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{{#Wiki_filter:1 OCFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power CompanySurry Power Station5570 Hog Island RoadSurry, Virginia 23883May 27, 2014U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
{{#Wiki_filter:1 OCFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 May 27, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control DeskWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.:SPS:Docket No.:License No.:14-255JSA50-280DPR-37
Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.: SPS: Docket No.: License No.: 14-255 JSA 50-280 DPR-37  


==Dear Sirs:==
==Dear Sirs:==
Pursuant to 1OCFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits thefollowing Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 1.Report No. 50-280/2014-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and willbe forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.N. L. Lane,Site Vice President Surry Power StationEnclosure Commitment contained in this letter: None cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IIMarquis One Tower, Suite 1200245 Peachtree Center Ave., NEAtlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
Pursuant to 1OCFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 1.Report No. 50-280/2014-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.N. L. Lane, Site Vice President Surry Power Station Enclosure Commitment contained in this letter: None cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower, Suite 1200 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017 (02-2014)
0113112017 (02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections-v / (. E N PO Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT(LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 1 OF 4 4. TITLE Closed Service Water Valve Results in Exceeding Technical Specifications
80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
: 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR S rry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 NUMBER NO.FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 29 2014 2014- 001 00 05 27 2014 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b)
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
-v / (. E N PO Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT(LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory  
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBdigits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGESurry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 1 OF 44. TITLEClosed Service Water Valve Results in Exceeding Technical Specifications
: 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDI FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR S rry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 NUMBER NO.FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER03 29 2014 2014- 001 00 05 27 2014 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)  
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)  
[1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
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El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
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NEl 20.2203(a)(1)
N El 20.2203(a)(1)
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El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
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El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
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El OTHERI'--1Specify in Abstract below or in20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
El OTHERI'--1Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Form bloA12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERLICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-200113. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPMANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SY MPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX C FACTURER TO EPIXA BI ISV F130 Y A BI P G200 Y14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED  
Form bloA 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-2001 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPMANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SY MPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX C FACTURER TO EPIX A BI ISV F130 Y A BI P G200 Y 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, Complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately)
: 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION El YES (If yes, Complete  
At 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1D service water header was declared inoperable as a result of indications received during testing. The direct cause of the indications was due to a mostly closed service water header isolation valve for the Unit 1 D service water header. In October 2013, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented causing the valve to become mostly closed while indicating open. Therefore, the Unit 1 D service water header was inoperable from October 21, 2013 until March 29, 2014 and Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation were exceeded twice during timeframes when one of two other operable service water headers was tagged out for maintenance.
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE15 single-spaced typewritten lines) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately)
Also, as a result of the restricted flow condition, a service water pump that supplies cooling to a charging pump was also determined to be inoperable beyond its Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation.
At 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1D servicewater header was declared inoperable as a result of indications received during testing.
Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), for operations prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The directcause of the indications was due to a mostly closed service water header isolation valve for the Unit 1 Dservice water header. In October 2013, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented causing the valve to become mostly closed while indicating open. Therefore, the Unit 1 Dservice water header was inoperable from October 21, 2013 until March 29, 2014 and Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation were exceeded twice during timeframes when one of twoother operable service water headers was tagged out for maintenance.
Based on the risk assessment of this event, the risk impact was determined to be very small and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
Also, as a result of therestricted flow condition, a service water pump that supplies cooling to a charging pump was alsodetermined to be inoperable beyond its Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017
Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),
for operations prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Based on the risk assessment of this event, the risk impact wasdetermined to be very small and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
0113112017
'02-2014)
'02-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours.S" tReported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pdvacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
