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'CORPOR ATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM l ARKANSAS POWFR G LICllT C03fi'tY FIGU.7 ARKANSAS MJCI.I AR ONE - UNIT 1 ptANAGEMENTORGANIZATIONCllART 6.2-1 ANCndinent. fin. | 'CORPOR ATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM l ARKANSAS POWFR G LICllT C03fi'tY FIGU.7 ARKANSAS MJCI.I AR ONE - UNIT 1 ptANAGEMENTORGANIZATIONCllART 6.2-1 ANCndinent. fin. (( - | ||
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Latest revision as of 04:40, 16 March 2020
ML19317H132 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
Issue date: | 01/17/1978 |
From: | ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML19317H124 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 8004210604 | |
Download: ML19317H132 (29) | |
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.B. isis for Chings to Specifications 3.5.5.2 The word "Special" was deleted in denoting the type o6 report required. If a report is filed, it will be pursuant to Specification 6.12.3.2(b) which would not be a special report.
3.17 Only areas containing redundant safety equipment require fire assure a safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire. protection to As we understand, NRC's philosophy in requiring these tech specs is that the Fir 20 Protection System protects equirnent requi red for sa fe shutdown. Below F, the reactor is already in safe shutdown.
Specification 3.18.2. 3.17.3a is deleted. This Specification is covered by Specification Specification 3.17.3b is modified.
The deleted portions of this specification are covered by Specification 6.12.3.1(b). Specification 3.17.3c is deleted as the only need for the Fire Protection System is for the Cab!c Spreading Room.
than the Cable Spreading Spec. This action is more drastic ing. The Cable Spreading Room Spec. sheuld be contro11-3.18 Specification 3.5.5.2 and 3.17 3.13.1 i s changed as per the basis for change to Specification With of at the cable spreading room sprinkler system inoperable, a periodic fire watch least one check per hour is adequate.
average, provide detect ion of a fire within 5t' ninntes.An haurly fire check tould, on the during a.14 day outage of the fire protection systen is of afire witn'n this area A
In addition, a fire in this area could only be ignited by a shorted very low probability.
cable. This type of ignition is slow in developing and propaaat inn.
3.19 '
Speci 3.5.5.2fication and 3.17 3.19.1 i s changed as per the P. mis for Changes to Specification A "cuntinuous fire watch" is always provided in t he cont rol room as there must always be a. reactor operat or i n the rona.
3.20 .
Since.the Cable Spreading Room is the only area with redundant safety related equipment' requirements for fire hoses should apply only toprotected by the Fire Protection Water S i Cable Spreading Room. These requirements on thisthe hose which will reach the base station will assure an adequate backup fire proteJ t ion system for t he Cable Spreading Room.
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To rcquire a fire barrier to be " functional" would require a test to assure it functional. The only test that would verify a harrier to be functional would be an insitu '. f1:une test which is not pract ical . I f t.he barrier ir intact, it must be assumed to be functional.
Specification t2on 3.13, 3.21.2 is changed according to the 6 asis for Change to Specifica-4.10 Specifications ~ 4.19.2 and 4.19.-3 are deleted. No credit has been taken in the fire ha:ards analysis for fire alanns. The ! ire Protection System described in these Technical Speci fications is completely automatic.
4.20 Specification 4.20.1(b) and 4.20.1(c) were changed for clarification. 4.20.1(b)
' will assure that water is available to the Cabic Spreading Room Sprinkler System.
4.20.1(c) clarifies the part of the system that will require a flush. Specifica-tion 4.20.1(d) is deleted as there are no automatic valves in the system. Speci-fication 4.20.1(e) has been modified as there are no automatic valves and the functional test is cove' red by Specification 4.20.1(a).
The dicsci fire pump engine day tank holds 250 gallons of fuel. National Fire Codes - Supplement Volume A 1976, Code 20, S-4.3 requires a fuel capacity to operate the pump engine for not less than eight hours. Our Cummins 340 dicsc1 will burn at maximica load 13.32 gph or 147.56 gallons in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Since the guage for the fuel day tank is marked in 1/3 i nerenent s, it is preferabic to have the spec read 5/8 full or approximately 155 gallons.
Speci fication 4.20.2.a(2) and 4.2n.2.e(2) are coeered by Specification 4.20.1.a. ~
4.21 .
As stated in the Bases, the only maintainable aspect of the system is the verifi-cation of system alignment .
will actuate the system which is alarmed.Imss of fusible head integrity in a wet pipe system ,
4.21.1 has been changed to he consistent with Specification 4.20 and to assure the system alignment is such that will provide water to the Cable Spreading Room.
