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{{#Wiki_filter:March 29, 2007Mr. Mark B. BezillaSite Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760
{{#Wiki_filter:March 29, 2007 Mr. Mark B. Bezilla Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF 2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)


==Dear Mr. Bezilla:==
==Dear Mr. Bezilla:==


By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006,you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have providedthe information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staff's review of the reports is enclosed.Sincerely,/RA/Thomas J. Wengert, Project ManagerPlant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationDocket No. 50-346
By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006, you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.
The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have provided the information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staffs review of the reports is enclosed.
Sincerely,
                                            /RA/
Thomas J. Wengert, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==
Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reportscc w/encls: See next page Mr. Mark B. BezillaMarch 29, 2007Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760
 
Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports cc w/encls: See next page
 
Mr. Mark B. Bezilla                                  March 29, 2007 Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF 2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)


==Dear Mr. Bezilla:==
==Dear Mr. Bezilla:==


By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006,you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have providedthe information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staff's review of the reports is enclosed.Sincerely,/RA/Thomas J. Wengert, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationDocket No. 50-346
By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006, you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.
The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have provided the information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staffs review of the reports is enclosed.
Sincerely,
                                            /RA/
Thomas J. Wengert, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==
Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reportscc w/encls:  See next page DISTRIBUTION
:PUBLICLPL3-2 R/FRidsNrrPMTWengert RidsNrrDciCsgbRidsOgcRpRidsRgn3MailCenter RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenterDHills, RIIIRidsNrrLAEWhitt RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2KKarwoski, NRRADAMS Accession Number:  ML070510609NRR-106OFFICEPM/LPL3-2LA/LPL3-2DCI/CSGB/BC*BC/LPL3-2 NAMETWengert:mwEWhittAHiserRGibbsDATE3/28/07 3/28/07 3/22/07  3/29/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:Manager, Site Regulatory ComplianceFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyDavis-Besse Nuclear Power StationMail Stop A-DB-30655501 North State Route 2Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760Director, Ohio Department of CommerceDivision of Industrial ComplianceBureau of Operations & Maintenance6606 Tussing RoadP.O. Box 4009Reynoldsburg, OH  43068-9009Regional Administrator, Region IIIU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionSuite 2102443 Warrenville RoadLisle, IL  60532-4352Resident InspectorU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission5503 North State Route 2Oak Harbor, OH  43449-9760Stephen HelmerSupervisor, Technical Support SectionBureau of Radiation ProtectionOhio Department of Health35 East Chestnut Street, 7 th FloorColumbus, OH  43215Carol O'Claire, Chief, Radiological BranchOhio Emergency Management Agency2855 West Dublin Granville RoadColumbus, OH  43235-2206Zack A. Clayton DERROhio Environmental Protection AgencyP.O. Box 1049Columbus, OH  43266-0149State of OhioPublic Utilities Commission180 East Broad StreetColumbus, OH  43266-0573Attorney General Office of Attorney General30 East Broad StreetColumbus, OH  43216President, Board of CountyCommissioners of Ottawa CountyPort Clinton, OH  43252 President, Board of CountyCommissioners of Lucas CountyOne Government Center, Suite 800Toledo, OH  43604-6506The Honorable Dennis J. KucinichUnited States House of RepresentativesWashington, D.C. 20515The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich United States House of Representatives14400 Detroit AvenueLakewood, OH 44107    Gary R. LeidichPresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GO-1976 South Main StreetAkron, OH  44308Joseph J. HaganSenior Vice President of Operations and        Chief Operating OfficerFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GO-1476 South Main StreetAkron, OH  44308David W. Jenkins, AttorneyFirstEnergy CorporationMail Stop A-GO-1876 South Main StreetAkron, OH  44308 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:
Danny L. PaceSenior Vice President, Fleet EngineeringFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GO-1476 South Main StreetAkron, OH  44308Manager, Fleet LicensingFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GHE-115395 Ghent RoadAkron, OH  44333Director, Fleet Regulatory AffairsFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GHE-315395 Ghent RoadAkron, OH 44333Jeannie M. RinckelVice President, Fleet OversightFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GO-1476 South Main StreetAkron, OH  44308Richard AndersonVice President, Nuclear SupportFirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyMail Stop A-GO-1476 South Main StreetAkron, OH 44308 EnclosureOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONEVALUATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORTSFROM 2005 CYCLE 14 MID-CYCLE OUTAGEDAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1DOCKET NO. 50-34


