ML102100259

Seismic Fragilities for Unit #1 and Unit #2 Turbine Building Piping and Equipment

ML102100259
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	06/30/2010
From:	J.D. Stevenson & Associates, Xcel Energy
To:	NRC/RGN-III/DRMA
References
10C3877-REP-001, Rev 2
Download: ML102100259 (84)

Text

XCEL ENERGY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 AND UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (REV. 2)

JUNE 2010 Prepared by J.D. Stevenson & Associates, Inc.

FCSU Corporate Center 6611 Rockside Road, Suite 110 Independence, OH 44131-2344 10 State Street, Suite 4 Woburn, MA 01801 781-932-9580 Report No. 10C3877-REP-001 Rev. 2 S:\10C3877 - PI TB Flooding Study\Final_ Prairie_Island_Report\10C3877-REP-001 (Rev. 0)_BFD_6_7_10.doc

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 3 2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 6 2.1 SEISMIC DEMAND ......................................................................................................................................... 6 2.1.1 Structural Model ................................................................................................................................. 6 2.1.2 Soil Properties .................................................................................................................................... 6 2.1.3 Ground Input Motion Seismic Demand .............................................................................................. 7 2.1.4 Soil-structure interaction analysis ...................................................................................................... 9 2.1.5 Generating Amplified floor response spectra ..................................................................................... 9 2.2 ESTABLISHING MEDIAN SEISMIC FRAGILITIES ................................................................................................. 9 2.2.1 EPRI NP-6041 Screening Lanes and the Surrogate Element ........................................................... 9 2.2.2 Calculating HCLPF capacities using CDFM Approach .................................................................. 10 2.2.3 Directly calculating median fragilities ............................................................................................... 10 3 EVALUATION CRITERIA ................................................................................................................................ 11 3.1 DUCTILE PIPING ......................................................................................................................................... 11 3.1.1 Material Properties ........................................................................................................................... 11 3.1.2 Strength and Load Combinations..................................................................................................... 11 3.1.3 Stress Indices and SIFs ................................................................................................................... 12 3.2 NON DUCTILE PIPING.................................................................................................................................. 12 3.3 DUCTILE PIPING WITH NON DUCTILE INLINE COMPONENTS (CAST IRON VALVES) ........................................... 13 3.4 DUCTILE PIPING WITH BRASS OR BRONZE THREADED INLINE COMPONENTS: ................................................. 13 3.5 DUCTILE PIPING WITH INLINE VICTAULIC COUPLINGS .................................................................................... 14 3.5.1 Victaulic Couplings ........................................................................................................................... 14 3.5.2 Victaulic Properties........................................................................................................................... 14 3.5.3 Evaluation Criteria ............................................................................................................................ 15 3.6 PIPE SUPPORTS ......................................................................................................................................... 16 3.6.1 Pipe Supports - Structural Steel ....................................................................................................... 16 3.6.2 Pipe Supports - Component Standards ........................................................................................... 17 3.6.3 Pipe Supports - Concrete Anchorages ........................................................................................... 17 3.6.4 Pipe Supports - Welds ..................................................................................................................... 17 3.7 DETERMINATION OF THE COEFFICIENT OF UNCERTAINTY, C ...................................................................... 17 3.8 EQUIPMENT ................................................................................................................................................ 22 3.9 BLOCK W ALLS ............................................................................................................................................ 22 3.10 RMST ....................................................................................................................................................... 23 4 EVALUATION RESULTS ................................................................................................................................ 24 4.1 SCOPE ....................................................................................................................................................... 24 4.2 CAST IRON VALVE FRAGILITY FOR CL-67 LINE ............................................................................................. 24 4.3 EQUIPMENT MEDIAN FRAGILITIES ................................................................................................................ 25 4.4 CIRCULATING W ATER PIPING SEISMIC CAPACITY ......................................................................................... 26 4.5 BLOCK W ALL MEDIAN FRAGILITIES .............................................................................................................. 27 4.6 PIPING MEDIAN FRAGILITIES........................................................................................................................ 27 5 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................. 80 APPENDIX 1 - WALKDOWN PACKAGE

SUMMARY

........................................................................................A1.1 APPENDIX 2 - LIST OF IN-SCOPE EQUIPMENT ...............................................................................................A2.1 APPENDIX 3 - MARKED-UP P&IDS ..................................................................................................................A3.1 2 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION The objective of this scope of work is to develop median seismic fragility values for the identified flooding sources in the Unit #1 and Unit #2 Turbine Building at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), for use in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).

The majority of the piping reviewed was in the following systems:

Cooling Water (CL) - including Turbine Building Cooling Fire Protection - Water System (FP)

Plant areas assessed are essentially all of the power block in the Turbine Building.

The seismic fragility values are developed as follows:

1. Xcel Energy identified the major equipment components whose failure would result in significant flooding in the turbine building. In addition, a few branch piping systems and components that are not part of the cooling water (CL) system were also identified. Using this as input, the interconnecting piping that, if it failed, could result in significant flooding, was determined. These components and systems are identified diagrammatically on the color coded P&IDs shown in Appendix 1.

NF-39216-2 NF-39217-1 NF-39220 NF-39221 NF-39222 NF-39223 NF-39224 NF-39242 NF-39244 NF-39253-1 NF-39253-3 NF-39603-2 NF-39603-3 NF-39605-1 NF-86172-1

2. From the PINGP flow diagrams, determine the portion of a subject system that is supplied water to and from the identified equipment.

3. Organize the non-seismically qualified piping on the P&ID (flow diagrams) into segments. A typical segment is a larger diameter run pipe between major pieces of equipment, or a smaller diameter branch from a run pipe to another piece of equipment. Each pipe segment is identified using the number of the first valve on the segment.

4. An engineer experienced in the seismic evaluation of piping at nuclear power plants walks down each pipe segment and identifies any conditions that would result in a reduced seismic capacity, such as:

An unusual geometry that would concentrate large inertial loads in a local area, Branch pipes with stiff lateral supports connected to run pipes with flexible lateral supports, Dead weight supports that are vulnerable to lateral loads, such as short threaded rods with fixed end conditions, beam clamps, vertical stanchions where the pipe could move laterally and fall off, and poorly detailed or poorly constructed supports, Non-ductile components such as cast iron valves or fittings, threaded fittings, or Victaulic couplings, Field-fabricated fittings that could result in high stress concentrations, Potential seismic interaction hazards such as unanchored equipment or masonry block walls.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Based on the walk-down, either assign the piping segment a seismic fragility based on pre-calculated screening values (Ref. [56]) or identify it as requiring further analysis.

5. An engineer experienced in the seismic analysis of equipment at nuclear power plants walks down each item of equipment and either screens it - i.e., concludes that it has a seismic capacity at least as high as the surrogate element (Reference [15], [18]), or identifies the equipment as requiring further evaluation. The evaluation includes consideration of any seismic interaction hazards such as masonry block walls. For example, a well anchored horizontal pump with no significant nozzle loads due to the attached piping would be screened, while an unanchored vertical tank would be identified as requiring further evaluation.

6. Where required, perform further evaluations of piping and equipment. The seismic demand for these evaluations are the seismic hazard floor response spectra described in Section 2.1. The criteria for the evaluations are described in Section 3.

7. Assign each piping segment a seismic fragility based on the above evaluations. The final fragility value is the lowest value based on consideration of the pipe fragility, the fragility of attached equipment, and the fragility of any seismic interaction hazards.

The piping and equipment that is part of this program is shown diagrammatically on the P&IDs in Appendix 1. In addition, the P&IDs show the boundaries and assign numbers to the individual piping walkdown packages. A summary of the walkdown packages is given in Appendix 2. A summary of the in-scope equipment is given in Appendix 3. The following color coding is used on the P&IDs of Appendix 1.

Pink = In-scope equipment Yellow = Supply piping to screened by walkdown Blue = Return piping to be screened by walkdown Green = Piping that will be analyzed for fragilities by S&A Orange = Piping previously analyzed by Xcel Energy; previous analyses will be scaled to establish fragilities The equipment nomenclature used in Appendix 1, 2, and 3 is as follows:

AFWP = Auxiliary Feedwater Pump TOROC = Turbine Oil Reserve Oil Cooler FWPOC = Feedwater Pump Oil Cooler T(E.H.)FROC = Turbine (E.H.) Fluid Reservoir Oil Cooler FWOSPC = Feedwater Oxygen Sensor Panel Cooler CPOC = Condensate Pump Oil Cooler HDPOC = Heater Drain Pump Oil Cooler GBDC = Generator Bus Duct Coolers RMHX = Radiation Monitor Heat Exchanger GHC = Generator Hydrogen Cooler HSOUC = Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Coolers GEC = Generator Exciter Coolers HVAC = Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioner LSAC = Lab and Service Area Chiller CD Pump = Condensate Pump HDR = Header FWPMUC = Feedwater Pump Motor Unit Cooler HDTPMUC = Heater Drain Tank Pump Motor Unit Cooler CPMUC = Condensate Pump Motor Unit Cooler ACMUC = Air Compressor Motor Unit Cooler AFWPMUC = Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Unit Cooler RCDSR = Refrigerator CDSR Unit 4 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT BW = Backwash BWSP = Backwash Water Supply Pump BWTP = Backwash Waste Transfer Pump BWST = Backwash Water Storage Tank BWRT = Backwash Waste Receiving Tank RMUWST = Reactor Make-Up Water Storage Tank RMUWP = Reactor Make-Up Water Pump SAC = Station Air Compressor SAAC = Station Air Compressor After Coolers In some cases, it was important to determine if a piping system had cast iron or welded steel valves. Cast iron inline valves can result in low median fragility values. Appendix 4 provides a determination of the valve materials for selected packages.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 2.1 SEISMIC DEMAND The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant model [20] is utilized to perform a new soil-structure interaction analysis in order to develop the seismic response to the uniform hazard mean ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [22]. The mean ground motion estimate is th closer to the 84 percentile shape normally employed in the using Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) Approach. Thus the mean uniform hazard spectrum (UHS) was used for the seismic demand in the development of equipment fragilities using the CDFM methodology. The uniform hazard median GMRS is essentially the same as the mean GMRS above about 5 Hz but the two spectra differ (median spectra is less) below 5 Hz. Since the piping fragilities (median capacities) are calculated directly using the separation of variable approach given in Reference 10, and a number of piping systems have fundamental frequencies less than 5 Hz, it was decided to use the median GMRS for the development of the piping fragilities. The mean GMRS amplified floor response spectra are provided in S&A calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [52]. The median GMRS amplified floor response spectra are provided in S&A calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-006 [56].

A GT STRUDL [21] structural model of the power plant is developed based on the original design-basis structural model from Blume [20]. An Eigen-solution analysis is performed and the fixed-base frequencies and mode shapes are then used with the EKSSI [23] software package in order to conduct a soil-structure interaction (SSI) seismic response analysis. The resulting amplified acceleration time histories are used to generate the floor response spectra for various damping values.

2.1.1 STRUCTURAL MODEL A GT STRUDL model of the PINGP is developed, comprising two reactor buildings, the auxiliary building (with the spent fuel pool), the turbine building, and two turbine supports, all as one interconnected structure. Since the Eigen-solution analysis results matched those from Blume [20], the model was divided into three different fixed-base structures: a reactor building (Unit 1), the turbine + auxiliary building, a turbine support (the West Unit), and each part is analyzed separately for the SSI response analysis. The GTSTRUDL model is provided in Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-001 [51].

The development of structural models is documented in S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-001 [51].

2.1.1.1 Turbine Pedestal The turbine pedestal is modeled as a 4-node system with one node attached to the fixed base. The fixed base structural model yields 4 modal frequencies and shapes which are used for the combined soil-structure analysis.

2.1.1.2 Turbine Building The turbine building is integrally connected to the auxiliary building and cannot be modeled as an independent component. The combined auxiliary and turbine buildings are modeled as a 28-node system with 2 nodes attached to the fixed base. The fixed base model yields 15 modal frequencies and shapes which are used for the combined soil-structure analysis.

2.1.2 SOIL PROPERTIES Low strain soil properties are based on those used in EQE Calculation 250800-C-03 [28] after adjusting for the actual foundation depth. Once elevations are adjusted, the profile is consistent with the limited set of modulus of rigidity values presented in Prairie Island NGP USAR, Appendix E [93].

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 2.1.3 GROUND INPUT MOTION SEISMIC DEMAND The mean ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) is from the client [22] and was identified as being derived from EPRI Seismic Hazard Curves for Prairie Island NGS following the procedure described in Regulatory Guide 1.208 [29]. (The client stated that this information was taken from EPRI Report 1016736, Assessment of Seismic Hazard at 34 U.S. Nuclear Plant Sites, August 2008. This report is not available to S&A and the S&A work is based on the data supplied in reference [22]). Resulting values are shown in Table 2.1 and plotted in Figure 2.1.

Data is based on 5% damping.

Table 2.1 - Data for Prairie Island NGS Ground Motion Response Spectrum (Based on Client Input [22])

Frequency (Hz) Sa (g) 100 0.169942 25 0.364251 10 0.339111 5 0.397295 2.5 0.193567 1 0.099222 0.5 0.07596 Figure 2.1 - Initial Prairie Island NGS GMRS (Based on Client Input [22])

Time histories were developed based on the GMRS data given above, scaled to an appropriate PGA. . To improve this process, it is necessary to interpolate more data points. In most sections, a constant linear-log slope is assumed as shown in Figure 2.1. For the higher frequencies, it is necessary to modify the data somewhat. 100 7 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Hz is considered unreasonably high for the analysis, and the PGA of 0.169942 is instead anchored at 50Hz. Data points are then interpolated between 25 and 50 Hz. The final set of frequencies is extended on the upper end to 50 Hz. The resulting data is shown in Figure 2.2.2.

Figure 2.2 - Final Prairie Island NGS GMRS (Based on client input [22], interpolated as discussed above)

The methodology consists of the steps outlined below. The detailed calculations, organized according to these steps, are provided in Section 7. The coordinate system used in the calculations is X=EW, Y=NS, Z=Vertical.

1. Fixed-base modal properties are calculated for the Turbine Pedestal and the combined Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings using the structural models described in Section 2.1.1.

2. Horizontal time histories are generated from the mean GMRS hazard spectrum scaled to a PGA of 0.3g.

Since horizontal and vertical response is considered to be uncoupled, vertical time history is determined as 2/3 of the first horizontal time history.

3. Lower-bound (LB) and upper-bound (UB) low strain soil properties are calculated based on the best estimate (BE) low strain soil properties given in Reference 25. The resulting range allows for an assessment of uncertainty in the analysis results. LB and UB values are taken as 2/3 and 3/2 times the initial BE shear modulus values, respectively, as suggested in ASCE 4-98 30 for the lowest level of uncertainty of soil properties.

4. Large strain soil properties are determined for the LB, BE, and UB cases. Poissons ratio is adjusted for vertical analysis to maintain an unchanged compression wave velocity at large strains.

5. Soil impedance functions are calculated for each of the components of the structure using each of the best estimate, lower bound, and upper bound high strain soil properties.

6. Soil impedance functions are selectively combined to develop soil impedance matrices for the Turbine Pedestal and the combined Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings. Translation and rotation in the horizontal plane 8 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT are controlled by the impedances of the overall structure while rocking, coupled translation-and-rocking, and vertical motion are controlled by the impedances of the particular component being analyzed.

7. The structural models and the soil impedance functions are combined to form the soil-structure models. The models are analyzed in EKSSI [23] using the input time histories, and response time histories are calculated separately for the X and Y direction for all levels in the Turbine Pedestal and Turbine Building and for the Z direction for the foundation of the Turbine Building. These calculations are performed for each of the LB, BE, and UB soil impedance matrices.

8. Amplified floor response spectra are generated from the time histories in SpectraSA for both X (E-W) and Y (N-S) directions in all levels in the Turbine Pedestal and Turbine Building and for the Z (Vertical) direction for the Turbine Building foundation.

The results of these analyses are found in S&A calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [52]

2.1.4 SOIL-STRUCTURE INTERACTION ANALYSIS Soil and structure models are combined using the software package EKSSI [23]. From the structural model, magnitudes and locations of nodal masses are inputted along with modal frequencies and shapes. From the preceding soil analysis, frequency-dependent soil impedance matrices are inputted. Finally, seismic excitation is applied using the time histories developed found in S&A calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [52].

