ML18095A580

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Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-27:on 880720-901010,listed Fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days.Cause of Degraded Fire Barrier Penetrations Could Not Be Positively Determined
ML18095A580
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/1990
From: Labruna S
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
88-3-27, NUDOCS 9011190002
Download: ML18095A580 (13)
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Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey OB038 Salem Generating Station November 7, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Do6ument Control.Desk Washington, DC 20555 Pear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO .. DPR-70 DOCKET NO.- 50-272 UlHT *NO. 1 -.

SUPPLEMEETJ-;L "S"PEC'IfJ, REFOKT 88 27 This supplemental Special Repoit addres~es additional fire barrier penetration s~al impairments (for both S~lem Unit 1 and Salem Unit

2) which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days. These impairments have been id~ntified by the Penetration Seal Task Force, This report has been prepared in accordance with the r~porting.requirements of. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to T~chnical Specificaticn 6.9.2.

Sincerely yours, S. LaBruna General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 1f:ii

,,,r 'I(

9o I// 9ooo d. 95-2189 1101.11 12-89

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

e Salem Generating Station - Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Technical Specification 3.7.11; Fire Barriers Impaire~ For Greater Than 7 Days Event Date(s): 7/20/88, 8/9/88, 9/7/88, 10/11/88, 11/7/88, 12/7/88, 1/5/89~ 2/6/89, 3/7/89, 4/6/89, 5/9/89, 6/7/89, 7/12/89, 8/8/89, 9/7/89, 10/7/89, 11/8/89, 12/8/89, 1/9/90, 2/8/90, 3/14/90, 4/9/90, 5/~/90, 6/8/90, 7/16/90, 8/22/90, 9/20/90, 10/10/90 Report Date: 11/07 /90 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.88-268, 88-531,88-536, 88-537,88-544, 89-050,89-075, 89-086,89-091, 89-092,89-127, 89-287,89-349, 89-472,90-357, and 90-359_

NIA DESCRIPTION

- OF - -OCCURRENCE:

As identified in PSE&G letter NLR~N38037 dated March 4, 1988, PSE&G has initiated a comprehensive review/inspection of fire barrier penetration seals. Due to the additional review by the Penetration Seal Task Force, penetrations found impaired are not being repaired within seven days as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a. This report summarizes the task force findings and Technical Specification 4.7.11 surveillance activity findings associated with inadequate penetration seals for both Unit 1 and Unit

2. The inadequate peietration seals found, to the date of issue of this report, include:

On July 13, 1988 two fire Barrier cable penetration were found degraded. The penetration contained electrical sleeving containing an electrical cable surrounded by foam type fire sealant. The area (approximately 1/8" gap and 1/4" gap respectively) surrotinding the electrical sleeves were not sealed thereby constituting an impaired seal. The fire barrier is in the east wall of the 100' Elevation Relay Room.

On July 25, 1988 three (3) degraded fire barrier cable penetration seals were found on the south wall in the-100' Elevation Relay Room. Two (2) of these penetrations are 3" in diameter and the other is 5.5" (located -is feet above the floor). The 3" penetrations contain fire wrapped cabling. This fire wrap extends over the penetration. There is no foam behind the fire wrap. It provides a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier, however, the wall is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier. The 5.5" penetration contains a 4" conduit surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/8" gap at the base of the conduit.

Unit 1 SPECIAL REPORT 813-27 DESCRIPTION OF oc;::_~QRREli_CE =.-~on.t...'._Ql On July 28, 1988 one (1) 3.5" degraded fire barrier cable penetration seal was found on the north wall in the 100' Elevation Relay Room. The penetration contains cabling surrounded by foam. The foam contains an 1/2" diameter hole.

Between August 2, 1988 and Arigust 30, 1988, 138 additional penetration* seals were found impaired of which 134 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 R~lay Room and 4 penetrations are located in the Unit 1 lA 125 V Battery Ro.om. The penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. The nature of the impairments include 6 with no seal, 14 with a hole in the seal (unknown cause), 2 with foreign material imbedded in the seal (one imbedded with a rag and the other with duct tape),

30 with a void in the seal (due to inadequate quantity of foam injection upon installation), 6 with apparent degradation (e.g. r cable pulled through) 47 with inadequate color/cell structure

{reference LER 272/88-013-00} and 32 thit are not deep enough into the penetration pe1 design {less than 6 inches).

