ML20153D849

Proposed Tech Specs 2.2.1,3.3.1.1 & 3.3.2.1 Re Operating Bypass Setpoint

ML20153D849
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/17/1998
From:	ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20153D847	List: 2CAN099805, Application for Amend to License NPF-6,modifying Notes in Table Associated with Tech Specs 2.2.1,3.3.1.1 & 3.3.2.1 Re Operating Bypass Setpoint ML20153D849
References
NUDOCS 9809250208
Download: ML20153D849 (18)

Text

.. -...

.... _ - ~ -

I l

i i

I i

1 I

I PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES i

i l

r i

i l

I l

l

+

9009250208 980917 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P

PDR:

l-

i TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 9.

Local Power Density - High s 21.0 kw/ft (5) s 21.0 kw/ft (5) 10.

DNER - Low 2 1.25 (5) 2 1.25 (5) 11.

Stecm Generator Level - High 5 93.7% (4) s 94.589% (4)

TABLE NOTATION (1)

Trip may' be manually bypassed above 10-*% of RATED THERMAL POWER: bypass shall be automatically removed before THERMAL POWER decreases below 10-*% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

l (2)

Value may be decreased manually, to a minimum value of 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressure, provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained j

at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

l (3)

Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(4)

% of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.

(5)

As stored within the Core Protection Calculator (CPC).

Calculation of the trip setpoint includes measurement, calculational and processor uncertainties, and dynamic allowances. Trip may be manually bypassed below 10-2% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed before THERMAL POWER exceeds 10-*% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 2-6 Amendment No. 34,36,24,66,-7-9, l

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES To maintain the margins of safety assumed in the safety analyses, the calculations of the tiip variables for the DNBR - Low and Local Power Density - High trips include the measurement, calculational and processor uncertainties and dynamic allowances as defined in CEN 305-P, " Functional Design Requirement for a Core Protection Calculator," July 1985; CEN-304-P,

" Functional Design Requirements for a Control Element Assembly Calculator,"

July 1985; CEN-310-P, "CPC and Methodology Changes for the CPC Improvement Program," October 1985; and CEN-308-P, "CPC/CEAC Software Modifications for the CPC Inprovement Program," August 1985.

The operating bypasses associated with the notations of Table 2.2-1 are discussed in the bases for specifications 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1.

Manual Reactor Trip The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provides manual reactor trip capability.

Linear Power Level - High The Linear Power Level - High trip provides reactor core protection against rapid reactivity excursions which might occur as the result of an ejected CEA.

This trip initiates a reactor trip at a linear power level of s 110.712% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

1 Logarithmic Power Level - High j

The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip is provided to protect the integrity of fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary in the event of an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. A reactor trip is initiated by the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip at a THERMAL POWER level of s 0.819%

of RATED THERMAL POWER unless this trip is nanually bypassed by the operator.

The operator may manually bypass this trip when the THERMAL POWER level is above 10"*% of RATED THERMAL POWER; this bypass is automatically removed before the THERMAL POWER level decreases below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

?

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 2-3 Amendment No. M, M,-7-9,

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continusd)

TABLE NOTATION

• With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

(a)

Trip may be manually bypassed above 10*d% of RATED THERMAL POWER: bypass shall be automatically removed before THERMAL POWER decreases below 10'*%

l of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(b)

Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

l (c)

Trip may be manually bypassed below 10**% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed before THERMAL POWER exceeds 10'#% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

During testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3, trip may be manually bypassed below 1% of RATED THZRMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed before THERMAL POWER exceeds 1% of RATED THERMAL l

POWER.

(d)

Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to special Test Exception 3.10.3.

(e)

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

(f)

Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers; actual trip logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the protective system trip breakers.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 444,

... _.. ~

-. -.-..~ - -. ~.... -.....-.- -..-,

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continuad)

TABLE NOTATION i

(a)

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

(b)

An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relay cabinet.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 9

- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT l

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within I

the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 10 -With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations.

The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS)

2. Jteam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

3. Steam Generator 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

4. Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low l

Steam Generator 1 Level - High i

Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1) l

5. Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low l

Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. M4,M9,-146,

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP VALUE VALUES 8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable

[

b.

Steam Generator (A&B) Level-Low 2 23% (3) 2 22.111% (3) c.

Steam Generator AP-High (SG-A > SG-B) s 90 psi s 99.344 psi d.

Steam Generator AP-High (SG-B > SG-A) s 90 psi s 99.344 psi e.

