Information Notice 1993-67, Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:U -AUUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555August 16, 1993NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTIONSTEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANTPERSONNEL
{{#Wiki_filter:U -AU UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to remind addressees of the hazards associated with steam drivencoolant injection systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and theauxiliary feedwater system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients willreview the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions Xcontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.BackgroundThe purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbinecasing and associated exhaust piping from an overpressure event if the normalexhaust path to the suppression pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station,two 40.6-cm [16-inch] stainless steel discs are installed in series with a6.4-cm [2.5-inch] spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensorinstrumentation line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function,actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert theoperators that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCIexhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI highexhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed bypressure sensors located downstream from where the section of pipingcontaining the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. Thesection of piping containing the rupture discs is mounted vertically over theturbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to ruptureand impact the outer disc, releasing steam into the HPCI room.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to remind addressees
 
of the hazards associated
 
with steam driven coolant injection
 
systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation
 
cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and the auxiliary
 
feedwater
 
system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
X contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
 
The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbine casing and associated
 
exhaust piping from an overpressure
 
event if the normal exhaust path to the suppression
 
pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station, two 40.6-cm [16-inch]  
stainless
 
steel discs are installed
 
in series with a 6.4-cm [2.5-inch]  
spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensor instrumentation
 
line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function, actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert the operators
 
that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCI exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI high exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed by pressure sensors located downstream
 
from where the section of piping containing
 
the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. The section of piping containing
 
the rupture discs is mounted vertically
 
over the turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than 1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to rupture and impact the outer disc, releasing
 
steam into the HPCI room.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
During a quarterly
 
inservice
 
test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth
 
Edison Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture 9308100248 F QrRi
 
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing
 
steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double doors that are part of the secondary
 
containment
 
boundary were also blown open. The floor latch on the inner containment
 
door was bent; the outer doors were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately
 
35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated
 
by automatic isolation
 
of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature
 
about 20 seconds into the event.Discussion
 
Upon investigating
 
the event, the licensee determined
 
that water had accumulated
 
in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed
 
a reliability-centered
 
maintenance
 
study which recommended
 
the level switches be included in the preventive
 
maintenance
 
program but the recommendation
 
had not been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level switches were also found to be inoperable.
 
The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed
 
the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing
 
the rupture discs. The resulting
 
pressure pulse caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal
 
61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure (see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance
 
and should have immediately
 
isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure was not detected indicates
 
two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design
 
pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the disc to burst, relieving
 
the exhaust line pressure before the downstream
 
pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.
 
While inspection
 
of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation
 
from corrosion
 
or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the discs are warranted
 
for one year of service under normal conditions.
 
The HPCI and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years and were not part of any scheduled
 
inspection
 
or preventive
 
maintenance
 
program. When consulted
 
about the event, the vendor advised against using the spare discs in the plant storeroom
 
because they were purchased
 
at the same time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture disc during a refueling
 
outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection.
 
The rupture discs were inspected
 
at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement
 
to the preventive
 
maintenance
 
program that was recommended
 
by a reliability-centered
 
analysis.
 
I I IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating
 
in the HPCI pump surveillance
 
test. The fifth, and m6st severely.
 
injured worker was a health physics technician
 
in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of the danger posed by the surveillance
 
test. The test procedure
 
contained
 
no specific guidance on room occupancy.
 
Interviews
 
with the workers revealed that they had performed
 
the surveillance
 
in the past and were familiar with the process. This familiarity
 
may have led to a relaxed attitude toward personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances
 
they sometimes
 
evacuated
 
the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement
 
over the plant paging system to alert plant personnel
 
before the HPCI-turbine
 
start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication
 
between the workersand
 
the control room may have contributed
 
to the personnel
 
injuries.
 
If a control room operator had been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the workers would have been aware of the impending
 
turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated
 
or the turbine manually tripped before the automatic
 
isolation
 
caused by the high area temperatureoin
 
the HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters
 
[2 inches]. If the steam release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing
 
high energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis.
 
For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered
 
that while the HPCI and RCIC rooms were qualified
 
for pressures
 
of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement
 
a preventive
 
maintenance
 
schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level switches.
 
The licensee will review the surveillance
 
test procedure
 
and evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the event at Unit 1 and is considering
 
burst testing the removed discs to determine
 
if they are degraded.
 
