ML18095A890

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Special Rept 91-1-1:on 910218,910220,910224 & 910322 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Impaired for Greater than Seven Days.Cause of Impairment Was to Support Outage Activities. Hourly Fire Watch Will continue.W/910417 Ltr
ML18095A890
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/17/1991
From: Vondra C
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
91-1-1, NUDOCS 9104240227
Download: ML18095A890 (4)


Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 17, 1991 U.

  • S. Nuclear R.egulatory. Conuitission Document Control' Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION .

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 91-1-1 This Special Report revjsion addiess~s additional planned fire barrier penetration impairments which had not been.restored to operable status within seven ( 7) days. This report has - been

  • prepared in accordance.with the reporting. requirements of Technica.l Sp~cification*Action St~tement 3.7.11.a pursuani to.Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted w.ithin thirty. (30) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours, C. A. Vondra General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution Q104?40227 910417 -

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95-2189 (10M) 12-89

UNIT 1. SPECIAL REPORT e-1 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Saiem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jer~eY. Oa038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3. 7~11; Fire Barriers Impaired For Greater . **

Than Seven ( 7) Days in Support of Planned Work . (Rev. 1* to original 1*

report)

Event Date~: 2/18/91, 2/20/91, 2/24/91 and 3/22/91.-

Report Date: 4/17/91

  • This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.91-094, 91-114;91-174 and 91-192. . I*.**

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode ~5 (Cold.Shutdown); 9th Refu~ling Outage in progress DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

Per *Technical Spe~ification Action*Statement 3.1.11.a, a Special Report is required when fire barrier penetration seals -are impaired for greater than seven (7) days. This report satisfies this requir~ment. . .

The subject fire barrier impairments were.initiated in support of design changes and other outage activities. Normally, the planning of penetr~tion impairments include's their repair within seven (7) days.

However, to fully support the specific work effort (identified in this report), the p~netrations could not be repaired within seven (7) days.

On Februaryll, 1991 and February 13, 1991, fire barrier penetrations

.were impaired (4 penetrations each day) in support of outage related activities. On February 17, 1991, sixteen (16) penetrations were impaired in support of design change package lSC-2154 (Control Room Modifications). On March 15, 1991, two (2) penetrations were impaired in*~upport of Containment Type "A" testing. These penetrations are lo~ated as £ollows:

Date of No. of Purpose Location.

Impairment Penetrations 2/11/91 2 11 S/G Tube Insp. U-1 Relay Room 2/11/91 1 100' Corridor 2/11/91 1 78' Elec. Pene. Area 2/13/91 1 Run hoses for 100' Baling &

cleaning of room Storage Area coolers 2/13/91 3 .SIG Eddy Current 100' Electrical Testing Penetration Area

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  • .UNIT l SPECIAL REPORT ~1~_1 .

DESCRIPTr°ON OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Date of .No. of Purpose Location Imp~ir~ent Penetrations 2/17/91 16 Control Room* #1 Control Room Modifications.

. 3/15/91 1 Type "A" .* Tes ting 78' El. Electrical Rertetration Area 1 100' El. Relay Room An:_ hourly r-oving fire watch ha~ been *previously established for the above fire areas due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the re.quireinents of Technical Sp~c-ification Action Statement 3~1.11. a; were met. ,

Technical Specification 3.7~11 states:

"All fire.penetrations (including cable penetration barriers,

~ire d6ors ~nd fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

  • Action Statement 3.7.il.a states:

"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour ~itner establish a continuous fire watch on* at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERA~ILITY of fire detectors on at least one *side of the-non-functional fire barrier arid establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore. the non~functional fire barrier penetr~tion(~) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other re~ort requi~~d by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the commission pursuant to.

Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional pen~tration and plans arid schedule for restoring the ~ire barrier penetration(s) *to functional status."

  • APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of- the impairment of the fire barrier penetrations was to support outage related activities.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional- integrity of.fire barrier penetrations ensures.that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject . to periodic inspections. This report satisfies reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater. than seven (7) days. Appropriate remedial actions were already in place in

.; UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT e-1--1 ,'.I.* ANALYSiS OF OCCURRENCE: *(cont'd) accordance with the requirements of Techriical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish an hourly roving fire watch patrol for the impaired fire barriers once the impairments were identified.

The subj~ct fire ~reas cont~iri detection devices in addition tq the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, a fire in the areas should be *I detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the time required to support the assoc1ated design change/outage activity work:. Upon completion of work, the penetrations were sealed.

The hourly fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.91-052