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| All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.PurDoseThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice (IN) to alert addressees to a potential for surveillance testing tofail to detect that a main steam isolation valve is mechanically bound andwill not close. It is expected that recipients will review the information forapplicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, toavoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this informationnotice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.DescriDtion of CircumstancesOn April 19, 1993, while performing maintenance to repair a presumed faultylimit switch on a main steam isolation valve, the licensee for the River BendStation (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically bound and would notclose as required. The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring andpneumatic closing, pneumatic-opening, internally balanced, poppet-type globevalve manufactured by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators hadpreviously performed partial stroke surveillance testing of the valve onFebruary 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would notclose. The licensee later determined that the testing failed to detect thatthe valve was inoperable because the test did not adequately consider thedesign of the valve and the positioning of the limit switch arm in relation tothe valve poppet travel.The licensee determined that the valve would not close because improperclearances between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessivewear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanicallybound. The excessive wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed ananti-rotation modification recommended by the manufacturer in 1989.Subsequent to this event, the manufacturer reported the failure to close tothe NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations andinformed affected licensees of the failure mechanism and recommended actionsto prevent recurrence. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee EventReport.93-006 provide additional details on the valve failure.(9401260242) TJ'O 02w> 44M'j J7JD#V&// c/S* '(I YJ Kx/ IN 94-08February 1, 1994 DiscussionThe original design positioning of the limit switches was such that, duringpartial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicatemovement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had notactually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may goundetected by partial stroke testing.Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters [11 inches] tofully stroke in either direction. As the valve strokes open, the first2.5 centimeters [1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opensan equalizing port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet toequalize. During the remainder of the open stroke, the internal poppet liftsthe main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position. During a partialstroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position,the stem travelled about 2.5 centimeters [I inch] and stopped when theinternal poppet seated in the equalizing port.There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.The first two switches provide a safety-related signal to the reactorprotection system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends anonsafety-related signal to position indicating lights in the control roomindicating that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the90-percent-open limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valvepoppet had moved to the 90-percent-open position. However, because the limitswitches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuatethe 90-percent-open limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters [0.88 inch]. Ina worst-case scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open limit switchescould be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.During the partial stroke testing conducted on February 7 and April 1, thefirst two limit switches (92-percent-open indication) actuated, the thirdlimit switch (90-percent-open indication) did not actuate. Although theprocedural step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open indication, theoperators did not declare the valve inoperable because the first two limitswitches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance on the presumed faultylimit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanicallybound and that the valve would not close.The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuateat 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation during partialstroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand intends to install the anti-rotation modification recommended by thevendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides. Also,operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of thelimit switche IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. byBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174 | | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.PurDoseThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice (IN) to alert addressees to a potential for surveillance testing tofail to detect that a main steam isolation valve is mechanically bound andwill not close. It is expected that recipients will review the information forapplicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, toavoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this informationnotice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.DescriDtion of CircumstancesOn April 19, 1993, while performing maintenance to repair a presumed faultylimit switch on a main steam isolation valve, the licensee for the River BendStation (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically bound and would notclose as required. The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring andpneumatic closing, pneumatic-opening, internally balanced, poppet-type globevalve manufactured by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators hadpreviously performed partial stroke surveillance testing of the valve onFebruary 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would notclose. The licensee later determined that the testing failed to detect thatthe valve was inoperable because the test did not adequately consider thedesign of the valve and the positioning of the limit switch arm in relation tothe valve poppet travel.The licensee determined that the valve would not close because improperclearances between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessivewear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanicallybound. The excessive wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed ananti-rotation modification recommended by the manufacturer in 1989.Subsequent to this event, the manufacturer reported the failure to close tothe NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations andinformed affected licensees of the failure mechanism and recommended actionsto prevent recurrence. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee EventReport.93-006 provide additional details on the valve failure.(9401260242) TJ'O 02w> 44M'j J7JD#V&// c/S* '(I |
