ML17216A324

Proposed Tech Specs Supporting Installation of safety-grade Automatic Feedwater Sys During Upcoming Refueling Outage

ML17216A324
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/22/1985
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17216A323	List: ML17216A322 ML17216A324
References
NUDOCS 8510290314
Download: ML17216A324 (28)

Text

~ProosedTechn5ca1Sec$ffcat)on~Chanes85i02903i4 851022PDRADOCK05000335P' 01g'~k' TAIILE3.3-3+Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONSYSTEtlIIISTRU%NTAT IONCCFUNCTIONAL UNITS.CONTAlINEIITSINPRECIR<ULATION (RAS)a.IL)nualRAS(TripGuttons)b.Refueling MaterTank--LosTOTALNO.CHANNELSOFCIIANNCLS TOTRIPHllllllN-CIIANNELS OPERAGLEAPPLICASLE NGES1,2,3,11,2,3ACllON86..LOSSOFPOMER~.i.l6kvEwergency busUndervoltage (LossofVoltage)>>

2/Gusb.1.16kvENergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)(1)UndervoltageDevice'll*2/Bus(2)UndervoltageDevicel2>>2/bus2/bus2/bus2/busI/busI/bus1/bus1,.2,31.2,31,2,3121212c.180VEjwergency busUnder-voltage(Degraded Voltage)>>

2/bus2/bus7.AUXILIARY FEENATE1AUTONTICSTARTSteaaGenerator (SG)Levellnstrments 1/SG%4Jl2/SGforeitherstemgenerator WillstartonetrainofAFM.TIIisspecification

~illbeeffective prortoCycle7restart.2/SGV1/bus2/SG1,2,31,2,3

/DE'57MlL3,g-gANlLIARYFEENATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TrfpButtons)b.Automatic Actuatfon

• I.opfc4/SG4/SG2/SG2/SG4/SG3/SGSGLevel(fh/fb)-t.mt4/SG2/SG3/SG13,148.AUXILIARY FEEDMATER ISOLATION a.SGfA-SGfBOffferentfal Pressure4/SG2/SG3/SGFeasterHeaderSGLA-SG18Dff-feren'al.Pressure 4/SG2/SG3/SG eaCst,r.

TABLE3.3-3Continued TABLENOTATIONACTION1O-ACTION11-ACTION12-NththenurrberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, operation mayproceedprovfdedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthcbypassedcondition.

-andtheMfnfmumChannelsOPERABLErequirement fsdemonstrated wfthfn1hour;oneadditional channelmaybebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillance testingperSepciffca-tfon4.3.2.1.1.

Instrument operability requirements arecontained fntheReactorProtection Systemrequirements forReactorTriponSteamGenerator Level.IfanAutomatic Startchannelfsfnoperablc.

operation maycontinueprovidedthattheaffectedpumpisverifiedtobeOPERABLEperSpecification 4.7.1.2.a within8hoursandatleastonceper7daysthereafter; andtheAutomatic StartchannelshallbercstorcdtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysorthereactorsallbefnatleastHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthcnext12hours.fifththenumberofOPERABLEChannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsoperation mayproceeduntilperformance ofthenextrequiredCHANNELFUNCTIONAL TESTprovidedthefnoperable channelfsplacedfnthetHppedcondition within1hour.ACTION1i-ACTION13-WiththenumberofOPERABLEchannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, restoretheinoperable channelstoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hoursandinHOTSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 6hours.Withthenumberof'channels OPERABLEonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels, STARTUPand/orPOWEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedtheinoperable channelfsplacedfnthebypassedortrippedcondition within1hour.Iftheinoperable channelisbypassed, thedesirability ofmaintaining thischannelinthebypassedcondition shallbereviewedinaccordance withSpecification 6.5.1.6m.

ThechannelshallbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusnolaterthanduringthenextCOLDSHUTDOWN.

