ML17229A537

St Lucie Unit 2 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 960106-970525.

ML17229A537
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Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/25/1997
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ST.LUCIEUNIT2DOCKETNUMBER50-389CHANGES,'TESTSANDEXPERIMENTSMADEASALLOWEDBY10CFR50'9FORTHEPERIODOFJANUARY6,1996THROUGHMAY25,199797ii28023997ii24PDRADOCK05000389RPDR INTRODUCTXONThisreportissubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59(b),whichrequiresthat:i)changesinthefacilityasdescribedintheSARii)changesinproceduresasdescribedintheSARiii)testsandexperimentsnotdescribedintheSARwhichareconductedwithoutpriorCommissionapprovalbereportedtotheCommissioninaccordancewith10CFR50.59(b)and50.71(e)(4).ThisreportisintendedtomeetthisrequirementfortheperiodofJanuary6,1996,throughMay25,1997.Thisreportisdividedintothree(3),sections;thefirst,changestothefacilityasdescribedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)performedbyaPlantChange/Modification(PC/M);thesecond,changestothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheUpdatedFSARnotperformedbyaPC/M-andtestsandexperimentsnotdescribedintheUpdatedFSAR;thethird,asummaryofanyfuelreloadsafetyevaluations.EachofthedocumentssummarizedinSections1,2and3includes'a10CFR50.59safetyevaluationwhichevaluatedthespecificchange(s).Eachofthesesafetyevaluationsconcludedthatthechangedoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorrequireachangetotheplanttechnicalspecifications;therefore,priorNRCapprovalwasnotrequiredforimplementation.

TABLEOFCONTENTS8409985153914639319194093ICWPUMPMATERIALCHANGESRABVENTILATIONSYSTEMDAMPERMODZFZCATIONRANGEINCREASEFORFEEDWATERANDMAINSTEAMINDICATORSANDRECORDERSINSTALLATIONOFANPSWORKSTATIONINCONTROLROOMICWANDCWSYSTEMINSTRUMENTIMPULSELINEMODIFICATION10129502895248INSTALLATIONOFANACOUSTICFEEDWATERFLOWMETERINSTALLATIONOFVIBRATIONMONITORINGPROBESONRCP2A213149601296099DRAINVALVESFORSTEAMSUPPLYTOTHE2CAFWPUMP16RCGVSPRESSUREINDICATORCONTROLLOGICMODIFICATION159612496133REACTORVESSEL0-RINGREPLACEMENTADDITIONOFMANUALISOLATIONVALVESTODIESELDRIVENAIRCOMPRESSOR.1718961389614396153961599616196163SHUTDOWNCOOLINGISOLATIONVALVEMODIFICATION)THERMO-LAGRELATEDMODZFICATIONSQUICKLOCINCOREINSTRUMENTFLANGEDESIGNCONDENSATEPUMPMECHANICALSEALVENTINGSTEAMGENERATORTUBEPLUGSANDTUBESTAKESCONTAINMENTBUILDINGRADIANTENERGYSHIELDMODIFICATION1920212223249616796174BYPASSINGTHE2APURIFICATIONFILTERREPLACEMENTOFRABSUPPLYFANHVS-4AWITHANON-EQMOTORANDSHIELDWALL2526 00 KKXXQlLRSEFJ-92-009LUDETERMINATIONOFCEAOPERATIONALLIFE28SEMP-95-004OPERATIONWITHREDUCEDPRESSURIZERHEATERCAPACITY29FPER-96-002FIREPROTECTIONEVALUATIONANDUFSARUPDATERELATED30TOTHERMO-LAGWALLSSENS-96-003CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMOPERATION31SEMS-96"007ADDITIONOFMANUALISOLATIONVALVESINTHEREACTOR32COOLANTGASVENTSYSTEMFPER-96"010FIRE,PROTECTIONEVALUATIONFORTHECONTROLROOMHVACSYSTEM33SENP-96-019SEFJ-96-019SEFJ-96-022UFSARCHANGES-PLANTHEATUPANDCOOLDOWNANALYSISTOALLOWANINCREASEDNUMBEROFOUTOFSERVICEINCOREDETECTORSEVALUATIONOFTHEBEACONCOREMONITORINGSYSTEM3436SENP-96-022ELIMINATIONOFTHE'PRESSURERELIEFFUNCTIONFORTHEREACTORCAVITYPRESSURERELIEFDAMPERS37SENS-96-033SENS-96-039WASTEGASHOLDUPSYSTEMOPERATION\EVALUATIONOFTHECEDMCSCOOLINGSYSTEMANDENCLOSURE3839SENS-96-046USEOFTHESTATIONBLACKOUTCROSS-TZEFORNON-LICENSEDBLACKOUTEVENTS40SEIS-96-049REMOVALOFREDUNDANTHPSZ,LPSIANDSHUTDOWNCOOLINGVALVEPOSITIONINDICATION41SENS-96-060SENS-96-065SENS-96"069SENS-96-072SENS-96-091REVISZONOFSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSPENTRESZNTRANSFERMETHODSUSEOFBREAKAWAYLOCKSONTHEHOTSHUTDOWNPANELROOMDOORSHIGHRATEOFCHANGEOFPOWERTRIPDESIGNBASISASSESSMENTOFCEAMODESELECTORSWITCHHYPOCHLORITESYSTEMUFSARCLARIFICATION4243444546 2RGZIQH>SESP-96-093(Continued)RESPONSETONRCRAIREGARDINGPRESSURIZEDTHERMALSHOCK47SENS-97-006EVALUATIONOFFULLCOREOFFLOADS48SEFJ-97-011~LOWFLOWTRIPSETPOINTCHANGE49SEES-97-019SENS-97-024SESJ-97-026DELETIONOFREQUIREMENTFORREFUELINGMACHINEUNDERWATERCAMERAWASTEGASSYSTEMANALYZEROPERATIONRESPONSETONRCSUPPLEMENTALRAIREGARDING"PRESSURIZEDTHERMALSHOCK505152SEMS-97-034EVALUATIONFORTHEUSEOFSIMULATEDINCOREDETECTOR53ASSEMBLIESINCORELOCATIONSR9ANDT13SENS-97-036SENS-97-038INTAKESTRUCTUREVENTILATIONSYSTEMOPERATIONPRESSURIZERCODESAFETYVALVEMODIFICATION5455SENS-97-040SAFETYINJECTIONTANKPRESSURIZATIONREQUIREMENTSFORMODES3&4OPERATIONWITHREDUCEDREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPRESSURE56SEMS-97-043SENS-97-044SENS-97-045SEMS-97-070SENS-97-071FIREPUMPSSTARTINGSEQUENCECONTAINMENTSUMPSCREENSUFSARCHANGEFORCONTAINMENTSUMPSCREENSUFSARCOMBUSTIBLELOADINGUPDATECONTROLROOMEMERGENCYSUPPLIES5758596061

BADST.LUCIEUNIT2CYCLE10RELOAD63

SECTIONIPLANTCHANGE/MODIPICATIONS

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION84099MATEALThismodificationconsistsofallowingtheuseofASTM-A-479,TypeXM-19austeniticstainlesssteel(Nitronics50)inadditiontothe,originalmaterial,ASTMB-164,fortheICWpumps'hafts,couplingsandkeys.Thenewmaterialofferssuperiorpitting/crevicecorrosionresistanceandshouldprovideimprovedmaterialperformance.'hismodificationprovidesfunctionallyequivalentcomponentsanddoesnotaltertheperformancecharacteristicsoroperationoftheXCWpumps.

