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| | document type = Letter | | | document type = Letter |
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| | project = TAC:MC4677, TAC:MC4676 | | | project = TAC:MC4676, TAC:MC4677 |
| | stage = Response to RAI | | | stage = Response to RAI |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:Rafael FloresSenior Vice President& Chief Nuclear Officerrafael.flores@Luminant.comLuminant PowerP 0 Box 10026322 North FM 56Glen Rose, TX 76043LuminantT 254 897 5590C 817 559 0403F 254 897 6652REF: GL 2004-02CP-201301214TXX-13149October 31, 2013U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001 | | {{#Wiki_filter:Rafael FloresSenior Vice President |
| | & Chief Nuclear Officerrafael.flores@Luminant.com Luminant PowerP 0 Box 10026322 North FM 56Glen Rose, TX 76043LuminantT 254 897 5590C 817 559 0403F 254 897 6652REF: GL 2004-02CP-201301214 TXX-13149 October 31, 2013U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001 |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CPNPP)DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDINGCLOSURE OPTIONS FOR GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191(TAC NOS. MC4676 AND MC4677)REFERENCE: 1.Letter logged TXX-13091, dated May 16, 2013, from Rafael Flores of LuminantPower to Balwant Singal of the NRC, RE: Closure OPTIONS FOR GENERICSAFETY ISSUE 191 (GSI-191), ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ONPRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE, (ML 13149A101)2. Letter dated September 30, 2013, from Balwant Singal of the NRC to Rafael Flores ofLuminant Power, RE: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 -Requestfor Additional Information Regarding Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191,ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ON PRESSURIZED-WATERREACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE (ML 13267A197) | | |
| | COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CPNPP)DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING CLOSURE OPTIONS FOR GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191(TAC NOS. MC4676 AND MC4677) |
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| | ==REFERENCE:== |
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| | 1.Letter logged TXX-13091, dated May 16, 2013, from Rafael Flores of LuminantPower to Balwant Singal of the NRC, RE: Closure OPTIONS FOR GENERICSAFETY ISSUE 191 (GSI-191), |
| | ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ONPRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE, (ML 13149A101) |
| | : 2. Letter dated September 30, 2013, from Balwant Singal of the NRC to Rafael Flores ofLuminant Power, RE: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 -Requestfor Additional Information Regarding Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191,ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ON PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE (ML 13267A197) |
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| ==Dear Sir or Madam:== | | ==Dear Sir or Madam:== |
| In Reference 1, Luminant Generation Company LLC (Luminant Power) provided the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) staff with the intended path forward for the resolution of Generic SafetyIssue (GSI)-191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,"for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (CPNPP). Luminant Power identified thatCPNPP will follow Option 2a (defined as deterministic approach with additional modeling refinementsin SECY-12-0093).A member of the STARS AllianceCallaway | | In Reference 1, Luminant Generation Company LLC (Luminant Power) provided the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) staff with the intended path forward for the resolution of Generic SafetyIssue (GSI)-191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance," |
| | for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (CPNPP). |
| | Luminant Power identified thatCPNPP will follow Option 2a (defined as deterministic approach with additional modeling refinements in SECY-12-0093). |
| | A member of the STARS AllianceCallaway |
| * Comanche Peak | | * Comanche Peak |
| * Diablo Canyon -Palo Verde | | * Diablo Canyon -Palo Verde |
| * South Texas Project | | * South Texas Project |
| * Wolf CreekAdD U. S. Nuctear Regulatory CommissionTXX-13149Page 2 of 210/31/2013In Reference 2, the NRC staff requested the following additional information to complete the review ofLuminant Power's path forward for the resolution of GSI-191 for CPNPP:1. Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations.2. Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC 1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, andFRC-0.2B to deal with inadequate core cooling.The attachment to this letter provides the requested information.This communication contains no new commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. D. Seawright at (254) 897-0140.I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on October 31, 2013.Sincerely,Luminant Generation Company LLCRafael FloresBy:Thomas P. McCoolVice President, Station SupportAttachmentc -Marc L. Dapas, Region IVBalwant K. Singal, NRRResident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Attachment to TXX-13149Page 1 of 2NRC Request No. 1.Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations.CPNPP Response:Westinghouse and the PWR Owners Group recommended (Ref. Direct Work Requests DW-01-017dated 02/20/2008 and DW-12-13 dated 03/20/2013) that the following changes be made to genericEmergency Operating Procedures.* ES-1.3, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (CPNPP EOS-1.3A for Unit 1 and CPNPP EOS-1.3B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFICINFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 6 (Step 7 LP) of ES-1.3:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". Susceptible plants should evaluate the use of available temperature monitoring (core exitthermocouples or PAMS) to initiate backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation on apotentially more frequent basis to ensure adequate core cooling. An analysis may be needed todetermine the frequency of switching to and from hot-leg injection to satisfy core blockagerequirements while addressing boron precipitation concerns."The corresponding step in the CPNPP procedures (step 14) determines if transfer to hot legrecirculation will be required. The plant staff is consulted for this determination. In accordancewith the generic recommendation, this guidance was added to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization." FR.C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC 1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2) and FR.C.2 Response to Degrade Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFICINFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C. 1 andStep 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C.2:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". During the recovery, if SI flow is indicated and core cooling remains inadequate, SI flowmay not be reaching the core due to blockage. It may be possible to restore adequate corecooling by initiating backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation."These changes to CPNPP procedures have been implemented by incorporation into the bases for thecorresponding step in CPNPP procedures (step 3) and by changes to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization. | | * Wolf CreekAdD U. S. Nuctear Regulatory Commission TXX-13149 Page 2 of 210/31/2013 In Reference 2, the NRC staff requested the following additional information to complete the review ofLuminant Power's path forward for the resolution of GSI-191 for CPNPP:1. Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations. |
| Attachment to TXX-13149Page 2 of 2Westinghouse also recommended procedure changes for plants that use a Westinghouse-designedreactor vessel level indication system. These do not apply to the CPNPP Reactor Vessel Water LevelIndication System (RVLIS) design which employs heated and unheated junction thermocouples asdescribed in the CPNPP FSAR TMI RESPONSE TO NRC ACTION PLAN DEVELOPED AS A RESULTOF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT, Section II.F.2 IDENTIFICATION OF AND RECOVERY FROMCONDITIONS LEADING TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.NRC Request No. 2.Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC 1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, and FRC-0.2Bto deal with inadequate core cooling.CPNPP Response:CPNPP FRC 1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Inadequate CoreCooling. This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenCore Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 1200 degrees F.CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Degrade CoreCooling. This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenRCS subcooling is inadequate, Reactor Vessel Water Level Indication System (RVLIS) indicates lowlevel in the vessel and Core Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 750 degrees F.Both procedures are based on assuring emergency core cooling to the reactor vessel. None of the stepsin the original generic or plant specific guidance dealt with core blockage. There are no actions to betaken for core blockage other than switchover from cold leg recirculation to hot leg recirculation andback. Therefore, the guidance added is to contact the Plant Staff for specific guidance.The Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) and/or the Technical Support Center (TSC) engineers wouldmonitor plant conditions and advise the control room operators regarding switchover from Cold LegRecirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation and back. | | : 2. Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC-0-1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, andFRC-0.2B to deal with inadequate core cooling.The attachment to this letter provides the requested information. |
| }} | | This communication contains no new commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. D. Seawright at (254) 897-0140. |
| | I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on October 31, 2013.Sincerely, Luminant Generation Company LLCRafael FloresBy:Thomas P. McCoolVice President, Station SupportAttachment c -Marc L. Dapas, Region IVBalwant K. Singal, NRRResident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Attachment to TXX-13149 Page 1 of 2NRC Request No. 1.Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations. |