The desired output of the analyses is response spectra for all levels in the turbine support and turbine building.

2.1.5 GENERATING AMPLIFIED FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA Outputted time histories based on best estimate soil properties are converted into amplified floor response spectra. The same set of frequencies used to develop the time histories are used to develop the response spectra for damping 0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, and 7% of critical, as well as N-411 variable damping.

Envelopes are also developed for the Turbine Building in both the E-W and N-S directions over its full height (elev. 693 to 790.5) and from foundation up to the operating floor (693 to 735). Final best estimate amplified floor response spectra plots and envelopes are given in Appendix A with the associated data tabulated in Appendix B of S&A calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [52].

2.2 ESTABLISHING MEDIAN SEISMIC FRAGILITIES 2.2.1 EPRI NP-6041 SCREENING LANES AND THE SURROGATE ELEMENT EPRI NP-6041, Tables 2-3 and 2-4 present three screening lanes that can be used to assign so-called High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) capacities to structures and equipment. The three lanes denote a seismic capacity in terms of spectral acceleration or peak ground acceleration (PGA). The capacities of the three lanes are 0.8g, 0.8g to 1.2g and > 1.2g, or in terms of PGA, 0.3g, 0.5g and >0.5g. These EPRI NP-6041 screening levels define a HCLPF capacity. The HCLPF of a component meeting the screening criteria for a lane is determined by comparing the screening level spectral acceleration to the 84th percentile ground motion spectrum. It is implied that the ground motion spectral shape is broad banded such as a NUREG/CR-0098 spectral shape used in NP-6041 and named the Review Level Earthquake (RLE). The EPRI UHS has a much different spectral shape and in the frequency range where the dominant structural response occurs, the spectral acceleration is somewhat low compared to the RLE whereas the peak of the EPRI UHS occurs at 10 Hz where there are often few significant structural response modes.

For Prairie Island (PI) the equipment screening level is >0.5g. For all equipment and piping that cannot be screened at this level explicit fragility calculations are performed. As a Class III* structure, the TB is designed to the greater of the static, lateral seismic load factor, 0.05g, or the design wind speed, 100-MPH, according to the USAR, Section 12.2.1.4 [93]. The TB seismic shears and moments are found in the Blume report [20] for the 9 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 0.06g design earthquake. They are doubled to be representative of the 0.12g Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and shown below. The base shear and moments for the 100-MPH wind are calculated (shown below) based on the wind pressure Equation 7 given in ASCE 3269 [25] where the projected areas of the north and east faces are based on a nominal TB height of 108 ft. and base widths of 440 ft. and 219 ft., respectively. The equivalent pressure for the 100-mph wind values is 33.3 psf (1.3 x 25.6 psf). The values for base shear and moment are considered comparable for the two external events.

Dir. Seismic Base Shear Seismic Base Moment Wind Base Shear Wind Base Moment (Kips) (Ft-Kips) (Kips) (Ft-Kips)

EW 940 52000 780 42148 NS 1600 66000 1568 84681 The tornado evaluation for the TB performed by Stevenson & Associates [26],[27] qualifies the building for 63 psf, which is nearly a doubling of the forces associated with the 100-mph wind event. This clearly infers that the seismic capacity is nearly double the 0.12g SSE site event. As such, the seismic capacity of the TB well exceeds the design basis SSE level earthquake and is, thus, screened out at 0.3g.

2.2.2 CALCULATING HCLPF CAPACITIES USING CDFM APPROACH For equipment that cannot be screened, and for masonry block walls, HCLPF capacities are computed using CDFM. The CDFM capacities are then converted to median fragilities. CDFM calculations consist of standard engineering calculations using DBE acceptance criteria. The criteria are described in Sections 3.8 and 3.9.

Per References [10] and [13], a HCLPF capacity is approximately equal to the 1% probability of failure for a lognormal distribution with = 0.4. This establishes the relationship between a median capacity and a HCLPF as:

2.326 2.326(0.4)

MEDIAN = HCLPF x e = HCLPF x e = 2.54 x HCLPF 2.2.3 DIRECTLY CALCULATING MEDIAN FRAGILITIES Piping capacities are established by directly calculating median fragilities and the associated uncertainty factors as given in Reference [10]. The methodology used is described in Section 3.1.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 3 EVALUATION CRITERIA 3.1 DUCTILE PIPING 3.1.1 MATERIAL PROPERTIES The piping was originally designed to the B31.1 Power Piping Code [4]. Per Ref. [8], code allowable stresses are mean plus 1 or 2 values. This represents a 95% to 98% confidence level. Median allowable stresses are typically 20% higher than the Code values. Therefore, 1.2 times the B31.1 Code allowable stresses will be used.

3.1.2 STRENGTH AND LOAD COMBINATIONS Reference [8] recommends the use of ASME BPVC Level D allowable stresses and the possible use of ductility factors. Since this is a median analysis versus a design basis analysis, ASME BPVC Class 3 acceptance criteria are used. Further, the later versions of the Code incorporate seismic design rules that reflect the extensive testing conducted by EPRI in the late 1980s and implemented in the Code by several ASME Special Working Groups.

Therefore this criteria provides the most current and realistic Code seismic design basis. This approach uses the B2 Stress indices for a pseudo primary stress evaluation and C2 stress indices for secondary stresses. The Sh value used in the ASME Code is essentially the same as the Sh used by the B31.1 Code. Therefore, actual material capacities (Sh values) should be based on the B31.1 Code of record values. This is considered appropriate since the piping was design and constructed to the 1967 B31.1 Code. The BPVC specifies a primary stress limit to be the lesser of 3Sh for seismic design.

PDo M Dwt + M SSE I B1 + B2' ( ) 3.0S H 2t Z M SSE D 2C2 < 6.0S H Z

S H = 12. * ( Sh = S )

P = Best estimate operating pressure (psi)

Do = Pipe outside diameter (in) t = Pipe wall thickness (in) 3 Z = Pipe section modules (in )

B1 = Primary pressure stress Index per the Code B2 = Seismic inertial bending stress index per the Code C2 = Secondary bending stress Index per the Code MDWT = Moment due to deadweight (in-lbs)

MSSE-I = Moment due to seismic inertial (in-lbs) (amplitude)

MSSE-D = Moment due to seismic displacement (in-lbs) (amplitude)

Sh, S = B31.1 Code allowable stress at operating temperature (psi)

The ASME Level D limits have requirements to evaluate SAMs or any secondary stresses as SAMs are a major cause of piping failures resulting from strong motion earthquake; therefore some limit on the SAM stresses is considered. The allowable stress values in the 1967 B31.1 Code were based on the lesser of 5/8 Sy or 1/4 Su. The above equations as put forth and the consideration of the 1.2 increase for material properties limit the piping stresses to about the lesser of 2.25 Sy or .9 Su for Primary Stresses and to about 4.5 Sy or 1.8 Su for secondary stresses.

The above limits are still conservative versus mean or median values. Based on the extensive EPRI [12] test program conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, ductile piping systems, configured as the systems under review in this program, can withstand elastically predicted seismic stress levels to 5 to 10 times the material yield stress. Ductility factors are applied to the elastically predicted stresses to account for these ductility and non-11 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT linear response effects. Ref. [31], [17] Table 4 suggests a ductility factor of 2 to 3 for ..distribution systems that can deform in-elastically to a moderate extent without any loss of function. This ductility factor is then used to reduce the seismic loads by an amount of:

1 2Hz and : = .33 to .5

µ 1

2Hz to 8Hz : = .44 to .57 2µ - 1 For our work here, a ductility factor of 2 or a knockdown factor of 1/2 = .5 is applied to the seismic inertial demand.

The Code secondary stress limits are set to allow local deformation. Therefore, they have some localized ductility allowance in them. In addition the Code limits assume that elastic follow-up will not occur. Therefore, for secondary anchor motions effects (SAMs) a lower ductility factor of 1.5 is used. This factor is applied to the piping stresses and support loads on ductile support members. It is removed for the evaluation of any brittle concrete anchorages and for components having limited ductility such as cast iron valves.

The resulting piping evaluation criteria are:

PDo M Dwt +.5

• M SSE I B1 + B2' ( ) 3.0S H 2t Z

.67

• M SSE D 2C2 < 6.0S H Z

S H = 12. * ( Sh = S )

The above equations limit the piping stresses to about the lesser of 4.5 Sy or 1.8 Su for primary stresses and to about 6.75 Sy or 2.7 Su for secondary stresses.. A primary stress limit of 6Sh has been proposed by ARC Technical Care Group (TCG) [33] after an in-depth review of the EPRI piping seismic test program [12]. This limit is based on the use of B indices and represents a factor of safety of about 1.5 to 2.0. For critical components (elbows and tees), the ASME B2 index is about 1.5 times the B2 index. Therefore the use of B2 and the ductility factor of 2 in the above primary stress equation is equivalent to using a capacity of 9Sh in the ARC TCG criteria.

As the ARC TCG capacity of 6Sh is based on a factor of safety of 1.5 to 2, the equivalent capacity of 9Sh used here provides a good estimate of the median capacity.

3.1.3 STRESS INDICES AND SIFS The B2 indices were developed by the ASME BPVC Section III, Special Working Group on Seismic Rules. They were extracted from the EPRI test data [12] and were further correlated to detailed FEA conducted by the Japanese Team members of the SWG-SR. The resulting values were essentially based on mean data and do not have a conservative bias [34, 35]

The original SIFs (i factors that will be discussed later) developed by Markl & George for the B31 series piping codes were based on mean data. In recent years, the trend has been to develop SIFs that have a conservative bias. The code, however, contains SIFs based on the original Markl & George data. It would take extensive investigation of the SIFs to quantify the margin above median capacity that may exist in these SIFs. Such an investigation is beyond the scope of the current effort. It was mentioned for information and possible future consideration.

3.2 NON DUCTILE PIPING The equations given in the previous section only apply to ASME material P grades number P1 thru P9. This is plain carbon steel or austenitic stainless steel. The equations are not applicable to non ductile materials such as cast iron. For non ductile piping the Code provides a modified set of level D stress equations. In addition, the Level D secondary stress limit on SAMs is applied as no explicit limit on secondary stresses is conducted for the OBE earthquake level. The equations are as given below with the allowable stress value reduced to Su. For non-12 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT ductile materials the failure point is more clearly defined. Brittle materials such as cast iron fail abruptly when the ultimate stress capacity is reached. Therefore, Su is judged to be a good estimate of the medium capacity. In addition, the ductility factor of = 2.0 no longer applies.

PD0 M DWT + M SSE1 B1 + B2 SU 2t Z M SSE D 2C 2 < SU Z

Where Su = Code or ASTM Standard ultimate material capacity.

3.3 DUCTILE PIPING WITH NON DUCTILE INLINE COMPONENTS (CAST IRON VALVES)

For the piping, the same criteria as in section 3.1 are applied. The cast iron valves are evaluated against capacities developed in reference [62]. The resulting relationships are:

PDo M Dwt +.5

• M SSE I B1 + B2' ( ) 3.0S H 2t Z

.67

• M SSE D 2C2 < 6.0S H Z

S H = 12. * ( Sh = S )

At the valves:

M DWT + M SSE1 S1 Z

M SSED 2i < S1 Z

S1 is developed specifically for cast iron valves in Reference [62].

3.4 DUCTILE PIPING WITH BRASS OR BRONZE THREADED INLINE COMPONENTS:

For the piping, the same criteria as in Section 3.1 are applied. As brass and bronze are ductile materials, the same criteria is applied with (1) the Code allowable stress for brass or bronze, as applicable, and (2) B2 = 2.3, which is the Code specified index for threaded joints.

For the piping:

PDo M Dwt +.5

• M SSE I B1 + B2' ( ) 3.0S H 2t Z

.67

• M SSE D 2C2 < 6.0S H Z

S H = 12. * ( Sh = S )

At the valves:

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT M DWT + .5M SSE1

[B1 = .5]* PD0 + [B2 = .75(2.3)]* 3.0 S 2 2t Z

.67

• M SSED 2(2.3) < 6.0 S 2 Z

S 2 = 1.2 * ( S h = S )

S2 is 1.2 times the Code allowable stress, Sh or S, for bronze or brass as applicable.

3.5 DUCTILE PIPING WITH INLINE VICTAULIC COUPLINGS Median capacities for Victaulic couplings are to be determined in accordance with the guidance provided in reference [64].

3.5.1 VICTAULIC COUPLINGS The Victaulic coupling criterion was based on developing a capacity equivalent to an ASME BPVC Level D. Such a criterion would insure Leak tight Structural integrity with a margin of about 2.0. Some additional conservatism was built into the capacities developed in the reference calculation [36]. This basis and a more in-depth review of the SQURTS [37] seismic test data to determine a median capacity criterion for use in the determination of median fragilities of Victaulic couplings.

The Victaulic Catalog [38] provides two controlling parameters for the design of the joint: the pull out load and the rotation of the joint. These two controlling capacities will be extracted from the catalog and median fragilities developed are based on the application of the seismic testing results.

3.5.2 VICTAULIC PROPERTIES 2 and 4 Victaulic Model 77 - Flexible Couplings were seismically tested. The 4 Model 77 coupling will govern the median fragility criterion due to data from the test results Allowable pullout axial loads for 2, 4, 6, and 12 Model 77 joints:[38]

2: 4,430 lbs 4: 15,900 lbs 6: 34,740 lbs 12: 102,000 lbs Allowable rotations for 2, 4, 6, and 12 Model 77 joints: [38]

2: 1.5º 4: 1.5º 6: 1.2º 12: 0.5º It is noted take per the Victaulic Catalog these values can be c doubled for cut grooved pipe. However this is provided for information only as the allowable rotations were based on actual test data.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 3.5.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The allowable rotations for Victaulic couplings: (Allowable Rotation in equation 1 )

Pipe size Allowable Rotation at the Joint 2 4.2 degrees 4 4.2 degrees 6 3.4 degrees 12 1.4 degrees The allowable axial loads are based on an assumed Amplified Floor Response Spectra ZPA of 3.25 g.

The allowable axial forces for Victaulic couplings if a detailed analysis is not conducted on the piping system: : (Allowable Axial Force in equation 2 )

Pipe size Allowable Axial Forces at the Joint 2 100 lbs 4 318 lbs 6 418 lbs 12 2035 lbs The allowable axial forces at Victaulic couplings if a detailed analysis is not conducted on the piping system: (Allowable Axial Load (AL) in equation 3 )

Pipe size Allowable Axial Load (AL) at the Joint 2 4,430 lbs 4 15,900 lbs 6 34,470 lbs 12 102,000 lbs The following relationships shall be used to determine the fragility of Victaulic Style 77 couplings:

Rotation:

Allowable Rotation 1 = ZPA1 Developed Rotation 15 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Axial Loads:

Allowable Axial Force 2 =

• ZPA1 Developed Axial Force SL 3 = ZPA1 APL Where:

ZPA1 = ZPA associated with the Amplified Floor Response Spectra used in the piping analysis is .3g.

Allowable Rotation = allowable degrees (º) from the testing Developed Rotation = rotation across the joint (not the total rotation of the piping system at the joint) from analysis. Total rotation in the piping system may be used as long as the resulting fragility is in excess of 1.25g SL = AL-PL-WL SL = Seismic axial capacity AL = allowable axial load from the Victaulic catalog PL = pressure load (P*AP)

AP = pipe inside cross section area WL = actual pipe weight load on the coupling from the analysis APL = developed axial load is applicable to detailed or simplified analysis, but is only applicable to detailed analysis.

2 3 or the median fragility is the lesser of , ( or as applicable) 1 2 3 3.6 PIPE SUPPORTS 3.6.1 PIPE SUPPORTS - STRUCTURAL STEEL th The pipe support structural steel is evaluated using AISC 6 Edition Part 2 [1] capacities. The ductility factor of 2.0 for inertial loads and 1.5 for SAM loads is maintained to account for the reduction in the applied load from the piping due to piping inelastic behavior and energy absorption, and to also account for the energy absorption of the support elements themselves. The ductility factor is incorporated by reducing the seismic loads based on the following load combination:

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT

[ ]

1/ 2 D + (.5

• SSE I ) 2 + (.67

• SSE D ) 2 Per Ref. [8], the code allowable stresses are at mean plus 1 or 2. Mean or median properties for structural steel materials are typically 20% higher than the ASTM allowable stress values. This 1.2 factor is applied to the code allowable stress.

