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| {{#Wiki_filter:00REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIOS)ACCESSION NdR:8102180444 DUC~DATE:81/02/10NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:0 0 REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIOS)ACCESSION NdR:8102180444 DUC~DATE: 81/02/10 NOTARIZED: |
| NOFACIL:50-87Susquehanna SteamElectricStation<UnitIRpennsylva sguehanna SteamEl.ectric Station<Unit2RPennsylva A,~AUTHURAFFILIATIONCUTISg>I~Ti~Pennsylvania PowertrIightCo.RECIP.~A~~E RECIPIc'NTAFFILIATION GRIERr8,h.ReasonIRPhilaaelphia<
| | NO FACIL:50-87 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station<Unit IR pennsylva sguehanna Steam El.ectric Station<Unit 2R Pennsylva A,~AU THUR AF F ILI ATION CU T I S g>I~Ti~Pennsylvania Power tr I ight Co.RECIP.~A~~E REC IPIc'NT AFFILIATION GR IER r 8, h.Reason IR Philaaelphia< |
| OfficeoftheDirectorSUBJECT;Finaldeficiency reptreovalityofsmalldiameterpipeatbendsexceeoina AS4lEBoilerttPressureVesselCodetolerancesiin>tiatly reportedon800411.Benos willoedispositioned inaccordance w/criteriaby810331ROISTRISUTIOR COOE:SOISSOORIESRECEIVES:LTR 3ERCLfSIZE:TITLE:Construction OeficiencyReport(10CFR50~55E)NOTES:Send IH,E3copiesFSAR4allamends'enal 16E3copiesf-SAR4allamends'OCKET
| | Office of the Director SUBJECT;Final deficiency rept re ovality of small diameter pipe at bends exceeoina AS4lE Boiler tt Pressure Vessel Code tolerancesiin>tiatly reported on 800411.Benos will oe dispositioned in accordance w/cr iteria by 810331R OISTRISUTIOR COOE: SOISS OORIES RECEIVES:LTR 3 ERCL f SIZE: TI TLE: Construction Oe f i c i ency Report (10CFR50~55E)NOTES:Send IH,E 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'enal 16E 3 copies f-SAR 4 all amends'OCKET |
| ¹05000387050003880500038705000388~ECIPIENTIDCODE/"lAt.1EACTION:A/9LICEHSI'tG OwRUSHBRODKztor | | ¹05000387 05000388 05000387 05000388~ECIP I ENT ID CODE/"lAt.1E ACTION: A/9 LICEHSI'tG Ow RUSHBRODKztor |
| ~nbINTERNAL: | | ~nb INTERNAL: AO/RC I/IE I?D/OIR Huq FAC15 EOU tt STAFF 19 HYg/GEO BR LIC QUAL BR lg t~Rt: POR 02 EV I>nl ST~NORDS OEV 21 COVIES LTl'R ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I PEC IP IENT IO CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODEB 05 STARKERS 07 ASLt3P/J.HARD DIR pOIV OF LIC FAUIP ilUAL BR11 IhE 09 SPA 20 OELO 21 QA BR 14 RUTHERFORDRH, IE COPIES LrTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS r~SIC lo Oo la 16 1 LPOR 03 TOTAL'tu>lBEEr OF COP IES rCEVUIRKO: |
| AO/RCI/IEI?D/OIRHuqFAC15EOUttSTAFF19HYg/GEOBRLICQUALBRlgt~Rt:POR02EVI>nlST~NORDSOEV21COVIESLTl'RENCL111111111111IPECIPIENTIOCODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODEB 05STARKERS07ASLt3P/J.HARD DIRpOIVOFLICFAUIPilUALBR11IhE09SPA20OELO21QABR14RUTHERFORDRH, IECOPIESLrTRENCL1111111111111111111EXTERNAL: | | LTTR 39 FNCL 39 l TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA.18101 PHONEr (215)770 5151 NORMAN W.CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 3 Construction-Nuclear 770.5381 February 10, 1981 Mr.Boyce H.Grier-Director, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY RELATING TO OVALITY OF BENT PIPE ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-630 |
| ACRSr~SICloOola161LPOR03TOTAL'tu>lBEEr OFCOPIESrCEVUIRKO:
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| LTTR39FNCL39 lTWONORTHNINTHSTREET,ALLENTOWN, PA.18101PHONEr(215)7705151NORMANW.CURTISVicePresident-Engineering 3Construction-Nuclear 770.5381February10,1981Mr.BoyceH.Grier-Director, RegionIU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission 631ParkAvenueKingofPrussia,PA19406SUSQUEHANNA STEAMELECTRICSTATIONFINALREPORTOFADEFICIENCY RELATINGTOOVALITYOFBENTPIPEERs100450/100508 FILE840-4/900-10 PLA-630
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| ==Reference:== | | ==Reference:== |
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| PLA-498(6/20/80) | | PLA-498 (6/20/80)' |
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| ==DearMr.Grier:== | | ==Dear Mr.Grier:== |
| ThisletterservestoprovidetheCommission withafinalreportofadeficiency relatingtoexcessive ovalityofsmalldiameterpipecausedbybendswhichwereproducedinthefieldpriortotheinstallation.
| | This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a deficiency relating to excessive ovality of small diameter pipe caused by bends which were produced in the field prior to the installation. |
| Theovalityofthepipeatthebendsexceedsthetolerances specified intheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,NB4223.2.
| | The ovality of the pipe at the bends exceeds the tolerances specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, NB4223.2.The condition was originally reported in PLA-498, and the information contained herein is submitted as a final report pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).The attachment to this letter contains a description of the problem;its cause, safety implications and significance; and the corrective action taken and planned to preclude recurrence. |
| Thecondition wasoriginally reportedinPLA-498,andtheinformation contained hereinissubmitted asafinalreportpursuanttotheprovisions of10CFR50.55(e).
| | We trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory. |
| Theattachment tothislettercontainsadescription oftheproblem;itscause,safetyimplications andsignificance; andthecorrective actiontakenandplannedtoprecluderecurrence.
| | Very truly yours, N.W.Curtis Vice President-Engineering |
| WetrusttheCommission willfindtheinformation forwarded bythislettertobesatisfactory.
