IR 05000317/2006003

IR 05000317-06-003 and IR 05000318-06-003 on 04/01/06-06/30/06 for Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2; Surveillance Testing, Public Radiation Safety

ML062060024
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	07/21/2006
From:	McDermott B J Reactor Projects Branch 1
To:	Spina J A Constellation Generation Group
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-06-003
Download: ML062060024 (39)

Text

July 21, 2006

Mr. James A. Spina, Vice President Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.

Constellation Generation Group, LLC

1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway

Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2006003 AND 05000318/2006003

Dear Mr. Spina:

On June 30, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report

documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 12, 2006, with you and other

members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) that were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low

safety significance and because these issues were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should

provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of

Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and

the NRC Resident Inspector at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Pub licly Available Records (PARS) component of 2 NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA Samuel L. Hansell For/

Brian McDermott, Chief Projects Branch 1

Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-317, 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53, DPR-69

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000317/2006003 and 05000318/2006003

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information 3 cc w/encl:

M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation

J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners

C. W. Fleming, Senior Counsel, Constellation Generation Group, LLC

Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters

R. McLean, Manager, Nuclear Programs

K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel

State of Maryland (2)

4 Distribution w/encl:

S. Collins, RA

M. Dapas, DRA

B. Sosa, RI OEDO

R. Laufer, NRR

P. Milano, PM, NRR

R. Guzman, PM, NRR (Backup)

B. McDermott, DRP

A. Burritt, DRP

J. Giessner, DRP, Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)

M. Davis, Resident Inspector

C. Newgent - Resident OA

ROP Reports

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)SUNSI Review Complete: SLH (Reviewer's Initials

)DOCUMENT NAME: C:\MyFiles\Copies\CC IR 2006-003.wpd After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:

" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRPRI/DRPRI/DRPNAMEABurrittMDavis/SLH FORBMcDermott/SLH FORDATE07/21 /0607/21/0607/ 21 /06 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos.DPR-53, DPR-69 Report Nos.05000317/2006003 and 05000318/2006003 Licensee:Constellation Generation Group, LLC Facility:Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:Lusby, MD Dates:April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006 Inspectors:Mark A. Giles, Senior Resident Inspector Marlone Davis, Resident Inspector

John R. McFadden, Health Physicist

Nancy T. McNamara, EP Inspector

Anne DeFrancisco, Reactor Inspector

Jennifer Bobiak, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Brian McDermott, Chief Projects Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects ii Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000317/2006-003, 05000318/2006-003; 04/01/06 - 06/30/06; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Surveillance Testing, Public Radiation Safety.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by reactor and emergency preparedness inspectors and a health physicist. The inspection identified two Green findings which were determined to be non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,

Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination

Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor

Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.

Cornerstone: Mitigating System

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, because Constellation did not establish new reference values or reconfirm the previous reference values following maintenance that affected hydraulic or mechanical parameters on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and emergency core cooling system (ECCS)pumps as required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM)

Code for inservice testing. Constellation entered this issue into their corrective action program as IRE-014-764. The planned corrective action include a review of maintenance and IST data to determine whether new reference values are needed or reconfirm existing reference values for the AFW and ECCS pumps.

This finding is more than minor because the same issue affected a number of safety-related pumps tested, the issue was repetitive and if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern. The finding has a very low safety significance because the condition did not result in an actual failure of the AFW and ECCS pumps or result in systems being declared inoperable for greater than their allowed Technical Specification outage time. A contributing cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) because Constellation did not periodically trend and assess information to identify programmatic and common cause problems. (Section 1R22)

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 for failure to make surveys of the radioactivity in a "sink hole" to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1) regarding the total effective dose equivalent limit for individual members of the public from licensed operations, specifically regarding assessing dose for batch releases of liquid radioactive waste and assessing iv annual dose. Constellation entered this issue into their corrective action program as IRE-010-005. Constellation created a detailed action plan for this issue to find the leaking component, fix the leaking component, determine the extent of contamination, map the plume, and evaluate the need for remediation.

This violation is more than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of maintaining a program and process to estimate offsite dose due to abnormal releases and to record and report on such releases and because it affected the Radiation Safety/Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone's objective to ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. The violation is of very low significance because, while it did impair Constellation's ability to assess the timing of dose consequence and the accuracy of the batch and annual effluent release dose records and reports due to the large difference in transit times for the permitted and non-permitted discharge pathways to the bay, Constellation did account for all released radioactivity and did assess the cumulative doses from their effluent releases. Additionally, the unanalyzed non-permitted pathway (i.e.,

via groundwater to the bay) did not impact private property, and the assessed doses did not exceed the dose values in Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. (Section 4OA2.4)

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On April 14, 2006, the unit returned to full power operation (100 percent) and remained unchanged throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and remained unchanged until May 20 when power was reduced to 85 percent for main turbine control valve testing. Following

the completion of the test the unit was restored to 100 percent power and remained there the

rest of the inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q - 5 samples)

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that selected equipment trains of safety-related and risk significant systems were properly aligned. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to

determine the correct system and power alignments, as well as the required positions of

critical valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that Constellation had properly

identified and resolved equipment alignment pr oblems that could cause initiating events or potentially impact the availability of associated mitigating systems. The applicable

documents used for this inspection are located in the Attachment. The inspectors

performed a partial walkdown for the following activities.*13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator*1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) walkdown during maintenance on the 1A EDG*4.16kV service transformers during the transfer of the 4kV unit busses from their normal to alternate supply*Unit 1 service water (SRW) system equipment alignment walkdown during maintenance on the13 SRW pump breaker*21 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve battery

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2 Enclosure1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 10 samples)

Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a tour of accessible portions of the ten areas listed below to assess Constellation's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire

detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and related compensatory

measures when required. The inspectors assessed the material condition of fire

protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or

deficiencies existed which could impair the availability of that equipment. The inspectors

also reviewed administrative procedure SA-1-100, Fire Fighting, and the Fire Fighting

Strategies Manual were referenced for this inspection activity. The ten areas are as

follows:*Unit 1 main steam isolation valve room*Unit 2 main steam isolation valve room

• Unit 1 cable spreading room

• Unit 2 cable spreading room

• Unit 1 4 kV service transformers

• Unit 2 4 kV service transformers

• Unit 1 turbine building basement

• Unit 2 turbine building basement

• Unit 1 intake structure (inside)

• Unit 2 intake structure (inside)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection

(71111.06 - 2 internal flooding samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed flood protection measures associated with internal flood events.

