ML18101A502

LER 94-016-00:on 941226,unplanned TS 3.0.3 Entry Occurred Due to Inoperability of High Steam Flow/Low - Low Tavg SI Above 545 Degrees F Rc Temp.Integrated Operating Procedure IOP-2 Will Be Procedurally enhanced.W/950125 Ltr

ML18101A502
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/25/1995
From:	Pastva M, Summers J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-94-016-02, LER-94-16-2, NUDOCS 9501270226
Download: ML18101A502 (8)

Text

P.02 01-2~-199~ 19:30 0 PStiG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 NUCllJI' Bu11n111 Unit .

January 251 1995

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Cesk Wa~hington, DC 20555 Attn: Document: Control Deak SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET No. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 94*016-00

~his Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code or Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). Issuance of this report is required wit~in thirty (30) d~ys of event discovery, Sincerely,

~~-----

f.""'c. summers General Manager -

Salem operations SORC Mtq *.95-010 MJPJ:vs c Distribution LER File i&J',

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ABSTRACT (Umlt to 1400 epacea, le., approximately 16 lln;IHpaciecl typarttten lln1e) (10)

During the reactor coolant syst~m (RCS) resistance temperature device (aTD) cross calibration, an unplanne~ Teehnical Sp@cification (TS) 3.0.3 entry, f.rom approximately 09.00 .u~til 0915 hou.r:s ori *12/26/94, occLtrred due to the high steam flow/low - low Tavg safety injection (SI) 2nqineered Safety Feature protecticn being ~locked above the allowed 545 deqrees rahrenheit Cf) P-12 ~alue. The SI protection was immediately reenabled and TS 3.0.3 was exited. At approximately 0923 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.512015e-4 months <br /> (same day) a plann*d evolution reduced RCS tEmp~~ature below P-12. At 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br /> on 12/26/94, the 24 loop RTD bistables were return~d to normal. From appro¥imately 2121 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.070405e-4 months <br /> on 17./27/94, until 1942 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.38931e-4 months <br /> on 1/10/95, P.CS t9mperature was aoove P-12 and the ~S required mction, due to inoperaoility of 24 loop IlTn ehc-nnel,

• W&!!I* not taken. * .Tha primary cause of both events is attributed to per:1onnel error, due to failure* to adequately follow prooadurl!. 24 loop llTD channol inopet:abil,;ty :-eeulted frorn an inadequate loop calibration subsequent to chanqinq to an -

"installed spare R.'l'C during the 12/21i/94 cross calibration. PC>siti~*

discipline is being taken concerning both events. The-TS 3.0.3 entry will be covered in Licensed Ope:r-at.nr. Requalif'ication Retraining and an Operations directi~e will be distributed. Approp~iate procedure enhancements* will be made and lassons l~~rned will be reviewed.

01-2s-1sss 19:31 P.04 LJCJlNSI3E EYBNT RllPORT Q1BB) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Dodcet Number LEllNumber Page2of6 Unit# 2 30-311 94..016 Plant and System ldentif'!oa~on:

Westinqhouse - Pressurized water aeactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes appear 1n the text as {xx)

Identitiaation of Oacurnncee:

Unplanned Technical Specitication 3.0.3 Entry Due To Inope.r:*a:t.Jility Of Hiqh steam Flow/Low Tavq Safety Injection Above 545 Degrees Fahrenheit Reactor Coolant Temperature And Failure *1*0 Take Action Required. DUe To Inoperability Of 24 Loop Reactor Coolant Resistance Temperature Device Date Of First Occurrence: 12/26/94 Pate of Second Occurrence: 12/27/94 through 1/10/95 Report Date: 1/25/95 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos. 94m544,95-020, and 9~-022.

Conditions Prior to laah OOCUrrenaa:

Mode 3 Re.~ctcr Pnwer -o- I Unit Load -o- MWe Onit rcfuolinq/maintenance outai* 2R8 was onqoinq, with cross calibration of reactor coolant system (RCS) resistance therm~l devices (RTDs) in progreBe, in acco~dance with procedure S2.IC-PT.RCP-0001~Q). In addition, RCS Temperature was less than P-12 [S4~ degrees ~ahrenheit(F)].

