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| | issue date = 07/11/1997 | | | issue date = 07/11/1997 |
| | title = LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr | | | title = LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr |
| | author name = FREHAFER K W, STALL J A | | | author name = Frehafer K, Stall J |
| | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. | | | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:('A.'l'E QO8.2 REGULATIO INFQRMATIQN DIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM (RIDE)!ACCESSION NBR:9707150008 DOC.DATE: 97/07/11 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:( 'A.'l'EQO8. 2 REGULATIO INFQRMATIQN DIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM (RIDE) |
| NO FACIL'.50-389 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power&Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHA:ER,K.W. | | ! ACCESSION NBR:9707150008 DOC.DATE: 97/07/11 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL'.50-389 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000389 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHA:ER,K.W. Florida Power & Light Co. |
| Florida Power&Light Co.STALL,J.A. | | STALL,J.A. Florida Power 6 Light Co. |
| Florida Power 6 Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389 | | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
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| |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered incorrect original cable tray fire stop assembly installation outside App R design basis.Caused personnel error.Posted hourly fire watch patrols.W/970711 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR | | LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered incorrect original cable tray fire stop assembly installation outside App R design basis. Caused personnel error. Posted hourly fire watch patrols.W/970711 ltr. |
| 'NCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POOREFW.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME WIENSFL~AEOD/SPD/RAB E T~KRONE NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENERFDS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR'ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 'NCL SIZE: |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD"5(EXT.415-2083)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON T NEEDr FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQJIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 Florida Power&Light Company, 6501 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 July 11, 1997 L-97-179 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.50-389 Reportable Event: 97-004 Date of Event: June 11, 1997 Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop P~The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirement's of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, J.A.Stall Vice President St.Lucie Plant JAS/KWF Attachment l/(W)cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant'Ir707150008 9707iX PDR ADOCK 0500038'P S PDR an FPL Group company iliillllllllllllllllllllllllIlls lllllll NRC FORM 366 (4.95)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED SY OMS No.3160%I 04 Exp)RES 04)3 ore 6 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WITH THIS M ANDATO INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST: 60.0 HRS.REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE BACK TO INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT To THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT%F33)U.S.NUCLEAR REGIAATORY COMMISSION. | | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| WASHINGTON, OC 206664KO)AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT I3160<104), OFFICE 0 MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.FACIUTY NAME (1)ST LUCIE UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER 12)05000389 PAGE 13 I 1 OF4 TITLE I4)Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Outside Appendix R Design Bases MONTH DAY YEAR 11 97 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-004-0 MONTH DAY YEAR 97 FACIUTY NAME FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 DOCKETNUMBER 05000 OPERATING MQDE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)100 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203 (a)(2)(v)20.2203(a) | | NOTES: |
| (3)(n)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)73.71 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BSA NAME K.W.Frehafer, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER Seclude Aree Code)(5611 468-4284 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS , x:,t,;4(..NkÃ"'9):A cAusE sYsTEM coMpoNENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS YEs (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On June 11, 1997, St, Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.Inspection results indicated that, generically, two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier.FPL determined that the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly.All the St.Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable. | | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR 'ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 WIENSFL ~ 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEOD/SPD/RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 E T 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 ~KRONE 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREFW. 1 1 NOAC QUEENERFDS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| The apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD"5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON T NEEDr FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQJIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 |
| Corrective actions include the posting of hourly fire watch patrols that were established to compensate for the inoperable fire stop assemblies. | | |
| Repairs or plant modifications will be implemented to restore the affected fire stop assemblies to their required three hour fire rating.NAC FOAM 366 (4.95) | | Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 July 11, 1997 L-97-179 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 P~ |
| NRC FORM 366A I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Tf XT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 97-004-0 2 OF 4 TEXT Ilf more spaceis required, use additional copies of iVRC Form 366Ai (17l On June 11, 1997, St.Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.FPL was investigating discrepancies of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies identified during previous field surveillances. | | Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 97-004 Date of Event: June 11, 1997 Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirement's of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event. |