These events were described in the Calvert Cliffs' Engineering Standard on flooding, the

Individual Plant Examination (IPE) report and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water

pumps rooms (rooms 226 and 205) which c ontain risk significant systems and components. The inspectors observed the condition of watertight doors, drain systems

and sumps, penetrations in floors and walls, and safety related instrumentation located

in these areas. In addition, the inspector reviewed operating procedures and related

internal flooding industry operating experience (OE).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

(71111.11Q - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator training scenario conducted on May 18, 2006, in order to assess operator performance and the adequacy of licensed

operators training program. The training scenario involved a condensate header rupture

that resulted in a loss of main feed event causing the operators to perform a manual reactor trip. Following the trip, equipment failures occurred ultimately resulting in a loss

of all feedwater. During this inspection, the inspectors focused on high-risk operator

actions performed during implementation of the abnormal and emergency operating

procedures, emergency plan (EP) implementation, and classification of the event.

The inspectors evaluated the clarity and formality of communications, the

implementation of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the performance of timely

control board operations and manipulations, and the oversight and direction provided by

the shift supervisor. The inspectors also reviewed simulator fidelity to evaluate the

degree of similarity to the actual control room, especially regarding recent control board

modifications.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Quarterly Review (71111.12Q - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Constellation effectiveness in performing routine maintenance activities. This review included an assessment of Constellation's practices pertaining to

the identification, scoping, and handling of degraded equipment conditions, as well as

common cause failure evaluations, and the resolution of historical equipment problems.

For those systems, structures, and components (SSC) scoped in the maintenance rule

per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability and unavailability were properly

monitored and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications were justified in light of

the reviewed degraded equipment condition. The inspectors conducted this inspection

for the following equipment issues:*Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater isolation control valves CV-4511 and CV-4512*11 condensate storage tank (CST) rupture valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

(71111.13 - 8 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Constellation's assessments concerning the risk impact of removing from service those components associated with the work items listed below.

This review primarily focused on activities determined to be risk significant within the

maintenance rule. The inspectors compared the risk assessments and risk

management actions performed by station procedure NO-1-117, "Integrated Risk

Management," to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the recommendations of

NUMARC 93-01, Revision 2, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of

Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and approved station procedures.

The inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration to actual plant conditions to

evaluate whether the assessment was accurate and comprehensive. In addition, the

inspectors assessed the adequacy of Constellation's identification and resolution of

problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities.

The inspectors reviewed the following selected work activities:*11A service water basket strainer cleaning*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)

• 21 vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve battery*13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator

• 1A emergency diesel generator for planned maintenance

• 22 switchgear Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) inspection and lubrication*23 auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance to replace the breaker hand switch

• 11 and 14 4kV busses during maintenance on the 14 4kV bus normal feeder breaker

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

5 Enclosure1R14Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events (71111.14 - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

Untrippable Control Element Assembly The inspectors assessed operator performance associated with a Unit 1 event that involved a misaligned control element assembly (CEA) while performing low power

physics testing. On April 8, 2006, at appr oximately 6:35 p.m., control room operators (CRO) began to insert regulating group 2 after testing groups 5, 4 and 3 with no position

anomalies. When regulating group 2 was inserted, the operators received a deviation

alarm in the control room. The alarm was due to regulating group 2, CEA #21, stopping

and being misaligned with the other CEA's in that group, which was greater than the

allowable technical specification deviation. At approximately 6:45 p.m., the Unit 1 CRO

entered the Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-1B, CEA Malfunction, to establish

group realignment and maintain reactivity control.

A troubleshooting plan was

developed and further reactivity controls were performed through dilution and boration of

the reactor coolant while the investigation of the misaligned CEA continued. However, the CEA did not respond to initial insertion signal and the electrical traces taken on the

drive mechanism during insertion attempts indicated abnormal responses to the lower

and upper gripper coil. This prompted the operators to declare CEA #21 untrippable.

At 10:45 p.m., the operators exited low pow er physics testing and then manually tripped the reactor. Although CEA #21 did not insert, the rest of the rods did insert to provide

adequate shutdown margin. On April 09, 2006, at approximately 1:20 a.m., Unit 1 was

in Mode 3 and the operators had exited AOP-1B.

The inspectors assessed the plant response and conditions specific to the event and evaluated the performance of licensed operators. The inspectors also reviewed control

room procedures and operator logs to determine if operators performed the appropriate

actions in accordance with their training and established station procedures.

Unit 1 Main Turbine Control Valve Oscillations The inspectors assessed operator performance associated with a Unit 1 main turbine startup after the installation of a new turbine control system. On April 11, 2006, at 2:30

a.m., Unit 1 main turbine control valves experienced high frequency valve oscillations

when the turbine reached 1800 revolutions per minute. The rapid cycling of the control

valves created excessive vibrations in the Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) piping

system. This excessive vibration was reported to the control room and the operators

immediately tripped and secured the main turbine.

When the main turbine was tripped, the vibration of the EHC piping stopped.

The inspectors assessed the plant response and conditions specific to the event, and evaluated the performance of licensed operators. The inspectors also reviewed control

room procedures and operator logs to determine if operators performed the appropriate

actions in accordance with their training and established station procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

(71111.15 - 6 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations to verify that the operability of systems important to safety were proper ly established and that affected components or systems remained capable of performing their intended safety function. The inspectors

reviewed the selected operability determinations to verify they were performed in

accordance with NO-1-106, "Functional Evaluation - Operability Determination," and

QL-2-100, "Issue Reporting and Assessment." The following operability evaluations were

reviewed:*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)*11, 12, and 13 high pressure safety injection pumps

• 12 containment spray pump overhaul following pump bearing failure

• 1. 21 control element assembly testing

• 1. 8 control element assembly testing

• 12 component cooling water heat exchanger due to saltwater pin hole leak on temperature probe

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 9 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and/or reviewed post-maintenance tests associated with the following nine work activities to verify that equipment was properly returned to service

and that appropriate testing was specified and conducted to ensure that the equipment

was operable and could perform its intended safety function following the completion of

maintenance. Post-maintenance testing activities were conducted as specified in station

procedure MN-1-101, "Control Of Maintenance Activities." Post-maintenance test results

associated with the maintenance activities listed below were reviewed.*12 containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed)*12 auxiliary feedwater pump