Between August 31, 1988 and October 30, 1990, 6911 Unit 1 penetration seals and 5138 Unit 2 penetration seals were reviewed. Of these, 2873 penetration seals were determined to be impaired. The majority of penetrations range in size from -3 inches to -6 inches in diameter. There were 337 penetrations

- which wr::re lc:rger thart 6 inches ir.i diameter. These pene1Jations ranged from J"x5" to 253"x36".

Page 3 of this report contains a table of the penetration seals found impaired, between August 2, 1988 and October 30, 1990, in relation to the fire zone where they were found. The impairment designator terms include:

No Seal NOS Hole in Seal HOL Void in Seal VIS Depth Ndt Gre2t Enough DPT Color/Cell Structure CEL Seal Degradation DEG Foreign Material Imbedded FMT Planned Impairment PIM An hourly fire watch patrol had been established for the above areas previously due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the requirements of Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.7.11.a are met.

Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations {including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Unit J. Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e DESCRIPTION OF OCCURREN_<;:J;:__;__( co_~_t__'__9)_

continuoui fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and-establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the_non-furictional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any oth~r report required by Specification 6.9.1, pr~pare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

NOTE - Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the ,words "OPERABLE and "inoperable".

TABLE OF INOPERABLE PENETRATION SEALS 8/02/ 83 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PI11 U-1 Relay Room 15 34 72 194 7 3 l**

U-1 lA D/G Control Room 2 2 21 U-1 lB D/G Control Roar;; 1 1 3 21 2 U-1 lC D/G Control Room J 1 1 11 11 2 U-1 lA 125 V Battery Room 2 3 2 U-1 lC 125 V Battery Room 20 1 1 U-1 #1 250 V Battery Room 1 1 5 U-1 #3 Stairwell 13 1 5 U-1 64' Elevation, Aisle 3 1 6 17

  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 84' Elevation, Aisle 6 4 7 7 1
  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 122' Elevation, N2 1 1 Bottle Storage Area U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 3 3 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 78' Electrical Penetia. 1 1 1 1 7 Area U-1 100' Boric Acid Transfer 3 4 12 5 Pump Area

~-

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e e TABLE OF INOPERABLE PE;_NETRATIQN S~~LS.

(cont'd) 8/02/88 - 10/30/90 ARE.i\ NOS HOL VIS DPT ~-1?_1,i. DEG :f-111'. Pili U-1 100' El. Mechanical 1 5 2 8 3 1 Penetration Area - Blowdown Tanks U-1 100' El. Corridor 2 3 3 2 1 Service Building U-1 100' Elevation, Aisle 4 4 2 6 14 1

  1. 1 Auxiliary Building U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 & 15 11 8 30 61 1 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 84' Corridor; Unit 1 & 2 7 14 11 2 1 2 Common North 6: South U-1 84' Corridcr; Unit 1 & 3 3 2 Common East & West
  • U-1 122' Lobb:y 2 U-1 100' Lobby 1 1 U-1 64' Lobby 1 U-l 11/12 Cont aininen t Spray 4 4 6 19 2 Pumps & Spray Add. Tank Area U-1 100' Corridor; Unit 1 & 2 4 3 1 185 2 2 Common North & South U-1 100' Elevation Counting 6 1 1 Room U-1 #11 Diesel Oil Tk Room 1 l 3 U-1 #12 Diesel Oil Tk Room 2 5 U-1 84' Elev. Control Area 23 14 1 22 91 1
  1. 1 Transformer Bus .Rm.

