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{{#Wiki_filter:~ProosedTechn5ca1Sec$ffcat)on~ | {{#Wiki_filter:~ProosedTechn5ca1Sec$ffcat)on~Chanes85i02903i4 851022PDRADOCK05000335P' 01g'~k' TAIILE3.3-3+Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONSYSTEtlIIISTRU%NTAT IONCCFUNCTIONAL UNITS.CONTAlINEIITSINPRECIR<ULATION (RAS)a.IL)nualRAS(TripGuttons)b.Refueling MaterTank--LosTOTALNO.CHANNELSOFCIIANNCLS TOTRIPHllllllN-CIIANNELS OPERAGLEAPPLICASLE NGES1,2,3,11,2,3ACllON86..LOSSOFPOMER~.i.l6kvEwergency busUndervoltage (LossofVoltage)>> | ||
2/Gusb.1.16kvENergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)(1)UndervoltageDevice'll*2/Bus(2)UndervoltageDevicel2>>2/bus2/bus2/bus2/busI/busI/bus1/bus1,.2,31.2,31,2,3121212c.180VEjwergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)>> | |||
2/bus2/bus7.AUXILIARY FEENATE1AUTONTICSTARTSteaaGenerator (SG)Levellnstrments 1/SG%4Jl2/SGforeitherstemgenerator WillstartonetrainofAFM.TIIisspecification | |||
~illbeeffective prortoCycle7restart.2/SGV1/bus2/SG1,2,31,2,3 | |||
/DE'57MlL3,g-gANlLIARYFEENATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TrfpButtons)b. | /DE'57MlL3,g-gANlLIARYFEENATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TrfpButtons)b.Automatic Actuatfon | ||
TABLE3.3- | *I.opfc4/SG4/SG2/SG2/SG4/SG3/SGSGLevel(fh/fb)-t.mt4/SG2/SG3/SG13,148.AUXILIARY FEEDMATER ISOLATION a.SGfA-SGfBOffferentfal Pressure4/SG2/SG3/SGFeasterHeaderSGLA-SG18Dff-feren'al.Pressure 4/SG2/SG3/SG eaCst,r. | ||
7. | TABLE3.3-3Continued TABLENOTATIONACTION1O-ACTION11-ACTION12-NththenurrberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, operation mayproceedprovfdedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthcbypassedcondition. | ||
TABLE3.3- | -andtheMfnfmumChannelsOPERABLErequirement fsdemonstrated wfthfn1hour;oneadditional channelmaybebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillance testingperSepciffca-tfon4.3.2.1.1. | ||
~TABLE3.3-5Cnntfnven'30.5~/20.5~~$0.0/14.0~30..0/17. | Instrument operability requirements arecontained fntheReactorProtection Systemrequirements forReactorTriponSteamGenerator Level.IfanAutomatic Startchannelfsfnoperablc. | ||
'ADLE~.3-2(Cn~ | operation maycontinueprovidedthattheaffectedpumpisverifiedtobeOPERABLEperSpecification 4.7.1.2.a within8hoursandatleastonceper7daysthereafter; andtheAutomatic StartchannelshallbercstorcdtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysorthereactorsallbefnatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthcnext12hours.fifththenumberofOPERABLEChannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsoperation mayproceeduntilperformance ofthenextrequiredCHANNELFUNCTIONAL TESTprovidedthefnoperable channelfsplacedfnthetHppedcondition within1hour.ACTION1i-ACTION13-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, restoretheinoperable channelstoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 6hours.Withthenumberof'channels OPERABLEonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthebypassedortrippedcondition within1hour.Iftheinoperable channelisbypassed, thedesirability ofmaintaining thischannelinthebypassedcondition shallbereviewedinaccordance withSpecification 6.5.1.6m. | ||
'lVH 7. | ThechannelshallbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusnolaterthanduringthenextCOLDSHUTDOWN. | ||
ACTION14-MiththenumberofchannelsOPERABLEonelessthantheMinimumChannelsOPERABLE, STARTUPand/orPOMEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedthatoneo'ftheinoperable channelshasbeenbypassedandtheotherinoperable channelhasbeenplacedinthetrippedcondition withinIhour.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/43-13Amendment No.A5,N1l.$g TABLE3.3-4~CnntlnunA EINEEDSAFETVFEATUREACTUATION STSTEIIIHSTRNIENTATION TRIPVALUESIONALUNITTRIPVALUEALL%ABLEVALUES6.LOSSOFPOINa.(1)4.16kvbaergency BusUndervoltage (LossofYo'Itage)>> | |||
b.i.l6kvEjsergeocy tusUhdervoltage (OegradedVoltage)(1)Uodervolta5eDeviceil>>(2)Uadervoltage Devicel2>>c.1NvoltsberitacySusUndervoltage (Degraded-Voltaie)>>3675i36voltswitha3615i36voltswitha7i1minutetiaedelay.7i1slatetiaedelay3592436volts.iith albiXsec@adt$aedelay3592436volts~itha18~Xsecondtlaedelayi29i5-0voltsstthai2%~5-0voltswitha7+1secoadt$aedelay7+1secondtiaedelay2900i29voltseltha2900t29voltssritha1iSsecondtiaedelayl+.5secondtIaedelay7.NXILINVFEEQNTEIi%5leveli3l5leveldpawaarpaceThissyecificatioI sillbeeffective priortoCycle7restart. | |||
7.AUNILIARZ FEEDWLTER (AFAS)e..Hanua)(TripSuttons)b.Autoaotic Actuation Logicc.SGlhtlSLevelLa>NotApplicableNot=Applicabl~.>2,8,0XNotApplicable NotApplicable | |||
~28$7r8.AUXILIARY FEEONTERISOLATION SteawGenerator hP-Highb.Feedrater HeaderHighAP<27$-':psid<150.0psid<gwgpsid<F7.5psid I | |||
TABLE3.3-5ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESPONSETINESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTION1.Nanucla.SIAS,.SafetyIrgectfon (ECCS)Conta<eatnt FanCoolersFeedwater Isolation Conta)naent Isolationb.CSASContafnnentSprayc.'ISContafeaent Isolation ShieldSufldfngVent)latfon Sys~d.RASContafrment SumpReckrculatkon e.NSISNafnSteamIsolat)on | |||
