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| {{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENTIMarked-upTechnicalSpecificationPageSt.LucieUnitl5-688012700148003pDRADOCN,0500@DR'P-EJW4/0I7/3 0~e.SlgShIM4gI13*~ | | {{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT IMarked-up Technical Specification PageSt.LucieUnitl5-68801270014 8003pDRADOCN,0500@DR'P-EJW4/0I7/3 0~e.SlgShIM4gI13*~ |
| ~~I~~~,~~~~~~~~I~IetI~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~'.~~II~~II~~~~l-~i~~~~~~~)~~sI~~~~~~I,~~~I~'~~I~~~I~~~~~,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~I'I~II~~~~i'ii~I''~~~~~~~I~~i~~~~~~~~~~i~~~I t | | ~~I~~~,~~~~~~~~I~IetI~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~'.~~II~~II~~~~l-~i~~~~~~~)~~sI~~~~~~I,~~~I~'~~I~~~I~~~~~,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~I'I~II~~~~i'ii~I''~~~~~~~I~~i~~~~~~~~~~i~~~I t |
| ATTACHMENT2SAFETYEVALUATlONEJWOIOi7/e SAFETYEVALUATIONBackroundThecurrentlylicensedfuelenrichmentlimitatSt.LucieUnitIfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracks,spentfuelracksandfuelhandlingstructuresis40w/oU235.FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hassubmittedaproposedlicenseamendmentinsupportofre-rackingtheUnitIspentfuelpoolwithhighdensitystorageracks(FPLletterL-87-245,datedJune12,1987).Thatsubmittaladdressestherequiredanalysis,i.e.,criticality,thermalhydraulic,seismic,etc.insupportofreplacingtheexistingspentfuelracks.Thecriticalityanalysisinthere-racksubmittalsupportsanenrichmentlimitof4.5w/oU-235forthehighdensityspentfuelracks.Thecriticalityanalysisfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipment(AppendixI)wasperformedseparatelyfromthere-rackanalysis.Thissubmittalsupportsincreasingtheenrichmentspecificationofthenewfuelstorageracktechnicalspecification(5.6.1.b)to4.5w/O'-235.FPLisrequestingtoincreasethemaximumenrichmentspecificationofthenewfuelstoragerackCriticalityTechnicalSpecification(5.6.1..b)atSt.LucieUnitIto<4.5w/oU-235.Thisproposedchangeallowsincreasedflexi6ilityinfuelmanagementandaccommodatesstorageofhigherenrichmentsforpossibleuseinfuture'cycles.SafetEvaluationTheanalysisoftheproposedincreaseinfuelenrichmenthasbeenaccomplishedusingcurrentlyacceptedcodesandstandardsasspecifiedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Calculationsperformedforthehandlingandstorage(newfuelracks)of4.5w/oU-235enrichedfuelassembliesdemonstratethattheapplicablecriticalityacceptancecriteriaaremet.Calculationsperformedforthenewfuelstorageracksatvariousdegreesofmoderation,includingfullflooding,indicatethatthelimitingkeffoccursforamoderatorvoidfractionof0.91andhasavalueof0.974atthe95Kconfidencelevel.Thisvalueislowerthanthesafetycriterialimitof0.98quotedintheapplicablestandardsfornewfuelstorageracksunderoptimummoderationconditions.Criticalityca1culationswerealsoperformedforthefuelhandlingstructures(fuelelevator,upenderandtransfertube)atapoolwatertemperatureof68oF.Themostreactivesituationduringnormalfuelhandlingoperationswasconservativelyassumed
| | ATTACHMENT 2SAFETYEVALUATlON EJWOIOi7/e SAFETYEVALUATION BackroundThecurrently licensedfuelenrichment limitatSt.LucieUnitIfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracks,spentfuelracksandfuelhandlingstructures is40w/oU235.FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hassubmitted aproposedlicenseamendment insupportofre-racking theUnitIspentfuelpoolwithhighdensitystorageracks(FPLletterL-87-245, datedJune12,1987).Thatsubmittal addresses therequiredanalysis, i.e.,criticality, thermalhydraulic, seismic,etc.insupportofreplacing theexistingspentfuelracks.Thecriticality analysisinthere-racksubmittal supportsanenrichment limitof4.5w/oU-235forthehighdensityspentfuelracks.Thecriticality analysisfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipment (Appendix I)wasperformed separately fromthere-rackanalysis. |
| 'tooccurwhentwoassembliesarelocated4inchesedgetoedgefromeachother.Theresultingkefffromthisscenariois0.929atthe95Kconfidencelevel.Forpostulatedaccidentssuchashavingtwoassembliesbyaccidentachieveabundletobundlespacingoflessthan4inches,creditmaybetakenforrealisticpoolconditions.Theseconditionsincludetakingcreditforsolubleboron(>1720ppm)presentinthepoolwater.Atthisboronconcentration,thekeffisreducedbyapproximately0.20,resultinginreactivitiesfarbelowthe0.95limit.Hence,postulatedaccidentsinthefuelhandlingsystemareoflittleconcernfromacriticalitysafetystandpoint.Basedontheforegoingdiscussion,itisconcludedthatthefuelelevatorupenderandtransfertubewillmeetthesafetycriterialimitofkeff<0.95. | | Thissubmittal supportsincreasing theenrichment specification ofthenewfuelstorageracktechnical specification (5.6.1.b) to4.5w/O'-235. |