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts:
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified
 
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
Cq~0cr cO Cd) h r-4 0\TO SUPPRESSION
 
POOL 1 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE I INNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]2 40.6 cm[16 in]VENT TO HPCI ROOM STEAM INLET LINE FROM "B" MAIN STEAM LINE LOCKED OPEN I I I I I RX BLDG I I I I 50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM 25 cm[10 In]D NOTES: 1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.
 
2. REDUNDANT
 
PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified
 
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line
 
Attachment
 
2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-66 93-65 93-64 93-63 93-62 93-61 93-60 93-59 93-58 Switchover
 
to Hot-Leg Injection
 
Following A Loss-of-Coolant
 
Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection
 
Bypassed Periodic Testing and Preventive
 
Maintenance
 
of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Improper Use of Soluble Weld Purge Dam Material Thermal Stratification
 
of Water in BWR Reactor Vessels Excessive
 
Reactor Coolant Leakage Following
 
A Seal Failure in A Reactor Coolant Pump or Reactor Recirculation
 
Pump Reporting
 
Fuel Cycle and Materials
 
Events to the NRC Operations
 
Center Unexpected
 
Opening of Both Doors in An Airlock Nonconservatism
 
in Low-Temperature
 
===Overpressure===
Protection
 
for Pressurized- Water Reactors 08/16/93 08/13/93-08/12/93 08/11/93 08/10/93 08/09/93 08/04/93 07/26/93 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
 
water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materials licensees.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
 
reactors.OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
l--IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for
 
Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified
 
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
 
OFC *OEAB:DORS
 
*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
 
*DRS:R-III
 
===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III
 
*SC:OEAB:DORS
 
*C/OEAB/DORS
 
*C:SPLB:DSSA
 
NAME GWright I RDennig AEChaffee
 
CEMcCracken
 
DATE [ 07/14/93 1 07/15/93 07/15/93 ]07/16/93 I__ _ i OFC*D:DSSA*C/OGCB:DORS
 
D/DORS A^r NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V[OFFICIAL
 
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN
 
\-IN 93-XX July XX, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts:
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David (301)Skeen, NRR 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
 
*D:DSSA AThadani 07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS
 
*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
 
*DRS:R-III
 
===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
DATE J 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III
 
*SC:OEAB:DORS
 
*C/OEAB/DORS
 
*C:SPLB:DSSA
 
NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee
 
CEMcCracken
 
DATE J 07/14/93 07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93.Y.OFC C/OGCB:DORS
 
D/DORS NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93[OFFICIAL
 
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
 
*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
 
*DRS:R-III
 
===NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet===
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 1'I*C:DRS:RIII
 
*SC:OEAB:DORS
 
*C:OEAB:DORS
 
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ACThadani 07/14/93 [07/15/93
07/15/93 -07/2/f93
07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS
 
D: DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
 
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IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
 
*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
 
*DRS:R-III
 
===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07 114/93 07/14/93 L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII
 
S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA
 
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ACThadani 07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS
 
D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 0 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
 
-E7/14/93 12:53 ?03 787905538417463837 P. 0', This infi you have the tech Roactor IN 93-XX July xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
It any questions
 
about the information
 
in this noticet please contact lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of sOrating RGOM Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technic~l
 
contacts Clark Vanderniet, R-II1 (708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR (301) 604-1174 Attach 4 nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C, OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED
 
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J\1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
I OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
 
*TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-III NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
 
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII
 
SC:OEAB:DORS
 
C:OEAB:DORS
 
C:SPLB:DSSA
 
D:DSSA GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken


==Description of Circumstances==
ACThadani 07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..I C:OGCB:DORS
During a quarterly inservice test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth EdisonQuad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture9308100248F QrRi