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| | YJ Kx/ IN 94-08February 1, 1994 DiscussionThe original design positioning of the limit switches was such that, duringpartial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicatemovement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had notactually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may goundetected by partial stroke testing.Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters [11 inches] tofully stroke in either direction. As the valve strokes open, the first2.5 centimeters [1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opensan equalizing port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet toequalize. During the remainder of the open stroke, the internal poppet liftsthe main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position. During a partialstroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position,the stem travelled about 2.5 centimeters [I inch] and stopped when theinternal poppet seated in the equalizing port.There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.The first two switches provide a safety-related signal to the reactorprotection system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends anonsafety-related signal to position indicating lights in the control roomindicating that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the90-percent-open limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valvepoppet had moved to the 90-percent-open position. However, because the limitswitches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuatethe 90-percent-open limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters [0.88 inch]. Ina worst-case scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open limit switchescould be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.During the partial stroke testing conducted on February 7 and April 1, thefirst two limit switches (92-percent-open indication) actuated, the thirdlimit switch (90-percent-open indication) did not actuate. Although theprocedural step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open indication, theoperators did not declare the valve inoperable because the first two limitswitches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance on the presumed faultylimit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanicallybound and that the valve would not close.The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuateat 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation during partialstroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand intends to install the anti-rotation modification recommended by thevendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides. Also,operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of thelimit switches. |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices v -" IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original t1gnad bBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174
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| | --- IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. byBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 ofOIP/NA/Per _ OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR DKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus* Wg901/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:94-08. IN IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IV
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| | v -" IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original t1gnad bBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 ofOIP/NA/Per _ OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR DKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus* Wg901/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:94-08. IN |
| List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR l C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 l12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV [REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV l D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR (KHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus I BKGrimes I01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLBA IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IV | |
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| | IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR l C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 l12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV [REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV l D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR (KHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus I BKGrimes I01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLBA |
| List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGIONY, EG10 YVI C/ES:RI ee DD/DR ' D/DRS:R ' ,,20dWM6N Tte 'ste a n AH &i' SColl I i 12+12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA er OGCB: DORS:NK, C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRKHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar GHMarcus BKGrimes01/06/94 1 01//0/94 01/ /94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLB'7-- | |
| IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid(512)P. Loveless, Region IV972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IV
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| | IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGIONY, EG10 YVI C/ES:RI ee DD/DR ' D/DRS:R ' ,,20dWM6N Tte 'ste a n AH &i' SColl I i 12+12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA er OGCB: DORS:NK, C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRKHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar GHMarcus BKGrimes01/06/94 1 01//0/94 01/ /94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLB'7-- |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C100AWR PDIV-2NAME PCampbel __JN___rg __ _ IDATE12/AI/9312/1ZI9312/27/93IOFFICE }jGIONI REGION IV [REGION IV FNAME _McNeil f' DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12A_7/93____ 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders* JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93.F I C A _ U U L l .' R L ,A ~ w u v r ..J_. L I._.^ .AM FIGIAL DOUMEN NAME:AMUMOIN.JLB IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IV | | IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid(512)P. Loveless, Region IV972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C100AWR PDIV-2NAME PCampbel __JN___rg __ _ IDATE12/AI/9312/1ZI9312/27/93IOFFICE }jGIONI REGION IV [REGION IV FNAME _McNeil f' DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12A_7/93____ 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders* JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93.F I C A _ U U L l .' R L ,A ~ w u v r ..J_. L I._.^ .AM FIGIAL DOUMEN NAME:AMUMOIN.JLB |
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| | IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME PCampbell JNorberg IDATE12/ /9312/ /93I12/ /93OFFICE REGION IV REGION IV REGION IVNAME WMcNeill DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE R1B:Ap L OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:ATWOODIN.JLH |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME PCampbell JNorberg IDATE12/ /9312/ /93I12/ /93OFFICE REGION IV REGION IV REGION IVNAME WMcNeill DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE R1B:Ap L OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:ATWOODIN.JLH Atta -ement,IN 94-08February 1, 1994Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-26,Supp. 194-0794-0693-85,Rev. 194-0594-0494-0394-02Grease SolidificationCauses Molded-CaseCircuit Breaker Failureto CloseSolubility Criteria forLiquid Effluent Releasesto Sanitary Sewerage Underthe Revised 10 CFR Part 20Potential Failure ofLong-Term EmergencyNitrogen Supply for theAutomatic DepressurizationSystem ValvesProblems with X-Relaysin DB- and DHP-TypeCircuit Breakers Manu-factured by WestinghousePotential Failure ofSteam Generator Tubeswith Kinetically WeldedSleevesDigital IntegratedCircuit Sockets withIntermittent ContactDeficiencies Identifiedduring Service Water SystemOperational PerformanceInspectionsInoperability of GeneralElectric Magne-BlastBreaker Because of Mis-alignment of Close-LatchSpring01/31/9401/28/9401/28/9401/20/9401/19/9401/14/9401/11/9401/07/94All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All byproduct material andfuel cycle licensees withthe exception of licenseesauthorized solely forsealed sources.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors (PWRs).All NRC licensees exceptlicensed operators.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit K-' x J IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original igned IyBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174 | |
