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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM,(RIDS)
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM,(RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 9105170317 DOC.DATE: 91/05/11 NOTARIZED:
ACCESSION NBR: 9105170317             DOC. DATE:   91/05/11   NOTARIZED: NO           DOCKET FACIL:50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee                   05000296 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION WALLACE,J.E.         Tennessee Valley Authority BYNUM,J.R.           Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
NO DOCKET FACIL:50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WALLACE,J.E.
Tennessee Valley Authority BYNUM,J.R.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 91-003-00:on 910412,unplanned ESF occurred when four Unit 3 EDG unexpectedly auto-started during performance of common accident signal logic surveillance instruction.TVA suppl LER rept will be submitted 910617.W/910511 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3 ENCL L SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Tnciden&Rpt, etc.NOTES:1 Copy each to: S.Black,B.WILSON 05000296 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME KREBS,M.ROSS,T.INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE I J~H NRC PDR NSIC POORE,W.NOTES: COPIES LTTR ENCL 1'1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 5 5 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HEBDON,F ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR/D~S/SgLB8D1 REG.R7LE~=012 RGN2 FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
LER   91-003-00:on 910412,unplanned ESF occurred when four Unit   3 EDG unexpectedly auto-started during performance of common accident signal logic surveillance instruction.TVA suppl LER rept will be submitted 910617.W/910511                 ltr.
y PLEASE-HELP US TO REDUCE Oi'ASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO'ELliXIINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL'38 IN J Tennessee Vatley Authority, t>0>Mar>ret Street.Chattanooga.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3 ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Tnciden&Rpt, etc.
Tennessee 37402 Joseph R.Bynum Vice President Nuctear Operations QY i.i 18SlU.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk washington, D.C.20555
L    SIZE:
NOTES:1 Copy each to: S. Black,B.WILSON                                               05000296 RECIPIENT               COPIES            RECIPIENT          COPIES ID   CODE/NAME             LTTR ENCL        ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL KREBS,M.                     1'            HEBDON,F                1    1 ROSS,T.                       1      1 INTERNAL: ACNW                           2      2    ACRS                    2' AEOD/DOA                     1      1    AEOD/DSP/TPAB          1    1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP                 2      2    NRR/DET/ECMB 9H        1    1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E               1      1    NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11        1    1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10               1      1    NRR/DOEA/OEAB          1    1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11               2      2    NRR/DST/SELB 8D        1    1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E               1      1    NRR/D~S/SgLB8D1        1    1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E               1      1    REG .R7LE~=012          1    1 RES/DSIR/EIB                 1      1    RGN2    FILE 01        1    1 EXTERNAL   EG&G BRYCE I J ~ H           3       3     L ST LOBBY WARD        1     1 NRC PDR                      1       1     NSIC MURPHY,G.A         1     1 NSIC POORE,W.                1       1     NUDOCS FULL TXT        1     1 NOTES:                                    5      5 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
y PLEASE -HELP US TO REDUCE Oi'ASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO'ELliXIINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR                 38   ENCL   '38


==Dear Sir:==
IN J
TVA-BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)UNIT 3-DOCKET NO'.50-296-FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68-REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/91003 The enclosed report provides details concerning an unplanned engineered safety feature actuation that occurred resulting from personnel error while performing a common accident signal logic surveillance instruction.
This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(IV).
TVA is continuing is investigation of this event and will issue a supplement to this report by June 17, 1991.Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h R.Bynum Enclosure cc: see page 2


U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosure):
Tennessee Vatley Authority, t >0> Mar>ret Street. Chattanooga. Tennessee 37402 Joseph R. Bynum Vice President Nuctear Operations QY      i.i    18Sl U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:        Document          Control Desk washington, D.C.                  20555
INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100.Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector, BFN Regional Administration U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M.Ross U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 i5 0 l.
 