| | &Construction-Nuclear FLW:sab Qorrt 5 I/i Attachment al ezlaO PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5 LIGHT COAIPANY |
| Verytrulyyours,N.W.CurtisVicePresident-Engineering
| | ~V~I Mr.Boyce H.Grier February 10, 1981 cc: Mr.Victor Stello (15)Director-Office of Inspection a Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 45 Office of Management Information |
| &Construction-Nuclear FLW:sabQorrt5I/iAttachment alezlaOPENNSYLVANIA POWER5LIGHTCOAIPANY | | &Program Control U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Mr.Robert M.Gallo U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.Box 52 Shickshinny, PA 18655 1 1.Description of Problem NCR-5523 dated April 11,.1980, identified a nonconforming condition in.which small diameter pipe bent in'the field exceeds the tolerance stated in ASME, Section III,"NB-4223.2. |
| ~V~I Mr.BoyceH.GrierFebruary10,1981cc:Mr.VictorStello(15)Director-Office ofInspection aEnforcement U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.2055545OfficeofManagement Information | | Ovality Tolerance. |
| &ProgramControlU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Mr.RobertM.GalloU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission P.O.Box52Shickshinny, PA18655 11.Description ofProblemNCR-5523datedApril11,.1980, identified anonconforming condition in.whichsmalldiameterpipebentin'thefieldexceedsthetolerance statedinASME,SectionIII,"NB-4223.2. | | Unless otherwise justified by the Stress Report, the ovality of piping after bending shall not exceed 8 percent as determined by 100 K (D-.D.)/D where.D 0 D min D max The minimum pipe outside diameter before bending or forming, in.(mm)=The minimum outside diameter'after bending or forming, in.'mm).=The maximum outside diameter after bending or forming, in.(mm)1 I Nuclear Class II and III piping are subject to the same provisions. |
| OvalityTolerance.
| | .This formula is derived from the 1971 edition of Section III with.Addenda thru Winter, 1972..This is the Code in effect for.this pro j e'ct.Construction determined the values for D , D., D through actual measurement of the pipe.D.anl D were 5etermined by taking 3 sets of readings inside tEe oend.Ponstruction used.the values from the point that produced the greatest variation. |
| Unlessotherwise justified bytheStressReport,theovalityofpipingafterbendingshallnotexceed8percentasdetermined by100K(D-.D.)/Dwhere.D0DminDmaxTheminimumpipeoutsidediameterbeforebendingorforming,in.(mm)=Theminimumoutsidediameter'afterbendingorforming,in.'mm).=Themaximumoutsidediameterafterbendingorforming,in.(mm)1INuclearClassIIandIIIpipingaresubjecttothesameprovisions.
| | D was determined by a reading taken adjacent to the bend.The deficiency identified four stainless steel pipe bends where the ovality exceeds 8g.2.'Cause.of Deficiency The subject non-conforming condition has been primarily on pipe bends that were made in place, apparently using the Greenlee Model jj884 One Shot.hydraulic ram type bender;Sample bends made on this bender did not meet the 8$ovality requirement. |
| .Thisformulaisderivedfromthe1971editionofSectionIIIwith.AddendathruWinter,1972..ThisistheCodeineffectfor.thisproje'ct.Construction determined thevaluesforD,D.,Dthroughactualmeasurement ofthepipe.D.anlDwere5etermined bytaking3setsofreadingsinsidetEeoend.Ponstruction used.thevaluesfromthepointthatproducedthegreatestvariation. | | Bends made in the onsite pipe prefab facility on the Pedrick mechanical bender have been observed to be better than those made on the Greenlee machine.However, even these bends have very little margin with respect to ovality.Bends made in place with the Ensley mechanical bender d'o not appear to have ovality discrepancies. |
| Dwasdetermined byareadingtakenadjacenttothebend.Thedeficiency identified fourstainless steelpipebendswheretheovalityexceeds8g.2.'Cause.ofDeficiency Thesubjectnon-conforming condition hasbeenprimarily onpipebendsthatweremadeinplace,apparently usingtheGreenleeModeljj884OneShot.hydraulic ramtypebender;Samplebendsmadeonthisbenderdidnotmeetthe8$ovalityrequirement.
| | Another contributing factor is the lack of specific instructions to construction forces (via specifications for fabrication and installation of piping)for qualification and control of pipe bending performed at the jobsite.1of 3 Siace there is no record of which bends were made on which machiae, all installed bends are being checked for ovality.Only after a complete iaspection will the full magnitude of the problem be Mown.This inspectioa is being performed and documented as part of the'isposition of NCR-5523,. |
| BendsmadeintheonsitepipeprefabfacilityonthePedrickmechanical benderhavebeenobservedtobebetterthanthosemadeontheGreenleemachine.However,eventhesebendshaveverylittlemarginwithrespecttoovality.BendsmadeinplacewiththeEnsleymechanical benderd'onotappeartohaveovalitydiscrepancies.
| | NCR-5674 aad additional NCR's.3.Analysis of Safety Impli'cation Project Engiaeeriag has developed acceptaace criteria based on stress analysis for pipe bends with.ovality up'to 15$.Maximumovality permitted is 8$for pipiag which is subject to temperature traasients and 15$for piping which is not subject.to temperature transients. |
| Anothercontributing factoristhelackofspecificinstructions toconstruction forces(viaspecifications forfabrication andinstallation ofpiping)forqualification andcontrolofpipebendingperformed atthejobsite.1of3 Siacethereisnorecordofwhichbendsweremadeonwhichmachiae,allinstalled bendsarebeingcheckedforovality.Onlyafteracompleteiaspection willthefullmagnitude oftheproblembeMown.Thisinspectioa isbeingperformed anddocumented aspartofthe'isposition ofNCR-5523,.