| ATTACHMENT3DETERMINATIONOFNOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONThestandardsusedtoarriveatadeterminationthatarequestforamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationareincludedintheCommission'sregulations,IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificanthazardsconsiderationsareinvolvediftheoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot(I)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussedasfollows:(I)Operationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.FPLhasidentifiedafuelassemblydropasapotentialaccidentscenariowhoseconsequenceswouldbeaffectedbytheproposedchange.Forthistypeofaccident,thecriticalityacceptancecriterionisnotviolated.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthattheproposedamendmentwillnotresultinanincreaseoftheprobabilityorconsequencesofaccidentspreviouslyevaluated.(2)Vseofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Therequestedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedbecausetheplantconfigurationandthemannerinwhichitisoperatedremainthesame.Theproposedchangedoesnotconstituteanychangeintheproceduresforplantoperationorhardware.Inaddition,FPLhasevaluatedtheproposedtechnicalspecificationchangesinaccordancewiththeappropriateIndustryCodesandStandardsand,basedonthisevaluation,FPLfindsthattheproposedtechnicalspecif'icationchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.(3)Vseofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thenewfuelstoragerackcalculatedkeffof0.974(95%confidencelevel)islowerthantheestablishedacceptancecriteriaof<0.98keff.The0.929keff(95%confidencelevel)calculatedforthefuelhandlingstructuresisalsoconsiderablylowerthantheestablishedacceptancecriteriaof<0.95keff.Theabovecalculatedneutronmultiplicationfactorsincludeallthenecessarybiasesanduncertainties.Asnotedabove,therequiredacceptancecriteria(<0.98keffunderoptimunmoderationconditionsand0.95underfullyfloodedconditionsforthenewfuelstorageracks,and<0.95keffforthefuelhandlingstructures)havebeenadheredtointhecriticalityanalysisperformedinsupportofthisproposedtechnicalspecificationchange.Specifically,theEJW4/0I7/5 4I4IIII'lIIIl4,4II\~FI4~II'W,tliIIII'4IgI44JrII4,~4II'I4~IIlII4FW~\'I4IIgtkll4'.FhI,IWIhIt4~l.I~IF44444,I4hlhtt,r4~~1444'4I'IIIIIII44IFW4I41IIWIII)'4I,4I~I~I4IW41Nh'WI4'I~I4I4'III~IWII~'uI'4'~4IIhflI411444I4'Im1'll-'.I*I 0.02keffand0.05keffcriticalitymarginofsafetyrequiredforthenewfuelstorageareaunderoptimummoderationandfullyfloodedconditionsrespectively,and0.05keffcriticalitymarginofsafetyrequiredforthefuelhandlingstructureshavebeenmaintained.Basedonthepreviousdiscussion,theproposedamendmenttoincreasetheallowablefuelU-235enrichmentinthenewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipmentwillnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedontheabove,'wehavedeterminedthattheamendmentrequestdoesnot(l)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,(2)createtheprobabilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety;andthereforedoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.EJWO/0I7/6 0p=<<I<<4i,<<l,<<UIII-<<~I4fl4>>I,,II4fIi~ffIfU<<ILI4~.4I4<<I<<~il~<<.4<<~4"~~'I.I,4,~<<44U'i''f4444Ul~''4II<<4<<<<~4il<<4<<"<<<<~ikll4L.~~3<<-<<<<
| | FPLisrequesting toincreasethemaximumenrichment specification ofthenewfuelstoragerackCriticality Technical Specification (5.6.1..b) atSt.LucieUnitIto<4.5w/oU-235.Thisproposedchangeallowsincreased flexi6ility infuelmanagement andaccommodates storageofhigherenrichments forpossibleuseinfuture'cycles.SafetEvaluation Theanalysisoftheproposedincreaseinfuelenrichment hasbeenaccomplished usingcurrently acceptedcodesandstandards asspecified intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Calculations performed forthehandlingandstorage(newfuelracks)of4.5w/oU-235enrichedfuelassemblies demonstrate thattheapplicable criticality acceptance criteriaaremet.Calculations performed forthenewfuelstorageracksatvariousdegreesofmoderation, including fullflooding, indicatethatthelimitingkeffoccursforamoderator voidfractionof0.91andhasavalueof0.974atthe95Kconfidence level.Thisvalueislowerthanthesafetycriterialimitof0.98quotedintheapplicable standards fornewfuelstorageracksunderoptimummoderation conditions. |
| | Criticality ca1culationswerealsoperformed forthefuelhandlingstructures (fuelelevator, upenderandtransfertube)atapoolwatertemperature of68oF.Themostreactivesituation duringnormalfuelhandlingoperations wasconservatively assumed |
| | 'tooccurwhentwoassemblies arelocated4inchesedgetoedgefromeachother.Theresulting kefffromthisscenariois0.929atthe95Kconfidence level.Forpostulated accidents suchashavingtwoassemblies byaccidentachieveabundletobundlespacingoflessthan4inches,creditmaybetakenforrealistic poolconditions. |