• 1. 21 control element assembly testing

• Unit 2 main steam safety valve lift settings test

• 13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator 7 Enclosure*1A emergency diesel generator for after planned maintenance*Unit 2 containment isolation valves

• 22 switchgear hvac inspection and lubrication

• 23 auxiliary feedwater pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

(71111.22 - 9 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the nine surveillance tests listed below associated with selected risk-significant SSCs to verify TS compliance and that test

acceptance criteria was properly specified. The inspectors also verified that proper test

conditions were established as specified in the procedures, no equipment

preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been satisfied.*STP O-8A-1, Test Of 1A DG and 11 4KV bus LOCI sequencer*STP O-073G-1, HPSI Pump Large Flow Test

• STP O-073L-1, LPSI Pump Large Flow Test

• STP O-073M-1, Containment Spray Flow Test

• STP O-029-1, Monthly CEA Partial Movement

• STP -662-1, Integrated Leak Rate Test Unit 1 Containment

• STP O-5A-1, Auxiliary Feedwater Sy stem Quarterly Surveillance Test*STP O-035-2, Safety Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Test

• STP M-3A-0, On line main steam safety valve testing

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, because Constellation did not establish new reference values or

reconfirm the previous reference values following maintenance that affected hydraulic or

mechanical parameters on the AFW and emergency core cooling pumps.

Description.

In May of 2002, the NRC granted Constellation a relief request (PR-12) to perform the inservice testing of the AFW and ECCS pumps in accordance with the 1995

Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code through the

1996 Addenda of the ASME Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code. The ASME OM

Code, Subsection ISTB, requires, in part, that when a reference value or set of reference

values that may have been affected by repair, replacement, or routine servicing of a

pump, a new reference value or set of values shall be determined or previous values

reconfirmed by an inservice test run before declaring the pump operable.

8 Enclosure The inspectors identified maintenance activities that would have affected the hydraulic or mechanical characteristics of the AFW and ECCS pumps. However, no new reference

values were established or the previous values reconfirmed before declaring the pumps

operable. For example, the 12 containment spray (CS) pump was overhauled in May of

2002 and March of 2006 with maintenance activities that affected the hydraulic (larger

impeller) and mechanical (thrust bearing) parameters respectively. Subsequent testing

performed for the 12 CS pump did not establish new reference values or validate

existing values; therefore, Constellation could not demonstrate that the pump

performance curve or the mechanical parameters did not change following maintenance

activities. Furthermore, a number of the ECCS pumps have exceeded inservice testing (IST) acceptance criteria for their surveillance test procedure. This could be contributed

to the fact that new reference values were not established or the existing values

reconfirmed after maintenance that affected the hydraulic or mechanical parameters for

their IST reference values.

Constellation entered this issue into their corrective action program as IRE-014-764.

Additionally, to assess the extent of condition, Constellation conducted a more detailed

review of the maintenance performed prior to May 2002 on all the AFW and ECCS

pumps. This review will determine whether or not the maintenance activities performed

required a new reference value to be developed or if the existing values were valid.

Analysis.

The inspectors concluded that a performance deficiency existed because Constellation did not establish new reference values or reconfirm the previous reference

values following maintenance that affected hydraulic or mechanical parameters on the

AFW and ECCS pumps. The finding is more than minor because the same issue

affected a number of pumps tested, the issue was repetitive and if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern due to the potential to not detect pump degradation which could impact pump operability. This finding has a very low safety significance because the conditions did not result in an actual failure of the AFW

and ECCS pumps or result in systems being declared inoperable for greater than their

allowed Technical Specification outage time. The planned corrective actions included a

review of maintenance and IST data to determine whether new reference values are

needed or if there is a need to reconfirm existing reference values for the AFW and

ECCS pumps. The inspectors identified that a contributing cause of this finding was

related to the cross-cutting aspect of PI&R because Constellation did not periodically

trend and assess information to identify programmatic and common cause problems.

Enforcement.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.55a, Codes and Standards, requires, in part, that testing of safety related pumps meet the

requirements of the ASME OM Code. The ASME Code, Subsection ISTB, states that

when a reference value or set of reference values that may have been affected by

repair, replacement, or routine servicing of a pump, a new reference value or set of

values shall be determined or previous values reconfirmed by an inservice test run

before declaring the pump operable. Contrary to the above, Constellation did not

establish new vibration or hydraulic reference values or reconfirm the previous values

were acceptable following maintenance that affected the reference values of the AFW

and ECCS pumps. This violation is documented in Constellation's corrective action 9 Enclosure program as IRE-014-764 and is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000317 and 318/2006003-01, Failure to establish appropriate reference values or reconfirm previous values for AFW and ECCS pumps.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness (EP)1EP4Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan (E-Plan) Changes (71114.04 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period of September 2005 - February 2006, the NRC received changes made to Constellation Nuclear's E-Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Constellation

Nuclear determined the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the E-Plan and

also that the E-Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. A selected sample of E-Plan changes were reviewed in-

office by the inspector. This review does not constitute approval of the changes and, as

such, the changes and the associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews are subject to future

NRC inspection. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection

Procedure 71114, Attachment 4.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. 1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample )

Simulator Exercises

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed control room simulator training exercises conducted on May 18, 2006, to assess licensed operators' performance in the area of emergency

preparedness. This training exercise focused on equipment failures and operator

challenges that would typically exist dur ing an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) and total loss of feedwater event. The required procedural transitions and

associated event classification was observed and evaluated by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

10 Enclosure2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)2OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed radiological work activities and practices and procedural implementation during observations and tours of the facilities and inspected procedures, records, and other program documents to ev aluate the effectiveness of Constellation's access controls to radiologically significant areas. This inspection activity represents the

completion of seven

(7) samples relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection procedure sections 02.02.d thru f, 02.03.a, and 02.05.a thru c) and

partially fulfills the annual inspection requirements.

Plant Walk Downs and RWP Reviews (02.02.d, e, and f)

During this inspection and the previous 2006 inspection during the Unit 1 refueling outage the inspector reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs) for airborne radioactivity

areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures of greater than

50 millirems Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE). For these selected

airborne radioactive material areas the inspector examined the performance of controls, such as use of containments, ventilation sy stems, and procedural processes. Also, the inspector discussed with radiation protection personnel their experience with uptakes of

radioactive material since the last inspection. The inspector reviewed and assessed the

adequacy of Constellation's internal dose assessment for the highest actual internal

exposure which was less than 50 millirems CEDE. The inspection also examined Constellation's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated

materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage pools.

PI&R (02.03.a)

The inspector discussed with Constellation their schedule for self-assessments and audits. The inspector reviewed one recent self-assessment on shutdown source term

management. The inspector also examined the plan for a corporate radiological release

audit which was scheduled for Calvert Cliffs in the near future. The inspector's review of

condition reports in the corrective action program indicated that problems in the

occupational radiation safety area were being identified.

High Risk Significant, High Dose Area and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls (02.05.a, b, and c)

The inspector met with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) and discussed high-dose-rate (HDR) high radiation areas and VHRA's and the procedures and controls for

these areas. The inspector did not identify any significant procedural changes since the 11 Enclosure last inspection which would substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection. The inspector discussed with several first-line Health Physics (HP)

supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become

VHRA's during certain plant operations. Also, during tours inside the radiologically

controlled area during this and the previous inspection, the inspector verified adequate

posting and locking of selected entrances to HDR high radiation areas and VHRA's.

Related Activities The inspector performed a selective examinati on of documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) to evaluate the adequacy of radiological controls.

The review in this area was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 19.12, 10 CFR 20 (Subparts D, F, G, H, I, and J), Technical Specifications, and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2OS2As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 6 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the effectiveness of Constellation's program to maintain occupational radiation exposure ALARA. This inspection activity represents the

completion of six

(6) samples relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection procedure

sections 02.01.a, c, and d, 02.02.c, and 02.03.a and b) and partially fulfills the biennial

inspection requirements.

Inspection Planning (02.01.a, c, and d)

The inspector reviewed pertinent information regarding plant collective exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing or planned activities in order to assess current

performance and exposure challenges. The inspector determined the plant's current

3-year rolling average collective exposure.

The inspector examined the source term measurements which Constellation had collected for trending purposes. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the site specific procedures associated with maintaining

occupational exposures ALARA. These procedures covered the processes used to

estimate and track work activity specific exposures.

Radiological Work Planning (02.02.c)

The inspector compared selected person-rem results achieved during the recent Unit 1 refueling outage with the estimated doses established in Constellation's ALARA

planning for these work activities. The inspector selected the refueling outage tasks with

the highest person-rem results and/or with the largest inconsistencies between intended 12 Enclosure and actual work activity doses. For the selected jobs the inspector reviewed documentation and discussed the results with ALARA personnel to determine the

reasons for the inconsistencies.

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (02.03.a and b)

The inspector reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate. Also, the inspector discussed Constellation's methodology for

estimating work-activity-specific exposures and the intended dose outcomes with

ALARA personnel. The inspector evaluated both the dose rate and man-hour estimates

for reasonable accuracy. The inspector also reviewed Constellation's method for

adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope

or emergent work are encountered in order to determine if adjustments to estimated

exposure (intended dose) were based on sound radiation protection and ALARA

principles.

Related Activities The inspector performed a selective examinati on of documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and for adequacy of control of

radiation exposure.

The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.1101 (Radiation protection programs), 10 CFR 20.1701 (Use of process or other engineering

controls) and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the program for health physics instrumentation and protective equipment to determine the accuracy and operability of the instrumentation and

equipment. This inspection activity represents the completion of three

(3) samples

relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection procedure sections 02.04.a and 02.06.a and b) and partially fulfills the

biennial inspection requirements.

13 Enclosure PI&R (02.04.a)

The review of internal exposures was accomplished during the inspection activity documented in Section 2OS1 (02.02.e).

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Maintenance and User Training (02.06.a and b)

The inspector reviewed the status and surveillance records of SCBA staged and ready for use in the plant. Also, the inspector examined Constellation's capability for refilling

and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support

center during emergency conditions. The inspector conducted an examination of records

and had discussions with cognizant personnel to determine that control room operators

and other emergency response and radiation protection personnel (assigned in-plant search and rescue duties or as required by Emergency Operating

Procedures (EOP) or the EP) were trained and qualified in the use of SCBA (including air bottle change-out). The inspector also determined that personnel assigned

to refill bottles were trained and qualified for that task. The inspector determined that

only personnel who possessed manufacturer-certified training/qualifications were

allowed to perform maintenance and repairs on SCBA components vital to the unit's

function. The inspector reviewed selected records for the testing and maintenance of

these SCBA components and checked for the required, periodic hydrostatic testing and

marking for a number of air bottles.

Related Activities The inspector performed a selective examinati on of documents (as listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section) for regulatory compliance and adequacy.

The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.1501, 10 CFR 20 Subpart H, Technical Specifications (TS), and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)40A1Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 8 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Constellation's program to gather, evaluate and report information on the following four performance indicators (PIs). The inspectors used the

guidance provided in NEI 99-02, Revision 3, "Regulatory Assessment Performance

Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy of Constellation's collection and reporting of

PI data for the period April 2005 through March 2006.

The inspectors reviewed licensee 14 Enclosure event reports (LERs), monthly operating reports, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) power history charts, NRC inspection reports, and operator narrative logs. Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical HoursUnit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat RemovalUnit 1 and 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical HoursUnit 1 and 2 Safety System Functional Failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Corrective Action Review by Resident Inspectors

a. Inspection Scope

Continuous Review The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Constellation's corrective action program as required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and

Resolution of Problems." The review facilitated the identification of potentially repetitive

equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up inspection. It was

accomplished by reviewing each issue report and attending screening meetings, and

accessing Constellation's computerized database.