D*acription of Oeourrenaa1:

During tha R.TD cross calib:ration, from approximately 0900 until discovery at 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> on December 26, 1994, an unplanned Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 antry occurred due to the h'iqh steam flow/low - low Tavq safety inje~tion .

(SI) Enginet!.nu:l Safety Feature (ESF) protes:tion :being blocked above the allowed P-12 value. This occurred durinq plannea RCS heatup to normal operatinq temperat~~e ~NOT)

(547 deqrees F), while the four Tavg low - low bistables' current transformer disconnect switches (CTs) were in tne

01-2:i-199:i 19:32 P.0:i YCENSJm EVENT REPORT CLllB.) TEXT CONIINlJATION Salem Generating Station D~ket Number . LER Number Page 3 of6 Unit#2 50-311 94.016-00 De*aription or Ocrmrrenicee: (oont' d) tripped condition, thereby prevent1nq automatic

• reinstatement of the SI protection. Immediately followinq event discovery, the.hiqh steam flow/SI permissive was reenabled by manually unblockinq the permissive in accordance with step 5.20 of Integrated Operating Procedure (IOP)~2 and TS .3.0.3 was axitad. At approximately 0923 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.512015e-4 months <br /> (same day) RCS temperature was subsequently reduced below P-12, as a result of a planned evolution to operate 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and RCS temp~rature temperature remained below 543 deqree~ r.

At approximately 142~ hours (same day) the !\TD chann~l bistables were returned to normal. RCS temperature was then increased in preparation to perform calibration ot

• individual rod position indications at NOT. Subsequently, from approximately 2121 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.070405e-4 months <br /> on December 27, 1994, until approxi~ately 1942 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.38931e-4 months <br /> on January 10, 1995, RCS temperciture exceeded P-12 and the TS required action, due to inopermbility of th* RCS 24 loop lTD channel, was not taken.

The 24 loop RTD channel was inoperable as the result of inadequate loop calibr.ation eubsequent to changing to an installed RTD spare durinq the cross calibration on December

. 26, 1994. Kith tihe 24 loop aTD channel inoperable, the associated bistables should have been placed in the tripped pcs~tion prior to exceeding P-12.

• Analysis o~ Occurrances:

During the RCS RTD c~oss calib~atio~, at approximately 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> on December 26, 1994, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) wae notified by the involved Cont~ols ~upervisor that data collection at 540 deqrees F was complete. A heatup to NOT commenced, at approximately 0830 houi:-s. The RTD c:c:oss calibration necessitates removing all narrow and wide range temperature indications from service. RCS temperature indication is provided by the core exit thermoco~ples. With RCS temperature below 540 degrees F, the low - low Tavq bistables indicated tripped on Control Room panel RP-4 protection mimic. Subsequently, at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> (same day) du~inq the heatup to NOT, RCS tamparature exceeded P-12. At 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> (1ame day) the senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) recognized that the low .;.. lcw Tavq bistables were still blocked above P-12 and immediate action wa::1 tcs.ken to inanua.lly unblock the bistable.1!1 in order

01-2:::;-199::::; 19: 33 P.00 LIQBNSEE JWmIT REPORT (j,ER) TEXT CONTINJJATIQN Salem Generating Station Docket Number LBR.Number Page 4 of6 Unit# 2 .50-311 94..016 ..QO Analxsia of 0oc:u~~*noe*: Coon~'dl to reenable the high :5tea.m flow/:SI permissive.

on the same day, per:cormance ot the RCS RTD cross .

calibration revealed 24 loop hot leq RTD 2TE441-3A was operatinq out of specification. The.spare RTD was aliqned for' service and the RTD channel bistables were returned to normal, at approximately 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br /> (si!Jtle day) without parforming the 24 loop channel calibration. Fol lowi.nq RCS heatup, RCS temperature was maintained qreat_er than P-12 fra~ approximately 2121 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.070405e-4 months <br /> on December 27, 1994 until approximately 1942 hours0.0225 days <br />0.539 hours <br />0.00321 weeks <br />7.38931e-4 months <br /> on January 10, 1995. At approximately 1005 hour::i on Janu~ry 10, 1995, while performing the involved work order to repair the 2TE441-3A problem, it was determined that the spare RTD had been incorrectly placed into service on December 26, 1994. This occurred when required recalibratinq of the involved channel had not been pertormed. The 24 loop RTD channel was determined to be inoperable and the bistable~ were placed in the tripped position, in accordance with TS Table 3.3-3.