@gFeechatar IsoIatton 2.Pressurizer Pressure-Los a.SafetyInfect)on(ECCS)b.Conta)nugent Isolation wee,c.Containment FanCoolersd.Fiedwater Isolat)on RESPONSETINEINSECONDSNotApplicable NotApplfcabl eNotApplicable NotApplkcabl eNotAppl)cableNotApplkcableNotApplicable NotApplicable NotApplfcableNotApplfcablec30./19.5~ | |||
c30.5a/20~30.0~/17.~' | |||
60.0ST.UlCIE-lJNIT13/43-15Peendoent No.Pl>g7,l9f.AFAS'ux)1faryFeedwater Actuat)on gotApplfcable ql'I | |||
~TABLE3.3-5Cnntfnven' 30.5~/20.5~ | |||
~$0.0/14.0~30..0/17.0ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESP~';=TIMESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTIONRESPONSETINEINSECONOSConta5nment Pressure-kf hSafetylrgect5on (ECCS)c30.gfl9.5~b."Conta5nment Isolat5on~ | |||
c.Sh5eldSu5ld5ngVent51at5on System4.Conta5mcnt FanCoolerse.Feedwater Isolat5on Containment Pressure--Hf h-Hfha.Conta5rment SprayContainment Rad5at5on-N ha.'onta5nment Isolat5on~ | |||
'.'h5eldSu5ld5ngVent5lat5on Systen6.SteamGenerator Pressure-Low a.Na5nSteamIsolat5on b.Feedwater Isolat5on Refuel5nMaterStorageTank-Lmv460.0c30.0fle.sc30.5~f20.5~ | |||
c30.0fl4.0c60.08.a.Conta5nment SumpRec5rculat5on'team Generator'evel Lo~c91.5a.Aux515ary Feedwatar rTABLESTATIOND5eselgenerator stirt5ngandD5eselgenerator start5ngandDffs5tapowerava5lable. | |||
Notaool4cable toconta5nment | |||
>ROSi+600"8/Av4Kd)sequenceload5n",delaysfncluded. | |||
sequenceloidfngdelaysnot5ncluded. | |||
5solat5on valveI-Nf-18-1. | |||
n3/I3-17AnttnenBBB Bo.ff:P.g jt | |||
'ADLE~.3-2(Cn~nllnund FUNCTlONL TESTCIIAIIIIEL CALIDDAllODCINIIIIEL CIICCKFUIICTNNLUNlT6.LOSSOFPNEkENGIIIEEREO SAFETYFEhTUREACTUATlON SYSTE4IHSTRNENThTlON SURVElLLAIICE REIRENEIITS NOOKSlNNIICIISUAVElLLAIICEEIIIlbba.I;16kvGaergeacy BusUnder-voltage{LossoD.Voltage)>> | |||
h.1.1CRvEaergency Wsthder-voltagetOegradad Voltage)(1)Uadervoltage Oevice]1>>(2)UadervoltageOevice/2>>h.18OVEaargancy WsUnder-voltage(Oegraded Voltage)~SNN1.2.31,2.31.2.31,2,37.AUXlLlNYFEENNKRa.AutoStartb.StoaaGenerator | |||
---------(See Survei11aace1.7.1.2.h)------ | |||
{SeeRESTablein31)~Aud~ex7~*Thisspecification willbeeffective priortqCycle7restart. | |||
'lVH 7.AUXILIARY FEEDNTER(AFAS)a.Nanual(TripButtons)b.SGLevel(A/8)-Lowc.Autowmatic Actuation Logic8.AUXILIARY FEEDNTERISOlATION a.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandSGDifferential Pressure(BtoA/AtoB) | |||
-Highb.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandFeedwater HeaderDifferential Pressure.(Btoh/AtoB) | |||
-HighN.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.1,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,3 | |||
(.0tih('i' | (.0tih('i' | ||
~~~~~I~I'~~~~~4~~~~~44~~4~~~I~~,~II4II~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~It~SS~~~~I~~~~~~~~44~I~~~~~~~~~~~SI~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4~~.~I~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~4~~~ | ~~~~~I~I'~~~~~4~~~~~44~~4~~~I~~,~II4II~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~It~SS~~~~I~~~~~~~~44~I~~~~~~~~~~~SI~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4~~.~I~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~4~~~ | ||
ST.LUCIEUNITNO. | ST.LUCIEUNITNO.IAUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEMSAFETYEVALUATION/NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS DETERMINATION ThisisarequesttoreviseTechnical Specification 3/4.3.2,Engineered SafetyFeatureActuation System(ESFAS)Instrumentation, oftheTechnical Specifications forSt.LucieUnit1.1.0DescritionofTechnical Secification ChaneTheproposedchangecontainsthosetechnical specifications neededtosupporttheinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS),whichwillbeinstalled tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-073V, ItemII.E.1.2. | ||
start-upofCycle7, | TheproposedchangerevisesTable3.3-3(ESFASInstrumentation), | ||
Table3.3-4(ESFASInstrumentation TripValues),Table3.3-5(Engineered SafetyFeaturesResponseTimes),andTable4.3-2(ESFASInstrumentation SurveiQance Requuements), | |||
andlistsanadditional responsibility fortheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)inTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6.ThechangetoTable3.3-3revisesitemV,.Auxiliary Feedwater, toincludemanualtripbuttons,automatic actuation logic,andsteamgenerator levelasinputstotheAFAS.Item8,Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation, wasaddedtoaccountforthesystemsabilitytoisolateafaultedsteamgenerator basedonhighdifferential pressurebetweenthesteamgenerators and/orthefeedwater headers.ACTIONSTATEMENTS wereaddedtodescriberequiredactionwhentheAFASdoesnotsatisfythechannelrequirements listedinTable3.3-3.ThechangetoTable3.3-4revisesitem7andaddsItem8toincludealltheinputslistedabovewiththeirapplicable tripvaluesandallowable values.NotethatthechangetotheAFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointisbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed. | |||