| | Additionally the bends must be free of rapid chaages in curvature aad circumferential kinks or concavity as defined in the criteria.Wall thickaess, after bending, must meet desiga.minimum;The effect on flow (pressure drop)due to reduced cross~sectional area of bends with up to 15$ovality was addressed and.found to be insignificaat. |
| NCR-5674aadadditional NCR's.3.AnalysisofSafetyImpli'cation ProjectEngiaeeriag hasdeveloped acceptaace criteriabasedonstressanalysisforpipebendswith.ovality up'to15$.Maximumovalitypermitted is8$forpipiagwhichissubjecttotemperature traasients and15$forpipingwhichisnotsubject.to temperature transients. | | Approximately 700 bends, including all bends in small piping within the primary reactor pressure vessel bouadary have been iaspected aad dispositioaed ia accordance with the criteria;Although the balance of bends (approximately 5,000), in safety related systems have not been inspected it is felt that the work to date i's a represeatative sample and is adequate to evaluate the safety impli-cations.Of the approximately 700 bends checked as of Dec.1980, one exceeded 15X ovality and two exceeded the 8$ovality limit for piping subject.to temperature transients. |
| Additionally thebendsmustbefreeofrapidchaagesincurvature aadcircumferential kinksorconcavity asdefinedinthecriteria. | | These three bends have been replaced.Approximately 240 bends measured fell between the 8-15$limit allowed for systems not subject to temperature transients. |
| Wallthickaess, afterbending,mustmeetdesiga.minimum;Theeffectonflow(pressure drop)duetoreducedcross~sectional areaofbendswithupto15$ovalitywasaddressed and.foundtobeinsignificaat.
| | Three installed bends in safety related piping had to be replaced to'meet the project engineering acceptance criteria.Aay bends which d'o not meet the acceptaace criteria are ass~ed to fail in service.Such failures could'ave affected adversely the safety of operatioas of'the plant.Therefore, this coaditioa is-considered reportable under 10 CZR 50.55(e)'. |
| Approximately 700bends,including allbendsinsmallpipingwithintheprimaryreactorpressurevesselbouadaryhavebeeniaspected aaddispositioaed iaaccordance withthecriteria; Althoughthebalanceofbends(approximately 5,000),insafetyrelatedsystemshavenotbeeninspected itisfeltthattheworktodatei'sarepreseatative sampleandisadequatetoevaluatethesafetyimpli-cations.Oftheapproximately 700bendscheckedasofDec.1980,oneexceeded15Xovalityandtwoexceededthe8$ovalitylimitforpipingsubject.totemperature transients. | | 5.Corrective Action The acceptance criteria was issued on May 30, 1980.Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250 bends per month and that final corrective action will be completed, for Unit 1 aad Common, by March, 1981.~~~Specificatioa M-204 for fabrication and, installation of pi>fag has been amended to require field procedures to control and monitor future bending to ensure that 8$.ovality is not exceeded and that beads exceeding this limit or any other criteria shall be rejected.2qf 3 6.Corrective Action'to Preclude Recurrence-E~bdb'd'p''d'd*'PP Engineering-acceptance criteria.All measurements are being verified by on site quality control personnel. |
| Thesethreebendshavebeenreplaced.
| | For future bends, a program has been instituted to'ave all bends checked for ovality by the responsible system engineers prior to installation of the bend.Also, all applicable superintendents have been directed to insure that proper bending equipment, and techniques are used for all.pipe.behds.In addition, Quality Control has been requested to inspect and document all Q-bends for ovality.Use of the Greenlee"one shot" bender has been discontinued for bending pipe.Also, a Pedrick representative visited the jobsite and.provided instruction as to the proper use and maintenance of the Pedrick bending machine, and re'commended some replacement parts where the shoes were worn.Those.parts have been replaced.2U/AAW 3of 3}} |
| Approximately 240bendsmeasuredfellbetweenthe8-15$limitallowedforsystemsnotsubjecttotemperature transients. | |
| Threeinstalled bendsinsafetyrelatedpipinghadtobereplacedto'meettheprojectengineering acceptance criteria.
| |
| Aaybendswhichd'onotmeettheacceptaace criteriaareass~edtofailinservice.Suchfailurescould'ave affectedadversely thesafetyofoperatioas of'theplant.Therefore, thiscoaditioa is-considered reportable under10CZR50.55(e)'.
| |
| 5.Corrective ActionTheacceptance criteriawasissuedonMay30,1980.Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250bendspermonthandthatfinalcorrective actionwillbecompleted, forUnit1aadCommon,byMarch,1981.~~~Specificatioa M-204forfabrication and,installation ofpi>faghasbeenamendedtorequirefieldprocedures tocontrolandmonitorfuturebendingtoensurethat8$.ovalityisnotexceededandthatbeadsexceeding thislimitoranyothercriteriashallberejected. | |
| 2qf3 6.Corrective Action'to PrecludeRecurrence
| |
| -E~bdb'd'p''d'd*'PP Engineering-acceptance criteria. | |
| Allmeasurements arebeingverifiedbyonsitequalitycontrolpersonnel.
| |
| Forfuturebends,aprogramhasbeeninstituted to'aveallbendscheckedforovalitybytheresponsible systemengineers priortoinstallation ofthebend.Also,allapplicable superintendents havebeendirectedtoinsurethatproperbendingequipment, andtechniques areusedforall.pipe.behds.Inaddition, QualityControlhasbeenrequested toinspectanddocumentallQ-bendsforovality.UseoftheGreenlee"oneshot"benderhasbeendiscontinued forbendingpipe.Also,aPedrickrepresentative visitedthejobsiteand.provided instruction astotheproperuseandmaintenance ofthePedrickbendingmachine,andre'commended somereplacement partswheretheshoeswereworn.Those.partshavebeenreplaced.