| Intrusive inspections of the remaining population of fire stop assemblies of this design were in progress to determine the extent of the issue.Preliminary inspection results indicated that, generically, the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier.The configuration did not conform to the design drawings and FPL ascertained that the identified field conditions were not previously evaluated during initial construction. | | Very truly yours, J. A. Stall l/ |
| | Vice President St. Lucie Plant (W) |
| | JAS/KWF Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant |
| | 'Ir707150008 9707iX PDR ADOCK 0500038'P S PDR lllllll iliillllllllllllllllllllllllIlls an FPL Group company |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED SY OMS No. 3160% I 04 Exp)RES 04)3 ore 6 (4.95) |
| | ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATO INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) To THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT% F33) |
| | U.S. NUCLEAR REGIAATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, OC 206664KO) |
| | AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT I3160<104), OFFICE 0 (See reverse for required number of MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603. |
| | digits/characters for each block) |
| | FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12) PAGE 13 I ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 1 OF4 TITLE I4) |
| | Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Outside Appendix R Design Bases FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITYNAME DOCKETNUMBER 11 97 97 004 0 97 05000 OPERATING MQDE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203 (a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) |
| | POWER LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3)(n) 50.73(a)(2) (iii) 73.71 OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2) (v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BSA 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) |
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Seclude Aree Code) |
| | K. W. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer (5611 468-4284 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS cAusE sYsTEM coMpoNENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS 4( .. |
| | , x:,t,; |
| | NkÃ"'9):A MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YEs SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15) |
| | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| | On June 11, 1997, St, Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Inspection results indicated that, generically, two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier. FPL determined that the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly. All the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable. |
| | The apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. Corrective actions include the posting of hourly fire watch patrols that were established to compensate for the inoperable fire stop assemblies. Repairs or plant modifications will be implemented to restore the affected fire stop assemblies to their required three hour fire rating. |
| | NAC FOAM 366 (4.95) |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TfXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 2 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT Ilfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of iVRC Form 366Ai (17l On June 11, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. FPL was investigating discrepancies of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies identified during previous field surveillances. |
| | Intrusive inspections of the remaining population of fire stop assemblies of this design were in progress to determine the extent of the issue. Preliminary inspection results indicated that, generically, the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier. The configuration did not conform to the design drawings and FPL ascertained that the identified field conditions were not previously evaluated during initial construction. |
| Therefore, the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly, as required by the plant 10 CFR 50 Appendix R commitments. | | Therefore, the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly, as required by the plant 10 CFR 50 Appendix R commitments. |
| As a conservative measure, all the St.Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable based on the preliminary inspection results.Hourly fire watch patrols were established as compensatory measures as required by plant administrative procedures. | | As a conservative measure, all the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable based on the preliminary inspection results. Hourly fire watch patrols were established as compensatory measures as required by plant administrative procedures. St. Lucie Unit 1 does not utilize cable tray fire stops of this design, so this condition is only applicable to Unit 2. |
| St.Lucie Unit 1 does not utilize cable tray fire stops of this design, so this condition is only applicable to Unit 2.A review of the original installation and inspection documentation for the construction of the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies suggests that the apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. | | A review of the original installation and inspection documentation for the construction of the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies suggests that the apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. A contributing cause was that the installation drawings were not clear in specifying that ceramic fiber needed to be installed around each cable in the fire stop assembly. |
| A contributing cause was that the installation drawings were not clear in specifying that ceramic fiber needed to be installed around each cable in the fire stop assembly.This condition was discovered during a recent fire stop surveillance. | | This condition was discovered during a recent fire stop surveillance. Consistent with the Industry, normal fire barrier inspection criterion is a visual inspection of exposed surfaces checking for voids, gaps, and holes. No intrusive inspections or disassembling of fire barriers are performed. One of the fire stops was located such that a visual inspection was difficult to perform, so the inspector ran his hand around the fire stop to check for voids, gaps, 'and holes. The inspector noted air flow between cables through the assembly. Although air flow was noted during that inspection, routine detection of air flow through a discrepant fire stop is problematic in nature and highly dependent on the existence of a differential pressure across the fire barrier. Even if previous inspections were performed in a hands on manner, a differential pressure could not be assured because of Reactor Auxiliary Building ventilation lineup or door configurations in effect during the inspection. |