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION85153DAMPMDFIDampersGD-3andGD-4serveasbackdraftdampersforreactorauxiliarybuilding(RAB)mainsupplyfansHVS-4AandHVS-4B.Eachofthesegravitydrivendampersclosestopreventfree-wheelingofitsassociatedfanwhenthatfanissecuredandtheotherfanisoperating.ThisPC/Mmodifiesthedamperstoinstallanadjustablestoponthedamperlinkagetopreventthehorizontallymounteddamperfromopeningbeyondthe90degreefullopenposition.Additionally,dampermullionsarebeingmodifiedtofacilitatemaintenanceaccesstothebearings.Theuseofa90degreestopisstandardpracticeforhorizontallymounteddampers.Thestopprovidesaddedassurancethedamperswillclosewhenrequired.Themullionmodificationsimprovemaintenanceaccesstodamperbearings,thusfacilitatingtheabilitytolubricateandmaintainthebearings.Thesechangesdonotaltertheperformancecharacteristicsofthedampersandareexpectedtoprovideimproveddamperreliability.

0

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION91463FEEDEEDThismodificationexpandstheindicatedrangeforfeedwaterandmainsteamflowindicatorsandrecorders.Theoriginalinstrumentswereprovidedwitharangeof0-6E+6ibm/hr.Althoughthisoriginalrangeenvelopedthestretchpowerfeedwaterandmainsteam'flows(5,893,450ibm/hr),thedeviceswereoperatingclosetotheirmaximumupperlimit.ThisPC/Mincreasestherangeofthesubjectinstrumentsto0-7E+6ibm/hr.Asaresultoftherangechange,theFeedwaterFlow/SteamFlowcontrollerproportionalbandswereadjustedandtheQuickOpeningTimeConstantsettingsfortheSteamBypassandControlSystemwereadjustedtocompensatefortherangechange.Systemtransmitterswerealsorecalibrated.Thereisnonetchangetosystemoperationorperformance.AsapartofthePC/M,ABB-CEevaluatedthechangesandprovidedrecommendedcoefficientsettingstoensurethatsystemswillprovidethesameperformanceandmeetthesamerequirementsastheoriginaldesign.10 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION93191ROLXUDQRxzThismodificationaddsacustomizedworkstationinthecontrolroomfortheAssistantNuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS).TheworkstationwasinstalledinproximitytotheReactorTurbineGeneratorBoards(RTGBs)andrequiredtherelocationoffourcomputerprinters.InstallationalsoimprovesRTGBaccesscontrol.Thischangewasevaluatedtoensurethatnoadverseinteractionswith'afetyrelatedequipmentwerecreated.Ahumanfactorsreviewconcludedtherewasnoadverseimpactassociatedwiththechange.11 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION94093IATIThismodificationallowsfortheuseofalternatematerials(6MolySS,Titanium,andHastelloyC-276)foraportionoftheinstrumentimpulselinesassociatedwiththeIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)andCirculatingWater(CW)systems.Thismodificationalsoallowstheuseoftubinginplaceofpiping.Thealternatematerialsanduseoftubingwasevaluatedandfoundtobeanacceptableequivalentsubstitution.AllapplicabledesignrequirementsaresatisfiedandICWandCWsystemoperationisnotaffectedbythechanges.12 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION95028DMETEThismodificationinstallsanacousticflowmetertomonitorfeedwaterflow.Thenewflowmeterprovidesimprovedperformanceovertheexistingfeedwaterflowventuriswhicharenoteasilyremovedandcleanedandaresusceptibletofouling.Feedwaterflowventurifoulingresultsinconservativepowermeasurementswhichresultinplantoperatinginefficiencies.SafetyEvaluationJPN-PSL-SEIP-95-031wasissuedtoevaluateandjustifythetemporaryuseoftheLEFMalongwiththeexistingventuri.Severalmonthsofdatawereobtainedandevaluated.ThisPC/MprovidesthedetailsforpermanentinstallationoftheLEFT1'IThismodificationdoesnotchangeanymechanicalcomponentsofthefeedwatersystem.Theoriginalfeedwaterflowmeasurementsystemremainsinstalledasaredundantsystem.Althoughsecondarysidethermohydraulicparametershavechanged,thechangeswereevaluatedtobewithindesignlimits.LEFMaccuracytestingwasperformedatAldenLaboratoriesandwasformallydocumentedinTestReportMPR-1576.TheresultsofthistestingwereincludedincalculationPSL-BFJI-94-001,l'*'lluncertaintyofthepowercalculationbeyondthe2.limitatfullpowerandthatitprovidesuncertaintieslessthanthoseanalyzedunderJPN-PSL-SEFJ-94-016,forpowerlevelslessthan100:.TheLEFMsoftwareunderwentaformalsoftwareverificationandvalidation.

iPLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION95248L0FVPBEA2~REX'hismodificationinstallsasetofvibrationmonitoringprobesonthelowermotorcasingofreactor.coolantpump(RCP)2A2atapreviouslyabandonedprobelocation.Thenewprobesareofthesamemakeandmodelandareinstalledinthesamelocationand~configurationasthesetoforiginalprobeswhichwererelocatedtothetopofthemechanicalsealviapreviousmodification.Thenewprobesareseismicallymountedandareusedformonitoringandtroubleshootingpurposes.ThereisnoimpactontheoperationorqualificationoftheRCP.

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96012Thismodificationtemporarilychangesthecontrollogicofrectorcoolant'asventsystem(RCGVS)pressureindicatorPIA-1140toannunciateonlowpressureinsteadofhighpressure.PIA-1140islocatedbetweentheRCGVSprimaryandsecondaryisolationvalves(isolationfromthereactorcoolantsystem)andisdesignedtoprovideoperatorswithanindicationofleakagepastoneormoreoftheprimaryisolationvalves.Asaresultofleakagepastoneormoreoftheprimaryisolationvalves,theannunciatorisinconstantalarm.Changingthecontrollogicwillclearthealarmandwillprovideanalarmonalowpressurecondition.Thenewalarmisusefultooperatorsinthatitwouldbeindicativeofaleakpastoneormoreofthesecondaryvalves.ThismodificationiseffectiveuntiltheCycle10refuelingoutagewhentheRCGVSisolationvalvesarescheduledforreplacement.Note:TheRCGVSisolationvalveswerereplacedandthecontrollogicwasrestoredtoitspreviousconfigurationduringtheCycle10refuelingoutage.