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| 2U/AAW3of3}} | |
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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998
Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps
ML20140A9661997-05-29029 May 1997
Part 21 Rept Re Ksv Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure.Caused by Jacket Water in Combustion Chamber. Recommends That Users Verify That Crown Thickness at Valve Cutout Be 100 Minimum
ML20137G6261997-03-25025 March 1997
Svcs Part 21 Rept Re Emergency Generators Installed at Zion Station Which Developed Significant Drop in Crankcase Lube Oil Level.Caused by Crack in Liner Wall,Allowing Jacket Water to Enter Chamber
ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996
Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs
ML18017A0421992-12-14014 December 1992
Suppl to 921127 Part 21 Rept Re High Air Concentration in Reactor Bldg Making Area Uninhabitable for Retrieving Air Filters,Per NUREG-0737,Item II.F.1.Util Current Position Re Fuel Pool Cooling Issues Contrary to Reg Guide 1.3
ML18026A2481992-11-27027 November 1992
Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard in Design of Facility for Loss of Normal Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
ML19325C9521989-09-29029 September 1989
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Common Failure of SMB-000 & SMB-00 Cam Type Torque Switches Supplied Prior to 1981 & 1976. Vendor Recommends That Switch W/Fiber Spacer Be Replaced
ML20211P7211987-02-23023 February 1987
Part 21 Rept Re Rockbestos Coaxial Cable Used in Sorrento Electronics Digital & Analog high-range Radiation Monitor. Insulation Resistance at High Temp Not High Enough for Ion Chamber & Associated Electronics to Operate Properly
ML20212E5631986-12-19019 December 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Valve Problem.Houghto 620 Lubricant Attacks & Degrades Aluminum in Valves.Valves Have Been or Being Rebuilt
ML20215G5351986-10-10010 October 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing
ML20203F6471986-07-23023 July 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Morrison-Knudsen Undersized Welds at Plant. Initially Reported on 860630.Study Concluded That Welds Not Cause for Failure of Plant.Welds Will Be Repaired by Vendor
ML20206S0841986-06-30030 June 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Cut Wires in Wire Harness of Bbc Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers.Initially Reported on 860509.Safety Implications Listed.Gear Guard Designed to Prevent Cut Wires
ML20197H1991986-05-0909 May 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Hilti Fastening Sys Anchor Bolts Failing to Meet Average Ultimate Tensile Loads.Initially Reported on 860509.Design Review & Resolutions of Installed Items Underway
ML20154K3611986-03-0505 March 1986
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Wiring Defect in Fabricated Primer Chamber Assemblies for Standby Liquid Control Valves. Initially Reported on 860214.Listed Corrective Actions Will Be Completed by 860328
ML20140A5281985-12-19019 December 1985
Part 21 Rept Forwarding Ltr Sent to Customers Re Check Valves Missing Lock Welds on Hinge Supports or Hinge Support Capscrews,Per 851121 Request.List of Customers Receiving Ltr Also Encl
ML20138F5631985-12-0505 December 1985
Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Perform Calculations for Two 6-inch Insp Nozzles.Purchaser Notified Not to Place Vessels Into Svc.Design Spec & Rept Will Be Revised to Include Insp Openings
ML20134A9511985-10-0808 October 1985
Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Valve Stems Bearing Heat Number 3876.Entire Stem/Disc Assembly Will Be Replaced Upon Request.Replacement Stem Assembly Will Be Supplied Under Unique Part Number 106626-10
ML20134B0031985-09-26026 September 1985
Part 21 Rept Re Cracked Stem Assembly Detected in 3/4-inch Yarway Welbond Valve at non-nuclear Facility.Investigation Revealed Leakage Caused by Void in Bar Stock.Valves Sold to Nuclear Facilities Contained Stems.Review Continuing
ML20137G1121985-08-22022 August 1985
Part 21 Rept Re Separation of Piston from Connecting Rod on Cooper-Bessemer Reciprocating Div Ksv Engine.Initially Reported on 850304.Engine Returned,Rebuilt & Inspected.No Future Problems Foreseen
ML20108B5611985-03-0404 March 1985
Part 21 Rept Re Defective Engine Used for Driving Standby Power Generator at Facility.Caused by Loosened Attachments Separating Piston from Rod.Engine Will Be Repaired Prior to Installation
PLA-2355, Revised Final Deficiency Rept Re RHR Throttling Valves. Initially Reported on 820316.Reversal of Valve Disks & Valves No Longer Considered Necessary1984-12-10010 December 1984
Revised Final Deficiency Rept Re RHR Throttling Valves. Initially Reported on 820316.Reversal of Valve Disks & Valves No Longer Considered Necessary
PLA-2230, Final Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Separation Inside Multiple Div Junction & Pull Boxes.Initially Reported on 830721.Drawings Revised to Clarify &/Or Define Sparation Requirements for Use W/Junction & Pull Boxes1984-06-28028 June 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Separation Inside Multiple Div Junction & Pull Boxes.Initially Reported on 830721.Drawings Revised to Clarify &/Or Define Sparation Requirements for Use W/Junction & Pull Boxes
PLA-2118, Final Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Clamps on CRD Insert/ Withdrawal Lines.Initially Reported on 831209.Outer Pedestal Modified Due to Lack of Sufficient Axial Restraint Capacity of Inner Pedestal Support1984-06-18018 June 1984
Final Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Clamps on CRD Insert/ Withdrawal Lines.Initially Reported on 831209.Outer Pedestal Modified Due to Lack of Sufficient Axial Restraint Capacity of Inner Pedestal Support
PLA-2215, Final Deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking & Bending of Angle Fittings Mfg by Unistrut,Powerstrut & B-Line Used on Class IE Electrical Raceways & Category 1 HVAC Supports. Initially Reported on 840206.Spec Revised1984-06-0101 June 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking & Bending of Angle Fittings Mfg by Unistrut,Powerstrut & B-Line Used on Class IE Electrical Raceways & Category 1 HVAC Supports. Initially Reported on 840206.Spec Revised
PLA-2189, Final Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Mode Switch.Initially Reported on 830407.Mode Switch Design Modified,Per Franklin Inst Research Lab Recommendations1984-05-21021 May 1984
Final Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Mode Switch.Initially Reported on 830407.Mode Switch Design Modified,Per Franklin Inst Research Lab Recommendations
ML20084C2851984-04-19019 April 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Waterhammer Loading of Scram Discharge Vol (SDV) Vent & Drain Lines After Opening SDV Vent & Drain Valves on Scram Reset.Initially Reported on 830628.Vent Line Supports Will Be Modified Prior to 841231
PLA-2180, Final Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Settings,Design Pressures & Temps.Initially Reported on 831118.Calculations Performed Assure Lines Adequate for Intended Svc1984-04-19019 April 1984
