ML18095A544

Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-26:on 880713,25 & 28,listed Fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days.Cause Not Determined.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Fire Protection Concerns Resolved

ML18095A544
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/17/1990
From:	LABRUNA S Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
88-3-26, NUDOCS 9010260113
Download: ML18095A544 (13)

Text

i . * .. -. e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 17, 1990 u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear *sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL*

SPECIAL REPORT 8.8-3-26 . . -. -This supplemental Special Report addresses.additional fire barrier penetration seal impairments (for both Salem Unit 1 and Salem Unit 2} which have not been restored to functional status within severt (7) days. These impairments have been identified by the Penetration Seal Task Foice.

• This report has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Acti.on Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. MJP:pc Distribution 9010260113 901017 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDC The Energy People Sincerely

yours, S. LaBruna General Manager -Salem Operations 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT . PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station -Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaired .For Greater Than 7 Days Event 9/7/88, 10/11/88, 12/7/88, 1/5/89, 2/6/89, 3/7/89, 4/6/89, 5/9/89, 6/7/89, 7/12/89, 8/8/89, 9/7/89, 10/7/89, 11/8/89, 12/8/89, 1/9/90, 2/8/90, 3/14/90, 4/9/90, 5/8/90, 6/8/90, 7/16/90, a122190, .9120190

• I Report 10/17/90 This report was initiated by Report Nos.88-268, 88-531,88-537, 88-544,89-050, 89-075,89-086, 89-091,89-127, 89-287,89-349, 90-357, and 90-359. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

As identified in PSE&G letter dated March 4: 1988, PSE&G has *initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetrati_on seals. Due to. the additional.

review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as. specified by. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

This report summarizes the task force findings and Technical Specification 4.7.11 surveiliance activity findings -associated with inadequate penetration seals for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inadequate penetration.

seals found,. to the date of issue of. this report, include: On July 13, .1988 two -fire. Barrier cabie wer*e found degraded.

The penetration contained.

electrical sleeving

• containing an electrical cable surrounded

• • by<:f'oam tj-pe fire sealant. The area_ (approximately 1/8"* gap ..

• . respectively) surrounding the el*ectrical sleev.es were.' not sealed thereby cons ti tu ting an impaired seal. _ *.The *fire :barrier.*

is in the east wall -of the 100' Relay:

c .. Ori July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded penetration seals were found on the south 'Wali' -:1ii -'the**'100' Elevatiori Relay Room. Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the floor). The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling. This fire wrap extends over the penetration.

There is no foam behind the fire wrap. It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

Unit 1 SPECIAL REPORT DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

{cont'd) *On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal* was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Ro*om. The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/2" diameter hole. . -. -Between August 2, 1988 .and August 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located *in the Unit 1 Re.lay Room and 4 penetrations are . located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Room. The penetrations range in size from -*3 inches to .-6 inches in diameter.

The nature of the impairments include 6 with. no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal {unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded in the seal (one imbedded with a rag and .the other with duct tape), 30 with a void in the seal (due to inadequate quantity*

of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation

{e.g., cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure

• {reference LER 272/88._013-00)

• and 32 that are not deep enough into* the penetration.

per design (less than 6 inches). Between August 31, 1988 a_nd October 12, 1990, 6856 Unit 1 penetration seals and 5122 Unit 2 penetration seals were reviewed.

Of these, 2871 penetration seals to be impaired.

The majority.of penetrations range .in size from -y inches to -6 inches in diameter.

There were 337 penetrations which were larger than*G inches in diameter.

These penetrations ranged from 3"x5" to 258"x36".

Page 3 of this contains a table of ihe found impaired, between August 2, 1988 and October 12,* 1990, in I relation to the fire zone where they were found. The impairment

• designator terms include:-No Seal Hole in Seal Void in Seal . Depth Not Great Enough Color/Cell Structure Seal Degradation Foreign Material Imbedded Planned Impairment NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM An hourly fire watch *patrol had been established areas previously due to other fire protection concerns.-*.

requirements of Tech. Spec. Action Statement are met * . Unit 1 Technical Specification

3. 7 .11 states: * * "All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety.related areas shall be functional." Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states: "With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a .. -.. :-

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT

-3 . ...:. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) U-1 u..;..1 U-1 U""'.'l U-1 U-1 u-*1 U-1 u..:...1 U-1 U-1 U-1 U-1 continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in . lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to . Specification

6.9.2 within

the next 30 days outiining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and .schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status." NOTE -Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the.words "OPERABLE and ... 1noperable".