| Consistent with the Industry, normal fire barrier inspection criterion is a visual inspection of exposed surfaces checking for voids, gaps, and holes.No intrusive inspections or disassembling of fire barriers are performed. | | This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) because the as found condition of the Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies do not meet three hour fire barrier requirements. The fire barriers are discussed in the Unit 2. UFSAR in chapter 9.5A. The principal design objective of the fire barrier and associated penetration seals is to protect personnel and redundant equipment from the effects of postulated fires in the reactor auxiliary building, to assure the capability to achieve safe shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A. The barriers and associated penetration seals are passive devices and are part of the plant fire protection system. |
| One of the fire stops was located such that a visual inspection was difficult to perform, so the inspector ran his hand around the fire stop to check for voids, gaps,'and holes.The inspector noted air flow between cables through the assembly.Although air flow was noted during that inspection, routine detection of air flow through a discrepant fire stop is problematic in nature and highly dependent on the existence of a differential pressure across the fire barrier.Even if previous inspections were performed in a hands on manner, a differential pressure could not be assured because of Reactor Auxiliary Building ventilation lineup or door configurations in effect during the inspection. | | NRG F0AM 366A I4-95I |
| This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) because the as found condition of the Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies do not meet three hour fire barrier requirements. | | |
| The fire barriers are discussed in the Unit 2.UFSAR in chapter 9.5A.The principal design objective of the fire barrier and associated penetration seals is to protect personnel and redundant equipment from the effects of postulated fires in the reactor auxiliary building, to assure the capability to achieve safe shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A.The barriers and associated penetration seals are passive devices and are part of the plant fire protection system.NRG F0AM 366A I4-95I C, 4 NRC FORM 366A I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 97-004-0 3 OF 4 TEXT/If more spece is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366AJ l17)The ceramic fiber between the cables is an extension of the Marinite board (ceramic fiber board)fire stop face.This ceramic fiber serves to resist heat, flame, and smoke propagation through the fire stop.In conjunction with the flame retardant this is an effective three hour fire rated assembly.(See Figure 1 for typical design details).However, without the ceramic fiber between the cables a path for heat and smoke propagation is provided.This is a small and tortuous path in that the space between the cables is typically small.The heat would still need to travel at least one foot down the tray where the flame retardant is applied, then would enter a large open space in the wall, and would then need to exit through another foot of confined space between cables on the non-fire side of the assembly.Localized hot spots would exist.The IEEE-383 cables will resist the effects of the increased temperatures and help to prevent the ignition of cable in the non-fire side of the assembly.The two sided cable tray fire stop deficiencies were evaluated and determined to be not safety significant. | | C, 4 |
| Although'the as-found condition of these cable tray fire stops was not in accordance with the tested and design conditions, and would probably not meet a three hour fire rating without the ceramic fiber between the cables, the installation does provide resistance to fire propagation. | | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| In addition, fire protection defense in depth provides an integrated means for mitigating the consequences of a fire, such as the existing smoke detection systems, automatic water fire suppression systems, hose stations, administrative programs that control combustible loading, and operator actions.Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by the condition of the St.Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies. | | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 3 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT /Ifmore spece is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366AJ l17) |
| | The ceramic fiber between the cables is an extension of the Marinite board (ceramic fiber board) fire stop face. This ceramic fiber serves to resist heat, flame, and smoke propagation through the fire stop. In conjunction with the flame retardant this is an effective three hour fire rated assembly. (See Figure 1 for typical design details). However, without the ceramic fiber between the cables a path for heat and smoke propagation is provided. This is a small and tortuous path in that the space between the cables is typically small. The heat would still need to travel at least one foot down the tray where the flame retardant is applied, then would enter a large open space in the wall, and would then need to exit through another foot of confined space between cables on the non-fire side of the assembly. Localized hot spots would exist. |
| | The IEEE-383 cables will resist the effects of the increased temperatures and help to prevent the ignition of cable in the non-fire side of the assembly. |
| | The two sided cable tray fire stop deficiencies were evaluated and determined to be not safety significant. |
| | Although'the as-found condition of these cable tray fire stops was not in accordance with the tested and design conditions, and would probably not meet a three hour fire rating without the ceramic fiber between the cables, the installation does provide resistance to fire propagation. In addition, fire protection defense in depth provides an integrated means for mitigating the consequences of a fire, such as the existing smoke detection systems, automatic water fire suppression systems, hose stations, administrative programs that control combustible loading, and operator actions. Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by the condition of the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies. |
| The hourly fire watch patrols were established to compensate for the inoperable two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies as required by plant administrative procedures. | | The hourly fire watch patrols were established to compensate for the inoperable two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies as required by plant administrative procedures. |