NRC Form 366 (6-89)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Approved OMB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 FACILITY NAHE (1)B w 1)DOCKET NUHBER (2))g~~~TITLE (4)An Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature Occurred From Personnel Error While Performing a Comnon Accident 1 i v'1 r V NT P T I I I.I I SE()UENTIAL I IREVISIONI I I I FACILITY NAMES N A N I I I I I I I I I I I ,,)DOCKET NUMBER(S)OPERATING MODE I ITHIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: I r f 1 w'OWER I LEVEL l I20.402(b)
==Dear      Sir:==
I=I20.405(a)(l)(i)
 
)20.405(a)(1)(ii)
TVA  BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 3  DOCKET NO'. 50-296 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68  REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/91003 The enclosed            report provides details concerning an unplanned engineered safety feature actuation that occurred resulting from personnel error while performing a common accident signal logic surveillance instruction. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(IV).
[20.405(a)(l)(iii)f20.405(a)(1)(iv) v-l20 405(c)F50.36(c)(1))50.36(c)(2)
TVA    is continuing is investigation of this event                          and will issue a supplement to              this report by June 17, 1991.
I l50 73(a)(2)(i) f50.73(a)(2)(ii)
Very      truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h
I (~[50.73(a)(2)(iv)
R. Bynum Enclosure cc: see page              2
[50.73(a)(2)(v)
 
)50.73(a)(2)(vii)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosure):
[50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100. Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector, BFN Regional Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland   20852
)50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
 
I73.71(b)i73.71(c)]OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in j Text, NRC Form 366A)NT TF T m W 1 1'1 r]AREA CODE (P N N F MPNN I I I IREPORTABLEf A YTM NNT NF T P D I I P N F T)REPORTABLE' PPL M P T P D 14 I SUBMISSION i f ml XP TD I NOT N AT ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately.
i5 0 l.
fifteen single-space typewritten lines)(16)On April 12, 1991 at 1817,hours, an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators unexpectedly auto-started during the performance of common accident signal logic Surveillance Instruction.
 