Final Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Settings,Design Pressures & Temps.Initially Reported on 831118.Calculations Performed Assure Lines Adequate for Intended Svc
PLA-2166, Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Crosby IMF-2 Solenoids Supplied by Ge.Initially Reported on 840403.Licensee & GE Jointly Developed Test Procedures to Bench Test Spares & Solenoids on Both Units.Testing Complete on Unit 11984-04-0909 April 1984
Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Crosby IMF-2 Solenoids Supplied by Ge.Initially Reported on 840403.Licensee & GE Jointly Developed Test Procedures to Bench Test Spares & Solenoids on Both Units.Testing Complete on Unit 1
PLA-2137, Revised Final Deficiency Rept Re Fraying of Hydrogen Recombiner Cables.Initially Reported on 830728.Fraying Caused by Handling Process for Shipment,Installation & Testing.Cables Repaired1984-03-23023 March 1984
Revised Final Deficiency Rept Re Fraying of Hydrogen Recombiner Cables.Initially Reported on 830728.Fraying Caused by Handling Process for Shipment,Installation & Testing.Cables Repaired
PLA-2140, Second Interim Deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking in Angle Fittings.Initially Reported on 840206.Angle Fittings Added to Defective Device List & Conduit Installation Spec Revised.Also Reportable Per 10CFR211984-03-22022 March 1984
Second Interim Deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking in Angle Fittings.Initially Reported on 840206.Angle Fittings Added to Defective Device List & Conduit Installation Spec Revised.Also Reportable Per 10CFR21
PLA-2074, Third Interim Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Separation Inside Multiple Division Junction & Pull Box.Initially Reported on 830721.Design Basis Criteria & Barrier Configuration Established.Also Reported Per Part 211984-03-20020 March 1984
Third Interim Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Separation Inside Multiple Division Junction & Pull Box.Initially Reported on 830721.Design Basis Criteria & Barrier Configuration Established.Also Reported Per Part 21
PLA-2120, Interim Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking in Fittings Used on Class IE Electrical Raceways & HVAC Supports.Initially Reported on 840206.Final Rept Expected Prior to Initial Criticality1984-03-0707 March 1984
Interim Part 21/deficiency Rept Re Base Metal Cracking in Fittings Used on Class IE Electrical Raceways & HVAC Supports.Initially Reported on 840206.Final Rept Expected Prior to Initial Criticality
PLA-2103, Final Deficiency Rept Re Cavitation of Jet Pumps Due to Induction Heating Stress Improvement Cooling.Initially Reported on 831206.No Erosion Found.Also Reportable Per Part 21.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)1984-03-0606 March 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Cavitation of Jet Pumps Due to Induction Heating Stress Improvement Cooling.Initially Reported on 831206.No Erosion Found.Also Reportable Per Part 21.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)
PLA-2075, Second Interim Deficiency Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Setting,Design Pressures & Design Temp within Several Sys. Initially Reported on 831118.Spec M-199 Revised & Code Data Repts Amended.Also Reported Per Part 211984-03-0202 March 1984
Second Interim Deficiency Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Setting,Design Pressures & Design Temp within Several Sys. Initially Reported on 831118.Spec M-199 Revised & Code Data Repts Amended.Also Reported Per Part 21
PLA-2089, Final Deficiency & Part 21 Repts Re Safety Parameter Display Sys Technology Energy Corp Model 156 Isolators.Initially Reported on 840106.Non-IE Power Supply Will Be Provided for Isolator Prior to End of First Refueling1984-02-27027 February 1984
Final Deficiency & Part 21 Repts Re Safety Parameter Display Sys Technology Energy Corp Model 156 Isolators.Initially Reported on 840106.Non-IE Power Supply Will Be Provided for Isolator Prior to End of First Refueling
PLA-2062, Final Deficiency Rept Re Bechtel Failure to Accomplish Design Verification of safety-related Power & Control Cables.Caused by Failure to Complete Required Cable Length Verification.Deficiency Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)1984-02-13013 February 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Bechtel Failure to Accomplish Design Verification of safety-related Power & Control Cables.Caused by Failure to Complete Required Cable Length Verification.Deficiency Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)
PLA-2073, Final Part 21 Rept Re Hydrogen Catalyst Used in Comsip Custom Line Model K-IV Containment Gas Monitoring Panels. Initially Reported on 840113.Comsip Redesigned Catalyst Will Be Installed1984-02-13013 February 1984
Final Part 21 Rept Re Hydrogen Catalyst Used in Comsip Custom Line Model K-IV Containment Gas Monitoring Panels. Initially Reported on 840113.Comsip Redesigned Catalyst Will Be Installed
PLA-2063, Interim Part 21 Rept Re Safety Parameter Display Sys Model 156 Isolators Mfg by Technology for Energy Corp (Tec). Initially Reported on 840106.All Tec Isolators Reviewed for Corrective Actions1984-02-0606 February 1984
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Safety Parameter Display Sys Model 156 Isolators Mfg by Technology for Energy Corp (Tec). Initially Reported on 840106.All Tec Isolators Reviewed for Corrective Actions
PLA-2045, Followup Deficiency Rept Re Mod of RHR Globe Valves F017A & FO17B to Enable Valves in Shutdown Cooling Mode to Perform W/O Adverse Cavitation & Vibration at Low Flow Rates.Initially Reported on 811112.Valves Replaced1984-01-25025 January 1984
Followup Deficiency Rept Re Mod of RHR Globe Valves F017A & FO17B to Enable Valves in Shutdown Cooling Mode to Perform W/O Adverse Cavitation & Vibration at Low Flow Rates.Initially Reported on 811112.Valves Replaced
PLA-2033, Interim Deficiency Rept Re Clamps on Control Rod Drive Insert/Withdraw Lines Not Providing Axial Restraint. Initially Reported on 831209.Design Mod to Pedestal Support Initiated.Also Reportable Per Part 211984-01-12012 January 1984
Interim Deficiency Rept Re Clamps on Control Rod Drive Insert/Withdraw Lines Not Providing Axial Restraint. Initially Reported on 831209.Design Mod to Pedestal Support Initiated.Also Reportable Per Part 21
PLA-2026, Interim Deficiency Rept Re GE Reactor Mode Switch.Proposed Redesign of Mode Switch by GE Rejected,Based on Results of Testing Conducted at Franklin Inst Research Lab.Alternate Switch Ordered Through Electroswitch.Final Rept by Apr 19841984-01-12012 January 1984
Interim Deficiency Rept Re GE Reactor Mode Switch.Proposed Redesign of Mode Switch by GE Rejected,Based on Results of Testing Conducted at Franklin Inst Research Lab.Alternate Switch Ordered Through Electroswitch.Final Rept by Apr 1984
PLA-2009, Final Deficiency Rept Re Standby Gas Treatment Sys (SGTS) Performance Not as Described in Fsar.Fsar Change Prepared to Indicate SGTS May Be Required to Maintain Secondary Containment Integrity1984-01-0909 January 1984