| | CPNPP Response: |
| | Westinghouse and the PWR Owners Group recommended (Ref. Direct Work Requests DW-01-017 dated 02/20/2008 and DW-12-13 dated 03/20/2013) that the following changes be made to genericEmergency Operating Procedures. |
| | * ES-1.3, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (CPNPP EOS-1.3A for Unit 1 and CPNPP EOS-1.3B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 6 (Step 7 LP) of ES-1.3:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". Susceptible plants should evaluate the use of available temperature monitoring (core exitthermocouples or PAMS) to initiate backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation on apotentially more frequent basis to ensure adequate core cooling. |
| | An analysis may be needed todetermine the frequency of switching to and from hot-leg injection to satisfy core blockagerequirements while addressing boron precipitation concerns." |
| | The corresponding step in the CPNPP procedures (step 14) determines if transfer to hot legrecirculation will be required. |
| | The plant staff is consulted for this determination. |
| | In accordance with the generic recommendation, this guidance was added to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization. |
| | " FR.C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC-0-1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2) and FR.C.2 Response to Degrade Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C. 1 andStep 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C.2:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". During the recovery, if SI flow is indicated and core cooling remains inadequate, SI flowmay not be reaching the core due to blockage. |
| | It may be possible to restore adequate corecooling by initiating backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation." |
| | These changes to CPNPP procedures have been implemented by incorporation into the bases for thecorresponding step in CPNPP procedures (step 3) and by changes to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization. |
| | Attachment to TXX-13149 Page 2 of 2Westinghouse also recommended procedure changes for plants that use a Westinghouse-designed reactor vessel level indication system. These do not apply to the CPNPP Reactor Vessel Water LevelIndication System (RVLIS) design which employs heated and unheated junction thermocouples asdescribed in the CPNPP FSAR TMI RESPONSE TO NRC ACTION PLAN DEVELOPED AS A RESULTOF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT, Section II.F.2 IDENTIFICATION OF AND RECOVERY FROMCONDITIONS LEADING TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.NRC Request No. 2.Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC-0-1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, and FRC-0.2Bto deal with inadequate core cooling.CPNPP Response: |
| | CPNPP FRC-0-1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Inadequate CoreCooling. |
| | This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenCore Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 1200 degrees F.CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Degrade CoreCooling. |
| | This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenRCS subcooling is inadequate, Reactor Vessel Water Level Indication System (RVLIS) indicates lowlevel in the vessel and Core Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 750 degrees F.Both procedures are based on assuring emergency core cooling to the reactor vessel. None of the stepsin the original generic or plant specific guidance dealt with core blockage. |
| | There are no actions to betaken for core blockage other than switchover from cold leg recirculation to hot leg recirculation andback. Therefore, the guidance added is to contact the Plant Staff for specific guidance. |
| | The Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) and/or the Technical Support Center (TSC) engineers wouldmonitor plant conditions and advise the control room operators regarding switchover from Cold LegRecirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation and back.}} |
Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
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MONTHYEARML0603903012006-02-0909 February 2006 GSI Letter RAI Response to GL 2004-02 (TAC Nos. MC4676 and 4677) Project stage: RAI ML0817601002008-06-27027 June 2008 Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, Approval of Extension Request Project stage: Other ML0835004652008-11-26026 November 2008 Comanche Peak - Supplement to Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors, Cover Letter Project stage: Request ML0916604102009-05-11011 May 2009 E-mail Draft Request for Additional Information, Licensee'S Supplemental Responses Dated February 29 and November 26, 2008, to GL 2004-02 Project stage: Draft RAI ML0916604222009-05-11011 May 2009 Request for Additional Information Supplemental Responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02 Dated 02/29/2008 and 11/26/2008 Project stage: RAI ML0918207102009-07-0202 July 2009 Revised