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| ===Attachment:=== | | Atta -ement,IN 94-08February 1, 1994Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-26,Supp. 194-0794-0693-85,Rev. 194-0594-0494-0394-02Grease SolidificationCauses Molded-CaseCircuit Breaker Failureto CloseSolubility Criteria forLiquid Effluent Releasesto Sanitary Sewerage Underthe Revised 10 CFR Part 20Potential Failure ofLong-Term EmergencyNitrogen Supply for theAutomatic DepressurizationSystem ValvesProblems with X-Relaysin DB- and DHP-TypeCircuit Breakers Manu-factured by WestinghousePotential Failure ofSteam Generator Tubeswith Kinetically WeldedSleevesDigital IntegratedCircuit Sockets withIntermittent ContactDeficiencies Identifiedduring Service Water SystemOperational PerformanceInspectionsInoperability of GeneralElectric Magne-BlastBreaker Because of Mis-alignment of Close-LatchSpring01/31/9401/28/9401/28/9401/20/9401/19/9401/14/9401/11/9401/07/94All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All byproduct material andfuel cycle licensees withthe exception of licenseesauthorized solely forsealed sources.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors (PWRs).All NRC licensees exceptlicensed operators.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM [EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR l PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 doOIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRRKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus*01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 0 1/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08.IN}} | | |
| | K-' x J IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original igned IyBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM [EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR l PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 doOIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRRKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus*01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 0 1/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08.IN |
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| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve| ML031070034 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
02/01/1994 |
|---|
| From: |
Grimes B K
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| References |
|---|
| IN-94-008, NUDOCS 9401260242 |
| Download: ML031070034 (10) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555February 1, 1994NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-08: POTENTIAL FOR SURVEILLANCE TESTING TO FAILTO DETECT AN INOPERABLE MAIN STEAM ISOLATIONVALVE
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.PurDoseThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice (IN) to alert addressees to a potential for surveillance testing tofail to detect that a main steam isolation valve is mechanically bound andwill not close. It is expected that recipients will review the information forapplicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, toavoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this informationnotice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.DescriDtion of CircumstancesOn April 19, 1993, while performing maintenance to repair a presumed faultylimit switch on a main steam isolation valve, the licensee for the River BendStation (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically bound and would notclose as required. The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring andpneumatic closing, pneumatic-opening, internally balanced, poppet-type globevalve manufactured by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators hadpreviously performed partial stroke surveillance testing of the valve onFebruary 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would notclose. The licensee later determined that the testing failed to detect thatthe valve was inoperable because the test did not adequately consider thedesign of the valve and the positioning of the limit switch arm in relation tothe valve poppet travel.The licensee determined that the valve would not close because improperclearances between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessivewear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanicallybound. The excessive wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed ananti-rotation modification recommended by the manufacturer in 1989.Subsequent to this event, the manufacturer reported the failure to close tothe NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations andinformed affected licensees of the failure mechanism and recommended actionsto prevent recurrence. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee EventReport.93-006 provide additional details on the valve failure.(9401260242) TJ'O 02w> 44M'j J7JD#V&// c/S* '(I
YJ Kx/ IN 94-08February 1, 1994 DiscussionThe original design positioning of the limit switches was such that, duringpartial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicatemovement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had notactually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may goundetected by partial stroke testing.Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters [11 inches] tofully stroke in either direction. As the valve strokes open, the first2.5 centimeters [1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opensan equalizing port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet toequalize. During the remainder of the open stroke, the internal poppet liftsthe main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position. During a partialstroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position,the stem travelled about 2.5 centimeters [I inch] and stopped when theinternal poppet seated in the equalizing port.There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.The first two switches provide a safety-related signal to the reactorprotection system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends anonsafety-related signal to position indicating lights in the control roomindicating that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the90-percent-open limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valvepoppet had moved to the 90-percent-open position. However, because the limitswitches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuatethe 90-percent-open limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters [0.88 inch]. Ina worst-case scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open limit switchescould be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.During the partial stroke testing conducted on February 7 and April 1, thefirst two limit switches (92-percent-open indication) actuated, the thirdlimit switch (90-percent-open indication) did not actuate. Although theprocedural step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open indication, theoperators did not declare the valve inoperable because the first two limitswitches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance on the presumed faultylimit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanicallybound and that the valve would not close.The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuateat 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation during partialstroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand intends to install the anti-rotation modification recommended by thevendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides. Also,operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of thelimit switches.
--- IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. byBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
v -" IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original t1gnad bBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 ofOIP/NA/Per _ OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR DKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus* Wg901/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:94-08. IN
IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR l C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 l12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV [REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV l D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR (KHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus I BKGrimes I01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLBA
IN 94-xxJanuary xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRCInformation Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGIONY, EG10 YVI C/ES:RI ee DD/DR ' D/DRS:R ' ,,20dWM6N Tte 'ste a n AH &i' SColl I i 12+12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94OIP/NA er OGCB: DORS:NK, C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRKHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar GHMarcus BKGrimes01/06/94 1 01//0/94 01/ /94 01/ /94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLB'7--
IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid(512)P. Loveless, Region IV972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C100AWR PDIV-2NAME PCampbel __JN___rg __ _ IDATE12/AI/9312/1ZI9312/27/93IOFFICE }jGIONI REGION IV [REGION IV FNAME _McNeil f' DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12A_7/93____ 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders* JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93.F I C A _ U U L l .' R L ,A ~ w u v r ..J_. L I._.^ .AM FIGIAL DOUMEN NAME:AMUMOIN.JLB
IN 93-xxJanuary x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pendingfurther evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, thelicensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basisand is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended bythe vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function ofthe limit switches.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell,(301) 504-1311NRRDavid P. Loveless, Region IV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill,(817) 860-8174Region IVAttachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESOFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2NAME PCampbell JNorberg IDATE12/ /9312/ /93I12/ /93OFFICE REGION IV REGION IV REGION IVNAME WMcNeill DLoveless TWestermanDATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICE R1B:Ap L OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME RSanders JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimesDATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:ATWOODIN.JLH
Atta -ement,IN 94-08February 1, 1994Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-26,Supp. 194-0794-0693-85,Rev. 194-0594-0494-0394-02Grease SolidificationCauses Molded-CaseCircuit Breaker Failureto CloseSolubility Criteria forLiquid Effluent Releasesto Sanitary Sewerage Underthe Revised 10 CFR Part 20Potential Failure ofLong-Term EmergencyNitrogen Supply for theAutomatic DepressurizationSystem ValvesProblems with X-Relaysin DB- and DHP-TypeCircuit Breakers Manu-factured by WestinghousePotential Failure ofSteam Generator Tubeswith Kinetically WeldedSleevesDigital IntegratedCircuit Sockets withIntermittent ContactDeficiencies Identifiedduring Service Water SystemOperational PerformanceInspectionsInoperability of GeneralElectric Magne-BlastBreaker Because of Mis-alignment of Close-LatchSpring01/31/9401/28/9401/28/9401/20/9401/19/9401/14/9401/11/9401/07/94All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All byproduct material andfuel cycle licensees withthe exception of licenseesauthorized solely forsealed sources.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors (PWRs).All NRC licensees exceptlicensed operators.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
K-' x J IN 94-08February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications atnuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two mainsteam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, locatedinside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primarycontainment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required toclose and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close,offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steamisolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillancetest accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager. Original igned IyBrian K. GrimesBrian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Thomas F. Westerman, RIV(817) 860-8145Patricia Campbell, NRR(301) 504-1311David P. Loveless, RIV(512) 972-2507William M. McNeill, RIV(817) 860-8174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE RPB:ADM [EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR l PDIV-2NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIVWMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 doOIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRRKHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus*01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 0 1/Z7/94OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08.IN
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| list | - Information Notice 1994-01, Turbine Blade Failures Caused by Torsional Excitation from Electrical System Disturbance (7 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-02, Inoperability of General Electric Magne-Blast Breaker Because of Misalignment of Close-Latch Spring (7 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-03, Deficiencies Identified During Service Water System Operational Performance Inspections (11 January 1994, Topic: Biofouling)