IN 93-67August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightlycontaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second afterthe turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI roomswere blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of doubledoors that are part of the secondary containment boundary were also blownopen. The floor latch on the inner containment door was bent; the outer doorswere also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated by automaticisolation of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature about20 seconds into the event.DiscussionUpon investigating the event, the licensee determined that water hadaccumulated in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches forthe Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed areliability-centered maintenance study which recommended the level switches beincluded in the preventive maintenance program but the recommendation had notbeen acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system levelswitches were also found to be inoperable.The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbinecasing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing the rupture discs. The resulting pressure pulsecaused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc asdesigned and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors,located in the horizontal 61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from thevertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure(see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance and should haveimmediately isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressurebefore the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressurewas not detected indicates two possible causes for the disc rupture. Eitherthe inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design pressure,or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused thedisc to burst, relieving the exhaust line pressure before the downstreampressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.While inspection of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation fromcorrosion or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that thediscs are warranted for one year of service under normal conditions. The HPCIand RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 yearsand were not part of any scheduled inspection or preventive maintenanceprogram. When consulted about the event, the vendor advised against using thespare discs in the plant storeroom because they were purchased at the sametime as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs withnew units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupturedisc during a refueling outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to QuadCities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection. The rupturediscs were inspected at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement to thepreventive maintenance program that was recommended by a reliability-centeredanalysis.
D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN


I IIN 93-67August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating in the HPCIpump surveillance test. The fifth, and m6st severely. injured worker was ahealth physics technician in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware ofthe danger posed by the surveillance test. The test procedure contained nospecific guidance on room occupancy. Interviews with the workers revealedthat they had performed the surveillance in the past and were familiar withthe process. This familiarity may have led to a relaxed attitude towardpersonal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances theysometimes evacuated the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near thedoors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement overthe plant paging system to alert plant personnel before the HPCI-turbinestart, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication between the workersand the control room mayhave contributed to the personnel injuries. If a control room operator hadbeen in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, theworkers would have been aware of the impending turbine start and, after start,the steam supply might have been manually-isolated or the turbine manuallytripped before the automatic isolation caused by the high area temperatureointhe HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blownoff their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted apipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters [2 inches]. If the steamrelease had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of theHPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCIsystem could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have beenanalyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing highenergy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis. For example,at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered that while the HPCI andRCIC rooms were qualified for pressures of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doorsbetween these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement a preventivemaintenance schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the levelswitches. The licensee will review the surveillance test procedure andevaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replacedthe rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after theevent at Unit 1 and is considering burst testing the removed discs todetermine if they are degraded.
I' >OFC OEAB:DORS


IN 93-67August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII(708) 790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachments:1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad CitiesStation HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
SC/OEAB:DORS


Cq~0crcOCd) h r-4 0\TOSUPPRESSIONPOOL1OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECKCHECK VALVE VALVE IINNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]240.6 cm[16 in]VENT TOHPCI ROOMSTEAM INLET LINEFROM "B" MAINSTEAM LINELOCKEDOPENIIIIIRX BLDGIIII50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM25 cm[10 In]D NOTES:1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTERRUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.2. REDUNDANT PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line
PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORS


Attachment 2IN 93-67August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-6693-6593-6493-6393-6293-6193-6093-5993-58Switchover to Hot-LegInjection FollowingA Loss-of-CoolantAccident in Pres-surized Water ReactorsReactor Trips Causedby Breaker Testingwith Fault ProtectionBypassedPeriodic Testing andPreventive Maintenanceof Molded Case CircuitBreakersImproper Use of SolubleWeld Purge Dam MaterialThermal Stratificationof Water in BWR ReactorVesselsExcessive Reactor CoolantLeakage Following A SealFailure in A ReactorCoolant Pump or ReactorRecirculation PumpReporting Fuel Cycle andMaterials Events to theNRC Operations CenterUnexpected Opening ofBoth Doors in AnAirlockNonconservatism in Low-Temperature OverpressureProtection for Pressurized-Water Reactors08/16/9308/13/93-08/12/9308/11/9308/10/9308/09/9308/04/9307/26/9307/26/93All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materialslicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized-waterreactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 1 7/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS


l--IN 93-67August 16, 1993 ]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN
C/DRS/R-III


\-IN 93-XXJuly XX, 1993 ]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark Vanderniet, R-III(708) 790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307/14/9307/14/931'I*C:DRS:RIII *SC:OEAB:DORS *C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLBAS* D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/14/93 [07/15/93 07/15/93 -07/2/f93 07/2A/93C:OGCB:DORSD: DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /93DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WENC 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J-
DRS/R-III NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet
IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark(708)Vanderniet, R-III790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307 114/9307/14/93L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSAGWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93C:OGCB:DORSD:DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /930DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN


-E7/14/9312:53 ?03 787905538417463837P. 0',This infiyou havethe techRoactorIN 93-XXJuly xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response. Itany questions about the information in this noticet please contactlcal contmct listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclearr.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of sOrating RGOM SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnic~l contactsClark Vanderniet, R-II1(708) 790-5594Oavid Skeen NRR(301) 604-1174Attach4nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C,OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED -I _ I RNAME _ JGnMain PI_. .,I -- '^A j"IR na jai4I 7/1k01.%0J//Y//93I1UATI I uJ 1 b I W ._ II nF&-flIA I C:PBDS :ISS I ----.n J T TVcr P. rAn
DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS


* Motwrn r nAs WDgRI C.SPLB*DSSAD :DSSA_ICh ouf I 1NNI I I I;rn n I= -- 1 --.-. -T II 1Atn"^"4^"I ji 1%V, famrEIaCrackenACThadani _1OI-lqn 0, 7/ R/9M3..~07~11 9 93 07/ /93 -- 107/ /193 -IQl l 193 107/ /93--:_ _r _r.nnr 'f lRSD:DORSus BK rimes-.. ..- _ L4Y.IIuL)OCUME NA ML: QUMrLun.w~J'14 JUL 93 B: 5uLETd lN11 211HM DUN411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0LM1 b0S IQ&#xa3;
D/DORS NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL
J\1IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark(708)Vanderniet, R-III790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEIOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307/ W/9307/ /93C:DRS:RIII SC:OEAB:DORS C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSAGWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..IC:OGCB:DORSD:DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /93DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN


I' >OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORSNAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 17/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93OFC OGCB:DORS C/DRS/R-III DRS/R-IIINAME PWen GWright CVandernietDATE / /93 / /93 / /93OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS D/DORSNAME l GMarcus l BGrimesDATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1  
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1}}
}}


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Revision as of 13:56, 31 August 2018

Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel
ML031070135
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000349, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1993
From: Grimes B K
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-067, NUDOCS 9308100248
Download: ML031070135 (14)
v • d • e


U -AU UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to remind addressees

of the hazards associated

with steam driven coolant injection

systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation

cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and the auxiliary

feedwater

system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

X contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background

The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbine casing and associated

exhaust piping from an overpressure

event if the normal exhaust path to the suppression

pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station, two 40.6-cm [16-inch]

stainless

steel discs are installed

in series with a 6.4-cm [2.5-inch]

spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensor instrumentation

line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function, actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert the operators

that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCI exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI high exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed by pressure sensors located downstream

from where the section of piping containing

the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. The section of piping containing

the rupture discs is mounted vertically

over the turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than 1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to rupture and impact the outer disc, releasing

steam into the HPCI room.Description

of Circumstances

During a quarterly

inservice

test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth

Edison Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture 9308100248 F QrRi

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing

steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double doors that are part of the secondary

containment

boundary were also blown open. The floor latch on the inner containment

door was bent; the outer doors were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately

35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated

by automatic isolation

of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature

about 20 seconds into the event.Discussion

Upon investigating

the event, the licensee determined

that water had accumulated

in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed

a reliability-centered

maintenance

study which recommended

the level switches be included in the preventive

maintenance

program but the recommendation

had not been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level switches were also found to be inoperable.

The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed

the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing

the rupture discs. The resulting

pressure pulse caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal

61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure (see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance

and should have immediately

isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure was not detected indicates

two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design

pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the disc to burst, relieving

the exhaust line pressure before the downstream

pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.

While inspection

of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation

from corrosion

or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the discs are warranted

for one year of service under normal conditions.

The HPCI and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years and were not part of any scheduled

inspection

or preventive

maintenance

program. When consulted

about the event, the vendor advised against using the spare discs in the plant storeroom

because they were purchased

at the same time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture disc during a refueling

outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection.

The rupture discs were inspected

at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement

to the preventive

maintenance

program that was recommended

by a reliability-centered

analysis.

I I IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating

in the HPCI pump surveillance

test. The fifth, and m6st severely.

injured worker was a health physics technician

in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of the danger posed by the surveillance

test. The test procedure

contained

no specific guidance on room occupancy.

Interviews

with the workers revealed that they had performed

the surveillance

in the past and were familiar with the process. This familiarity

may have led to a relaxed attitude toward personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances

they sometimes

evacuated

the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement

over the plant paging system to alert plant personnel

before the HPCI-turbine

start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication

between the workersand

the control room may have contributed

to the personnel

injuries.