Theinputtosafetyanalysesisunaffected. | |||
ThechangetoTable3.3-5addsitem1.ftoincludeamanualAFASinitiating signalandrevisesitem8,SteamGenerator Level,toreflectthenewAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)systemresponsetimebasedsolelyonnewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor(+25sec).ThechangetoTable4.3-2revisesitem7andaddsitem8toincludetheinputstotheAFAS,aslistedabove,andliststheassociated surveillance requirements foreachinput.ThechangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m tothelistofresponsibilities oftheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG).ItrequirestheFRGtoreviewanddocumentthejudgement concerning prolonged operation inanabnormalconfiguration asallowedinACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.DescritionofChanetotheAFWSstemThepresentAFWsystemincludesautomatic actuation ofauxiliary feedwater onlowsteamgenerator level,aftertheexpiration ofapresettimedelay.Thissystemrepresents FPL'sshort-term commitment toNUREG-0737, ItemII.E.1.2ThenewAFASwhichistobeinstalled priorto J | |||
start-upofCycle7,alsoincludesautomatic actuation oftheAFWsystemonlowsteamgenerator levelandanadjustable timedelay.However,theAFASalsoincludeslogicthatwillautomatically isolateafaultedsteamgenerator onlowSGlevelcoincident withhighsteamgenerator and/orhighfeedwater headerdifferential pressuresignals.Provisions areincorporated intheAFASsothattheactuation signalcanbemanuallyinitiated. | |||
ThenewAFASwillbeasdescribed andapprovedintheNRC'sSafetyEvaluation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater System,FloridaPower4LightCompany,St.LuciePlant,UnitNo.1,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 10>1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig),exceptthatatimedelayhasbeenaddedwhichwilldelaytheactuation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)Systemforsomepre-selected periodoftime(205to600seconds)afterreceiving aninitiation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint). | |||
If,however,the:.initiation signalisremoved(duetoincreasing steamgenerator levelabovethebistableresetpoint)beforetheexpiration ofthetimedelay,thetimedelayisresettozero.Thisstopstheprocessandactuation oftheAFWsystemwillnotoccurunlesstheinitiation signalisreceivedagainandthetimedelayexpiresbeforetheinitiation signalisremoved.Theprimaryfunctionofthetimedelayistoreducechallenges ontheAFWsystemunderthecondition ofreactortripwithoffsitepowerandmainfeedwater available. | |||
Thetimedelayalsoprovidesmorefavorable resultsforthe'teamLineBreakanalysisbydelayingtheactuation oftheAFWsystem.Theinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)isbeingdone,inpart,tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-0737, ItemILE.1.2.AnNRCsafetyevaluation oftheAFAS(NRClettertoFPL,R.A.ClarketoR.E.Uhrig,datedSeptember 10,1982)statedthattheelectrical, instrumentation, andcontrolaspectsoftheAFASwerereviewedbytheNRCandthattheNRCconcluded thattheSt.Lucie,UnitNo.1auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation systemcomplieswiththestaff'slongtermsafetygraderequirements, andtherefore, isacceptable. | |||
Thesafetyevaluation recommended theadditionoftechnical specifications addressing thesurveillance testingoftheAFASautomatic actuation logic.Thisproposedtechnical specification changepackagecomplieswiththoserecommendations. | |||
Automatic controloftheAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation Systemwillbemodifiedtoincorporate atimedelayasdescribed inSection1.1,Description ofChangetotheAFWSystem.Twoclassesofevents,increased heatremovalanddecreased heatremoval,werere-evaluated to'determine iftheywereaffectedbythischange.ThespecificFSAReventsre-evaluated, becausetheadditionoftheAFAShas.themostimpactofthem,weretheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-tripReturn-to-Criticality event.TheexistinganalysesfortheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality eventarestillvalid,asdescribed below.2.1SteamLineBreakPost-TriReturn-to Criticalit TheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality Analysiscanbeaffectedbychangesintheassumptions fortheauxiliary feedwater flowrateandthetimeanddurationofdelivery. | |||
Moreflow,delivered sooner,couldadversely affecttheresults.TheeffectsoftheAFASontheSteam | |||
LineBreakpost- | LineBreakpost-trip Return-to Criticality analysiswasevaluated byCombustion Engineering, thedesigneroftheAFASbycomparing theCycle5analysisresultswiththoseobtainedafterchangingonlythoseassumptions impactedby'AFAS.Theseassumptions arelistedinthetablebelow.Acomparison betweenthenewvaluesandthereference valuesshowsthatthereference analysisjsconservative, inthatitassumesthesameauxiliary feedwater flow,thesameAFASactuation | ||