==61.0INTRODUCTION==
Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
By letters to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated February 17, 2005 (AgencywideDocuments Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML050530314),April 29, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051230212), February 16, 2006 (ADAMS AccessionNo. ML060530594), and October 22, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062980206), FirstEnergyNuclear Operating Company (FENOC), the licensee, submitted information summarizing theresults of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse NuclearPower Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the NRC staff summarizedadditional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at DBNPS in a letter datedSeptember 1, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052310010).
PUBLIC                          LPL3-2 R/F          RidsNrrPMTWengert RidsNrrDciCsgb                  RidsOgcRp            RidsRgn3MailCenter RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter          DHills, RIII        RidsNrrLAEWhitt RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2              KKarwoski, NRR ADAMS Accession Number: ML070510609                                NRR-106 OFFICE PM/LPL3-2            LA/LPL3-2        DCI/CSGB/BC*        BC/LPL3-2 NAME TWengert:mw EWhitt                      AHiser              RGibbs DATE      3/28/07          3/28/07          3/22/07              3/29/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:
Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance        Attorney General FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company      Office of Attorney General Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station          30 East Broad Street Mail Stop A-DB-3065                        Columbus, OH 43216 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760                  President, Board of County Commissioners of Ottawa County Director, Ohio Department of Commerce      Port Clinton, OH 43252 Division of Industrial Compliance Bureau of Operations & Maintenance        President, Board of County 6606 Tussing Road                          Commissioners of Lucas County P.O. Box 4009                              One Government Center, Suite 800 Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-9009                Toledo, OH 43604-6506 Regional Administrator, Region III        The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission        United States House of Representatives Suite 210                                  Washington, D.C. 20515 2443 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4352                      The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich United States House of Representatives Resident Inspector                        14400 Detroit Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission        Lakewood, OH 44107 5503 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760                  Gary R. Leidich President and Chief Nuclear Officer Stephen Helmer                            FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Supervisor, Technical Support Section      Mail Stop A-GO-19 Bureau of Radiation Protection            76 South Main Street Ohio Department of Health                  Akron, OH 44308 35 East Chestnut Street, 7th Floor Columbus, OH 43215                        Joseph J. Hagan Senior Vice President of Operations and Carol OClaire, Chief, Radiological Branch  Chief Operating Officer Ohio Emergency Management Agency          FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 2855 West Dublin Granville Road            Mail Stop A-GO-14 Columbus, OH 43235-2206                    76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Zack A. Clayton DERR                                      David W. Jenkins, Attorney Ohio Environmental Protection Agency      FirstEnergy Corporation P.O. Box 1049                              Mail Stop A-GO-18 Columbus, OH 43266-0149                    76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission 180 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43266-0573
 
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:
Danny L. Pace Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Manager, Fleet Licensing FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GHE-115 395 Ghent Road Akron, OH 44333 Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GHE-315 395 Ghent Road Akron, OH 44333 Jeannie M. Rinckel Vice President, Fleet Oversight FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Richard Anderson Vice President, Nuclear Support FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EVALUATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORTS FROM 2005 CYCLE 14 MID-CYCLE OUTAGE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346
 
==1.0      INTRODUCTION==
 
By letters to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated February 17, 2005 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML050530314),
April 29, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051230212), February 16, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML060530594), and October 22, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062980206), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), the licensee, submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the NRC staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at DBNPS in a letter dated September 1, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052310010).
 
==2.0      BACKGROUND==
 
Davis-Besse has two Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) once-through SGs. The tubes are sensitized Alloy 600 in the mill annealed condition. Prior to 14MCO, the last inspection of the SG tubes was completed on March 9, 2002. The NRC staff issued a license amendment on February 26, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040580026), regarding a one-time extension to the SG tube inservice inspection frequency. This amendment extended the 24-calendar month inspection frequency in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.4.5.3.a by approximately 12-calendar months. For most of the first 24-calendar months since the previous SG tube inspections, the plant was in an extended shutdown. As a result, the SGs were not exposed to the high temperature conditions generally required for corrosion-induced degradation of the SG tubes.
At the time of the mid-cycle inspection, the plant had operated for approximately 16.6 effective full power years. In the ?2A SG, there are 199 sleeves installed and in the ?1B SG, there are 212 sleeves installed. All sleeves were installed in the 1994-1996 timeframe in the lane/wedge region as a preventive measure against high-cycle fatigue. All sleeves are manufactured from Alloy 690 thermally-treated material. At the start of 14MCO, there were 32 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?2A SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?1B SG. All of these re-roll repairs were performed in 2002.
Enclosure
 