| FPL will either rework the associated fire stop assemblies to their original design or develop and implement a new design to restore the degraded barriers to a three hour fire barrier rating.None. | | FPL will either rework the associated fire stop assemblies to their original design or develop and implement a new design to restore the degraded barriers to a three hour fire barrier rating. |
| NRC FORM 366A I4 95I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 97-004-0 4 OF 4 TEXT (if more spoce is required, uso additional copies of NRC Arm 3MAl I17)TWO-SIDED CABLE TRAY SEAL IN FLOOR/WALL OPENING FIRESTOP 2" CERAMIC FIBER PLUGS FLAME RETARDANT MARINITE-I BOARD FLAME RETARDANT (MJOWO!ee Rot Figure 1 Typical Two Sided Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly}} | | None. |
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| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4 95I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 4 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT (if more spoce is required, uso additional copies of NRC Arm 3MAl I17) |
| | TWO-SIDED CABLE TRAY SEAL IN FLOOR/WALL OPENING FIRESTOP 2" CERAMIC FIBER PLUGS FLAMERETARDANT MARINITE- I BOARD (MJOWO!ee Rot FLAMERETARDANT Figure 1 Typical Two Sided Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999
Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr.
ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999
Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines.
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999
SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept.
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998
Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209.
ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998
Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project).
ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr
ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency
ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr.
ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr.
ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr
ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
1999-09-30
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Text
( 'A.'l'EQO8. 2 REGULATIO INFQRMATIQN DIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM (RIDE)
! ACCESSION NBR:9707150008 DOC.DATE: 97/07/11 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL'.50-389 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000389 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHA:ER,K.W. Florida Power & Light Co.
STALL,J.A. Florida Power 6 Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered incorrect original cable tray fire stop assembly installation outside App R design basis. Caused personnel error. Posted hourly fire watch patrols.W/970711 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 'NCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR 'ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 WIENSFL ~ 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEOD/SPD/RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 E T 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 ~KRONE 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREFW. 1 1 NOAC QUEENERFDS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD"5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON T NEEDr FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQJIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25
Florida Power & Light Company, 6501 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 July 11, 1997 L-97-179 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 2 P~
Docket No. 50-389 Reportable Event: 97-004 Date of Event: June 11, 1997 Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirement's of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
Very truly yours, J. A. Stall l/
Vice President St. Lucie Plant (W)
JAS/KWF Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant
'Ir707150008 9707iX PDR ADOCK 0500038'P S PDR lllllll iliillllllllllllllllllllllllIlls an FPL Group company
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED SY OMS No. 3160% I 04 Exp)RES 04)3 ore 6 (4.95)
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE To COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATO INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) To THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT% F33)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGIAATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, OC 206664KO)
AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT I3160<104), OFFICE 0 (See reverse for required number of MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.
digits/characters for each block)
FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12) PAGE 13 I ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 1 OF4 TITLE I4)
Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Outside Appendix R Design Bases FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITYNAME DOCKETNUMBER 11 97 97 004 0 97 05000 OPERATING MQDE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203 (a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)
POWER LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3)(n) 50.73(a)(2) (iii) 73.71 OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2) (v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3BSA 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Seclude Aree Code)
K. W. Frehafer, Licensing Engineer (5611 468-4284 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS cAusE sYsTEM coMpoNENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS 4( ..
, x:,t,;
NkÃ"'9):A MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YEs SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On June 11, 1997, St, Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Inspection results indicated that, generically, two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier. FPL determined that the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly. All the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable.
The apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. Corrective actions include the posting of hourly fire watch patrols that were established to compensate for the inoperable fire stop assemblies. Repairs or plant modifications will be implemented to restore the affected fire stop assemblies to their required three hour fire rating.
NAC FOAM 366 (4.95)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TfXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 2 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT Ilfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of iVRC Form 366Ai (17l On June 11, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. FPL was investigating discrepancies of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies identified during previous field surveillances.
