution of Revision 7 of NUREG-1021, Operation Licensing Examiner Standards (31 March 1993, Topic: Job Performance Measure)
- Information Notice 1993-25, Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation (1 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-26, Grease Soldification Causes Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close (31 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1993-27, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization (8 April 1993, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1993-28, Failure to Consider Loss of DC Bus in the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation May Lead to Nonconservative Analysis (9 April 1993, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1993-29, Problems with the Use of Unshielded Test Leads in Reactor Protection System Circuitry (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-30, NRC Requirements for Evaluation of Wipe Test Results; Calibration of Count Rate Survey Instruments (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-31, Training of Nurses Responsible for the Care of Patients with Brachytherapy Implants (13 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-32, Nonconservative Inputs for Boron Dilution Events Analysis (21 April 1993, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class Ie Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-34, Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to a Combination of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment (6 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-35, Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events (12 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-36, Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadministrations (7 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-37, Eyebolts with Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers (19 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-38, Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (24 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams From Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams from Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-40, Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material (26 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1993-41, One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems (28 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1993-42, Failure of Anti-Rotation Keys in Motor-Operated Valves Manufactured by Yelan (9 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-43, Use of Inappropriate Lubrication Oils in Satety-Related Applications (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-44, Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient (15 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-45, Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance (16 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-46, Potential Problem with Westinghouse Rod Control System and Inadvertent Withdrawal of Single Rod Control Cluster Assembly (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-47, Unrecognized Loss of Control Room Annunciators (18 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-48, Failure of Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater Pump to Trip Because of Contaminated Oil (6 July 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-49, Improper Integration of Software Into Operating Practices (8 July 1993)
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