3.0      RESULTS OF 2005 MID-CYCLE INSPECTION The licensee provided the scope, extent, methods, and results of their SG tube inspections in the documents referenced above. In addition, the licensee described corrective actions (i.e., tube plugging) taken in response to the inspection findings.
As a result of the review of the reports, the NRC staff has the following comments/observations:
During 14MCO, the licensee noticed that a shop re-roll (SRR) had been installed, during original manufacturing of the SGs, above the roll in the lower tubesheet in almost all the SG tubes (i.e., in all but 102 tubes). The tubes were re-rolled because the length of the original roll in the lower tubesheet was not controlled well and most were too short. The tubes were re-rolled prior to the annealing of the vessel. Based on the maintenance records, all of the tubes were supposed to have additional rolls installed. However, 102 did not have the SRR. The licensee indicated that 46 of the 102 tubes without a SRR contained rolls less than 1-inch in length. The shortest roll was 0.75 inches. The licensee indicated that, despite this condition, the tube would have been capable of performing its intended function (i.e., maintain structural and leakage integrity under a hot-leg large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA)) due to the presence of the seal weld. Axial indications were identified in the heel of the SRR in a total of 30 tubes in the
        ?1B SG. The licensee indicated the degradation was most likely caused by higher residual stresses in the SRR (i.e., higher than in the original roll). All of the tubes with axial indications in the area of the roll and SRR were plugged on detection. (The licensee initially attempted to install another re-roll above the original roll, or SRR, to enable them to leave the tube in-service. However, this process was not successful because there was tube springback due to the sludge and the roll wasnt acceptable.)
Approximately 34 tubes with a short original roll (and no SRR) were also plugged.
As a result of the above findings (i.e., the additional SRR), the licensee reviewed the manufacturing records for their SGs to identify any unknown design changes or construction features that could potentially impact the SG tubes. None were found.
No degradation was identified in dents, sleeves, or in the sludge pile region during this outage.
Intergranular attack and stress corrosion cracking (typically associated with grooves in the tubes) was identified in five tubes.
The internal auxiliary feedwater (AFW) headers were stabilized and functionally replaced by external headers in the 1980s. The repairs were qualified for postulated accident conditions. The internal AFW header and supporting welds are visually inspected each 10-year inservice inspection interval per TS 4.4.5.8. Inspections in 1990 and 1998 showed no evidence of movement or degradation of the AFW header or degradation of the AFW supply nozzles and thermal sleeves. During a visual inspection in 1998, one AFW nozzle was found to be stuck. As a result, the header at this nozzle location was inspected in 2000 and there was no evidence of movement or change in the header. The next 10-year inservice inspection interval at DBNPS begins in 2012, and the next visual inspection is scheduled for the 16th refueling outage. During each eddy current inspection, 100-percent of the periphery tubes are inspected with a bobbin coil, and an analysis is performed to ensure that the gap between the header and the