3.6.2 PIPE SUPPORTS - COMPONENT STANDARDS The MSS-SP-58 allowable loads on component standard supports are multiplied by 2, as put forth for level D loads in ASME BPVC,Section III, Division 1 Code Case N500 [3]. In addition, the ductility factor of 2.0 for inertial loads and 1.5 for SAM loads applies. The resulting load combination is:

[ ]

1/ 2 D + (.5

• SSE I ) 2 + (.67

• SSE D ) 2 The majority of the MSS-SP-58 [14] components in this system are fabricated from hot rolled steel products. Per Ref. [10], mean or median properties for structural steel materials are typically 20% higher than the tabulated ASTM or MSS-SP-58 allowable stress values. Therefore, the capacities can be increased by an additional factor of 1.2 or a total increase of 1.2*2.0 = 2.4.

Per Ref. [11], tests on snubbers and struts indicated that they have a failure margin against ASME Level D limits (2 times Level A) of between 1 to 4. The average is approximately 2.0. The approach taken here is to reduce the applied load by 2.0 and compare them to failure Level D limits (2 Times Level A).

3.6.3 PIPE SUPPORTS - CONCRETE ANCHORAGES For pipe support anchors the mean capabilities from testing due for the GIP Program [18] and as given in EPRI Report NP-5228-SL [7] are used and no ductility factors are applied.

Per Ref. [7], pg. 2-58, the following tension / shear interaction equation is used:

1 TL 2 VL 2 2

+ 1.0 ATL AVL TL=applied Tensile load VL=applied Shear load ATL=mean capacity in tension from the GIP tests [7]

AVL=mean capacity in shear from the GIP tests [7]

3.6.4 PIPE SUPPORTS - WELDS All the welds on the piping system supports are fillet welds. The median allowable weld shear stress is computed as 1.7*.3*fu, where fu is the ultimate strength of the weld material. . This is a typical allowable stress for DBE loads and is a conservative estimate of median capacity. Based on the quality of welding observed at PINGP, weld stresses are not expected to control support fragilities. The ductility factor of 2 on inertial loads and 1.5 on SAM loads is applied in calculating weld stresses.

3.7 DETERMINATION OF THE COEFFICIENT OF UNCERTAINTY, C Per reference [10], page 2-34 and 2-35 17 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT

-1.65(r + u)

HCLPF50 = Ame Where Am is the median capacity based on the pga and the r is the variance associated with randomness and u is the variance associated with the uncertainty. The values are determined in the table that follows this discussion.

The uncertainty, C, as associated with this fragility is C= r 2 + U2 . This value is required in the PRA if the fragilities a being developed and supplied are Median fragilities verses HCLPF50 or HCLP84. The values developed using the criteria of this calculation are judged to be median values and there a C value is required.

Table 3.1 lists the demand variable and associated variances associated with each of the factors. Table 3.2 lists the capacity variables and associated variances associated with each of the factors. These factors were arrived at by review and use of Ref. [59] and the documents referenced in Ref. [59]. Detailed discussion of the basis of all the factors is not provided. The notes provide general insight and in some cases specific reference to the basis of the values selected. These tables are provided for information only.

Table 3.1 - Fragility Analysis Demand Variables Item Median r u Notes Demand Randomness Uncertainty Factor Std Dev. Std Dev Structure Ground Motion Spectral 1 .14 0 Ref [10] Table 3-2 anchored at PGA of 33 Hz Shape average of high and low values Vertical 1 .15 .18 Ref [10] Table 3-2 Lower bound values reduced Component .07 for detailed site specific analysis based on Response engineering judgment for r ; u is based on the average of the generic values reduce by .05 per notes in Table 3-2.

Horizontal .09 0 Ref [10] Table 3-2 Lower bound augmented by Direction Peak the guidance for average of anchor bolt tension Response and shear given in Ref [10], Table 3-3.

Damping .07 ---- .05 Ref [10] Table 3-4 for Concrete Structures, S&A used 7% building damping in CB [18]. It was not specified for RB but assume it was similar and 7% was used.

Modeling Frequency 1 ---- .05 Ref [10], Page 3-15 to 3-18 based on the consideration that the frequency prediction is highly accurate due to the details of the analysis Mode Shape 1 ---- .05 Ref [10], Page 3-18 as Turbine building is a simple structure dominated by a one or two modes of response Torsional N/A ---- ---- Three dimensional Models used by S&A Coupling Mode .07 --- Ref [10]; page 3-19 average of simple and Combinations complex structure would be .07 with the simple structure being at .05. Since the Turbine building and Pedestal is a relatively simple structure a value of .07 was chose.

Time History 1 .1 Per Boston Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-Simulation 002 (Ref [29])

Foundation-Structure 18 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Table 3.1 - Fragility Analysis Demand Variables Item Median r u Notes Demand Randomness Uncertainty Factor Std Dev. Std Dev Interaction Ground 1 ---- ---- No reduction or effect.

Motion Incoherence Vertical 1 .08 .02 Uncertainty taken at 3 std dev per ref [10] page Spatial 3-23 and Randomness per ref [12] Page 3-24 Variation SSI Analysis 1 ---- ---- All uncertainty was accounted for and addressed in the detailed SSI done by S&A Earthquake .10 ---- Earthquake direction combination was via Component SRSS. Value per Ref [10] page 3-27.

Combination Subtotal ----- .27 .22 Equipment Qualification 1 --- --- Median Centered Reanalysis Conducted Method Damping .05 ---- .02 Ref [10] page 3-48 suggests a value between

.02 to .035. The work by PVRC [8] and more recent studies conducted by Jack Ware at EGG Idaho and information presented to the Appendix N Working Group of the ASME BPVC,Section III, Division 1 supports the lower value therefore, it is the authors opinion that

.02 should be used.

Modeling Frequency 1 --- .05 Ref [10] page 3-49 (also the discussion on pages 3-15 to 3-18)analysis estimate of Frequency should be fairly close.(based on authors judgment)

Mode Shape 1 --- .05 Ref [10], page 3-45 and the above considerations (based on authors judgment)

Mode 1 .07 --- Ref [10], page 3-45. this has partially been Combination accounted for in the variances associated with the structure, (based on authors judgment)

Earthquake 1 .10 ---- SRSS used; Value per Ref [10] page 3-27. This Component has partially been accounted for in the Combination Variances associated with the structure, (based on authors judgment)

Subtotal .12 .16 Total .29 .27 Table 3.2 - Fragility Analysis Capacity Variables Item Median r u Notes Demand Randomness Uncertainty Factor Std Dev. Std Dev Piping 19 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Table 3.2 - Fragility Analysis Capacity Variables Item Median r u Notes Demand Randomness Uncertainty Factor Std Dev. Std Dev Material Properties 1 .07 Reference [10], Table 3-9 S the piping allowable capacity is a function ultimate stress for A-106 Gr. B Strength Factor N/R --- --- Not required accounted for in the material (Allowable properties Capacities)

Load Combinations 1 0.00 ---- SRSS used for Inertial loads and SAM loads, Value per Ref [10] page 3-27.

However, this was already accounted for in the equipment demand variances above.

Inelastic Response 1 ---- .07 Since ductility is a function of material (Ductility) properties its uncertainty shown be on the order of the that for material properties.

This based on the authors judgment.

Total ----- 0.00 .10 Supports (Ductile Members - No expansion anchors)

Material Properties 1 .12 Reference [10], Table 3-9, the AISC-SCM

[Ref 1] is allowable stress design and is controlled by yield stress Strength Factor N/R --- --- Not required accounted for in the material (Allowable properties Capacities)

Load Combinations 1 0.00 ---- SRSS used for Inertial loads and SAM loads, Value per Ref [10] page 3-27.

However, this was already accounted for in the equipment demand variances above.

Inelastic Response 1 ---- .12 Since ductility is a function of material (Ductility) properties its uncertainty shown be on the order of the that for material properties..

This based on the authors judgment.

Total ---- .0 .17 Anchor Bolts Strength Factor (Allowable Capacities)

Tension 1 --- .28 Reference [8], Table, pg. O-3. Per field review there were not cracks observed in the vicinity of the concrete anchorages.

Shear 1 --- .24 Reference [8], Table, pg. O-3 Per field review there were not cracks observed in the vicinity of the concrete anchorages.

Load Combinations .0 ---- SRSS used for Inertial loads and SAM loads, Value per Ref [10] page 3-27.

However, this was already accounted for 20 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Table 3.2 - Fragility Analysis Capacity Variables Item Median r u Notes Demand Randomness Uncertainty Factor Std Dev. Std Dev in the equipment demand variances above. Interaction effects accounted for in strength factors.

Total ---- 0 .28 Used the Higher of the Tension or Shear Variance Limited Ductility Components Material Properties 1 .07 Taken the same as ductile materials above based on ultimate capacity failure.

Strength Factor --- --- --- Not required accounted for in the material (Allowable properties Capacities)

Load Combinations 0 ---- SRSS used for Inertial loads and SAM loads, Value per Ref [10] page 3-27.

However, this was already accounted for in the equipment demand variances above. Interaction effects accounted for in strength factors.

Ductility 1 ----- .07 Since ductility is a function of material properties its uncertainty shown be on the order of the that for material properties Total .0 .10 The following is a summary of the combined r and u values:

Piping (Ductile and non ductile) r = .29 2 + 0 2 = .29 U = .27 2 + .10 2 = .28 Support Steel:

r = .29 2 + 0 2 = .29 U = .27 2 + .17 2 = .28 Support Anchor Bolts:

r = .29 2 + 0 2 = .29 U = .27 2 + .28 2 = .39 Support Limited Ductility Components 21 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT r = .29 2 + 0 2 = .29 U = .27 2 + .10 2 = .28 The resulting uncertainty associated with each item is:

Piping: C = .29 2 + .28 2 = .41 Support Steel: C = .29 2 + .312 = .42 Anchor Bolts: C = .29 2 + .39 2 = .48 Limit Ductility Component: C = .29 2 + .28 2 = .40 It was decided to use a C = 0.4 for piping by consensus of XCEL Energy and S&A staff members.

3.8 EQUIPMENT As discussed in Section 2.2, equipment that is either screened by the walk down engineer (it is therefore covered by the surrogate element) or HCLPF capacity is computed using CDFM. The HCLPF capacity is then converted to a median fragilities by multiplying by a factor of 2.54. The associated composite mean c = 0.4. The CDFM acceptance criteria are based on the recommendations in EPRI NP-6041, and are summarized below:

Equipment damping: 3% pumps, 5% other equipment th Allowable stresses, steel & welds: 1.7 x AISC 9 [1] normal allowable stresses Allowable stress, concrete anchors: GIP [18] Appendix C Some equipment is unanchored. Where appropriate, friction is credited. Static friction coefficients were established based on a review of engineering manuals:

Friction, steel concrete: 0.35 Friction, rubber pad: 1.00 Unanchored, vertical, atmospheric storage tanks (in particular, the Reactor Make-Up Water Storage Tanks) are evaluated based on the methodology given in Reference [5].

3.9 BLOCK WALLS As discussed in Section 2.2, a block wall HCLPF capacity is computed using CDFM. The HCLPF capacity is then converted to a median fragilities by multiplying by a factor of 2.54. The associated c = 0.4.

The CDFM values were first computed using the fairly conservative acceptance criteria are summarized below:

Reinforced Block Walls Damping: 5%

22 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Fundamental frequency: Based on cracked section properties; if the frequency is below the peak of the floor response spectrum, the peak is used.

a As f y Moment capacity: M u = 0 .9 A s f y d Where, a= , b = 12 2 0.85

• f ' m *b As = area of reinforcing steel per foot of wall fy = reinforcing steel yield strength d = depth of reinforcing steel f'm = compressive strength of concrete block.

3.10 RMST The Reactor Make-Up Water Storage Tanks (RMST) are vertical water storage tanks located on the Turbine Building ground floor (el. 695), founded on a thick grade slab. It is a freestanding, flat-bottom, vertical cylindrical tank containing water at atmospheric pressure. The tank is unanchored.

This evaluation uses the unanchored tank seismic analysis procedure developed for DOE High-Level Waste Storage tanks in BNL 52361[5]. The procedure addresses high-importance unanchored tanks subject to high earthquake load and is appropriate for this application.

Applied ground floor response spectra are taken as developed in S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [55]

for the foundation level of the Turbine Building. Details of the tank evaluations can be found in Reference [58].

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 4 EVALUATION RESULTS 4.1 SCOPE The following table, Table 4.1, lists the systems, flow diagrams and piping specifications that define the scope of this evaluation.

Table 4.1 System Flow Diagram Piping Specifications Cooling Water Turbine Bldg NF-39216-2 M-362, MZX1 Cooling Water Turbine Bldg NF-39217-1 M-362 Chilled Water System NF-86172-1 MZX1 or M-359 (as applicable)

Condensate System Unit 1 NF-39220 M-354, M-359 Instrument Air Piping NF-39244 M-362 Condensate Polishing System NF-39253-1 M-380 Reactor Made Up & Demineralized Water Systems NF-39242 M-380 Condensate System Unit 2 NF-39221 M-354, M-359 Equipment Heat Removal System NF-39603-2 M-362 Station Air/Condensate Polishing NF-39253-3 M-362 Feedwater & Aux Feedwater Unit 1 NF-39222 M-362 Feedwater & Aux Feedwater Unit 2 NF-39223 M-362 Steam Heating System NF-39605-1 M-362 Lab & Service Area A/C & Chilled Water Safeguard NF-39603-3 M-369 System Bleed Steam & Heater Vents NF-39224 M-362 4.2 CAST IRON VALVE FRAGILITY FOR CL-67 LINE Shown below is Table 4.2 with Cast Iron valve fragilities for valves near the following equipment: Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Cooler (HSOUC), Generator Exciter Cooler (GEC), and Generator Hydrogen Cooler (GHC).

Table 4.2 Table with valve fragilities in relationship to the equipment they support Valve Number Valve Diameter Equipment it is attached associated Fragility number with CW-2-3 3 Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Cooler 0.221g CW-10-1 2-1/2 Generator Exciter Cooler 0.364g CW-10-2 2-1/2 Generator Exciter Cooler 0.372g CW-10-3 2-1/2 Generator Exciter Cooler 0.397g CW-10-4 2-1/2 Generator Exciter Cooler 0.318g CW-28-1 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.430g CW-28-2 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.587g CW-28-3 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.516g CW-28-4 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.528g CW-28-5 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.400g CW-28-6 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.522g CW-28-7 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.491g CW-28-8 6 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.585g CW-32-1 14 Generator Hydrogen Cooler 0.613g 24 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT 4.3 EQUIPMENT MEDIAN FRAGILITIES The equipment HCLPFs or, in some case, median capacities, Am, are presented in Table 4.3 below. In general, the conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) criteria of EPRI NP-6041 are followed; however, in the case of the unit coolers the median capacity was calculated directly since its based on the attached supply and return line capacities. If an equipment item is shown as screened then its capacity is greater than or equal to 0.5g by virtue of being screened in accordance with Table 2-3 of EPRI Report NP-6041 [8]. Detailed calculations for the equipment capacities are given in S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-004 [57].

A Seismic Review Team (SRT) inspected equipment in the field (walkdown) and identified vulnerabilities. The evaluated equipment is listed in Table 1 with the screening results. When the calculations did not show excessive capacity of the equipment, an estimate of the HCLPF (High-Confidence-Low-Probability-Failure) capacity was determined. The HCLPFs and median capacities are reported in terms of peak ground acceleration.

The applied floor response spectra are taken from S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [55]. Several pieces of equipment are located at elevation 679 in the Turbine Pedestal (TP), which is considered to have the same response spectrum as elevation 695 in the Turbine Building due to the connection of a rigid foundation.

