ML20236Y508

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Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.3.4.B Re Sodium Hydroxide Tank Limits
ML20236Y508
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear 
Issue date: 08/06/1998
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236Y507 List:
References
NUDOCS 9808120268
Download: ML20236Y508 (6)


Text

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l PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 9908120268 990006 PDR ADOCK 05000313 i-P PDR

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(I) The engineered safety features valves aasociated with each of the above systems chall be operable or locked in the ES position.

3.3.2 In addition to 3.3.1 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operable when the reactor coolant system is above 350F and irradiated fuel is in the core:

(A)

Two out of three high pressure injection (makeup) pumps shall be maintained operable, powered from independent essential buses, to provide redundant and independent flow paths.

(B)

Engineered safety features valves associated with 3.3.2.a above shall be operable or locked in the ES position.

3.3.3 In addition to 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operable when the reactor coolant system is above 800 psig:

(A)

The two core flooding tanks shall each contain an indicated minimum of 13 i 0.4 feet (1040 i 30 ft') of borated water at 600 25 psig.

(B)

Core flooding tank boron concentration shall not be less than 2270 ppm boron.

(C)

The electrically operated discharge valves from the core flood tanks shall be open and breakers locked open and tagged.

(D)

One of the two pressure instrument channels and one of the two level instrument channels per core flood tank shall be operable.

3.3.4 The reactor shall not be made critical unless the following equipment in addition to 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 above is operable.

(A)

Two reactor building spray pumps and their associated spray nozzle headers and two trains of reactor building emergency cooling. The two reactor building spray pumps shall be powered from operable independent emergency buses and the two reactor building emergency cooling trains shall'be powered from operable independent emergency buses.

(B)

The sodium hydroxide tank shall contain a volume of 29,000 gallons of sodium hydroxide solution at a concentration >5.0 wt% and <16.5 wt%.

(C)

All manual valves in the main discharge lines of the sodium hydroxide tanks shall be locked open.

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Amendment No. M, 49, 4M, 444, M4 37

, 370,100 gallons of borated water are supplied for emergency core cooling and reactor building spray in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This amount fulfills requirements for emergency core cooling. Approximately 16,000 gallons I

of borated water are required to reach cold shutdown. The original nominal borated water storage tank capacity of 380,000 gallons is based on refueling volume requirements.

Heaters maintain the borated water supply at a temperature to prevent crystallization and local freezing of the boric acid.

The minimum required BWST boron concentration of 2270 ppm assures that the core will be maintained at least 1 percent Ak/k suberitical at 70*F without any control rods in the core.

Specification 3.3.2 assures that above 350 F two high pressure injection pumps are also available to provide injection water as the energy of the reactor coolant system is increased.

Specification 3.3.3 assures that above 800 psig both core flooding tanks are operational.

Since their design pressure is 600 i 25 psig, they are not brought into the operational state until 800 psig to prevent spurious injection of borated water.

Both core flooding tanks are specified as a single core flood tank has insuf ficient inventory to reflood the core. (1)

Specification 3.3.4 assures that prior to going critical the redundant train of reactor building emergency cooling and spray train are operable.

The spray system utilizes common suction lines with the low pressure injection system.

If a single train of equipment is removed from either system, the other train must be assured to be operable in each system.

The volume specified by 3.3.4.B is the safety analysis volume and does not contain allowances for instrument uncertainty.

9,000 gallons corresponds to a level of approximately 26 feet at a temperature of 77*F and a NaOH concentration of 5.0 wt%.

No maximum volume is specified as the value used as the maximum volume in the safety analysis bounds the physical size of the NaOH tank.

Additional allowances for instrument uncertainties, as determined in Reference 6, are incorporated in the operating procedures associated with the level instrumentation used in the control room.

When the reactor is critical, maintenance is allowed per Specification 3.3.5.

Operability of the specified components shall be based on the results of testing as required by Technical Specification 4.5.

The maintenance period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is acceptable if the operability of equipment redundant to that removed from service is demonstrated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to removal.

Exceptions to Specification 3.3.6 permit continued operation for seven days if one of two BWST level instrument channels is operable or if either the pressure or level instrument channel in the CFT instrument channel is operable.

In the event that the need for emergency core cooling should occur, functioning of one train (one high pressure injection pump, one low pressure injection pump, and both core flooding tanks) will protect the core and in the event of a main coolant loop severance, lindt the peak clad temperature to less than 2200*F and the metal-water reaction to that representing less than 1 percent of the clad.

The service water system consists of two independent but interconnected, full capacity, 100% redundant systems, to ensure continuous heat removal. (4 )

One service water pump is required for normal operation.

The normal operating requirements are greater than the emergency requirements following a loss-of-coolant accident.

l Amendment No. 444,446,444r 39 l

P-...--

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9/31/91; '/15/92; 9/15/95

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6 MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FOR INFO ONLY) 1 1

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(I)

The engineered safety features valves associated with each of the above systens shall be operable or locked in the ES position.