Steam Generator (A&B) Pressure - Low 2 712 psia (2) 2 699.6 psia (2)

(1)

Value may be 'c.c: eased manually, to a minimum of 2 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressuret provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increcsed automatically as pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip set-point is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before' pressurizer pressure exceeds 500 psia.

l (2)

Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure, provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at 5 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(3)

% of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.

(4)

Inverse time relay set value, not a trip value. The zero voltage trip will occur in 0.75 i 0.075 seconds.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. 9,24,M,4-89,

.s

i l

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS I

t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

l l

'3.10.3 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1.1 and noted requirements of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and l

PHYSICS TESTS, provided:

a.

The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at s 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

During startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER > 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be 5 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall ce subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to initiating startup or PHYSICS TESTS.

l l

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-3 Amendment No. 449,

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.

!2?sor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

Plant Protective System (PPS) logic is designed for operation as a 2-out-of-3 logic, although normally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode.

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Matrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

The ESEAS Logic consists of everything downstream of the biatable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays. The ESEAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the matrix power supplies, trip channel bypass contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts).

ESEAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Function; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital instrument bus, is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESEAS Function (e.g.,

SIAS, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) uses separate power supplies, the matrices for the different ESEAS Functions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the Condition specified for each of the associated ESEAS Functional Units.

The LCOs for the RPS and the ESEAS instrumentation systems require the OPERABILITY of the bypass permissive removal channels. These LCOs require the automatic bypass removal feature of all four operating bypass channels to be i

l OPERABLE for each of the RPS and ESEAS functions with an operating bypass in i

the MODES addressed in the specific LCO for each function. The operating i

bypasses required by these LCOs are the Pressurizer Pressure - Low, the CPC (DNBR - Low and LPD - High), and the Logarithmic Power Level - High trips.

All four automatic bypass removal channels must be OPERABLE to ensure that none of the four RPS and ESEAS channels are inadvertently bypassed. The automatic removal feature of the operating bypasses is required to be verified ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 469, l

I: ued Sy "nC Lett:r 0;ted June 10, 1000 l

l l

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES

, during surveillance testing and are not required to be verified during plant maneuvering.

The bypass term in the RPS and ESFAS LCOs applies to the automatic operating bypass removal feature and not the PPS trip channel bypass feature.

If the bypass enable function is failed so as to prevent entering a bypass condition, operation may continue.

In the case of the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip, the absence of a bypass will limit maximum power to below the trip setpoint.

Tables 3.3-1 notation (a) and 2.2-1 notation (1) allow the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip to be manually bypassed when above 10"% of RATED THERMAL POWER to allow the reactor to be brought to power during a reactor startup. The operating bypass is manually initiated in all four logarithmic power channels when the plant conditions do not warrant this trip protection and the operating bypass permissive has been enabled. The bistable design ensures that the CPC trips will be automatically enabled when the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip can be manually bypassed. The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip operating bypass is automatically removed before THERMAL POWER decreases below 10"% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the logarithmic nuclear instrumentation.

Tables'3.3-1 notation (c) and 2.2-1 notation (5) allow the CPC trips to be manually bypassed below 10-2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

The operating bypass effectively removes the CPC trips from the RPS.

This allows closure of the l

reactor trip circuit breakers and thus enabling the CEA operation necessary for a plant startup.

The operating bypass is manually initiated in all four CPC channels when the plant conditions do not warrant this trip protection and the operating bypass permissive has been enabled.

The bistable design ensures that the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip will be automatically enabled when the CPC trips can be manually bypassed. The CPC operating bypass is automatically j

removed before THERMAL POWER exceeds 10-2% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the logarithmic power instrumentation.

l The bistable for the operating bypasses for the CPC and Logarithmic Power Level - High trips is required to be set within the two decade range allowed by l

Table 3.3-1 notations (a) and (c) and Table 2.2-1 notations (1) and (5).

These

(

limits provide the bistable with the appropriate range to account for the bistable hysteresis and to provide margin for the applicable uncertainties.

Regardless of the actual bistable setpoint within the two decade band, the single bistable design ensures that either the CPC or the Logarithmic Power Level - High trips are available to provide reactor trip protection.

During l

testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3, the bistable setpoint for l

these operating bypasses is increased to automatically remove the CPCs from bypass before THERMAL POWER exceeds 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the logarithmic power instrumentation.

l Tables 2.2-1 notation (2), 3.3-1 notation (b), 3.3-3 notation (a), and 3.3-4 notation (1) allow the Pressurizer Pressure - Low function to be manually l

bypast ? below 400 psia when the operating bypass permissive has been enabled.