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1 It is impractical to perfom a flow test as the system does not have instrumenta-i tion for this purpose,. It is preferred to not isolate the control room. The halon is in the enclosed ceiling and floor. Any halon leaking from these areas will not be useful for firFprotection and therefore should be removed from the habitabic area of- the room. " lye installed system does not actuate any dampers.
4.23 Same as'3.20 1
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Table 6.2-1 Part 5 An evaluation was made of the historical records of fires at nuclear power reactors as reported to the NRC. The major source of information was from the references in NUREG-0050, " Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire."
The tionalreferences listedto46 fires reported fires the NRCwhich had occurred.
in licensee event There have been reports which have14 addi-been entered into the computer based record retrieval system since the Browns Ferry Report. In addition to reviewing the swnmaries of these fires as entered a number of the reports from the licensees were reviewed in the Public Document Room to obtain further information.
As evaluated, of the 60 fires reported over 38 of them occurred directly as the result time when theof construction, plant was not maintenance or testing activities, most of the in operation. There were eight cases identified when the fire occurred during a period of normal routing operation when no construction maintenance or testing operation were in progress. In 14 of the events the summaries were not complete enough to establish the status of the plant.
In any event the record clearly esthblishes that fires are least likelypcwcr state to occur on the routine shifts when the plant is in normal steady operation. This is the period of time when there are the fewest persons at the most onerous.the site and the stated requirement for the five-man fire brigade The historical record also shows that those fires involving electrical cable or equipment was the Browns were in most Ferry fire).cases promptly extinguished (a notable exception In fact, many of the electrical equipment fires were extinguished by removing power fron the equipment. As a consequence of the Browns Ferry fire both the NRC and industry were active in upgrading the requirements and capabilities for coping with fires. .
installed since the Browns Ferry fire as well as the development of betterThe upgraded equipm instructions for combatting fires reduce the probability of another fire simi-lar to that at Browns Ferry.
The five man requirement is indicated to be interim in nature and subject to revision when the detailed plant review is complete. We are of the opinion that there are not sufficient bases to warrant the imposition of such a re-quirement, particulary on an interim basis which requires hiring and possible '
tiring of individuals whose special skills many not allow them to be used for other plant functions.
Indications are that it is true that somethe NRC position was p fire departments use r,artially ive-manbased teams,onothers precedent. While use less. For exanple, one department _that uses a five-man response was as' ked for their rationale.
The stated reason for five men to accompany an engine company is that two trucks required to operate'thisare utili:cd by this five-man crew and additional persons are equipment. Another significant factor is that commer-cial fire companies connect to hydrants having 25 inch diameter hose fittings, requiring more personnel to handle the hoses than if the 1 inch hoses used in our plant were used.
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s The Andrews Air Force _ crash crew is the emergency response force for Andrews Air. Force Base in the event of an aircraft crash at the base. <
Their_ response is, of- course, to save 'iiver and protect property in the event of a crash at the site. As desc ribed a crash crew consists of a- three-man team who man a special veh cle at the base. The teams are trained to fight fires as well as to ente.' smoke-filled aircraft ,
to save lives.- it was indicated that although the concept is to use
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three-man teams, at present only two-man teams were used at the bare contacted. .This is considered. the minimum si:c, mainly for the safety of the team itself.
NFPA Stradards were also- reviewed to determine if any provided guidance relevant to ' minimum staffing requirements for private fire brigades.
NFPA No. - 27, Private Fire Brigades, states "the equipment that must be put into service at a fire will determine the number of men required for each operating unit or compcny into which the brigade is organized and the total number of men needed in the brigade. Operating units or companies may be composed of two or more men to operate a specific item of equipment or a ' larger group to perform'more complicated operations.
Each company. should have a leader and each brigade should have a chief.
There is no indication that a minimum brigade size of five is desired, -
rather it states si:e should depend on nature of equipment to be used.
In the initial response to a fire in a nucicar power plant, the only equipment to be used is that disbursed or permanently installed in the plant.' In this instance it is difficult to imagine what five men could accomplish that could not be accomplished by a two-man brigade receiving.
Instructions from the plant control room or fire control panel.
We therefore conclude-that a 3 man team with fire protection training is more .than sufficient to assure adequate protection for ANO-1.
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N 4.24 Same as 3.21.
6.4.2 We assumed that the deleted portion was included because of Spec. 6.4.1. A request to change Specification 6.4.1 has been made (due to our new organiza-tion) in a separate package.