==2.0BACKGROUND==
tubes is at least 0.250-inch. Although the inspections during 14MCO indicated that no AFW header movement had occurred, there was one small volumetric wear indication detected in the 2A SG in tube 146-50. This indication of wear was attributed to tube contact with the abandoned internal AFW header dowel pin support stay. As a result, it appears that the flow conditions in the 2A SG during the prior operating period were suitable to support some relative movement between the tube and the AFW header sufficient to cause contact with the support stay and initiate wear. A re-review of the 12th refueling outage eddy current data indicated there was some evidence that this indication was present during the 12th refueling outage. There have been no other similar indications observed in the SGs.
Davis-Besse has two Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) once-through SGs. The tubes are sensitizedAlloy 600 in the mill annealed condition. Prior to 14MCO, the last inspection of the SG tubeswas completed on March 9, 2002. The NRC staff issued a license amendment on February 26,2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040580026), regarding a one-time extension to the SG tubeinservice inspection frequency. This amendment extended the 24-calendar month inspectionfrequency in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.4.5.3.a by approximately12-calendar months. For most of the first 24-calendar months since the previous SG tubeinspections, the plant was in an extended shutdown. As a result, the SGs were not exposed tothe high temperature conditions generally required for corrosion-induced degradation of the SGtubes.At the time of the mid-cycle inspection, the plant had operated for approximately 16.6 effectivefull power years. In the
At the conclusion of the outage, there were 104 inservice tubes repaired by rolling in the
?2A" SG, there are 199 sleeves installed and in the
        ?2A SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?1B SG.
?1B" SG, there are212 sleeves installed. All sleeves were installed in the 1994-1996 timeframe in the lane/wedgeregion as a preventive measure against high-cycle fatigue. All sleeves are manufactured fromAlloy 690 thermally-treated material. At the start of 14MCO, there were 32 tubes repaired byrolling in the
A subsequent inspection of the SGs was performed in spring 2006.
?2A" SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the
?1B" SG. All of these re-roll repairswere performed in 2002. 3.0RESULTS OF 2005 MID-CYCLE INSPECTIONThe licensee provided the scope, extent, methods, and results of their SG tube inspections inthe documents referenced above. In addition, the licensee described corrective actions  (i.e., tube plugging) taken in response to the inspection findings.As a result of the review of the reports, the NRC staff has the following comments/observations:During 14MCO, the licensee noticed that a shop re-roll (SRR) had been installed, duringoriginal manufacturing of the SGs, above the roll in the lower tubesheet in almost all theSG tubes (i.e., in all but 102 tubes). The tubes were re-rolled because the length of theoriginal roll in the lower tubesheet was not controlled well and most were too short. Thetubes were re-rolled prior to the annealing of the vessel. Based on the maintenancerecords, all of the tubes were supposed to have additional rolls installed. However, 102did not have the SRR. The licensee indicated that 46 of the 102 tubes without a SRRcontained rolls less than 1-inch in length. The shortest roll was 0.75 inches. Thelicensee indicated that, despite this condition, the tube would have been capable ofperforming its intended function (i.e., maintain structural and leakage integrity under ahot-leg large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA)) due to the presence of the sealweld. Axial indications were identified in the heel of the SRR in a total of 30 tubes in the
?1B" SG. The licensee indicated the degradation was most likely caused by higherresidual stresses in the SRR (i.e., higher than in the original roll). All of the tubes withaxial indications in the area of the roll and SRR were plugged on detection.  (Thelicensee initially attempted to install another re-roll above the original roll, or SRR, toenable them to leave the tube in-service. However, this process was not successfulbecause there was tube springback due to the sludge and the roll wasn't acceptable.) Approximately 34 tubes with a short original roll (and no SRR) were also plugged.As a result of the above findings (i.e., the additional SRR), the licensee reviewed themanufacturing records for their SGs to identify any unknown design changes orconstruction features that could potentially impact the SG tubes. None were found.No degradation was identified in dents, sleeves, or in the sludge pile region during thisoutage.Intergranular attack and stress corrosion cracking (typically associated with grooves inthe tubes) was identified in five tubes.The internal auxiliary feedwater (AFW) headers were stabilized and functionallyreplaced by external headers in the 1980s. The repairs were qualified for postulatedaccident conditions. The internal AFW header and supporting welds are visuallyinspected each 10-year inservice inspection interval per TS 4.4.5.8. Inspections in 1990and 1998 showed no evidence of movement or degradation of the AFW header ordegradation of the AFW supply nozzles and thermal sleeves. During a visual inspectionin 1998, one AFW nozzle was found to be stuck. As a result, the header at this nozzlelocation was inspected in 2000 and there was no evidence of movement or change inthe header. The next 10-year inservice inspection interval at DBNPS begins in 2012,and the next visual inspection is scheduled for the 16 th refueling outage. During eacheddy current inspection, 100-percent of the periphery tubes are inspected with a bobbincoil, and an analysis is performed to ensure that the gap between the header and the  tubes is at least 0.250-inch. Although the inspections during 14MCO indicated that noAFW header movement had occurred, there was one small volumetric wear indicationdetected in the "2A" SG in tube 146-50. This indication of wear was attributed to tubecontact with the abandoned internal AFW header dowel pin support stay. As a result, itappears that the flow conditions in the "2A" SG during the prior operating period were suitable to support some relative movement between the tube and the AFW headersufficient to cause contact with the support stay and initiate wear. A re-review of the 12 threfueling outage eddy current data indicated there was some evidence that this indication was present during the 12 th refueling outage. There have been no othersimilar indications observed in the SGs.At the conclusion of the outage, there were 104 inservice tubes repaired by rolling in the
?2A" SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the  
?1B" SG.A subsequent inspection of the SGs was performed in spring 2006.