- Information Notice 1994-04, Digital Integrated Circuit Sockets with Intermittent Contact (14 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-05, Potential Failure of Steam Generator Tubes with Kinetically Welded Sleeves (19 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-06, Potential Failure of Long-Term Emergency Nitrogen Supply for the Automatic Depressurization System Valves (28 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-07, Solubility Criteria for Liquid Effluent Releases to Sanitary Sewerage Under the Revised 10 CFR Part 20 (28 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-08, Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve (1 February 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-09, Release of Patients with Residual Radioactivity from Medical Treatment & Control of Areas Due to Presence of Patients Containing Radioactivity Following Implementation of Revised 10 CFR Part 20 (3 February 1994, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1994-10, Failure of Motor-Operated Valve Electric Power Train Due to Sheared or Dislodged Motor Pinion Gear Key (4 February 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-11, Turbine Overspeed and Reactor Cooldown During Shutdown Evolution (8 February 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-12, Insights Gained from Resolving Generic Issue 57: Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment (9 February 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-13, Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment (28 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-14, Failure to Implement Requirements for Biennial Medical Examinations and Notification to the NRC of Changes in Licensed Operator Medical Conditions (24 February 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-15, Radiation Exposures During an Event Involving a Fixed Nuclear Gauge (2 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-16, Recent Incidents Resulting in Offsite Contamination (3 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-17, Strontium-90 Eye Applicators: Submission of Quality Management Plan (QMP), Calibration, and Use (11 March 1994, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1994-17, Strontium-90 Eye Applicators: Submission of Quality Management Plan (Qmp), Calibration, and Use (11 March 1994, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1994-18, Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (Responses to Supplement 5 to Generic Letter 89-10) (16 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-19, Emergency Diesel Gemerator Vulnerability to Failure from Cold Fuel Oil (16 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-20, Common-Cause Failures Due to Inadequate Design Control and Dedication (17 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-21, Regulatory Requirements When No Operations Are Being Performed (18 March 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-22, Fire Endurance & Ampacity Derating Test Results for 3-Hour Fire-Rated Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers (16 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-23, Guidance to Hazardous, Radioactive and Mixed Waste Generators on the Elements of a Waste Minimization Program (25 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-24, Inadequate Maintenance of Uninterruptible Power Supplies & Inverters (24 March 1994, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-25, Failure of Containment Spray Header Valve to Open Due to Excessive Pressure from Inertial Effects of Water (15 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-26, Personnel Hazards and Other Problems from Smoldering Fire-Retardant Material in the Drywell of a Boiling-Water Reactor (28 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-27, Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Flooding (31 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-28, Potential Problems with Fire-Barrier Penetration Seals (5 April 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-29, Charging Pump Trip During a Loss-of-Coolant Event Caused by Low Suction Pressure (11 April 1994, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1994-30, Leaking Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves at Cooper Nuclear Station (19 August 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-31, Potential Failure of Wilco, Lexan-Type HN-4-L Fire Hose Nozzles (14 April 1994, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1994-32, Revised Seismic Estimates (29 April 1994, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1994-33, Capacitor Failures in Westinghouse Eagle 21 Plant Protection Systems (9 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-34, Thermo-LAG 330-660 Flexi-Blanket Ampacity Derating Concerns (13 May 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1994-35, Niosh Respirator User Notices, Inadvertent Separation of the Mask-Mounted Regulator(Mmr) from the Facepiece on the Mine Safety Appliances (16 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-35, Niosh Respirator User Notices, Inadvertent Separation of the Mask-Mounted Regulator(MMR) from the Facepiece on the Mine Safety Appliances (16 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-36, Undetected Accumulation of Gas in Reactor Coolant System (24 May 1994, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1994-37, Misadministration Caused by a Bent Interstitial Needle During Brachytherapy Procedure (27 May 1994, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1994-38, Results of Special NRC Inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Following Rupture of Service Water Inside Containment (27 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-39, Identified Problems in Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery (31 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-40, Failure of a Rod Control Cluster Assembly to Fully Insert Following a Reactor Trip at Braidwood, Unit 2 (26 May 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-41, Problems with General Electric Type Cr124 Overload Relay Ambient Compensation (7 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-41, Problems with General Electric Type CR124 Overload Relay Ambient Compensation (7 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-42, Cracking in the Lower Region of the Core Shroud in Boiling-Water Reactors (7 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-43, Determination of Primary-to-Secondary Steam Generator Leak Rate (10 June 1994, Topic: Grab sample)
- Information Notice 1994-44, Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close on Demand Because of Inadequate Maintenance and Testing (16 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-44, Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close on Demand because of Inadequate Maintenance and Testing (16 June 1994)
- Information Notice 1994-45, Potential Common-Mode Failure Mechanism for Large Vertical Pumps (17 June 1994, Topic: Biofouling)
- Information Notice 1994-46, Nonconservative Reactor Coolant System Leakage Calculation (20 June 1994)
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