Information Notice 1994-13, Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment

ML031070002
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	06/28/1994
From:	Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-94-013, Suppl 1, NUDOCS 9406220075
Download: ML031070002 (20)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 28, 1994 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT 1: UNANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDED

MOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AND

OTHER COMPONENTS DUE TO IMPROPER

OPERATION OF REFUELING EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice supplement to alert addressees to an event involving unauthorized

movement of a defective spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients will

review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Background

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN)94-13, "Unanticipated and Unintended

Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of

Refueling Equipment," to alert addressees to problems that could result from

inadequate oversight of refueling operations and inadequate performance on the

part of refueling personnel. IN 94-13 described various refueling events that

occurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach BE'ttom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.

These events demonstrate the importince of proper controls over, and operation

of, refueling equipment during use. A recent event at the Waterford Steam

Electric Station (Waterford) demonstrates the potential for fuel damage or

personnel hazards which could result from fuel-handling equipment that is not

properly stored and not secured from unauthorized use.

DescriDtion of Circumstances

On February 18, 1994, the Waterford plant was operating at 100-percent power

when a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from the

fuel-handling machine in the fuel-handling building. Health physics

technicians measured radiation levels in the spent fuel pool area and found

them to be normal. Licensee personnel remotely secured the object with vise

grips and determined that underwater radiation levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr

[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters [6 inches] from the object. A Combustion

Engineering employee identified the object as a fuel rod encapsulation tube.

No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a security

guard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.

9406220075 PD9 XIT q.

9t /I.3

,-A 94-13, Supplement 1

-June 28, 1994 'The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined that the tube.

contained 'adefective fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated fuel

assembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in a

center guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licensee

reviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling area and interviewed

relevant personnel about the event. Personnel who may have had access to the

fuel-handling machine completed questionnaires regarding the event.- The

licensee determined that the refueling director had used the fuel-handling

machine the day before the object was discovered and had parked the

fuel-handling machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulation

tube. However, the refueling director had not used the hoist and was not sure

that he would have noticed if the encapsulation tube was hanging from the

hoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance records indicated that

the fuel rod encapsulation tube must have become attached to the fuel-handling

tool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.

Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation tube showed that the

outer diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end of

the fuel-handling tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in the

fuel-handling tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuel

rack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely removed from the

grid cage.

Although contractors had performed the fuel-handling operations for previous

refueling outages, Waterford personnel were scheduled to perform the fuel

handling for the March 1994 refueling outage. The licensee speculated that

one of the people assigned to fuel-handling activities for the March outage

may have inadvertently lifted the encapsulation tube while practicing the use

of the hoist. Personnel were required to notify health physics staff before

accessing the refueling machine; however, health physics records showed that

no one had made such a notification during this time. No keys or special

knowledge was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling machine.

Electrical power could be obtained by closing two electrical breakers and

pushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questioned

several employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized use of the

fuel-handling machine.

As an interim corrective action, the licensee deenergized the computer that

controls the fuel-handling machine by opening a breaker in a locked power

control center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent the

fuel rod encapsulation tube from being inadvertently lifted by the

fuel-handling tool, (2) add a precaution to the operating procedure warning

operators not to lower the fuel-handling tool over the storage location, and

(3) add hoist manipulations to the lesson plans for proficiency training.

Discussion

Procedures governing the use of equipment for handling fuel and core

components may not prevent unauthorized or unintended operation of that

equipment. Precautions such as locking out breakers that energize the

fuel-handling equipment and the placement of placards in highly visible areas

declaring that unauthorized operation of fuel-handling equipment is forbidden

• ~ 94-13, Supplement 1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without-proper authorization.

Additionally, storing the fuel-handling'machine in an area where accidental

movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other

components may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement or

damage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and core

component handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and core

components are protected'from damage or unauthorized movement and that plant

personnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director'

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV

(817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

D kachment

IN 94-13, Supp. *1 June 28, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

94-47 Accuracy of Information 06/21/94 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Provided to NRC during Commission Material

the Licensing Process Licensees.

94-46 NonConservative Reactor 06/20/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Coolant System Leakage for nuclear power reactors.

Calculation

94-45 Potential Common-Mode 06/17/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Failure Mechanism for for nuclear power reactors.

Large Vertical Pumps

94-44 Main Steam Isolation 06/16/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Valve Failure to Close for nuclear power reactors.

on Demand because of

Inadequate Maintenance

and Testing

94-43 Determination of Primary- 06/10/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

to-Secondary Steam for pressurized water

Generator Leak Rate reactors.

94-42 Cracking in the Lower 06/07/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Region of the Core for boiling-water reactors

Shroud in Boiling-Water (BWRs).

Reactors

94-41 Problems with General 06/07/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Electric Type CR124 for nuclear power reactors.

Overload Relay Ambient

Compensation

94-40 Failure of a Rod Control 05/26/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Cluster Assembly to Fully for pressurized-water

Insert Following a Reactor reactors (PWRs).

Trip at Braidwood Unit 2

94-39 Identified Problems in 05/31/94 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Gamma Stereotactic Commission Teletherapy

Radiosurgery Medical Licensees.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

SIN 94-13, Supplement 1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without proper authorization.

Additionally, storing the fuel-handling machine in an area where accidental

movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other

components may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement or

damage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and core

component handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and core

components are protected from damage or unauthorized movement and that plant

personnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV

(817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• See Previous Concurrence

OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRR

NAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*

DATE 05/26/94 06/01/94 06/01/94 [06/02/94 OFFICE _ C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR l D/Dji;RR

NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham* RJKiessel* BKGfm'es

I

DATE 06/03/94 06/03/94 06/07/94 06/IA3/94 Document Name: 94-13SP1.IN

In 94-XX

June xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV

(817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• See Previous Concurrence

OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRR

NAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*

DATE 05/26/94 I06/01/94 [06/01/94 106/02/94 OFFICE C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR ,D/DORS:NRR

NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham RJKiessel BKGrimes

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In 94-XX

June xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV

(817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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