Notice of Meeting with Representatives of Luminant Generation Co., LLC, Comanche Peak to Discuss Draft Request for Information for Generic Letter 2004-02 Response Project stage: Draft RAI ML0919604492009-07-0808 July 2009 Alion Meeting Presentations on RAI 9 - Pool Fill Transport, & RAI 6 - Fiber Erosion Testing Project stage: Request ML0919400842009-07-0909 July 2009 Luminant RAI 22 and 23 SBLOCA, Vortex, Air Ingestion, Void Fraction and Flashing Issues Project stage: Request ML0919402762009-07-0909 July 2009 NRC Opening Remarks Discuss the Draft Us Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information for Generic Letter GL-2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressur Project stage: Draft RAI ML0919402772009-07-0909 July 2009 Luminant Holistic Overview: Presentation Will Cover Information Related to RAIs 1 - 5, 7, 12 - 14,16 - 19, 21, 25 - 36 and Overall Response to GL 2004-02 Project stage: Request ML0919400832009-07-0909 July 2009 Pci RAI 8, Test Protocol, Erosion Issue, RAI 15, Test Protocol, Latent Fiber Issue, Areva RAI 20, Test Flume, Fiberglass Larges Question Project stage: Request ML0919400852009-07-0909 July 2009 Luminant RAI 24 and 37, Secondary Line Breaks, Debris Load and Testing Project stage: Request ML0916707382009-07-15015 July 2009 Request for Additional Information Supplemental Responses to GL 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: RAI ML0920203432009-07-22022 July 2009 Revised Conference Call with Luminant Generation Company, LLC, to Discuss Draft Request for Additional Information Re Generic Letter 2004-02, Dated May 11, 2009 Project stage: Draft RAI ML0919705782009-07-31031 July 2009 Summary of Category 1 Meeting with Luminant Generation Company LLC, Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Meeting ML0926107912009-09-10010 September 2009 Comanche Peak Supplement Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors. Project stage: Request CP-200901396, Supplement to Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basic Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors.2009-10-12012 October 2009 Supplement to Response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basic Accidents at Pressurized-water Reactors. Project stage: Supplement ML0930800032009-10-13013 October 2009 Comanche Peak - Supplement to Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors Project stage: Request ML1009505642010-04-19019 April 2010 Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Response Project stage: Other ML13045A4102013-02-15015 February 2013 2/28/13 Notice of Meeting Via Conference Call with Luminant to Discuss Generic Safety Issue 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR (Pressurized-Water Reactor) Sump Performance, for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Meeting ML13059A2022013-02-28028 February 2013 Email Licensee Slides for 2/28/13 Meeting Via Conference Call Project stage: Meeting ML13059A1812013-02-28028 February 2013 Licensee Slides for 2/28/13 Meeting Via Conference Call with Luminant Generation Company, LLC, Project stage: Meeting ML13067A0292013-03-15015 March 2013 2/28/13 - Summary of Meeting Via Conference Call with Luminant to Discuss Generic Safety Issue 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR (Pressurized-Water Reactor) Sump Performance, for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Meeting CP-201300670, Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191), Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance2013-05-16016 May 2013 Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191), Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance Project stage: Other ML13267A1972013-09-30030 September 2013 Request for Additional Information, Closure of Option 2a to Address In-Vessel Mitigative Measures for Potential In-Vessel Blockage; Related to Generic Safety Issue 191 Project stage: RAI CP-201301214, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 1912013-10-31031 October 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191 Project stage: Response to RAI 2009-07-31
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARCP-202400335, License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-51, TSTF-471, and TSTF-571-T to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations and Revise Requirements During Handling of Irradiated Fuel2024-09-12012 September 2024 License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-51, TSTF-471, and TSTF-571-T to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations and Revise Requirements During Handling of Irradiated Fuel ML24031A6322024-09-11011 September 2024 Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4), Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule (EPID L-2023-LLE-0023) - Letter ML24243A0152024-09-0303 September 2024 – Notification of Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (05000445/2025012 and 05000446/2025012) and Request for Information ML24194A1332024-08-28028 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 190 and 190, Respectively, Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-589, Eliminate Automatic Diesel Generator Start During Shutdown ML24228A2252024-08-22022 August 2024 Relief to