Final Deficiency Rept Re Standby Gas Treatment Sys (SGTS) Performance Not as Described in Fsar.Fsar Change Prepared to Indicate SGTS May Be Required to Maintain Secondary Containment Integrity
PLA-1990, Final Deficiency Rept Re Isolation of Nitrogen Makeup Sys. Permanent Mod Consists of Rerouting Drywell & Wetwell Nitrogen Makeup Lines to Spare Penetrations.Divisionalized Isolation Valves Will Be Installed1983-12-30030 December 1983
Final Deficiency Rept Re Isolation of Nitrogen Makeup Sys. Permanent Mod Consists of Rerouting Drywell & Wetwell Nitrogen Makeup Lines to Spare Penetrations.Divisionalized Isolation Valves Will Be Installed
PLA-1946, Interim Deficiency Rept Re Bechtel Failure to Accomplish Design Verification of safety-related Power & Control Cables.Bechtel Completed & Documented Required Cable Length Verification & Calculations1983-12-30030 December 1983
Interim Deficiency Rept Re Bechtel Failure to Accomplish Design Verification of safety-related Power & Control Cables.Bechtel Completed & Documented Required Cable Length Verification & Calculations
PLA-1991, Final Deficiency Rept Re Cracks in Pacific Scientific PSA-1 & PSA-3 Snubber Capstan Springs.Caused by Improper Spring Forming.Snubbers Will Be Corrected Prior to Completion of First Refueling Outage.Also Reported Per Part 211983-12-27027 December 1983
Final Deficiency Rept Re Cracks in Pacific Scientific PSA-1 & PSA-3 Snubber Capstan Springs.Caused by Improper Spring Forming.Snubbers Will Be Corrected Prior to Completion of First Refueling Outage.Also Reported Per Part 21
PLA-2000, Interim Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Sys Separation in Multiple Div Pull & Junction Boxes.One Box Identified Containing Redundant Channel C & D Circuits Insufficiently Separated by Approved Barrier1983-12-27027 December 1983
Interim Deficiency Rept Re Electrical Sys Separation in Multiple Div Pull & Junction Boxes.One Box Identified Containing Redundant Channel C & D Circuits Insufficiently Separated by Approved Barrier
PLA-2006, Interim Part 21 Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Settings & Design Pressures & Temps Found in Hpci,Rcic,Rhr,Core Spray & Essential Svc Water Sys.Initially Reported on 831118. Hydrotests Performed1983-12-20020 December 1983
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Improper Relief Valve Settings & Design Pressures & Temps Found in Hpci,Rcic,Rhr,Core Spray & Essential Svc Water Sys.Initially Reported on 831118. Hydrotests Performed
PLA-1987, Updated Interim Deficiency Rept Re Scram Discharge Vol Vent & Drain Valve Waterhammer.Testing & Subsequent Analysis Will Be Completed in Mar 1984.Util Will Submit Final Rept by Apr 19841983-12-14014 December 1983
Updated Interim Deficiency Rept Re Scram Discharge Vol Vent & Drain Valve Waterhammer.Testing & Subsequent Analysis Will Be Completed in Mar 1984.Util Will Submit Final Rept by Apr 1984
PLA-1967, Final Deficiency Rept Re Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring Sys (Spotmos).Initially Reported on 821015.Modified Installation Configuration Tested.Review of Test Results Will Be Completed by End of Mar 19841983-12-13013 December 1983
Final Deficiency Rept Re Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring Sys (Spotmos).Initially Reported on 821015.Modified Installation Configuration Tested.Review of Test Results Will Be Completed by End of Mar 1984
PLA-1968, Final Deficiency & Part 21 Repts Re Final Design of GE 7700 Series 250-volt Dc Control Ctrs.Plant Operating Procedures Revised to Include Methods of Clearing Obstructions as Provided by GE & Exam & Reforming of Draw Out Contacts1983-12-0505 December 1983
Final Deficiency & Part 21 Repts Re Final Design of GE 7700 Series 250-volt Dc Control Ctrs.Plant Operating Procedures Revised to Include Methods of Clearing Obstructions as Provided by GE & Exam & Reforming of Draw Out Contacts
1998-07-09
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data
ML17146B1741999-08-0303 August 1999
GL 96-06 Risk Assessment for Sses.
ML20206D3331999-04-27027 April 1999
SER of Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal on Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2. Staff Notes That Licensee IPEEE Complete with Regard to Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20
ML20195B2381999-03-31031 March 1999
Redacted Version for 10CFR2.790 Request for Decommissioning Status Rept for Sses,Units 1 & 2
ML17164A8451998-10-31031 October 1998
SSES Unit 1 Tenth Refueling & Insp Outage ISI Outage Summary Rept.
ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998
Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps
ML20217Q4891998-04-21021 April 1998
Rev 1 to Draft LDCN 2482, FSAR Chapter 13.4 & FSAR Chapter 17.2 Changes to Support ITS Implementation
ML18026A4931998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 97-007-01:on 971017,entry Into TS 3.0.3 Occurred to Allow Completion of Surveillance Testing of One Channel of Rbm.Caused by Failure of Components in LPRM Output to Rbm. Submitted TS Change Request to Extend LCO Action Statement
ML18026A5401998-02-28028 February 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.W/980313 Ltr
ML18026A4891997-11-17017 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971017,TS 3.0.3 Entry Voluntarily Made. Caused by Inadequate Post Maint Testing Following Earlier Work Associated W/Components.Failed Components Repaired, Replaced & Testing Completed
ML18017A2921997-10-28028 October 1997
1997 Nrc/Fema Observed Exercise.
ML17158C1861997-06-0505 June 1997
Proceedings of Intl Topical Meeting on Advanced Reactors Safety Vol II, on 970601-05
ML20140A9661997-05-29029 May 1997
Part 21 Rept Re Ksv Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure.Caused by Jacket Water in Combustion Chamber. Recommends That Users Verify That Crown Thickness at Valve Cutout Be 100 Minimum
ML18026A4781997-03-28028 March 1997
Rev 1 to Application of Anfb to ATRIUM-10 for Susquehanna Reloads.
ML20137G6261997-03-25025 March 1997
Svcs Part 21 Rept Re Emergency Generators Installed at Zion Station Which Developed Significant Drop in Crankcase Lube Oil Level.Caused by Crack in Liner Wall,Allowing Jacket Water to Enter Chamber
ML20155F7661996-07-25025 July 1996
Partially Deleted Job Number 739619-96, Investigation of E Diesel Breaker Misalignment
ML20155F7491996-07-24024 July 1996
Independent Safety Evaluation Svcs Project Rept 3-96, Investigation of E Diesel Generator In-Operability Event
ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996
Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs
ML18026A5961996-01-0202 January 1996
LER 95-013-00:on 951119,thermally Induced Pressure Locking of HPCI Valve Occurred Under Bonnet Pressure of 3,000-7,000 Psig.Damaged HPCI Injection Valve repaired.W/960102 Ltr
ML18017A0511995-11-30030 November 1995
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1995 for SSES Units 1 & 2. W/951215 Ltr
ML20092H7641995-08-31031 August 1995
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1995 for Susquehanna Ses
ML17158A8771995-08-15015 August 1995
Exercise Manual.