• *

• TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS 8/02188 -10112/90 HOL . VIS . DPT Relay Room 15 34 54 72 194 lA DIG Control Room 2 3 2 21 lB DIG Control Room 1 1 3 21 lC DIG Control Room 1 1 1 11 11 lA 125 v Battery Room 2 3 lC 125 v Battery Room 20 i 1 #1 250 v Battery Room 1 1 5 #3 Stairwell 13 1 s* 64' Elevation, Aisle 3 1 6 17 11 Auxiliary Building 84' Elevation, Aisle 6 4 7 7 #1 Auxiliary Building 122' Elevation, N2 1 Bottle Storage Area .. 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 3 3 2 Common East & West

• 78' Electrical Penetra. 1 1 1 1 7 Area 100' Boric Acid Transfer 3 12 5 Pump *Area DEG _FMT . PIM 7 3 l** 2 2 2 1 1 \. . ' . --**. -*

.. -:----.. . . ....... ---*-** ---, .. -*-------1 UNIT l SPECIAL REPORT 8'93-26 TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont Id} . 8/02/88 -10/12/90 lOci' El.

• 1 5 Penetration Area.-Blowdown Tanks U-1 100' El. Corridor Service Building U-1 100' Elevation, 4 11-Auxiliary Buildirig U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 & 15 2 Common East & West

• U-1 84 ' .. Corridor; Uni. t 1 & 2 Common North & South U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 2 Common East &

• U-1 122' Lobby U-1 100' ,Lobby U-1 64' Lobby 2 U-1 11/12 Containment Spray 4 Pumps & Spray Add. Tank Area *u-1 100' Cqrridor; Unit 1 & 2 Common North & South. U-1 100' Elevation Counting Room U-1 Ill Diesel Oil Tk Room U-1 112 Diesel Oil Tk Room U-1 84' Elev. Control Area 11 Transformer Bus Rm. Spent Fuel Pit Heat .Exchanger Area U-1 lA Diesel Generator Area . 2 6 23 3 U-1 lB Dies.el Generator Area 5 U-1 lC Diesel Generator Area 6 U-1 Waste Evaporator Room 4 U-1 100' Elevation Mechanical 8 Penetration Area 2 4 11 7 3 1 1 4 1 14 3 1 *. 4 2 . 8. 3 3 3 2 2 6 14. 1 8 30 61 14 11 2 3 2 1 6 19 3 1 185 1 1 1 3 2 .5 1 6 . 16. 1 7 1 1 2 3 11 4 .1 10 *1 1 1 1 2 2 7 1 1.,.,,_ *.

• .._

• _ ........

.. *

... 7--*-* ........ --.. ----.***-****

• 1*

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 89-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U'-1 UPS Battery Room 2 U-1 Containment Rad Mon Room 4 1 10 10 U-:-1 ill Chg. &: SI Pump Room 1 4 U-1 #12 Chg. &: SI Pump Room 1 U-1 #13 Chg. &: st Pump Room 2 U-1 84' El. Pipe Trench 126 1 1 16 2 U-1 100' El. Baling &: Storage 7 1 3 1 1 U-1 110' El. Control Console 1 9 U'."""l 78' El. Contain. Rad 1 1 Mon. Room u...:...1 84' El. #11 Comp. Cool. 20 1 3 2 Heat Xgr. & 12 cc Pp Room U-1 100' Elec. Penetra. Area 14 4 17 6 5 U-1 Laundry, Chem Pump Area 5 3 2 19 4 U-1 64' El. Control Area #1 3 4 18 11 1 4KV Bus U-1 #1 Letdown Heat Exch. 1 U-1 84' El. #12 Comp. Cool. 3 3 3 He.at Xgr * &: 12 &: 13 CC Pp Room U-1 ill SI Pump Room 1 1 U-1 Pipe Trench 14 3 3 20 16 3 U-1 Rx Coolant Filter Area 9 1 U-1 84' Spent Resin Xfer Pp Rm 2 U-1 11 &: 12 Mon. Tank Room 8 1 *. 5 2 ,-, __ U-1 84' Elevator Lobby 1 U-1 Aux Feed Pumps 3 U-1 Valve Alley 3 2 3 U-1 Seal Water Heat XChg 2 3 1 U-1 84' El. Corridor 2 2 1