Apparent Cau*e Of' Both Occurrence a: -

The primary cause of both occurrences is attributed to

~Personnel Errorn, as classified in NUREG-1022, Appendix B due to failure to adequately follow procedure.

The unplanned TS 3.0.3 entry resulted from unintentional failure of the licensed Operating shift per.sonnel to adhere to the requirements of Step 5.20 of IOP-2.

Following determination that 2TE441~3A was operatin9 out of specification, the involved Controls supervisor and technician expanded the scope of the kTD cro5s calibration work request, by changing the out of specification RTD to the spare ~TO, which is permitted by NUclear A.dm.1n1strat1ve Procedure (NAP)- 9. NAP-S requires review of the expanded scopa with the work control Center s.enior Reactor Operator.

However, due to oversiqht by the Controls supervisor, this review did not occur. Consequently, a barrier to identify that the 24 loop channel.was inoperable was not utilized.

As a result~ the proper *ction to leave the channel tripped as part of the re*toration of the RTD cross calibration procedure was not performed. An inadequate barrier to this .

occu~rence was that the RTD crom~.cQlibr~tion procedure did

01-2~-199~ 19:34 P.07 UCENS:EE EVibII BBPQ&T (J.RR,) TiXT 00NTINUAIION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LEI.Number Pages of6 Unit#2 S0-311 94--016-00

!Pp!~ont eauao o~ aoth oaau~aranaaa: Caant'!l.

not provide epecific guidelines to follow it deviation~ were encountered. In addition, a contributor to this occurrence was failure of the Controls supervisor and technician to adequately employ self check methods before the involved channel was returned to service.

Prior Si!rlilar Oacmrran~**:

Review of documentation did not reveal p~ior similar

, occurrences.

Safety 8191'.lificance:

These events did not affect the health and safety of the public and are* reportable pursuant to 10CFR50. "13 {a) (2) (1) (B)

• Durinq the 15 minute timeframe that the low - low Tavq bistablea were not re~et trora. their tripped condltion above P-12, the hiqh steam~ine flow SI siqnals would not have actuated if required. However, at the time of this occurrence, the main steam line isolation valves were already closed. Th1s event occurred in operational Mode 3, and at the beginning of reactor core life from the 2'.RS reload. on December 26, 1994 1 reactor core keff was significantly lower than 0.99. With the current very small

'negative moderator temperature coefficient, it is judged that the amount of positive reactivity resulting f~om a postulated steamline break would not have equaled the amount of reactivity reqt.iired to attain criticality. A8 euch, the satety analysis DNBR limit would not have baen challenged due to this occurrence.

Corrective Action:

Positive diRcipline is heinq t8ken with Operations personnel involved with the unplanned TS 3.0.3 entry. In addition, this occurrence will be covered in Licensed Operator Requalification Retraininq.

_J

01-25-1995 19:3~ P.08 LIC'ENSER EVENT R;m>OB.T Q.RB,) TSX'[,CONTINUATION Salem Ocncratins Statlon Docket Nwnber LERNumber Pqe6ot6 Unit# 2 S0-311 94-016-00 Corrective Action: <cont'd)

IOP-2 will be procedurally enhanced to help preclude 'future*

similar occurrences during performance of RTD cross cGlibrations.

Aii Operations Oirectiv~ will be distributed to all Operations personnel, which reinforces the necessity for thcrouqh procedure review during changing plant conditions.

The involved controls supervisor and technician will receive positive discipline on the necessityof adequate self checkinq techniques and the importance of a questioninq attitude re9ardinq channel/systQl\\ operability. In addition, lessons learned from *these occurrences will be reviewed with the Controls Department supeviaore and technicians.

Sl(2) .IC-PT.RCP-OOOl(Q) will be revised to include additional steps to ensure correct steps are taken to ensure channel operability.

~b<j~

6".i- ,

J, c. Swnmere General Manaqer -

Salem Operations MJ?J:vs REF: SORC Mtg,95-010

01-25-1995 19:30 P.01

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