==4.0CONCLUSION==
==4.0    CONCLUSION==
S AND FUTURE INSPECTION PLANSBased on a review of the information provided, the NRC staff concludes that the licenseeprovided the information required by their TSs. In addition, the NRC staff concludes that thereare no technical issues that warrant follow-up action at this time since the inspections appear tobe consistent with the objective of detecting potential tube degradation and the inspectionresults appear to be consistent with industry operating experience at similarly designed andoperated units. Note, however, that the NRC staff review did not address the acceptability of the licensee'sbest-estimate, primary-to-secondary leakage expected for a LBLOCA. This best-estimatedetermination was performed to satisfy a license condition to permit the use of a re-roll repairprocess for the Davis-Besse SGs. The Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plant licensees in thePressurized Water Reactor Owner's Group (PWROG) are addressing the LBLOCA of concernon a generic basis in a topical report that will be applicable to Davis-Besse. The NRC staff iscurrently reviewing that topical report which was submitted on January 4, 2007 (ADAMSAccession No. ML070330123). The NRC staff believes that the generic PWROG program isthe proper place to address the LBLOCA issue since the technical nature of this issue iscomplex, and the issue is generic to B&W plants.Principal Contributor: K. Karwoski Date: March 29, 2007}}
S AND FUTURE INSPECTION PLANS Based on a review of the information provided, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee provided the information required by their TSs. In addition, the NRC staff concludes that there are no technical issues that warrant follow-up action at this time since the inspections appear to be consistent with the objective of detecting potential tube degradation and the inspection results appear to be consistent with industry operating experience at similarly designed and operated units.
Note, however, that the NRC staff review did not address the acceptability of the licensees best-estimate, primary-to-secondary leakage expected for a LBLOCA. This best-estimate determination was performed to satisfy a license condition to permit the use of a re-roll repair process for the Davis-Besse SGs. The Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plant licensees in the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) are addressing the LBLOCA of concern on a generic basis in a topical report that will be applicable to Davis-Besse. The NRC staff is currently reviewing that topical report which was submitted on January 4, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070330123). The NRC staff believes that the generic PWROG program is the proper place to address the LBLOCA issue since the technical nature of this issue is complex, and the issue is generic to B&W plants.
Principal Contributor: K. Karwoski Date: March 29, 2007}}

Latest revision as of 09:19, 23 November 2019

Evaluation of 2005 Mid-Cycle (14MCO) Steam Generator Tube Inspections
ML070510609
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/29/2007
From: Thomas Wengert
NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLIII-2
To: Bezilla M
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
Wengert, Thomas
References
TAC MD0528
Download: ML070510609 (7)


Text

March 29, 2007 Mr. Mark B. Bezilla Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF 2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006, you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.

The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have provided the information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staffs review of the reports is enclosed.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Thomas J. Wengert, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346

Enclosure:

Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports cc w/encls: See next page

Mr. Mark B. Bezilla March 29, 2007 Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - EVALUATION OF 2005 MID-CYCLE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (TAC NO. MD0528)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

By letters dated February 17, 2005, April 29, 2005, February 16, 2006, and October 22, 2006, you submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at Davis-Besse in a letter dated September 1, 2005.