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' UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS {cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 A/C & Boric Acid 5 1 10 81 1 Tank Room U-1 A/C Equipment Rm 1 2 4 u-i Boric Acid Evap. & 2 1 3 1 Gas Stripper Unit U-1 Water Recirc Heater 3 1 1 2 U-1 #1 Stairwell 6 5 U-1 11 Cone. Filter Area 1 U-1 Rm Next To #11 Chg Pp 2 2 U-1 Diesel Oil C02 Area 4 1 U-1 Motor Control Center 2 1 1 U-1 Elevator -El 2 1 1 U-1 N2 Bottle Storage 3 U-1 #12 RHR XGR Room 1 U-1 55' El. Walkway 2 U-1 Future Mixed Bed 7 Dem in U-1 :fl:ll Mixed Bed Dem in 2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed {NW) 2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed {SW) 8 U-1 #11 Debora ting Demin 3 " .:.** U-1 112 Debora ting Dem in 2 1 U-1. Primary Sampling Lab 4 1 U-1 78' Piping Penetration 1 4 U-1 Vent Duct Shaft 1 6 U-1 Valve Room 4 U-1 Waste Evaporator Area 1 U-1 #11 Evap. *Feed Ion Xchg. 3 UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8w-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 I AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 #12 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 2 U-1 #13 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 4 U-1 #14 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 1 1 U-1 100' Aisle #1 N & s 2 U-1 122' Corridor 1 U-1 Ops File & Ref Rm 1 U-1 Watch Engineer Room 3 U-1 #1 Maint, Spare & Test 1 Equipment Room U-1 #2 Maint, Spare & Test 2 Equipment Room U-1 Janitors Closet 1 U-1 #1 Control Equip. Room 15 5 U-1 84' El. Pipe Alley 2 3 1 U-1 Sample Room 1 U-1 Data Logging Room 2 16 U-1 Work Control Center 1 2 1 U-1 #11 & #12 RHR Sump Pumps 1 -. ,_: Room U-1 11 Control Room 4 2 ... .-.. ;* . . *:.-.:,\**

U-1 AC Equip. Room 1 .2 U-1 #1 Spent Fuel Pit Filter 1 U-1 Women's Toilet 5 U-1 Containment Rad Monitor 1 Room U-2 #5 Stairwell 3 1 .*i U-2 #4 Stairwell 7 1 1 U-2 #2 Stairwell 7 1 1 . *. *--*----.. --*-.. -_____:_ ____ _

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 AREA* NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 100' El. Mechanical Pene. 2 6 Area -Blowdown Tanks u:....2 100' El. Corridor 2 1 U-2 100' Elevation Mechanical 5 3 5 6 4 3 Penetration Area U-:2 AC & Boric Acid Tank Room 9 9 21 4 1 U-2 Relay Room 23 27 4 61 132 1 U-2 2.2 RHR Xgr Room 3 u:....2 84' Control Area Trans-17 34 4 39 31 former Bus Room U-2 Rad. Detector Panel 1 U-2 Battery Room .2C 1.25VDC 13 U-2 Battery Room .2B 1.25VDC 2 3 3 U-2 #.2 .250V Battery Room 3 U-.2 Control Area #7 4KV 4 5 2 3 1 Vital Bus Area U-2 110' El. Control Console 1 3 U-.2 18' Electrical Pen. Area 5 4 U-2 100' Electrical Pen. Area .2 1 3 U-2 2A D/G Control Room 1 5 4 1 U-2 2B DIG Control Room 1 2 11 4 U-2 2C D/G Control Room 2 4 3 U-2 *#21 Diesel Oil Tank Area 5 2 1 3 U-2 122 Diesel Oil Tank Area 1 3 2 4 4 U-2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil 1 1 Transfer Pump Area *U-2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil 1 Transfer Pump Area U-2 111' Vent. Equip. Area 19 4 9 UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8*3-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT* PIM U-2 100'. Vent Duct Shaft 1 1 U-2 64' Storage Area 2 1 19 6 U-2 84' Spent Fuel Pit Heat 4 1 4 XChgr. & Pump Room U-2 Boric Acid XFer Pump Area 9 1 1 2 U-2 Aisle #1 East Section 7 1 1 2-U-2 Aux. Feedwater Pumps 2 4 1 U-2 #21 & 22 Monitor Tank 3 1 1 2 Area U-2 21 & 22 Cont. Spray 11 4 1 1 Pumps & Spray Add Tank U-2 Aisle 2 East & West 1 1 U-2 Counting Room 1 5 U-2 #2 Control Room . 13 7 2 1 1 U-2 78' Containment Rad 6 5 Monitor Room U-2 21 & 22 SI Pump Room 1 U-2 84' Piping Pene Area 5 U-2 Aisle 2 North & South 1 1 U-2 84' Corridor 1 U-2 Calibration Room 1 U-2 #21 Component Cooling 16 1 Heat Exchanger and Pumps U-2 #22 Component Cooling 6 Heat Exchanger and Pumps U-2 84' SW Piping Room 1 U-2 C02 Fire Equipment Area 1 U-2 Concentrates Holding Tank 1 U-2 Seal Water Heat XChgr 1