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- 6.5.2.9A and 6.5.2.9B It'is neither necessary or desirable to obtain outside consultants for inspection and audit of the fire protection program. These Technical Specifications along with our QA' program are adequate to assure that the program is maintained b
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s TABLE OF CONTESTS I . .
1 TITLE PAGE SECTION 1
- 1. DEFINITICNS 1
1.1 PATED pct.ER 1
1.2 REACOR OPERATING CONDITIONS 2
1.3 OPERA 3LE 2
1.4 PROTECTION INSTP.U:1E::TATION LCG1C 1NSTRUMENTATION SUT.V21LLx;C2 3 .
1.5 4 1.6 QUADRA'iT PO'.ER T*LT- 4 1.7 .
REACTOR SUILDING 5
1.8 rIRE . PROTECTION WATER SYSTDI SAFETY 'LDtITS X;D LIM.ITING S. FEU SYS'"C! SETTING 5 7
- 2. 7 2.1 5AFEiY LDiiT5, Rf.ETUR CORE SAFETY LDl!TS, RE).CTOR SYSTE'1 PRESSURE 10 2.2 2.3 LDlITING SAFETf SYSTD1 SE'~ TINGS, PROTECTIVE INSEU-11 MENTATION 16
- 3. LDlITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 16 3.1 REAGOTCCOLMT 515Th:l Decrationsi Conronents 16 3.1.1 IS 3.1.2 Pressuri:st.cn. nc..:uu :.d Cooldewn Li~.itations 21 3.1.3 Flininun condi::o .s for Cri ::al:.:.
Reactor Coolan- Svsten Ac::vity 22 3.1.4 25 3.1.5 Chemistry 27 3.1.6 Leaka g e 3.1.7 Moder::or Tenrerature Coefficient of '.seactivity 30 Low Power invsics Tes tin: Restrie:::-i 31 3.1.8 32
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3.1.9 Control i;oc 0:eratun .
MAKf.UP MD ChDilCAL DITION SYSTE:!S 34 3.2 3.3 DtERGENCY CORE CCOLING, REAC~0R BUILDI: G COOLING, AND REACTOR BUILDING S? RAY SYSTDiS 36 STEA.\1 AND pct!ER @NVERSICN SYSTDI 40 3.4 42 3.5 INSTRUMENTATION 3YSTD!S 42 3.5.1 OoerationsI Safetv Ins tr=entation 3.5.2 Control i;oc Grous anc iewer 0:str:.oi, tion 1.imits 46 ~
Safety Features Ac us::.cn systen Seiroints 49 3.S.3 In-Core Instrue.:n:a ten 51 3.5.4 53d 3.5.5 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION S4 3.6 REACTOR BUILDING 56 3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTE11 SC 3.8 FUEL IDADING AND REFUELING CONTROL RCO.1 DtERGENCY AIR CONDITION ;NG SYSTDI 60 3.9 \
Sl!CONDAltY SYSTE 1 ACIVITY 66 3.10 66a 3.11 D'ERGENCY CCOLING PCN0 MISCULL\NEOUS RA0!0 ACTIVE R\TERIALS SCURCES 66b 3.12 3.13 PENETRATION ROCM VESTILATIC:1 SYSTDI 66c 3.14 HYDRCGEN PURGE SYSTI.! '66e 3.1S FUEL IL1.NOLING AREA '.ENT!LATICN SYSTE}l 66g
. 3.16 SHOCK SL*??RESSORS (SNUBBERS) 661 3.17 FIRE PROTECTION WATER SYSTEM 66m
- 3.18 CABLE SPREADING R00'4 SPRINKLER SYSTD4 3.19 CONTROL ROOM HALON SYSTDi 3.20 ' IRE HOSE STATION F
3.21 PM EIRATION FIRE BARRIERS Amendment No. n ,, , ,
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,' SECTIO'l TITLE % PAGE
- 4. SURVUTf.l.ANCC PTCUt RE!r:NTS . 67 l
4.1 OPEP.AT10:.Ai. 6.\i+.n l';D:S -
67 4.2 REACOR COOLMIT SYSTDI SUT3EI*.LX4C2 . 76 4.3 REACICR CCOLxiT SYSTEM I:.TEGRIT( FOLLOWI.NG E'.TRY 78 4.4 REACTOR BUILDING 79 4.4.1 Reactor Building Le..kcae Tes: 79 4.4.2 a t:-actur:1 In:e.tri:v ,
, 85 4.5 D re acESCt CCSI. CLOG:.G S'.'STE 1 AND REACOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTE!! PERIODIC TESTING 92
' 4.S.1 Ea rrenev Core C:oline S.ste: 92
- fi 4.5.2 Resetcr 2nie:.nr cc:anc: S . s : c .s DS 4.6 AUX.IL'AM ELECTRI:AL SY3iE:! THT3 100 4.7 REAC~OR CO .iFO*. ROI, SYSTE:1 2575 102 4.7.1 Control Red Dri'.e Sys ten Functions 1 Tests 102 4.7.2 Control Rod P::c::: 'erii v ca: ton 104 4.8 UfERGENCY FEE:.,.AiEA H,:l? TE5TI:G 105 4.9 REACTIVITY M;C:ulIES 106 4.10 CONTROL RCOM D'ERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTDI SURVEILLANCE 107 j 4.11 PESETRATION ROOM VENTI!.ATICN SYSTDI SURVEILLANCE 109 4.12 HYDROGEN PURG7 SYSTE:1 SURVEILLANCE 109b 4.13 DERGENCY rGOLING POND .
110s
, 4.14 PADI0 ACTIVE ."ATERI A1.S SOURCES SURVEILLMiCE 110b '
4.iS AUGrchTED INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRM.I FOR HIC 4 ENERGY LINES OUTSIDE OF CONTAIN' TENT 110e 4.16 SEOCK SWPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) 110e 4.16.1 ~
Hydraulic Slwek_Suporessors 110e 4.17 FUEL HANDLING AP~A E.TILAT10N SYSTDI SURVEILLANCE 110h 4.18 STEM! GEMRNM'E TL'BT.!:C SERVEILlW;CE 110j -
4.19 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION 110p 4.20 FIRE PROTECTION WATER SYSTEM 4.21 CABLE SPREADING ROOM SPRINKLER SYSTEM 4.22 CONTROL ROOM HALON SYSTEM 4.23 FIRE HOSE STATION 4.24 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS S. DESIGS FEATJRES 111 S.1 Silt 111 .
S.2 REACTOR SUILDING 112 S.3 REACTOR 114 S.4 NEh' AND SPENT FUCL STORAGE FACILITIES 116
- 6. ADMINISTR AT! /E C;NTROLS 117
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6.1 RES PGY51s I L16~~ 117 6.2 PLN4T STAFF Or,CR4::ATION 117 6.3 Ql'ALIFICATIONS 118 6.4 REVIEW AND AUDIT 12!
6.5 ACTION TO l.it TAKEN IN THE EVE.'.T OF A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE D?SC ISED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.32 3 3 127, 6.6 ACION TO BE TAKEN IF A S AFETY LI: LIT IS EXCEEDED 12'J 6.7 , PLAN" CPE:tATING PROCEDURES 129 6.8 RADIATION K;D REEPI.V.TCRY FRCTECTION PROGRAM 130 6.9 D$ RC.":'*r F L.'.';N ING 136 6.10 IND'JST: I AL SEC'.;R'. Y PRCCPMI 137 6.11 RfC?r.2% RETLM iCN 133 6.12 P!A..T P.EPCRTIN's TEU:PRIENTS 140 Amendmerit No. 23. 71 fi
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- 17 REACTOR BUILDING Reactor building integrity exists when the folleving ceniitions are satisfied:
- a. The equip =ent batch is closed and sealed and both doors of the personnel lock and emergency lock are closed and sealed, or b.
below.
- b. At least one door en each of the personnel lock and e=ergency j lock is closed and sealed during personnel access or repair.
- c. All non-autocatic reactor building isolation valves and blind flanges are closed as required.
- d. All autc=atic reactor building isolation valves are operable j or deactivated in the closed positien.
- e. The reactor building leakage deter =ined at the last testing
- interval satisfies Specificatica L.k.1 1.8 , FIRE PROTECTION WATE,R SYSTDI
'The fire protection water system consists of: water sources, pumps, and distribution piping with associated sectionalizing isolation valves. Such
' valves include yard bydrant valves, and the first valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler, hose standpipe, or spray system riser.
Amendment.No. . .
i 3.5.5 FireDetectionInstrumentaQon.
pplicability
. This specification applies to fire detection instrumentation utilized within 3
fire areas containing redundant safety related cquipment or circuitry for the purposes of protecting that redundant safety related equipment or circuitry.
Objective i
- To provide.inmediate initiation of protection and notification of fires in
! areas where there exists a potential for a fire to disable redundant tr.ains j of safety related systems.
I Specification 3.5.5.1 A minimum of three main control room heat detectors, two auxiliary j control room ceiling heat detectors and one auxiliary control room floor heat detector shall be operable.
3.5.5.2 If less than three main control room heat detectors, two auxiliary control room ceiling heat detectors and one auxiliary' control room floor heat detector are operable, within on'c hour establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone (s) with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour and restore the equipment to operable status within 14 days or orepare and e,utrait a report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.12.3.2(b) within the next 30 days outlining the action
- taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for re-storing the instrunent(s) to operable status.
Bases The control room heat detectors initiate fire protection and that initiation provides alarms that notify the operators of the existence of a fire in its early stages. Redundant safety related circuitry is located within the control room. No other areas in the plant meet these applicability criteria.
The heat detectors required to be operable in the various areas represent 1/2 of those installed to actuate each of 3 separate Halon systems, one in the main control room, one in the auxiliary control roem ceiling and one in the auxiliary control room floor. Any single heat detector can actuate its respective system.
Operability of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This capability is regured in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages , Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.
In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establistrient of frequent fire patrbis in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored. to operability.
I Amendment No. 53d j l
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J .17. Fira Prott 1rn W7t':r System I
Applicability This specification applies to the portions of the automatic fire protection water system utilized to provide fire protection to those areas containing redundant safety equipment.
Ofj ective_
To assure that fire protection is available to redundant safety related equipment which is located in a common area and provided with fire protection.
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.. Specification i
l 3.17.1 The fire protection water system shall be operable at all times when the reactor is above 200 F with two high pressure pumps, I
each with a capacity of at least 2S00 GPM, with their U discharges aligned to the fire protection header.
3.17.2 When the reactor is above 2000F; with one pump inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within seven days or prepare and submit a report to the C6thmission pur-suant to Specification 6.12.3.2(b) within the next 30 days out-
, i lining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system.
I 3.17.3 When the reactor is above 200 F; with the fire protection water i
system inoperable submit a report in accordance with 1 Specification 6.12.3.1 -(b) . .
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- Bases -
! The fire pumps supply the only source of water for all fire protection systems utilizing water. Each pump is individually capable of providing full flow required for proper fire protection water system operation. The pumps
- start automatically on low system pressure.
In the event that the fire protection water system becomes inoperable, inmediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provided the
- major. fire protection capability of the plant. The requirement for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire protection capability for the continued operation of the plant.
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3.18 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Applicability
., This specification applies to the fire protection sprinkler system located in the cable spreading room.
Objective To assure that fire protection is available to safety-related cables located in the cable spreading room.
I Specification 1'
3.18.1 The cable spreading room sprinkler system shall be operable at all 3
times when the reactor is above 2000F.
1 3.18.2 With the cable spreading room sprinkler system inoperable, establish a periodic fire watch of at least one check per hour, with backup fire protection equipment for the cable spreading room within one hour. Restore the system to operable status within 14 days or prepare and submit a report to the' Commission pursuant to Specification 6.12.3.2(b) within the next 30 days out-lin.ing the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans dnd schedule for restoring the system to operable status..
Bases Redundant safety related circuitry located in the cable spreading roca is protected by a wet pipe sprinkler system. The operability of this system ensures that adequate fire protection capability is available to confine and extinguish a fire ocurring in the caple spreading room. In the event this system is inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.
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Amendment No. 66n
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i, 3.19 Control Room Halon System Applicability This specification applies to the Halon system utilized as the fire protection system for the control room.
Objective To assure that fire protection is available to the safety related equi *pment in the control room.
Specification
- 3.19.1 The control room Halon system shall be operable at all times when the reactor is above 2000 F with the storage tanks having at least 95% of full charge weight and 90% of full charge pressure.
' 3.19.2 With the control room Halon system inoperable, establish backup fire protection equipment for the control room within one l' hour. Restore the system to operable status within 14 days or
- prepare and submit a feport to the Commission pursuant to Specifi-
' cation 6.12.3.2(b) w'ithin- 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the the system toinoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring operable status. -
Bases Redundant safety elated circuitry located in portions of the control room is protected by the Halon system. The operability of this system ensures that adequate fire protection capability is available to confine and extinguish a fire occuring in the control room. -
In the event that this system is inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the control room until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.
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Amendment No. 66o 1
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3.20 Fire Hose Station
, Applicability This specification applies to at least one fire hose station located in the vicinity of_ the cable spreading room.