| | Theseconditions includetakingcreditforsolubleboron(>1720ppm)presentinthepoolwater.Atthisboronconcentration, thekeffisreducedbyapproximately 0.20,resulting inreactivities farbelowthe0.95limit.Hence,postulated accidents inthefuelhandlingsystemareoflittleconcernfromacriticality safetystandpoint. |
| | Basedontheforegoing discussion, itisconcludedthatthefuelelevatorupenderandtransfertubewillmeetthesafetycriterialimitofkeff<0.95. |
| | ATTACHMENT 3DETERMINATION OFNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Thestandards usedtoarriveatadetermination thatarequestforamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration areincludedintheCommission's regulations, IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificant hazardsconsiderations areinvolvediftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussed asfollows:(I)Operation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated. |
| | FPLhasidentified afuelassemblydropasapotential accidentscenariowhoseconsequences wouldbeaffectedbytheproposedchange.Forthistypeofaccident, thecriticality acceptance criterion isnotviolated. |
| | Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment willnotresultinanincreaseoftheprobability orconsequences ofaccidents previously evaluated. |
| | (2)Vseofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated. |
| | Therequested changedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated becausetheplantconfiguration andthemannerinwhichitisoperatedremainthesame.Theproposedchangedoesnotconstitute anychangeintheprocedures forplantoperation orhardware. |
| | Inaddition, FPLhasevaluated theproposedtechnical specification changesinaccordance withtheappropriate IndustryCodesandStandards and,basedonthisevaluation, FPLfindsthattheproposedtechnical specif'ication changedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated. |
| | (3)Vseofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thenewfuelstoragerackcalculated keffof0.974(95%confidence level)islowerthantheestablished acceptance criteriaof<0.98keff.The0.929keff(95%confidence level)calculated forthefuelhandlingstructures isalsoconsiderably lowerthantheestablished acceptance criteriaof<0.95keff.Theabovecalculated neutronmultiplication factorsincludeallthenecessary biasesanduncertainties. |
| | Asnotedabove,therequiredacceptance criteria(<0.98keffunderoptimunmoderation conditions and0.95underfullyfloodedconditions forthenewfuelstorageracks,and<0.95keffforthefuelhandlingstructures) havebeenadheredtointhecriticality analysisperformed insupportofthisproposedtechnical specification change.Specifically, theEJW4/0I7/5 4I4IIII'lIIIl4,4II\~FI4~II'W,tliIIII'4IgI44JrII4,~4II'I4~IIlII4FW~\'I4IIgtkll4'.FhI,IWIhIt4~l.I~IF44444,I4hlhtt,r4~~1444'4I'IIIIIII44IFW4I41IIWIII)'4I,4I~I~I4IW41Nh'WI4'I~I4I4'III~IWII~'uI'4'~4IIhflI411444I4'Im1'll-'.I*I 0.02keffand0.05keffcriticality marginofsafetyrequiredforthenewfuelstorageareaunderoptimummoderation andfullyfloodedconditions respectively, and0.05keffcriticality marginofsafetyrequiredforthefuelhandlingstructures havebeenmaintained. |
| | Basedonthepreviousdiscussion, theproposedamendment toincreasetheallowable fuelU-235enrichment inthenewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipment willnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Basedontheabove,'we havedetermined thattheamendment requestdoesnot(l)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety;andtherefore doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration. |
| | EJWO/0I7/6 0p=<<I<<4i,<<l,<<UIII-<<~I4fl4>>I,,II4fIi~ffIfU<<ILI4~.4I4<<I<<~il~<<.4<<~4"~~'I.I,4,~<<44U'i''f4444Ul~''4II<<4<<<<~4il<<4<<"<<<<~ikll4L.~~3<<-<<<< |
| APPENOIX1 1/Iy~f}} | | APPENOIX1 1/Iy~f}} |
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|---|
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks
ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit
ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution
ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position
ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases
ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1
ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position
ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses
ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal
ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b
ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998
Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank
ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews
ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions
ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures
ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998
Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls
ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity
ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values
ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion
ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8
ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE
ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases
ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings
ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept
ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls
ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel
ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria
ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel
ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996
Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition
ML17228B5041996-06-0101 June 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Thermal Margin & RCS Flow Limits
ML17228B3761996-01-0404 January 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rectifying Discrepancy for Each St Lucie Unit & Providing Assurance That Admin Controls for Hpsip Remain Effective in Lower Operational Modes
ML17228B3361995-11-22022 November 1995
Proposed TS 3/4.4.6.1 for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation,Adapting STS for C-E Plants (NUREG-1432) Spec 3.4.15
ML17228B2451995-08-16016 August 1995
Proposed TS 3.6.6.1, Sbvs.
ML17228B2421995-08-16016 August 1995
Proposed Ts,Reflecting Relocation of Selected TS Requirements Re Instrumentation & Emergency & Security Plan Review Process,Per GL 93-07
ML17228B1891995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Injection Tank Surveillances
ML17228B1811995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Time Allowed to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17228B1791995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Extended Allowed Outage Time for EDGs
ML17228B1471995-05-17017 May 1995
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending Applicability of Current RCS Pressure/Temp Limits & Maximum Allowed RCS Heatup & Cooldown Rates to 23.6 Effective Full Power Yrs of Operation
ML17228B1441995-05-17017 May 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative & Conforming Update
ML17228B0901995-04-0303 April 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Incorporation of line-item TS Improvements to TSs 3/4.8.1 & 4.8.1.2.2 for Licenses DPR-67 & NPF-16
ML17228B0591995-02-27027 February 1995
Proposed TS Re Sdcs Min Flow Rate Requirements
ML17228B0521995-02-27027 February 1995
Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 & 3.3-4 to Accommodate Improved Coincidence Logic & Relay Replacement for 4.16 Kv Loss of Voltage Relays
ML17228B0331995-02-22022 February 1995
Proposed TS 4.6.1.3,reflecting Deletion of Refs to Automatic Tester for Containment Personnel Air Lock
ML17228A9921995-01-20020 January 1995
Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Incore Detectors to (TS 3/4.3.3.2) to Updated FSAR & Revising Lhr Surveillance 4.2.1.4 & Special Test Exceptions Surveillance 4.10.2.2,4.10.4.2 & 4.10.5.2
ML17228A9031994-11-0202 November 1994
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.6.2.1 & 3/4.6.2.3,adapting Combined Spec for Containment Spray & Cooling Sys Contained in Std TS for C-E Plants
ML17228A8911994-10-27027 October 1994
Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Administrative Changes
ML17228A6521994-07-28028 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Re LTOP Requirements for Power Operated Relief Valves,Per GL 90-06
ML17228A6591994-07-25025 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Enhancements Recommended by GL 93-05, Line-Item TS Improvements to Reduce SR for Testing During Power Operation.
ML17228A6561994-07-25025 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs for Main Feedwater Line Isolation Valves to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1432,standard TS for C-E Plants
ML17228A5771994-05-23023 May 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Option That Allows HPCI Pump 1C to Be Used as Alternative to Preferred Pump for Subsystem Operability
1999-06-01
[Table view]
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17309A9961999-06-30030 June 1999
Rev 35 to HP-90, Emergency Equipment.
ML17309A9941999-06-17017 June 1999
Rev 1 to COP-06.06, Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples.
ML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17309A9951999-05-27027 May 1999
Rev 0 to COP-06.11, Establishing Remote Lab for Analyses of Accident Samples.
ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks
ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit
ML17229B0441999-03-0202 March 1999
Cycle 11 Reactor Startup Physics Testing Rept. with 990304 Ltr
ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution
ML17229B0361998-12-22022 December 1998
Rev 20 to Procedure C-200, Odcm.
ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position
ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases
ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1
ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position
ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses
ML20153G0781998-08-26026 August 1998
Rev 19 to Plstqp, Guard Training & Qualification Plan
ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal
ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b
ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998
Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank
ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures
ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions
ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews
ML17229A6751998-03-27027 March 1998
Cycle 15 Reactor Startup Physics & Replacement SG Testing Rept. W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998
Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls
ML17229A6381998-02-12012 February 1998
Rev 19 to C-200, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ML17229A6151998-01-12012 January 1998
Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, St Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ISI Plan.
ML17229A6141998-01-12012 January 1998
Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, Third Interval ISI Program for St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1.
ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity
ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values
ML17229A5851997-12-12012 December 1997
Rev 0 to ADM-29.01, IST Program for Pumps & Valves.
ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion
ML17309A9171997-11-26026 November 1997
Rev 0 to PSL-ENG-SENS-97-068, Spent Fuel Pool Dilution Analysis.
ML17229A5931997-09-26026 September 1997
Rev 4 to Procedure QI-5-PSL-1, Preparation,Rev,Review/ Approval of Procedures.
ML17229A5921997-09-18018 September 1997
Rev 0 to Procedure ADM-17.11, 10CFR500.59 Screening.
ML20211Q5841997-09-10010 September 1997
Rev 18 to Training & Qualification Plan
ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8
ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE
ML17309A8951997-06-11011 June 1997
Rev 0 to PL-CNSI-97-004, Transportation & Emergency Response Plan for St Lucie Unit 1 SG Project.
ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases
ML17229A2981997-03-0606 March 1997
Final Analysis of Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment for St Lucie Unit 1 NPP Using NUREG-0800 Std Review Plan 15.1.5 App A.
ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings
ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept
ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls
ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel
ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel
ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria
ML17229A0951996-10-24024 October 1996
Rev 0 to 00000-OSW-16, In-Situ Pressure Test Results for St Lucie Unit 1 Spring 1996 Outage.
ML17229A0861996-10-18018 October 1996
Startup Physics Testing Rept. W/961018 Ltr
ML17229A2441996-09-23023 September 1996
Rev 18 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (Odcm).
ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996
Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition
ML17229A0961996-06-12012 June 1996
Rev 0 to TR-9419-CSE96-1101, Test Rept - SG Tube In-Situ Hydrostatic Pressure Test Tool Hydro Chamber Pressure Determination.
1999-06-30
[Table view] |
Text
ATTACHMENT IMarked-up Technical Specification PageSt.LucieUnitl5-68801270014 8003pDRADOCN,0500@DR'P-EJW4/0I7/3 0~e.SlgShIM4gI13*~
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ATTACHMENT 2SAFETYEVALUATlON EJWOIOi7/e SAFETYEVALUATION BackroundThecurrently licensedfuelenrichment limitatSt.LucieUnitIfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracks,spentfuelracksandfuelhandlingstructures is40w/oU235.FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hassubmitted aproposedlicenseamendment insupportofre-racking theUnitIspentfuelpoolwithhighdensitystorageracks(FPLletterL-87-245, datedJune12,1987).Thatsubmittal addresses therequiredanalysis, i.e.,criticality, thermalhydraulic, seismic,etc.insupportofreplacing theexistingspentfuelracks.Thecriticality analysisinthere-racksubmittal supportsanenrichment limitof4.5w/oU-235forthehighdensityspentfuelracks.Thecriticality analysisfortheexistingnewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipment (Appendix I)wasperformed separately fromthere-rackanalysis.
Thissubmittal supportsincreasing theenrichment specification ofthenewfuelstorageracktechnical specification (5.6.1.b) to4.5w/O'-235.