The margin between the pressurizer pressure and the setpoint is maintained s 200 psia as pressurizer pressure is reduced during controlled plant cooldowns. This allows for controlled depressurization of the RCS while still maintaining an active trip setpoint until the trip is no longer needed to protect the plant.

Since the Pressurizer Pressure - Low bistable is shared with RPS, SIAS, and CCAS an inadvertent actuation of these systems due to low pressurizer pressure is prevented while bypassed. The Pressurizer Pressure - Low bypass is required to be automatically removed before RCS pressure exceeds 500 psia.

The difference between the 400 psia allowance for the manual bypass and 500 psia automatic bypass removal feature allows for the bistable hysteresis.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-lb Amendment No.

.mi

.~,,am...u.4 u.~41_wu-..a...mm.

-..~-4.~.-asm.-.

-%w=--

---.u....

-mm..

f -..-

4 k

l L

MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FORINFO ONLY) 1 I

I i-e k

i

l. '.

t k'

i e

l I-5.,...

.m.,

TABLE 2.

) .ontinued)

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTafION TRIP SETPOINT LIMITS l

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 9.

Local Power Density - High s 21.0 kw/ft (5) s 21.0 kw/ft (5) 10.

DNBR - Low 2 1.25 (5) 2 1.25 (5) 11.

Steam Generator Level - High s 93.7% (4) s 94.589% (4)

TABLE NOTATION (1)

Trip may be manually bypassed above 10-'% of RATED THERMAL POWER: bypass shall be automatically

,l removed when-before THERMAL POWER -ie- _4 decreases below 10"% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(2)

Value may be decreased manually, to a minimum value of 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressure, provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically ss pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed before d.

.csc: pressurizer pressure -le-dexceeds, 500 psia.

l

(?)

Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(4)

% of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.

r (5) As stored within the Core Protection Calculator (CPC).

Calculation of the trip setpoint includes measurement, calculational and processor uncertainties, and dynamic allowances. Trip may be manually bypassed below 10"3% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed before when-THERMAL POWER exceeds 4-s-h-1042% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 2-6 Amendment No. 34, M, 3-7, M, M,

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES To maintain the margins of safety assumed in the safety analyses, the calculations of the trip variables for the DNBR - Low and Local Power Density - High trips include the measurement, calculational and processor

, uncertainties and dynamic allowances as defined in CEN 305-P, " Functional Design Requirement for a Core Protection Calculator," July 1985; CEN-304-P,

" Functional Design Requirements for a Control Element Assembly Calculator,"

July 1985; CEN-310-P, "CPC and Methodology Changes for the CPC Improvement Program," October 1985; and CEN-308-P, "CPC/CEAC Software Modifications for the CPC Improvement Program," August 1985.

The oneratino bvoasses associated with the notations of Table 2.2-1 are discussed in the bases for specifications 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1.

Manual Reactor Trip The Manual Reactor Trip is a redundant channel to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and providus manual reactor trip capability.

Linear Power Level - High The Linear Power Level - High trip provides reactor core protection against rapid reactivity excursions which might occur as the result of an ejected CEA.

This trip initiates a reactor trip at a linear power level of s 110.712% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Logarithmic Power Level - High The Logarithmic Power Level - High trip is provided to protect the integrity l

of fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary in the event of l

an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. A reactor trip is initiated l

by the Logarithmic Power Level - High trip at a THERMAL POWER level of s 0.819%

of RATED THERMAL POWER unless this trip is manually bypassed by the operator.

The operator may manually bypass this trip when the THERMAL POWER level is above 10-'% of RATED THERMAL POWER; this bypass is automatically removed when-before the THERMAL POWER level decreases ee-below 10'd% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

I l

l l

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 2-3 Amendment No. 34,66,-74,

~

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continusd) l TABLE NOTATION With the prot ective system trip breakers in the closed position and the i

CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

i (a) Trip may ir, manually bypassed above 10'*% of RATED THERMAL POWER: bypass shall be automatically removed beforewhen THERMAL POWER 4*-decreases below G-10'*% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(b)

Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically re. moved uher. ver before pressurizer pressure h gxceeds 500 psia.

l l

(c)

Trip may be manually bypassed below 10Z% of RATED THERMAL POWER; bypass shall be automatically removed when-before THERMAL POWER 4*,h-exceeds _10**3%

of RATED THERMAL POWER.