ML17158A8061995-07-14014 July 1995
Books 1 & 2 of ISI Outage Summary Rept SSES Unit 1 8th Refuel Outage.
ML18017A0461995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 950609,shift Average Licensed Core Thermal Power Was Exceeded.Caused by Failed Instrumentation Drift. Repaired & Recalibrated Subject Instrumentation
ML17164A6631995-04-11011 April 1995
Impact of Extending T-10 AOT from 3 to 7 Days.
ML17164A5871995-01-31031 January 1995
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1995 for Susquehanna Ses
ML18026A5351994-10-31031 October 1994
SSES Unit 1 & 2 MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method Seismic Evaluation. W/One Oversize Drawing
ML17158A4821994-08-23023 August 1994
ISI Outage Summary Rept Unit 2 6th Refueling Outage, Books 1 & 2 of 2
ML17158A2391994-04-0505 April 1994
Books 1 & 2 of SSES Unit 1 Seventh Refueling & Insp Outage ISI Outage Summary Rept.
ML18017A2701993-12-31031 December 1993
PP&L Annual Rept 1993.
ML17158A2651993-12-31031 December 1993
Allegheny Electric Cooperative,Inc Annual Rept 1993.
ML17158A1631993-12-0909 December 1993
Remote Indication of Spent Fuel Pool Level & Temperature.
ML18026A4281993-08-16016 August 1993
PP&L Response to NRC Concerns Re Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Following Loca,Sses,Units 1 & 2.
ML18026A4261993-06-0909 June 1993
LER 90-007-01:on 900705,primary Power Supply to RPS a Power Distribution Panel Lost When One Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) Breaker Tripped.Epa Logic Cards Reviewed & RPS Power Supply Will Be redesigned.W/930609 Ltr
ML17157C2441993-02-28028 February 1993
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1993 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2
ML18017A2031993-02-0101 February 1993
Books 1 & 2 of Unit 2 Fifth Refueling & Insp Outage,Isi Outage Summary Rept.
ML20044C2741993-01-31031 January 1993
Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1993 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Unit 2,consisting of Info on Unit Shutdowns & Power Reductions
ML17157C3691992-12-31031 December 1992
PP&L Annual Rept 1992.
ML20056C3941992-12-31031 December 1992
Allegheny Electric Cooperative,Inc Annual Rept 1992
ML18017A0421992-12-14014 December 1992
Suppl to 921127 Part 21 Rept Re High Air Concentration in Reactor Bldg Making Area Uninhabitable for Retrieving Air Filters,Per NUREG-0737,Item II.F.1.Util Current Position Re Fuel Pool Cooling Issues Contrary to Reg Guide 1.3
ML18026A2481992-11-27027 November 1992
Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard in Design of Facility for Loss of Normal Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
ML18026A4231992-11-17017 November 1992
LER 92-016-00:on 920416,discovered That Existing Analysis for Two Spent Fuel Storage Pools Did Not Reflect Current Fuel Design & Plant Operation.Caused by Failure to Modify FSAR Analysis.Fsar Will Be revised.W/921117 Ltr
ML17157C1421992-10-21021 October 1992
Engineering Assessment of Fuel Pool Cooling Piping EDR-G20020.
ML17157C1411992-08-31031 August 1992
Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling Event Evaluation.
ML17157C1401992-08-31031 August 1992
Review of Fuel Pool Cooling During Postulated Off-Normal & Accident Events SSES Units 1 & 2.
ML20082C4941992-08-14014 August 1992
Evaluation of Unit 1 & Unit 2 Derating of Power Cables in Raceways Wrapped W/Thermo-Lag Matl
ML17157C1381992-07-27027 July 1992
Safety Consequences of Boiling Spent Fuel Pool at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
ML17157B9331992-07-24024 July 1992
Sixth Refueling & Insp Outage Inservice Insp Outage Summary Rept, Books 1 & 2
ML20097D4681991-12-31031 December 1991
Pennsylvania Power & Light Company,1991 Annual Rept
ML18017A0391991-07-26026 July 1991
LER 91-010-00:on 910628,RWCU Isolated on Two Occassions Due to Actuations of Steam Leak Detection Instrumentation. Caused by Design Deficiency & Elevated Ambient Penetration Room Temps.Temp Modules replaced.W/910726 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
0 0 REGULATORY 1NFORlLiATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIOS)ACCESSION NdR:8102180444 DUC~DATE: 81/02/10 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-87 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station<Unit IR pennsylva sguehanna Steam El.ectric Station<Unit 2R Pennsylva A,~AU THUR AF F ILI ATION CU T I S g>I~Ti~Pennsylvania Power tr I ight Co.RECIP.~A~~E REC IPIc'NT AFFILIATION GR IER r 8, h.Reason IR Philaaelphia<
Office of the Director SUBJECT;Final deficiency rept re ovality of small diameter pipe at bends exceeoina AS4lE Boiler tt Pressure Vessel Code tolerancesiin>tiatly reported on 800411.Benos will oe dispositioned in accordance w/cr iteria by 810331R OISTRISUTIOR COOE: SOISS OORIES RECEIVES:LTR 3 ERCL f SIZE: TI TLE: Construction Oe f i c i ency Report (10CFR50~55E)NOTES:Send IH,E 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'enal 16E 3 copies f-SAR 4 all amends'OCKET
¹05000387 05000388 05000387 05000388~ECIP I ENT ID CODE/"lAt.1E ACTION: A/9 LICEHSI'tG Ow RUSHBRODKztor
~nb INTERNAL: AO/RC I/IE I?D/OIR Huq FAC15 EOU tt STAFF 19 HYg/GEO BR LIC QUAL BR lg t~Rt: POR 02 EV I>nl ST~NORDS OEV 21 COVIES LTl'R ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I PEC IP IENT IO CODE/NAME YOUNGBLOODEB 05 STARKERS 07 ASLt3P/J.HARD DIR pOIV OF LIC FAUIP ilUAL BR11 IhE 09 SPA 20 OELO 21 QA BR 14 RUTHERFORDRH, IE COPIES LrTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL: ACRS r~SIC lo Oo la 16 1 LPOR 03 TOTAL'tu>lBEEr OF COP IES rCEVUIRKO:
LTTR 39 FNCL 39 l TWO NORTH NINTH STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA.18101 PHONEr (215)770 5151 NORMAN W.CURTIS Vice President-Engineering 3 Construction-Nuclear 770.5381 February 10, 1981 Mr.Boyce H.Grier-Director, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY RELATING TO OVALITY OF BENT PIPE ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-630
Reference:
PLA-498 (6/20/80)'
Dear Mr.Grier:
This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a deficiency relating to excessive ovality of small diameter pipe caused by bends which were produced in the field prior to the installation.