: setpoint, andthesameminimumdelaytime.Theonlydifference isthatthenewAFAShastheabilitytoautomatically isolatetherupturedsteamgenerator onhighdifferential pressureensuringthatnoadditional waterisadmittedtotherupturedsteamgenerator. | |||
ThisfeatureoftheAFASmakestheCycle5SteamLineBreakanalysisconservative. | |||
Parameter Ref.AnalysisWithoutAFASNewAnalysisWithAFASCommentS/GWaterLevelAFWActuation SetpointMinimumAFASDelayTimeMaximumAFWFlowRate62.596(NormalWaterLeve9180seconds1280gpm180secondsNoDifference 1280gpmNoDifference 62.596(NormalNoDifference WaterLeve9MaximumHighSGN/APAFWIsolation Setpoint530psid+ForHZPcase-Noimpact.ForFullPowerCaseIsolatesAFWflowtorupturedS/GpriortoAFASactuation. | |||
U+Notethatthe'530psidisolation setpointrepresents theTechnical Sp~ificationvalueplusinstrument uncertaintiesintheconservative direction. | |||
ThehighSGPAFWisolation setpointwasevaluated todetermine ifahysteretic valuewasrequiredtomaketheeffectsofre-initiating AFWflowtotherupturedsteamgenerator acceptable. | |||
Forthisanalysistherupturedsteamgenerator willbeisolatedwhentheSGPreaches530psid,andremainsisolateduntilthefeedwater headerPfallsbelow200psid.Sincethefeedwater headerPdoesnotfallbelow200psiduntilwellafterthetimeofpeakreactivity, re-initiation ofAFWisnotofconcern;therefore, ahysteretic valuefortheSGPAFWisolation setpointisnotrequired.. | |||
ExxonNuclearCo.hasperformed theirsafetyevaluation basedonthecurrentAFASandhasfoundtheCycle7analysistobebounding. | |||
Feedwater linebreakswerenotanalyzedforexcessive heatremovalbecausethesteamlinebreakisthelimitingcooldowneventasstatedintheFSAR.2.2LossofFeedwater/Feedwater LineBreaksLossofFeedwater events,including Feedwater LineBreaks,werepreviously evaluated asaresultofpostTMIrequirements (NUREG-0737, IClf' ItemII.E.1.1). | |||
Thisevaluation showedthattheLossofFeedwater eventwaslimitingfortheAFWsystem.Thisevaluation wassubmitted totheNRCandapp'roved intheNRC'sSE,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 14,1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig).Thisevaluation ispresently reflected inSection10.5oftheFSAR.Areevaluation oftheseeventsconfirmed thatthelossofmainfeedwater withlossoffoffsitepowerplusanactivefailureoftheAorBbatteryandahighenergylinebreakintheAFWsystemwasthemostlimitingwithregardstotheAFWsystemrequirements. | |||
Anevaluation ofthisevent,plustheLossofFeedwater analysisshowninSection15.2.8intheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)demonstrates that,afterthestartoftheevents,atleasttenminutesareavailable toverifyauto-start or,ifnecessary tomanuallyinitiateauxiliary feedwater flowbeforesteamgenerator dryoutoccurs.ThenewAFASwillactuatetheAFWsystemautomaticaQy wellwithinthetimeframedemonstrated asacceptable intheFSAR.Basedontheabove,theexistingLossofFeedwater AnalysisintheFSARremainsboundingandnoadditional analysisisrequired. | |||
==3.0 SiificantHazardsConsideration== | |||
OnSeptember 14,1982,NRCapprovedthechangestotheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)SystematSt.LucieUnit1,whichweretobemadetosatisfyNUREG-073V, SectionII.E.1.2. | |||
BecauseSt.LucieUnit2wasbeinglicensedatthattimewiththesameauxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)aswhatwasapprovedforSt.LucieUnit1,NRCallowedpostponement oftheimplementation ofAFASonSt.LucieUnit1untiltheFall1985refueling outage,inordertoobtainoperational experience withthesystemonUnit2.St.LucieUnit1willbeimplementing thenewAFASduringtheupcomingrefueling outage,scheduled tobeginonOctober20,1985.Theonlydifference betweenthesystemapprovedbyNRCandthesystembeinginstalled istheadditionofatimedelay.Theadditionofthetimedelayon.thenewsystemperformsthesamefunctionasthecurrently installed timedelay,i.e.,itdelaysactuation of.thesystemforapre-selected periodoftimeafterreceiving anactuation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint).Theproposedchangestothetechnical specifications arenecessary tomeetNUREG-0737 technical specification recommendations inthatadditional surveillance requirements arenowspecified fortheAFWsystem.ThisissimilartoExample(ii)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, contained intheCommission's guidancefordetermination ofsignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthatthenewsurveillance requirements arechangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedinthetechnical specifications: | |||
forexample,amorestringent surveillance requirement. | |||
Theproposedchangetothesteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointforAFWsysteminitiation (Table3.3-4Item7)isbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed. | |||
Theinputtothesafetyanalysesisunaffected. | |||
~~ | ~~ | ||