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96099Thismodificationprovidesforsystemimprovementsbyincreasingthereliabilityofthesteamsupplysystemforthe2Cauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpturbine.Thismodificationrelocatedthewarmuplineinlettoallowbetterdrainingofthesteamsupplylineandreduceoperatingtransientswhenopeningthesteamadmissionvalves'dditionally,upstreamisolationvalveswereinstalledineachwarmuplinetoenhancesystemmaintenance-capabilities'hemodificationconformstothesamequalitygroup,materials,andclassificationasthesystem.Thereisnoadverseimpactontheoperationorqualificationofthe2CAFWpump.16 0

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96124RJGsGWThismodificationreplacestheexistingreactorvessel0-ringswithaspringenergized0-ringdesignrecommendedbyHelicoflex(theoriginalequipmentmanufacturer)andABB-CE.Thenewdesignreducestheamountofhoningand/orwelding(andassociatedradiationdoses)currentlyrequiredtoaddressminorsurfaceanomaliesofthevesselflange.Thenew0-ringsusemetalstripsilverjacketinginlieuofelectroplatedsilverandtheyuseaninternalhelicalspringtoprovidesealingforceduringflangecompression.Thisdesignhasbeensuccessfullyusedinover75nuclearinstallations.ThischangeprovidesafunctionallyequivalentdesignandhasbeenevaluatedbyABB-CEasbeingacceptableforuse.17 0

PLANT'CHANGE/MODIFICATION96133ALETEThismodificationinstallsnormallyopenmanualisolationvalvesinthedischargelinesfromtheEmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)airstartcompressorstofacilitateaircompressormaintenance.Fourisolationvalveswereinstalleddownstreamoftheexistingcheckvalvesandupstreamofthesensinglinesontheelectricdrivenaircompressorswhichareequippedwiththeirownisolationvalves.Thevalvesdonotinterferewithoverpressureprotectionoradversely,affectfunctionaloperationofthesystem.Thismodificationeliminatesthepracticeoftypicallytakingoutofservicebothcompressorsinordertoperformmaintenanceononeofthecompressors.Thismodificationallowstheisolationofeitheraircompressorineachtrainformaintenanceandisconsideredadesignenhancement.ThereisnoadverseimpactontheoperationorqualificationoftheEDG.18

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96138LAgllIQIQj~gThisPC/MmodifiesshutdowncoolingsystemhotlegsuctionisolationvalvesV3651,V3652andV3480topreventpotentialpressurelocking.ThesevalveswerepreviouslyidentifiedviaevaluationJPN-PSL-SEMP-93-036asbeingsusceptibletopressurelocking.ThischangeisbeingperformedtosatisfytherequirementsofNRCGenericLetter95-07.Themodificationdrillsa3/16"holeontheupstream(reactorcoolantsystem)sideofeachvalvedisksinordertoprovideventingofhighpressurefluidfromthevalvebonnetarea.ThisisastandardmethodofaddressingpressurelockingconcernsandisendorsedinNUREG-1275Vol.9.Thedownstreamseatofthevalvesisnotbeenaffected.Thismodificationdoesnotadverselyaffectoperationofthe~~subjectvalvesortheshutdowncoolingsystem.19 e

-PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96143IFATThisPC/MimplementschangesrelatedtoconcernsovertheperformanceofThermo-lag330-1andthefireprotectionofvariousplantequipment.AsaresultofNRCconcerns,FPLperformedindividualfireareaevaluationstoassesspotentialoptions(e.g.,redundantequipment,conduitreroutes,manualactions,etc.)whichwouldeliminatetheneedforprotectionofaffectedconduits.ThismodificationreroutesconduitsprotectedwithThermo-lag330-1.Thereroutedconduitscontaincablesforthe480Vpowerfeedtobatterycharger2Afrommotorcontrolcenter2AS;lowvoltage125V.dcpowerfrombus2AtoRTGB-205andRTGB-206;andlowvoltage120Vacpowerfrominstrumentbus2MA-1toisolationcabinetMA/SAforpowerdistributiontoRTGBs201,202,203,205and206.ThischangeeliminatesThermo-lagsurveillanceandmaintenancerequirementsassociatedwiththeaffectedconduit.Thismodificationalsorestorestheprotectionprovidedtothepressurizerhigh-lowdischargepressureinterfacesbyeliminatingtheprotectionrequirementandoperatoractionforthePORVblockvalvesandaddingfireprotectiontothePORVcables.Thus,operatormanualactionshavebeenreplacedwithapassiveprotectionandarenolongerneededforafireintheelectricalpenetrationrooms.ThechangesprovidedbythisPC/Marelimitedtothefireprotectionaspectsofsystemdesignanddonotaffectthesafetyfunctionsoftherelatedplantequipment.20 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96153UMEFLEDEQgmi~yThismodificationreplacestheexistingreactorinstrumentnozzlepenetrationandsealingsystemwiththeABB-CENOdesignedQuicklocsystem.Includedwiththischangeisthereplacementof56incoreinstrumentassemblieswhichenterthevesselthroughthenozzleflanges.TheQuicklocmodificationreplaces10incoreinstrumentflangeswhichareusedforincoreinstrument(ICI)andheatedjunctionthermocouple(HJTC)probeinsertionintothereactorvessel.Theseflangesserveasapartoftheprimarysystempressureboundary.Thenewdesignreducespersonnelradiationexposurebysimplifyinginstrumentnozzleassembly,disassemblyandICImaintenance.Reactorcoolantsystempressureboundarydesignrequirementshavebeenmaintained.ThenewICIassembliesarecompatiblewiththeQuicklocdesignandarefunctionally.equivalenttotheoriginalassemblies.ThereisnoaffectontheinterfacebetweentheICIsandtheexistingcomputersystem(DDPS).21