U-1 Spent Fuel Pit Heat 3 3 6 16 Exchanger & Pump Area U-1 lA Diesel Generator Area 5 1 1 U-1 lB Diesel Generator Area 5 1 7 1 7 U-1 lC DieseI Generator Area 6 1 2 3 U-1 Waste Evaporator* Roon< 4 11 4 1 1 U-1 100' Elevation Mechanical 8 4 10 Penetration Area

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e TAI2_~_LOF I_~O:r__l;:RABLE !'_:i_;:_~ETRA1'_J_Q_N S_!iALS (cont' dJ_

8/02/83 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL FMT PIM U-1 UPS Battery Room 2 U-1 Containment Rad Mon Room ~ 1 10 10 U-1 #11 Chg. & SI Pump Room 1 4 U-1 #12 Chg. & SI Pump Room 1 U-1 #13 Chg. & SI Pum~ Room 2 U-1 84' *El. Pipe Trench 126 1 16 2

\

U-1 100' El. Baling & Storage 7 1 3 1 1 U-1 110' El. Control Console 1 9 U-1 78' El. Contain. Rad 1 1 Mon. Room U-1 84' El. #11 Comp. Cool. 20 1 3 Heat Xgr. & 12 CC Pp Room U-1 100' Elec. Penetra. Area 14 4 17 6 5 U-1 Laundry, Chem Pump Area 5 3 2 19 U-1 64' El. Control Area #1 3 4 18 1 J.

4KV Bus U-1 #1 Letdown Heat Exch. 1 u~1 84' El. #12 Comp. Cool. 3 3 3 Heat Xgr. & 12 & 13 CC Pp Room U-1 #11 SI Pump Room 1 1 U-1 Pipe Trench 14 3 3 20 16 . 3 U-1 Rx Coolant Filter Area 9 1 U-1 84' Spent Resin Xfer Pp Rm 2 U-1 11 & 12 Mon. Tank Room 8 1 5 2 U-1 84' Elevator Lobby 1 U-1 Aux Feed Pumps 3 U-1 Valve Alley 3 2 3 U-1 Seal Water Heat XChg 2 3 1 U-1 84' El. Corridor 2 2 1

lINIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 ..,..5-

e. e TABLE OF INOPERAJ?.bi~ P~_N~TRATION SEALS ( con_t 'd).

8/02/88 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT ~-~]:' . !?_~g_ FMT PI11 U-1 A/C & Boric Acid 5 l 10 81 i Tank.Room U-1 A/C Equipment Rm 1 2 4 U-1 Boric Acid EV(ip. & 2 1 3 1 Gas Stripper Unit U-1 Water Rec ire Heater 3 1 1 2 U-1 #1 Stairwell 6 5 U-1 #1 Cone.* Filter Area 1 U-1 Rm Next To #11 .Chg Pp 2 2 U-1 Diesel Oil C02 Area 4 1 U-1 Motor Control Center 2 1 1 U:-1 Elevator - El.* 2. 1 1 U-1 N2* Bottle Storage 3 U-1 #11 RH? XGR Room 1

. U-1. #12 RHR XGR Room 1 U-1 55"' El. Walkway 2 U-1 Future Mixed Bed 7 Dem in U-1 #11 Mixed Bed Demin ')

tJ-1 #1 Cation Bed (NW} .2 U-1 #1 Cation Bed (SW) 8 U-1 #11 Debora ting Dem in 3 U-1 #12 Debora ting Dem in 2 1 U-1 Primary Sampling Lab 4 1 U-1 78' Piping Penetration 1 4 U-1 Vent Duct Shaft 1 6 U-1 Valve Room 4 U-1 Waste Evaporator Area 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e e TABLE OF I_li9_~-~RA_}:3_~]L_f_J;;_lj~TRA T I_Qli__~_EAL S (cont '_gl_

8/02/88 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-1 #11 Evap._ Feed Ion Xchg. j U-1 #12 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 2 U-1 #13 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 4 U-1 #14 Evap. Feed Ion Xchg. 1 1 U-1 100' Aisle #1 N & s 2 U-1 122' Corridor 1 U-1 Ops File & Ref Rm 1

. U-1 Watch Engineer Room 3 U-1 #1 Maint, Spare (;, Test 1 Equipment* ROOJ!;

U-1 #2 Na.int, Spare .-

CT Test 2 Equipment Room U-1 Janitors Closet 1 U-1 #1 Control Equip. Room 15 5 U-1 84' El. Pipe Alley 2 3 1 U-1 Sample Room 1 u--1 Data .uogging T

  • Roe::,: 2 16 U-1 Work Control Center 1 2 1 U-1 #11 & #12 RHR Sump Pumps 1

..1.