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UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8w-26 e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 -10/12/90 AREA -NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT U-2 #2 Rx Coolant Filter Area 7 -u-2 i2 Control Equip -Room

• 1 4 U-2 84' Valve Room 5 U-2 ilOO Rad Detector Panel 1 1 U-2 Waste Evaporator Area 1 2 3 U-2 Vent Duct Enclosure Shaft 2 U-2 Motor Control Center 1 U-2 Ref. Water Purifier Room 2 U-2 Data Logging-Room 5 7 U-2 A/C Equipment_

Room 2 U-2 84' Pipe Alley 6 1 U-2 N2 Bottle Storage Area 1* 1 U-2 #24 Feed Ion Xchgr 1 U-2 100' Cation Bed Demin. 3 U-2 84' Valve Alley 1 U-1 lA Diesel* Generator Area 1 U-1 lB Diesel Generator Area 4 U-1 lC Diesel Generator Area 2 * -The opposite room for the north and east walls is the Unit 2 Relay Room. ** -The Relay Room PIM was resealed.thirteen days after opening APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:.

The cause of the degraded fire harrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the PIM sleeve which hid the gap. The 3. 5" south wall penetrations

r;< (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed f'rom the Relay Room side, as -,,,, described in the Description of Occurrence section. Closer inspection, as required by the Seal Penetration Review Group * -. "***-*--*-***.,,.-

4*-..*..

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) procedures, revealed the nature of the impairments.

Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months via a visual inspection.

This inspection would not necessarily identify the non-functional status of the subject penetrations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location.

The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage.

It does not appear as though a cable was pulled {forming the gap). The 3.5" north wall penetration

{found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location.

The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull. It has not been determined when or by whom the cable was pulled. The penetrations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and October 12, 1990, are similar in configuration (except as noted) to the penetrations identified in the original issue of this Special Report. The cause of their degraded condition also could not positively be determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification

6.9.2 since

the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairmehts is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with .the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving.fire watch for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable.

to .a fire in either area would be detected before it could.involve an adjacent area. -This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk _to the:health or safety of the public. ,. CORRECTIVE ACTION: The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of .Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

I .

1 _SPECIAL REPORT ._-26 e* ' . CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd} Penetration seal repair work has been initiated.

The Unit 1 Relay Room was the first area worked. To date, 3261 penetratiqns have been sealed and accepted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. The majority of those penetrations in the unit 1 a:nd Unit 2 Relay Rooms (halon discharge areas) which either have no seal or holes through the seal have been sealed using approved station procedure MJY_, "Installation and Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals". The and corrective actions, conducted by the Penetration Seal Review Program, will be completed in accordance with the March 4, 1988 . PSE&G letter NLR-N88037 to the* NRC, the.

26, 1988 *telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office, and the August 15, 1989 semi-annual management meeting conducted with the NRC. MJP:pc SORC 90-143

• 1/cx?cLoroc.-

General Manager -Salem Operations

.. .. -