Information Notice 1993-27, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 04/08/1993
| issue date = 04/08/1993
| title = Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization
| title = Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization
| author name = Grimes B K
| author name = Grimes B
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  

Revision as of 05:24, 14 July 2019

Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization
ML031080007
Person / Time
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Issue date: 04/08/1993
From: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-027, NUDOCS 9304020319
Download: ML031080007 (8)


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 8, 1993 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 93-27: LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION

INACCURACIES

OBSERVED DURING NORMAL PLANT DEPRESSURIZATION

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to inaccuracies

in reactor vessel level indication

that occurred during a normal depressurization

of the reactor coolant system at the Washington

Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WNP-2) and to the fact that errors in level indication

may result in a failure to automatically

isolate the residual heat removal (RHR) system under certain conditions.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background

As discussed

in NRC Information

Notice 92-54, "Level Instrumentation

Inaccuracies

Caused by Rapid Depressurization," and Generic Letter 92-04,"Resolution

of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation

in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)," noncondensible

gas may become dissolved

in the reference

leg of water level instrumentation

and lead to false indications

of high level after a rapid depressurization

event.Reactor vessel level indication

signals are important

because these signals are used for actuating

automatic

safety systems and for guidance to operators during and after an event. While Information

Notice 92-54 dealt with potential

consequences

of rapid system depressurization, this information

notice discusses

level indication

errors that may occur during normal plant cooldown and depressurization.

Description

of Circumstances

On January 21, i993, during a plant cooldown following

a reactor scram at WNP-2, "notching" of the level indication

was observed on at least two of four channels of the reactor vessel narrow range level instrumentation. "Notching is a momentary

increase in indicated

water level. This increase occurs when a gas bubble moves through a vertical portion of the reference

leg and causes a temporary

decrease in the static head in the reference

leg. The notching at 9304020319 PD9Z X 3 MoC J 3pzu 13 oqat P- o'itv k

IN 93-27 April 8, 1993 WNP-2 was first observed on channel NC" at a pressure of approximately

827 kPa (120 psig]. Channel IBS experienced

notching starting at approximately

350 kPa [50 psig]. At these pressures, the level error was on the order of 10 to 18 centimeters

(4 to 7 inches] and persisted

for approximately

one minute.Beginning

at a pressure of approximately

240 kPa [35 psig], the level indication

from channel IC' became erratic and, as the plant continued

to depressurize, an 81-centimeter

(32-inch]

level indication

error occurred.This depressurization

was coincident

with the initiation

of the shutdown cooling system. The 81-centimeter

[32-inch]

level error was sustained

and was gradually

recovered

over a period of two hours. The licensee postulated

that this large error in level indication

was caused by gas released in the reference

leg displacing

approximately

40 percent of the water volume. The licensee also postulated

that the slow recovery of correct level indication

was a result of the time needed for steam to condense in the condensate

chamber and refill the reference

leg. The licensee inspected

the IC" reference

leg and discovered

leakage through reference

leg fittings.

This leakage may have been a contributing

factor for an increased

accumulation

of dissolved

noncondensible

gas in that reference

leg.The licensee determined

that the type of errors observed in level indication

during this event could result in a failure to automatically

isolate a leak in the RHR system during shutdown cooling. The design basis for WNP-2 includes a postulated

leak in the RHR system piping outside containment

while the plant Is in the shutdown cooling mode. For this event, the shutdown cooling suctlon valves are assumed to automatically

isolate on a low reactor vessel water level signal to mitigate the consequences

of the event. For the January 21, 1993 plant cooldown, the licensee concluded

that, with the observed errors in level indication, the shutdown cooling suction valves may not have automatically

isolated the RHR system on low reactor vessel water level as;designed.

The licensee has implemented

compensatory

measures for future plant cooldowns

to ensure that a leak that occurs in the RHR system during shutdown cooling operation

would be isolated promptly.

These measures include touring the associated

RHR pump room hourly during shutdown cooling and backfilling

the water level instrument

reference

legs after entry into mode 3 (hot shutdown).

The licensee is also evaluating

measures to minimize leakage from the IC' reference

leg.Discussion

The event described

above is different

than events previously

reported because of the large magnitude

and sustained

duration (as opposed to momentary notching)

of the level error that occurred during normal plant cooldown.

A large sustained

level error is of concern because of the potential

for complicating

long-term

operator actions. In addition, the scenario of a postulated

leak in the RHR system evaluated

by WNP-2 suggests that some safety systems may not automatically

actuate should an event occur while the reactor is in a reduced pressure condition.

Generic Letter 92-04 requested, in part, that licensees

determine

the impact of potential

level indication

errors on

IN 93-27 April 8, 1993 automatic

safety system response during licensing

basis transients

and accidents.

The information

in this notice indicates

that sustained

level instrument

inaccuracies

can occur during a normal reactor depressurization.

Therefore, events occurring

during low pressure conditions

may also be complicated

by level indication

errors.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Amy Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Attachnent

IN 93-27 April 8, 1993 Pge I of I ME0 a-dc LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED HRC INFORMATION

NOTICES inroruauon

Inforuti0n

Notice No.93-26)93-25 93-24 93-23 93-22 93-21 Subject Grease Solidification

Causes Molded Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close Electrical

fenetration

Assembly Degradation

Distribution

of Revision 7 of NUREG-1021,*Operator

Licensing Examiner Standards'

Veschler Instruments

Model 252 Switchboard

Meters Tripping of Ilockner-toeller Molded-Case

Circuit Breakers due to Support Level Failure Sumary of NRC Staff Observations

Compiled'during Engineering

Audits or Inspections

of Licen-see Erosion/Corrosion

Programs Thermal Fatigue Cracking of Feedwater

Piping to Stem Generators

Slab Hopper Bulging Portable Moisture-Density

Gauge User Responsibilities

during Field Operations

u te OT Issuance Issued to 04/07/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.04/01/93 All holders of OLs or Cps for nuclear power reactors.03/31/93 All holders of operator and senior operator licenses at nuclear power reactors.03/31/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.03/26/93 All holders of Ots or CPs for nuclear power reactors.03/25/93 All holders of Ots or CPs for light water nuclear power reactors.93-20)93-19 93-18 03/24/93 All holdefs of Os or CPs for PFRs supplied by Westinghouse

or Combustion

Engineering.

03/17/92 All nuclear fuel cycle licensees.

03/10/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Couuission

licensees

that possess moisture-density

gauges.2° _clo co o 001 c 2 o II 2 u z J qq:3 0 0 a.LwU):)4 aL.OL -Operating

License CP

  • Construction

Permit

IN 93-27 April 8, 1993 automatic

safety system response during licensing

basis transients

and accidents.

The information

in this notice indicates

that sustained

level instrument

inaccuracies

can occur during a normal reactor depressurization.

Therefore, events occurring

during low pressure conditions

may also be complicated

by level indication

errors.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Original signed by Brian K. Grime: Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Amy Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

  • OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

04/01/93*SRXB:DSSA:NRR

ACubbage 03/19/93*C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

GHMarcus 04/01/93*C/SRXB:DSSA:NRR

RJones 03/26/93*TECH:ED RSanders 03/18/93*D/DSSA:NRR

AThadani 03/26/93 Document name: 93-27.IN

IN 93-XX March XX, 1993 errors on automatic

safety system response during licensing

basis transients

and accidents.

The information

in this notice indicates

that sustained

level instrument

inaccuracies

can occur during a normal reactor depressurization.

Therefore, events occurring

during low pressure conditions

may also be complicated

by level indication

errors.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact (one of) the technical

contact(s)

listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Amy Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*See previous c OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

03"' 3 gY.Z-*SRXB:DSSA:NRR

ACubbage 03/19/93 concurrence

C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

GHMarcusas

°f 1 /93C tW*C/SRXB:DSSA:NRR

RJones 03/26/93 D/DORS:NRR

BKGrimesrMk

03/ /931'*D/DSSA:NRR

AThadani 03/26/93*TECH:ED RSanders 03/18/93 Document name: RVLEVEL.IN

\ I This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

regarding

the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Amy Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document name: RVLEVEL.IN

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OGCB:DORS:NRR

C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

D/DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

GHMarcus BKGrimes 03//903/ 93 03 /93*SRXB:DSSA:NRR

B:DSSA:NR

& D/DSSA:NR ACubbage RJ nes Thadani 03/ /93 0 t;/ /93 03 X/931*TECHED:ADM

RSanders 03/ /93 IN 93-XX March XX, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

regarding

the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Amy Cubbage, NRR (301) 504-2875 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document name: INFONOT2.RVL

OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

03/ /93 C/OGCB: DORS:NRR GHMarcus 03/ /93 0/DORS:NRR

BKGrimes 03/ /93 TECHED LADM JMain 03/8 /93 SRXB:DSSA~:NlRR

ACubbagqAtf-~

03/lcj/93 C/SRXB:DSSA:NRR

RJones 03/ /93 D/DSSA:NRR

AThadani 03/ /93