Room U-1 #1 Control Room* 4 2 U-1 AC Equip. Room 1 2 U-1 #1 Spent Fuel Pit Filter 1 U-1 Women's Toilet 5 U-1 Containment Rad Monitor 1 Room U-2 #5 Stairwell 3 1 U-2 #4 Stairwell ...,

l 1 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e

e TABLE O~_l_NOP.ERA_ll_1=!_~_1;:_t'I_ETRATION SEALS ~ont'd)_

8/02/88 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM.

U-2 #2 Stairwell 7 1 1 U-'-2 .100 El. Mechanical Pene. 2 I

6 Area - Blowdown Tanks U-2 100' El. Corridor 2 1 U-2 100' Elevation Mechanical 5 3 5 6 4 3 Penetration Area U-2 AC & Boric Acid Tank Room 9 9 21 4 1 u--2 Relay Room 23 27 4 61 132 1 U-2 21 RHR x~~-

"*'='!~ Roo"n 1 U-2 22 RHR Xgr Room 3 U-2 84' Control Arec: Trans-* ~ ~

J. I 34 4 39 31 former Bus Roo!*u U-2 Rad. Detector Panel ..L U-2 Battery Room 2C 125VDC 13 U-2 Batter}' Roo:r~1 2B 12 5\r[i(= 2 3 3 U-2 #2 250V Battery Roorri 3 U-2 Control Area #7 4KV 4 5 " 3

,!_, 1 Vital Bus Area U-2 110' El. Control Console 1

-1. 3 U-2 78' Electrical Pen. Area 5 4 U-2 100' Electrical Pen. Area 2 1 3 U-2 2A DIG Control Room 1 5 4 1 U-2 2B DIG Control Room 1 2 11 4 U-2 2C DIG Control Room 2 4 3 U-2 #21 Diesel Oil Tank Area 5 2 1 3 U-2 #22 Diesel Oil Tank Area 1 3 2 4 4 U-2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil 1 1 Transfer Pump Area

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88-3-27 e e TABLE OF :p*m:p_ERABLE P~_~ETRATIQ_l1_~_EALS (cont'd) 8/02/88 - 10/30/90 I AREA NOS HOL VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil 1

Transfer Pump Area U-2 111' Vent. Equip. Area 19 4 9 U-2 *100* Vent Duct Shaft 1 1 U-2 64' Storage Area 2 :1 19 6 U-:-2 84' Spent Fuel Pit Heat 4 1 4 XChgr. & Purrip Roorn U-2 Boric Acid XFer Pump Area 9 1 1 2 U-2 Aisle #1 *East Section 7 1 1 2 U-2 Aux. Feedwater Pumps 2 4 1 U-2 #21 &_ 22 Monitor TanJ> 3 1 1 2 Area U-2 21 & 22 Cont. Spray 11 4 1 *1 Pumps r;, Spray.Add Tan}:

U-2 Aisle 2 East & West l 1 U-2 Counting Room 1 5 u_-2 #2 Control Room 13 7 2 1 1 U-2 78' Containment Rad 6 5 Monitor Roor;-,_

U-2 21 & 22 SI Pump Room 1 U-2 84' Piping Pene Area 5 U-2 Aisle 2 North & South 1 1 U-2 84' Corridor 1 U-2 Calibration Room 1 U-2 #21 Component Cooling 16 1 Heat Exchanger and Pumps U-:-2 #22 Component Cooling 6 Heat Exchanger and Pumps U-2 84' SW Piping Room 1 U-2 C02 Fire Equipment Area 1