Table 4.3 - Equipment List and Results Summary Equipment Building Elevation HCLPF (pga) Median (pga) 253-281 (11BWST), (21BWST) Backwash Water TB 695 0.60 g Storage Tank 11, 21 Backwash Waste Receiving Tank TB 695 Screened 11/12 Heater Drain Tanks TB 695 Screened 21&22 and 11&12 Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Coolers TB 695 Screened 21&22 Turbine Oil Reservoir Oil Coolers TB 695' 0.66 g 11&12 Turbine Oil Reservoir Oil Coolers TB 695 0.55 g 11/12 & 21/22 Generator Bus Duct Coolers TB 715 0.39 g 121 Lab & Service Area Water Chiller TB 755 0.25 g 11, 12, 21 and 22 FW Pump Oil Coolers TB 695 Screened 11 Heater Drain Tank Pump Motor Unit Cooler TP 679 0.14 g 23 Heater Drain Tank Pump Motor Unit Cooler TP 679 0.34 g 11/21 ZX Chiller TB 715 Screened Heater Boiler TB 715 0.50 g U1 Condensate Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 695 0.19 g U1 Feedwater Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 715 0.37 g U1 Heater Drain Tank Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 695 0.37 g (12,13) 21 U2 Condensate Pump Motor Unit Coolers (3/4 TB 695 0.05 g Valve) 22, 23 U2 Condensate Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 695 0.29 g U2 Feedwater Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 715 0.39 g U2 Heater Drain Tank Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 695 0.39 g (21,22) 11/ 12 & 21/22 Reactor Make-Up Water Storage TB 695 100% full: 0.40g 1

Tank 75% full : 0.55g 11/12 & 21/22 Generator Exciter Coolers TB 735 Internal to Turbine Screened 11/12 & 21/22 Generator Hydrogen Coolers TB 735 Internal to Turbine Screened 25 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Equipment Building Elevation HCLPF (pga) Median (pga) 11/12 & 21/22 Turbine EH Fluid Reservoir Oil TB 715 Screened Coolers 11/12 & 21/22 Turbine Room Sump Pumps TB 679 Screened Rad Monitor Heat Exchanger TB 695 Screened Refrigerator CDSR TB 695 Screened FW Oxygen Sample Cooler TB 715 Screened 121,122,123, 124, 125 Station Air Compressors TB 695 Screened 121,122,123, 124, 125 Station Air After coolers TB 695 Screened 121,122 Bag Filters TB 715 Screened 121,122 Media Filters TB 715 Screened 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23 Condensate Pump Oil TB 679 Internal to pump Coolers Screened 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23 Heater Drain Pump Oil TB 679 Internal to pump Coolers Screened 12/21 Aux Feedwater Pump Motor Unit Coolers TB 715 39603-2 Screened 121, 122, 123 Air Compressor Motor Unit Coolers TB 715 39603-2 Screened Note 1 : Calculation presented in S&A 10C3877-BOS-CAL-005 [55]

4.4 CIRCULATING W ATER PIPING SEISMIC CAPACITY During the CL piping and equipment walkdowns, the Cooling Water (CW) main and branch piping was also assessed. However, based on the walkdown, the piping could be screened, and fragility calculations were not required. The main conclusions from the walkdown were:

a) The large CW supply and discharge headers have high seismic capacity, especially when compared to the CL and FP piping included in the seismic flooding assessment.

b) he large expansion joints between the piping and the condenser waterboxes have high seismic capacity, and provide for some flexibility if needed.

c) The condenser tube cleaning system (Amertap) connected to the CW piping has high seismic capacity. The ball catching units and small recirculation pumps are well anchored, the valves and fittings are flanged stainless steel, and the welded steel piping is well-supported.

d) The 3/4 corrosion monitoring piping and socket welded steel valves have high capacity through the first valve. This valve is closed during normal operation, isolating the remainder of the piping. Therefore, these lines have high capacity.

e) While the condenser waterbox vent and drain piping has some cast iron valves, their failure would not impact the seismic flooding analysis. If the vent piping lines failed, there would not be any water flow through these lines, so the flooding scenarios would not be affected. The drain lines are isolated during power operation. Although the waterbox inventory could drain out if these drain lines failed, as the condenser pit filled with water from other flooding sources, the water would backflow into the waterbox, and fill it higher than the original level. Thus, more volume would be available in the condenser pit if the waterbox drain lines failed. Therefore, there is no impact on the flooding scenarios.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT Therefore, the CW piping and equipment is screened from the flooding assessment.

4.5 BLOCK WALL MEDIAN FRAGILITIES The masonry block wall HCLPFs are presented in Table 4.4 below. The conservative, deterministic failure margin (CDFM) criteria of EPRI NP-6041 [8] are followed. The HCLPFs are reported in terms of peak ground acceleration.

The applied floor response spectra are taken from S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002 [55].

Table 4.4 - Equipment List and Results Summary Equipment Building Elevation HCLPF (pga)

Block Wall behind Demineralizer Tank TB 708 - 0.40 g 732 Block Wall adjacent to Elevator TB 715 - 0.35 g 735 Safety Related Masonry Block Walls #3 and #8 TB 695-715 0.29 g Block Wall on south wall el. 735 TB 735-755- 1.80 g 4.6 PIPING MEDIAN FRAGILITIES An engineer experienced in the seismic evaluation of piping at nuclear power plants walked down each pipe segment identified as being in-scope and identified any conditions that would result in a reduced seismic capacity, such as:

An unusual geometry that would concentrate large inertial loads in a local area, Branch pipes with stiff lateral supports connected to run pipes with flexible lateral supports, Dead weight supports that are vulnerable to lateral loads, such as short threaded rods with fixed end conditions, beam clamps, vertical stanchions where the pipe could move laterally and fall off, and poorly detailed or poorly constructed supports, Non-ductile components such as cast iron valves or fittings, threaded fittings, or Victaulic couplings, Field-fabricated fittings that could result in high stress concentrations, Potential seismic interaction hazards such as unanchored equipment or masonry block walls.

Based on the walk-down, either the piping segment was assigned a seismic fragility based on pre-calculated screening values, or identified as requiring further analysis. The evaluations were performed in accordance with the criteria specified in Section 3.1, and are documented in References [68], [70] thru [78], and [94]. The results are summarized in the following tables.

There is one table for each PINGP flow diagram drawing identified in Section 4.1. Within each table, the piping is organized into segments. Each segment is identified by a description and a valve number. For each segment, up to three median fragilities are provided: piping inertia, piping seismic anchor, and other. For piping inertia and piping seismic anchor motion median fragilities, the associated uncertainty = 0.4. The "other" median fragility is that of any equipment attached to the piping segment, or any block wall that has the potential to fall on the piping segment. The associated uncertainty is = 0.4. These are the median fragilities previously tabulated in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, now associated with specific piping segments (The table notes specify the particular equipment or wall.)

27 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING & EQUIPMENT As discussed in Section, 2.2, all piping has another fragility, the median fragility of the Turbine Building itself and all other items which were "screened" using EPRI NP-6041 screening lane 1. These items are lumped into the so-called surrogate element, which has a median fragility of 2.08g and uncertainty of = 0.4.

A portion of the Main Steam Lines in Unit #1 and Unit#2 are being reanalyzed by the S&A Chicago office. The analysis for earthquake is primarily Response Spectra Modal Analysis (RSMA). The Unit #1 analysis has been completed Ref. [101] for the load cases involving Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). The piping was demonstrated to meet the equivalent of somewhere between a Level C and Level D ASME Section III limit. The input spectra used was the PINGP Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for most of the piping, while some of the piping was evaluated to a Uniform Building Code (UBC) Zone 1 Seismic load. The piping evaluated for the UBC Zone 1 Seismic load was qualified essentially to ASME BPVC Level B limits. Based on the discussions in References [8], [10], and [16], piping analyzed to the level of detain with the capacity limits used, results in a HCLPF50 of greater than 0.5g. Therefore both the Unit #1 and Unit #2 Main Steam Line piping is judged to have a median fragility of 1.25g.

The Fire Protection piping in the Turbine Building was analyzed for seismic fragility. The enveloped worst case analysis yielded a fragility of 0.15g Ref. 69].

Another consideration for the response of the plant to a seismic induced flood is the Loss of Off Site Power.

Reviews conducted by during the IPEEE program indicated that Loss of Off Site Power has a significant probability of occurrence and in most cases is controlled by the failure of ceramic insulators that support the offsite power supply lines. Considering this, the fragility value assign to the Loss of Off Site Power Event is as follows:

Median fragility: 0.30g r = .27

= .40 28 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39216-2, NF-39222, NF-39605-1, and NF-39223 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-1 4-CL-89 4 24 Supply #11 AFWP M-362 H1 4: 1/1 4: 2/1 2.53 NC EQ:AFWP#11 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all Header 3: 1/1 3: 2/1 Screened at 0.5g welded construction, (U1) HCLPF per NP- including valves and 6041 Table 2-3. has had obvious Median Valve is seismic design.

1.25 (2) Part of the pipe is SS but screened on the basis that it is all CS CL-2 4-CL-68 4 24 Supply 12 TOROC M-362 H1 1.5/1 4/1 > 1.25 N/C None > 1.25g .4 Contains CI Valves.

HDR Supply Line Based on comparison of U1 to U2 plant dwgs., the median fragility is > 1.25g.

CL-3 2-CL-96 2 24 Supply Station Air M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 5/1 2: .99 NC Safety Related 0.73 .4 2 valves are THRD HDR Branches Block Wall #8: brass valves and HCLPF capacity is welded steel.

0.29 g and median capacity = 0.73g CL-4 2/1 12 TOROC T(EH)FROC M-362 H1 1.5/1 5/1 (1.25*.99) = NC EQ:T(EH)FROC: 1.24 .4 (1) Portion of the Supply Line 1.24 (Freq Screened at 0.5g piping on the 715

<2.5 HZ) HCPLF per NP- Level is 1 SS tubing 6041 Table 2-3. (2) Contains THRD Median Value is brass valves, THRD 1.25 unions and compression fittings CL-5 3-CL-69 3/2 12 TOROC FWPOC M-362 H1 1/1 16/1 3: .34*1.25 N/C EQ: FWPOC #11: 3: 0.43 .4 (1) Contains CI valves Supply Line =.43 EQ: FWPOC #12: 2: 1.24 .4 (3 pipe) and THRD 2: .99*1.25 = Screened at .5 g brass valves (2 pipe) 1.24 HCLPF Median and THRD unions (Freq < 2.5 value is 1.25g HZ) 29 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-6 3/4 -CL- 69 3/4 3-CL-69 FWOSPC M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 >1.0 N/C EQ: FWOSPC: 0.10 .4 (1) Line is 3/4 SS Screened at 0.5g tubing with HCLPF per NP- compression fittings 6041 Table 2-3. (2) OUTLIER - has which is a median major Spatial value of 1.25g interaction problem with conduit and with Controlling issue is piping system spatial interaction which results in a median capacity of 0.10 CL-7 2-CL-68 2 12-CL-68 12-CL-68 M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 .99 N/C None 0.99 .4 (1) Contains THRD brass valves and THRD unions CL-8 11/2 -CL-72 11/2 16-CL-67 CPOC M-362 H1 1-1/2: 1-1/2: 4/1 3/4: 1.07 > 1.0 EQ: CPOC #11: 1.03 .4 (1) Most of the pipe is

1. 11/#12/#13 1.5/1 3/4: 2/1 1-1/2: 1.03 EQ: CPOC #12: welded SS and 3/4 3/4: 1.5/1 EQ: CPOC #13: valves are welded. 1-Condensate 1/2 pipe is CS and pumps are has THRD brass adequately valves anchored. (2) The piping is Screened at .5 g attached to the 16 HCLPF. Median Pipe that was value is 1.25 analyzed in CL-57.

Actual SAM from that analysis used for SAM review (The analysis included the appropriate spectral adjustment factors) 30 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-9 1-CL-74 1 3-CL-69 HDPOC M-362 H1 2: 1.5/1 2: 6/1 >1.0 N/C EQ: HDPOC #11: 1.00 .4 (1) piping is all welded

1. 11/#12/#13 1: 1.5/1 1: 1.5/1 EQ: HDPOC #12: carbon steel, valves 3/4: 1/1 3/4: 2/1 EQ: HDPOC #13: are all weld carbon The HDPOC are steel, does contain attached to the THRD unions heater drain pumps which screen at .5 g HCLPF median value is .1.25 CL-10 2-CL-67 2 16-CL-67 GBDC #11/#12 M-362 H1 1.2/1 7/1 .99*1.25 = 1.10 EQ: GBDC #11: .98 .4 (1) All valves are 1.24 EQ: GBDC #12: THRD brass valves (Freq < 2.5 The GBDC screens (2) The piping is HZ) at ..39 g HCLPF. attached to the 16 Median capacity is Pipe that was 0.98g analyzed in CL-57.

. Actual SAM from that Block wall capacity analysis used for is 0.39g HCPLF. SAM review (The Median capacity analysis included the

.98 appropriate spectral adjustment factors)

(3) Block wall SI evaluated.

CL-11 11/2 16-CL-67 RMHX M-362 H1 1.5/1 8/1 1.03*1.25 = NC EQ: RMHX: 0.98 .4 (1) Contains both 1.29 Screened at 0.5g welded steel and (Freq < 2.5 HCLPF per NP- THRD brass valves.

HZ) 6041 Table 2-3 (2) There is a block Block wall: .39g wall above the piping HCLPF. Median and equipment.

capacity is .98 (Same as CL-17) 31 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-12 24-CL-12 24 Aux. Bldg. Cooling Water M-362 H2 1/1 3/1 .>0.75 g NC None >0.75 .4 This piping is welded Wall Exit of TB steel piping with no valves and which has obvious seismic design. Based on the analysis conducted for CL-57 and the results of the evaluation of existing plant analyses for large bore in the CL system. This line is assigned g level of

>.75g based on judgment. If questioned detailed analysis would bear out this number.

CL-13 10-CL-04 5/6/ GHC Cooling Water M-362 H2 1/1 6/1 5: 1.15 NC EQ: GHC #11: .4 (1) Analysis was 14-CL-110 10/14 #11/#12 Exit Header 6: 0.597 EQ: GHC #12: 0.597 conducted for this 10: 1.15 Screened at 0.5g piping system.

14: 1.15 HCLPF per NP- (2) Fragility is 6041 Table 2-3. controlled by 6 cast Median capacity is iron valves 1.25 CL-14 11/2 RMHX Cooling Water M-362 H1 1/1 3/1 >1.0 NC EQ: RMHX: 0.98 .4 (1) All valves are Exit Header Screened at 0.5g welded but it does HCLPF per NP- contain THRD unions 6041 Table 2-3 (2) There is a block Block wall: .39g wall above the piping HCLPF (same as and equipment.

CL-17). Median capacity is .98g 32 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-15 2-CL-275 3/4/2 CPOC 24 Return M-362 H1 2 SS 1/1 2 SS 1/1 2: 0.99 NC EQ: CPOC #11: 0.99 .4 (1) All 3/4 valves are

1. 11/#12/#13 Header 2 CS 2 CS 3/1 EQ: CPOC #12: welded steel and all 1.5/1 3/4 CS1/1 EQ: CPOC #13: 2 valves are THRD 3/4 CS1/1 The condensate brass valves.

pumps are (2) Also contains adequately glass sight-glass in anchored. steel case. Judged as Screened at .5g not controlling.