Intrusive inspections of the remaining population of fire stop assemblies of this design were in progress to determine the extent of the issue. Preliminary inspection results indicated that, generically, the as-built configuration of two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies lacked the installation of ceramic fiber between cables within the fire barrier. The configuration did not conform to the design drawings and FPL ascertained that the identified field conditions were not previously evaluated during initial construction.
Therefore, the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies did not meet the tested configuration for a three hour fire rated assembly, as required by the plant 10 CFR 50 Appendix R commitments.
As a conservative measure, all the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies were declared inoperable based on the preliminary inspection results. Hourly fire watch patrols were established as compensatory measures as required by plant administrative procedures. St. Lucie Unit 1 does not utilize cable tray fire stops of this design, so this condition is only applicable to Unit 2.
A review of the original installation and inspection documentation for the construction of the two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies suggests that the apparent cause of this event was due to personnel error during the implementation of design drawings or insufficient design guidance during initial installation. A contributing cause was that the installation drawings were not clear in specifying that ceramic fiber needed to be installed around each cable in the fire stop assembly.
This condition was discovered during a recent fire stop surveillance. Consistent with the Industry, normal fire barrier inspection criterion is a visual inspection of exposed surfaces checking for voids, gaps, and holes. No intrusive inspections or disassembling of fire barriers are performed. One of the fire stops was located such that a visual inspection was difficult to perform, so the inspector ran his hand around the fire stop to check for voids, gaps, 'and holes. The inspector noted air flow between cables through the assembly. Although air flow was noted during that inspection, routine detection of air flow through a discrepant fire stop is problematic in nature and highly dependent on the existence of a differential pressure across the fire barrier. Even if previous inspections were performed in a hands on manner, a differential pressure could not be assured because of Reactor Auxiliary Building ventilation lineup or door configurations in effect during the inspection.
This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) because the as found condition of the Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies do not meet three hour fire barrier requirements. The fire barriers are discussed in the Unit 2. UFSAR in chapter 9.5A. The principal design objective of the fire barrier and associated penetration seals is to protect personnel and redundant equipment from the effects of postulated fires in the reactor auxiliary building, to assure the capability to achieve safe shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A. The barriers and associated penetration seals are passive devices and are part of the plant fire protection system.
NRG F0AM 366A I4-95I
C, 4
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-9SI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 3 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT /Ifmore spece is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366AJ l17)
The ceramic fiber between the cables is an extension of the Marinite board (ceramic fiber board) fire stop face. This ceramic fiber serves to resist heat, flame, and smoke propagation through the fire stop. In conjunction with the flame retardant this is an effective three hour fire rated assembly. (See Figure 1 for typical design details). However, without the ceramic fiber between the cables a path for heat and smoke propagation is provided. This is a small and tortuous path in that the space between the cables is typically small. The heat would still need to travel at least one foot down the tray where the flame retardant is applied, then would enter a large open space in the wall, and would then need to exit through another foot of confined space between cables on the non-fire side of the assembly. Localized hot spots would exist.
The IEEE-383 cables will resist the effects of the increased temperatures and help to prevent the ignition of cable in the non-fire side of the assembly.
The two sided cable tray fire stop deficiencies were evaluated and determined to be not safety significant.
Although'the as-found condition of these cable tray fire stops was not in accordance with the tested and design conditions, and would probably not meet a three hour fire rating without the ceramic fiber between the cables, the installation does provide resistance to fire propagation. In addition, fire protection defense in depth provides an integrated means for mitigating the consequences of a fire, such as the existing smoke detection systems, automatic water fire suppression systems, hose stations, administrative programs that control combustible loading, and operator actions. Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by the condition of the St. Lucie Unit 2 two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies.
The hourly fire watch patrols were established to compensate for the inoperable two sided cable tray fire stop assemblies as required by plant administrative procedures.
FPL will either rework the associated fire stop assemblies to their original design or develop and implement a new design to restore the degraded barriers to a three hour fire barrier rating.
None.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4 95I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 2 05000389 4 OF 4 97 004 0 TEXT (if more spoce is required, uso additional copies of NRC Arm 3MAl I17)
TWO-SIDED CABLE TRAY SEAL IN FLOOR/WALL OPENING FIRESTOP 2" CERAMIC FIBER PLUGS FLAMERETARDANT MARINITE- I BOARD (MJOWO!ee Rot FLAMERETARDANT Figure 1 Typical Two Sided Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly
