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| {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELEBRATED 91S'JUUBUTION DEMONS~TJON SY~gMREGULATINFORMATION DISTRIBUTIOIYSTEM (RIDE))",ACCESSION NBR:8807060119 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:AC CELEBRATED 91S'JUUBUTION DEMONS~TJON SY~gM REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIOIYSTEM (RIDE))", ACCESSION NBR:8807060119 DOC.DATE: 88/06/24 NOTARIZED: |
| 88/06/24NOTARIZED: | | NO DOCKET FACZL:50-316 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana&05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POSTLEWAZT,T.K. |
| NODOCKETFACZL:50-316 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Indiana&05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION POSTLEWAZT,T.K.
| | Indiana Michigan Power Co.SMITH,W.G. |
| IndianaMichiganPowerCo.SMITH,W.G.
| | Indiana Michigan Powe Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
| IndianaMichiganPoweCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
| |
|
| |
|
| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER86-023-02:on 860715,erroneous accumulator levelindication resulting inlowaccumulator volume.W/8DISTRIBUTION CODE:ZE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR tENCL/SIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RRECIPIENT ZDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANGFJINTERNAL:
| | LER 86-023-02:on 860715,erroneous accumulator level indication resulting in low accumulator volume.W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL/SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: R RECIPIENT ZD CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA STANGFJ INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 DR<IB 9A RES/DE/EIB RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EGSrG WI LL IAMS F S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYSFG COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DRPS DEPY FORD BLDG HOYFA LPDR NSIC HARRZSFJ COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 h D h TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44 NRC Form 355 (9.83)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATOAY COMMISSION APPAOVEO OMB NO, 31504101 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3)o 5 o o o 3 1 6>OF 0 7 TITLE (Il Erroneous Accumulator Level Indication Resulting in Low Accumulator Volume MONTH DAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (5)YEARÃ~'.SEQVSNtIAL Pr~REVOKE NVM888 X5 IIVM88R REPORT DATE (7)MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)0 7 1 5 8 6 8 6 0 2 3 0 2 0 62 48 8 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (8)POWER LEVEL THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 50.73(e)(2)(ivl 50.73(e)12)(vl 50.nN)(2)(vB) 50.n(el(2)(vBII(A) 50,73(el(2)(v)5)(BI 9),73(~)(2)(el 20A05(c)50.38(cl(1) 50.38(c)(2)50,73(e I l2)0)50 73(el(2)(EI 50.73(e)(2)(511 20.802 (8)20405(~)(1)(l)20A05 (el(I)(8)20A05(e)(1)(BII 20A05(el(1)(tvl 20A05(~)(I)(vl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()I (Check one or mori Of the follovffnfl (Ill 73.7)(8)73.71(c)OTHER fSpeclfy In Ahttrect Oelow end In Feet, NRC Form 3BBAI NAME T.K.Postlewait-Technical En ineerin Su erintendent TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 64 6 5-5 9 0 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER E P0 R TA 8 L~',It~I Ii CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER TO NPROS X X B P E C B D B P T D I 2 0 4 I 2 0 4@~I X B PP I T I 2 04 SUPPLEMENTAL AEPOAT EXPECTED (lel EXPECTED SU 5 Ml SS ION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR YES f/f yet, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION D4 FE)NO ABBTRAcT (Llmlt to te00 tpecet, I.e., eppronlmetely fifteen tlncleepece typewritten llnnl 08)This revision is being submitted to include the results of diagnostic testing performed during the September 1987 outage.Between July 15 and 18, 1986, problems were encountered with the process instrumentation monitoring the volume within accumulator)jj'2.Complications developed during ultrasonic testing (UT)conducted to verify accumulator operability which resulted in the failure to identify a violation of the action statement associated with low accumulator volume and a missed surveillance for boron concentration. |
| ACRSMICHELSON AEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/MEB 9HNRR/DEST/PSB 8DNRR/DEST/SGB 8DNRR/DLPQ/QAB 10NRR/DREP/RAB 10DR<IB9ARES/DE/EIB RGN3FILE01EXTERNALEGSrGWILLIAMSFSHSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYSFGCOPIESLTTRENCL111111112211101111111111111111111144111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDACRSMOELLERAEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/ICSB 7NRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/DLPQ/HFB 10NRR/DOEA/EAB 11NRR/DREP/RPB 10NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RESTELFORD,J RES/DRPSDEPYFORDBLDGHOYFALPDRNSICHARRZSFJCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111'1111111111111122111111111111hDhTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | The administrative problems associated with accumulator level verification by UT were corrected.and this method was used in lieu of the process instrumentation to verify accumulator operability until unit shutdown for an outage March 3, 1987.Testing performed during the March 1987 outage, determined that three instrument components were defective; all were replaced in kind.On April 26, 1987 ILA<<121 began to drift upwards.On April 30, 1987, as a precautionary measure, ILA-121 was declared inoperable. |
| LTTR45ENCL44 NRCForm355(9.83)LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)U.S.NUCLEARREOULATOAY COMMISSION APPAOVEOOMBNO,31504101EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(I)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)PAE3)o5ooo316>OF07TITLE(IlErroneous Accumulator LevelIndication Resulting inLowAccumulator VolumeMONTHDAYYEAREVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(5)YEARÃ~'.SEQVSNtIAL Pr~REVOKENVM888X5IIVM88RREPORTDATE(7)MONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMESDOCKETNUMBER(SI 05000OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)071586860230206248805000OPERATINO MODE(8)POWERLEVELTHISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTT50.73(e)(2)(ivl50.73(e)12)(vl50.nN)(2)(vB) 50.n(el(2)(vBII(A) 50,73(el(2)
| | Accumulator level was monitored using UT until unit shutdown on August 27, 1987.Testing performed during the September 1987 outage determined that one instrument component was defective. |
| (v)5)(BI9),73(~)(2)(el20A05(c)50.38(cl(1) 50.38(c)(2)50,73(eIl2)0)5073(el(2)(EI 50.73(e)(2)(51120.802(8)20405(~)(1)(l)20A05(el(I)(8)20A05(e)(1)(BII 20A05(el(1)(tvl 20A05(~)(I)(vlLICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)0THEREOUIREMENTS OF10CFR()I(CheckoneormoriOfthefollovffnfl (Ill73.7)(8)73.71(c)OTHERfSpeclfyInAhttrectOelowendInFeet,NRCForm3BBAINAMET.K.Postlewait-Technical EnineerinSuerintendent TELEPHONE NUMBERAREACODE616465-5901COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTUREREP0RTA8L~',It~IIiCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TURERTONPROSXXBPECBDBPTDI204I204@~IXBPPITI204SUPPLEMENTAL AEPOATEXPECTED(lelEXPECTEDSU5MlSSIONDATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARYESf/fyet,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION D4FE)NOABBTRAcT(Llmlttote00tpecet,I.e.,eppronlmetely fifteentlncleepece typewritten llnnl08)Thisrevisionisbeingsubmitted toincludetheresultsofdiagnostic testingperformed duringtheSeptember 1987outage.BetweenJuly15and18,1986,problemswereencountered withtheprocessinstrumentation monitoring thevolumewithinaccumulator | | The component was replaced in kind and the process instrumentation has subsequently functioned normally.NRC Form 388 (Be)3I 8807060}}9 880624 PDR ADOCK 050003}6 S PNU$6ZZ NRC Form 3BBA (943(LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO, 3I50-0104 EXPIRES: 8/3'I/88 FACILITY NAME (I(DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8(PAGE (3i D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TE/ET/~RRE>> |
| )jj'2.Complications developed duringultrasonic testing(UT)conducted toverifyaccumulator operability whichresultedinthefailuretoidentifyaviolation oftheactionstatement associated withlowaccumulator volumeandamissedsurveillance forboronconcentration. | | <<~,~~//RC r 3SBA<</(m YEAR o s o o o 3 1 6 8 6 SEOUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 2 QF 0 7 This revision is being submitted to include the results of diagnostic testing performed during the September 1987 outage.Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 2 in Mode 1, RTP at 48 percent (91330 hours on 7-15-86)Descri tion of Event Technical Specification 3.5.lb requires that each accumulator (EIIS/BP-TK) must maintain between 929 and 971 cubic feet of borated water while the unit is in Modes 1-3 (Power Operation, Startup, and Hot Standby, respectively). |
| Theadministrative problemsassociated withaccumulator levelverification byUTwerecorrected.and thismethodwasusedinlieuoftheprocessinstrumentation toverifyaccumulator operability untilunitshutdownforanoutageMarch3,1987.Testingperformed duringtheMarch1987outage,determined thatthreeinstrument components weredefective; allwerereplacedinkind.OnApril26,1987ILA<<121begantodriftupwards.OnApril30,1987,asaprecautionary measure,ILA-121wasdeclaredinoperable.
| | If the accumulator volume deviates from the prescribed limits, the volume must be restored within 1 hour or the unit must be in hot shutdown (Mode 4)within the next 12 hours.Process instrumentation monitoring accumulator inventory (EIIS/BP-LIT) displays water volume in cubic feet.The system is comprised of 2 indicators for each accumulator, one wide range (300-1000 cubic feet)and one narrow range (900-1000 cubic feet).On July 15, 1986, operators on shift became suspect of the accumulator 82 volume indication and requested an ultrasonic test (UT)be performed to verify water inventory. |
| Accumulator levelwasmonitored usingUTuntilunitshutdownonAugust27,1987.Testingperformed duringtheSeptember 1987outagedetermined thatoneinstrument component wasdefective.
| | Quality Control personnel located the water level using ultrasound and then marked/dated the tank accordingly; however, during this process their data sheet became contaminated and was discarded before leaving access control.A new data sheet was subsequently filled out from memory and the Control Room was informed at 1330 hours on July 15 that accumulator |
| Thecomponent wasreplacedinkindandtheprocessinstrumentation hassubsequently functioned normally.
| | (/(2 was at 115.75 inches.When mathematically converted to volume, this level corresponds to 969.58 cubic feet;which, by coincidence only, happened to closely agree with the process instrumentation indication at that time.On July 18, 1986, at 0800 hours another UT was requested for accumulator |
| NRCForm388(Be)3I8807060}}9 880624PDRADOCK050003}6SPNU$6ZZ NRCForm3BBA(943(LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUANU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO,3I50-0104 EXPIRES:8/3'I/88FACILITYNAME(I(DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(8(PAGE(3iD.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2TE/ET/~RRE>>
| | /!2 because of questionable volume indication. |
| <<~,~~//RCr3SBA<</(mYEARosooo31686SEOUENTIAL NUMBER023REVISIONNUMBER0202QF07Thisrevisionisbeingsubmitted toincludetheresultsofdiagnostic testingperformed duringtheSeptember 1987outage.Conditions PriortoOccurrence Unit2inMode1,RTPat48percent(91330hourson7-15-86)DescritionofEventTechnical Specification 3.5.lbrequiresthateachaccumulator (EIIS/BP-TK) mustmaintainbetween929and971cubicfeetofboratedwaterwhiletheunitisinModes1-3(PowerOperation, Startup,andHotStandby,respectively).
| | When QC arrived at accumulator |
| Iftheaccumulator volumedeviatesfromtheprescribed limits,thevolumemustberestoredwithin1hourortheunitmustbeinhotshutdown(Mode4)withinthenext12hours.Processinstrumentation monitoring accumulator inventory (EIIS/BP-LIT) displayswatervolumeincubicfeet.Thesystemiscomprised of2indicators foreachaccumulator, onewiderange(300-1000cubicfeet)andonenarrowrange(900-1000cubicfeet).OnJuly15,1986,operators onshiftbecamesuspectoftheaccumulator 82volumeindication andrequested anultrasonic test(UT)beperformed toverifywaterinventory.
| | (/'2 they discovered a 10 inch error was made in the July 15 report.The level was actually 105.75 inches (909.58 cubic feet)on July 15, and not 115.75 (969.58 cubic feet)as reported.It can therefore be deduced that the lower limit for continued operation (929 cubic feet)had been violated since at least July 15 without the appropriate compensatory actions being taken.NRC FORM SBBA (EBS I*U.S.GPO:(BBB 0 824 538/455 NRC Form 366A (84)3)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3(50-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME l()D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)3 1 686 LFR NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 PAGE (3)OF TUCT (lmrso Epsos/4 rBEM)BI(, BBB///orrr/HRC |
| QualityControlpersonnel locatedthewaterlevelusingultrasound andthenmarked/dated thetankaccordingly; however,duringthisprocesstheirdatasheetbecamecontaminated andwasdiscarded beforeleavingaccesscontrol.Anewdatasheetwassubsequently filledoutfrommemoryandtheControlRoomwasinformedat1330hoursonJuly15thataccumulator
| | /ronn 36543)l17)Descri tion of Event (cont'd)This error was compounded during communications between Quality Control and Operations following the UT performed the morning of July 18.At 0945 hours on that morning, Quality Control reported the level of accumulator f32 had risen 3 inches since the last test performed on July 15.Operations was not made aware of the 10 inch error discovered earlier.Consequently, acting under the impression that accumulator |
| (/(2wasat115.75inches.Whenmathematically converted tovolume,thislevelcorresponds to969.58cubicfeet;which,bycoincidence only,happenedtocloselyagreewiththeprocessinstrumentation indication atthattime.OnJuly18,1986,at0800hoursanotherUTwasrequested foraccumulator
| | ((I2 had risen from 115.75 inches (969.58 cubic feet)to a volume exceeding the upper limiting condition for continued operation,'perations personnel declared accumulator 82 inoperable based upon high level (it was actually low)and measures were taken to begin draining the tank.With respect to the volume increase which occurred sometime between July 15 and July 18, no conclusive evidence can be produced confirming that said increase actually happened within a six hour time span preceding boron sampling performed at 0925 hours on July 18.Therefore, the plant must assume the boron concentration was not verified following a solution increase>/1 percent of tank volume as required by Technical Specification 4.5.1b.It should be noted that at 0952 hours on July 18, while preparations were underway for draining accumulator 82, Unit 2 tripped on a steam generator level high-high signal thus placing the unit in Mode 3.This event was further complicated at 1447 hours on July 18 when the Control Room was informed that UT results placed 82 accumulator's level 3 inches below the last measurement taken earlier that morning (due to draining). |
| /!2becauseofquestionable volumeindication.
| | With this information, and still unaware of the 10 inch error made on July 15, Operations declared the accumulator operable because they believed the apparently high volume of water had been reduced to within acceptable limits for continued operation. |
| WhenQCarrivedataccumulator
| | In reality, the accumulator volume was drained down from an already too low condition to an even lower status.At 1620 hours on July 18, Operations became cognizant of the 10 inch error made on July 15.It was recognized at this time that accumulator |
| (/'2theydiscovered a10incherrorwasmadeintheJuly15report.Thelevelwasactually105.75inches(909.58cubicfeet)onJuly15,andnot115.75(969.58cubicfeet)asreported.
| | $!2 was, and had been since at least 1330 hours on July 15, in violation of the lower volume limit required by Technical Specification 3.5.1b.Accumulator |
| Itcantherefore bededucedthatthelowerlimitforcontinued operation (929cubicfeet)hadbeenviolatedsinceatleastJuly15withouttheappropriate compensatory actionsbeingtaken.NRCFORMSBBA(EBSI*U.S.GPO:(BBB 0824538/455 NRCForm366A(84)3)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUANV.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO.3(50-0104 EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAMEl()D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2OOCKETNUMBER(2)31686LFRNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER023REVISIONNUMBER020PAGE(3)OFTUCT(lmrsoEpsos/4rBEM)BI(,
| | /f2 was immediately declared inoperable. |
| BBB///orrr/HRC
| | Cooling of the reactor coolant system (EIIS/BP-AB) to achieve Mode 4 began at 1720 hours and the NRC was notified of the event by phone at 1808 hours.Efforts towards filling accumulator f/2 via the refueling water storage tank (EIIS/BP-TK) commenced at 1839 hours and the event was terminated at 2120 hours on July 18 when the accumulator volume and boron concentration were verified to be within the limiting condition for operation as described in Technical Specification 3.5.1b and 3.5.1c respectively. |
| /ronn36543)l17)DescritionofEvent(cont'd)Thiserrorwascompounded duringcommunications betweenQualityControlandOperations following theUTperformed themorningofJuly18.At0945hoursonthatmorning,QualityControlreportedthelevelofaccumulator f32hadrisen3inchessincethelasttestperformed onJuly15.Operations wasnotmadeawareofthe10incherrordiscovered earlier.Consequently, actingundertheimpression thataccumulator | | Cooldown was halted prior to reaching Mode 4.With the exception of the loop 2 accumulator volume instrumentation, there were no inoperable structures, systems, or components at the start of this event which could have contributed to its occurrence. |
| ((I2hadrisenfrom115.75inches(969.58cubicfeet)toavolumeexceeding theupperlimitingcondition forcontinued operation,'perations personnel declaredaccumulator 82inoperable baseduponhighlevel(itwasactuallylow)andmeasuresweretakentobegindrainingthetank.WithrespecttothevolumeincreasewhichoccurredsometimebetweenJuly15andJuly18,noconclusive evidencecanbeproducedconfirming thatsaidincreaseactuallyhappenedwithinasixhourtimespanpreceding boronsamplingperformed at0925hoursonJuly18.Therefore, theplantmustassumetheboronconcentration wasnotverifiedfollowing asolutionincrease>/1percentoftankvolumeasrequiredbyTechnical Specification 4.5.1b.Itshouldbenotedthatat0952hoursonJuly18,whilepreparations wereunderwayfordrainingaccumulator 82,Unit2trippedonasteamgenerator levelhigh-high signalthusplacingtheunitinMode3.Thiseventwasfurthercomplicated at1447hoursonJuly18whentheControlRoomwasinformedthatUTresultsplaced82accumulator's level3inchesbelowthelastmeasurement takenearlierthatmorning(duetodraining). | | NRC FORM 366A (()4)3)o U,S.GPO.1 988 0 824 538/455 0<i I I NRC Form 388A (943)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA~N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (Bl PAGE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Flant-Unit 2 7%XT/4/m<<o NMoo/s IFEo8or/, Irso I/8/ooo/HRC R<<m 35843/(17)o s o o o 3 1 6 YEAR@IrI 8 6 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 8 rV 0 2 3 IIEVISION NUMSER 0 2 0 4 OF 0 7 Cause of Event The cause of this event has been attributed to the inability of the process instrumentation to accurately reflect the volume within accumulator 82, which resulted in the need for ultrasonic testing to verify accumulator operability. |
| Withthisinformation, andstillunawareofthe10incherrormadeonJuly15,Operations declaredtheaccumulator operablebecausetheybelievedtheapparently highvolumeofwaterhadbeenreducedtowithinacceptable limitsforcontinued operation.
| | Three defective components within the system were diagnosed as the root cause for the instrumentation failure.the instrumentation consists of a circuit board (EIIS/BP-ECBD), strain gauge (EIIS/BP-TD), potentiometer span (EIIS/BP-EC), potentiometer zero (EIIS/BP-EC) and a narrow range differential pressure unit (DPU)(EIIS/BP-PIT). |
| Inreality,theaccumulator volumewasdraineddownfromanalreadytoolowcondition toanevenlowerstatus.At1620hoursonJuly18,Operations becamecognizant ofthe10incherrormadeonJuly15.Itwasrecognized atthistimethataccumulator
| | The initial investigation indicated that the"zero" was drifting, which results from a faulty circuit board and strain gauge.Subsequently, these components were replaced.The instrumentation subsequently zeroed properly, but data was not repeatable vhen ranged up and back down the measurement scale.As a result, the DPU narrow range was replaced which eliminated the repeatability problem.Later,'he span and zero potentiometers vere replaced to ensure proper instrumentation operation. |
| $!2was,andhadbeensinceatleast1330hoursonJuly15,inviolation ofthelowervolumelimitrequiredbyTechnical Specification 3.5.1b.Accumulator
| | The calibrated instrument was returned to service on April 2, 1987, and functioned normally until April 26, at which time the system began to exhibit signs of drifting upwards.Ultrasonic measurements taken after April 26 confirmed the actual volume within accumulator f/2 was steady and well within the Technical Specification allowable range, however, the results also confirmed that ILA-121 was continuing a slow but steady upward drift towards the administrative limit for operability. |
| /f2wasimmediately declaredinoperable.
| | As a precautionary measure, ILA-121 was declared inoperable at 1328 hours on April 30, 1987.Further investigation conducted during the September 1987 outage indicated that the root cause of the second instrument failure was a faulty DPU narrow range.The DPU narrow range was replaced and the calibrated instrument was returned to service on September 24, 1987.The instrument has subsequently functioned normally.Contributing to this event was the fact that Quality Control personnel who performed the original UT on July 15 did not implement sound work practices while conducting activities in a radioactive environment. |
| Coolingofthereactorcoolantsystem(EIIS/BP-AB) toachieveMode4beganat1720hoursandtheNRCwasnotifiedoftheeventbyphoneat1808hours.Effortstowardsfillingaccumulator f/2viatherefueling waterstoragetank(EIIS/BP-TK) commenced at1839hoursandtheeventwasterminated at2120hoursonJuly18whentheaccumulator volumeandboronconcentration wereverifiedtobewithinthelimitingcondition foroperation asdescribed inTechnical Specification 3.5.1band3.5.1crespectively.
| | This resulted in the loss of hard.copy data supporting test results forcing those involved to rely solely upon memory recall.It should be noted that the UT was performed within-an extremely harsh environment consisting of elevated temperature and airborne radioactivity. |
| CooldownwashaltedpriortoreachingMode4.Withtheexception oftheloop2accumulator volumeinstrumentation, therewerenoinoperable structures, systems,orcomponents atthestartofthiseventwhichcouldhavecontributed toitsoccurrence.
| | These adverse conditions complicated efforts of the test crew because full face mask was required and the fatigue process was accelerated. |
| NRCFORM366A(()4)3)oU,S.GPO.1 9880824538/455 0<iII NRCForm388A(943)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUA~NU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO3150-0104 EXPIRES8/31/88FACILITYNAME(11DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(BlPAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearFlant-Unit27%XT/4/m<<oNMoo/sIFEo8or/,
| | Inadequate communication between the Control Room and Quality Control personnel further complicated this event.No formal mechanism had been established to verify that operators on shift had a complete and accurate understanding of the UT results.NRC FORM SBBA (948)*U.S.GPO:)988%.824 538/455 NRC Form 366A (94)3)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3(9)&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)PAGE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/kmcY8<<>>48 lr nr/I/EerE I/88 T/I/or>>/HRC |
| IrsoI/8/ooo/HRC R<<m35843/(17)osooo316YEAR@IrI86SEQUENTIAL NUMBER8rV023IIEVISION NUMSER0204OF07CauseofEventThecauseofthiseventhasbeenattributed totheinability oftheprocessinstrumentation toaccurately reflectthevolumewithinaccumulator 82,whichresultedintheneedforultrasonic testingtoverifyaccumulator operability.
| | %%dnn 35549/(17)YEAR 3 1 6 8 6 0 2 3 0 2 (jar, SEGVENTIAL jZ': REVISION 49 NUM88R v>err NUMSER 0 5 OF 0 7 Anal sis of Event This event is reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)as described below.-For approximately 3 days prior to July 18, 1986, the volume of accumulator 82 was below its lower limiting condition for operation and the corresponding action statement associated with Technical Specification 3.5.1b was not satisfied. |
| Threedefective components withinthesystemwerediagnosed astherootcausefortheinstrumentation failure.theinstrumentation consistsofacircuitboard(EIIS/BP-ECBD),
| | -Between July 15 and July 18, 1986, accumulator 82 experienced a solution increase greater>/m 1 percent of the tank volume and the boron concentration was not verified to be acceptable within the next 6 hours as required by Technical Specification 4.5.1b.The safety significance of power operation with accumulator volume of one accumulator at 909.6 cubic feet rather than 929 cubic feet is limited to impact on the loss-of-coolant accident analysis.The limiting loss-of-coolant accident analysis for Unit 2 Cycle 6 predicts a peak clad temperature of 2079 degree F with a 121 degree F margin to the 2200 degree F limit specified in 10 CFR 50.46.Exxon Nuclear Company, the fuel vendor for Cycle 6, was requested to evaluate the impact of this event on public health and safety.Their response stated: it is Exxon's opinion that a significant safety hazard to the public did not exist for the following reason.The limiting case in the reference indicated a peak cladding temperature (PCT)of 2079 degree F for operation at lOOX power.Operation at 90 percent power would result in a reduction in the PCT and would tend to offset any increase in PCT due to the reduced accumulator liquid volume.The reduced accumulator liquid volume alone is expected to have a very small effect on the PCT.The accumulator flow would end approximately 1 second sooner than the time indicated in the reference. |
| straingauge(EIIS/BP-TD),
| | Since this occurs after the beginning of core recovery time (BOCREC)when the downcomer is full, a very small adverse effect on reflood rate and PCT would occur and would be much less than the 121 degree F margin indicated in the reference." It is of note that the difference between the as-found condition (909.6 cubic feet)and the value specified in the Technical Specification of 929 cubic feet is 19.4 cubic feet, or approximately 960 lbs.of water.In order to conservatively evaluate the effect on peak clad temperature, a hypothetical scenario was evaluated in which it was assumed that this water was deficient during the refill period, and had to be made up by pumped in5ection water.It would have taken the pumps approximately 1.1 seconds to make up this water.Since the PCT rate of heatup during the early reflood/refill period is about 13 degree/sec., this would have resulted in a PCT increase of about 15 degree F.Adding 15 degree F to the calculated PCT results in a new PCT of 2094 degree F, which is still well within the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.NRC FORM SStA (94)3)8 U.S.GPO:1986.0.624 538/455 NRC Form 388A (943)L'ICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3150M)84 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME{1)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)PACE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/Smroo draco/r orR/)or/, I/44/8/orro/NRC Farm 35(LE'4/(IT) 0 5 0 0 0 3]YEAR P~r~+8 6 SEQUENTIAL gj<NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 6 OF Anal sis of Event (cont'd)The actual change in peak clad temperature, had a new analysis been performed, would have been well below the above 15 degrees F value because the deficit,in water would have occurred after the beginning of core recovery when heat transfer mechanisms associated with reflood were in place, and the need for accumulator water had significantly lessened.It is also concluded that the missed boron surveillance was not of significance, since a boron sample taken at 0925 hours on July 18 contained a concentration of 1975 parts per million (ppm), which is well within the required limits of 1900 and 2100 ppm.Based on all of the above information, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 nor did it adversely impact public health and safety.Corrective Actions Immediate corrective/preventative action consisted of: 1)promptly increasing accumulator volume to wi.thin Technical Specification limits and verifying acceptable boron concentration; and 2)obtaining independently verified UT level indication, at least once every 10 hours, to ensure Technical Specification compliance while the process instrumentation was/is out of service.Long term preventative action will be to replace all of the accumulator level instrumentation with Foxboro instrumentation as similar problems have been experienced with several of the other ITT-Barton instruments. |
| potentiometer span(EIIS/BP-EC),
| | The replacement is scheduled for Unit 1 during its scheduled 1989 Refueling Outage and for Unit 2 during its next scheduled refueling outage in 1990.The personnel responsible for the inaccurate report on July 15 have been instructed in the appropriate methods for maintaining cleanliness of written documents while in a contaminated environment, and the importance of transmitting accurate information utilized to evaluate plant conditions. |
| potentiometer zero(EIIS/BP-EC) andanarrowrangedifferential pressureunit(DPU)(EIIS/BP-PIT).
| | These persons have since demonstrated the necessary skills to prevent a recurrence of this event during activities performed under similar circumstances. |
| Theinitialinvestigation indicated thatthe"zero"wasdrifting, whichresultsfromafaultycircuitboardandstraingauge.Subsequently, thesecomponents werereplaced.
| | To enhance the effectiveness of communications between Quality Control and Operations personnel, the data sheet(s)within the ultrasonic test procedure have been revised to require: 1)independent verification of test results;and 2)Unit Supervisor/SRO review and signature. |
| Theinstrumentation subsequently zeroedproperly, butdatawasnotrepeatable vhenrangedupandbackdownthemeasurement scale.Asaresult,theDPUnarrowrangewasreplacedwhicheliminated therepeatability problem.Later,'he spanandzeropotentiometers verereplacedtoensureproperinstrumentation operation.
| | NRC FORM 3BBA (943)*U.S.GPO.'(988 0 824 538/455 NRC FORR 35BA (983)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU N U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)o s o o o 3 1 6 8 6 0 2 3-0 2 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR~+.SEQVENTIAL |
| Thecalibrated instrument wasreturnedtoserviceonApril2,1987,andfunctioned normallyuntilApril26,atwhichtimethesystembegantoexhibitsignsofdriftingupwards.Ultrasonic measurements takenafterApril26confirmed theactualvolumewithinaccumulator f/2wassteadyandwellwithintheTechnical Specification allowable range,however,theresultsalsoconfirmed thatILA-121wascontinuing aslowbutsteadyupwarddrifttowardstheadministrative limitforoperability.
| | >y'EVISION NUMBER.~%NUMBER PAGE (3)0 7 QF 0 7 TEXT N/R/FB BP44B/4 BqvlBI/IIFB//I/BIBBn/ |
| Asaprecautionary measure,ILA-121wasdeclaredinoperable at1328hoursonApril30,1987.Furtherinvestigation conducted duringtheSeptember 1987outageindicated thattherootcauseofthesecondinstrument failurewasafaultyDPUnarrowrange.TheDPUnarrowrangewasreplacedandthecalibrated instrument wasreturnedtoserviceonSeptember 24,1987.Theinstrument hassubsequently functioned normally.
| | HRC%%dnII 35549/(17)Failed Com onent Identification Component: |
| Contributing tothiseventwasthefactthatQualityControlpersonnel whoperformed theoriginalUTonJuly15didnotimplement soundworkpractices whileconducting activities inaradioactive environment.
| | EIIS: Manufacturer: |
| Thisresultedinthelossofhard.copydatasupporting testresultsforcingthoseinvolvedtorelysolelyuponmemoryrecall.ItshouldbenotedthattheUTwasperformed within-anextremely harshenvironment consisting ofelevatedtemperature andairborneradioactivity.
| | Model Number: Circuit Board ECBD ITT-Barton 384 Component: |
| Theseadverseconditions complicated effortsofthetestcrewbecausefullfacemaskwasrequiredandthefatigueprocesswasaccelerated.
| | EIIS: Manufacturer: |
| Inadequate communication betweentheControlRoomandQualityControlpersonnel furthercomplicated thisevent.Noformalmechanism hadbeenestablished toverifythatoperators onshifthadacompleteandaccurateunderstanding oftheUTresults.NRCFORMSBBA(948)*U.S.GPO:)988%.824 538/455 NRCForm366A(94)3)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUNU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3(9)&104EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(llDOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2TEXT/kmcY8<<>>48lrnr/I/EerE I/88T/I/or>>/HRC
| | Model Number: Strain Gauge TD ITT-Barton 386 Component: |
| %%dnn35549/(17)YEAR3168602302(jar,SEGVENTIAL jZ':REVISION49NUM88Rv>errNUMSER05OF07AnalsisofEventThiseventisreportable underthecriteriaof10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) asdescribed below.-Forapproximately 3dayspriortoJuly18,1986,thevolumeofaccumulator 82wasbelowitslowerlimitingcondition foroperation andthecorresponding actionstatement associated withTechnical Specification 3.5.1bwasnotsatisfied.
| | EIIS: Manufacturer: |
| -BetweenJuly15andJuly18,1986,accumulator 82experienced asolutionincreasegreater>/m1percentofthetankvolumeandtheboronconcentration wasnotverifiedtobeacceptable withinthenext6hoursasrequiredbyTechnical Specification 4.5.1b.Thesafetysignificance ofpoweroperation withaccumulator volumeofoneaccumulator at909.6cubicfeetratherthan929cubicfeetislimitedtoimpactontheloss-of-coolant accidentanalysis.
| | Model Number: Differential Pressure Unit PIT ITT-Barton 224-352 Previous Similar Events There have been no similar events in the past where the plant has failed to meet the action statement associated with accumulator volumes being out of specification. |
| Thelimitingloss-of-coolant accidentanalysisforUnit2Cycle6predictsapeakcladtemperature of2079degreeFwitha121degreeFmargintothe2200degreeFlimitspecified in10CFR50.46.ExxonNuclearCompany,thefuelvendorforCycle6,wasrequested toevaluatetheimpactofthiseventonpublichealthandsafety.Theirresponsestated:itisExxon'sopinionthatasignificant safetyhazardtothepublicdidnotexistforthefollowing reason.Thelimitingcaseinthereference indicated apeakcladdingtemperature (PCT)of2079degreeFforoperation atlOOXpower.Operation at90percentpowerwouldresultinareduction inthePCTandwouldtendtooffsetanyincreaseinPCTduetothereducedaccumulator liquidvolume.Thereducedaccumulator liquidvolumealoneisexpectedtohaveaverysmalleffectonthePCT.Theaccumulator flowwouldendapproximately 1secondsoonerthanthetimeindicated inthereference.
| | Also, the plant has never failed in the past to verify boron concentration in the accumulators within 6 hours following a solution increase of>/J'percent of tank volume.NRC FORM SBBA (94)3)*U.S.GPO:1985.O.B24 538/455 Indiana Michigan Power".ompany Cook Nuclear Planl P.O, Box 458 Bridgman.MI 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICMIGAN POWER June 24, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No.50-316 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted: |
| Sincethisoccursafterthebeginning ofcorerecoverytime(BOCREC)whenthedowncomer isfull,averysmalladverseeffectonrefloodrateandPCTwouldoccurandwouldbemuchlessthanthe121degreeFmarginindicated inthereference."
| | 86-023-02 Sincerely, W.G.Smith, Jr.Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc: D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.,Davis, Region III M.P.Alexich P.A.Barrett H.B.Brugger R.W.Jurgensen NRC Resident Inspector J.F.Stang, NRC R.C.Callen G.Charnoff, Esq.Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D.Hahn INPO PNSRC A.A.Blind S.J.Brewer/B.P.Lauzau}} |
| Itisofnotethatthedifference betweentheas-foundcondition (909.6cubicfeet)andthevaluespecified intheTechnical Specification of929cubicfeetis19.4cubicfeet,orapproximately 960lbs.ofwater.Inordertoconservatively evaluatetheeffectonpeakcladtemperature, ahypothetical scenariowasevaluated inwhichitwasassumedthatthiswaterwasdeficient duringtherefillperiod,andhadtobemadeupbypumpedin5ection water.Itwouldhavetakenthepumpsapproximately 1.1secondstomakeupthiswater.SincethePCTrateofheatupduringtheearlyreflood/refill periodisabout13degree/sec.,
| |
| thiswouldhaveresultedinaPCTincreaseofabout15degreeF.Adding15degreeFtothecalculated PCTresultsinanewPCTof2094degreeF,whichisstillwellwithinthelimitsof10CFR50.46.NRCFORMSStA(94)3)8U.S.GPO:1986.0.624 538/455 NRCForm388A(943)L'ICENSEE NTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUANU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO.3150M)84EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME{1)DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(8)PACE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2TEXT/Smroodraco/rorR/)or/,
| |
| I/44/8/orro/NRC Farm35(LE'4/(IT) 050003]YEARP~r~+86SEQUENTIAL gj<NUMBER023REVISIONNUMBER0206OFAnalsisofEvent(cont'd)Theactualchangeinpeakcladtemperature, hadanewanalysisbeenperformed, wouldhavebeenwellbelowtheabove15degreesFvaluebecausethedeficit,in waterwouldhaveoccurredafterthebeginning ofcorerecoverywhenheattransfermechanisms associated withrefloodwereinplace,andtheneedforaccumulator waterhadsignificantly lessened. | |
| Itisalsoconcluded thatthemissedboronsurveillance wasnotofsignificance, sinceaboronsampletakenat0925hoursonJuly18contained aconcentration of1975partspermillion(ppm),whichiswellwithintherequiredlimitsof1900and2100ppm.Basedonalloftheaboveinformation, itisconcluded thattheeventdidnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59nordiditadversely impactpublichealthandsafety.Corrective ActionsImmediate corrective/preventative actionconsisted of:1)promptlyincreasing accumulator volumetowi.thinTechnical Specification limitsandverifying acceptable boronconcentration; and2)obtaining independently verifiedUTlevelindication, atleastonceevery10hours,toensureTechnical Specification compliance whiletheprocessinstrumentation was/isoutofservice.Longtermpreventative actionwillbetoreplacealloftheaccumulator levelinstrumentation withFoxboroinstrumentation assimilarproblemshavebeenexperienced withseveraloftheotherITT-Barton instruments.
| |
| Thereplacement isscheduled forUnit1duringitsscheduled 1989Refueling OutageandforUnit2duringitsnextscheduled refueling outagein1990.Thepersonnel responsible fortheinaccurate reportonJuly15havebeeninstructed intheappropriate methodsformaintaining cleanliness ofwrittendocuments whileinacontaminated environment, andtheimportance oftransmitting accurateinformation utilizedtoevaluateplantconditions.
| |
| Thesepersonshavesincedemonstrated thenecessary skillstopreventarecurrence ofthiseventduringactivities performed undersimilarcircumstances.
| |
| Toenhancetheeffectiveness ofcommunications betweenQualityControlandOperations personnel, thedatasheet(s)withintheultrasonic testprocedure havebeenrevisedtorequire:1)independent verification oftestresults;and2)UnitSupervisor/SRO reviewandsignature.
| |
| NRCFORM3BBA(943)*U.S.GPO.'(988 0824538/455 NRCFORR35BA(983)LICENSEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUNU.S,NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO.3150&104EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit2OOCKETNUMBER(2)osooo31686023-02LERNUMBER(6)YEAR~+.SEQVENTIAL
| |
| >y'EVISIONNUMBER.~%NUMBERPAGE(3)07QF07TEXTN/R/FBBP44B/4BqvlBI/IIFB//I/BIBBn/
| |
| HRC%%dnII35549/(17)FailedComonentIdentification Component:
| |
| EIIS:Manufacturer:
| |
| ModelNumber:CircuitBoardECBDITT-Barton 384Component:
| |
| EIIS:Manufacturer:
| |
| ModelNumber:StrainGaugeTDITT-Barton 386Component:
| |
| EIIS:Manufacturer:
| |
| ModelNumber:Differential PressureUnitPITITT-Barton 224-352PreviousSimilarEventsTherehavebeennosimilareventsinthepastwheretheplanthasfailedtomeettheactionstatement associated withaccumulator volumesbeingoutofspecification.
| |
| Also,theplanthasneverfailedinthepasttoverifyboronconcentration intheaccumulators within6hoursfollowing asolutionincreaseof>/J'percentoftankvolume.NRCFORMSBBA(94)3)*U.S.GPO:1985.O.B24 538/455 IndianaMichiganPower".ompanyCookNuclearPlanlP.O,Box458Bridgman.
| |
| MI491066164655901INDIANANICMIGANPOWERJune24,1988UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Operating LicenseDPR-58DocketNo.50-316DocumentControlManager:Inaccordance withthecriteriaestablished by10CFR50.73entitledLicenseeEventReortinSstem,thefollowing reportisbeingsubmitted:
| |
| 86-023-02 Sincerely, W.G.Smith,Jr.PlantManagerWGS:clwAttachment cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.,Davis, RegionIIIM.P.AlexichP.A.BarrettH.B.BruggerR.W.Jurgensen NRCResidentInspector J.F.Stang,NRCR.C.CallenG.Charnoff, Esq.DottieSherman,ANILibraryD.HahnINPOPNSRCA.A.BlindS.J.Brewer/B.
| |
| P.Lauzau}} | |
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Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999 LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999 LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998 LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998 LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122 ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998 LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998 LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998 LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998 LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405 ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999 LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999 LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999 LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999 LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999 LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999 LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998 LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998 LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122 ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998 LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998 LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998 LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998 LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998 LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3 1999-09-17
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999 Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3). ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999 Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios. ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999 Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2. ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates. ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999 Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218. ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
AC CELEBRATED 91S'JUUBUTION DEMONS~TJON SY~gM REGULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIOIYSTEM (RIDE))", ACCESSION NBR:8807060119 DOC.DATE: 88/06/24 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACZL:50-316 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana&05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POSTLEWAZT,T.K.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.SMITH,W.G.
Indiana Michigan Powe Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 86-023-02:on 860715,erroneous accumulator level indication resulting in low accumulator volume.W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL/SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: R RECIPIENT ZD CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA STANGFJ INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 DR<IB 9A RES/DE/EIB RGN3 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EGSrG WI LL IAMS F S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYSFG COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DRPS DEPY FORD BLDG HOYFA LPDR NSIC HARRZSFJ COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 h D h TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44 NRC Form 355 (9.83)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATOAY COMMISSION APPAOVEO OMB NO, 31504101 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3)o 5 o o o 3 1 6>OF 0 7 TITLE (Il Erroneous Accumulator Level Indication Resulting in Low Accumulator Volume MONTH DAY YEAR EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (5)YEARÃ~'.SEQVSNtIAL Pr~REVOKE NVM888 X5 IIVM88R REPORT DATE (7)MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)0 7 1 5 8 6 8 6 0 2 3 0 2 0 62 48 8 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (8)POWER LEVEL THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 50.73(e)(2)(ivl 50.73(e)12)(vl 50.nN)(2)(vB) 50.n(el(2)(vBII(A) 50,73(el(2)(v)5)(BI 9),73(~)(2)(el 20A05(c)50.38(cl(1) 50.38(c)(2)50,73(e I l2)0)50 73(el(2)(EI 50.73(e)(2)(511 20.802 (8)20405(~)(1)(l)20A05 (el(I)(8)20A05(e)(1)(BII 20A05(el(1)(tvl 20A05(~)(I)(vl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()I (Check one or mori Of the follovffnfl (Ill 73.7)(8)73.71(c)OTHER fSpeclfy In Ahttrect Oelow end In Feet, NRC Form 3BBAI NAME T.K.Postlewait-Technical En ineerin Su erintendent TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 64 6 5-5 9 0 1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER E P0 R TA 8 L~',It~I Ii CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER TO NPROS X X B P E C B D B P T D I 2 0 4 I 2 0 4@~I X B PP I T I 2 04 SUPPLEMENTAL AEPOAT EXPECTED (lel EXPECTED SU 5 Ml SS ION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR YES f/f yet, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION D4 FE)NO ABBTRAcT (Llmlt to te00 tpecet, I.e., eppronlmetely fifteen tlncleepece typewritten llnnl 08)This revision is being submitted to include the results of diagnostic testing performed during the September 1987 outage.Between July 15 and 18, 1986, problems were encountered with the process instrumentation monitoring the volume within accumulator)jj'2.Complications developed during ultrasonic testing (UT)conducted to verify accumulator operability which resulted in the failure to identify a violation of the action statement associated with low accumulator volume and a missed surveillance for boron concentration.
The administrative problems associated with accumulator level verification by UT were corrected.and this method was used in lieu of the process instrumentation to verify accumulator operability until unit shutdown for an outage March 3, 1987.Testing performed during the March 1987 outage, determined that three instrument components were defective; all were replaced in kind.On April 26, 1987 ILA<<121 began to drift upwards.On April 30, 1987, as a precautionary measure, ILA-121 was declared inoperable.
Accumulator level was monitored using UT until unit shutdown on August 27, 1987.Testing performed during the September 1987 outage determined that one instrument component was defective.
The component was replaced in kind and the process instrumentation has subsequently functioned normally.NRC Form 388 (Be)3I 88070609 880624 PDR ADOCK 050003}6 S PNU$6ZZ NRC Form 3BBA (943(LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO, 3I50-0104 EXPIRES: 8/3'I/88 FACILITY NAME (I(DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8(PAGE (3i D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TE/ET/~RRE>>
<<~,~~//RC r 3SBA<</(m YEAR o s o o o 3 1 6 8 6 SEOUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 2 QF 0 7 This revision is being submitted to include the results of diagnostic testing performed during the September 1987 outage.Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 2 in Mode 1, RTP at 48 percent (91330 hours on 7-15-86)Descri tion of Event Technical Specification 3.5.lb requires that each accumulator (EIIS/BP-TK) must maintain between 929 and 971 cubic feet of borated water while the unit is in Modes 1-3 (Power Operation, Startup, and Hot Standby, respectively).
If the accumulator volume deviates from the prescribed limits, the volume must be restored within 1 hour or the unit must be in hot shutdown (Mode 4)within the next 12 hours.Process instrumentation monitoring accumulator inventory (EIIS/BP-LIT) displays water volume in cubic feet.The system is comprised of 2 indicators for each accumulator, one wide range (300-1000 cubic feet)and one narrow range (900-1000 cubic feet).On July 15, 1986, operators on shift became suspect of the accumulator 82 volume indication and requested an ultrasonic test (UT)be performed to verify water inventory.
Quality Control personnel located the water level using ultrasound and then marked/dated the tank accordingly; however, during this process their data sheet became contaminated and was discarded before leaving access control.A new data sheet was subsequently filled out from memory and the Control Room was informed at 1330 hours on July 15 that accumulator
(/(2 was at 115.75 inches.When mathematically converted to volume, this level corresponds to 969.58 cubic feet;which, by coincidence only, happened to closely agree with the process instrumentation indication at that time.On July 18, 1986, at 0800 hours another UT was requested for accumulator
/!2 because of questionable volume indication.
When QC arrived at accumulator
(/'2 they discovered a 10 inch error was made in the July 15 report.The level was actually 105.75 inches (909.58 cubic feet)on July 15, and not 115.75 (969.58 cubic feet)as reported.It can therefore be deduced that the lower limit for continued operation (929 cubic feet)had been violated since at least July 15 without the appropriate compensatory actions being taken.NRC FORM SBBA (EBS I*U.S.GPO:(BBB 0 824 538/455 NRC Form 366A (84)3)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N V.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3(50-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME l()D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)3 1 686 LFR NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 PAGE (3)OF TUCT (lmrso Epsos/4 rBEM)BI(, BBB///orrr/HRC
/ronn 36543)l17)Descri tion of Event (cont'd)This error was compounded during communications between Quality Control and Operations following the UT performed the morning of July 18.At 0945 hours on that morning, Quality Control reported the level of accumulator f32 had risen 3 inches since the last test performed on July 15.Operations was not made aware of the 10 inch error discovered earlier.Consequently, acting under the impression that accumulator
((I2 had risen from 115.75 inches (969.58 cubic feet)to a volume exceeding the upper limiting condition for continued operation,'perations personnel declared accumulator 82 inoperable based upon high level (it was actually low)and measures were taken to begin draining the tank.With respect to the volume increase which occurred sometime between July 15 and July 18, no conclusive evidence can be produced confirming that said increase actually happened within a six hour time span preceding boron sampling performed at 0925 hours on July 18.Therefore, the plant must assume the boron concentration was not verified following a solution increase>/1 percent of tank volume as required by Technical Specification 4.5.1b.It should be noted that at 0952 hours on July 18, while preparations were underway for draining accumulator 82, Unit 2 tripped on a steam generator level high-high signal thus placing the unit in Mode 3.This event was further complicated at 1447 hours on July 18 when the Control Room was informed that UT results placed 82 accumulator's level 3 inches below the last measurement taken earlier that morning (due to draining).
With this information, and still unaware of the 10 inch error made on July 15, Operations declared the accumulator operable because they believed the apparently high volume of water had been reduced to within acceptable limits for continued operation.
In reality, the accumulator volume was drained down from an already too low condition to an even lower status.At 1620 hours on July 18, Operations became cognizant of the 10 inch error made on July 15.It was recognized at this time that accumulator
$!2 was, and had been since at least 1330 hours on July 15, in violation of the lower volume limit required by Technical Specification 3.5.1b.Accumulator
/f2 was immediately declared inoperable.
Cooling of the reactor coolant system (EIIS/BP-AB) to achieve Mode 4 began at 1720 hours and the NRC was notified of the event by phone at 1808 hours.Efforts towards filling accumulator f/2 via the refueling water storage tank (EIIS/BP-TK) commenced at 1839 hours and the event was terminated at 2120 hours on July 18 when the accumulator volume and boron concentration were verified to be within the limiting condition for operation as described in Technical Specification 3.5.1b and 3.5.1c respectively.
Cooldown was halted prior to reaching Mode 4.With the exception of the loop 2 accumulator volume instrumentation, there were no inoperable structures, systems, or components at the start of this event which could have contributed to its occurrence.
NRC FORM 366A (()4)3)o U,S.GPO.1 988 0 824 538/455 0<i I I NRC Form 388A (943)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA~N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (Bl PAGE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Flant-Unit 2 7%XT/4/m<<o NMoo/s IFEo8or/, Irso I/8/ooo/HRC R<<m 35843/(17)o s o o o 3 1 6 YEAR@IrI 8 6 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 8 rV 0 2 3 IIEVISION NUMSER 0 2 0 4 OF 0 7 Cause of Event The cause of this event has been attributed to the inability of the process instrumentation to accurately reflect the volume within accumulator 82, which resulted in the need for ultrasonic testing to verify accumulator operability.
Three defective components within the system were diagnosed as the root cause for the instrumentation failure.the instrumentation consists of a circuit board (EIIS/BP-ECBD), strain gauge (EIIS/BP-TD), potentiometer span (EIIS/BP-EC), potentiometer zero (EIIS/BP-EC) and a narrow range differential pressure unit (DPU)(EIIS/BP-PIT).
The initial investigation indicated that the"zero" was drifting, which results from a faulty circuit board and strain gauge.Subsequently, these components were replaced.The instrumentation subsequently zeroed properly, but data was not repeatable vhen ranged up and back down the measurement scale.As a result, the DPU narrow range was replaced which eliminated the repeatability problem.Later,'he span and zero potentiometers vere replaced to ensure proper instrumentation operation.
The calibrated instrument was returned to service on April 2, 1987, and functioned normally until April 26, at which time the system began to exhibit signs of drifting upwards.Ultrasonic measurements taken after April 26 confirmed the actual volume within accumulator f/2 was steady and well within the Technical Specification allowable range, however, the results also confirmed that ILA-121 was continuing a slow but steady upward drift towards the administrative limit for operability.
As a precautionary measure, ILA-121 was declared inoperable at 1328 hours on April 30, 1987.Further investigation conducted during the September 1987 outage indicated that the root cause of the second instrument failure was a faulty DPU narrow range.The DPU narrow range was replaced and the calibrated instrument was returned to service on September 24, 1987.The instrument has subsequently functioned normally.Contributing to this event was the fact that Quality Control personnel who performed the original UT on July 15 did not implement sound work practices while conducting activities in a radioactive environment.
This resulted in the loss of hard.copy data supporting test results forcing those involved to rely solely upon memory recall.It should be noted that the UT was performed within-an extremely harsh environment consisting of elevated temperature and airborne radioactivity.
These adverse conditions complicated efforts of the test crew because full face mask was required and the fatigue process was accelerated.
Inadequate communication between the Control Room and Quality Control personnel further complicated this event.No formal mechanism had been established to verify that operators on shift had a complete and accurate understanding of the UT results.NRC FORM SBBA (948)*U.S.GPO:)988%.824 538/455 NRC Form 366A (94)3)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3(9)&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (ll DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)PAGE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/kmcY8<<>>48 lr nr/I/EerE I/88 T/I/or>>/HRC
%%dnn 35549/(17)YEAR 3 1 6 8 6 0 2 3 0 2 (jar, SEGVENTIAL jZ': REVISION 49 NUM88R v>err NUMSER 0 5 OF 0 7 Anal sis of Event This event is reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)as described below.-For approximately 3 days prior to July 18, 1986, the volume of accumulator 82 was below its lower limiting condition for operation and the corresponding action statement associated with Technical Specification 3.5.1b was not satisfied.
-Between July 15 and July 18, 1986, accumulator 82 experienced a solution increase greater>/m 1 percent of the tank volume and the boron concentration was not verified to be acceptable within the next 6 hours as required by Technical Specification 4.5.1b.The safety significance of power operation with accumulator volume of one accumulator at 909.6 cubic feet rather than 929 cubic feet is limited to impact on the loss-of-coolant accident analysis.The limiting loss-of-coolant accident analysis for Unit 2 Cycle 6 predicts a peak clad temperature of 2079 degree F with a 121 degree F margin to the 2200 degree F limit specified in 10 CFR 50.46.Exxon Nuclear Company, the fuel vendor for Cycle 6, was requested to evaluate the impact of this event on public health and safety.Their response stated: it is Exxon's opinion that a significant safety hazard to the public did not exist for the following reason.The limiting case in the reference indicated a peak cladding temperature (PCT)of 2079 degree F for operation at lOOX power.Operation at 90 percent power would result in a reduction in the PCT and would tend to offset any increase in PCT due to the reduced accumulator liquid volume.The reduced accumulator liquid volume alone is expected to have a very small effect on the PCT.The accumulator flow would end approximately 1 second sooner than the time indicated in the reference.
Since this occurs after the beginning of core recovery time (BOCREC)when the downcomer is full, a very small adverse effect on reflood rate and PCT would occur and would be much less than the 121 degree F margin indicated in the reference." It is of note that the difference between the as-found condition (909.6 cubic feet)and the value specified in the Technical Specification of 929 cubic feet is 19.4 cubic feet, or approximately 960 lbs.of water.In order to conservatively evaluate the effect on peak clad temperature, a hypothetical scenario was evaluated in which it was assumed that this water was deficient during the refill period, and had to be made up by pumped in5ection water.It would have taken the pumps approximately 1.1 seconds to make up this water.Since the PCT rate of heatup during the early reflood/refill period is about 13 degree/sec., this would have resulted in a PCT increase of about 15 degree F.Adding 15 degree F to the calculated PCT results in a new PCT of 2094 degree F, which is still well within the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.NRC FORM SStA (94)3)8 U.S.GPO:1986.0.624 538/455 NRC Form 388A (943)L'ICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3150M)84 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME{1)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)PACE (3)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT/Smroo draco/r orR/)or/, I/44/8/orro/NRC Farm 35(LE'4/(IT) 0 5 0 0 0 3]YEAR P~r~+8 6 SEQUENTIAL gj<NUMBER 0 2 3 REVISION NUMBER 0 2 0 6 OF Anal sis of Event (cont'd)The actual change in peak clad temperature, had a new analysis been performed, would have been well below the above 15 degrees F value because the deficit,in water would have occurred after the beginning of core recovery when heat transfer mechanisms associated with reflood were in place, and the need for accumulator water had significantly lessened.It is also concluded that the missed boron surveillance was not of significance, since a boron sample taken at 0925 hours on July 18 contained a concentration of 1975 parts per million (ppm), which is well within the required limits of 1900 and 2100 ppm.Based on all of the above information, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 nor did it adversely impact public health and safety.Corrective Actions Immediate corrective/preventative action consisted of: 1)promptly increasing accumulator volume to wi.thin Technical Specification limits and verifying acceptable boron concentration; and 2)obtaining independently verified UT level indication, at least once every 10 hours, to ensure Technical Specification compliance while the process instrumentation was/is out of service.Long term preventative action will be to replace all of the accumulator level instrumentation with Foxboro instrumentation as similar problems have been experienced with several of the other ITT-Barton instruments.
The replacement is scheduled for Unit 1 during its scheduled 1989 Refueling Outage and for Unit 2 during its next scheduled refueling outage in 1990.The personnel responsible for the inaccurate report on July 15 have been instructed in the appropriate methods for maintaining cleanliness of written documents while in a contaminated environment, and the importance of transmitting accurate information utilized to evaluate plant conditions.
These persons have since demonstrated the necessary skills to prevent a recurrence of this event during activities performed under similar circumstances.
To enhance the effectiveness of communications between Quality Control and Operations personnel, the data sheet(s)within the ultrasonic test procedure have been revised to require: 1)independent verification of test results;and 2)Unit Supervisor/SRO review and signature.
NRC FORM 3BBA (943)*U.S.GPO.'(988 0 824 538/455 NRC FORR 35BA (983)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU N U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 OOCKET NUMBER (2)o s o o o 3 1 6 8 6 0 2 3-0 2 LER NUMBER (6)YEAR~+.SEQVENTIAL
>y'EVISION NUMBER.~%NUMBER PAGE (3)0 7 QF 0 7 TEXT N/R/FB BP44B/4 BqvlBI/IIFB//I/BIBBn/
HRC%%dnII 35549/(17)Failed Com onent Identification Component:
EIIS: Manufacturer:
Model Number: Circuit Board ECBD ITT-Barton 384 Component:
EIIS: Manufacturer:
Model Number: Strain Gauge TD ITT-Barton 386 Component:
EIIS: Manufacturer:
Model Number: Differential Pressure Unit PIT ITT-Barton 224-352 Previous Similar Events There have been no similar events in the past where the plant has failed to meet the action statement associated with accumulator volumes being out of specification.
Also, the plant has never failed in the past to verify boron concentration in the accumulators within 6 hours following a solution increase of>/J'percent of tank volume.NRC FORM SBBA (94)3)*U.S.GPO:1985.O.B24 538/455 Indiana Michigan Power".ompany Cook Nuclear Planl P.O, Box 458 Bridgman.MI 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICMIGAN POWER June 24, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No.50-316 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:
86-023-02 Sincerely, W.G.Smith, Jr.Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc: D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.,Davis, Region III M.P.Alexich P.A.Barrett H.B.Brugger R.W.Jurgensen NRC Resident Inspector J.F.Stang, NRC R.C.Callen G.Charnoff, Esq.Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D.Hahn INPO PNSRC A.A.Blind S.J.Brewer/B.P.Lauzau}}