ML20216J784

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Proposed Tech Specs Bases Change Concerning Plant Protection Sys Matrix Logic Testing
ML20216J784
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/1998
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20216J770 List:
References
NUDOCS 9803240076
Download: ML20216J784 (7)
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Text

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PROPORFn TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGE

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systens and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and udtigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systens is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the udnimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

The RPS Matrix Logic channels and the Initiation Logic channels are listed as separate functional units in Table 3.3-1 and are grouped together in the corresponding surveillance Table 4.3-1 as a single functional unit listed as Reactor Protection System (RPS) Logic. The RPS Logic contains six Matrix Logic channels and four Initiation Logic channels. For surveillance testing purposes, the RPS Logic is considered to have four channels or n=4 with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The associated triannual CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTING requirements are performed during the individual channel PPS test. The six RPS Matrix Logic channels are divided up for testing purposes as follows: Matrix AB is tested with channel A, matrices BC and BD are tested with channel B, matrices AC and CD are tested with channel C, and matrix AD is tested with channel D. This testing methodology is supported by the analysis that was performed to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frequency and also satisfies the STAGGERED TEST BASIS requirements for the RPS Matrix Logic channels.

Table 4.3-2 requires the Automatic Actuation Logic channels for each of the associated ESEAS functional units to have a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST performed on a triannual frequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. These testing requirements also apply to the six ESEAS Matrix Logic channels and the four ESEAS Initiation Logic channels. For surveillance testing purposes, the ESEAS Matrix Logic channels and the ESEAS Initiation Logic channels are considered to have four channels or n=4 with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The ESEAS Matrix Logic channels are divided up for testing purposes like the RPS Matrix Logic channels.

This testing methodology is supported by the analysis that was performed to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frequency and also satisfies the STAGGERED TEST BASIS requirements for the ESEAS Matrix Logic channels.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance _that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

1 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,M,M6,4M,

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' 3/4.3' INSTRUMENTATION aAsEs l

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlappins or total channel test naasurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response

- time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

Plant Protective System (PPS) logic is designed for operation as a 2-out-of-3 logic, although normally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode.

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Matrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual b1 stables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

The ESFAS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays-and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESEAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic. Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the natrix power supplies, trip channel bypass contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts).

ESEAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Function; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital instrument bus, is to be treated as a single umtrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESEAS Function (e.g., SIAS, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) uses separate power supplies, the matrices for the different ESEAS Functions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the condition specified for each of the associated ESEAS Functional Units.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 'B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. M9,

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MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES (FORINFO ONLY) l b

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3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (EST)

INSTRUMENTATION ]

The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or conbination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from '

diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the fa-ility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systens ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

The RPS Natrix Loaic channels and the Initiation Loaic channels are listed i 33 separate functional units in Table 3.3-1 and are arouped tocether in the correspondina surveillance Table 4.3-1 as a sinale functional unit listed as Reactor Protectior System (RPS) Loaic. The RPS }ocic contains six Matrix Loaic channels anc. four Initiation Loaic channels. For surveillance testino ourcoses, the RPS Loaic is considered to have four channels or n=4 with respect to STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The associated triannual CHANNEL EVNCTIONAL TESTING )

reauirements are oe formed durina the individual channel PPS tent. The six RPS j Matrix Loaic channels are divided up for testina purposes as foLLows: Matrix l

AB is tested with channel A, matrices BC and BD are tested with channel B, i nutrices AC and CD are tested with channel C. and natrix AD is tested with channel D. This testina methodoloav is supported by the analysis that was performed to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frecuency and also satisfies the STAGGERED TEST EASIS reau:.rements for the RPS Matrix Locic channels.

Table 4.3-2 recuires the Automatic Actuation Locic channels for each of the associated ESEAS functional units to have a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST performed on a triannual freauency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. These testina recuirements also apolv to the six ESEAS Matrix Loaic channels and the four ESFAS Initiation Loaic channels. For surveillance testina purposes. the ESEAS Matrix Locic ,

channehs and the ESEAS Initiation Loaic channels are considered to have four j channels or n=4 witt respect to STAGGERED TES" BASIS. The ESEAS Matrix Locic channels are dividec. up for testina eurooses .ike the RPS Matrix Loa:.c channels.

This testina methodoloav is succorted by the analysis that was performed to extend the surveillance interval to the triannual frecuency and also satisfies j thg_ITAE9ERED TEST BASIS requirements for the ESFAS Matrix Locic channels.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

.The RPS and ESEAS response time tables have been relocated to the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,M,M4,M9,

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Re:p:nso time may ba d:monstrat:d by cny serics of saquantici, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified respqnse times.

(The above paragraph is moved to page B 3/4 3-la)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. M,M,444,M9,

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential,,

overlappinc or total channel test measugements provided that such tesla

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demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response ;

lime verification may be demonstra$ed by either 1) in place. onsite or l offsite test measurements or 2) utilizina replacement sensors with certified response times.

Plant Protective System (PPS) logic is designed for operation as a f 2-out-of-3 logic, although normally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode. ]

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Matrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

The ESFAS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESFAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic. Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the natrix power supplies, trip channel bypass contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts) .

ESFAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Function; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital instrument bus, is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESFAS Function (e.g., SIAS, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) uses separate power supplies, the matrices for the different ESFAS Functions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the Condition specified for each of the associated ESFAS Functional Units.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 469,

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