ML18283B417: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:'r~oiuTloh O'~~e-19<~0 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORlTY t CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE>7401 f.'o gC'eptember 26, 1977 Mr.James P.O'Reilly, Director U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 230 Peachtree Street, NM., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303  
{{#Wiki_filter:'
O
    ~oiuTloh r
    '~~e-19<~
f.'o TENNESSEE VALLEY 26, 1977 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region   II 230 Peachtree Street, NM., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 AUTHORlTY t CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE >7401 0
gC'eptember


==Dear Mr.O'Reilly:==
==Dear Mr. O'Reilly:==
r TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY-BROWNS PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3-DOCKET NO.50-296-PACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68-REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE, REPORT BPRO-50-296/7717 The enclosed repoit.provides details concerning the'primary containment isolation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line which would'not operate as required by Techni'cal Specification 3.7.D.l during routine operability checks.This report is submitted in accordance.
 
with Browns Perry unit 3 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.2.b;(2).
r TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY     - BROWNS PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT   3-DOCKET NO. 50-296   - PACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68     - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE, REPORT BPRO-50-296/7717 The enclosed   repoit.provides details concerning the'primary containment isolation valve   3-FCV-77-2A on the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line which would 'not operate as required by Techni'cal Specification 3.7.D.l during routine operability checks. This report is submitted in accordance. with Browns Perry unit 3 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.2.b;(2).
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY~~H.S.Pox Director of Power Production Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Director (3)Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vashington, DC 20555 Director (40)-*~Office of Inspection and Enforcement U,S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 An Equal Opportunity Employer LILiLIVUCC CVCI'II I MCI UM I CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEA RINT ALL REOUIRED INFDRMATIONI)
                      ~
+01 LICENSEE NAME AL B R F 3 0 (f 89 14 15 REPORT AEPOAT CATEGORY,, TYPE SOURCE~ci corn'8 57 58 59 60 61 EVENT DESCFIIPTION, Z3 89 0+3 ee 0+4 8 9 LICENSE.TYPE 1 1 1 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE 68 69 LICENSE NUMBER'0 00 0 0 0 0'4 25 26 EVENT TYPE~o 30 31 32 REPORT DATE 0 9 2 2 7 74 75 80 80 80 80 8 9 3+6 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CODE CODE K~I LmJ'M"hJ 8 9 10 11 12 CAUSE.DESCRIPTION-0+8 (SEE ATTACHMENT) 8 9+09 8 9+10 COMPONENT CODE h r 17 PAMIE COMPONENT lzJ COMPOI4ENT MANUFACTURER,'GLATGN 80 80 80 OTHER STATUS 89 LOSS OR DAMAGE'O FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION
H. S. Pox Director of   Power Production Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
[Jz-NA 89 10 PUBLICITY NA 8 8 ADDITIONAL FACTORS 89 LzJ L(ALxJ 8~8 10.12 13 FORM OF ACTIVITY COATENT RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY HH LJ Lzl 8 8 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION
Director (3)
~oo 0~Z'A 89 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES K4]LRLQL'Ql 89 11 12 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES 1/5 NA METHOD OF OSCOVERY LaJ., 44 45, 46 44 45 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION utine 0 eration LOCATION OF RELEASE 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 Qe 89/19 89 NA eo 80 0: '}EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued)
Office of Management Information       and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory     Commission Vashington, DC 20555 Director (40) -       *
'\J During routine operability checks, primary containment i:solation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on C*the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line would not operate as required by Technical Specification 3.7.D.1..Reactor operation was continued by deactivating the valve in the closed position as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.D.2..Repairs were made by fixing a cracked.air line oiler and replacement of a sticking flow I I solenoid valve in the air supply to the FCV-77-2A air operator.Previous solenoid failures axe reported on BFAO-7351W and BFAO-50-260/7414W; CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued)
                  ~
'he air supply line oilex cracked, thus 1osing lubrication to the solenoid control'I valve (FSV-77-2A).
Office of Inspection     and Enforcement U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 An Equal Opportunity Employer
Lack of lubrication caused FSV-77-2A to fail to operate properly-therefore, the primary containment isolation valve was inoperable.
 
The oilex was-manufactured by Dyna-Quip O'X-11-6, mcdel M7;the solenoid valve is a Versa 4 model VSG"3521.I}}
LILiLIVUCC CVCI'II I           MCI UM I CONTROL BLOCK:                                                             (PLEA       RINT ALL REOUIRED INFDRMATIONI)
LICENSEE                                                                            LICENSE              EVENT NAME                                  LICENSE NUMBER                              .TYPE                TYPE
  +01       AL     B     R   F   3         0   (f     '0 00        0  0        0    0    '4    1    1    1          ~o 89                             14     15                                           25    26                  30    31    32 REPORT   AEPOAT CATEGORY,, TYPE         SOURCE             DOCKET NUMBER                        EVENT DATE                    REPORT DATE
~ci corn'                                                                                                                 0 9      2  2  7 8         57     58       59       60     61                             68    69                      74    75                    80 EVENT DESCFIIPTION, Z3 89                                                                                                                                       80 0+3 ee                                                                                                                                       80 0+4 8 9                                                                                                                                       80 8 9 3+6 8 9                                                               PAMIE                                                                    80 SYSTEM     CAUSE                                       COMPONENT            COMPOI4ENT CODE       CODE             COMPONENT CODE                              MANUFACTURER,          'GLATGN K~I       LmJ'M       "hJ                                             lzJ 8 9 10               11       12                       17 CAUSE. DESCRIPTION-                   h        r 0+8       (SEE ATTACHMENT) 8 9                                                                                                                                       80
+09 8 9                                                                                                                                       80
+10 89                                                                      METHOD OF 80 OTHER STATUS         OSCOVERY                        DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 8   ~    8 LzJ           L(ALxJ 10           .12 13                         44 LaJ 45,
                                                                                    .
46 utine    0  eration 80
                                                                      ,
FORM OF ACTIVITY     COATENT RELEASEO     OF RELEASE           AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY                                         LOCATION OF RELEASE HH 8        8 LJ           Lzl 10     11                                 44      45                                                          80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 89
        ~oo NUMBER 0
11 TYPE
                            ~Z 12    13
                                          'A DESCRIPTION 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES K4] LRLQL'Ql 89               11   12                                                                                                                 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES 1/5                                         NA 89                                                                                                                                        80 LOSS OR      DAMAGE'O        FACILITY TYPE      DESCRIPTION
[Jz-                                NA 89          10                                                                                                                          80 PUBLICITY NA 8 8                                                                                                                                      80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS Qe                                         NA 89                                                                                                                                       eo
/19 89                                                                                                                                       80
 
