ML17228B376

Proposed Tech Specs Rectifying Discrepancy for Each St Lucie Unit & Providing Assurance That Admin Controls for Hpsip Remain Effective in Lower Operational Modes

ML17228B376
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	01/04/1996
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17228B375	List: ML17228B374 ML17228B376
References
NUDOCS 9601160240
Download: ML17228B376 (11)

Text

St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments ECCS SUBSYSTEMS SHUTDOWN C ENT 3 STo LUCZE UNIT 1 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES Page 3/4 5-7 Page B 3/4 5-1

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.BlERGENCY CORE COOLING STEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T < 325'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

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a. In MODES 3* and 4 , one ECCS subsystem composed of one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump and one OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.

b. Prior to decreasing the reactor coolant system temperature below 270'F a maximum of only one high pressure safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE with its asiociated header stop valve open.

c. Prior to decreasing the reactor coolant system temperature below 236'F.all high pressure safety injection pumps shall'e disabled and their associated header stop valves closed except as allowed by Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3.

APPLICABILITY: %89 MODES 3* and 4.

'MODES 5 and 6 when the Pressurizer manvay cover ACTION: is in place and the reactor vessel head is on.

a. With no ECCS subsystems OPERABLE in MODES 3* and 4 , immediately restore one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 20 hours.

b. With RCS temperature below 270'F and with more than the allowed high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or injection valves and header isolation valves open, immediately disable the high pressure safety injection pump(s) or close the header isolation valves.

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 The high pressure safety injection pumps shill be verified inoperable and the associated header stop valves closed prior to decreasing below the above specified Reactor Coolant System temperature and once per month when the Reactor Coolant System is at refueling temperatures.

• With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.

PREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM cold leg temperature above 250'F.

ST. LUG IE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. gg,$ g, gg~

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures hat a sufficient volume of borated water will be imnediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling echanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

I The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable safety injection tank minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event ccurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank hich may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

/4.5.2 and 3 4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems nsures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be avail-ble in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through ny single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunc-tion with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation ode during the accident recovery period.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of ach component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the ccident analyses are met'and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The limitations on HPSI pump operability when the RCS temperature is < 270'F and < 236'F, and the associated Surveillance Requirements provide additional administrative assurance that the pressure/temperature limits (Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b) will not be exceeded during a mass addition transient mitigated by a single PORV.

,'A limit on the maximum number of operable HPSI pumps is not necessary when the,

,pressurizer manway cover or the reactor vessel head is removed.

R T. LUCIE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. W,y.

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St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments ECCS SUBSYSTEMS SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT 4 ST LUCZE UNIT 2 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES Page 3/4 5-7 Page B 3/4 5-2

F EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T LESS THAN 325 F av LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and

b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal.

3" and 4¹. A APPLICABILITY: MODES hCT1OM.pooznoz.e 5 shs11 remain applicah1e in MoDES 5ans 6 .shen She pre.ssurizer I

'malay cover is in place and the reactor vessels head is on.

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4. 5. 2.

With pressurizer pressure less than 1750 psia.

¹One HPSI shall be rendered inoperable prior to entering MODE 5.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No ~

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=!ERG'CY CORE ""OLIl<G SYST=;!S BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS Continued)

In Mode 3 xith RCS pressure < 1750 psia and in Mode 4, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requireients.

The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provided this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to greater than or equal to 7.0.

The requirement for one high pressure safety injection pump to be rendered inoperable prior to entering MODE 5, although the analysis supports actuation of safety injection in a water solid RCS with pressurizer heaters energized, provides additional administrative assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or SOCRV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum,. the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the"piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RMT ~ater provides assurance that the stored TSP will .dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures.

3/4. 5.4 REFUELING MATER TANK The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Mater Tank (RMT) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RMT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RMT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

A limit on the max mum number of operable HPSI pumps is not necessary when he pressurizer manway cover or the reactor vessel head is removed.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No&6;

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