FPLisrequesting toincreasethemaximumenrichment specification ofthenewfuelstoragerackCriticality Technical Specification (5.6.1..b) atSt.LucieUnitIto<4.5w/oU-235.Thisproposedchangeallowsincreased flexi6ility infuelmanagement andaccommodates storageofhigherenrichments forpossibleuseinfuture'cycles.SafetEvaluation Theanalysisoftheproposedincreaseinfuelenrichment hasbeenaccomplished usingcurrently acceptedcodesandstandards asspecified intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Calculations performed forthehandlingandstorage(newfuelracks)of4.5w/oU-235enrichedfuelassemblies demonstrate thattheapplicable criticality acceptance criteriaaremet.Calculations performed forthenewfuelstorageracksatvariousdegreesofmoderation, including fullflooding, indicatethatthelimitingkeffoccursforamoderator voidfractionof0.91andhasavalueof0.974atthe95Kconfidence level.Thisvalueislowerthanthesafetycriterialimitof0.98quotedintheapplicable standards fornewfuelstorageracksunderoptimummoderation conditions.
Criticality ca1culationswerealsoperformed forthefuelhandlingstructures (fuelelevator, upenderandtransfertube)atapoolwatertemperature of68oF.Themostreactivesituation duringnormalfuelhandlingoperations wasconservatively assumed
'tooccurwhentwoassemblies arelocated4inchesedgetoedgefromeachother.Theresulting kefffromthisscenariois0.929atthe95Kconfidence level.Forpostulated accidents suchashavingtwoassemblies byaccidentachieveabundletobundlespacingoflessthan4inches,creditmaybetakenforrealistic poolconditions.
Theseconditions includetakingcreditforsolubleboron(>1720ppm)presentinthepoolwater.Atthisboronconcentration, thekeffisreducedbyapproximately 0.20,resulting inreactivities farbelowthe0.95limit.Hence,postulated accidents inthefuelhandlingsystemareoflittleconcernfromacriticality safetystandpoint.
Basedontheforegoing discussion, itisconcludedthatthefuelelevatorupenderandtransfertubewillmeetthesafetycriterialimitofkeff<0.95.
ATTACHMENT 3DETERMINATION OFNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Thestandards usedtoarriveatadetermination thatarequestforamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration areincludedintheCommission's regulations, IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificant hazardsconsiderations areinvolvediftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussed asfollows:(I)Operation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
FPLhasidentified afuelassemblydropasapotential accidentscenariowhoseconsequences wouldbeaffectedbytheproposedchange.Forthistypeofaccident, thecriticality acceptance criterion isnotviolated.
Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheproposedamendment willnotresultinanincreaseoftheprobability orconsequences ofaccidents previously evaluated.
(2)Vseofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Therequested changedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated becausetheplantconfiguration andthemannerinwhichitisoperatedremainthesame.Theproposedchangedoesnotconstitute anychangeintheprocedures forplantoperation orhardware.
Inaddition, FPLhasevaluated theproposedtechnical specification changesinaccordance withtheappropriate IndustryCodesandStandards and,basedonthisevaluation, FPLfindsthattheproposedtechnical specif'ication changedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
(3)Vseofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thenewfuelstoragerackcalculated keffof0.974(95%confidence level)islowerthantheestablished acceptance criteriaof<0.98keff.The0.929keff(95%confidence level)calculated forthefuelhandlingstructures isalsoconsiderably lowerthantheestablished acceptance criteriaof<0.95keff.Theabovecalculated neutronmultiplication factorsincludeallthenecessary biasesanduncertainties.
Asnotedabove,therequiredacceptance criteria(<0.98keffunderoptimunmoderation conditions and0.95underfullyfloodedconditions forthenewfuelstorageracks,and<0.95keffforthefuelhandlingstructures) havebeenadheredtointhecriticality analysisperformed insupportofthisproposedtechnical specification change.Specifically, theEJW4/0I7/5 4I4IIII'lIIIl4,4II\~FI4~II'W,tliIIII'4IgI44JrII4,~4II'I4~IIlII4FW~\'I4IIgtkll4'.FhI,IWIhIt4~l.I~IF44444,I4hlhtt,r4~~1444'4I'IIIIIII44IFW4I41IIWIII)'4I,4I~I~I4IW41Nh'WI4'I~I4I4'III~IWII~'uI'4'~4IIhflI411444I4'Im1'll-'.I*I 0.02keffand0.05keffcriticality marginofsafetyrequiredforthenewfuelstorageareaunderoptimummoderation andfullyfloodedconditions respectively, and0.05keffcriticality marginofsafetyrequiredforthefuelhandlingstructures havebeenmaintained.
Basedonthepreviousdiscussion, theproposedamendment toincreasetheallowable fuelU-235enrichment inthenewfuelstorageracksandfuelhandlingequipment willnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Basedontheabove,'we havedetermined thattheamendment requestdoesnot(l)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety;andtherefore doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.
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APPENOIX1 1/Iy~f