The NRC staff has completed its review of these reports and concludes that you have provided the information required by the Davis-Besse technical specifications and that no additional follow-up is required at this time. The NRC staffs review of the reports is enclosed.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Thomas J. Wengert, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346

Enclosure:

Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPL3-2 R/F RidsNrrPMTWengert RidsNrrDciCsgb RidsOgcRp RidsRgn3MailCenter RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter DHills, RIII RidsNrrLAEWhitt RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 KKarwoski, NRR ADAMS Accession Number: ML070510609 NRR-106 OFFICE PM/LPL3-2 LA/LPL3-2 DCI/CSGB/BC* BC/LPL3-2 NAME TWengert:mw EWhitt AHiser RGibbs DATE 3/28/07 3/28/07 3/22/07 3/29/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:

Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance Attorney General FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Office of Attorney General Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 30 East Broad Street Mail Stop A-DB-3065 Columbus, OH 43216 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 President, Board of County Commissioners of Ottawa County Director, Ohio Department of Commerce Port Clinton, OH 43252 Division of Industrial Compliance Bureau of Operations & Maintenance President, Board of County 6606 Tussing Road Commissioners of Lucas County P.O. Box 4009 One Government Center, Suite 800 Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-9009 Toledo, OH 43604-6506 Regional Administrator, Region III The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States House of Representatives Suite 210 Washington, D.C. 20515 2443 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4352 The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich United States House of Representatives Resident Inspector 14400 Detroit Avenue U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lakewood, OH 44107 5503 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Gary R. Leidich President and Chief Nuclear Officer Stephen Helmer FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Supervisor, Technical Support Section Mail Stop A-GO-19 Bureau of Radiation Protection 76 South Main Street Ohio Department of Health Akron, OH 44308 35 East Chestnut Street, 7th Floor Columbus, OH 43215 Joseph J. Hagan Senior Vice President of Operations and Carol OClaire, Chief, Radiological Branch Chief Operating Officer Ohio Emergency Management Agency FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 2855 West Dublin Granville Road Mail Stop A-GO-14 Columbus, OH 43235-2206 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Zack A. Clayton DERR David W. Jenkins, Attorney Ohio Environmental Protection Agency FirstEnergy Corporation P.O. Box 1049 Mail Stop A-GO-18 Columbus, OH 43266-0149 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission 180 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43266-0573

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 cc:

Danny L. Pace Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Manager, Fleet Licensing FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GHE-115 395 Ghent Road Akron, OH 44333 Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GHE-315 395 Ghent Road Akron, OH 44333 Jeannie M. Rinckel Vice President, Fleet Oversight FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Richard Anderson Vice President, Nuclear Support FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-GO-14 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EVALUATION OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION REPORTS FROM 2005 CYCLE 14 MID-CYCLE OUTAGE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letters to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated February 17, 2005 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML050530314),

April 29, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051230212), February 16, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML060530594), and October 22, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062980206), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), the licensee, submitted information summarizing the results of the 2005 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse). These inspections were performed during the cycle 14 mid-cycle outage (14MCO). In addition to these reports, the NRC staff summarized additional information concerning the 2005 SG tube inspections at DBNPS in a letter dated September 1, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052310010).

2.0 BACKGROUND

Davis-Besse has two Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) once-through SGs. The tubes are sensitized Alloy 600 in the mill annealed condition. Prior to 14MCO, the last inspection of the SG tubes was completed on March 9, 2002. The NRC staff issued a license amendment on February 26, 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040580026), regarding a one-time extension to the SG tube inservice inspection frequency. This amendment extended the 24-calendar month inspection frequency in Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.4.5.3.a by approximately 12-calendar months. For most of the first 24-calendar months since the previous SG tube inspections, the plant was in an extended shutdown. As a result, the SGs were not exposed to the high temperature conditions generally required for corrosion-induced degradation of the SG tubes.

At the time of the mid-cycle inspection, the plant had operated for approximately 16.6 effective full power years. In the ?2A SG, there are 199 sleeves installed and in the ?1B SG, there are 212 sleeves installed. All sleeves were installed in the 1994-1996 timeframe in the lane/wedge region as a preventive measure against high-cycle fatigue. All sleeves are manufactured from Alloy 690 thermally-treated material. At the start of 14MCO, there were 32 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?2A SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?1B SG. All of these re-roll repairs were performed in 2002.

Enclosure

3.0 RESULTS OF 2005 MID-CYCLE INSPECTION The licensee provided the scope, extent, methods, and results of their SG tube inspections in the documents referenced above. In addition, the licensee described corrective actions (i.e., tube plugging) taken in response to the inspection findings.