.2 Semi-Annual PI&R Review

The inspectors performed an in-depth, semi-annual, PI&R review of Constellation documents written from January 2006 through June 2006 to verify that Constellation is

identifying issues at the appropriate threshold, entering them into the corrective action

program, and ensuring that there are no significant adverse trends outside of the

corrective action program which would indicate the existence of a more significant safety

issue. The inspectors reviewed Constellation PIs, self-assessment reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, corrective action reports, and system health reports and

compared the results of the review with results reported in the NRC baseline inspection

program. Additionally, the inspectors eval uated the reports against the requirements of the Constellation Nuclear's CAP as delineated in QL-2, "Self-Assessment/Corrective

Action Program."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..3Identification and Resolution of Problems - Occupational Radiation Safety (71121.01,

.02 , and .03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector selected three issues identified in the CAP for review (i.e., Issue Report (IR) Nos. IRE-012-638, -012-716, and -013-639). The issues were

associated with radiography boundaries, intermittent tele-dosimetry contact, and the

year-end collective radiation exposure goal, respectively. The documented reports for the issues were reviewed to determine whether the full extent of the issues was

identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions

were specified and prioritized.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Annual sample review - Elevated Levels of Tritium Found in #11 Piezometer Tube

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the issue of elevated levels of tritium found in a groundwater sample collected on Calvert Cliffs site property for a detailed review. Routine annual

groundwater samples from four piezometer tubes (40 to 50 feet deep) were collected on

December 3, 2005. Three of the four samples did not indicate any radioactivity.

Samples from #11 piezometer tube, however, indicated 1800 picocuries per liter (pCi/l)

of tritium in the groundwater. No gamma-emitting radioactivity was detected in any

samples. The previous annual samples for these four tubes did not identify any plant-

related radioactivity. Issue Report (IR) IRE-010-005 was written to identify this issue, and the NRC was notified. The IR was categorized as requiring an apparent causal

evaluation. The last sample for #11 piezometer tube, which measured positive for

tritium, was taken on December 21, 2005. Monthly samples since then have not

indicated any plant-related radioactivity.

During this inspection, the inspectors discussed this issue with cognizant personnel and reviewed the following:-the Action Plan for Tritium in Groundwater (Updated as of April 17, 2006), -the positive sample results for #11 piezometer tube,

-the negative sample results from the thirteen onsite deep wells (approximately

-460 feet) available for supplying site drinking water and makeup water, from the onsite storm drains, from the onsite subsurface drains (SSDs), and from the

piezometer tubes (other than #11),

16 Enclosure-the input to the 10 CFR 50.75(g) file, -OE21958 - low levels of tritium found in groundwater at Calvert Cliffs,

-the Tritium and Generic Implications Presentation prepared for the site's Nuclear

-Safety Review Board, and

-the Corporate Radiological Release Audit Project Plan.

b. Findings

Introduction.

A Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified for failure to make surveys of the radioactivity in a large "sink hole" in order to make an evaluation in

accordance with 10 CFR 20.1501(a) to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1)

regarding the total effective dose equivalent limit for individual members of the public

from the licensed operations.

Description.

Routine annual liquid samples from four piezometer tubes (40 to 50 feet deep) were collected on December 3, 2005. These piezometer tubes were installed

during the site hydrology study prior to plant construction. Their purpose was for

measurement of ground water depth at the site. A piezometer consists of a small-

diameter steel pipe equipped with a well point or perforated PVC pipe. Three of the four

liquid samples indicated no activity. Multiple samples from #11 piezometer tube, however, indicated 1800 picocuries per liter (pCi/l) of tritium in the groundwater. For

comparison, these sample results are below the Environmental Protection Agency's

drinking water standard for tritium which is 20,000 pCi/l. No gamma-emitting

radioactivity was detected in any samples. The previous annual samples for these four

tubes did not identify any plant-related radioactivity. IR IRE-010-005 was written to

identify this issue and the NRC was notified. The IR was categorized as requiring an

apparent causal evaluation. The last sample for #11 piezometer tube, which measured

positive for tritium, was taken on December 21, 2005. Monthly samples since then have

not indicated any plant-related radioactivity.

Upon identification of this issue Constellation recognized the need to investigate the source of the tritium and effect corrective actions. Their documented action plan for this

issue (updated as of April 17, 2006) included multiple stages, including finding the

leaking component, fixing the leaking component, determining the extent of

contamination, mapping the plume, and evaluating the need for remediation. The plan

included 36 action items, each with an assigned responsible individual and with an

estimated completion date. Action items which have been initiated included increasing

the number of sampling points and sampling frequencies for groundwater monitoring, contracting for the services of an experienced hydrologist/geologist for consultation, attempting to "age" the tritium samples, and obtaining site drawings showing the location

and arrangement of building foundations, tanks, pools, and underground piping to

evaluate systems as potential sources of the tritium.

As of January 3, 2006, the investigation indicated that a previously-ruptured, underground pipe, plugged in 2001, was partially or wholly responsible for the tritium

contamination. By design, the circulating water discharge conduits (CWDCs) accept

normal, permitted, liquid radioactive waste discharges and dilute the liquid waste prior to 17 Enclosure discharges to the Chesapeake Bay. At a point downstream of the liquid radioactive waste connection to the CWDC #22, this conduit, by design, was connected to a

subsurface drain (SSD) system by a section of underground piping. This piping

connection allowed circulating water (containing tritium) to enter the SSD system (essentially a large, industrial French drain) and the circulating water (saltwater)

corroded the metal piping connection to the French drain. The corroded section of

underground piping to the French drain allowed a pathway for circulating water to leak to

the soil approximately 50 feet from # 11 piezometer tube. The circulating water leakage

washed out soil in that area which eventually resulted in a large "sink hole" that opened

and revealed itself on February 26, 2001. This "sink hole" was oval-shaped, measured

approximately 6 feet by 4 feet in cross-section and approximately 11 feet deep, and

required 800 cubic feet of dirt to fill. To stop the circulating water from entering the

corroded section of underground piping to the French drain, the connection to the

CWDC #22 was plugged in April of 2001.

As of April 20, 2006, the station is still continuing actions to verify that there are no additional sources contributing to this contamination to determine the extent of

contamination and to map the plume. Also, the station is currently evaluating the need

to drill additional monitoring wells. The investigation is ongoing.

Based on the above and only assessing the time period from December 3, 2005, to the present time the station's problem identification, classification, and prioritization of this

issue and the identification of needed corrective actions appear timely and adequate for

this point in their investigation. Constellation's action plan acknowledged that there were

further evaluations and actions which still needed to be completed.