80 hours.S" tReported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR ,I INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 N 12 OF 4 2014 001 -00 NARRATIVE 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT At 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1 D service water (SW) header was declared inoperable as a result of indications received during scheduled performance of the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing. Based on Operations and Maintenance troubleshooting, it was determined on March 31, 2014 that the Unit 1D SW header isolation valve [EIIS-BI-ISV]
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pdvacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or byLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory  
was either closed or partially closed while indicating full open. This condition existed since October 21, 2013 when, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented 90 degrees to eliminate interference with welding activity in the area. Therefore, during the time period from October 21, 2013 to March 29, 2014, the Unit 1D SW header was determined to have been inoperable due to the restricted flow of the mostly closed Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve.The Units 1 and 2 SW Systems supply cooling water through three common SW flow paths to the charging pump service water subsystems and the Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystems.
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Technical Specification 3.14 requires two operable SW flow paths to these subsystems.
Office of Management and Budget,CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display acurrently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.
During the period when the Unit 1D SW header was inoperable, one of the remaining two operable SW headers was tagged out for maintenance in two instances.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR ,I INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 N 12 OF 42014 001 -00NARRATIVE 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTAt 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit1 D service water (SW) header was declared inoperable as a result of indications receivedduring scheduled performance of the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump andValve In-service Testing.
The Unit 2A SW header was tagged out for circulating water system maintenance from January 6, 2014 at 04:28 to January 11, 2014 at 23:30 and the Unit 2C SW header was tagged out for circulating water system maintenance from March 16, 2014 at 01:30 to March 23, 2014 at 16:33. The tagged out durations of Unit 2A and 2C SW headers during the timeframe Unit 1 D SW header was inoperable exceeded the Technical Specification 24 hour limiting condition of operation for two SW headers being inoperable.
Based on Operations and Maintenance troubleshooting, it wasdetermined on March 31, 2014 that the Unit 1D SW header isolation valve [EIIS-BI-ISV]
waseither closed or partially closed while indicating full open. This condition existed sinceOctober 21, 2013 when, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented 90 degrees to eliminate interference with welding activity in the area. Therefore, during thetime period from October 21, 2013 to March 29, 2014, the Unit 1D SW header wasdetermined to have been inoperable due to the restricted flow of the mostly closed Unit 1 DSW header isolation valve.The Units 1 and 2 SW Systems supply cooling water through three common SW flow pathsto the charging pump service water subsystems and the Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystems.
Technical Specification 3.14 requires twooperable SW flow paths to these subsystems.
During the period when the Unit 1D SWheader was inoperable, one of the remaining two operable SW headers was tagged out formaintenance in two instances.
The Unit 2A SW header was tagged out for circulating watersystem maintenance from January 6, 2014 at 04:28 to January 11, 2014 at 23:30 and theUnit 2C SW header was tagged out for circulating water system maintenance from March 16,2014 at 01:30 to March 23, 2014 at 16:33. The tagged out durations of Unit 2A and 2C SWheaders during the timeframe Unit 1 D SW header was inoperable exceeded the Technical Specification 24 hour limiting condition of operation for two SW headers being inoperable.
Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Also, at 07:40 on April 3, 2014, during swapping of the Unit 1 charging SW pumps (whichsupply SW flow to the charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube oil coolers),
Also, at 07:40 on April 3, 2014, during swapping of the Unit 1 charging SW pumps (which supply SW flow to the charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube oil coolers), the Unit 1 B charging SW pump [EIIS-BI-P]
the Unit1 B charging SW pump [EIIS-BI-P]
experienced low discharge pressure.
experienced low discharge pressure.
The pump wassubsequently declared inoperable and a 72 hour limiting condition of operation was enteredfor Unit 1 in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.2 and 3.3. The SW suction strainerbasket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented for 25 seconds to evacuate air and thelimiting condition of operation was exited at 10:49 on April 3, 2014. An apparent causeevaluation determined that as a consequence of performing the Control Room AirConditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit 1DSW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, air in the SW system migratedto the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump causing it to become air bound. Therefore, the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was inoperable from March 29, 2014 until it was vented onNRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
The pump was subsequently declared inoperable and a 72 hour limiting condition of operation was entered for Unit 1 in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.2 and 3.3. The SW suction strainer basket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented for 25 seconds to evacuate air and the limiting condition of operation was exited at 10:49 on April 3, 2014. An apparent cause evaluation determined that as a consequence of performing the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit 1D SW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, air in the SW system migrated to the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump causing it to become air bound. Therefore, the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was inoperable from March 29, 2014 until it was vented on NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 3 OF 42014 001 00NARRATIVE April 3, 2014. This timeframe exceeded the Technical Specification 72 hour limiting condition of operation.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 3 OF 4 2014 001 00 NARRATIVE April 3, 2014. This timeframe exceeded the Technical Specification 72 hour limiting condition of operation.
Therefore, this event is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) foroperation prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Therefore, this event is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.
2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The Unit 1 D SW header supports charging pump operability as a source of SW (heat sink)for the charging pump lube oil coolers and MCR/emergency switchgear room air conditioning subsystems.
2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The Unit 1 D SW header supports charging pump operability as a source of SW (heat sink)for the charging pump lube oil coolers and MCR/emergency switchgear room air conditioning subsystems.