Use Later Code Edition for Inservice Inspection Program ML24179A0772024-08-20020 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 189 and 189, Respectively, Extension of Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator ML24232A2412024-08-19019 August 2024 Information Request, ISFSI Security IR 2024401 ML24232A2262024-08-19019 August 2024 Information Request, Security IR 2024404 IR 05000445/20240052024-08-15015 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000445/2024005 and 05000446/2024005) CP-202400294, (CPNPP) - Response to RAI for Exemption Request from 10 CPR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Update Schedule2024-08-15015 August 2024 (CPNPP) - Response to RAI for Exemption Request from 10 CPR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Update Schedule CP-202400319, (CPNPP) - Revision to CPNPP Letter to the NRC, Multiple Relief Requests for Unit 2 Third Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval from 10CFR50.55(a) Inspection Requirements Due to Impracticality2024-08-13013 August 2024 (CPNPP) - Revision to CPNPP Letter to the NRC, Multiple Relief Requests for Unit 2 Third Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval from 10CFR50.55(a) Inspection Requirements Due to Impracticality ML24177A2692024-08-0707 August 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 188 and 188, Respectively, Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-591, Revise Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program CP-202400315, (Cpnpp), Multiple Relief Requests for Unit 2 Third Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval from 10CFR50.55(a) Inspection Requirements Due to Impracticality2024-08-0505 August 2024 (Cpnpp), Multiple Relief Requests for Unit 2 Third Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval from 10CFR50.55(a) Inspection Requirements Due to Impracticality IR 05000445/20240022024-07-31031 July 2024 Units 1 and 2 - Integrated Inspection Report 05000445/2024002 and 05000446/2024002,and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200074/2024001 IR 05000445/20244032024-07-16016 July 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000445/2024403 and 05000446/2024403 (Full Report) ML24187A0372024-07-15015 July 2024 Withdrawal of Requested Licensing Action Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses ML24192A1862024-07-10010 July 2024 Notification of Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000445/2024003 and 05000446/2024003) and Request for Information ML24185A1382024-07-0202 July 2024 Inservice Inspection Request for Information IR 05000445/20244012024-06-26026 June 2024 MC&A Program Inspection Report 05000445-2024401 and 05000446-2024401 Public-Final CP-202400253, (Cpnpp), Units 1 & 2 Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves Third Interval, Revision 52024-06-26026 June 2024 (Cpnpp), Units 1 & 2 Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves Third Interval, Revision 5 CP-202400235, (Cpnpp), Units 1 & 2, Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves Fourth Interval, Revision 02024-06-18018 June 2024 (Cpnpp), Units 1 & 2, Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves Fourth Interval, Revision 0 IR 05000445/20240122024-06-17017 June 2024 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000445/2024012 and 05000446/2024012 ML24120A3632024-06-10010 June 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 187 and 187, Respectively Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Plants CP-202400120, (Cpnpp), Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Remote Shutdown System Functions2024-06-0303 June 2024 (Cpnpp), Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable Remote Shutdown System Functions CP-202400205, (Cpnpp), Units 1and 2, Submittal of the Snubber Inservice Program Plan for the Fourth Ten Year Interval2024-05-30030 May 2024 (Cpnpp), Units 1and 2, Submittal of the Snubber Inservice Program Plan for the Fourth Ten Year Interval CP-202400175, (CPNPP) - Supplement to License Amendment Request to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator2024-05-16016 May 2024 (CPNPP) - Supplement to License Amendment Request to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator CP-202400100, (Cpnpp), Unit 2, Two Recurring Reactor Scrams Associated with Main Feedwater System Modifications2024-05-13013 May 2024 (Cpnpp), Unit 2, Two Recurring Reactor Scrams Associated with Main Feedwater System Modifications CP-202400097, Re Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperability of Both Trains of Uninterruptible Power Supply Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning2024-05-0606 May 2024 Re Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperability of Both Trains of Uninterruptible Power Supply Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning ML24107B1012024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Cernek, J, Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana ML24120A2942024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Gonzalez, B, Caddo Nation ML24120A3012024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Parton, T, Wichita and Affiliated Tribes ML24120A2912024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Cooper, D, Apache Tribe of Oklahoma ML24120A2902024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Bunch, J, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians ML24120A3022024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Pierite, M, Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana ML24120A3042024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Sylestine, R, Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas ML24120A2932024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Garza, Jr, Juan, Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas ML24120A2922024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Dotson, Delaware Nation ML24120A2952024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Johnson, L.J., Seminole Nation of Oklahoma ML24120A3032024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-SpottedBird, L, Kiowa Indian Tribe ML24120A3052024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Woommavovah, M, Comanche Nation ML24120A2982024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Martinez, E, Mescalero Apache Tribe ML24120A3002024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Morrow, R K, Thlopthlocco Tribal Town ML24120A2962024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Kaskaske, D, Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma ML24120A3062024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Yahola, s, Kialegee Tribal Town ML24120A3072024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Yargee, W, Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town ML24120A2972024-04-29029 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters, Tribes-Martin, R, Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma CP-202400153, (Cpnpp), Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Canisters2024-04-29029 April 2024 (Cpnpp), Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Storage Canisters ML24107B0292024-04-26026 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters SHPO ML24108A1542024-04-26026 April 2024 Lr Feis Section 106 Consultation Letters Achp ML24080A1802024-04-26026 April 2024 Ltr to Ken J. Peters, Sr VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, CPNPP re-NOA Final Plant Specific Supplement 60 2024-09-03
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Rafael FloresSenior Vice President
& Chief Nuclear Officerrafael.flores@Luminant.com Luminant PowerP 0 Box 10026322 North FM 56Glen Rose, TX 76043LuminantT 254 897 5590C 817 559 0403F 254 897 6652REF: GL 2004-02CP-201301214 TXX-13149 October 31, 2013U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CPNPP)DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING CLOSURE OPTIONS FOR GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE 191(TAC NOS. MC4676 AND MC4677)
REFERENCE:
1.Letter logged TXX-13091, dated May 16, 2013, from Rafael Flores of LuminantPower to Balwant Singal of the NRC, RE: Closure OPTIONS FOR GENERICSAFETY ISSUE 191 (GSI-191),
ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ONPRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE, (ML 13149A101)
- 2. Letter dated September 30, 2013, from Balwant Singal of the NRC to Rafael Flores ofLuminant Power, RE: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2 -Requestfor Additional Information Regarding Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191,ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIS ACCUMULATION ON PRESSURIZED-WATER REACTOR SUMP PERFORMANCE (ML 13267A197)
Dear Sir or Madam:
In Reference 1, Luminant Generation Company LLC (Luminant Power) provided the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) staff with the intended path forward for the resolution of Generic SafetyIssue (GSI)-191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,"
for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (CPNPP).
Luminant Power identified thatCPNPP will follow Option 2a (defined as deterministic approach with additional modeling refinements in SECY-12-0093).
A member of the STARS AllianceCallaway
- Diablo Canyon -Palo Verde
- Wolf CreekAdD U. S. Nuctear Regulatory Commission TXX-13149 Page 2 of 210/31/2013 In Reference 2, the NRC staff requested the following additional information to complete the review ofLuminant Power's path forward for the resolution of GSI-191 for CPNPP:1. Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations.
- 2. Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC-0-1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, andFRC-0.2B to deal with inadequate core cooling.The attachment to this letter provides the requested information.
This communication contains no new commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. D. Seawright at (254) 897-0140.
I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on October 31, 2013.Sincerely, Luminant Generation Company LLCRafael FloresBy:Thomas P. McCoolVice President, Station SupportAttachment c -Marc L. Dapas, Region IVBalwant K. Singal, NRRResident Inspectors, Comanche Peak Attachment to TXX-13149 Page 1 of 2NRC Request No. 1.Please provide the Westinghouse recommended mitigative measures deemed necessary for CPNPP,and if not yet implemented, the schedule for implementing the Westinghouse recommendations.