During testing pursuant to Special Test Exception i

3.10.3, trip may be manually bypassed below 1% of RATED THERMAL POWEF bypass shall be automatically removed when-before THERMAL POWER 4e-4 exceeds 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(d)

Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

(e)

See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.

(f)

Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers; actual trip j

logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice.

4 l

ACTION STATEMENTS j

ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the protective system trip breakers.

l l

1 d

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 4-34,

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continutd)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is below 400 psias bypass shall be automatically removed whenbefore pressurizer pressure ie-h-exceeds 500 psia.

(b)

An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relay cabinet.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 9

- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 10 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS) f Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS)

2. Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

3. Steam Generscor 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

4. Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low Steam Generator 1 Level - High Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

5. Sterm Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. M4, M9, M6,

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES ALLOWABLE RINCTIONAL UNIT TRIP VALUE VALUES 8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

Not Applicable Not Applicable b.

Steam Generator (A&B) Level-Low 2 23% (3) 2 22.111% (3) c.

Steam Generator AP-High (SG-A > SG-B) s 90 psi 5 99.344 psi d.

Steam Generator AP-High (SG-B > SG-A) 5 90 psi s 99.344 psi e.

Steam Generator (A&B) Pressure - Low 2 712 psia (2) 2 699.6 psia (2)

(1)

Value may be decreased manually, to'a minimum of 2 100 psia, during a planned reduction in pressurizer pressure, provided the margin between the pressurizer pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as pressurizer pressure is increased until the trip set-point is reached. Trip may be manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed

-h.:.

before pressurizer pressure *e-2 exceeds 500 psia.

l (2)

Value may be decreased manually during a planned reduction in steam generator pressure, provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at s 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(3)

% of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level instrument nozzles.

(4)

Inverse time relay set value, not a trip value. The zero voltage trip will occur in 0.75 i 0.075 seconds.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. 9,G4,65,449,

-.,a

+

-+a 6 -

Ea--

,A-a-4

-A=4 m

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.3 The limitations of Specification 3.4.1.1 and noted requirements of Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and l,

PHYSICS TESTS, provided:

a.

The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.

The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE power level channels are set at s 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY:

During startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

ACTION:

With the THERMAL POWER > 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately trip the reactor.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be s 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each wide range logarithmic and power level neutron flux monitoring channel shall be subjected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to initiating startup or PHYSICS TESTS.

i l

l t

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-3 Amendment No. 449, I

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.

Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

Plant Protective System (PPS) logic is designed for operation as a 2-out-of-3 logic, although normally it is operated in a 2-out-of-4 mode.

The RPS Logic consists of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers. The RPS Logic is divided into two parts, Matrix Logic, and Initiation Logic.

Failures of individual histables and their relays are considered measurement channel failures.

The ESEAS Logic consists. of everything downstream of the bistable relays and upstream of the subgroup relays.

The ESEAS Logic is divided into three parts, Matrix Logic, Initiation Logic, and Actuation Logic.

Failures of individual bistables and their relays are considered measurement channel. failures.

Matrix Logic refers to the matrix power supplies, trip channel bypass l

contacts, and interconnecting matrix wiring between bistable relay cards, up to, but not including the matrix relays. Matrix contacts on the bistable relay cards are excluded from the Matrix Logic definition since they are addressed as part of the measurement channel.

Initiation Logic consists of the trip path power source, matrix relays and their associated contacts, all interconnecting wiring, and the initiation relays (including contacts).

ESEAS Actuation Logic consists of all circuitry housed within the Auxiliary Relay Cabinets (ARCS) used to house the ESF Function; excluding the subgroup relays, and interconnecting wiring to the initiation relay contacts mounted in the PPS cabinet.

For the purposes of this LCO, de-energization of up to three matrix power supplies due to a single failure, such as loss of a vital instrument bus, is to be treated as a single matrix channel failure, providing the affected matrix relays de-energize as designed to produce a half-trip. Although each of the six matrices within an ESEAS Function (e.g., SIAS, MSIS, CSAS, etc.) uses separate power supplies, the matrices for the different ESEAS Functions share power supplies. Thus, failure of a matrix power supply may force entry into the Condition specified for each of the associated ESEAS Functional Units.

l The LCOs for the RPS and the ESEAS instrumentation systems resuire the OPERABILITY of the bvoass carmissive removal channels. These LCOs reauire the automatic bvoass renoval feature of all four operatina bvoass channels to be QPIB&BLE_f.9I_Aash_g.L_the_RPJ_ ansi _EEIAg_ functions with an operatina bvoass in the MODES addressed in the specific LCO for each function.