The ovality of the pipe at the bends exceeds the tolerances specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, NB4223.2.The condition was originally reported in PLA-498, and the information contained herein is submitted as a final report pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).The attachment to this letter contains a description of the problem;its cause, safety implications and significance; and the corrective action taken and planned to preclude recurrence.
We trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.
Very truly yours, N.W.Curtis Vice President-Engineering
&Construction-Nuclear FLW:sab Qorrt 5 I/i Attachment al ezlaO PENNSYLVANIA POWER 5 LIGHT COAIPANY
~V~I Mr.Boyce H.Grier February 10, 1981 cc: Mr.Victor Stello (15)Director-Office of Inspection a Enforcement U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 45 Office of Management Information
&Program Control U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 Mr.Robert M.Gallo U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.Box 52 Shickshinny, PA 18655 1 1.Description of Problem NCR-5523 dated April 11,.1980, identified a nonconforming condition in.which small diameter pipe bent in'the field exceeds the tolerance stated in ASME,Section III,"NB-4223.2.
Ovality Tolerance.
Unless otherwise justified by the Stress Report, the ovality of piping after bending shall not exceed 8 percent as determined by 100 K (D-.D.)/D where.D 0 D min D max The minimum pipe outside diameter before bending or forming, in.(mm)=The minimum outside diameter'after bending or forming, in.'mm).=The maximum outside diameter after bending or forming, in.(mm)1 I Nuclear Class II and III piping are subject to the same provisions.
.This formula is derived from the 1971 edition of Section III with.Addenda thru Winter, 1972..This is the Code in effect for.this pro j e'ct.Construction determined the values for D , D., D through actual measurement of the pipe.D.anl D were 5etermined by taking 3 sets of readings inside tEe oend.Ponstruction used.the values from the point that produced the greatest variation.
D was determined by a reading taken adjacent to the bend.The deficiency identified four stainless steel pipe bends where the ovality exceeds 8g.2.'Cause.of Deficiency The subject non-conforming condition has been primarily on pipe bends that were made in place, apparently using the Greenlee Model jj884 One Shot.hydraulic ram type bender;Sample bends made on this bender did not meet the 8$ovality requirement.
Bends made in the onsite pipe prefab facility on the Pedrick mechanical bender have been observed to be better than those made on the Greenlee machine.However, even these bends have very little margin with respect to ovality.Bends made in place with the Ensley mechanical bender d'o not appear to have ovality discrepancies.
Another contributing factor is the lack of specific instructions to construction forces (via specifications for fabrication and installation of piping)for qualification and control of pipe bending performed at the jobsite.1of 3 Siace there is no record of which bends were made on which machiae, all installed bends are being checked for ovality.Only after a complete iaspection will the full magnitude of the problem be Mown.This inspectioa is being performed and documented as part of the'isposition of NCR-5523,.
NCR-5674 aad additional NCR's.3.Analysis of Safety Impli'cation Project Engiaeeriag has developed acceptaace criteria based on stress analysis for pipe bends with.ovality up'to 15$.Maximumovality permitted is 8$for pipiag which is subject to temperature traasients and 15$for piping which is not subject.to temperature transients.
Additionally the bends must be free of rapid chaages in curvature aad circumferential kinks or concavity as defined in the criteria.Wall thickaess, after bending, must meet desiga.minimum;The effect on flow (pressure drop)due to reduced cross~sectional area of bends with up to 15$ovality was addressed and.found to be insignificaat.
Approximately 700 bends, including all bends in small piping within the primary reactor pressure vessel bouadary have been iaspected aad dispositioaed ia accordance with the criteria;Although the balance of bends (approximately 5,000), in safety related systems have not been inspected it is felt that the work to date i's a represeatative sample and is adequate to evaluate the safety impli-cations.Of the approximately 700 bends checked as of Dec.1980, one exceeded 15X ovality and two exceeded the 8$ovality limit for piping subject.to temperature transients.
These three bends have been replaced.Approximately 240 bends measured fell between the 8-15$limit allowed for systems not subject to temperature transients.
Three installed bends in safety related piping had to be replaced to'meet the project engineering acceptance criteria.Aay bends which d'o not meet the acceptaace criteria are ass~ed to fail in service.Such failures could'ave affected adversely the safety of operatioas of'the plant.Therefore, this coaditioa is-considered reportable under 10 CZR 50.55(e)'.
5.Corrective Action The acceptance criteria was issued on May 30, 1980.Coastructioa anticipates completiag approximately 1250 bends per month and that final corrective action will be completed, for Unit 1 aad Common, by March, 1981.~~~Specificatioa M-204 for fabrication and, installation of pi>fag has been amended to require field procedures to control and monitor future bending to ensure that 8$.ovality is not exceeded and that beads exceeding this limit or any other criteria shall be rejected.2qf 3 6.Corrective Action'to Preclude Recurrence-E~bdb'd'pd'd*'PP Engineering-acceptance criteria.All measurements are being verified by on site quality control personnel.
For future bends, a program has been instituted to'ave all bends checked for ovality by the responsible system engineers prior to installation of the bend.Also, all applicable superintendents have been directed to insure that proper bending equipment, and techniques are used for all.pipe.behds.In addition, Quality Control has been requested to inspect and document all Q-bends for ovality.Use of the Greenlee"one shot" bender has been discontinued for bending pipe.Also, a Pedrick representative visited the jobsite and.provided instruction as to the proper use and maintenance of the Pedrick bending machine, and re'commended some replacement parts where the shoes were worn.Those.parts have been replaced.2U/AAW 3of 3