However, during the time period from the appearance of the "sink hole" to the plugging of the underground pipe connection to CWDC #22 and the backfill of the "sink hole," no

radiation surveys of the contents of the "sink hole" were performed to ascertain the

nature and extent of radioactive contamination or the possibility of a ground water

plume. This was the case even though the "sink hole" was created by the action of

circulating water containing radioactive material from routine, permitted, plant discharges

of liquid radioactive waste. Thus, such a survey would have been reasonable and

appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, for an unknown period of time, some

portions of routine permitted liquid radioactive waste discharges to CWDC #22 were

inadvertently released on site into the ground instead of being released as planned and

permitted into the Chesapeake Bay. Based on information in Section 2.5, Hydrology, of

the site's Undated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), these portions would flow to

the bay via shallow groundwater flow (i.e., a non-permitted pathway) within the site's

boundaries; the transit time for groundwater flow to the bay is much longer than that for

permitted discharges via the CWDC which transit time is a matter of seconds or minutes.

Analysis.

The performance deficiency was that no radiation surveys of the contents of the "sink hole" were performed. This was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 and is more

than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of maintaining a

program and process to estimate offsite dose due to abnormal releases and to properly

report such releases, and because it affected the Radiation Safety/Public Radiation 18 Enclosure Safety Cornerstone's objective to ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. This

finding did not meet the criteria for traditional enforcement. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix D, the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP), it

was determined that this violation did not involve the radioactive material control or

environmental monitoring program branches but did involve the SDP's radioactive effluent release program branch. Further, it was determined that this violation was of

very low significance based on the fact that while it did impair Constellation's ability to

assess the timing of dose consequence and the accuracy of the batch and annual

effluent release dose records and reports due to the large difference in transit times for

the permitted and non-permitted discharge pathways to the bay, Constellation did

account for all released radioactivity and did assess the cumulative doses from their

effluent releases. Additionally, the violation is of very low significance because the

involved radioactivity had been addressed in Constellation permits prior to release, the

unanalyzed non-permitted pathway (i.e., via groundwater to the bay) did not impact

private property, and the dose consequences woul d not differ significantly from those calculated in Constellation's release permits, and the assessed doses did not exceed

the dose values in Appendix I to 10 CFR 50. Therefore, the finding is Green.

Enforcement.

10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that may be necessary for Constellation to comply with the regulations in Part

20 and that are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation

levels, concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential radiological

hazards that could be present. Contrary to the above, as of February 26, 2001, Constellation did not make surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1)

regarding the dose limit for individual members of the public from licensed operations.

Specifically, for an unknown period of time, some portions, of routine permitted liquid

radioactive waste discharges to CWDC #22, were inadvertently released into the ground

instead of being released as planned and permitted into the Chesapeake Bay. Based on

information in Section 2.5, Hydrology, of the site's UFSAR, these portions would flow to

the bay via shallow groundwater flow (i.e., a non-permitted pathway) within the site's

boundaries. The transit time for groundwater flow to the bay is much longer than that for

permitted discharges via the CWDC's which transit time is a matter of seconds or

minutes and Constellation did not accurately assess, record, and report the annual dose

to individual members of the public during that time period. Because this failure to meet

a survey requirement is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the

corrective action program (CAP) Condition Report (CR) IRE-014-244, this violation is

being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000317,05000318/2006003-02, Failure to perform anadequate survey for radioactivity

.

19 Enclosure4OA3Event Followup (Closed) LER 05000317/2006-002 Control Element Assembly Determined to be Untrippable On April 8, 2006, while performing low power physic testing, CEA 21 stopped inserting at approximately 134 inches. Upon further attempts to troubleshoot the situation, CEA 21

was determined to be untrippable. Operators then commenced a shutdown and placed

the unit in Mode 3 in accordance with station procedures and TS Limiting Condition for

Operation (LCO) 3.1.4.F. Following the shutdown, testing was performed on CEA 21

and all other CEAs. The LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of

significance were identified, and no violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Constellation documented the event in their corrective actions program as IRE-013-755.

This LER is closed.4OA5Other Activities Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk

a. Inspection Scope

The objective of TI 2515/165, "Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk," was to gather information to support the assessment of nuclear power plant

operational readiness of offsite power systems and impact on plant risk. The inspectors

evaluated Constellation procedures against the specific offsite power, risk assessment

and system grid reliability requirements of TI 2515/165. They also discussed the

attributes with Constellation personnel.

The information gathered while completing this TI was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation. bFindings No findings of significance were identified..24R01Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection (71007 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The scope covers onsite and in-office review of post-installation, testing and storage activities that occurred during the refueling outage.

20 Enclosure Post-Installation Testing Post-installation verification and testing inspections were reviewed in the following areas:-Constellation's post-installation inspections and verifications program and its implementation.-The conduct of reactor coolant system leakage testing and review the test results.-The procedures for equipment performance testing required to confirm the design and to establish baseline measurements and the conduct of testing.-Compliance with regulatory requirements including the incorporation of inservice inspection requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a (g).-Adherence to and reconciliation of code requirements.

Specifically, the inspector reviewed Constellation's inspection results for component alignment, cleanliness, foreign material exclusion (FME) and parts inventory for the new

reactor head and enhanced service structure, as documented in the "Post Construction

Record of Walkdown," and discussed the walkdown with knowledgeable members of

plant staff. In addition, the results of several types of tests conducted at the conclusion

of the outage were reviewed by the inspector, including: the polar crane post

maintenance testing (mechanical and non-destructive examination (NDE), control rod

drop time tests, and visual testing (VT-2) performed on the reactor coolant system (RCS)

to confirm no leakage was observed.

Storage The inspector directly observed the storage package on the old head and the security barriers present at the storage location. The radiological surveys taken for contact and

general area dose rates were reviewed. The inspector verified that access to the

storage area was properly controlled and did not create the potential for an unmonitored

effluent release pathway and that external radiation levels at the perimeter would be

below applicable limits, and dose rates at the perimeter were below applicable limits.