HCLPF. Median capacity 1.25g CL-16 1-CL-276 3/4/1/ HDPOC 24 Return M362 H1 3/4: 1.5/1 3/4: 6/1 3/4: 1.07 NC EQ: HDPOC#11: .4 (1) all 3/4 valves are 1-1/2 #11/12/13 Header 1: 1.5/1 1: 6/1 *1.25 = 1.33 EQ: HDPOC#12: 0.20 g welded and 1 and 1-1-1/2: 1-1/2: 6/1 1: 1.04*1.25 EQ: HDPOC#13: 1/2 valves are THRD 1.5/1 = 1.3 The Heater Drain brass valves 1-1/2 : Pumps and the (2) 1 and 1-1/2 pipe 1.03*1.25 = HDPOC are contains THRD 1.28 Screened at .5g unions HCLPF which is (3) 1-1/2 pipe also median value of contains glass sight-1.25 glass in steel case, judged as strong as a Median capacity threaded brass valve.

for the spatial (4) This is a spatial interaction with the interaction between cable tray is 0.20 g the 1-1/2 Pipe and a cable tray bank that requires further review 33 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-17 2-CL-77 2 GBDC 24 Return M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 .99 NC EQ: GBDC #11: 0.98 .4 All valves are THRD

1. 11/#12 Header EQ: GBDC #12: brass valves Screened at .39g Governed by block HCLPF. Median wall capacity.

capacity is 0.98g Adjacent block walls pose interaction hazard

- capacity =0.39g HCLPF. Median capacity is .98g CL-18 3-CL-81 3/2 HSOUC 24 Return M-362 H1 1/1 2/1 3: .34 NC EQ: HSOUC#11: 3: .34 .4 All 3 valves are CI

1. 11/#12 Header 2: .99 EQ: HSOUC#12: 2: .99 .4 and all 2 valves are Screened at 0.5g THRD brass valves HCLPF per NP-6041 Table 2-3.

Median capacity is 1.25.

CL-19 4-CL-86 4/ GEC 24 Return M-362 H2 4: 1/1 4: 3/1 2-1/2: 0.606 NC EQ: GEC#11: .4 (1) Screening of GEC 2-1/2 #11/#12 Header 2-1/2: 2-1/2: 4 : 2.53*1.54 EQ: GEC#12: 0.606 based on drawing 1.5/1 3/1 = 3.9 Screening of GEC review.

(Freq < 2.5 based on drawing (2) All 2-1/2 valves HZ) review. Screened are CI at .5 g. HCLPF.

Median capacity is 1.25.

CL-20 10-CL-68 10/12 TOROC 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 1/1 >1.25g NC EQ: TOROC#11: >1.25 .4 Piping contains CI

1. 11/#12 Header EQ: TOROC#12: valves. Capacity Screened at 0.55g based on comparison HCLPF. to unit 2 line which is Median capacity is essentially identical 1.38 and was analyzed by PI (package 03P-XI-1) 34 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-21 2-CL-271 2/1 T(EH)FROC 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 5/1 .99*1.25 = NC EQ: 1.24 .4 (1) Portion of the

1. 11/#12 Header 1.24 T(EH)FROC#11: piping on the 715 (Freq < 2.5 EQ: Level is 1 SS tubing HZ) T(EH)FROC#12: (2) Contains THRD Screened at 0.5g brass valves, THRD HCLPF per NP- unions and 6041 Table 2-3. compression fittings Medina capacity is 1.25 CL-22 2-CL-110 2 FWPOC 24 Return M-362 H1 1/1 2/1 .99 0.75 EQ: FWPOC#12: 0.75 .4 (1) Piping contains

1. 12 Header Coolers are THRD brass valves adequately and THRD unions anchored.

Screened at .5g HCLPF. Median capacity is 1.25 CL-23 3/4 -CL-262 3/4 FWOSPC 3-CL-110 M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 >1.0 0.6 EQ: FWOSPC: 0.10 .4 (1) Line is 3/4 SS Coolers are tubing with adequately compression fittings anchored. (2) OUTLIER - has Screened at .5g major Spatial HCLPF. Median interaction problem capacity is 1.25. with conduit and other items.

Controlling issue is spatial interaction which results in a median capacity of 0.10 CL-24 2-CL-110 2 FWPOC 24 Return M-362 H1 1/1 2/1 .99 0.75 EQ: FWPOC#11: .4 All valves are THRD

1. 11 HDR Coolers are 0.75 brass valves and the adequately pipe contains THRD anchored and unions screened at 0.5g HCLPF. Median capacity is 1.25 35 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-25 6-CL-111 2 Station Air 24 Return M-362 H1 6: 1.1/1 6: 3/1 6: > 1.92 NC None 1.92 .4 (1) All 6 valves are 3-CL-111 Branches HDR 3: 1/1 3: 3/1 3: > 1.92 .4 CI, all 3 valves are 2-CL-111 3: 1.5/1 3: 5/1 .4 welded steel 2: 1.5/1 2: 5/1 CL-26 4-2CL-137 4 24 Supply #21 AFWP M-362 H1 4: 1.5/1 4: 2/1 2.53 NC EQ:AFWP#21: 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all HDR 3: 1.5/1 3: 2/1 Screened at 0.5g welded construction, HCLPF per NP- including valves and 6041 Table 2-3. has had obvious Median capacity is seismic design.

1.25 (2) Part of the pipe is SS but screen on the basis that it is all CS CL-27 4 24 Supply Sprinkler M-362 H1 1/1 1/1 2.53 NC None 2.53 .4 (1) Valve CW-15-5 is HDR System a welded steel valve.

The remaining values are CI but are down stream of CW-15-5 which is normally closed. Therefore screen as welded steel pipe with weld steel valves (2) Pipe is full anchored past Check valve at the Turbine Bldg wall CL-28 2-CL-111 2 AFWP 24 Return M-362 H1 1/1 2/1 2.53 NC EQ: AFWP#11: 1.25 .4 1) Piping is all welded

1. 11/#12 Header EQ: AFWP#12: construction, including Screened at 0.5g valves and has had HCLPF per NP- obvious seismic 6041 Table 2-3. design.

Median capacity (2) Part of the pipe is 1.25 SS but screen on the basis that it is all CS 36 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-55 6-CL-78 4/6 #11/#12 24 Return M-362 H1 6: 1.5/1 6: 6/1 6: 0.561 NC EQ: TRSP #11: .4 (1) Very small amount TRSP Header 0.5g HCLPF 0.561 of 4 pipe line is EQ: TRSP #12: basically all 6 pipe 0.5g HCLPF (2) All 6 valves are CI Screened at 0.5g (3) There are 3 HCLPF per NP- attached lines to the 6041 Table 2-3. Steam Generator Median capacity Blowdown system 1.25 that are out of scope.

The only in scope branch is evaluated in CL-55a CL-55a 2/3 6-CL-78 #11 M-362 H1 1/1 2/1 >1.00 NC None >1.00 .4 (1) 2 Piping is not TBSCS/RM shown on PID but (162-081) was found in the field.

(2) Valve CV-39085 normally closed therefore the piping integrity is only required to this valve (per PRA guys)

(3) Pipe is all threaded fittings and valves are all THRD brass valves.

37 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-57 16-CL-67 24 Supply #11/#12 GHC, M362 H2 N/A N/A NC EQ: GHC#11: .4 (1) Fragilities for 2-HDR #11/#12 GEC, 16: >1.5 EQ: GHC#12: 16: 1.26 .4 1/2, 3, 6 and 14

1. 11 HSOCU 14: 0.613 EQ: GEC#11: 14: 0.613 .4 pipe are controlled by 6: 0.40 EQ: GEC#12: 6: 0.40 .4 cast iron valves.

5: >0.8 EQ: HSOCU#11: 5: >0.8 .4 (2) Fragilities for 2 4: >1.5 Screened at 0.5g 4: >1.26 .4 pipe are controlled by 3:0.221 HCLPF per NP- 3:0.221 threaded brass valves 2-1/2:0.318 6041 Table 2-3. 2-1/2:0.318 (3) The fragilities of 2: 1.00 Median capacity 2: 1.0 the 4 and 16 pipe 1.25 are controlled by steel pipe.

(4) Results are based on detailed linear elastic analysis ZX-7 16-ZX-127 16 18-CL-67 Pipe Cap MZX1 H1 695: 1/1 695: 3/1 .99* 1.25 = NC (1) Block Wall 0.73 .4 (1) Pipe is assume to 715: 1/1 715: 1.24 (A10): be CS 10/1 (Freq < 2.5 (2) Block Wall (2) Pipe runs next to Hz) (A12): two block walls on the Both block walls 715 Elevation; one at have a capacity of CL A-10 and one from 0.29g HCLPF. CL A-12 to A-14 Median capacity

.73 38 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C ZL-1 1 Svc Bldg 6-CL-98 M362 H1 1.5/1 5/1 1.04*1.25 NC (1) Elev. Block 1.30 .4 (1) Pipe first appears Lunch = 1.30 Wall: .35g HCLPF between 735 and Room /AC (Freq < 2.5 (2) Mens LR Block 715 in the mens HZ) Wall: .35g HCLPF locker room. (near Median capacity is column line G3) It

.875. (Block wall is then runs thru the remote from floor on 715 and ties isolation valve into the 6 pipe at therefore does not about elevation 708 control.) (2) Pipe runs beside block wall that is the elevator shaft from 708 to 715 (near column line G3) and then the block wall that is the mens locker room from 715+

(3) Pipe is all THRD steel fittings and THRD brass valves 39 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C ZL-2 6-CL-98 6 HVAC 24 Return unkno H1 10/1 0.85 NC (1) Elev. Block N/A (1) This is a 6 roof Return Line HDR wn Wall: .35g HCLPF 0.85 drain line that runs and a median thru the floor on 715 value of .875g and ties into the 24 (2) Mens LR Block Header pipe at about Wall: .35g HCLPF elevation 708 (near and a median column line G3) value of .875g (2) Pipe runs beside block wall that is the elevator shaft from 708 to 715 and then the block wall that is the mens locker room from 715 to 735 (near column line G3)

(3) Pipe is all Victaulic Fittings 40 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C ZL-3 1 2-CL-74 SVC Building M362 H1 1.5/1 to 8/1 N/A NC (1) Elev. Block N/A N/A (1) Pipe first appears Lunch Room 2/1 Wall: .35g HCLPF between 735 and AC (2) Mens LR Block 715 in the mens Wall: .35g HCLPF locker room. (near Block wall capacity column line G3) It is 0.35g HCLPF. then runs thru the Median capacity floor on 715 and ties

.875 into the 6 pipe at about elevation 708 (2) Pipe runs beside block wall that is the elevator shaft from 708 to 715 (near column line G3) and then the block wall that is the mens locker room from 715+

(3) pipe eventually ties into line 2-CL-74 (4) Pipe welded construction with THRD unions and THRD brass valves (5) Actual Cooling Unit cannot be found.

Based on discussions of Plant personal this unit was removed from service in the past. Pipe is valved off at the header.

Since this is the return line it does not contribute as there is not flow.

41 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C HS-1 HS-15-2 1- 121 Heating 30 Return M-362 H1 1/1 5/1 2.53*1.25 = NC EQ: 121 Heating 1.25 0.4 (1) The piping is all 1/2/3/ Boiler Stanchion (U1) 3.1 Boiler: 0.5g welded construction 4 HCLPF. Median and all the valves are capacity is 1.25 welded steel.

(2) HCLPF of boiler is set equal to commencement of sliding.

01P-III-1 24-CL-20 20 NP 292 NP-252 M362 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0.4 Taken from existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-1 30-CL-20 30 Turbine NP 452 M362 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0.4 Determined using the Bldg Wall existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-2 24-CL-67 24 NP 452 CWH-93 M362 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0.4 Determined using the existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-4 18-CL-67 18 NP 410 NP 3025 M362 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC Safety-related 0.73 0.4 (1) Determined using block wall #3 at the existing PI 0.29g HCLPF. Analysis Median capacity is (2) Piping runs thru 0.73 Safety Related Block Wall #3 which controls capacity 01P-VIII-3 12-CL-12 12 NP 410 NP 2072 & M362 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC EQ: #11TOROC: 0.4 Taken from existing 2059 EQ: #12TOROC: >1.25 PI Analysis Anchorage capacity governs at 0.55g HCLPF with a median capacity of 1.38g CL-58 8-CL-97 8 Roof Drain 24 Return Unkno H1/H3 1/1 1/1 and .7g NC None 0.7 0.4 Pipe contains HDR (U1) wn 3/1 Victaulic fittings but is well support and screening based on the consideration of Victaulic fittings 42 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C Notes:

NC = Not controlling NA = Not Applicable to Determination 43 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39217-1, NF-39222, and NF-39223 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-32 4-CL-90 4 24 Supply AFWP #12 M362 H1 1.5/1 1.5/1 2.53 NC EQ:AFWP#12 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all HDR Screened at 0.5g welded construction, HCLPF per NP- including valves and 6041 Table 2-3. has had obvious Median Valve is seismic design.

1.25 (2) Part of the pipe is SS but screened on the basis that it is all CS CL-33 4-2AF-1 4 24 Supply AFWP #22 M362 H1 1.5/1 1.5/1 2.53 NC EQ:AFWP#22 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all HDR Screened at 0.5g welded construction, HCLPF per NP- including valves and 6041 Table 2-3. has had obvious Median Valve is seismic design.

1.25 (2) Part of the pipe is SS but screened on the basis that it is all CS CL-34 4-2CL-11 4 24 Supply TOROC M362 H1 1/1 2/1 3.04 N/C None .4 (1) piping contains CI HDR Supply Line 3.04 valves which controls fragility CL-35 2-2CL-211 2 TOROC Supply TOROC M362 H1 1/1 1/1 0.99 N/C None 0.99 .4 (1) Pipe is welded Line Supply Line steel and contains threaded brass valves which controls fragility CL-36 3-2CL-14 3/2 TOROC Supply FWPOC M362 H1 1/1 10/1 2:0.99 *1.25 N/C EQ: FWPOC 2: 1.24 .4 (1) 3 pipe contains Line #21/#22 = 1.24 #21: 3: 0.43 Cast Iron valves 3:0.34*1.25 EQ: FWPOC (2) 2: pipe contains

= .43 #22: threaded brass valves (Freq <2.5 Screened at .5 g and threaded unions, HZ) HCLPF Median the valves control.

value is 1.25g 44 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-37 3/4 -2CL- 3/4 3-2CL-14 FWOSPC M362 H1 1/1 1/1 >1.0 0.1 EQ: FWOSPC: 0.1 .4 (1) This is 3/4 SS 144 Screened at 0.5g Tubing with Swagelok per NP-6041 fittings.

Table 2-3. (2) Rides on a 3 pipe Median Valve is with spans of 10/1 to 1.25 14/1 and has a short run from last pipe attachment to panel.

This is the controlling fragility and was assigned a value of

.1g CL-38 11/2-2CL- 11/2/1/ 2-2CL-14 HDPOC M362 H1 3/4: 1/1 3/4: 3/1 3/4: N/C EQ: HDPOC #21: 3/4: 1.25 .4 (1) 1-1/2 pipe 18 3/4 #21/#22/#23 1: 1/1 1: 4/1 1.07*1.25 = EQ: HDPOC #22: 1: 1.25 contains brass 1-1/2: 1/1 1-1/2: 2/1 1.34 EQ: HDPOC #23: 1-1/2: 1.03 threaded valves and 1: 1.06*1.25 The HDPOC are threaded unions

= 1.32 attached to the valves will control 1-1/2: 1.03 heater drain (2) 1 and 3/4 pipe is pumps which all welded steel screen at .5 g including valves and HCLPF median fittings does have value is 1.25 some threaded unions CL-39 2-2CL-15 2/3/4 18-2CL-9 T(EH)FROC M362 H1 3/4: 1/1 3/4: 1/1 3/4: 1.07 N/C EQ:T(EH)FROC: 3/4: 1.07 .4 Pipe contains

1. 21 2: 1/1 2: 4/1 2: .99*1.25 Screened at 0.5g 1: 1.24 threaded brass valves

= 1.24 HCPLF per NP- and threaded unions (Freq <2.5 6041 Table 2-3.

HZ) Median Value is 1.25 CL-40 11/2-2CL- 11/2 16-2CL-9 CPOC M362 H1 3/4: 1.5/1 3/4: 3/1 3/4: 1.07*1.25 >1.0 EQ: CPOC #21: >1.00 .4 (1) All sizes of pipe 17 #21/#22/#23 1: 1.5/1 1: 3/1 = 1.33 EQ: CPOC #22: contain threaded 1-1/2: 1-1/2: 3/1 1: 1.04*1.25 EQ: CPOC #23: brass valves and 1.5/1 = 1.3 Condensate threaded unions 1-1/2: pumps are (2) SAMs based on 1.03*1.25 = adequately using CL-57 results 1.29 anchored. as input (Freq < 2.5 Screened at .5 g Hz) HCLPF. Median value is 1.25 45 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-41 2-2CL-9 2 16-2CL-9 GBDC M362 H1 1/1 1/1 and 5/1 0.99 >1.0 EQ: GBDC #21: 0.98 .4 (1) there are flexible

1. 21/#22 EQ: GBDC #22: joints at the The GBDC equipment but both screens at .39 g ends of the joints are HCLPF therefore well supported and the median value the equipment is well is 0.98 g support therefore not

. a concern based on Block wall judgment capacity is 0.39g (2) Pipe contains HCPLF. Median threaded brass valves capacity .98 (3) Adjacent block wall governs capacity.