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8w-27 TAI:}_:f,.,_E Of~1l'i9X~BAJiJ:,JL_p_J;:_lJETRATI_91L_~Ji~~~ J~g_n t 'd )_

&/02/88 - 10/30/90 AREA NOS HOI, VIS DPT CEL DEG FMT PIM U-2 Concentrates Holding Tank 1 U-2 Seal Water Heat XChgr 1 U-2 #2 Rx Coolant Filter Area 7 U-2 #2 Control Equip Room 1 4 U-2 84' Valve Room 5 U-:2 #100 Rad Detector Panel 1 1 U-2 Waste Evaporc.tor Area 1 2 3 U-2 Vent Duct Enclosure Shaft 2 U-2 Motor Contro} Center 1 U-2 Ref. Water Purifier Roon 2 U-2 Data Lo*;;r9ing Roo;*;, ,-

)

U-2 A/C Equipment Roorr, 2 U-2 8 /l I Pipe i\11 e::i' 6 l U-2 hf2 Bottle Storage Area l 1 U-2 #24 Evap. Feed Ion Xchgr ~

J_

U-2 100' Cation Bed Dernin. 3 U-2 84' Valve Alley 1 U-1 lA Diesel Generator Area 1 U-1 1B Diesel Generator Area 4 U-1 lC Diesel Generator Area 2

  • - The opposite room f6r the north and east walls is the Unit 2 Relay Room.
    • - The Relay Room PIM was resealed thirteen days after opening The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be

_positively determined.

The east wall penetrations (discovered 7/13/88) from the Relay Room side "appeared" sealed visually due to the use of a bushing on the

1 UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 8-3-27 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURR:f1:_NC~J_g_ont 'd) sleeve which hid the gap. The 3.5 south wall penetrations (discovered 7/25/88) also appeared sealed _from the Relay Room side, as described in the Description of Occurrence section. Closer inspection, as required by th~ Seal Penetr~tion Review Gr6up proc~dures, revealed the nature cif the impairments. Technical Specification Surveill~nce 4.7.11 requires verification of the functional status of fire barrier penetrations every eighteen months via a visual inspe6tion.- -Thi~ inspection would not necessarily identify the non-furictional status of _the subject penet~ations.

The 5.5" south wall penetration (found July 25) is located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal may have formed due to shrinkage. It does not appear as though a cable was pulled (fbrming the gap).

The 3.5 north wall penetration (found July 28) is also located in a difficult to reach location. The gap in the seal appears to have formed as a result of a cable pull. It has not been determined when or by whom thE cabls was pulled.

The pen~trations with non-functional seals, found between August 2, 1988 and Octo~ez* 30, 1990, are similar in c6nfiguratiort (except as noted) tci the penetrations identified in the original issue of this Special Report. The cause of their degraded condition also could ncl positively be determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCUKRENCE:

The functidnal integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be conf iried or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility.

The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the -

facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification

£.9.2 since ths time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairments is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were already in place in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barrier~ once the impairments were identified.

The subject fire area contains detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be-detected before it could involve an adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE

- - - - - - - - - -ACTION:

The hourly fire ~atch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with these areas are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7)

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 88.-27. CORRECTIVE ACT_I_O_N_:~~<c~ont'~L days due to the additional review being conducted by the Penetration Seal Task Force. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

Penetration seal repair work has been *initiated. The Unit 1 Relay Room was the £irst area worked. To date, 3261 penetrations have been sealed and accepted by the Penetration Seal Task Force.

The majority of those penetrations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Relay Rooms (halon discharge areas) ~hich either have no seal or.holes through the seal have been sealed using approved station procedure

~3Y, ~Installation and Repair of Fire Barrier and Flood Protection Seals".

The review and corrective actions, conducted by the Penetration Seal Review Program, will be completed in accordance with the March 4, 1988 PSE&G letter ~LR-N88037 to the NRC, the August 26, 1988 telecommunication between PSE&G and the NRC Region 1 office, and the August 15, 1939 semi-annual manage~ent meeting conducted with the NRC.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC w.~g. 9("-153

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