Objective To assure that manual fire protection capability is available.
Specification 3.20.1 When the reactor is above 200 0 F; at least one fire hose station shall
, be operable.
3.20.2 When the fire hose station of 3.20.1 is inoperable, route an addi-tional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area from an operable hose station within one hour.
Bases The operability of the fire hose station adds additional assurance that adequate fire protection capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located.
In the event that portions of this system are inoperable, backup fire ho'se equipment is required to be made available in the affected area (s) until the -
inoperable equipment is restored to service.
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3.21 Penetration Fire Barriers j Applicability This specification applies to penetration fire barriers relied on for restriction of fire damage such that redundant safety-related quipment in areas other than the main fire area are not affected.
Objective
. To assure that penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas perform their separation function.
Specification 3.21.1 All penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas shall be intact at all times.
3.21.2
- With one or more of the required penetration fire barriers not intact, establish a periodic fire watch of at least one observation per hour on at least one side of the affected penetration within one hour.
Bases The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and -
extinguishment. Tho penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.
During periods of time when the barriers are not intact, a periodic fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected
, barrier until the barrier is restored to its intact position. ,
Amendment No. 66q
O 4.19 Fire Detection Instrumentation Applicability Applies to surveillance of fire detection instrumentation required operable by Specification 3.5.5 Objective To assure that the fire detection instrumentation required operable by Specification 3.5.5 is available and operable when needed.
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Specification 4.19.1 Each required fire detection instrument shall be demonstrated operable at least once per six months by performance of a channel functional test.
Bases 1
These required demonstrations will assure operability of the fire detection
, instrumentation. .
- Amendment No. 110p
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4.20 Fire Protection Water System Applicability
. Applies to surveillance of fire protection equipment required operable by Specification 3.17.
Objective To assure that the ap operable when needed.plicable fire protection equipment is available and Specification 4.20.1 The fire protection water system shall be demonstrated operable:
- a. At least once per 31 days on a staggered test basis by starting each pump by automatic actuation and operating it for 13 minutes with flow through the relief line;
- b. At intervals not to exceed 3 months by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path to the cable spreading room sprinkler system is in its correct position;
- c. At least once per six months by performing a flush of the system main;
- d. At least once per 18 months:
- 1) Verify that each pump develops at least 7500 GPM at a discharge pressure of 125 psi;
- 2) Verify that each high pressure pump starts (sequentially) to maintain the fire protection water system pressure s 85 psig.
- e. At least once per three years by performing a flow test of the system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of the Fire '
Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association.
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'4.20.2 .The fire pump diesel engine shall be demonstrated OPERABIE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying the fuel storage day tank to be at least 5/3' full of fuel ( approximately 155 gallons )
- b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D270-65, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-74 with respect to viscosity, water content and sediment.
- c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its
- manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service.
4.20.3 The fire pump diesel starting 24-volt ba+,tery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
- 1) The electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates;
- 2) The overall battery voltage is 24 volts,
- b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the specific gravity is appropriate for continued service of the battery,
- c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that: ,
- 1) The batteries, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and
- 2) The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion and coated with anti-corrosion material.
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Bases These required demonstrations, tests, and verifications will assure the
,, availability of:the fire protecti6n water system when it is needed, The t'ntention of 4.20,1,a is to te'st each fire pump '(not including the jockey pump) and the automatic starting logic. This can be accomplished by allowing the fire system pressure to drop to the automatic start setpoint, The pump will then start and discharge through the relief line until stopped by the operator, For purposes of the annual system main flush, the system main consists of line KE-1-12, i
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i Amendment No. Il0s
n 4.21 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Applicability Applies to surveillance of the cable spreading room sprinkler system, which is required to be operable by Specification 3.18.
Objective To assure that the cable spreading room sprinkler system is available and operable when needed.
Specification 4.21.1 The cable spreading room sprinkler system shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by verifying that the system is aligned ;
to the fire pumps.
l Bases The cable spreading room sprinkler system is a wet pipe system actuated only by heat action on the fusible head t'rinkler. The only maintainable aspect of the system is the verification of system alignment.
. The required inspections will assure availability of the cable spreading room sprinkler system when it is needed.
4.22 Control Room Halen System Applicability Applies to surveillance of the control room Halon system, which is required to be operable by Specification 3.19.
Objective To assure that the control room Halon system is available and operable when needed.