With 1 D SW header unavailable, multiple equipment/human failures arerequired to result in a core damage scenario.
With 1 D SW header unavailable, multiple equipment/human failures are required to result in a core damage scenario.
This includes a failure of one of the otheravailable SW headers (2A,2C),
This includes a failure of one of the other available SW headers (2A,2C), of which at least one remained available during this event and was fully capable of servicing all charging pump subsystem and Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystem SW loads.Similarly, the Unit 1A charging SW pump remained available during the period the Unit 1B charging SW pump was inoperable.
of which at least one remained available during this eventand was fully capable of servicing all charging pump subsystem and Main ControlRoom/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystem SW loads.Similarly, the Unit 1A charging SW pump remained available during the period the Unit 1Bcharging SW pump was inoperable.
The Unit 2 charging SW pumps can also be cross-connected to those of Unit 1.Therefore, based on the assessment of this event, the risk impact was determined to be very small and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.3.0 CAUSE The root cause evaluation (RCE) team determined that the direct cause was the re-orientation of the valve handwheel, resulting in the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve being mostly closed while indicating open and in service. The root cause was failure to adhere to maintenance standards which requires work activities to be performed lAW controlled procedures or instructions.
The Unit 2 charging SW pumps can also be cross-connected to those of Unit 1.Therefore, based on the assessment of this event, the risk impact was determined to be verysmall and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
3.0 CAUSEThe root cause evaluation (RCE) team determined that the direct cause was the re-orientation of the valve handwheel, resulting in the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve beingmostly closed while indicating open and in service.
The root cause was failure to adhere tomaintenance standards which requires work activities to be performed lAW controlled procedures or instructions.
No procedures or written instructions were used for the evolution of re-orienting the valve handwheel.
No procedures or written instructions were used for the evolution of re-orienting the valve handwheel.
An apparent cause evaluation determined that during the performance of the Control RoomAir Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit1 D SW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, the SW supply strainer linedup to the Unit 1 D SW header was operated in a vacuum and allowed air to enter the system(most likely at the strainer packing) which migrated to the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SWpump causing it to become air bound.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)
An apparent cause evaluation determined that during the performance of the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, the SW supply strainer lined up to the Unit 1 D SW header was operated in a vacuum and allowed air to enter the system (most likely at the strainer packing) which migrated to the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump causing it to become air bound.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)The Unit 1 D SW header was declared inoperable and tagged out until the cause of the inoperability was determined and corrected.
The Unit 1 D SW header was declared inoperable and tagged out until the cause of theinoperability was determined and corrected.
SW header 2C was placed in service along with 2A, which was already in service, and both were established as protected equipment.
SW header 2C was placed in service along with2A, which was already in service, and both were established as protected equipment.
NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIALI REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000 -280 4 OF 42014 -001 -00NARRATIVE The SW suction strainer basket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented to evacuatethe air, returned to service and the limiting condition of operation was exited.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONSThe handwheel on the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve was correctly  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIALI REV YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000 -280 4 OF 4 2014 -001 -00 NARRATIVE The SW suction strainer basket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented to evacuate the air, returned to service and the limiting condition of operation was exited.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The handwheel on the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve was correctly oriented, proper valve operation was verified and the entire 1 D SW header was restored to operable flowing condition.
: oriented, propervalve operation was verified and the entire 1 D SW header was restored to operable flowingcondition.
A RCE team was assembled to determine the cause of this event and to recommend corrective actions.An apparent cause evaluation was performed for inoperability of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump caused during the Unit 1 D SW header troubleshooting.
A RCE team was assembled to determine the cause of this event and torecommend corrective actions.An apparent cause evaluation was performed for inoperability of the Unit 1 B charging SWpump caused during the Unit 1 D SW header troubleshooting.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The personnel responsible for re-orienting the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve handwheel will be evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the performance management process. A procedure will be developed for maintenance of Fisher butterfly valves and actuators to be used in work orders for these valves and actuators, including verification of proper valve installation and operation.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The personnel responsible for re-orienting the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve handwheel will be evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the performance management process.
Corrective actions from the apparent cause evaluation for the inoperability of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump will be implemented.
A procedure will be developed for maintenance of Fisher butterfly valves andactuators to be used in work orders for these valves and actuators, including verification ofproper valve installation and operation.
7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS None 8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER Fisher Controls Int'l (Emerson Proc Ctls)/43556-01, 8" Goulds Pumps, Inc./3996ST/1.5X2-6 9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION None NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)}}
Corrective actions from the apparent cause evaluation for the inoperability of the Unit 1 Bcharging SW pump will be implemented.
7.0 SIMILAR EVENTSNone8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBERFisher Controls Int'l (Emerson Proc Ctls)/43556-01, 8"Goulds Pumps, Inc./3996ST/1.5X2-6 9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NoneNRC FORM 366A (02-2014)}}