TUA is presently conducting an investigation of this event.TVA will report the results in a supplement to this Licensee Event Report.NRC Form 366(6-89)
NRC (6-89)
II iJ NRC Form 366A (6-89).NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION Approved OMB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 FACILITY NANE (1)[DOCKET NUNOER (2)'I H I I ISEQUENTIAL
Form 366 FACILITY NAHE (1)
/)REVISIONI I I I I I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)'(l7)On April 12, 1991, at 1817 hours CST, an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF)actuation occurred during the performance of Common Accident Signal (CAS)Logic Surveillance Instruction (SI)1/2 SI-4.9.A.3.a, when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators (EDGs)[EK]unexpectedly auto-started.
B  w                1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                   i                Approved OMB   No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92
In addition,.the Unit 3 4kV shutdown board manual transfer switches[EB]tripped to manual, and A3 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW)[CC]pump also started.The Unit 1/2 Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance is performed to verify that both divisions of the CAS logic will function on actuation of the Core Spray (CS)System of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all 4 Unit 1/2 EDGs and 4 RHRSW pumps and blocks transfer to the 4KV shutdown buses and boards.On.April 12, 1991, Division I testing of 1/2-SI-'4.9.A.3.a was completed at 1600 hours and Division II of the CAS logic testing was started at 1630 hours.At.approximately 1817 hours, the CAS logic circuitry was aligned for testing relay CASB-1.This involved placing test switches for the remaining relays of the division in the TEST position to prevent undesired init'iation of Units 1/2 ESF equipment.
                                                                                                                                      )DOCKET NUHBER   (2) )g~~~
The CASB-1 relay[RLX]was then energized using the CASB-C test switch.Contacts were verified to be operating properly, and the appropriate trip to manual bus reset circuit relays were verified to trip.Boots were installed on contacts 11-12 of the CS logic relay to inhibit a Unit 2 accident signal to the Unit 3 CAS logic circuitry.
TITLE (4) An Unplanned Engineered                     Safety Feature Occurred From Personnel Error While Performing a                                 Comnon Accident 1     i         v'1                     r V NT                                                                                   P     T I       I       I       .
A jumper with an in-line test switch in the open position was installed to the CS logic relay coil.The in-line test switch was closed, energizing CS logic relay.CASB-C test switch was then placed in the NORNAL position, and relay CASB-1 was verified to remain energized.
I     I SE()UENTIAL     I     IREVISIONI                   I       I     I   FACILITY NAMES             ,, )DOCKET NUMBER(S)
The in-line test switch was then opened, and relay CASB-1 verified to be de-energized.
N               A                                                                     N I       I       I         I     I                 I     I             I             I       I       I OPERATING       I   ITHIS     REPORT       IS SUBHITTED           PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR                   5:
Since this SI was being performed on Unit 2 and only the four Unit 3 EDGs actuated, the ENs did not realize that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated.ENs continued performing the SI.At 1820 hours, ENs attempted to contact an Auxiliary Unit Operator (utility, non-licensed) to place the Unit 2 Division II CASB-1 in TEST position.At that time, the ENs were notified that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated.The SI was stopped.Shutdown activity was completed by 1940 hours after the Unit Operator (utility, licensed)completed the manual shutdown of the Unit 3 EDGs.I EN TVA will issue a supplement to this Licensee Event Report by June 17, 1991.Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS)codes are identified in the text as[xx].NRC Form 366(6-89) iO t}}
MODE        I                             r             f           1 I20.402(b)                          l20      405(c)  w'OWER
(~[50.73(a)(2)(iv)                  I73.71(b)
I            I=I20.405(a)(l)(i)                           F50.36(c)( 1)                         [50.73(a)(2)(v)              i73.71(c)
LEVEL l                  )20.405(a)(1)(ii)                         )50.36(c)(2)                         )50.73(a)(2)(vii)             ]OTHER (Specify in
[20.405(a)(         l)(iii)       I     l50  73(a)(2)(i)                     [50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)         Abstract below and in f20.405(a)(1)(iv)                         f50.73(a)(2)(ii)                     )50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)     j   Text, NRC Form 366A) v                                            I NT         TF     T
                                                                                                                      ] AREA CODE  (
m         W   1 1'                   1                   r P             N       N   F                   MPNN I         I                 I                   IREPORTABLEf                         I        I                                      )REPORTABLE' A       YTM             NNT             NF     T                   P D                                             P N             F T PPL     M             P     T     P       D       14 I                                     SUBMISSION i f           ml               XP   TD                   I NOT                       N                               AT ABSTRACT     (Limit to     1400 spaces,           i.e.,   approximately. fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)
On April 12, 1991 at 1817,hours, an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators unexpectedly auto-started during the performance of common accident signal logic Surveillance Instruction.
TUA   is presently conducting an investigation of this event.                                                           TVA   will report       the results in a supplement to this Licensee Event Report.
NRC   Form   366(6-89)
 