(4) SAMs based on using CL-57 results as input CL-42 24-2CL-56 24/30 Aux Bldg Wall Cooling M362 H2 1/1 2/1 .>0.75 NC Block Wall: > 0.75 .4 This piping is welded Water steel piping with no Discharge Block wall is valves and which has short (10 High) obvious seismic II/I and the block design. Based on the wall is prevented analysis conducted from interacting for CL-57 and the with the result of the standpipe by a evaluation of existing structural bracing plant analyses for member. large bore in the CL Therefore, the system. This line is block wall is assigned g level of screened out and >..75g based on is not a concern judgment. Detailed analysis would bear out this number.

(2) There is a block wall above the Standpipe that is reviewed 46 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-43 4-2CL-56 4/21/2 GEC #21; #22 24 Return M362 H2 1/1 2/1 0.606 0.606 EQ: GEC#21: .4 (1) 2-1/2 Pipe HDR (U2) EQ: GEC#22: 0.67 contains cast iron Screening of valves GHC based on (2) Header pipe drawing review. displacement controls Screened at .5 g. SAM value and was HCLPF. Median evaluated and shown capacity is 1.25. to be 0.606 g CL-44 14-2CL-56 5/6/10 GHC #22; #21 24 Return M362 H2 1/1 2/1 & 3/1 5: 1.15 NC EQ: GHC#21: 5: 1.15 .4 (1) 6 pipe contains

/14 HDR (U2) 6: .597 EQ: GHC#22: 6: .597 cast iron valves and S 10: 1.15 Screening of 10: 1.15 type Victaulic 14: 1.15 GHC based on 14: 1.15 couplings drawing review. (2) Valves on 10 and Screened at .5 g. 14 pipes are steel HCLPF. Median and welded capacity is 1.25 (3) Fragility is controlled by cast iron valves (4) Similar to CL-13 and results from that analysis are applied here.

47 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-45 2-2CL-54 2 GBDC #21/#22 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 3/1 .99 N/C EQ: GBDC #21: 0.98 .4 (1) there are flexible HDR (U2) EQ: GBDC #22: joints at the The GBDC equipment but both screens at .39 g ends of the joints are HCLPF, well supported and therefore the the equipment as well median value is support therefore not 0.98 g a concern based on

. judgment Block wall (2) Pipe contains capacity is 0.39g threaded brass valves HCPLF. Median and threaded unions.

capacity .98g (4) Pipe has threaded connections to the unit (3) Adjacent block wall was evaluated.

CL-46 2-2CL-130 2/ 11/2 CPOC 24 Return M362 H 3/4: 1/1 3/4": 1/1 3/4: 1.07 N/C EQ: CPOC #21: .4 (1) 3/4 and 1 pipe is

/ 3/4 #21/#22/#23 HDR (U2) 1: 1/1 1: 3/1 1: 1.04 EQ: CPOC #22: 3/4: 1.07 all welded 2: 1/1 2: 1/1 & 2: .99 EQ: CPOC #23: 1: 1.04 construction but does 5/1 Condensate 2: .99 contain threaded pumps are unions.

adequately (2) 2 pipe contains anchored. threaded brass valves Screened at .5 g (3) Also contains HCLPF. Median glass sight-glass in value is 1.25 steel case. Judged as not controlling.

(4) Poor designed support was reviewed Worst Case and found to have Support > 1.25 more than adequate capacity and would not control the fragility.

48 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-47 11/2-2CL- 3/4 /1/ HDPOC 24 Return M362 H1 3/4: 1/1 3/4: 2/1 3/4: 1.07 PP: .05 EQ: HDPOC #21: .05 .4 (1) In the pump pit the 131 11/2 #21/#22/#23 HDR (U2) 1: 1/1 1: 3/1 1: 1.04 HDR: EQ: HDPOC #22: 1 piping is cross 1-1/2: 1/1 1-1/2: 4/1 1-1/2: 1.03 0.9 EQ: HDPOC #23: supported to pipe that The HDPOC are are cross support to attached to the other pipes that in heater drain some cases are pumps which rigidly support and in screen at .5 g some cases are not.

HCLPF median Pipe will receive value is 1.25 multiple conflicting SAM inputs.

Therefore, use and initial SAM fragility of

.05g. Higher vale may be possible if in depth review is conducted.

(2) 3/4 and 1 pipe in pump pit is all welded steel construction but does contain threaded unions (3) 1-1/2 pipe contains threaded brass valves and unions (4) Also possible SAM issue at the header pipe (5) Also contains glass sight-glass in steel case. Judged as not controlling.

CL-48 2-2CL-56 2 FWPOC #22 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 2/1 .99 N/C EQ: FWPOC 0.99 .4 Pipe contains HDR (U2) #22: threaded brass valves Screened at .5 g and unions HCLPF Median value is 1.25g 49 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-49 2-2CL-56 2 FWPOC #21 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 2/1 .99 N/C EQ: FWPOC 0.99 .4 Pipe contains HDR (U2) #21: threaded brass valves Screened at .5 g and unions HCLPF Median value is 1.25g CL-50 2-2CL-50 2 /1/ T(EH) FROC 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 15/1 3/4: 1.07 N/C EQ:T(EH)FROC: .99 .4 (1) 3/4 and 1 pipe has 3/4 #21 HDR (U2) 1: 1.04 Screened at 0.5g threaded valves and 2: .99 HCPLF per NP- unions by the 6041 Table 2-3. equipment Median Value is (2) the 2 valve in this 1.25 piping system is flanged steel.

Conservatively use Threaded brass to account for flanges CL-51 3/4 -2CL- 3/4 FWOSPC 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 1/1 N/C N/C EQ: FWOSPC: .35 .4 (1) This is 3/4 tubing 145 HDR (U2) Screened at 0.5g that is well support on per NP-6041 Unistrut supports Table 2-3. directly to the in place Median Valve is steel.

1.25 (2) Header SAMs would be small and Fire Protection the tubing has System SI: 0.35 adequate flexibility to accept the SAMs (3) There is a 1-1/2 Fire Protection sprinkler system that runs above the tubing.

It is threaded construction with cast iron fittings and the piping is poorly supported.

50 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-52 3-2CL-56 3/2 HSOUC #21 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 2/1 3: 0.34 .35 EQ: HSOCU#21: 0.34 .4 (1) 3 pipe contains HDR (U2) 2: .99 Screened at 0.5g cast Iron valves HCLPF per NP- (2) 2 pipe has 6041 Table 2-3. threaded brass valves Median capacity (3) simplified SAM 1.25 screening was conducted.

CL-53 2-CL-112 2 AFWP #21 24 Return M362 H1 1.5/1 1.5/1 2.53 NC EQ:AFWP#21 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all HDR (U2) Screened at 0.5g welded construction, HCLPF per NP- including valves and 6041 Table 2-3. has had obvious Median Valve is seismic design.

1.25 (2) Part of the pipe is SS but screened on the basis that it is all CS CL-54 16-2CL-09 16/10/ Anchor at 3110 GHC M362 H2 N/A N/A N/C EQ: GHC#21: .4 (1) This line is very 6/3/2 #21/#22 16: >1.5 EQ: GHC#22: 16: 1.25 similar in routing to GEC 14: 0.613 EQ: GEC#21: 14: 0.613 CL-57. The fragilities

1. 21/#22 6: 0.40 EQ: GEC#22: 6: 0.40 for this line are based HSOUC #21 5: >0.8 EQ: HSOCU#21: 5: >0.8 on the fragilities for 4: >1.5 Screened at 0.5g 4: >1.25 CL-57 3:0.221 HCLPF per NP- 3:0.221 (2) CL-57 was 2-1/2:0.318 6041 Table 2-3. 2-1/2:0.318 evaluated by analysis.

2: 1.0 Median capacity 2: 1.0 1.25 CL-56 6-2CL-51 4/6 TRSP #21/#22 24 Return M362 H1 4: 1/1 4: 1/1 0.561 g N/C EQ: TRSP #21: .4 (1) 4 pipe contains HDR (U2) 6: 1/1 6: 7/1 0.66g HCLPF Cast Iron valves by EQ: TRSP #22: 0.561 g the Sump Pumps 0.66g HCLPF (2) 6 pipe contains therefore the Cast Iron Valves median capacity (3) Attaches to 24 is 1.65 return header by lateral strut support and therefore, no SAM concerns 51 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-56a N/A 2 6-2CL-51 Thru CV M362 H1 N/A N/A 1.0 N/C None 1.0 .4 1) 2 Piping is not 39080 shown on PID but was found in the field.

(2) Valve CV-39085 normally closed therefore the piping integrity is only required to this valve (per PRA guys)

(3) Pipe is all threaded fittings and valves are all THRD brass valves.

01P-II-1 24-CL-23 24/30 Turbine Bldg NP 80 M362 H1 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0. Determined using the Wall 4 existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-4 18-2CL-9 18 NP 3025 Unit #1 (NP M362 H1 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0. Determined using the 410) 4 existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-5 12-2CL-9 12 NP 3025 NP 3380 & M362 H1 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC EQ: #21TOROC: >1.25 0. Determined using the NP 3425 EQ: #22TOROC: 4 existing PI Analysis Anchorage capacity governs at 0.66g HCLPF with a median capacity of 1.6 g 01P-VIII-7 30-CL-23 30 NP 80 NP 2 M362 H1 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0. Determined using the 4 existing PI Analysis 01P-VIII-6 16-2CL-9 16 NP-32 NP-3110 M362 H1 N/A N/A > 1.25 NC None >1.25 0. Determined using the 4 existing PI Analysis 03P-XI-1 24-2CL-56 24 Aux Bldg Wall IIB/III M362 H1 N/A N/A > 0.75g NC EQ: #21TOROC: >1.25 .4 Determined using the 12-2CL-56 12 TOROC Boundary EQ: #22TOROC: existing PI Analysis 24-2CL-24 Anchorage capacity governs at 0.66g HCLPF with a median capacity of 1.6 g 52 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-59 6-2CL-56 8 Roof Drain 24 Return Unkno H1/H3 1/1 1/1 and 3/1 0.70 NC None 0.70 0. This line is essentially Header (U2) wn 4 identical to the Unit 1 line and capacities are based on the Unit 1 review.

CL-60 6-2CL-57 6 Roof Drain 24 Return Unkno H1 1/1 1/1 and 3/1 0.80 NC None 0.80 .4 Header wn Notes:

NC = Not controlling NA = Not Applicable to Determination 53 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39220 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CD-1 6-CD-12 6/4/2 CD Pump 24 Service M-354 H2 6: 1/1 6 :6 /1 .74*1.54 6: .35 none 6: 0.35 .4 (1) pipe and valves are 4-CD-42 Discharge Pipe Water HDR 2: 1/1 2: 6/1 =1.14 4: NC 4: 1.14 .4 all weld CS 2-CD-34 18-CD-2 (U2) (Freq < 2: NC 2: 1.14 .4 (2) piping has had a 2.5 HZ) Seismic II/I design (3) 2 pipe branches from 6 pipe at lateral

& vertical support ,

therefore, no SAM concerns (4) 6 line branches from RH 18 pipe.

Simplified span review used to get SAMs.

Notes:

NC = Not controlling 54 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39221 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CD-2 6-2CD-12 6 18-2CD-2 24 Return M-354 H2 1/1 12/1 .74*1.54 6: 0.45 None 6: 0.45 .4 (1) pipe and valves are HDR (U2) =1.14 4: NC 4: 1.14 .4 all weld CS (Freq < (2) piping has had 2.5 HZ) limited Seismic II/I design (3) 6 line branches from RH 18.

Simplified review used to get SAM capacity.

CD-3 2-2CD-40 2 6-2CD-12 Valve 2CD M-354 H1 1/1 3/1 .91*1.25 0.48 None 0.48 .4 (1) pipe and valves are 1 =1.14 all weld CS (Freq < (2) 2 line branches 2.5 HZ) from CD-2 pipe.

Simplified review used to get SAM capacity.

Notes:

NC = Not controlling 55 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39242 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C RM-1 3-2RM-10 3 21/22 Demineralizer M380 H1 1/1 (1) BT: 8/1 1.30 2-1/2: EQ: #21RMUWST: .4 (1) Piping runs a long RMUWST Tank (2) 715: 1/1 > 2.65 EQ: #22 RMUWST: 0.79 distance; review was 2: > Tank Capacities: conducted to above the 2.65 100% full: 0.40g 715 elevation so that the 3: 0.79 HCLPF. Median pipe could not Siphon the Value is 1.0 RMUSTs. Therefore, it 75% full: 0.55g was not reviewed to the HCLPF. Median Demineralizer. Tank.

value is 1.38 (2) Piping is all welded construction and is SS (3) Four Branch Lines that were reviewed for possible SAM issues using simplified SAM Review.

(4) Piping near unanchored tank has flex leg of 8 check against anticipated Tank movements. Tank slip is defined as failure therefore not a concern.

56 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C RM-2 6-2RM-2 6 21/22 RMUP (U2) M380 H1 1/1 1/1 .59 NC EQ: #21RMUWST: .59 .4 (1) Pipe is all welded RMUWST EQ: #22 RMUWST: construction and is SS EQ: #21 RMUP: (2) Very short stiff run to EQ: #22 RMUP: tanks, therefore when tank Tank Capacities: moves nozzle will pull out 100% full: 0.40g the tank wall. Therefore, HCLPF. Median Tank controls Fragility.

value is 1.0 Tank slip is defined as 75% full: 0.55g failure therefore not a HCLPF. Median concern.

value is 1.38 Pumps screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI Table 2-3 Median value is 1.25 RM-3 3-RM-10 3 11/12 Demineralizer M380 H1 1/1 (1) BT: 4/1 1.30 >1.0 EQ: #11RMUWST: 1.00 .4 (1) Piping runs a long RMUWST Tank (2) 715 EL: EQ: #12 RMUWST: distance; review was 1/1 Tank Capacities: conducted to above the 100% full: 0.40g 715 elevation so that the HCLPF. Median pipe could not Siphon the value 1 is 1.0 RMUSTs. Therefore, it 75% full: 0.55g was not reviewed to the HCLPF. Median Demineralizer. Tank.

value is 1.38 (2) Piping is all welded construction and is SS (3) two Branch Lines that were review for possible SAM issues.

(4) Piping near unanchored tank has flex leg of 8 check against anticipated Tank movements. Tank slip is defined as failure therefore not a concern.

57 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C RM-4 4-RM-2 4 21/22 RWMP (U1) M380 H1 1/1 1/1 .59 NC EQ: #11RMUWST: .59 .4 (1) Pipe is all welded RMUWST EQ: #12 RMUWST: construction and is SS EQ: #11 RMUP: (2) Very short stiff run to EQ: #12 RMUP: tanks, therefore when tank Tank Capacities: moves nozzle will pull out 100% full: 0.40g the tank wall. Therefore, HCLPF median Tank controls HCLPF.

value is 1.0. Tank slip is defined as 75% full: 0.55g failure therefore not a HCLPF. Median concern.

value is 1.38 Pumps screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI Table 2-3.

median values is 1.25 Notes:

NC = Not controlling 58 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39244 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-29(a) 11/2-CL-96 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 3/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#121) SAAC: 1.03 .4 (1) All valves, all sizes 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#121) SAC: are THRD brass Screened at 0.5g valves HCLPF per EPRI (2) 1-1/2 pipe Table 2-3. Median contains THRD brass Value is 1.25. glass flow indicator.

Judged to have as much capacity as a brass valve.

(3) 3/4 pipe contains THRD brass glass flow indicator. Judged to have as much capacity as a brass valve.