If a control room operator had been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the workers would have been aware of the impending

turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated

or the turbine manually tripped before the automatic

isolation

caused by the high area temperatureoin

the HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters

[2 inches]. If the steam release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing

high energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis.

For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered

that while the HPCI and RCIC rooms were qualified

for pressures

of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement

a preventive

maintenance

schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level switches.

The licensee will review the surveillance

test procedure

and evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the event at Unit 1 and is considering

burst testing the removed discs to determine

if they are degraded.

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, "Simplified

Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Cq~0cr cO Cd) h r-4 0\TO SUPPRESSION

POOL 1 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE I INNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]2 40.6 cm[16 in]VENT TO HPCI ROOM STEAM INLET LINE FROM "B" MAIN STEAM LINE LOCKED OPEN I I I I I RX BLDG I I I I 50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM 25 cm[10 In]D NOTES: 1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.

2. REDUNDANT

PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified

Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line

Attachment

2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-66 93-65 93-64 93-63 93-62 93-61 93-60 93-59 93-58 Switchover

to Hot-Leg Injection

Following A Loss-of-Coolant

Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection

Bypassed Periodic Testing and Preventive

Maintenance

of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Improper Use of Soluble Weld Purge Dam Material Thermal Stratification

of Water in BWR Reactor Vessels Excessive

Reactor Coolant Leakage Following

A Seal Failure in A Reactor Coolant Pump or Reactor Recirculation

Pump Reporting

Fuel Cycle and Materials

Events to the NRC Operations

Center Unexpected

Opening of Both Doors in An Airlock Nonconservatism

in Low-Temperature

Overpressure

Protection

for Pressurized- Water Reactors 08/16/93 08/13/93-08/12/93 08/11/93 08/10/93 08/09/93 08/04/93 07/26/93 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized

water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materials licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water

reactors.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

l--IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for

Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, "Simplified

Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.

OFC *OEAB:DORS

  • TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
  • DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III

  • SC:OEAB:DORS
  • C/OEAB/DORS
  • C:SPLB:DSSA

NAME GWright I RDennig AEChaffee

CEMcCracken

DATE [ 07/14/93 1 07/15/93 07/15/93 ]07/16/93 I__ _ i OFC*D:DSSA*C/OGCB:DORS

D/DORS A^r NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V[OFFICIAL

RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN

\-IN 93-XX July XX, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David (301)Skeen, NRR 504-1174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.

  • D:DSSA AThadani 07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS
  • TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
  • DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE J 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III

  • SC:OEAB:DORS
  • C/OEAB/DORS
  • C:SPLB:DSSA

NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee

CEMcCracken

DATE J 07/14/93 07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93.Y.OFC C/OGCB:DORS

D/DORS NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93[OFFICIAL

RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE *OEAB:DORS

  • TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
  • DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 1'I*C:DRS:RIII

  • SC:OEAB:DORS
  • C:OEAB:DORS

C:SPLBAS*

D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken

ACThadani 07/14/93 [07/15/93

07/15/93 -07/2/f93

07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS

D: DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN

C 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J-

IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE *OEAB:DORS

  • TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
  • DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07 114/93 07/14/93 L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII

S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA

D:DSSA GWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken

ACThadani 07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS

D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 0 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN

-E7/14/93 12:53 ?03 787905538417463837 P. 0', This infi you have the tech Roactor IN 93-XX July xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response.

It any questions

about the information

in this noticet please contact lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of sOrating RGOM Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technic~l

contacts Clark Vanderniet, R-II1 (708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR (301) 604-1174 Attach 4 nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C, OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED

-I _ I R NAME _ JGnMain PI_. ., I -- '^A j" IR na jai4 I 7/1k01.%0J//Y//93 I1 UATI I uJ 1 b I W ._ I I nF&-flIA I C:PBDS :ISS I ----.n J T TV cr P. rAn

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14 JUL 93 B: 5u LETd lN11 211HM DUN 411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0 LM1 b0S IQ£

J\1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

I OFFICE *OEAB:DORS

  • TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-III NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII

SC:OEAB:DORS

C:OEAB:DORS

C:SPLB:DSSA

D:DSSA GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken

ACThadani 07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..I C:OGCB:DORS

D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN

I' >OFC OEAB:DORS

SC/OEAB:DORS

PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORS

NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 1 7/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS

C/DRS/R-III

DRS/R-III NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet

DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS

D/DORS NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL

RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1


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