Revision as of 16:07, 9 July 2018

LER 14-001-00 for Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Closed Service Water Valve Results in Exceeding Technical Specifications
ML14154A083
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/27/2014
From: Lane N L
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
14-255 LER 14-001-00
Download: ML14154A083 (6)


Text

1 OCFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883 May 27, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Serial No.: SPS: Docket No.: License No.: 14-255 JSA 50-280 DPR-37

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to 1OCFR50.73, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 1.Report No. 50-280/2014-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Facility Safety Review Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.N. L. Lane, Site Vice President Surry Power Station Enclosure Commitment contained in this letter: None cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Marquis One Tower, Suite 1200 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017 (02-2014)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections-v / (. E N PO Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT(LER) internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB digits/characters for each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Surry Power Station, Unit 1 05000-280 1 OF 4 4. TITLE Closed Service Water Valve Results in Exceeding Technical Specifications
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR S rry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 NUMBER NO.FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 29 2014 2014- 001 00 05 27 2014 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)El 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

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El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

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El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

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N El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

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El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHERI'--1Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Form bloA 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)N. L. Lane, Site Vice President (757) 365-2001 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPMANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SY MPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX C FACTURER TO EPIX A BI ISV F130 Y A BI P G200 Y 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, Complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately)

At 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1D service water header was declared inoperable as a result of indications received during testing. The direct cause of the indications was due to a mostly closed service water header isolation valve for the Unit 1 D service water header. In October 2013, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented causing the valve to become mostly closed while indicating open. Therefore, the Unit 1 D service water header was inoperable from October 21, 2013 until March 29, 2014 and Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation were exceeded twice during timeframes when one of two other operable service water headers was tagged out for maintenance.

Also, as a result of the restricted flow condition, a service water pump that supplies cooling to a charging pump was also determined to be inoperable beyond its Technical Specification limiting conditions of operation.

Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), for operations prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Based on the risk assessment of this event, the risk impact was determined to be very small and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017

'02-2014)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.S" tReported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pdvacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) intemet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, CONTINUATION SHEET Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR ,I INUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 N 12 OF 4 2014 001 -00 NARRATIVE 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT At 11:40 on March 29, 2014, with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the Unit 1 D service water (SW) header was declared inoperable as a result of indications received during scheduled performance of the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing. Based on Operations and Maintenance troubleshooting, it was determined on March 31, 2014 that the Unit 1D SW header isolation valve [EIIS-BI-ISV]

was either closed or partially closed while indicating full open. This condition existed since October 21, 2013 when, following valve replacement, the valve handwheel was re-oriented 90 degrees to eliminate interference with welding activity in the area. Therefore, during the time period from October 21, 2013 to March 29, 2014, the Unit 1D SW header was determined to have been inoperable due to the restricted flow of the mostly closed Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve.The Units 1 and 2 SW Systems supply cooling water through three common SW flow paths to the charging pump service water subsystems and the Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystems.

Technical Specification 3.14 requires two operable SW flow paths to these subsystems.

During the period when the Unit 1D SW header was inoperable, one of the remaining two operable SW headers was tagged out for maintenance in two instances.