TheproposedchangetotheSteamGenerator Level-Low responsetimeforAFWSysteminitiation (Table3.3-5Item8)isalsobasedsolelyonthenewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor.TheproposedchangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m undertheFacilityReviewGroupresponsibilities tobeconsistent withtheadditionofnewACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.TheselastthreechangesaresimilartoExample(i)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthattheyareadministrative innaturetoachieveconsistency throughout thetechnical specifications andtochangethetechnical specifications tobeconsistent withtheinstalled instrumentation. | |||
Basedonthesafetyevaluation anddiscussions above,ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations. | |||
WP/DISCNB0000/Rev TechSpec/0985/BL}} |
Revision as of 17:07, 29 June 2018
ML17216A324 | |
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Site: | Saint Lucie |
Issue date: | 10/22/1985 |
From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
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Download: ML17216A324 (28) | |
Text
~ProosedTechn5ca1Sec$ffcat)on~Chanes85i02903i4 851022PDRADOCK05000335P' 01g'~k' TAIILE3.3-3+Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONSYSTEtlIIISTRU%NTAT IONCCFUNCTIONAL UNITS.CONTAlINEIITSINPRECIR<ULATION (RAS)a.IL)nualRAS(TripGuttons)b.Refueling MaterTank--LosTOTALNO.CHANNELSOFCIIANNCLS TOTRIPHllllllN-CIIANNELS OPERAGLEAPPLICASLE NGES1,2,3,11,2,3ACllON86..LOSSOFPOMER~.i.l6kvEwergency busUndervoltage (LossofVoltage)>>
2/Gusb.1.16kvENergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)(1)UndervoltageDevice'll*2/Bus(2)UndervoltageDevicel2>>2/bus2/bus2/bus2/busI/busI/bus1/bus1,.2,31.2,31,2,3121212c.180VEjwergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)>>
2/bus2/bus7.AUXILIARY FEENATE1AUTONTICSTARTSteaaGenerator (SG)Levellnstrments 1/SG%4Jl2/SGforeitherstemgenerator WillstartonetrainofAFM.TIIisspecification
~illbeeffective prortoCycle7restart.2/SGV1/bus2/SG1,2,31,2,3
/DE'57MlL3,g-gANlLIARYFEENATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TrfpButtons)b.Automatic Actuatfon
- I.opfc4/SG4/SG2/SG2/SG4/SG3/SGSGLevel(fh/fb)-t.mt4/SG2/SG3/SG13,148.AUXILIARY FEEDMATER ISOLATION a.SGfA-SGfBOffferentfal Pressure4/SG2/SG3/SGFeasterHeaderSGLA-SG18Dff-feren'al.Pressure 4/SG2/SG3/SG eaCst,r.
TABLE3.3-3Continued TABLENOTATIONACTION1O-ACTION11-ACTION12-NththenurrberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, operation mayproceedprovfdedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthcbypassedcondition.
-andtheMfnfmumChannelsOPERABLErequirement fsdemonstrated wfthfn1hour;oneadditional channelmaybebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillance testingperSepciffca-tfon4.3.2.1.1.
Instrument operability requirements arecontained fntheReactorProtection Systemrequirements forReactorTriponSteamGenerator Level.IfanAutomatic Startchannelfsfnoperablc.
operation maycontinueprovidedthattheaffectedpumpisverifiedtobeOPERABLEperSpecification 4.7.1.2.a within8hoursandatleastonceper7daysthereafter; andtheAutomatic StartchannelshallbercstorcdtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysorthereactorsallbefnatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthcnext12hours.fifththenumberofOPERABLEChannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsoperation mayproceeduntilperformance ofthenextrequiredCHANNELFUNCTIONAL TESTprovidedthefnoperable channelfsplacedfnthetHppedcondition within1hour.ACTION1i-ACTION13-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, restoretheinoperable channelstoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 6hours.Withthenumberof'channels OPERABLEonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthebypassedortrippedcondition within1hour.Iftheinoperable channelisbypassed, thedesirability ofmaintaining thischannelinthebypassedcondition shallbereviewedinaccordance withSpecification 6.5.1.6m.
ThechannelshallbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusnolaterthanduringthenextCOLDSHUTDOWN.
ACTION14-MiththenumberofchannelsOPERABLEonelessthantheMinimumChannelsOPERABLE, STARTUPand/orPOMEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedthatoneo'ftheinoperable channelshasbeenbypassedandtheotherinoperable channelhasbeenplacedinthetrippedcondition withinIhour.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/43-13Amendment No.A5,N1l.$g TABLE3.3-4~CnntlnunA EINEEDSAFETVFEATUREACTUATION STSTEIIIHSTRNIENTATION TRIPVALUESIONALUNITTRIPVALUEALL%ABLEVALUES6.LOSSOFPOINa.(1)4.16kvbaergency BusUndervoltage (LossofYo'Itage)>>
b.i.l6kvEjsergeocy tusUhdervoltage (OegradedVoltage)(1)Uodervolta5eDeviceil>>(2)Uadervoltage Devicel2>>c.1NvoltsberitacySusUndervoltage (Degraded-Voltaie)>>3675i36voltswitha3615i36voltswitha7i1minutetiaedelay.7i1slatetiaedelay3592436volts.iith albiXsec@adt$aedelay3592436volts~itha18~Xsecondtlaedelayi29i5-0voltsstthai2%~5-0voltswitha7+1secoadt$aedelay7+1secondtiaedelay2900i29voltseltha2900t29voltssritha1iSsecondtiaedelayl+.5secondtIaedelay7.NXILINVFEEQNTEIi%5leveli3l5leveldpawaarpaceThissyecificatioI sillbeeffective priortoCycle7restart.