II iJ NRC Form 366A                       . NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION                   Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)                                                                                      Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NANE (1)
                                                                          '
[DOCKET NUNOER (2)
I I ISEQUENTIAL / )REVISIONI   I I I I I                                                       I I I I H
TEXT   (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) '(l7)
On   April   12, 1991, at 1817 hours CST, an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred during the performance of Common Accident Signal (CAS)
Logic Surveillance Instruction (SI) 1/2 SI-4.9.A.3.a, when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) [EK] unexpectedly auto-started.                       In addition,
      .the Unit 3 4kV shutdown board manual transfer switches [EB] tripped to manual, and A3 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) [CC] pump also started.
The   Unit 1/2 Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance is performed to verify that both divisions of the CAS logic will function on actuation of the Core Spray (CS) System of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all                         4 Unit 1/2 EDGs and 4 RHRSW pumps and blocks transfer to the 4KV shutdown buses and boards.
On .April 12, 1991, Division I testing of 1/2-SI-'4.9.A.3.a was completed at 1600 hours and Division       II   of the CAS logic testing was started at 1630 hours. At
      .approximately 1817 hours, the CAS logic circuitry was aligned for testing relay CASB-1. This involved placing test switches for the remaining relays of the division in the TEST position to prevent undesired init'iation of Units 1/2 ESF equipment. The CASB-1 relay [RLX] was then energized using the CASB-C test switch. Contacts were verified to be operating properly, and the appropriate trip to manual bus reset circuit relays were verified to trip. Boots were installed on contacts 11-12 of the CS logic relay to inhibit a Unit 2 accident signal to the Unit 3 CAS logic circuitry. A jumper with an in-line test switch in the open position was installed to the CS logic relay coil. The in-line test switch was closed, energizing CS logic relay. CASB-C test switch was then placed in the NORNAL position, and relay CASB-1 was verified to remain energized. The in-line test switch was then opened, and relay CASB-1 verified to be de-energized.
Since   this SI was being performed on Unit 2 and only the four Unit 3 EDGs actuated, the ENs did not realize that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated. ENs continued performing the SI. At 1820 hours, ENs attempted to contact an Auxiliary Unit Operator (utility, non-licensed) to place the Unit 2 Division II CASB-1 in TEST position. At that time, the ENs were notified that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated.       The SI was stopped.           Shutdown activity was completed by 1940 hours after the Unit Operator (utility, licensed) completed the manual shutdown of the Unit 3 EDGs.
I   EN TVA   will issue   a supplement     to this Licensee Event Report by June 17, 1991.
Energy Industry     Identification       System   (EIIS) codes are identified in the text           as
[xx].
NRC Form 366(6-89)
 
iO t}}

Revision as of 00:33, 22 October 2019

LER 91-003-00:on 910412,unplanned ESF Occurred When EDG Unexpectedly auto-started During Performance of Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance Instruction.Suppl to LER Will Be Submitted by 910617.W/910511 Ltr
ML18033B702
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/1991
From: Bynum J, Jay Wallace
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-91-003-04, LER-91-3-4, NUDOCS 9105170317
Download: ML18033B702 (10)


Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM,(RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9105170317 DOC. DATE: 91/05/11 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WALLACE,J.E. Tennessee Valley Authority BYNUM,J.R. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 91-003-00:on 910412,unplanned ESF occurred when four Unit 3 EDG unexpectedly auto-started during performance of common accident signal logic surveillance instruction.TVA suppl LER rept will be submitted 910617.W/910511 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 3 ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Tnciden&Rpt, etc.

L SIZE:

NOTES:1 Copy each to: S. Black,B.WILSON 05000296 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL KREBS,M. 1' HEBDON,F 1 1 ROSS,T. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2' AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/D~S/SgLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG .R7LE~=012 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE I J ~ H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTES: 5 5 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

y PLEASE -HELP US TO REDUCE Oi'ASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOXI Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO'ELliXIINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL '38

IN J

Tennessee Vatley Authority, t >0> Mar>ret Street. Chattanooga. Tennessee 37402 Joseph R. Bynum Vice President Nuctear Operations QY i.i 18Sl U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TVA BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 3 DOCKET NO'. 50-296 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-296/91003 The enclosed report provides details concerning an unplanned engineered safety feature actuation that occurred resulting from personnel error while performing a common accident signal logic surveillance instruction. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(IV).

TVA is continuing is investigation of this event and will issue a supplement to this report by June 17, 1991.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h

R. Bynum Enclosure cc: see page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100. Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Resident Inspector, BFN Regional Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

i5 0 l.

NRC (6-89)

Form 366 FACILITY NAHE (1)

B w 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92

)DOCKET NUHBER (2) )g~~~

TITLE (4) An Unplanned Engineered Safety Feature Occurred From Personnel Error While Performing a Comnon Accident 1 i v'1 r V NT P T I I I .