The Unit 2A SW header was tagged out for circulating water system maintenance from January 6, 2014 at 04:28 to January 11, 2014 at 23:30 and the Unit 2C SW header was tagged out for circulating water system maintenance from March 16, 2014 at 01:30 to March 23, 2014 at 16:33. The tagged out durations of Unit 2A and 2C SW headers during the timeframe Unit 1 D SW header was inoperable exceeded the Technical Specification 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limiting condition of operation for two SW headers being inoperable.

Therefore, this report is being submitted, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.

Also, at 07:40 on April 3, 2014, during swapping of the Unit 1 charging SW pumps (which supply SW flow to the charging pump intermediate seal coolers and lube oil coolers), the Unit 1 B charging SW pump [EIIS-BI-P]

experienced low discharge pressure.

The pump was subsequently declared inoperable and a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition of operation was entered for Unit 1 in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.2 and 3.3. The SW suction strainer basket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented for 25 seconds to evacuate air and the limiting condition of operation was exited at 10:49 on April 3, 2014. An apparent cause evaluation determined that as a consequence of performing the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit 1D SW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, air in the SW system migrated to the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump causing it to become air bound. Therefore, the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was inoperable from March 29, 2014 until it was vented on NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000-280 3 OF 4 2014 001 00 NARRATIVE April 3, 2014. This timeframe exceeded the Technical Specification 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limiting condition of operation.

Therefore, this event is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The Unit 1 D SW header supports charging pump operability as a source of SW (heat sink)for the charging pump lube oil coolers and MCR/emergency switchgear room air conditioning subsystems.

With 1 D SW header unavailable, multiple equipment/human failures are required to result in a core damage scenario.

This includes a failure of one of the other available SW headers (2A,2C), of which at least one remained available during this event and was fully capable of servicing all charging pump subsystem and Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning subsystem SW loads.Similarly, the Unit 1A charging SW pump remained available during the period the Unit 1B charging SW pump was inoperable.

The Unit 2 charging SW pumps can also be cross-connected to those of Unit 1.Therefore, based on the assessment of this event, the risk impact was determined to be very small and, as a result, the health and safety of the public were not affected.3.0 CAUSE The root cause evaluation (RCE) team determined that the direct cause was the re-orientation of the valve handwheel, resulting in the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve being mostly closed while indicating open and in service. The root cause was failure to adhere to maintenance standards which requires work activities to be performed lAW controlled procedures or instructions.

No procedures or written instructions were used for the evolution of re-orienting the valve handwheel.

An apparent cause evaluation determined that during the performance of the Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve In-service Testing on March 29, 2014, with the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve mostly closed and restricting flow, the SW supply strainer lined up to the Unit 1 D SW header was operated in a vacuum and allowed air to enter the system (most likely at the strainer packing) which migrated to the suction of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump causing it to become air bound.4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)The Unit 1 D SW header was declared inoperable and tagged out until the cause of the inoperability was determined and corrected.

SW header 2C was placed in service along with 2A, which was already in service, and both were established as protected equipment.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (02-2014)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIALI REV YEAR NUMBER NO.Surry Power Station 05000 -280 4 OF 4 2014 -001 -00 NARRATIVE The SW suction strainer basket for the Unit 1 B charging SW pump was vented to evacuate the air, returned to service and the limiting condition of operation was exited.5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The handwheel on the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve was correctly oriented, proper valve operation was verified and the entire 1 D SW header was restored to operable flowing condition.

A RCE team was assembled to determine the cause of this event and to recommend corrective actions.An apparent cause evaluation was performed for inoperability of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump caused during the Unit 1 D SW header troubleshooting.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The personnel responsible for re-orienting the Unit 1 D SW header isolation valve handwheel will be evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the performance management process. A procedure will be developed for maintenance of Fisher butterfly valves and actuators to be used in work orders for these valves and actuators, including verification of proper valve installation and operation.

Corrective actions from the apparent cause evaluation for the inoperability of the Unit 1 B charging SW pump will be implemented.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS None 8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER Fisher Controls Int'l (Emerson Proc Ctls)/43556-01, 8" Goulds Pumps, Inc./3996ST/1.5X2-6 9.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION None NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)