As a result of the review of the reports, the NRC staff has the following comments/observations:

During 14MCO, the licensee noticed that a shop re-roll (SRR) had been installed, during original manufacturing of the SGs, above the roll in the lower tubesheet in almost all the SG tubes (i.e., in all but 102 tubes). The tubes were re-rolled because the length of the original roll in the lower tubesheet was not controlled well and most were too short. The tubes were re-rolled prior to the annealing of the vessel. Based on the maintenance records, all of the tubes were supposed to have additional rolls installed. However, 102 did not have the SRR. The licensee indicated that 46 of the 102 tubes without a SRR contained rolls less than 1-inch in length. The shortest roll was 0.75 inches. The licensee indicated that, despite this condition, the tube would have been capable of performing its intended function (i.e., maintain structural and leakage integrity under a hot-leg large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA)) due to the presence of the seal weld. Axial indications were identified in the heel of the SRR in a total of 30 tubes in the

?1B SG. The licensee indicated the degradation was most likely caused by higher residual stresses in the SRR (i.e., higher than in the original roll). All of the tubes with axial indications in the area of the roll and SRR were plugged on detection. (The licensee initially attempted to install another re-roll above the original roll, or SRR, to enable them to leave the tube in-service. However, this process was not successful because there was tube springback due to the sludge and the roll wasnt acceptable.)

Approximately 34 tubes with a short original roll (and no SRR) were also plugged.

As a result of the above findings (i.e., the additional SRR), the licensee reviewed the manufacturing records for their SGs to identify any unknown design changes or construction features that could potentially impact the SG tubes. None were found.

No degradation was identified in dents, sleeves, or in the sludge pile region during this outage.

Intergranular attack and stress corrosion cracking (typically associated with grooves in the tubes) was identified in five tubes.

The internal auxiliary feedwater (AFW) headers were stabilized and functionally replaced by external headers in the 1980s. The repairs were qualified for postulated accident conditions. The internal AFW header and supporting welds are visually inspected each 10-year inservice inspection interval per TS 4.4.5.8. Inspections in 1990 and 1998 showed no evidence of movement or degradation of the AFW header or degradation of the AFW supply nozzles and thermal sleeves. During a visual inspection in 1998, one AFW nozzle was found to be stuck. As a result, the header at this nozzle location was inspected in 2000 and there was no evidence of movement or change in the header. The next 10-year inservice inspection interval at DBNPS begins in 2012, and the next visual inspection is scheduled for the 16th refueling outage. During each eddy current inspection, 100-percent of the periphery tubes are inspected with a bobbin coil, and an analysis is performed to ensure that the gap between the header and the

tubes is at least 0.250-inch. Although the inspections during 14MCO indicated that no AFW header movement had occurred, there was one small volumetric wear indication detected in the 2A SG in tube 146-50. This indication of wear was attributed to tube contact with the abandoned internal AFW header dowel pin support stay. As a result, it appears that the flow conditions in the 2A SG during the prior operating period were suitable to support some relative movement between the tube and the AFW header sufficient to cause contact with the support stay and initiate wear. A re-review of the 12th refueling outage eddy current data indicated there was some evidence that this indication was present during the 12th refueling outage. There have been no other similar indications observed in the SGs.

At the conclusion of the outage, there were 104 inservice tubes repaired by rolling in the

?2A SG and 8 tubes repaired by rolling in the ?1B SG.

A subsequent inspection of the SGs was performed in spring 2006.

4.0 CONCLUSION

S AND FUTURE INSPECTION PLANS Based on a review of the information provided, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee provided the information required by their TSs. In addition, the NRC staff concludes that there are no technical issues that warrant follow-up action at this time since the inspections appear to be consistent with the objective of detecting potential tube degradation and the inspection results appear to be consistent with industry operating experience at similarly designed and operated units.

Note, however, that the NRC staff review did not address the acceptability of the licensees best-estimate, primary-to-secondary leakage expected for a LBLOCA. This best-estimate determination was performed to satisfy a license condition to permit the use of a re-roll repair process for the Davis-Besse SGs. The Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plant licensees in the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) are addressing the LBLOCA of concern on a generic basis in a topical report that will be applicable to Davis-Besse. The NRC staff is currently reviewing that topical report which was submitted on January 4, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070330123). The NRC staff believes that the generic PWROG program is the proper place to address the LBLOCA issue since the technical nature of this issue is complex, and the issue is generic to B&W plants.

Principal Contributor: K. Karwoski Date: March 29, 2007