TSP Modifications The last report referenced Constellation's efforts to align the new thimble support plate (TSP) onto the upper guide structure in the vessel. Constellation documented a

condition report on the installation process in their corrective action program (IRE-012-607). During the third phase of onsite inspection the inspector reviewed an

independent assessment of whether the modifications to the TSP could affect design

basis structural analysis and loading conditions. The inspector also reviewed FME

controls implemented during the outage while the TSP was being modified, as well as

the operational decision making checklist. At the time of the inspection exit, Constellation was compiling design and condition report information to incorporate into a

root cause report and determine the applicability of these issues to the upcoming TSP

replacement planned for Unit 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 12, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to yourself and other members of your staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked

Constellation whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be

considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Constellation Personnel

J. Adams, Constellation, TSP Engineering/Installation

R. Conatser, Chemist

B. Dansberger, Health Physics Work Leader (Materials Processing Facility)

S. Etnoyer, Plant Health Physicist

H. Evans, Health Physics Work Leader (Dosimetry)

J. Johnson, Engineering Analyst

V. Johnson, Health Physics Technician

G. Joy, Training, Fire Brigade SCBA

G. Khouri, Component Replacement Engr

T. Kirkham, Health Physics Supervisor (Operations)

T. Konerth, Fab PM/Project Engineer

W. Lankford, Operations, Fire Brigade

J. Lenhart, Health Physics Work Leader (Operations)

P. Lombardi, Maintenance

K. Prescott, Admin assist

J. Remenuik, ESS Task Manager/P.E., PMP

I. Rice, Health Physics Technician

E. Roach, General Supervisor of Health Physics

G. B. Rudell, Engineering Programs.Quinn, Installation TM

J. Branyan, Functional Surveillance Test Coordinator

M. Flaherty, Engineering Services Manager

L. Larragoite, Constellation Licensing Director

D. Bauder, Operations Manager

A. Simpson, Sr. Licensing Engineer

M. Stanley, Operations, Fire Brigade

D. Taylor, Administrative Assistantt

B. Tench, Acting Director, RVH Projet

L. Williams, System Manager

M. Yox, Engineering Analyst

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened and Closed

05000317-318/2006003-01NCVFailure to establish appropriate reference

values or reconfirm previous values

reference values for the AFW and ECCS

pumps (Section 1R22)05000317-318/2006003-02NCVFailure to perform an adequate survey for

radioactivity (Section 4OA2)

Closed

05000317/LER-2006-002LERControl Element Assembly Determined to

be Untrippable (section 4OA3)

Section 1R04:

Equipment Alignment

13.8kV during internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator Maintenance Order (MO) 2200401489

Operating Instruction (OI) 27B, 13.8 kV System

Drawing 61001SH001

Clearance Order

2200500173

Clearance Order

2200500602

1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) walkdown during maintenance on the 1A EDG

Operating Instruction (OI) 21B-1, 1B Diesel Generator

4.16kV service transformers Maintenance Order (MO) 1200503371

Operating Instruction (OI) 27C, 4.16 kV System

SRW pump breaker equipment alignment Operating Instruction (OI) 15-1, Service Water System Maintenance Order (MO) 1200501844

Drawing 61080SH0003

vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve battery Operating Instruction (OI) 26A, 125 Volt Vital DC System Attachment Maintenance Order (MO) 2200502563

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

IRE-013-795

Calvert Cliffs UFSAR Section 9.9, CCNPP Fire Protection Program, Rev. 37

FP-00002, Fire Hazards Analysis Summary Document, Rev. 0

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

ES-001, Flooding, Rev. 2

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment Individual Plant Examination

Summary Report, dated December 1993

AOP-7A, Unit 1 Loss of Saltwater Cooling, Rev. 14

AOP-7A, Unit 2 Loss of Saltwater Cooling, Rev. 12

OI-29, Unit 2 Saltwater System, Rev. 52

OI-45, Unit 2 Service Water System, Rev. 44

Information Notice No. 83-44, Supplement 1:

Potential Damage to Redundant Safety Equipment as a Result of Backflow Through the Equipment and Floor Drain System, dated 8/30/90

Information Notice No. 83-44: Potential Damage to Redundant Safety Equipment as a Result of

Backflow Through the Equipment and Floor Drain System, dated 7/1/83

Section 1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program Manual

OP-24, Simulator Operating Examination for the Licensed Operator Training Program at the

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater isolation control valves

CV-4511 and CV-4512

IRE-015-024

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200602819

STP O-5A-1, Auxiliary Feedwater Sy stem Quarterly Surveillance Test condensate storage tank rupture valve

IRE-009-227

Maintenance Order (MO)

1200504137

Attachment

Section 1R13:

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

11A service water basket strainer cleaning:

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504373

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504765

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200503808

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200603151

IRE-015-188

containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed):

IRE-014-186, U1 containment temperature is relatively high for this time of year

10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001

Drawing 61076SH0011D, Schematic Diagr am Containment Cooling Fan 12

Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)

MN-1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/06

vital 125 Vdc bus being attached and removed from the 125 Vdc reserve battery Maintenance Order (MO) 2200502563

STP M 552-2, 21 Station Battery Service Test

13.8kV internal inspection and testing of the 2H2103 voltage regulator Maintenance Order (MO) 2200401489

Operating Instruction (OI) 27B, 13.8 kV System

Drawing 61001SH001

Clearance Order

2200500173

Clearance Order

2200500602

1A emergency diesel generator for planned maintenance

IRE-014-223

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200602153

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200500480

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504037

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504044

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200504093

switchgear hvac inspection and lubrication Performance Evaluation (PE) 2-023-02-0-M

Maintenance Order (MO)

2200504655

Attachment Maintenance Order (MO) 2200504679

Maintenance Order (MO) 2200501668

auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance to replace the breaker hand switch Maintenance Order (MO) 220043186

Clearance Order

2200600130

Drawing 61087SH0010A

and 14 4kV busses during maintenance on the 14 4kV bus normal feeder breaker Maintenance Order (MO) 1200503371

Operating Instruction (OI) 27C, 4.16 kV System

Drawing 61052SH0004

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed):

IRE-014-186

10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001

Drawing 61076SH0011D, Schematic Diagr am Containment Cooling Fan 12

Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)

MN-1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/06

1. 21 control element assembly testing Operability Determination (OD)06-002

License Event Report (LER) 2006-002

PSTP-02, Initial Approach to Criticality and Low Power Physics Testing, Rev.

AOP-1B, Control Element Assembly (CEA) Malfunctions, Rev.