I I SE()UENTIAL I IREVISIONI I I I FACILITY NAMES ,, )DOCKET NUMBER(S)

N A N I I I I I I I I I I I OPERATING I ITHIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5:

MODE I r f 1 I20.402(b) l20 405(c) w'OWER

(~[50.73(a)(2)(iv) I73.71(b)

I I=I20.405(a)(l)(i) F50.36(c)( 1) [50.73(a)(2)(v) i73.71(c)

LEVEL l )20.405(a)(1)(ii) )50.36(c)(2) )50.73(a)(2)(vii) ]OTHER (Specify in

[20.405(a)( l)(iii) I l50 73(a)(2)(i) [50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below and in f20.405(a)(1)(iv) f50.73(a)(2)(ii) )50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) j Text, NRC Form 366A) v I NT TF T

] AREA CODE (

m W 1 1' 1 r P N N F MPNN I I I IREPORTABLEf I I )REPORTABLE' A YTM NNT NF T P D P N F T PPL M P T P D 14 I SUBMISSION i f ml XP TD I NOT N AT ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately. fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 12, 1991 at 1817,hours, an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators unexpectedly auto-started during the performance of common accident signal logic Surveillance Instruction.

TUA is presently conducting an investigation of this event. TVA will report the results in a supplement to this Licensee Event Report.

NRC Form 366(6-89)

II iJ NRC Form 366A . NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NANE (1)

'

[DOCKET NUNOER (2)

I I ISEQUENTIAL / )REVISIONI I I I I I I I I I H

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) '(l7)

On April 12, 1991, at 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br /> CST, an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred during the performance of Common Accident Signal (CAS)

Logic Surveillance Instruction (SI) 1/2 SI-4.9.A.3.a, when the four Unit 3 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) [EK] unexpectedly auto-started. In addition,

.the Unit 3 4kV shutdown board manual transfer switches [EB] tripped to manual, and A3 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) [CC] pump also started.

The Unit 1/2 Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance is performed to verify that both divisions of the CAS logic will function on actuation of the Core Spray (CS) System of each reactor to provide an automatic start signal to all 4 Unit 1/2 EDGs and 4 RHRSW pumps and blocks transfer to the 4KV shutdown buses and boards.

On .April 12, 1991, Division I testing of 1/2-SI-'4.9.A.3.a was completed at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> and Division II of the CAS logic testing was started at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />. At

.approximately 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br />, the CAS logic circuitry was aligned for testing relay CASB-1. This involved placing test switches for the remaining relays of the division in the TEST position to prevent undesired init'iation of Units 1/2 ESF equipment. The CASB-1 relay [RLX] was then energized using the CASB-C test switch. Contacts were verified to be operating properly, and the appropriate trip to manual bus reset circuit relays were verified to trip. Boots were installed on contacts 11-12 of the CS logic relay to inhibit a Unit 2 accident signal to the Unit 3 CAS logic circuitry. A jumper with an in-line test switch in the open position was installed to the CS logic relay coil. The in-line test switch was closed, energizing CS logic relay. CASB-C test switch was then placed in the NORNAL position, and relay CASB-1 was verified to remain energized. The in-line test switch was then opened, and relay CASB-1 verified to be de-energized.

Since this SI was being performed on Unit 2 and only the four Unit 3 EDGs actuated, the ENs did not realize that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated. ENs continued performing the SI. At 1820 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.9251e-4 months <br />, ENs attempted to contact an Auxiliary Unit Operator (utility, non-licensed) to place the Unit 2 Division II CASB-1 in TEST position. At that time, the ENs were notified that the Unit 3 EDGs had actuated. The SI was stopped. Shutdown activity was completed by 1940 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.3817e-4 months <br /> after the Unit Operator (utility, licensed) completed the manual shutdown of the Unit 3 EDGs.

I EN TVA will issue a supplement to this Licensee Event Report by June 17, 1991.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as

[xx].

NRC Form 366(6-89)

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