  '}
EVENT DESCRIPTION the drywell
                *
(Continued) floor drain J
0:
sump pump
                                        '\
During routine operability checks, primary containment i:solation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on discharge line C
would not operate as required by Technical Specification 3.7.D.1.. Reactor operation           was continued by deactivating the valve in the closed position     as allowed by     Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. .Repairs were made by   fixing a cracked .air     line oiler and replacement   of a   sticking flow I
air                              air operator.
I solenoid valve in the         supply to the FCV-77-2A                         Previous solenoid failures axe reported on BFAO-7351W and BFAO-50-260/7414W; CAUSE DESCRIPTION     (Continued) air         line oilex                     1osing lubrication to the solenoid control
                                      'he supply              cracked, thus  'I valve (FSV-77-2A). Lack of lubrication caused FSV-77-2A to           fail to     operate properly-therefore, the primary containment isolation valve         was inoperable. The oilex was
- manufactured by Dyna-Quip O'X-11-6, mcdel M7;           the solenoid valve     is a Versa 4
model VSG"3521.
I}}

Revision as of 13:48, 20 October 2019

LER 1977-017-00 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Primary Containment Isolation Valve 3-FCV-77-2A on Drywell Floor Drain Sump Pump Discharge Line Would Not Operate as Required by Tech Spec 3.7.D.L During Routine Operability Checks
ML18283B417
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/1977
From: Fox H
Tennessee Valley Authority
To: O'Reilly J
NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
LER 1977-017-00
Download: ML18283B417 (3)


Text

'

O

~oiuTloh r

'~~e-19<~

f.'o TENNESSEE VALLEY 26, 1977 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 230 Peachtree Street, NM., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 AUTHORlTY t CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE >7401 0

gC'eptember

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

r TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS PERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3-DOCKET NO. 50-296 - PACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE, REPORT BPRO-50-296/7717 The enclosed repoit.provides details concerning the'primary containment isolation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line which would 'not operate as required by Techni'cal Specification 3.7.D.l during routine operability checks. This report is submitted in accordance. with Browns Perry unit 3 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.2.b;(2).

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

~

H. S. Pox Director of Power Production Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vashington, DC 20555 Director (40) - *

~

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 An Equal Opportunity Employer

LILiLIVUCC CVCI'II I MCI UM I CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEA RINT ALL REOUIRED INFDRMATIONI)

LICENSEE LICENSE EVENT NAME LICENSE NUMBER .TYPE TYPE

+01 AL B R F 3 0 (f '0 00 0 0 0 0 '4 1 1 1 ~o 89 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT AEPOAT CATEGORY,, TYPE SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

~ci corn' 0 9 2 2 7 8 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT DESCFIIPTION, Z3 89 80 0+3 ee 80 0+4 8 9 80 8 9 3+6 8 9 PAMIE 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPOI4ENT CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE MANUFACTURER, 'GLATGN K~I LmJ'M "hJ lzJ 8 9 10 11 12 17 CAUSE. DESCRIPTION- h r 0+8 (SEE ATTACHMENT) 8 9 80

+09 8 9 80

+10 89 METHOD OF 80 OTHER STATUS OSCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 8 ~ 8 LzJ L(ALxJ 10 .12 13 44 LaJ 45,

.

46 utine 0 eration 80

,

FORM OF ACTIVITY COATENT RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE HH 8 8 LJ Lzl 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 89

~oo NUMBER 0

11 TYPE

~Z 12 13

'A DESCRIPTION 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES K4] LRLQL'Ql 89 11 12 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES 1/5 NA 89 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE'O FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

[Jz- NA 89 10 80 PUBLICITY NA 8 8 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS Qe NA 89 eo

/19 89 80

'}

EVENT DESCRIPTION the drywell

(Continued) floor drain J

0:

sump pump

'\

During routine operability checks, primary containment i:solation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on discharge line C

would not operate as required by Technical Specification 3.7.D.1.. Reactor operation was continued by deactivating the valve in the closed position as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. .Repairs were made by fixing a cracked .air line oiler and replacement of a sticking flow I

air air operator.

I solenoid valve in the supply to the FCV-77-2A Previous solenoid failures axe reported on BFAO-7351W and BFAO-50-260/7414W; CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued) air line oilex 1osing lubrication to the solenoid control

'he supply cracked, thus 'I valve (FSV-77-2A). Lack of lubrication caused FSV-77-2A to fail to operate properly-therefore, the primary containment isolation valve was inoperable. The oilex was

- manufactured by Dyna-Quip O'X-11-6, mcdel M7; the solenoid valve is a Versa 4

model VSG"3521.

I