(4) 3/4 pipe is all THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (5) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions 59 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-29(b) 11/2-CL- 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 3/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#121) SAAC 1.03 .4 (1) All valves, all sizes 111 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#121) SAC: are THRD brass Screened at 0.5g valves HCLPF per EPRI (2) 1-1/2 pipe Table 2-3. Median contains THRD brass Value is 1.25. glass flow indicator.

Judged to have as much capacity as a brass valve.

(3) 3/4 pipe contains THRD brass glass flow indicator. .

Judged to have as much capacity as a brass valve.

(4) 3/4 pipe is all THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (5) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions 60 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-30(a) 11/2-CL-96 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 4/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#122) SAAC: 0.73 0.4 (1) All valves, all sizes 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#122) SAC: are THRD brass valves Block Wall #8 (2) 1-1/2 pipe capacity is 0.29g contains THRD brass HCLPF. Median glass flow indicator.

value is .73g Judged to have as much capacity as a Pumps and brass valve.

compressors (3) 3/4 pipe contains screened at 0.5g THRD brass glass HCLPF per EPRI flow indicator. .

Table 2-3. Median Judged to have as Value is 1.25. much capacity as a brass valve.

(4) 3/4 pipe is all THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (5) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions (6) Block wall by compressor and piping, called Safety Related Block Wall

1. 8 61 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-30(b) 11/2-CL- 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 4/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#122) SAAC 0.73 0.4 (1) All valves, all sizes 111 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#122) SAC are THRD brass valves Block Wall #8 (2) 1-1/2 pipe capacity is 0.29g contains THRD brass HCLPF. Median glass flow indicator value is .73g. (3) 3/4 pipe contains THRD brass glass Pumps and flow indicator. Judged compressors to have as much screened at 0.5g capacity as a brass HCLPF per EPRI valve. Judged to have Table 2-3. Median as much capacity as a Value is 1.25. brass valve.

(4) 3/4 pipe is all THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (5) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions (6) Block wall by compressor and piping, called Safety Related Block Wall

1. 8 62 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-31(a) 11/2-CL-96 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 3/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#123) SAAC 0.73 .4 (1) All valves, all sizes 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#123) SAC are THRD brass valves Block Wall #8 (2) 1-1/2 pipe capacity is 0.29g. contains THRD brass Median value is glass flow indicator

.73g (2) 3/4 pipe contains THRD brass glass Pumps and flow indicator. .

compressors Judged to have as screened at 0.5g much capacity as a HCLPF per EPRI brass valve.

Table 2-3. Median (3) 3/4 pipe is all Value is 1.25. THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (4) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions (5) Block wall by compressor and piping, called Safety Related Block Wall

1. 8 63 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CL-31(b) 11/2-CL- 1-1/2, Station Air Station Air M-362 H1 1.5/1 4/1 1.03 NC EQ: (#123) SAAC 0.73 0.4 (1) All valves, all sizes 111 1, 3/4 Supply Line Return Line EQ: (#123) SAC are THRD brass valves Block Wall #8 (2) 1-1/2 pipe capacity is 0.29g contains THRD brass HCLPF median glass flow indicator value is .73g. (2) 3/4 pipe contains THRD brass glass Pumps and flow indicator. .

compressors Judged to have as screened at 0.5g much capacity as a HCLPF per EPRI brass valve.

Table 2-3. Median (3) 3/4 pipe is all Value is 1.25. THRD fittings and includes CI fittings at some locations (4) 1-1/2 piping is welded construction but contains THRD unions (5) Block wall by compressor and piping, called Safety Related Block Wall

1. 8 Notes:

NC = Not controlling 64 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table for NF-39253-1 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CP-1 4-2CP-20 4 Valve 2CP-52-1 #21 M380 H2 1/1 NT: 2/1 .34 NC EQ: (#21)BWST .34 .4 (1) This is a very long BWST (U2) RT: 6/1 Tank capacity = run of piping to get to 0.60g HCLPF. CHK valve 2CP-52-1 Median capacity is 1.5 CP-2 6-2CP-6 6 #21 BWSP (U2) M380 H1 1/1 2/1 >1.0 NC EQ: (#21)BWST: >1.0 .4 (1) Piping is all welded BWST (U2) EQ: (#21)BWSP: steel construction.

EQ: (#21)BWSP:

Tank capacity =

0.6g HCLPF.

Median capacity is 1.5 Pumps are screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.26 CP-3 4-CP-20 4 Valve CP-52-1 #11 M380 H2 1/1 NT: 2/1 .34 NC EQ: (#11)BWST .22 .4 (1) This is a very short BWST(U1) RT: 3/1 SI: FP Pipe run of piping to get to CHK valve CP-52-1 Tank capacity = (2) There is an 8 0.6g HCLPF. THRD and Victaulic Median capacity is FP Protection Header 1.5 that is directly above this piping. Screened Fire protection based on the fire Spatial interaction: protection system

.11g (Freq < 2.0 Hz capacity in this double the value location.

.22) 65 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CP-4 6-CP-5 6 #11 BWSP (U1) M380 H1 1/1 2/1 >1.0 NC EQ: (#11)BWST: >1.0 .4 (1) Piping is all welded BWST EQ: (#11)BWSP: steel construction.

EQ: (#11)BWSP:

Tank capacity =

0.6g HCLPF Median capacity is 1.5.

Pumps are screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25 CP-5 4-CP-11 4 #11 BWTP (U1) M380 H1 1/1 3/1 .95*1.25 NC EQ: (#11)BWRT: 1.19 .4 (1) Pipe and valves BWRT =1.19 EQ: (#11)BWTP: are all welded steel (Freq < EQ: (#11)BWTP:

2.5 HZ)

Tank capacity >>

0.5g HCLPF Median capacity is

>1.25 Pumps are screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25 66 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CP-6 4-2CP-12 4 #21 BWTP (U2) M380 H1 1/1 3/1 .95*1.25 NC EQ: (#21)BWRT: 1.19 .4 (1) Pipe and valves BWRT =1.19 EQ: (#21)BWTP: are all welded steel (Freq < EQ: (#21)BWTP:

2.5 HZ) Tank capacity >>

0.5g HCLPF Median capacity is greater than 1.25 Pumps are screened at 0.5g HCLPF per EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25 Notes:

NC = Not controlling 67 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table NF-39353-3 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CP-7 2-CP-81 3/4, 1- 24 Supply HDR #124/#125 M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 4/1 3/4: 1.09 NC SAAC 0.99 .4 1. All piping is welded or 1/4, 1- (U2) SAAC 1-1/4: 1.03 #124/#125 threaded fittings.

1/2, 2 1-1/2: 1.03 screen at .5g 2. Valves are threaded 2: .99 HCLPF which brass.

is 1.25 median 3. Supports are well constructed.

CP-8 1-CP-45 3/4, 1 2-CP-81 #124 SAC M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 3/1 3/4: 1.09 NC SAC #124 1.04 .4 1. All piping is welded or 1: 1.04 screen at .5g threaded fittings.

HCLPF which 2. Valves are threaded is 1.25 median brass.

3. Supports are well constructed.

CP-9 1-CP-45 3/4, 1 2-CP-81 #125 SAC M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 3/1 3/4: 1.09 NC SAC #125 1.04 .4 1. All piping is welded or 1: 1.04 screen at .5g threaded fittings.

HCLPF which 2. Valves are threaded is 1.25 median brass.

3. Supports are well constructed.

CP-10 1-1/2-CP- 1, 1- #124/#125 SAAC 24 Return M362 H1 1/1 1/1, 4/1, 1: 1.04 NC SAAC .99 .4 1. All piping is welded or 82 1/4, 1- HDR (U2) 8/1 1-1/4: 1.03 #124/#125 threaded fittings.

1/2, 2 1-1/2: 1.03 screen at .5g 2. Valves are threaded 2: .99 HCLPF which brass.

is 1.25 median 3. Supports are well constructed.

68 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C CP-11 3-CP-55 3/4,1, #124 SAC 2-CP-55 M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 2/1 3/4: 1.09 NC SAAC 3/4: 1.09 .4 1. All piping is welded or 3 1: 1.04 #124/#125 1: 1.04 threaded fittings.

3: 2.93 screen at .5g 3: 2.93 2. Valves are threaded HCLPF which brass.

is 1.25 median 3. Supports are well constructed.

4. Small SAM < 1/2.

Header pipe displacement limited by branch to valve station.

No concerns per engineer judgment CP-12 3-CP-55 3/4, 1, #125 SAC 1-1/2-CP-82 M362 H1 1/1 1/1 & 2/1 3/4: 1.09 NC SAC #125 1.04 .4 1. All piping is welded or 3 1: 1.04 screen at .5g threaded fittings.

3: 2.93 HCLPF which 2. Valves are threaded is 1.25 median brass.

3. Supports are well constructed.

Notes:

NC = Not Controlling 69 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table NF-39603-2 (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control ZE-1 4-ZE-3 4/3/2/ 24 Supply HDR #11A/#11B/#12 M-359 H1 15 ft 30 ft 2.53 0.14g HCLPF (1) EQ: 0.35 .4 Governed by #11 1-1/2 (U1) A/#12B for HDTPMUC (#11A) FWPMUC: (#11 Heater Drain Tank (12-CL-67) FWPMUC; # 11: (2) EQ: only) Pump Motor Unit

1. 11/#12/#13 (#11B) FWPMUC HDTPMUC HDTPMUC (3) EQ: (#12 &

12&13 and (#12A) FWPMUC #13 are FWPMUC (4) EQ: 0.52g) 11A/B and (#12B) FWPMUC 12A/B Median (5)EQ: (#11A/B is 1.4 *.37 = (#11) HDTPMUC: &

0.52 (6)EQ: #12A/B (Freq < 2.5 HZ) (#12) HDTPMUC: =0.52g)

(7)EQ:

(#13) HDTPMUC:

Governed by #11 Heater Drain Cooler frame ZE-2 3-ZE-2 3/2 24 Supply HDR #11/#12/#13 M-359 H1 10 ft 40 ft 2.57 0.19 *1.4 = .27 (1) EQ: .4 Governed by (U1) CPMUC (Freq < 2.5 HZ) (#11)CPMUC: 0.27 Condensate Pump (12-CL-67) (2) EQ: (=1.4*0. Motor Unit Cooler

(#12)CPMUC: 19g) SAMs (3) EQ:

(#13)CPMUC:

70 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control ZE-3 2-ZE-14 2/11/2 24 Supply HDR #121/#123 M-359 H1 11ft 18 ft 2.57 (1) EQ: .4 All components (U1) ACMUC (#121)ACMUC: 1.25 seismically designed

1. 21 (1) EQ:

AFWPMUC (#123)ACMUC: (1)

EQ:

(#21)AFWPMUC:

Screened at 0.5g HCLPF by EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25g ZE-4 4-ZE-5 4/3/2/ #11A/#11B/#12A/ 24 Return M-359 H1 12 ft 56 ft 2.53 (1) EQ: .4 All components 1-1/2 #12B FWPMUC HDR (U1) (#11A)FWPMUC: 0.52g seismically designed 0.37G for (2) EQ:

FWPMUC (#11B)FWPMUC

1. 11A/B & (3) EQ:

1. 12A/B: (#12A)FWPMUC Median is 1.4 * (4) EQ:

.37 = 0.52 (#12B)FWPMUC (Freq < 2.5 Hz)

ZE-5 4-ZE-4 2/11/2 #11/#12/#13 24 Return M-359 H1 17 ft 17 ft 2.57 0.37g for (1)EQ: 0.35 .4 Governed by #11

/3/4 HDTPMUC HDR (U1) HDTPMUC # (#11)HDTPMUC: (#11 Heater Drain Tank 12 & 13: (2)EQ: only) Pump Motor Unit Median is 1.4 (#12)HDTPMUC: Cooler

• .37 = 0.52 (3)EQ: (#12 &

(Freq < 2.5 HZ) (#13)HDTPMUC: #13 are 0.52g)

ZE-6 3-ZE-2 2/11/2 #11/#12/#13 24 Return M-359 H1 13 ft 20 ft 2.57 0.19 *1.4 = .27 (1) EQ: .4 Governed by CPMUC HDR (U1) (Freq < 2.5 HZ) (#11)CPMUC: 0.27 Condensate Pump (10-CL-110) (2) EQ: (=1.4*0. Motor Unit C

(#12)CPMUC: 19g)

(3) EQ:

(#13)CPMUC 71 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control ZE-7 4-ZE-15 4/2/1- #121/#123 24 Return M-359 H1 11ft 18 ft 2.53 NC (1) EQ: 1.25 .4 1/2 ACMUC HDR (U1) (#121)ACMUC:

1. 21 AFWPMUC (2) EQ:

(#123)ACMUC:

(3) EQ:

(#21)AFWPMUC:

Screened at 0.5g HCLPF by EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25 ZE-8 2-ZE-12 2/11/2 24 Supply HDR #12AFWPMUC M-359 H1 11 ft 18 ft 2.57 NC (1) EQ: 1.25 .4 (U2) #122 ACMUC (#12)AFWPMUC:

(2) EQ:

(#122)ACMUC:

Screened at 0.5g HCLPF by EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25g ZE-9 4-ZE-13 4/2/1- #12 24 Return M-359 H1 11 ft 18 ft 2.53 NC (1) EQ: 1.25 .4 1/2/1 AFWPMUC HDR (U2) (#12)AFWPMUC:

1. 122 ACMUC (2) EQ:

(#122)ACMUC:

Screened at 0.5g HCLPF by EPRI NP-6041 screening tables. Median capacity is 1.25g 72 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control ZE-10 4-2ZE-3 4/3/2 24 Supply HDR #21A/#21B/ M-359 H1 14 ft 24 ft 2.53 0.34 HCLPF for (1) EQ: 0. (0.86 .4 Governed by (U2) #22A/#22B #23 HDTPMUC (#21A)FWPMUC: for #23 FWPMUC &

FWPMUC; (2) EQ: only) HDTPMUC #21 & # 22

1. 21/#22/#23 FWPMUC & (#21B)FWPMUC HDTPMUC #21A/B & (3) EQ: (#22&

1. 22A/B (#22A)FWPMUC 23 HDT (4) EQ: are HDPTMUC (#22B)FWPMUC 0.55g)

1. 21 &#22 (5)EQ:

median is 0.39* (#21)HDTPMUC: (#22A/B 1.4=0.55 (6)EQ: &

(#22)HDTPMUC: #21A/B (7)EQ: are

(#23)HDTPMUC: 0.55g)

ZE-11 3-ZE-18 3/2 4-2ZE-5 #121/#122 M-359 H1 12 ft 40 ft 2.57 NC (1) EQ: 1.25 .4 RCDSR (#121)RCDSR:

(2) EQ:

(#122)RCDSR Screened by EPRI NP-6041 at 0.5g HCLPF per Tables 2-3. Median capacity is 1.25g ZE-12 3-2ZE-1 3/2 24 Supply HDR #21/#22/#23 M-359 H1 14 ft 24 ft 2.57 0.05*1.4=0.07 (1) EQ: -.07 for .4 Governed by (U2) CPMUC for 3/4 hole for (#21)CPMUC: #21 Condensate Pump

1. 21 (2) EQ: (3/4 Motor Unit Cooler CPMUC (#22)CPMUC: hole) SAMs

1. 22&23 (3) EQ:

median is= (#23)CPMUC: 0.41 for 0.29*1.4=0.41 #22&23 73 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control ZE-13 4-2ZE-5 4/3/2/1 #21A/#21B/ 24 Return M-359 H1 12 ft 28 ft 2.53 (1) EQ: .4 Seismically designed 1/2 #22A/#22B HDR (U2) 0.39g for (#21A)FWPMUC: 0.55g FWPMUC FWPMUC (2) EQ:

21A/B & 22A/B (#21B)FWPMUC (3) EQ:

Median is 1.4 * (#22A)FWPMUC

.39 = 0.55g (4) EQ:

(#22B)FWPMUC ZE-14 3-ZE-19 3/2 #121/#122 4-2ZE-5 M-359 H1 12 ft 40 ft 2.57 NC (1) EQ: 1.25 .4 Seismically designed RCDSR (#121)RCDSR:

(2) EQ:

(#122)RCDSR Screened by EPRI NP-6041 at 0.5g HCLPF per Tables 2-3. Median capacity is 1.25g ZE-15 3-2ZE-4 3/2/1 #22/#23/#21 24 Return M-359 H1 10 ft 20 ft 2.57 (1)EQ: .4 Governed by Heater 1/2/3/4 HDTPMUC HDR (U2) 0.39g for (#21)HDTPMUC: (0.85 Drain Tank Pump HDTPMUC #21 (2)EQ: for #23 Motor Unit Cooler

& #22 (#22)HDTPMUC: only)

(3)EQ:

Median is 1.4 * (#23)HDTPMUC: (#22&

.39 = 0.55g Governed by #11 23 HDT are 0.55g)

ZE-16 3-2ZE-2 3/2/1- #21/#22/#23 24 Return M-359 H1 14 ft 24 ft 2.57 CPMUC #22 & (1) EQ: -.07 for .4 1/2 CPMUC HDR (U2) #23 Median = (#21)CPMUC: #21 0.29 *14 = .41 (2) EQ: (3/4 (Freq < 2.5 HZ) (#22)CPMUC: hole) 0.05*1.4=0.07 (3) EQ:

for 3/4 hole for (#23)CPMUC 0.41 for

1. 21 . #22&23 74 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT (1)

Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes C

(2) (2)

No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control Notes:

NC = Not controlling (1) values given are maximum unsupported Spans versus span ratio (2) For equipment at the 695 or lower elevation if the original fragility was based on a mean versus median spectra. In the low frequency range (<2.5 Hz) the mean spectra is significantly higher than the median spectra. The 1.4 factor is used to reflect this difference. This is documented in S&A calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-036.

75 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table NF-39603-3 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C ZW-1 4-ZW-1 4 24 Supply 121 Lab and M359 H3, H1 1/1 1/1 695 Elev.: NC EQ: 121 Lab and .4 (1) Pipe is attached to Header Svc Area 0.40 SVC Area Chiller: 0.40 the Chiller on top of Chiller Other Elev.: Chiller has a median Block wall offices in TB

.7 capacity based on at 735. Runs from the onset of sliding of chiller, thru roof, above 0.63 g suspended ceiling and exists block wall on Block wall: 735 Elev.: south side (Unit #1 Block wall median Side) and runs directly capacity is not less down to the 695 than 4.5 g Elevation (2) Valves by Chiller are welded steel.

(3) Valves on 695 Elevation are 3 cast iron valves.

(4) There is a missing support at the bottom of the riser on this line.

ZW-2 4-ZW-2 4 121 Lab and Svc 24 Return M359 H3, H1 1/1 1/1 0.8 NC EQ: 121 Lab and 0.63 g .4 (1) Pipe is attached to Area Chiller Header SVC Area Chiller: the Chiller on top of Chiller has a median Block wall offices in TB capacity based on at 735. Runs from the onset of sliding of chiller, thru roof, above 0.63 g suspended ceiling and exists block wall on Block wall: 735 Elev.: south side (Unit #1 Block wall median Side) and runs directly capacity is not less down to the 695 than 4.5gg Elevation (2) Valves and on 695 by Chiller are steel.

76 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. I Span Ratio I Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) I Notes No. I I Size I I I Spec I I Vert. I Lat. I Inert. I SAM I Other I Control I C I Notes:

NC = Not controlling 77 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Table NF-86172-1 Package Line No. Pipe From To Matl Spect. Span Ratio Fragilities - Median Capacity (g-PGA) Notes No. Size Spec Vert. Lat. Inert. SAM Other Control C ZX-1 12-ZX-144 12 Aux Building Wall #11/#21 MZX1 H1 1/1 4/1 >1.25 NC EQ: (#11)ZX Chiller >1.25 .4 (1) Pipe is all welded ZX Chiller EQ: (#21)ZX Chiller steel construction mostly CS with small Anchorage capacity amounts of SS exceeds 0.5g (2) all valves are HCLPF Median welded or bolted steel capacity is 1.25 valves (3) Pipe is attached to Chiller screened at Coolers with 12 #77 0.5g HCLPF per Victaulic connections EPRI NP-6041 (4) Analysis conducted Tables median to determine fragilities capacity is 1.25 ZX-2 12-ZX-155 12 #11/#21 ZX 24 Return MZX1 H1 1/1 4/1 >1.25 NC EQ: (#11)ZX Chiller >1.25 .4 (1) Pipe is all welded Chiller Header (U2) EQ: (#21)ZX Chiller steel construction mostly CS with small Anchorage capacity amounts of SS exceeds 0.5g (2) all valves are HCLPF. Median welded or bolted steel capacity is 1.25 valves (3) Pipe is attached to Chiller screened at Coolers with 12 #77 0.5g HCLPF per Victaulic connections EPRI NP-6041 Tables. Median capacity 1.25 ZX-3 2-Zx-153 2 12-ZX-144 2 Tee MZX1 H1 1/1 3/1 3.92 *1.25 = >1.25 None >1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all welded 4.9 SS construction (Freq < 2.5 (2) Branches from 12 HZ) Header; Header is1/1 Vertical and 4/1 lateral; flex leg is 36.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT ZX-4 2-Zx-? 2 2-ZX-154 12-ZX-3 MZX1 H1 1/1 3/1 3.92* 0.98 None 0.98 .4 (1) Piping is all welded 1.25=4.94 SS construction (Freq < 2.5 (2) Branches from 12 HZ) Header; Header is1/1 Vertical and 4/1 lateral; flex leg is 3 ZX-5 Mech. 2 MZX1 H1 1/1 3/1 1.86* 1.25 NC EQ: (#121N)MF: 1.25 .4 (1) Piping is all welded Pack Pipe =2.32 (Freq EQ: (#121S)MF SS construction, short

< 2.5 HZ) EQ: (#122W)BF runs very stiff.

EQ: (#121E)BF (2) Flanged glass sight-glass. Glass is Screened at 0.5g contained in large rigid HCLPF per EPRI stainless steel NP-6041 Tables. component judged to Median capacity have the less capacity 1.25. than the pipe, the pipe capacity is reduced by 50% to account for this component ZX-6 2-ZX-155 2 Mech. Pack Pipe 24 Return MZX1 H1 1.5/1 8/1 >1.25 NC None >1.25 .4 (1) Piping is a HDR combination of CS and SS (2) pipe contains THRD steel valve and THRD unions (3) There are 5 very short rod hangers mid-span in the system.

(4) Detailed Analysis conducted to determine Fragilities Notes:

NC = Not controlling 79 of 84

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT 5 REFERENCES General References

1. AISC, "Manual of Steel Construction", 6th and 9th Editions

2. ALWR FOAKE Piping Technical Care Group, "TCG Report on FOAKE Task E-1: ASME Piping", April 16, 1993.

3. ASME, "Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1", pre 1986 Edition, and the 2007 Edition

4. ASME/ANSI, "B31.1 Power Piping Code", 1967 and the 1972 Edition, including the Summer 1973 Addenda.

5. Brookhaven National Laboratory, BNL 52361 Rev. 10/95, Seismic Design and Evaluation Guidelines for the Department of Energy High-Level Waste Storage Tanks and Appurtenances.

6. Building Seismic Safety Council, "NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program) Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures, Part 1, Provisions (FEMA-368)",

2000 Edition.

7. EPRI NP-5228-SL, "Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment Anchorage", Rev. 1, June 1991.

8. EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1, August, 1991.

9. EPRI NP-6395-D, "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard at Nuclear Plant Sites in the Central and Eastern United States: Resolution of the Charleston Earthquake Issue", April, 1989.

10. EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, June 1994.

11. EPRI-TR-101968, Tier 2, Volume 4 of 8, "Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Support Evaluation and Design, Volume 4: Behavior and Failure Mode of Standard Pipe Supports Beyond Their Design Condition", Prepared by Duke Power Company, Charlotte, NC., May 1993.

12. EPRI, "Piping and Fitting Dynamic Reliability Program, Final Report, 1989.

13. Kennedy, R. P., "Overview of Methods for Seismic PRA and Margin Analysis Including Recent Innovations",

Proceedings of the OECD-NEA Workshop on Seismic Risk, Tokyo Japan, 10-12 August 1999.

14. MSS SP-58, "Pipe Hangers and Supports - Materials and Design", 1967 Edition.

15. NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June, 1991.

16. NUREG-1488, Revised Livermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains, Draft Report for Comment, October, 1993.

17. NUREG/CR-0098, "Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants", May 1978.

18. SQUG, Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) For Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Rev.

2, Corrected 2/14/92.

19. USNRC, Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities - 10CFR50.54(f), dated June 28, 1991.

20. JAB-PS-02, John A. Blume & Associates, Earthquake Analysis of the Reactor-Auxiliary-Turbine Building, November 29, 1968

21. GT STRUDL User Reference Manual, Volumes 1 & 3, Revision T

22. Email from David Moore to Walter Djordjevic on 3/2/2010 including attached PI_Hazards.xls spreadsheet.

23. EKSSI v3.1, A Program for the Dynamic Analysis of Structures Including Soil-Structure Interaction Effects.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

24. Email from David Moore to Walter Djordjevic on 3/2/2010 including attached PI_Hazards.xls spreadsheet.

25. ASCE Paper 3269, Wind Forces on Structures, 1961.

26. Stevenson & Associates Calculation 03Q0418-C-002, Assessment of Prairie Island Turbine Building for North-South Tornado Loads, October 22, 2004.

27. Stevenson & Associates Calculation 03Q0418-C-003, Assessment of Prairie Island Turbine Building for East-West Tornado Loads, October 29, 2004.

28. EQE calculation 250800-C-03 Revision 0, Development of Soil Profile.

29. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.208, A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion.

30. ASCE 4-98, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary.

31. USNRC NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, 1978.

32. Pressure Vessel Research Council (PVRC) of the Welding Research Council (WRC) Bulletins 300 and 316, available for purchase from the WRC via www.forengineers.com.

33. TCG Report on FOAKE Task E-1: ASME Piping - ALWR FOAKE Piping Technical Core Group, April 16, 1993.

34. Kennedy, R.P., Using Component Test Data to Assist in Establishing Code Criteria to Achieve the Desired Seismic Capacity Margin for Piping, January 2000.

35. Minichiello, J.C., Adams, T.M., et. al., Background to Recent Revision of the Section III Seismic Piping Rules, presented at the 2002 Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, August 4-8 2002, Vancouver, B.C.

36. S&A Calculation 2956.02-C32, Expanded Victaulic Fitting Seismic Capacity Criteria (EVFSCC), Revision 0, 7-14-97

37. SQURTS, Seismic Qualification Report # 50096.0, Revision 1, 5-10-96

38. Victaulic General Catalog September 1995 Flow Diagrams

39. NF-39616-2, Flow Diagram - Unit 1 Cooling Water - Turbine Building, Revision 76.

40. NF-39617-1, Flow Diagram - Unit 2 Cooling Water - Turbine Building, Revision 77.

41. NF-86172-1, Auxiliary Building and Containment Chilled Water Systems Unit 1 & 2, Revision 76.

42. NF-39220, Flow Diagram - Condensate System Unit 1, Revision 76.

43. NF-39244, Flow Diagram Instrument Air Piping, Revision 81.

44. NF-39353-1, Condensate Polishing System Flow Diagram Units 1 & 2, Revision 76.

45. NF-39242, Flow Diagram - Units 1 & 2 Reactor Made Up & Demineralized Water Systems, Revision 76.

46. NF-39221 Flow Diagram - Condensate System Unit 2, Revision 76.

47. NF-39603-2, Flow Diagram - Equipment Heat Removal System Unit 1 & Unit 2, Revision 76.

48. NF-39353-3 Flow Diagram Station Air/Condensate Polishing Units 1 & 2, Revision 77.

49. NF-39222, Flow Diagram - Feedwater & Aux. Feedwater Unit 1, Revision 78.

50. NF-39223, Flow Diagram - Feedwater & Aux. Feedwater Unit 2, Revision 79.

51. NF-39605-1, Flow Diagram - Steam Heating System, Revision 81.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

52. NF-39603-3, Flow Diagram - Lab & Service Area A/C & Chilled Water Safeguard System, Revision AK.

53. NF-39224, Flow Diagram - Unit 1 Bleed Steam & Heater Vents, Revision 77.

Project Specific Calculations

54. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-001, Prairie Island NGS Structural Dynamics Model, Revision 0.

55. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-002, Development of Mean Floor Response Spectra for the Turbine Building, Revision 0.

56. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-003, General Piping Fragilities, Revision 0.

57. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-004, Equipment Screening Evaluations for Seismic PRA, Revision 0.

58. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-005, Seismic Capacity of Reactor Make-Up Water Storage Tank, Revision 0.

59. S&A Calculation 10C3877-BOS-CAL-006, Development of Median Floor Response Spectra for the Turbine Building, Revision 0.

60. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-001, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Capacity Criteria to Establish Fragilities for In-Scope Piping for Walkdown Screening, Revision 0.

61. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-002, Turbine Building Piping Median Capacities - Methodology to Establish Median Capacities form Existing Prairie Island Piping Analyses and New Piping Analyses, Revision 0.

62. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-003, Capacities for ANSI B16.1 Cast Iron Flanged Valves, Revision 0.

63. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-004, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Capacities - Definition of Piping & Equipment Scope, Revision 0.

64. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-005, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities for Victaulic Style 77 Couplings, Revision 0.

65. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-006, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities Line ZX-6, Revision 0.

66. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-007, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Line 01P-VIII-1 thru 01P-VIII-7, Revision 0.

67. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-008, Turbine Building: ZX Chiller (NF-86172-1) Supply & Return Lines, Revision 0.

68. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-009, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39253-1, Revision 0.

69. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-010, Turbine Building: Fire Protection Line, Revision 0.

70. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-011, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39242, Revision 0.

71. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-012, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-86172-1, Revision 0.

72. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-013, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39244, Revision 0.

73. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-014, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39220, Revision 0.

74. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-015, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39221, Revision 0.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

75. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-016, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39217-1, NF-39222, and NF-39223 Revision 0.

76. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-017, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39603-3, Revision 0.

77. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-018, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39603-2, Revision 0.

78. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-019, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities - Piping on NF-39216-2, NF-39222, NF-39605-1, and NF-39223 Revision 0.

79. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-021, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Line CL-43, Revision 0.

80. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-022, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-56 (a)

Line, Revision 0.

81. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-023, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: ZX-4 Line, Revision 0.

82. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-024, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-34 Line, Revision 0.

83. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-025, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: ZL-2 Line, Revision 0.

84. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-026, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Line CL-57, Revision 0.

85. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-027, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Line CL-13, Revision 0.

86. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-028, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Line CL-19, Revision 0.

87. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-029, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-55, Revision 0.

88. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-030, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-16 Line, Revision 0.

89. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-031, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: ZW-1 Line, Revision 0.

90. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-032, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-60 Line, Revision 0.

91. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-033, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: RM-3 Line, Revision 0.

92. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-034, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: CL-25 Line, Revision 0.

93. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-036, Low Frequency Increase Factors, Revision 0.

94. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CLE-CAL-037, Turbine Building Median Piping Seismic Fragilities: Piping on NF-39253-3, Revision 0

95. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CHI-CAL-001, Structural Evaluation of Pipe Supports in Unit 1. Revision 0

96. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CHI-CAL-002, Structural Evaluation of Pipe Support on 562 in Unit 1. Revision 0

97. S&A Calculation 10C3877-CHI-CAL-001, Structural Evaluation of Pipe Support on CL-46 in Unit 1. Revision 0

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 10C3877-REP-001 REV. 2 SEISMIC FRAGILITIES FOR UNIT #1 & UNIT #2 TURBINE BUILDING PIPING AND EQUIPMENT Prairie Island Specifications

98. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant EM 3.2.1.4, Specification for Piping Materials, Revision 8

99. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant EM 3.2.1.8, Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchors, Revision 3 100. Prairie Island Updated Safety Analysis Report, Revision 29.

101. 09Q4836-CAL-001, Unit #1 MSL Pipe Stress Analysis, Rev. 0 (Draft) 4/30/10 84 of 84