Specification 4.22.1 The control room Halon system shall be demonstrated operable:
- a. At least once per 6. months by verifying Halon storage tank weight and pressure;
- b. At least once per 18 months by verifying the system, actuates Etnually and adt'oma'tically (.upon receipt of a simulated test signal).,
Bases Performance of the testing required by these specifications will assure that the Control Room Halon system is operable when needed.
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4.23 Fire Hose Station Applicability Applies to the fire hose station in the vicinity of the cable spreading room which are required to be operable by Specification 3.20.
Objective To assure that the fire hose station in the vicinity of the cable spreading room is operable to provide manual fire protection capability when needed.
Specification 4.23.1 When the reactor is above 200 F; the fire hose station shall be demonstrated operable:
- a. At least once per 31 days by visual inspection of the station to assure all required equipment is at the station; 4.23.2 At least once per 18 months:
- 1) Remove. the hose for inspection and re-racking; and
4.23.3 At least once per 3 years:
- 1) Partially open the hose station valve to verify valve operability and no flow blockage. ~
- 2) Conduct a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure at least 50 psig greater than the maximum pressure available at that hose station.
Bases The required inspections and test will assure that fire hose station serving the cable sp~;ading room is maintained operable and ready for use as a -
backup fire protection system to the automatic system when needed.
110v
4.24 Penetration Fire Barriers Applicability '
Applies to surveillance of the penetration barriers required functional by
. Specification 3.21.
Objective To assure that significant barrier degradation is detected and corrected.
Specification -
4.24.1 Each of the penetration fire barrices protecting safety-related areas shall be verified to be intacc ev a visual inspection;
- a. At least once per 18 months, and
- b. Prior to declaring a penetration fire barrier' intact following repairs or maintenance.
Bases The visual inspection will detect cracking, spalling, etc. that may degrade the functionability of the barrier. Degraded barriers will be corrected per Specification 3.21.
Amendment No. 110w a
4 s ,
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6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS' 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY 6.1.1 The Superintendent of power Plant shall be responsible for overall facility operation. In his absence, the Assistant Superintendent of Power Plant shall assume all responsibility and perform all duties of the Superintendent of Power Plant. If both the Superintendent of Power Plant and his assistant are absent, these responsibilities and duties are assumed by the Supervisor of Plant Operations followed by the Technical Support Engineer.
6.2 ORGANIZATION OFFSITE 6.2.1 The offsite organi:ation for facility management and technical support shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-1.
FACILITY STAFF 6.2.2 The Facility organization shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-2A and 6.2-2B and each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1, 6.3 FACILITY STAFF QUALIFICATIONS 6.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable position, except for -
the Health Physics Supervisor who shall meet or exceed the qualifica-tions of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975.
6.4 TRAINING
- 6. 4.1 ~
A retraining and replacement training program for the facility staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Supervisor of Plant Operations and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommenda- ,
tions of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 and Appendix "A" of 10 CFR Part 55.
6.4.2 A training program for fire protection training shall be maintiined and shall meet or exceed the requirements of Section 27 of the NFPA Code-1976 with the e be 6 times per ysar.xception of frequency of training which shall
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6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT 6.5.1 Plant Safety Committee (PSC) Function 6.5.1.1 The Plant Safety Committee shall function to advise the Superintendent of Power Plant on all matters related to nuclear safety.
COMPOSITION 6.5.1.2 The Plant Safety Committee shall be composed of the:
-117-
- TABl.E 6.2-1 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE ,
MINIMIDI Sil1FT CREW COMPOSITION #
. UNIT 1 .
LICENSE COLD AND REFUELING ABOVE COLD SlitTTD0hN SilUTD0h'NS CATEGORY i
1 l' SOL 2 1 OL 2 1 NON-LICENSED
- Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel llandling, supervising refueling operations
, after the initial fuc1 loading.
- Shift crew composition may be Icss than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accomodate unexpected absence of on duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1.
Additional Requirements: .
- 1. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor.
- 2. At least two licensed Operators shall be present in the control room during reactor start-up, scheduled reactor shutdown and I during recovery from reactor trips.
An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures shall 3.
be on site when fuel is in the reactor.
- 4. All refueling operations after the initial fuel loading shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
S. At least 3 individuals with fire. protection tr_aining shall be maintained onsite at all times. These individuals shafl not include the minimum shift crew necessary for siitfe shutdowsDof tue unit (2 members) or any personnel required for otherf essential functions during'a fire emergency.
Amendment No. 16, _ 3 ,i g .
SENIOR VICE PRES! CENT PRO O. ,T R AN S.
& ENGRG.