CPNPP Response:
Westinghouse and the PWR Owners Group recommended (Ref. Direct Work Requests DW-01-017 dated 02/20/2008 and DW-12-13 dated 03/20/2013) that the following changes be made to genericEmergency Operating Procedures.
- ES-1.3, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (CPNPP EOS-1.3A for Unit 1 and CPNPP EOS-1.3B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 6 (Step 7 LP) of ES-1.3:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". Susceptible plants should evaluate the use of available temperature monitoring (core exitthermocouples or PAMS) to initiate backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation on apotentially more frequent basis to ensure adequate core cooling.
An analysis may be needed todetermine the frequency of switching to and from hot-leg injection to satisfy core blockagerequirements while addressing boron precipitation concerns."
The corresponding step in the CPNPP procedures (step 14) determines if transfer to hot legrecirculation will be required.
The plant staff is consulted for this determination.
In accordance with the generic recommendation, this guidance was added to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization.
" FR.C.1 Response to Inadequate Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC-0-1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2) and FR.C.2 Response to Degrade Core Cooling (CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2)Westinghouse recommended that the following be added to the PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION section of the Step Description Table for Step 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C. 1 andStep 2 (HP and LP) of FR-C.2:"Some plants may be susceptible to blockage in the fuel assemblies due to debris passingthrough the sump screen. Plants can assess the impact of debris on equipment required by theECCS and NSSS to maintain the core in a coolable geometry following an accident usingWCAP-16406-P, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Downstream Sump Debris Effects in Support of GSI-191". During the recovery, if SI flow is indicated and core cooling remains inadequate, SI flowmay not be reaching the core due to blockage.
It may be possible to restore adequate corecooling by initiating backflow through the core via hot leg recirculation."
These changes to CPNPP procedures have been implemented by incorporation into the bases for thecorresponding step in CPNPP procedures (step 3) and by changes to the Plant Staff Document for useby the Emergency Response Organization.
Attachment to TXX-13149 Page 2 of 2Westinghouse also recommended procedure changes for plants that use a Westinghouse-designed reactor vessel level indication system. These do not apply to the CPNPP Reactor Vessel Water LevelIndication System (RVLIS) design which employs heated and unheated junction thermocouples asdescribed in the CPNPP FSAR TMI RESPONSE TO NRC ACTION PLAN DEVELOPED AS A RESULTOF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT,Section II.F.2 IDENTIFICATION OF AND RECOVERY FROMCONDITIONS LEADING TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.NRC Request No. 2.Please provide the details of actions performed by EOPs FRC-0-1A, FRC-0.1B, FRC-0.2A, and FRC-0.2Bto deal with inadequate core cooling.CPNPP Response:
CPNPP FRC-0-1A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.1B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Inadequate CoreCooling.
This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenCore Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 1200 degrees F.CPNPP FRC-0.2A for Unit 1 and CPNPP FRC-0.2B for Unit 2 are titled Response to Degrade CoreCooling.
This procedure is entered from Critical Safety Function CORE COOLING Status Tree whenRCS subcooling is inadequate, Reactor Vessel Water Level Indication System (RVLIS) indicates lowlevel in the vessel and Core Exit Temperature (CET) is greater than or equal to 750 degrees F.Both procedures are based on assuring emergency core cooling to the reactor vessel. None of the stepsin the original generic or plant specific guidance dealt with core blockage.
There are no actions to betaken for core blockage other than switchover from cold leg recirculation to hot leg recirculation andback. Therefore, the guidance added is to contact the Plant Staff for specific guidance.
The Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) and/or the Technical Support Center (TSC) engineers wouldmonitor plant conditions and advise the control room operators regarding switchover from Cold LegRecirculation to Hot Leg Recirculation and back.