ACTION14-MiththenumberofchannelsOPERABLEonelessthantheMinimumChannelsOPERABLE, STARTUPand/orPOMEROPERATION maycontinueprovidedthatoneo'ftheinoperable channelshasbeenbypassedandtheotherinoperable channelhasbeenplacedinthetrippedcondition withinIhour.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/43-13Amendment No.A5,N1l.$g TABLE3.3-4~CnntlnunA EINEEDSAFETVFEATUREACTUATION STSTEIIIHSTRNIENTATION TRIPVALUESIONALUNITTRIPVALUEALL%ABLEVALUES6.LOSSOFPOINa.(1)4.16kvbaergency BusUndervoltage (LossofYo'Itage)>>

b.i.l6kvEjsergeocy tusUhdervoltage (OegradedVoltage)(1)Uodervolta5eDeviceil>>(2)Uadervoltage Devicel2>>c.1NvoltsberitacySusUndervoltage (Degraded-Voltaie)>>3675i36voltswitha3615i36voltswitha7i1minutetiaedelay.7i1slatetiaedelay3592436volts.iith albiXsec@adt$aedelay3592436volts~itha18~Xsecondtlaedelayi29i5-0voltsstthai2%~5-0voltswitha7+1secoadt$aedelay7+1secondtiaedelay2900i29voltseltha2900t29voltssritha1iSsecondtiaedelayl+.5secondtIaedelay7.NXILINVFEEQNTEIi%5leveli3l5leveldpawaarpaceThissyecificatioI sillbeeffective priortoCycle7restart.

7.AUNILIARZ FEEDWLTER (AFAS)e..Hanua)(TripSuttons)b.Autoaotic Actuation Logicc.SGlhtlSLevelLa>NotApplicableNot=Applicabl~.>2,8,0XNotApplicable NotApplicable

~28$7r8.AUXILIARY FEEONTERISOLATION SteawGenerator hP-Highb.Feedrater HeaderHighAP<27$-':psid<150.0psid<gwgpsid<F7.5psid I

TABLE3.3-5ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESPONSETINESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTION1.Nanucla.SIAS,.SafetyIrgectfon (ECCS)Conta<eatnt FanCoolersFeedwater Isolation Conta)naent Isolationb.CSASContafnnentSprayc.'ISContafeaent Isolation ShieldSufldfngVent)latfon Sys~d.RASContafrment SumpReckrculatkon e.NSISNafnSteamIsolat)on

@gFeechatar IsoIatton 2.Pressurizer Pressure-Los a.SafetyInfect)on(ECCS)b.Conta)nugent Isolation wee,c.Containment FanCoolersd.Fiedwater Isolat)on RESPONSETINEINSECONDSNotApplicable NotApplfcabl eNotApplicable NotApplkcabl eNotAppl)cableNotApplkcableNotApplicable NotApplicable NotApplfcableNotApplfcablec30./19.5~

c30.5a/20~30.0~/17.~'

60.0ST.UlCIE-lJNIT13/43-15Peendoent No.Pl>g7,l9f.AFAS'ux)1faryFeedwater Actuat)on gotApplfcable ql'I

~TABLE3.3-5Cnntfnven' 30.5~/20.5~

~$0.0/14.0~30..0/17.0ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESRESP~';=TIMESINITIATING SIGNALANDFUNCTIONRESPONSETINEINSECONOSConta5nment Pressure-kf hSafetylrgect5on (ECCS)c30.gfl9.5~b."Conta5nment Isolat5on~

c.Sh5eldSu5ld5ngVent51at5on System4.Conta5mcnt FanCoolerse.Feedwater Isolat5on Containment Pressure--Hf h-Hfha.Conta5rment SprayContainment Rad5at5on-N ha.'onta5nment Isolat5on~

'.'h5eldSu5ld5ngVent5lat5on Systen6.SteamGenerator Pressure-Low a.Na5nSteamIsolat5on b.Feedwater Isolat5on Refuel5nMaterStorageTank-Lmv460.0c30.0fle.sc30.5~f20.5~

c30.0fl4.0c60.08.a.Conta5nment SumpRec5rculat5on'team Generator'evel Lo~c91.5a.Aux515ary Feedwatar rTABLESTATIOND5eselgenerator stirt5ngandD5eselgenerator start5ngandDffs5tapowerava5lable.

Notaool4cable toconta5nment

>ROSi+600"8/Av4Kd)sequenceload5n",delaysfncluded.

sequenceloidfngdelaysnot5ncluded.

5solat5on valveI-Nf-18-1.

n3/I3-17AnttnenBBB Bo.ff:P.g jt

'ADLE~.3-2(Cn~nllnund FUNCTlONL TESTCIIAIIIIEL CALIDDAllODCINIIIIEL CIICCKFUIICTNNLUNlT6.LOSSOFPNEkENGIIIEEREO SAFETYFEhTUREACTUATlON SYSTE4IHSTRNENThTlON SURVElLLAIICE REIRENEIITS NOOKSlNNIICIISUAVElLLAIICEEIIIlbba.I;16kvGaergeacy BusUnder-voltage{LossoD.Voltage)>>

h.1.1CRvEaergency Wsthder-voltagetOegradad Voltage)(1)Uadervoltage Oevice]1>>(2)UadervoltageOevice/2>>h.18OVEaargancy WsUnder-voltage(Oegraded Voltage)~SNN1.2.31,2.31.2.31,2,37.AUXlLlNYFEENNKRa.AutoStartb.StoaaGenerator

---

(See Survei11aace1.7.1.2.h)------

{SeeRESTablein31)~Aud~ex7~*Thisspecification willbeeffective priortqCycle7restart.