7.AUNILIARZ FEEDWLTER (AFAS)e..Hanua)(TripSuttons)b.Autoaotic Actuation Logicc.SGlhtlSLevelLa>NotApplicableNot=Applicabl~.>2,8,0XNotApplicable NotApplicable
~28$7r8.AUXILIARY FEEONTERISOLATION SteawGenerator hP-Highb.Feedrater HeaderHighAP<27$-':psid<150.0psid<gwgpsid<F7.5psid I
TABLE3.3-5ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESPONSETINESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTION1.Nanucla.SIAS,.SafetyIrgectfon (ECCS)Conta<eatnt FanCoolersFeedwater Isolation Conta)naent Isolationb.CSASContafnnentSprayc.'ISContafeaent Isolation ShieldSufldfngVent)latfon Sys~d.RASContafrment SumpReckrculatkon e.NSISNafnSteamIsolat)on
@gFeechatar IsoIatton 2.Pressurizer Pressure-Los a.SafetyInfect)on(ECCS)b.Conta)nugent Isolation wee,c.Containment FanCoolersd.Fiedwater Isolat)on RESPONSETINEINSECONDSNotApplicable NotApplfcabl eNotApplicable NotApplkcabl eNotAppl)cableNotApplkcableNotApplicable NotApplicable NotApplfcableNotApplfcablec30./19.5~
c30.5a/20~30.0~/17.~'
60.0ST.UlCIE-lJNIT13/43-15Peendoent No.Pl>g7,l9f.AFAS'ux)1faryFeedwater Actuat)on gotApplfcable ql'I
~TABLE3.3-5Cnntfnven' 30.5~/20.5~
~$0.0/14.0~30..0/17.0ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESP~';=TIMESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTIONRESPONSETINEINSECONOSConta5nment Pressure-kf hSafetylrgect5on (ECCS)c30.gfl9.5~b."Conta5nment Isolat5on~
c.Sh5eldSu5ld5ngVent51at5on System4.Conta5mcnt FanCoolerse.Feedwater Isolat5on Containment Pressure--Hf h-Hfha.Conta5rment SprayContainment Rad5at5on-N ha.'onta5nment Isolat5on~
'.'h5eldSu5ld5ngVent5lat5on Systen6.SteamGenerator Pressure-Low a.Na5nSteamIsolat5on b.Feedwater Isolat5on Refuel5nMaterStorageTank-Lmv460.0c30.0fle.sc30.5~f20.5~
c30.0fl4.0c60.08.a.Conta5nment SumpRec5rculat5on'team Generator'evel Lo~c91.5a.Aux515ary Feedwatar rTABLESTATIOND5eselgenerator stirt5ngandD5eselgenerator start5ngandDffs5tapowerava5lable.
Notaool4cable toconta5nment
>ROSi+600"8/Av4Kd)sequenceload5n",delaysfncluded.
sequenceloidfngdelaysnot5ncluded.
5solat5on valveI-Nf-18-1.
n3/I3-17AnttnenBBB Bo.ff:P.g jt
'ADLE~.3-2(Cn~nllnund FUNCTlONL TESTCIIAIIIIEL CALIDDAllODCINIIIIEL CIICCKFUIICTNNLUNlT6.LOSSOFPNEkENGIIIEEREO SAFETYFEhTUREACTUATlON SYSTE4IHSTRNENThTlON SURVElLLAIICE REIRENEIITS NOOKSlNNIICIISUAVElLLAIICEEIIIlbba.I;16kvGaergeacy BusUnder-voltage{LossoD.Voltage)>>
h.1.1CRvEaergency Wsthder-voltagetOegradad Voltage)(1)Uadervoltage Oevice]1>>(2)UadervoltageOevice/2>>h.18OVEaargancy WsUnder-voltage(Oegraded Voltage)~SNN1.2.31,2.31.2.31,2,37.AUXlLlNYFEENNKRa.AutoStartb.StoaaGenerator
(See Survei11aace1.7.1.2.h)------
{SeeRESTablein31)~Aud~ex7~*Thisspecification willbeeffective priortqCycle7restart.
'lVH 7.AUXILIARY FEEDNTER(AFAS)a.Nanual(TripButtons)b.SGLevel(A/8)-Lowc.Autowmatic Actuation Logic8.AUXILIARY FEEDNTERISOlATION a.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandSGDifferential Pressure(BtoA/AtoB)
-Highb.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandFeedwater HeaderDifferential Pressure.(Btoh/AtoB)
-HighN.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.1,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,3
(.0tih('i'
~~~~~I~I'~~~~~4~~~~~44~~4~~~I~~,~II4II~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~It~SS~~~~I~~~~~~~~44~I~~~~~~~~~~~SI~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4~~.~I~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~4~~~
ST.LUCIEUNITNO.IAUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEMSAFETYEVALUATION/NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS DETERMINATION ThisisarequesttoreviseTechnical Specification 3/4.3.2,Engineered SafetyFeatureActuation System(ESFAS)Instrumentation, oftheTechnical Specifications forSt.LucieUnit1.1.0DescritionofTechnical Secification ChaneTheproposedchangecontainsthosetechnical specifications neededtosupporttheinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS),whichwillbeinstalled tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-073V, ItemII.E.1.2.
TheproposedchangerevisesTable3.3-3(ESFASInstrumentation),
Table3.3-4(ESFASInstrumentation TripValues),Table3.3-5(Engineered SafetyFeaturesResponseTimes),andTable4.3-2(ESFASInstrumentation SurveiQance Requuements),
andlistsanadditional responsibility fortheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)inTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6.ThechangetoTable3.3-3revisesitemV,.Auxiliary Feedwater, toincludemanualtripbuttons,automatic actuation logic,andsteamgenerator levelasinputstotheAFAS.Item8,Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation, wasaddedtoaccountforthesystemsabilitytoisolateafaultedsteamgenerator basedonhighdifferential pressurebetweenthesteamgenerators and/orthefeedwater headers.ACTIONSTATEMENTS wereaddedtodescriberequiredactionwhentheAFASdoesnotsatisfythechannelrequirements listedinTable3.3-3.ThechangetoTable3.3-4revisesitem7andaddsItem8toincludealltheinputslistedabovewiththeirapplicable tripvaluesandallowable values.NotethatthechangetotheAFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointisbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed.
Theinputtosafetyanalysesisunaffected.
ThechangetoTable3.3-5addsitem1.ftoincludeamanualAFASinitiating signalandrevisesitem8,SteamGenerator Level,toreflectthenewAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)systemresponsetimebasedsolelyonnewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor(+25sec).ThechangetoTable4.3-2revisesitem7andaddsitem8toincludetheinputstotheAFAS,aslistedabove,andliststheassociated surveillance requirements foreachinput.ThechangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m tothelistofresponsibilities oftheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG).ItrequirestheFRGtoreviewanddocumentthejudgement concerning prolonged operation inanabnormalconfiguration asallowedinACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.DescritionofChanetotheAFWSstemThepresentAFWsystemincludesautomatic actuation ofauxiliary feedwater onlowsteamgenerator level,aftertheexpiration ofapresettimedelay.Thissystemrepresents FPL'sshort-term commitment toNUREG-0737, ItemII.E.1.2ThenewAFASwhichistobeinstalled priorto J
start-upofCycle7,alsoincludesautomatic actuation oftheAFWsystemonlowsteamgenerator levelandanadjustable timedelay.However,theAFASalsoincludeslogicthatwillautomatically isolateafaultedsteamgenerator onlowSGlevelcoincident withhighsteamgenerator and/orhighfeedwater headerdifferential pressuresignals.Provisions areincorporated intheAFASsothattheactuation signalcanbemanuallyinitiated.
ThenewAFASwillbeasdescribed andapprovedintheNRC'sSafetyEvaluation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater System,FloridaPower4LightCompany,St.LuciePlant,UnitNo.1,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 10>1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig),exceptthatatimedelayhasbeenaddedwhichwilldelaytheactuation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)Systemforsomepre-selected periodoftime(205to600seconds)afterreceiving aninitiation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint).
If,however,the:.initiation signalisremoved(duetoincreasing steamgenerator levelabovethebistableresetpoint)beforetheexpiration ofthetimedelay,thetimedelayisresettozero.Thisstopstheprocessandactuation oftheAFWsystemwillnotoccurunlesstheinitiation signalisreceivedagainandthetimedelayexpiresbeforetheinitiation signalisremoved.Theprimaryfunctionofthetimedelayistoreducechallenges ontheAFWsystemunderthecondition ofreactortripwithoffsitepowerandmainfeedwater available.
Thetimedelayalsoprovidesmorefavorable resultsforthe'teamLineBreakanalysisbydelayingtheactuation oftheAFWsystem.Theinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)isbeingdone,inpart,tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-0737, ItemILE.1.2.AnNRCsafetyevaluation oftheAFAS(NRClettertoFPL,R.A.ClarketoR.E.Uhrig,datedSeptember 10,1982)statedthattheelectrical, instrumentation, andcontrolaspectsoftheAFASwerereviewedbytheNRCandthattheNRCconcluded thattheSt.Lucie,UnitNo.1auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation systemcomplieswiththestaff'slongtermsafetygraderequirements, andtherefore, isacceptable.
Thesafetyevaluation recommended theadditionoftechnical specifications addressing thesurveillance testingoftheAFASautomatic actuation logic.Thisproposedtechnical specification changepackagecomplieswiththoserecommendations.
Automatic controloftheAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation Systemwillbemodifiedtoincorporate atimedelayasdescribed inSection1.1,Description ofChangetotheAFWSystem.Twoclassesofevents,increased heatremovalanddecreased heatremoval,werere-evaluated to'determine iftheywereaffectedbythischange.ThespecificFSAReventsre-evaluated, becausetheadditionoftheAFAShas.themostimpactofthem,weretheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-tripReturn-to-Criticality event.TheexistinganalysesfortheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality eventarestillvalid,asdescribed below.2.1SteamLineBreakPost-TriReturn-to Criticalit TheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality Analysiscanbeaffectedbychangesintheassumptions fortheauxiliary feedwater flowrateandthetimeanddurationofdelivery.
Moreflow,delivered sooner,couldadversely affecttheresults.TheeffectsoftheAFASontheSteam
LineBreakpost-trip Return-to Criticality analysiswasevaluated byCombustion Engineering, thedesigneroftheAFASbycomparing theCycle5analysisresultswiththoseobtainedafterchangingonlythoseassumptions impactedby'AFAS.Theseassumptions arelistedinthetablebelow.Acomparison betweenthenewvaluesandthereference valuesshowsthatthereference analysisjsconservative, inthatitassumesthesameauxiliary feedwater flow,thesameAFASactuation
- setpoint, andthesameminimumdelaytime.Theonlydifference isthatthenewAFAShastheabilitytoautomatically isolatetherupturedsteamgenerator onhighdifferential pressureensuringthatnoadditional waterisadmittedtotherupturedsteamgenerator.