The operatina bvoassas reauired by these pCOg are the Pr9ssurizer Pressure - Low, the CPC (DNBR - Low and LPD - Hich), and the Locarith=4 c Power Level - Hiah tries.

All four automatic bvoass removal channels must be OPERABLE to ensure that none of the four RPS and ESEAS channels are inadvertent 1v bvoassed.

The f

automatic removal feature of the operatina bvoasses is reauired to be verified ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. M9,

!;;;;d Sy "n0 L;tt;; 0;t d J;;: 15, 1000

- -. _ _ _ ~ -. -. -

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES durina surveillance testina and are not recuired to be verified durina plant mgneuverina.

The bvoass team in the RPS and ESEAS LCOs applies to the automatic operatina bvoass r.gmoval feature and not the PPS trio channel bvoass feature.

If the bvoass enable function is failed so as to orevent enterina a bvoass condition, operation may continue.

In the case of the Locarithmic Power Level - Hiah trio, the absence of a bvoass will limit maximum power to below the trio setooint.

Tables 3.3-1 notation (a) and 2.2-1 notation (1) allow the Locarithmic Power Level - Hiah trio to be manually bypassed when above 10'% of RATED THERMAL POWER to allow the reactor to be broucht to cower durina a reactor startuo. The operatine bvoass is manually initiated in all four loaarithmic l

Dower channels when the plant conditions do not warrant this trio protection l

and the operatina bvoass permissive has been enabled. The bistable des:.qn ensures that the CPC trios will be automatically enabled when the Locar:.thmic Power Level - Mich trio can be manually bvoassed.

The Locarithmic Power kevel - Hich trio operatina bypass is automatica_J1v removed before THERMAL POWER decreases below 10'% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the locarithmic nuclear instrumentation.

Tables 3.3-1 notation (c) and 2.2-1 notation (5) allow the CPC trios to be manually bvoassed below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

The operatina bvoass effectively removes the CPC trios from the RPS.

This allows closure of the l

reactor trio circuit breakers and thus enablina the CEA operation necessary for l

a,olant startuo. The operatina bvoass is manually initiated in all four CPC channels when the o.lant conditions do not warrant thi_t trio protection and the operatina bvoass permissive has been enabled. The bistable desian ensures that the Locarithmic Power Level - Hich tE o will be automatically enabled when the l

CPC trips can be manually bvoassed. The CPC operatina bvoass is automatically removed before THERMAL POWER exceeds 10"% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the loaarithmic power instrumentation.

)

i The bistable for the operatina bvoasses for the CPC and Locarithmic Power i

Level - Hiah trios is recuired to be set within the two decade rance allowed by Table 3.3-1 notations (a) and (c) and Table 2.2-1 notations (1) and (5).

These limits provide the bistable with the appropriate rance to account for the bistabhe hysteresis and to provide marcin for the applicable uncertainties.

Recardiess of the actual bistable setooint within the two decade band, the sinaLe bistable desian ensures that either the CPC or the Locarithmic Power Level - Hich trios are available to provide reactor trio protection.

Durina testino oursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3, the bistable setooint for these operating _ bypasses is increased to automatically remove the CPCs from l

l byp_ ass be_ fore THERMAL POWER exceeds 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER, as sensed by the locarithmic power instrumentation.

Tables 2.2-1 notation (2), 3.3-1 notation (b), 3.3-3 notation (a), and 3.3-4 notation (1) allow the Pressurizer Pressure - Low function to be manually bypassed below 400 osia when the operatina bypass permissive has been enabled.

The maroin between the pressurizer pressure and the setooint is maintained s 200 osia as pressurizer pressure is reduced durina controlled plant cooldowns.

This allows for controlled depressurization of the RCS while still

(

maintainina an active trio setooint until the trio is no loncer needed to protect the plant.

Since the Pressurizer Pressure - Low bistable is shared d

with RPS, SIAS, and CCAS an inadvertent actuation of these systems due i

to low oressurizer pressure is prevented while bvoassed. The Pressurizer Pressure - Low bvoass is reauired to be automatically removed before RCS j

oressure exceeds 500 osia. The difference between the 400 osia allowance for the manual _kypass and 500 osia automatic bvoass removal feature allows for the bistable hysteresis.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-lb Amendment No.

I l

l

--