'lVH 7.AUXILIARY FEEDNTER(AFAS)a.Nanual(TripButtons)b.SGLevel(A/8)-Lowc.Autowmatic Actuation Logic8.AUXILIARY FEEDNTERISOlATION a.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandSGDifferential Pressure(BtoA/AtoB)

-Highb.SGLevel(A/B)-LowandFeedwater HeaderDifferential Pressure.(Btoh/AtoB)

-HighN.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.1,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,31,2,3

(.0tih('i'

~~~~~I~I'~~~~~4~~~~~44~~4~~~I~~,~II4II~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~It~SS~~~~I~~~~~~~~44~I~~~~~~~~~~~SI~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4~~.~I~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~~4~~~

ST.LUCIEUNITNO.IAUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEMSAFETYEVALUATION/NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS DETERMINATION ThisisarequesttoreviseTechnical Specification 3/4.3.2,Engineered SafetyFeatureActuation System(ESFAS)Instrumentation, oftheTechnical Specifications forSt.LucieUnit1.1.0DescritionofTechnical Secification ChaneTheproposedchangecontainsthosetechnical specifications neededtosupporttheinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS),whichwillbeinstalled tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-073V, ItemII.E.1.2.

TheproposedchangerevisesTable3.3-3(ESFASInstrumentation),

Table3.3-4(ESFASInstrumentation TripValues),Table3.3-5(Engineered SafetyFeaturesResponseTimes),andTable4.3-2(ESFASInstrumentation SurveiQance Requuements),

andlistsanadditional responsibility fortheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)inTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6.ThechangetoTable3.3-3revisesitemV,.Auxiliary Feedwater, toincludemanualtripbuttons,automatic actuation logic,andsteamgenerator levelasinputstotheAFAS.Item8,Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation, wasaddedtoaccountforthesystemsabilitytoisolateafaultedsteamgenerator basedonhighdifferential pressurebetweenthesteamgenerators and/orthefeedwater headers.ACTIONSTATEMENTS wereaddedtodescriberequiredactionwhentheAFASdoesnotsatisfythechannelrequirements listedinTable3.3-3.ThechangetoTable3.3-4revisesitem7andaddsItem8toincludealltheinputslistedabovewiththeirapplicable tripvaluesandallowable values.NotethatthechangetotheAFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointisbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed.

Theinputtosafetyanalysesisunaffected.

ThechangetoTable3.3-5addsitem1.ftoincludeamanualAFASinitiating signalandrevisesitem8,SteamGenerator Level,toreflectthenewAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)systemresponsetimebasedsolelyonnewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor(+25sec).ThechangetoTable4.3-2revisesitem7andaddsitem8toincludetheinputstotheAFAS,aslistedabove,andliststheassociated surveillance requirements foreachinput.ThechangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m tothelistofresponsibilities oftheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG).ItrequirestheFRGtoreviewanddocumentthejudgement concerning prolonged operation inanabnormalconfiguration asallowedinACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.DescritionofChanetotheAFWSstemThepresentAFWsystemincludesautomatic actuation ofauxiliary feedwater onlowsteamgenerator level,aftertheexpiration ofapresettimedelay.Thissystemrepresents FPL'sshort-term commitment toNUREG-0737, ItemII.E.1.2ThenewAFASwhichistobeinstalled priorto J

start-upofCycle7,alsoincludesautomatic actuation oftheAFWsystemonlowsteamgenerator levelandanadjustable timedelay.However,theAFASalsoincludeslogicthatwillautomatically isolateafaultedsteamgenerator onlowSGlevelcoincident withhighsteamgenerator and/orhighfeedwater headerdifferential pressuresignals.Provisions areincorporated intheAFASsothattheactuation signalcanbemanuallyinitiated.

ThenewAFASwillbeasdescribed andapprovedintheNRC'sSafetyEvaluation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater System,FloridaPower4LightCompany,St.LuciePlant,UnitNo.1,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 10>1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig),exceptthatatimedelayhasbeenaddedwhichwilldelaytheactuation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)Systemforsomepre-selected periodoftime(205to600seconds)afterreceiving aninitiation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint).