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200601808

IRE-013-755

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

containment air cooler repair (reverse flow in fast speed):

IRE-014-186, U1 containment temperature is relatively high for this time of year

10CFR50.59/10CFR72.48 screening form, dated 8/15/2001

Drawing 61076SH0011D, Schematic Diagr am Containment Cooling Fan 12

Containment temperature profile graphs (4/28/06 - 5/4/06)

MN-1-110, Troubleshooting control form, dated 5/10/06

Attachment

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

HPSI Pump Large Flow Test

IRE-011-980

IRE-011-986

IRE-011-991

(ES) 2004000048-000

LPSI Pump Large Flow Test

IRE-014-764

Containment Spray Flow Test

IRE-014-764

Monthly CEA #21 Partial Movement

IRE-013-755

Tech Spec 3.1.4

Integrated Leak Rate Test Unit 1 Containment Maintenance Order (MO) 1200404741

Integrated Leak Rate Outage Plan 2006

Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance Test

IRE-015-024

Maintenance Order (MO) 1200602819

Safety Injection Tank Outlet Isolation Valve Test

IRE-014-969

Maintenance Order (MO) - 2200602819Section EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan (E-Plan) Changes Calvert Cliffs Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures

Section 2OS1: Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

Procedure

RSP-1-101, Rev. 22, Routine radiological surveys

Procedure

RSP-1-106, Rev. 10, Special work permit administration

Procedure

RSP-1-117, Rev. 11, Issuance and wearing of respiratory protection Attachment devices used to protect against airborne radioactivity

Procedure

RSP-1-132, Rev. 9, Job coverage in radiologically controlled areas

Focused self-assessment on shutdown source term management at Calvert Cliffs

Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedure

RP-1-100, Rev. 8, Radiation Protection

Procedure

RSP-1-200, Rev. 22, ALARA planning and SWP preparation

ALARA packages for SWPs

20061351, Rev. 2, Demolish thimble support pate/guide tubes

20061358, Rev. 0, Surface destruction activities to remove interference

from new TSP

20061373, Rev. 0, Remove TSP cut up station

20061420, Rev. 2, Half nozzle replacements on the reactor coolant

system hot legs

20061423, Rev. 2, Mechanical stress improvement process

Section 2OS3: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment

Procedure

RSP-2-301, Rev. 14, Respiratory protection device maintenance

Procedure

RSP-2-304, Rev. 0, Operation of the Bauer breathing air compressor

Procedure

OI-20A, Rev. 12, Fire protection performance evaluations and fire

system inspections Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems (paragraph 02.02 - SelectedIssue Follow-up Inspection)

Action Plan for Tritium in Groundwater (Updated as of April 17, 2006), OE21958 - Low Levels of Tritium Found in Groundwater at Calvert Cliffs, Tritium and Generic Implications Presentation prepared for the site's Nuclear

Safety Review Board, and

Corporate Radiological Release Audit Project Plan.

Procedure

CP-224, Rev. 13, Monitoring radioactivity in systems normally

uncontaminated

Procedure

CP-501, Rev. 10, Liquid and steam sampling techniques

Procedure

QL-2-100, Rev. 20, Corrective Action Program Section 4OA5: Other Activities Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk

AOP-7M, "Major Grid Disturbances", Rev 1

OAP 91-09, "Communications for Load Reduction or Outage"

OAP 94-5, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Operat ions Support for Electric System Operation and Planning Department", Rev 10

OCP--3, "Planning and Scheduling", Rev 0

Attachment Operations Coordination and Interconnection Agreement between Baltimore Gas and Electric Company and Constellation Power Source Generation, INC., May 1 2003

NO-1-117, "Integraded Risk Management", Rev 15

4R01Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection Post-Installation Testing:

MO#

1200404115, Containment Polar Crane 180/25 TON/Periodic Inspection

CCNPP Technical Procedure HE-05

CCNPP Technical Procedure HE-55

Visual Examination for Leakage(VT-2), Report No. CC06-BV-079

CCNPP Technical Procedure, ETP99-015R, U0, CEDM Performance Testing, Rev. 3, for test dated 4/7/06

ESP No. ES200200485/ES200300312, various supplements, Form 4, Record of Walkdown Storage: Storage of U-1 Old Reactor Vessel Head (ORVH), Map Rev. 0

TSP Modifications:

Presentation, RV

TSP 2006 RFO Modification Summary

MPR Associates Inc., April 4, 2006 letter to Constellation Energy Group, Calvert Cliffs Unit 1

Closeout Letter for Independent Review of Thimble Support Plate Modifications

Constellation letter, 3/31/2006, Exemption of Class B Requirements for the RCS

Operational Decision-Making Checklist, RFO IRT Issues/Hot Particles and FME

Procedure

Field Change Request, Field Change No.

FCR-013, Traveler for Installation of the

Replacement TSP and Thimble at Calvert Cliffs Condition Reports:

IRE-012-607

IRE-012-644

IRE-012-737

IRE-013-293

IRE-012-917

IRE-011-923

Other: Calvert Cliffs UFSAR, Table 4-2, Reactor Vessel Parameters

AREVA Letter of Qualification Waiver, 3/10/2006

Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMSAgencywide Documents

Access and Management SystemASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers

AFWA uxiliary Feedwater

ALARAA Low As Reasonably Achievable

AOPAbnormal Operating Procedure

ATWSAnticipated Transient Without Scram

CAPCorrective Action Program

CCNPPCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

CEAControl Element Assembly

CEDECommitted Effective Dose Equivalent

CEDMControl Element Drive Mechanism

CFRCode of Federal Regulations

CRCondition Report

CROControl Room

CSContainment Spray

CWDCCirculating Water Discharge Conduit

ECCSEmergency Core Cooling System

EDGEmergency Diesel Generator

EHCElectro Hydraulic Control

EOPEmergency Operating Procedure

EPEmergency Preparedness

EPEmergency Plan

E-PlanEmergency Plan

FMEForeign Material Exclusion

HDRHigh Dose Rate

HPHealth Physics

HVACHeating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IMCInspection Manual Chapter

IPEIndividual Plant Examination

IRIssue Report

ISTInService Testing

LERLicensee Event Report

LCOLimiting Condition Operation

NCVN on-Cited Violation

NDE Non Destructive Examination

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

OAOther Activities

OMO peration and Maintenance

ORVH Old Reactor Vessel Head

OSOccupational Safety

PARSPublicly Available Records

PIPerformance Indicators

PI&RProblem Identification & Resolution

pCi/lPico-curies per Liter

AttachmentRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRPMRadiation Protection Manager

RWPRadiation Work Permit

SCBASelf-Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDPSignificance Determination Process

SRWService Water

SSCSystems, Structures, and Components

SSDSub-Surface Drain

TIT emporary Instruction

TSP Thimble Support Plate

TSTechnical Specifications

UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report

VHRAV ery High Radiation Area