)

3.3.2 In addition to 3.3.1 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operable when the reactor coolaat system is above 350F and irradiated fuel is in the core:

i i

(A)

Two out of three high pressure injection (makeup) pumps shall be maintained operable, powered from independent essential buses, to provide redundant and independent flow paths.

1 1

(B)

Engineered safety features valves associated with 3.3.2.a above shall be operable or locked in the ES position.

)

3.3.3 In addition to 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above, the following ECCS equipment shall be operable when the reactor coolant system is above 800 psig:

(A)

The two core flooding tanks shall each contain an indicated minimum of 13 i 0.4 feet (1040 i 30 ft8) of borated water at 600 i 25 psig.

(B)

Core flooding tank boron concentration shall not be less than 2270 ppm boron.

(C)

The electrically operated discharge valves from the core flood tanks shall be open and breakers locked open and tagged.

(D)

One of the two pressure instrument channels and one of the two level instrument channels per core flood tank shall be operable.

3.3.4 The reactor shall not be made critical unless the following equipment in addition to 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 above is operable.

(A)

Two reactor building spray pumps and their associated spray nozzle headers and two trains of reactor building emergency cooling. The two reactor building spray pumps shall be powered from operable independent emergency buses and the two reactor building emergency cooling trains shall be powered from operable independent emergency buses.

(B)

The sodium hydroxide tank shall contain en indiccted a volume of l 33.2 ~ 1.9 ft.29,000 callons of 1B+2'4 wt eclution sodium hydro ide solution

-4r0 at a concentration >5.0 wt3_and <16.6 wt%.

(c) All manual valves in the main discharge lines of the sodium hydroxide tanks shall be locked open.

Amendment No. 24, 39, -1M, -M&, M4 37

370,100 gallona of borated water are supplied for emergency core cooling and reactor building spray in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. This amount fulfills requirements for emergency core cooling. Approximately 16,000 gallons of borated water are required to reach cold shutdown. The original nominal borated water storage tank capacity of 380,000 gallons is based on refueling volume requirements.

Heaters maintain the borated water supply at a temperature to prevent crystallization and local freezing of the boric acid.

The minimum required BWST boron concentration of 2270 ppm assures that the core will be maintained at least 1 percent Ak/k suberitical at 70*F without any control rods in the core.

Specification 3.3.2 assures that above 350*F two high pressure injection pumps are also available to provide injection water as the energy of the reactor coolant system is increased.

Specification 3.3.3 assures that above 800 psig both core flooding tanks are operational.

Since their design pressure is 600 i 25 psig, they are not brought into the operational state until 800 psig to prevent spurious injection of borated water.

Both core flooding tanks are specified as a single core flood tank has insuf ficient inventory to reflood the core. (1)

Specification 3.3.4 assures that prior to going critical the redundant train of reactor building emergency cooling and spray train are operable.

The epray system utilizes common suction lines with the low pressure injection

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system.

If a single train of equipment is removed from either system, the other train must be assured to be operable in each system.

Reference 5 provid : cn accccament of the impact cf icvcl indicator-+netru=cnt c :c cn th; cllowed ";O" tant level variation "ste that th: indicated icvel varicticn of 33.2 1 1.9 feet include: an allcwance fer instrument lecp cr:cr.Ihg volume specified by 3.3.4.B is the safety _ analysis volume and_does not contain allowances for instrument uncertainty.

9,000 callons corresponds to a level of gppoximatel.y_2,6 feet at a temperat_ure of 77"F and a NaOH concentration of 5.0 wt%. No maximum volume is specified as the value used as the maximum volume in the safety _ analysis bounds the physical size of the NaOH tank.

Additional aklowances for instrument uncertainties, as deterndned in Reference 6 _are t

incorp_ orated in the operatino procedures associated with the level instrumentation used in the control room.

When the reactor is critical, maintenance is allowed per Specification 3.3.5.

Operability of the specified components shall be based on the results of testing 1

as required by Technical Specification 4.5.

The maintenance period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is acceptable if the operability of equipment redundant to that removed from service is demonstrated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to removal.

Exceptions to Specification 3.3.6 permit continued operation for seven days if one of two BWST level instrument channels is operable or if either the pressure or level instrument channel in the CFT instrument channel is operable.

In the event that the need for emergency core cooling should occur, functioning of one train (one high pressure injection pump, one low pressure injection pump, and both core flooding tanks) will protect the core and in the event of a main coolant loop severance, limit the peak clad temperature to less than 2200*F and the metal-water reaction to that representing less than 1 percent of the clad.

l The service water system consists of two independent but interconnected, full j

capacity, 100% redundant systems, to ensure continuous heat removal. (4)

One service water pump is required for normal operation.

The normal operating requirements are greater than the emergency requirements following a loss-of-coolant accident, Amendment No. 444,445, M4r 39 j

REVISEO SY "nC 1.ETTER-DA-T-B&t 9/31/91; 7/15/02; 9/15/96

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