SAFETY REVIEW q CUALITY ASSURANCE COM*dlT TEE R COMMITTEE DIRECTOR ,
POWER PRODUCTION I .
ASST. DIRECTOR POWER , l PRODUCTION
- I MANAGER MANAGER WANAGER - g OVALITY NUCLEAR NUCLEAR ENSM ASSURANCE PROJECTS. . FUEL
- 8 SUPERINTENDENT
, COMMITTEE w
) ..
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'CORPOR ATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM l ARKANSAS POWFR G LICllT C03fi'tY FIGU.7 ARKANSAS MJCI.I AR ONE - UNIT 1 ptANAGEMENTORGANIZATIONCllART 6.2-1 ANCndinent. fin. (( -
119
.a _e=
x .
- N SUPERINT ENDE N T OF P3aE9 PLANT CE F
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Ab $1ST ANT SUPT OF POWER PL ANT ,
CE LSO SEE FIG!!RE 6.2 28
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j l l TE CMIC AL SUPPOR EuotNCER $gpysn.ptgy ops 0. C. E N GIN E E R L,n i
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$0,y3'I" C H EW S E NV SUPVSR HP SUPV5R PERFORW ENGR-A$57.SUPV$R PLT OP 0.C INSPEC TORS LSO l
ASST H P. SHIP T OP 8U*V$R TRAINING COORDINATOR SUPVSR Lf0 PLANT OPER i Lo RA010 CLN. L A D.
CHCWISTS CHCWISTS H . P.'s ASST PLNT OPER l LO IVSTd. J CONT.
OPER.
C - Degree or (quivalent Required AUX. -
Cf Ingineering Degree or (quivalent #ccuirrJ s
OPER. .
L50 . Senter Opera'or Liceme Required L1 - Operator Lfden e Asquired' *
'ONSITE RESPOf45181tlTV FOR FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM l
ARKANSAS Poh1R G LICt!T CO. FUNCTIONA L ARKANSAS MJCLEAR ONE-UNIT I ORCAN!MTION FOR FICURE PIANT OPERATION 6.2 2^
Amendme,ttNo.[I; - 120 -
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- e. ' The Facility Security Plan and implementing procecures at least once per two years.
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. f. Any other area of facility operation considered appropriate by the SRC or the Senior Vice President (FTSE)
F AUTHORITY 6.5.2.10 The SRC shall report to and advise the Senior Vice President (PT6E) on those areas of responsibility specified in Sectiori 6.5.2.7 and 6.5.2.8.
RECORDS 6.5.2.11 Recorcs of SRC activitics shall be prepared, approved and dis-tribut6d as indicated below:
- a. Minutes of each SRC meeting shall be prepared, approved and forwarded to the Senior Vice President (PT6E) within 30 days following each meeting.
- b. Reports of reviews encompassed by Section 6.5.2.7 e, f, g and h above, shall be prepared, a,tproved and forwarded to the Senior Vice President (PT6r) wi'.hin '30 days following completion of the review.
- c. Audit reports encompassed by Section 6.5.2.8 above, shall be forwarded to the Senior Vice President (PT6E) and to the management positions responsible for the areas audited within 30 days after completion of the audit.
6.6 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE ACTION 6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for Reportable Occurrences:
- a. The Commission shall be notified and/or a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Specification 6.12.
- b. Each Reportable Occurrence requir:ng 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification to the Com.i.ission shall be reviewed by the PSC and submitted to SRC, the Assistant Director, Power Production by the Superin-tendent of Power Plant.
6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION 6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:
- a. The facility shall be placed in at least hot shutdown within one hour,
- b. . The Nuclear Regulatory Commissior, shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant-to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 and Specification 6.12.3.1 A==nanen t fle s 75. - 126 -
- s 6.8 PROCEDURES 6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced below:
- a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November,1972.
- b. Refueling operations.
- c. Surveillance r.nd test activities of safety related equipment.
- d. Security Plan implementation.
- e. Emergency Plan implementation.
- f. Implementation of Fire Protection Activities required by Technical Specifications.
6.8.2 Each procedure of 6.8.1 above, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed by the PSC and approved by the Superintendent of Power Plant prior to implementation and reviewed periodically as set forth in administrative procedures.
6.8.3 Temporary changes to procedures of 6.8.1 above may be made provided:
- a. The intent of the original procedure is not altered.
- b. The change is approved by two members of the plant staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Reactor Operator's License on the unit affected.
- c. The change is documented, reviewed by the PSC and approved by the Superintendent of Power Plant within 14 days of implementation.
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