If,however,the:.initiation signalisremoved(duetoincreasing steamgenerator levelabovethebistableresetpoint)beforetheexpiration ofthetimedelay,thetimedelayisresettozero.Thisstopstheprocessandactuation oftheAFWsystemwillnotoccurunlesstheinitiation signalisreceivedagainandthetimedelayexpiresbeforetheinitiation signalisremoved.Theprimaryfunctionofthetimedelayistoreducechallenges ontheAFWsystemunderthecondition ofreactortripwithoffsitepowerandmainfeedwater available.

Thetimedelayalsoprovidesmorefavorable resultsforthe'teamLineBreakanalysisbydelayingtheactuation oftheAFWsystem.Theinstallation ofthesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)isbeingdone,inpart,tosatisfyarequirement inNUREG-0737, ItemILE.1.2.AnNRCsafetyevaluation oftheAFAS(NRClettertoFPL,R.A.ClarketoR.E.Uhrig,datedSeptember 10,1982)statedthattheelectrical, instrumentation, andcontrolaspectsoftheAFASwerereviewedbytheNRCandthattheNRCconcluded thattheSt.Lucie,UnitNo.1auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation systemcomplieswiththestaff'slongtermsafetygraderequirements, andtherefore, isacceptable.

Thesafetyevaluation recommended theadditionoftechnical specifications addressing thesurveillance testingoftheAFASautomatic actuation logic.Thisproposedtechnical specification changepackagecomplieswiththoserecommendations.

Automatic controloftheAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation Systemwillbemodifiedtoincorporate atimedelayasdescribed inSection1.1,Description ofChangetotheAFWSystem.Twoclassesofevents,increased heatremovalanddecreased heatremoval,werere-evaluated to'determine iftheywereaffectedbythischange.ThespecificFSAReventsre-evaluated, becausetheadditionoftheAFAShas.themostimpactofthem,weretheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-tripReturn-to-Criticality event.TheexistinganalysesfortheLossofFeedwater eventandtheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality eventarestillvalid,asdescribed below.2.1SteamLineBreakPost-TriReturn-to Criticalit TheSteamLineBreakpost-trip Return-to-Criticality Analysiscanbeaffectedbychangesintheassumptions fortheauxiliary feedwater flowrateandthetimeanddurationofdelivery.

Moreflow,delivered sooner,couldadversely affecttheresults.TheeffectsoftheAFASontheSteam

LineBreakpost-trip Return-to Criticality analysiswasevaluated byCombustion Engineering, thedesigneroftheAFASbycomparing theCycle5analysisresultswiththoseobtainedafterchangingonlythoseassumptions impactedby'AFAS.Theseassumptions arelistedinthetablebelow.Acomparison betweenthenewvaluesandthereference valuesshowsthatthereference analysisjsconservative, inthatitassumesthesameauxiliary feedwater flow,thesameAFASactuation

setpoint, andthesameminimumdelaytime.Theonlydifference isthatthenewAFAShastheabilitytoautomatically isolatetherupturedsteamgenerator onhighdifferential pressureensuringthatnoadditional waterisadmittedtotherupturedsteamgenerator.

ThisfeatureoftheAFASmakestheCycle5SteamLineBreakanalysisconservative.

Parameter Ref.AnalysisWithoutAFASNewAnalysisWithAFASCommentS/GWaterLevelAFWActuation SetpointMinimumAFASDelayTimeMaximumAFWFlowRate62.596(NormalWaterLeve9180seconds1280gpm180secondsNoDifference 1280gpmNoDifference 62.596(NormalNoDifference WaterLeve9MaximumHighSGN/APAFWIsolation Setpoint530psid+ForHZPcase-Noimpact.ForFullPowerCaseIsolatesAFWflowtorupturedS/GpriortoAFASactuation.

U+Notethatthe'530psidisolation setpointrepresents theTechnical Sp~ificationvalueplusinstrument uncertaintiesintheconservative direction.

ThehighSGPAFWisolation setpointwasevaluated todetermine ifahysteretic valuewasrequiredtomaketheeffectsofre-initiating AFWflowtotherupturedsteamgenerator acceptable.

Forthisanalysistherupturedsteamgenerator willbeisolatedwhentheSGPreaches530psid,andremainsisolateduntilthefeedwater headerPfallsbelow200psid.Sincethefeedwater headerPdoesnotfallbelow200psiduntilwellafterthetimeofpeakreactivity, re-initiation ofAFWisnotofconcern;therefore, ahysteretic valuefortheSGPAFWisolation setpointisnotrequired..

ExxonNuclearCo.hasperformed theirsafetyevaluation basedonthecurrentAFASandhasfoundtheCycle7analysistobebounding.

Feedwater linebreakswerenotanalyzedforexcessive heatremovalbecausethesteamlinebreakisthelimitingcooldowneventasstatedintheFSAR.2.2LossofFeedwater/Feedwater LineBreaksLossofFeedwater events,including Feedwater LineBreaks,werepreviously evaluated asaresultofpostTMIrequirements (NUREG-0737, IClf' ItemII.E.1.1).

Thisevaluation showedthattheLossofFeedwater eventwaslimitingfortheAFWsystem.Thisevaluation wassubmitted totheNRCandapp'roved intheNRC'sSE,transmitted viaNRCletterdatedSeptember 14,1982(R.A.ClarktoR.E.Uhrig).Thisevaluation ispresently reflected inSection10.5oftheFSAR.Areevaluation oftheseeventsconfirmed thatthelossofmainfeedwater withlossoffoffsitepowerplusanactivefailureoftheAorBbatteryandahighenergylinebreakintheAFWsystemwasthemostlimitingwithregardstotheAFWsystemrequirements.

Anevaluation ofthisevent,plustheLossofFeedwater analysisshowninSection15.2.8intheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)demonstrates that,afterthestartoftheevents,atleasttenminutesareavailable toverifyauto-start or,ifnecessary tomanuallyinitiateauxiliary feedwater flowbeforesteamgenerator dryoutoccurs.ThenewAFASwillactuatetheAFWsystemautomaticaQy wellwithinthetimeframedemonstrated asacceptable intheFSAR.Basedontheabove,theexistingLossofFeedwater AnalysisintheFSARremainsboundingandnoadditional analysisisrequired.

3.0 SiificantHazardsConsideration

OnSeptember 14,1982,NRCapprovedthechangestotheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)SystematSt.LucieUnit1,whichweretobemadetosatisfyNUREG-073V, SectionII.E.1.2.

BecauseSt.LucieUnit2wasbeinglicensedatthattimewiththesameauxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)aswhatwasapprovedforSt.LucieUnit1,NRCallowedpostponement oftheimplementation ofAFASonSt.LucieUnit1untiltheFall1985refueling outage,inordertoobtainoperational experience withthesystemonUnit2.St.LucieUnit1willbeimplementing thenewAFASduringtheupcomingrefueling outage,scheduled tobeginonOctober20,1985.Theonlydifference betweenthesystemapprovedbyNRCandthesystembeinginstalled istheadditionofatimedelay.Theadditionofthetimedelayon.thenewsystemperformsthesamefunctionasthecurrently installed timedelay,i.e.,itdelaysactuation of.thesystemforapre-selected periodoftimeafterreceiving anactuation signal(lowsteamgenerator levelsetpoint).Theproposedchangestothetechnical specifications arenecessary tomeetNUREG-0737 technical specification recommendations inthatadditional surveillance requirements arenowspecified fortheAFWsystem.ThisissimilartoExample(ii)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, contained intheCommission's guidancefordetermination ofsignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthatthenewsurveillance requirements arechangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedinthetechnical specifications:

forexample,amorestringent surveillance requirement.

Theproposedchangetothesteamgenerator lowlevelsetpointforAFWsysteminitiation (Table3.3-4Item7)isbasedsolelyontheadditionofnewleveltransmitters withlessinstrument uncertainty thanthosepresently installed.

Theinputtothesafetyanalysesisunaffected.

~~

TheproposedchangetotheSteamGenerator Level-Low responsetimeforAFWSysteminitiation (Table3.3-5Item8)isalsobasedsolelyonthenewequipment instrument uncertainty asstatedbythevendor.TheproposedchangetoTechnical Specification 6.5.1.6addsparagraph 6.5.1.6.m undertheFacilityReviewGroupresponsibilities tobeconsistent withtheadditionofnewACTIONSTATEMENT 13ofTable3.3-3.TheselastthreechangesaresimilartoExample(i)oftheexamplesofamendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations, inthattheyareadministrative innaturetoachieveconsistency throughout thetechnical specifications andtochangethetechnical specifications tobeconsistent withtheinstalled instrumentation.

Basedonthesafetyevaluation anddiscussions above,ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations.

WP/DISCNB0000/Rev TechSpec/0985/BL