ThisfeatureoftheAFASmakestheCycle5SteamLineBreakanalysisconservative.
Parameter Ref.AnalysisWithoutAFASNewAnalysisWithAFASCommentS/GWaterLevelAFWActuation SetpointMinimumAFASDelayTimeMaximumAFWFlowRate62.596(NormalWaterLeve9180seconds1280gpm180secondsNoDifference 1280gpmNoDifference 62.596(NormalNoDifference WaterLeve9MaximumHighSGN/APAFWIsolation Setpoint530psid+ForHZPcase-Noimpact.ForFullPowerCaseIsolatesAFWflowtorupturedS/GpriortoAFASactuation.
U+Notethatthe'530psidisolation setpointrepresents theTechnical Sp~ificationvalueplusinstrument uncertaintiesintheconservative direction.
ThehighSGPAFWisolation setpointwasevaluated todetermine ifahysteretic valuewasrequiredtomaketheeffectsofre-initiating AFWflowtotherupturedsteamgenerator acceptable.
Forthisanalysistherupturedsteamgenerator willbeisolatedwhentheSGPreaches530psid,andremainsisolateduntilthefeedwater headerPfallsbelow200psid.Sincethefeedwater headerPdoesnotfallbelow200psiduntilwellafterthetimeofpeakreactivity, re-initiation ofAFWisnotofconcern;therefore, ahysteretic valuefortheSGPAFWisolation setpointisnotrequired..
ExxonNuclearCo.hasperformed theirsafetyevaluation basedonthecurrentAFASandhasfoundtheCycle7analysistobebounding.
Feedwater linebreakswerenotanalyzedforexcessive heatremovalbecausethesteamlinebreakisthelimitingcooldowneventasstatedintheFSAR.2.2LossofFeedwater/Feedwater LineBreaksLossofFeedwater events,including Feedwater LineBreaks,werepreviously evaluated asaresultofpostTMIrequirements (NUREG-0737, IClf' ItemII.E.1.1).
Thisevaluation showedthattheLossofFeedwater eventwaslimitingfortheAFWsystem.Thisevaluation wassubmitted totheNRCandapp'roved intheNRC'sSE,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 14,1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig).Thisevaluation ispresently reflected inSection10.5oftheFSAR.Areevaluation oftheseeventsconfirmed thatthelossofmainfeedwater withlossoffoffsitepowerplusanactivefailureoftheAorBbatteryandahighenergylinebreakintheAFWsystemwasthemostlimitingwithregardstotheAFWsystemrequirements.
Anevaluation ofthisevent,plustheLossofFeedwater analysisshowninSection15.2.8intheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)demonstrates that,afterthestartoftheevents,atleasttenminutesareavailable toverifyauto-start or,ifnecessary tomanuallyinitiateauxiliary feedwater flowbeforesteamgenerator dryoutoccurs.ThenewAFASwillactuatetheAFWsystemautomaticaQy wellwithinthetimeframedemonstrated asacceptable intheFSAR.Basedontheabove,theexistingLossofFeedwater AnalysisintheFSARremainsboundingandnoadditional analysisisrequired.
3.0 SiificantHazardsConsideration
OnSeptember 14,1982,NRCapprovedthechangestotheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)SystematSt.LucieUnit1,whichweretobemadetosatisfyNUREG-073V, SectionII.E.1.2.
BecauseSt.LucieUnit2wasbeinglicensedatthattimewiththesameauxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)aswhatwasapprovedforSt.LucieUnit1,NRCallowedpostponement oftheimplementation ofAFASonSt.LucieUnit1untiltheFall1985refueling outage,inordertoobtainoperational experience withthesystemonUnit2.St.LucieUnit1willbeimplementing thenewAFASduringtheupcomingrefueling outage,scheduled tobeginonOctober20,1985.Theonlydifference betweenthesystemapprovedbyNRCandthesystembeinginstalled istheadditionofatimedelay.Theadditionofthetimedelayon.thenewsystemperformsthesamefunctionasthecurrently installed timedelay,i.e.,itdelaysactuation of.thesystemforapre-selected periodoftimeafterreceiving anactuation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint).Theproposedchangestothetechnical specifications arenecessary tomeetNUREG-0737 technical specification recommendations inthatadditional surveillance requirements arenowspecified fortheAFWsystem.ThisissimilartoExample(ii)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, contained intheCommission's guidancefordetermination ofsignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthatthenewsurveillance requirements arechangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedinthetechnical specifications:
forexample,amorestringent surveillance requirement.
Theproposedchangetothesteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointforAFWsysteminitiation (Table3.3-4Item7)isbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed.
Theinputtothesafetyanalysesisunaffected.
~~
TheproposedchangetotheSteamGenerator Level-Low responsetimeforAFWSysteminitiation (Table3.3-5Item8)isalsobasedsolelyonthenewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor.TheproposedchangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m undertheFacilityReviewGroupresponsibilities tobeconsistent withtheadditionofnewACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.TheselastthreechangesaresimilartoExample(i)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthattheyareadministrative innaturetoachieveconsistency throughout thetechnical specifications andtochangethetechnical specifications tobeconsistent withtheinstalled instrumentation.
Basedonthesafetyevaluation anddiscussions above,ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations.
WP/DISCNB0000/Rev TechSpec/0985/BL