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96159PEThismodificationprovidesameansofventingcondensatepumpmechanicalsealspriortopumpstartupandprovidesablowofflineonthemechanicalsealinletstrainerstoallowforon-linestrainercleaning.On-linestrainercleaningwillincreasecondensatepumpavailabilitysincethepumpswillnolongerhavetoberemovedfromserviceforthisevolution.Existingventvalveswillbeusedandmanualblowoffvalveswillbeadded.Thecondensatepumpsarenon-safetypumps.Thischangedoesnotaltercondensatepumpdesign,functionorperformancecharacteristics.Althoughadditionalpotentialfailuremodesareintroduced(e.g.,inadvertentlyleavingavalveopen),thebenefitsofthemodificationoutweightheconsequencesofsuchfailures.22 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96161TEQgmngryThismodificationevaluatesnewlydesignedCombustion.Engineeringstandard,extendedandshortmechanicalsteamgenerator(SG)tubeplugs,standardweldedtubeplugsandstandardandfulllengthtubestakes.Thischangedoesnotaffecttubeplugginglimitswhichareestablishedbythereloadsafetyanalysis.Thenewplugdesignsareequivalentinform,fitandfunctiontoexistingplugdesignsandtherequirementsoftheoriginalconstructioncodeofrecordhavebeensatisfied.TheplugsandstakeshavebeendesignedforuseinCEdesignedSGsinaccordancewithASMECode.TheonlychangeinthestandardmechanicalplugisataperdimensionintheXDoftheopenendoftheplug.Theextendedandshortlengthplugshaveslightlychangedinlength.Theextendedplugwillaccommodateadifferentlocationinthetubeforsealingintheeventthenormalsealingareaisdamaged.Theshortplugcanbeusedwhenthereisaninterferenceduringinstallation.Allplugsmeetthesametestingcriteria.Additionally,thenewdesignincludessignificantlymoremetalattheplugtipandthusdoesnotrequiretheantiwearcollarwheninstalledbehindatubestake.TubestakedesignshavebeenevaluatedbyABB-CEtoensurethestake/tubeassemblyremainsoutofcriticalvibrationfrequenciesduringnormalandabnormalconditionsandtoensurecompatabilitywithtubeplugs.ThisPC/MalsoallowsthegrindingoftheSGdividerpartitionplatecornerpatchplateboltheadsintheeventofaninterferenceduringpluggingactivities.Thesubjectboltsarenotloadedexceptfortheinitialtighteningduringfabrication.Theboltsarenotcreditedinanystructuralevaluationsorcalculations.ABB-CEhasevaluatedmodificationoftheboltheadsandconcludesitisacceptabletoremoveupto50%oftheboltheadareaandstillmaintainadequatesheararea.23 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96163ThismodificationremovesThermo-lag330-1wall-typeradiantenergyshieldsincontainmentandreplacesthemwith16gaugestainlesssteelsheetmetalpanels.Additionally,24gaugestainlesssteelsheetmetalwillbeusedtocoverfourThermo-lagcoveredconduitsincontainment.Thereplacementbarriershavebeenevaluatedtoprovideadequateprotectionandtohavenoimpactonanysafetyrelatedstructures,systemsorcomponents.ThesubjectwallsarebeingreplacedasaresultofNRCstatementsregardingthecombustibilityofThermo-lag330-1andsincetheUFSARand10CFR50AppendixR(SectionIII.G.2.f)requireradiantenergyshieldstobeconstructedfromnon-combustiblematerials.24 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION961672PURIFATRRERXZThismodificationaddressesthebypassing(isolation)ofthe2ApurificationfilterbyclosingisolationvalveV2360andopeningbypassvalveV2355.Letdownflowwillberoutedaroundthe2Afiltertothepuri'ficationionexchangers.ThisPC/MmakespermanentthetemporarychangeauthorizedviaTemporarySystemAlteration(TSA)2-96-028.Thechangeincreasesflowthroughtheboronometerandeliminatestheboronometerlowflowalarmduringperiodswhenonlyonechargingpumpisinoperation.Additionally,thechangeeliminatestheneedfordisposalofhighlyradioactivefilters.Isolationofthe2Afilterhasnoeffectontheplant'ssafetyanalysissincenoreductioninfissionproductoractivationproductinventoryiscreditedtothefilter.Thepurificationionexchangerswillcontinuetoremaininservice,aswillthe2Bpurificationfilterlocated'ownstreamoftheionexchangers.Experiencehasshownthattheionexchangersareeffectiveremoversofparticulatesandeliminatethedifficultyofdisposinghighlyradioactivefilterelements.Plantchemistryspecificationsandlimitsonreactorcoolantsystemspecificactivityhavenotchanged.Asaresult,noincreaseinfuelcladdingperforationswillresultfromfilterisolation.The2Afiltermaybeplacedbackinserviceintheeventofunexpectedfuelrodfailures.25 0

PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96174MEFB4LHVS-4Aisanenvironmentallyqualified(EQ)fanmotorwhichprovidessupplyairforthereactorauxiliarybuilding(RAB).Themotorforthisfanfailedandwasreplacedwithanon-EQmotorandaseismicallymountedlocalshieldingwallviaTemporarySystemAlteration2-96-24.ThisTSAconfigurationwasevaluatedandfoundacceptableviasafetyevaluationJPN-PSL-SEES-96-011,Revision1.ThismodificationprovidesthejustificationtomaketheTSAapermanentplantchange.ThereplacementmotorwaspurchasedasanequivalentClass1Ereplacementwiththeexceptionofitsradiationqualification.Becausethenewmotorwasnotqualifiedforaradiationenvironment,ashieldingwallwasincludedaspartofthemotorreplacement.Thisnewshieldingwasevaluatedasprovidingacceptableattenuationofexpectedpost-.accidentradiationlevels.Inaddition,theshieldingwallwasseismicallyanalyzedtoensureitsintegrityismaintainedandthattherearenoadverseinteractionswithadjacentequipment.Theweightoftheshieldingwallwasevaluatedagainstallowablefloorloadsandfoundtobeacceptable.ThisPC/Mwasconcludedtorepresentafunctionallyequivalentreplacementfortheoriginalmotor.Theability,oftheHVS-4Afantomeetitsdesignrequirementshasnotbeencompromised.26 SECTXON2SAFETYEVALVATXONS27

-SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEFJ-92-009REVISION0ERMIATIOFEAPERATLFETheUFSARsforeachunitassumea10yearoperationallifeforcontrolelementassemblies(CEAs).TheCEAvendor,ABB-CE,clarifiedthatthisisa10calendaryearlimitwhichcorrespondstoapproximatelyeighteffectivefullpoweryears.The10yearlimitisbasedonadifferentCEAdesignthanthatcurrentlyusedatSt.Lucie.ThisevaluationutilizesunitspecificCEAinspectiondataalongwithdatafromasimilarplant(ArkansasNuclearOne-Unit2)todeterminetheoperationallifeoftheCEAdesigncurrentlyinusersCEAoperationallifelimitsweredeterminedbyevaluatingCEAperformanceagainstdesigncriteriarelatedtocladdingwear,unrecoverablecladdingstrainlimits,fastneutronfluencelh.mittoprecludefailureduetocladdingmaterialdegradation,andCEAabsorbermaterialdepletion.CurrentandfuturefuelmanagementandCEAprogrammedrepositioningstrategieswerealsoincludedinthisevaluation.Asaresultofthisevaluation,CEAinspectionandreplacementstrategieshavebeenrevised.28 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEMP-95-004REVISION3TIOTHDZEEATQgggggryRevision0ofthisevaluationdocumentstheacceptabilityofremovinguptoatotalofsixpressurizerheatersfromserviceifneeded;oneproportionalheaterandfivebackupheatersforatotalof300kW.Thiswouldleaveaheatercapacityof1200kW.Thecapabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantundernaturalcirculationconditionsisnotadverselyaffectedsincethebackupheatersrequiredtoprovidepressurecontrolunderalossofoffsitepowerwillbemaintainedatorabovethetechnicalspecificationlimitof150kWperheaterbank.Revision3wasissuedtoprovideclarificationregardingrequirementsforheatercapacity.29

SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-FPER-96-002REVISION1OTETEVELEThisfireprotectionevaluationreviewstheuseofaThermo-lagwallasafirebarrierandconsidersThermo-lagasacombustibleloadinlightofNRCInformationNotices92-082and95-027andGenericLetter86-10.TheUFSARwasrevisedasfollows:plantconformancetoNRCBranchTechnicalPosition9.5-1wasrevisedtonotetheacceptabilityoffirebarrierswhichdonotmeetASTME-1193-hourcriteria,but'havebeenevaluated'nddeterminedtoprovideadequateprotectionforredundantsafeshutdown.equipmentandcomponents;thefireratingofanauxiliarybuildingThermo-lagwallwaschangedfromanASTME-1193-hourratingtotheas-built/testedfirerating;and'ariousfirezonecombustibleloadingvalueswereupdatedbasedontheincreasedloadingassociatedwiththeuseofThermo-lag.30 e

SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-003REVISION0PERAThissafetyevaluationwasissued'oclarifytheUFSARwordingwithrespecttooperationofthechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS).TheexistingUFSARwordingpredominantlydescribedsystemoperationintheautomaticmodeofoperation,includingthealignmentofthechargingpumpsuctiontothevolumecontroltank(VCT).Althoughthesystemwasoriginallydesignedtobeoperatedinautomatic,ithastraditionallybeenoperatedinmanualbecauseofadesiretomanuallycontrolreactivitychanges.Thisoperationalflexibilitywasdesignedintothesystem;however,itwasnotdescribedintheUFSARinanydetail.TheUFSARswererevisedtonotetheacceptabilityofsystemoperationinthemanualmode,includingtheabilitytodiluteorborateviadirectinjectionthroughthechargingpumpsratherthanviatheVCT.TheUFSARChapter15accidentanalyseswerereviewedanddeterminedtoboundtheUFSARchanges.

SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEMS-96-007REVISION0GAVEVALThissafetyevaluationdocumentstheacceptabilityofinstallingthreemanuallyoperatedisolationvalvesinthereactorcoolantgasventsystem(RCGVS).TheRCGVSinterfaceswiththereactorcoolantsystemandprovidesapressureboundaryfunction.Thenewvalvesallowtheisolationofexistingnormallyclosedsystemsolenoidoperatedventvalvesinordertofacilitatemaintenanceonthesolenoidvalves.Thenewmanualvalvesarerequiredtobemaintainedlockedopen,therebyensuringproperoperationoftheRCGVS.Intheeventitbecomesnecessarytoperformmaintenanceononeofthesolenoidoperatedvalves,theassociatedmanualvalve(s)maybeclosed.Pertheevaluation,theappropriateRCGVStechnicalspecificationrequirementsmustbecompliedwithwhenisolatingaportionofthesystem.ThemanualvalvesweredesignedandfabricatedinaccordancewithASMEClass1requirementsandwerepurchasedasnucleargradecomponents.Thevalveswerereviewedforsystemcompatibility,includingvalvepressuredrop,materialsandseismicdesign.32

SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-FPER-96-010REVISIONS06c1ERQKBsQKThissafetyevaluationassessestheneedforadditionalfireprotectionfeaturessincefiredampersarenotpresentinHVACductspenetratingthefirewallbetweentheHVS-5A65BfanroomandthecontrolroomHVACequipmentroom.Theevaluationalsoallowstheremoval,ifdesired,ofthermalwrapinstalledonthecontrolroomHVACductslocatedintheHVS-5A&5Bfanroom.Thisfireprotectionanalysisconsideredthedesignandconstructionoffireareapenetrationinconjunctionwithsystemoperatingfeaturesandareacombustibleloads'heevaluationconcludesthattheexistingbarrierprovidesadequateseparationandthatneithertheinstallationoffiredampersintheventilationductsnortheuseofthermalwrapwouldaugmentormateriallyenhancethesafetyoftheplant.33 00 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENP-96-019REVISION0HEAreviewoftheplantheatupandcooldownoperatingproceduresidentifiedsomeminordiscrepanciesbetweentheproceduresandtheUFSAR.ThissafetyevaluationevaluatesthesedifferencesandprovidesthenecessaryUFSARchanges.Nochangestoplantprocedureswererequired.

'J SAFETYEVALUATIONO'PN-PSL-SEFJ-96-019REVISION1ALLOWDDETERFThissafetyevaluationdocumentstheresultsofapowerpeakinguncertaintyanalysisoftheCECOREcomputercodewhichisusedtomonitorthecorepowerdistribution.Atthetimethiswasperformed,10of56detectorstringswerefailed.TheUFSARlimitforfaileddetectorswasnomorethan25%ofthetotal.Theanalysisquantifiedtheimpactofincreasingtheallowablenumberoffaileddetectorstringsontheuncertaintyassociatedwiththeresultingpowerdistributionsobtainedfromthereducednumberofdetectors.Theeffectofincreasingtheallowednumberoffaileddetectorsfrom25:to46%wasevaluated.Theevaluationconcludedthattheabilityoftheincoredetectorsystemtoperformitsintendedfunctionsremainsunaffected.Note:IncoredetectorswerereplacedduringtheCycle10refuelingoutage.35 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-022REVISIONS0Ec1LUATIFTHBATEThissafetyevaluationqualifiesthemethodologyandperformanceoftheBestEstimateAnalyzerforCoreOperations-Nuclear(BEACON)systemforcoreanalysisatUnits1&2.ThisallowstheuseofBEACONasareplacementfortheINPAXcode(Unit1)andtheCECOREcode(Unit2).BEACONisanadvancedonline,coremonitoringandsupportsystemwhichprimarilyusesrodpositions,coreinlettemperatureandfixedincoredetectorinstrumentationsignalsinconjunctionwithacompleteanalyticalmethodologyforgenerationofnearreal-time3-Dpowerdistributions.Thesystemprovidescoremonitoring,coreanalysisandfollow,andcorepredictions.TheheartofthesystemisanNRCapproved,threedimensionalnodalcode,ANC.36 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENP-96-022REVISION0LATFEELThereactorcavitypressurereliefdampersweredesignedtoopenandventthelowerportionofthereactorcavityintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident.ThisevaluationrevisesthedesignbasesofthedamperstoeliminatethispressurerelieffunctionbasedonNRCapprovaloftheleak-befor'e-breakevaluationforSt.LucieUnit2.Assuch,thedynamiceffectsassociatedwithahotorcoldlegpipingfailuremayberemovedfromtheplant'sdesignbasisandthereliefdampersarenolongerrequiredforpressurerelief.37

'SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-033REVISION0DThissafetyevaluationclarifiesUFSARwordingwithrespecttothepermissiblemodesofoperationforthewastegasholdupsystem.TheUFSARdescribessystemoperationwiththeflowstreamroutedfromthegassurgetanktothewastegascompressorsandthegasdecaytanksforholduppriortodischargethroughtheplantvent.Whilethisisanacceptablemodeofoperationandisthepreferredmodeofoperationduringperiodsofhighreactorcoolantfissionproductinventory,itisalsoacceptable,subjecttotheconstraintsprovidedbytheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual,todischargegaseouswastedirectlytotheplantvent.Originalplantdesignassumednormaloperationwithacertainamountofreactorcoolantactivity.Undersuchconditionsitwouldbeappropriatetoroutewastegastothedecaytankspriortorelease;however,becauseofimprovementsinfueldesignandplantoperatingpractices,normalcoolantactivitylevelshavebeenmuchlowerthantheoriginaldesignassumptions.,Assuch,itisacceptabletoroutegaseouswastedirectlytotheplantvent.38

'SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-039REVISION1EDLEThissafetyevaluationdocumentstheacceptabilityofthecoolingsystemandenclosureofthecontrolelementdrivemechanismcontrolsystem(CEDMCS)locatedonthe43'levationofthe'eactorauxiliarybuilding.AlthoughtheCEDMCSisanon-safety,non-seismicsystem,theseismicadequacyofthedesignwasconsideredtoensurenointeractionconcernsexisted.Additionally,theUFSARwasrevisedtonotetheadditionalcombustibleloadingassociatedwiththeenclosureitself.39 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-046REVISION00E-LIEDBLAE-TIETheUnit162UFSARsprovideadiscussionontheuseofthestationblackout(SBO)cross-tiewithrespecttotheanalyzedSBOevent.TheanalyzedSBOeventconsidersthatbothunitsareinitiallyatpowerand,uponablackout,arebothmaintainedinahotstandbycondition(Mode3)withACpowerprovidedfromasingleavailableemergencydieselgenerator.Theblacked-outunitispoweredviatheSBOcross-tie.ThereisnodiscussionintheUFSARsontheuseofthecross-tieforabla'ckouteventwhichoccurswhiletheunitisoperatinginModesotherthanMode1(i.e.,blackouteventsbeyonddesignandlicensingbasis).Thisevaluationrecognizestheuseofthecross-tieforthoseeventsandrevisestheUFSARsaccordingly.40 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEIS-96-049REVISION0DHPALVEPIT/@mmeThesubjectvalvepositionindicationdeviceswereintendedtoprovideoperatorswithanindicationofvalvepercentopen.Theseindicationswere.inadditiontotheseparatelyprovidedopen/closedindication.PertheplantEmergencyOperatingProcedures,NormalOperatingProceduresandOff-NormalOperatingProcedures,whentheassociatedsystemvalvesarerequiredtobemodulated,operatorsarerequiredtorelyonmonitoredparameterssuchassystemflow,pressurizerlevelorreactorcoolantsystemtemperatureandnotthisvalvepositionindication.~~~~~Pertheplant'sTotalEquipmentDatabase,theseindicatorsarenotrequiredtosatisfyNRCRegulatoryGuide1.97requirementsforpost-accidentmonitoring.Thevalves'penandclosedindicatinglightsareusedtodeterminevalveposition.Assuch,thesehistoricallyunreliableindicatorshavebeenremoved.

0 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-060REVISION0FTEAMETFERMEHODThesteamgeneratorblowdownfacilityissharedbybothunits.TransferofspentresinisdescribedintheUnit1UFSARasviagravityfeedtothespentresinstoragetank.ThisevaluationrevisedtheUFSARtorecognizealternatemeansofresinprocessing.AllresinsaretreatedasradioactiveuntilsampledandanalyzedbyHealthPhysics.Followingthisanalysis,resinsmaybeusedinanotherionexchangerortransferredintoastoragevesselorshippingcontainer.TransferofresinmaybeasdescribedintheUnit1UFSAR,orresincanbedirectlypumpedfromtheionexchangerstoastoragecontainerorshippingliner.Perplantprocedures,theshippinglinerwouldthenbede-wateredpriortooff-siteshipping.Eliminationoftheuseofthespentresinstoragetankduringtransfersavesaprocessstepanddoesnotposeanuclearsafetyconcern.

e SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-065REVISION0THEHOTDPThissafetyevaluationdocumentedacceptabilityofinstallingabreakawaylockonthedoortothehotshutdownpanelroomofeachunit.Breakawaylocksprovideimprovedsecuritybyallowinganeasymeansofdeterminingiftheroomhadbeenenteredwithoutcontrolroomauthorization.Becausethelocksareofthebreakawaytype,thereisnorestrictiontooperatoraccessshouldthekeynotbereadilyavailablewhenaccessisrequired.43 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-069REVISION0RTDggnan~~yThissafetyevaluationwasissuedtoclarifythedesignbasisofthehighrateofchangeofpower(HRCP)tripoftheUnit1andUnit2reactorprotectionsystems(RPS).TheexistingUnit162UFSARsandTechnicalSpecificationsrefertotheHRCPtripasanequipmentprotectivetripwhichisnotrequiredforreactorprotectionandisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses.ABB-CE,viaTechNote96-04,clarifiedtheoriginaldesignintentoftheHRCPtripfunction.TheTechNotesuggeststhatalackofdiscussioninoriginalFSARshascausedsomeutilityandABB-CEpersonneltoerroneouslyassumethattheHRCPtripwasnotcreditedinaplant'ssafetyanalyses.AccordingtoABB-CE,thepresenceoftheHRCPtripprecludedthespecificanalysisofeventsinitiatedfromsubcriticalconditions.ThisevaluationincorporatestheconclusionsoftheABB-CETechNoteintotheTechnicalSpecificationBasesandtheUFSARs.44

SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-072REVISIONS0&.1ELERWTThissafetyevaluationclarifiedtheUnit1&2UFSARswithrespect,toplantoperationwiththecontrolelementassembly(CEA)modeselectorswitchintheOFFpositionratherthanintheAUTOMATICposition.Bothunit'sUFSARsdescribeautomaticsystemoperationwithrespecttomaintainingprogrammedreactorcoolanttemperatureandpowerlevelduringboricacidconcentrationchanges.AlthoughtheUFSARsdescribeautomaticoperation,theyalsomentionmanualoperation.ItwasnottheintentoftheseUFSARdiscussionstolimitplantoperationstoaparticularmode(i.e.,manualorautomatic),rather,theUFSARsareprovidingageneraldescriptionofsystemcapabilities.Automaticoperationwasprovidedasapartofthesystem'sdesigntosupportload-followingplantoperations.

SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SENS-96-091REVISION0RLAATI~u~nryAs.aresultof,UFSARreviews,adiscrepancyregardingthehypochloritesystemdescriptionwasidentified.Specifically,boththeUnit1and2UFSARsrefertoahypochlorite"generating"systemwhenidentifyingthesystem;however,theplantshavefrequentlybeenusingatemporarysystemforchemicalinjection.Thistemporarys'stemdoesnotgenerateitsownchlorinesolution,ratheritusesachlorinesolutionwhichisprovidedfromanoff-sitesourceandisstoredinasuitabletank.Thehypochloritesystemisanon-safetysystemcommontobothunitsandwasdesignedtoproduceasodiumhypochloritesolutionviaelectrolyticdecompositionoffilteredseawaterandtoperiodicallyinjectthissolutionintotheseawaterintakebaysforthecontrolofbiologicalfouling.Asaresultofincreasedmaintenance,equipmentaging,partsobsolescence,etc.,theoriginalsystem(i.e.,the"generatingsystem")isfrequentlynotinserviceandaliquidchlorinesolutionfromanoff-sitesourceisused.Whetherornotachlorinesolutionisgeneratedon-siteisimmaterialtotheachievementofthesystem'function.ThisevaluationrevisestheUnit182UFSARdescriptionstoreplacetheterm"hypochloritegeneratingsystem"withtheterm"hypochloritesystem."46 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SESP-96-093REVISION0EQARDIZEDThisevaluationprovidedSt.Lucie'sresponsetoanNRCrequestforadditionalinformation(RAX)regardingtheplant'spressurizedthermalshock(PTS)evaluationpreviouslysubmittedtotheNRC.A10CFR50.59evaluationwasperformedinordertoreviseUnit2UFSARTable5.2-7a,includingtheadditionoftemperaturedataandsurveillanceweldmaterialpropertydata.47 SAFETYEVALUATXONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-006REVXSXONS0Ec1ALThissafetyevaluationdocumentedtheacceptabilityofafullcoreoffloadasaroutineplantoutagepractice.Theabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemtomaintainfuelpooltemperaturesbelowthe140FlimitprovidedintheNRCStandardReviewPlanhasbeenconfirmed.Thefollowingrestrictionswereprovidedintheevaluationtoensureitremainsboundingforfutureuse:thecalculatedmaximumdecayheatloadduringeachfullcoreoffloadshallbes31.7E6BTU/hrat168hoursfollowingreactorshutdown;thereactormustbesubcriticalforatleast168hourspriortoplacementofthefirstoffloadassemblyinthepool;priortooffload,poolwaterlevelshallbeconfirmedtobewithinitsnominaloperatingband;withoneheatexchangerinservice,coolingwaterflowshallbemaintained23560gpm;twofuelpoolcoolingpumpsshallbeinoperation(exceptionsnoted);andcontrolroomannunciationforpoolhightemperature,pumpstatusandpoollevelshallbeoperable.48 00 SAFETYEVALUATIONJPN-PSL-SEFJ-97-011REVISIONS061TPThissafetyevaluationrevisedthereactorcoolantlowflowtripsetpointtogainoperatingmargin.DuringimplementationoftheCycle9lowflowtripsetpointprocedure,pre-tripalarmsweregenerated.Itwasfoundthatthecalculatedvaluesofthetripsetpointswereclosetotheactualmeasuredflowvaluesasindicatedbysteamgeneratorpressuredropreadings.Themethodologyusedingeneratingtheseoriginalsetpointswasidentifiedasbeingconservativewithrespecttotheincorporationofuncertainties.ThemethodologyusedfortherevisedsetpointisconsistentwiththatusedinotherSt.Luciesetpointcalculations.Fortherevisedsetpoint,theuncertaintieswerecombinedusingthesquarerootsumofthesquares(SRSS)method.Fromasafetyanalysisstandpoint,thereactortripfordegradedflowremainsunchangedandthenewsetpointvaluescomplywithtechnicalspecificationrequirements.49 I0 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SEES-97-019REVISION0FOFCHThissafetyevaluationdocumentedtheacceptabilityofremovingtheunderwatercamerafromtherefuelingmachine.Additionally,theevaluationalsodocumentedtheacceptabilityofusingaportabletemporarycamera,ifdesired.PertheUFSAR,bothaviewingportintherefuelingmachinetrolleydeckaswellaselectronicandvisualindicationofrefuelingmachinepositionoverthecoreareprovided.Theunderwatercameraprovidessupplementalvisualindicationforrefuelingoperationsandisatooltoaidinrefueling.Thecameraisnotrequirednorcreditedwiththepreventionormitigationofafuelhandlingaccident.Removalofthecamerawillresultineliminationofworkpresentlyresultinginhighradiationdoses.50 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-024REVISION0EMALZB~RXYThissafetyevaluationaddressesaConditionReportwhichidentifiedaconcernrelatedtotheUFSARdescriptionforoperationofthewastegassystemanalyzersandprovidesthedocumentationnecessarytorevisetheUFSARdescriptions.Thewastegasanalyzeristypicallyoperatedbysamplingthein-serviceGas'ecayTank(GDT)atasinglepoint.However,theUnit2UFSARstatesthatthegasanalyzerisusedto"sequentiallymeasureseveralpointsinthesystem."Althoughthisconfigurationdescribesamethodofoperationbasedonagasanalyzerfeaturethatallowsforautomaticsequentialsamplingoperation,itdoesnotcorrectlyreflectthewaythesystemisoperatedperplantprocedures(asinglesamplepointisuseddependingonsystemoperation,GasSurgeTank(GST),toGDTorGSTtoplantvent).Thecontinuouslymonitoredsinglesamplepointsareselectedbasedonthedesiredmethodofgaseouseffluentrelease.Ifgassamplesexceedapredeterminedlevelofradioactivityandholding.ofthegaseouseffluentisdesired,thenthein-serviceGDTpathisutilizedandcontinuouslymonitoredforoxygen;likewise,iflittleornoradioactivityexistsinthesample,thentheGSTtoplantventpathisutilizedandcontinuouslymonitored.Bothmethodsofgaseouseffluentcontrolandreleasearemonitoredforradioactivity.Thisevaluationconcludesthatoperationofthewastegasanalyzerandthewastegassysteminamanualand/orbatchmodewithcontinuousmonitoringofasinglesamplepointdoesnotadverselyimpactplantsafetyanddoesnotconflictwiththeTechnicalSpecificationsortheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual.51 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SESJ-97-026REVISION0REDEThisevaluationprovidedSt.Lucie'sresponsetoasupplementalNRCrequestforadditionalinformation(RAI)regardingtheplant'spressurizedthermalshock(PTS)evaluationpreviouslysubmittedtotheNRC.,SafetyevaluationJPN-PSL-SESP-96-054documentedEngineering'sresponsetotheoriginalRAI.A10CFR50.59evaluationwasperformedinordertoreviseUnit2UFSARTable5.2-7afandTable5.3-2,SeveralminorenhancementsweremadetoTable5.2-7a,includingtheadditionoftemperaturedataandsurveillanceweldmaterialpropertydata.AninformationalnotewasaddedtoTable5.3-2.52 0

SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SEMS-97-034REVISIONS0Ee1LIORLATEDCOELTThissafetyevaluationdocumentedtheacceptabilityofinstallingtwosimulatedfixedincoredetectorassembliesprovidedbyABB-CE.Theevaluationalsoconsideredtheeffectofbrokendetectorpiecesleftinthethimbletubesatthesedetectorlocations.ThesimulatedassemblieswereinstalledduringtheCycle10refuelingoutage.Duringinspectionoftheupperguidestructure(UGS)incoreinstrumentation(ICI)guidetubes,brokenICIdetectorsegmentswerelocatedinlocationsR9andT13andcouldnotberemoved.Becauseofthisproblem,thelocationscouldnotbeusedfor,.incoreinstrumentation.ItwasdecidedtopushthebrokenpiecesdownintothethimbletubessothattheyremainshieldedwellunderwaterduringtheUGSlift..SimulatedICIassembliesweresubsequentlyinstalled.Thesimulatedassembliesaredimensionallysimilartothenormaldetectorassembliesandweredesignedforthisapplication.ThenumberofremainingavailabledetectorsremainsaboveUFSARandTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Thebrokendetectorpiecesleftinthethimbletubesweredeterminedtohavenoadverseeffectonplantoperationorsafety.Thisconclusionwasbasedonanevaluationperformedfortheeffectsrelatedtovibration,seismicloads,loosepartsmigration/potentialconsequences,andeffectspertainingtoneutronicaspectsandcorebypassflow.53 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-036REVISION0TEMRATITheintakestructureventilationsystemconsistsofexhaustfansEATE-41A&,B.ThesefansaredesignedtomaintainroomtemperaturewithindesignlimitsandtooperateasasupportsystemfortheintakecoolingwaterpumpswhicharerequiredbythetechnicalspecificationsinModes1,2,3&4.ThereisnotechnicalspecificationLimitingConditionofOperation(LCO)forthefans.TheUFSARdescribesthefansasSafetyRelatedcomponentswhicharedesignedtomaintainthetemperatureoftheICWpumproombetween80-120F.Thecorrectlystateddesignfunctionofthefansistolimitroomtemperaturetolessthan120F.TheUFSARdescriptionalsoimpliesthatfanoperationisrequiredinallmodesofplantoperation.Infact,therearecertainplantconditionswherethefansmaynotberequiredtooperate(e.g.,duringperiodsofcoolweatherand/orwithonlyoneICWpumpinservice).NRCGenericLetter91-18describessupportsystemoperabilityandrecognizesthatalicenseemaymodifythesupportfunctionbytheuseofthe50.59processandUFSARchange.ThisevaluationrevisestheUFSARtoaddresstheaboveitemsandtoclarifyastatementregar'dingmanualandautomaticsystemoperation.54 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL>>ENG-SENS-97-038,REVISIONS0&1ICODEAFETYPlantChange/Modification(PC/M)96139Mprovidedforthereplacementofthepressurizercodesafetyvalvesduringthe1997refuelingoutage.QualityReport97-0754documentedaQualityAssurance(QA)reviewofthemodificationwhichconcludedthata10CFR50.59safetyevaluationshouldhavebeenperformedforthemodificationsincethechangerepresentsachange'othefacilityasdescribedintheUFSAR.Specifically,theQAreportnotedthattheUFSARdescribesthevalvesashavingablowdownofapproximately10'hereasthenewvalveshaveaspecifiedblowdownvalueof4%.ConditionReport97-0753waswrittenonthesubject.AlthoughthePC/Mprovidedananalysiswhichaddressedthechangeinvalve'blowdown,itdid,notincludea10CFR50.59evaluation.Thisevaluationdocumentsthe10CFR50.59considerationforchangingtheblowdownofthesubjectvalvesandrevisestheUFSAR.55 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-040REVISION0DEPERATEDEACTORIEMEFThissafetyevaluationwaswrittentoevaluateandcorrectUFSARwordingpertainingtooperationofthesafetyinjectiontanksatreducedreactorcoolantsystempressures.ExistingUFSARwordingistooexplicitandexcessivelypreciseinitslanguageanditconflictswiththerelevanttechnicalspecificationrequirementsandplantprocedures.56

SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SEMS-97-043REVISION0AGEUEEJumpilyThisevaluationrevisestheUFSARtoclarifythatthetwofirepumpsdonotstartsequentially.Thefireprotectioncode(NFPA-20)referstosequentiallystartingfirepumps.Thisrequirementisintendedtopreventawaterhammerandpossibleelectricalsystemoverload.SincetheSt.Luciedesignincorporatesahydropneumatictankwhichmaintainsthepipingsystemfullofwaterandsincethetwofirepumpsarepoweredfromseparateelectricalbusses,theneedforsequentialpumpstartingiseliminated.Thisevaluationalsoclarifiesthatthepumpsstartatasystempressureof"equaltoorgreaterthan85psig"ratherthan"at85psig."57 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-044REVISION0ggm~ryConditionReport97-1102documentsgapsidentifiedinthecontainmentsumpscreens.ThisevaluationwaspreparedasaresponsetotheCR.Thecontainmentsumpscreensactasabarriertopreventdebrisfromenteringtheemergencycorecoolingsystemandcontainmentspraysystem.PertheUFSARandtheoriginalNRCSafetyEvaluationReport,thesescreensweredesignedinaccordancewithNRCRegulatoryGuide1.82,Revision0.Thisevaluationdocumentsthedesignandlicensingrequirementsforthesumpscreensandclarifiesthedesignbases,includingadiscussionontheacceptabilityofgapsinthescreen.Ananalysisisprovidedforthesumpdividerscreen(thescreenwhichsegregatesthesumpintoAandBtrains)todeterminethelimitingdividerscreengapsize.TheUFSARwasrevisedtomoreaccuratelydescribetheoverallsumpscreendesign.58 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-045,REVISION0Asaresultofrepairsrequiredfortheemergencycorecoolingsystemcontainmentsumpscreens,"'uestionswereraisedregardingtheacceptabilityofusinga20gage(wire)meshscreenforrepairstothe18gagemeshsumpscreen.TheUFSARdescribesonlyan18gagemeshsi'zewithanopenareaof0.0081squareinches.Thisevaluationdocumentedtheacceptabilityofusingthe20gagemeshscreenforsumpscreenrepairs.The20gagemeshwasconsideredacceptablesince:ithasanequivalentopeningof0.090"diameterrequiredforfilteringofparticlesthatcouldbecomelodgedinthefuel;itdoesnotadverselyaffectthecapabilityofthescreenstowithstandmaximumdebrisloading;itwillnotadverselyaffecttheflowratethroughthescreens;anditisconstructedof304stainlesssteel.TheUFSARwasrevisedtonotetheacceptabilityofascreenmeshsizeotherthan18gage.59 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SEMS-97-070REVISION0PDmumm~NRCInformationNotice92-82statedthatThermo-lagwasacombustiblematerial.ThisevaluationrevisesUFSARfirezonecombustibleloadinginformationasaresultofincludingThermo-lagasacombustible~Thestorageofvariouscombustiblematerialsrelatedtoplantoperationandmaintenancehasalsobeenincluded.Theevaluationconcludedthat,withthisadditionalcombustibleloading,adequatefireprotectionisprovidedtoensurethecontinuedavailabilityofredundantsafeshutdownequipmentandcomponents.60 SAFETYEVALUATIONPSL-ENG-SENS-97-071REVISION0BoththeUnit1andUnit2UFSARsincluderequirementsforthestorageofemergencysuppliesinthecontrolroom.Theseemergencysuppliesconsistoffood,water,medicalandsanitaryprovisionsintendedforcontrolroompersonnelintheeventofadesignbasislossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheUFSARdescriptionsincludealistofspecificsanitationsuppliesbasedonOfficeofCivilDefenseSanitationKitIIIwhichwasapparentlydevelopedforuseinfalloutshelters(supports25personsfor2weeks).Inaddition,theUFSARsnotethatasupplyoffoodandwaterisstoredinthecontrolroomstosupportacrewoftenpersonsforaoneweekperiod.Thereisnoregulatoryrequirementforthestorageofspecificemergencysuppliesinthecontrolroom.Assuch,the'evelofdetailcontainedwithintheUFSARsisunnecessarilyrestrictiveanddoesnotallowforefficientplantoperations.Additionally,NUREG-0800,doesnotdiscusscontrolroomemergencysupplies'.ThisevaluationrevisestheUFSARstodeletethespecificsupplyrequirementsfromtheUFSARsandwillrecognizethesite'sEmergencyPlanwithrespecttoensuringadequatefood,water,medicalandsanitary-suppliesareavailableforcontrolroompersonnel.ThisactionisconsistentwithRevision1toRegulatoryGuide1.101,whichnotesthatemergencyplanrequirementsshouldbemaintainedseparatelyfromtheFSAR.61 0

SECTION3RELOADSAFETYEVALUATIONS62 PLANTCHANGE/MODIFICATION96172TLELThisengineeringpackageprovidedthereloadcoredesignoftheSt.LucieUnit2Cycle10.TheCycle10coreisdesignedforcyclelengthsbetween12,793and13,545EFPH,dependinguponvariationintheCycle9lengthofbetween9,902and11,024EFPH,respectively.ThecyclelengthsforCycle10includedanendofcycleinlettemperaturecoastdownto535'Ffollowedbyacoastdowninpowertoapproximately85-.power.Cycle9isexpectedtoreachanEOCexposureofapproximately10,738EFPH.'heprimarydesignchangetothecoreforCycle10isthereplacementof64irradiatedfuelassemblieswithfreshRegionMfuelassemblies.ThefuelisarrangedinalowleakagepatternsimilartothedesignoftheCycle9core.ThemechanicaldesignofRegionMfuelisthesameasthatofRegionL(Cycle9)withtheexceptionofincorporatingcorelessHID-1Lgrids.Thetwodesignsareequivalentfromthestandpointofperformanceandfunctionalrequirements.ThesafetyanalysisofthisdesignwasperformedbyAseaBrownBoveriCombustionEngineeringNuclearOperations(ABBCENO)andindependentlyreviewedbyFloridaPowerandLightCo.r63