IR 05000336/2013003

IR 05000336-13-003, 05000423-13-003, on 04/01/2013-06/30/2013, Millstone, Units 2 and 3, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion, Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Contro

ML13219A187
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	08/06/2013
From:	Fred Bower NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Heacock D Dominion Resources
Bower F
References
IR-13-003
Download: ML13219A187 (55)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ust 6, 2013

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2013003 AND 05000423/2013003

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On June 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 16, 2013, with Mr. Scace, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, the NRC has identified a traditional enforcement Severity Level IV violation. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. Further, two licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone. If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Fred L. Bower III, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423 License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000336/2013003 and 05000423/2013003 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos: 50-336 and 50-423 License Nos: DPR-65 and NPF-49 Report No: 05000336/2013003 and 05000423/2013003 Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Facility: Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Dates: April 1, 2013 through June 30, 2013 Inspectors: J. Ambrosini, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) J. Krafty, Resident Inspector, DRP B. Haagensen, Resident Inspector, DRP E. Andrews, Reactor Engineer, DRP P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) R. Rolph, Health Physicist, DRS C. Newport, Operations Engineer, DRS E. Burkett, Reactor Engineer, DRS J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Office of Nuclear Security and Incidence Response (NSIR) Approved By: Fred L. Bower III, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000336/2013003, 05000423/2013003; 04/01/2013 - 06/30/2013; Millstone Power Station

Units 2 and 3; Refueling and Other Outage Activities; Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion; Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Two Green findings and one Severity Level IV violation, all of which were non-cited violations (NCVs), were identified. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the failure to make the required initial notification to the NRC within eight hours of a major loss of monitoring capability. On April 16, Dominion declared the main station stack radiation monitor inoperable but did not report this to the NRC until the inspectors questioned the control room operators on April 18. Dominion evaluated the condition and made the required notification (NRC event report number 48941) on April 18, 2013, and entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR512007.

The inspectors determined that Dominion did not notify the NRC of a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities event in the time required by 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors determined the finding was subject to traditional enforcement because Dominions failure to make a required report could potentially impact the NRCs regulatory function. This finding is similar to the one described in NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9.d(9), A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73, which corresponds to Severity Level IV. In accordance with guidance contained in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Section 07.03, cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 4OA3)

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

The inspectors noted a self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Criterion III, Design Control, when Dominions did not adequately implement established measures for the identification and control of design interfaces and for coordinating among participating design organizations. Specifically, Dominion failed to properly require a temporary modification for a work activity that met the design requirements of CM-AA-TCC-204, Temporary Configuration Changes, when workers installed an air line jumper that caused an AOV to open and led to an uncontrolled loss of RCS inventory. Dominion entered the issue into their CAP as CR511856.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. Specifically, Dominion failed to properly implement a temporary modification which ultimately led to the uncontrolled loss of RCS inventory. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the charging system had sufficient capacity to maintain pressurizer level, the leakage would not have caused the loss of the running residual heat removal (RHR) pump for a substantial period of time, and at least one steam generator (SG)remained available. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Work Practices, because Dominion failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, the station did not maintain control of activities in accordance with plant procedures [H.4(c)]. (Section 1R20)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, for failing to implement Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) OP-3353VP1B1-4 (BATT ROOM 1, 3, 5, EXHAUST FAN FLOW LOW) and stop the equalizing battery charge that was occurring on three batteries to prevent the buildup of hydrogen gas in the Unit 3 east switchgear room when room ventilation was stopped. After a period of two hours, Dominion stopped the equalizing charge and entered the issue into their CAP as CR511856 and CR519744.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events, such as fire, to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage).

Specifically, Dominion failed to properly implement the ARP which allowed the potential build-up of hydrogen gas to occur in the east switchgear room. A hydrogen fire in the east switchgear room would have disabled numerous safety-related systems and potentially injured personnel during a time when the plant was in a yellow shutdown risk state based on RCS decay heat removal and power availability. The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because train B was protected and RHR loop B was in operation providing core cooling. Train B components and systems were physically isolated in the west switchgear room. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because Dominion did not effectively communicate expectations regarding personnel following procedures [H.4(b)]. (Section 1R13)

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance identified by Dominion were reviewed by the NRC.

Corrective actions taken or planned by Dominion have been entered into Dominions CAP.

These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Millstone Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.

Millstone Unit 3 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On April 14, Unit 3 was shutdown to begin refueling outage (RFO) 3R15. Unit 3 returned to 100 percent power on May 23, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate Alternating Current (AC) Power Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of plant features and procedures for the operation and continued availability of the offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power system to evaluate readiness of the systems prior to seasonal high grid loading. The inspectors reviewed Dominions procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and Dominion.

This review focused on changes to the established program and material condition of the offsite and alternate AC power equipment. The inspectors assessed whether Dominion established and implemented appropriate procedures and protocols to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by interviewing the responsible system engineer, reviewing system health reports, condition reports (CR), and open work orders, and walking down portions of the offsite and AC power systems including the 345 kilovolt switchyards.

Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2 B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump while a surveillance test was being conducted on the A MDAFW pump on May 7 B boric acid pump while the A boric acid pump was being overhauled on June 25 Unit 3 Spent fuel pool cooling with recent core offload in the spent fuel pool on April 23 B train high pressure safety injection (HPSI) while it was credited as an injection path for RCS inventory control on May 9 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), TS, work orders, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Dominion staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

From April 15 through April 22, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 3 RHR system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed drawings and equipment line-up check-off lists to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of related CRs and work orders, and interviewed the system engineer to ensure Dominion appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection