Information Notice 1994-31, Potential Failure of Wilco, Lexan-Type HN-4-L Fire Hose Nozzles

Potential Failure of Wilco, Lexan-Type HN-4-L Fire Hose Nozzles
	ML070180065
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	04/14/1994
From:	Grimes B; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
References
	IN-94-031, NUDOCS 9404080170
	Download: ML070180065 (7)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 14, 1994 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-31: POTENTIAL FAILURE OF WILCO, LEXAN-TYPE HN-4-L

FIRE HOSE NOZZLES

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert the addressees of the potential for failure of Lexan- type HN-4-L fire hose nozzles. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On August 3, 1992, the licensee for the H.B. Robinson facility experienced a

failure of a 1 1/2-inch Lexan-type HN-4-L fire hose nozzle during a routine

fire hose hydrostatic pressure test. Following the failure, the licensee

revised their procedures to require the use of a ball-style shutoff nozzle

during future pressurization tests. On June 17, 1993, the licensee

experienced another failure of a Lexan-type HN-4-L nozzle during a regularly

scheduled fire hose station flush. The nozzle failed when it was pressurized

to nominal firemain pressure. Following this event, the licensee replaced

Lexan-type HN-4-L nozzles with ball-style shutoff nozzles.

Discussion

During a fire hose pressurization test on August 3, 1992, the Lexan- type HN-4-L nozzle attached to a hose being tested was shut to pressurize the

hose to the final test pressure of 1,756 kPa [254.7 psia]. With the hose

pressurized to approximately 1,204 kPa [174.7 psia], the nozzle failed.

Following a review of the event, the licensee revised their fire hose

hydrostatic test procedure to require the use of ball-style shutoff nozzles.

On June 17, 1993, a similar failure of a Lexan-type HN-4-L nozzle occurred

during a routine flush of an installed fire hose station. With the nozzle

shut and the fire hose charged to the nominal system pressure of 1,032 kPa Y r

[149.7 psia], the nozzle failed.

9g404080o70

O-

"t

c 1 3 j f, (

J!

IN 94-31 April 14, 1994 The nozzles were both 1 1/2-inch diameter, Lexan (polycarbonate) fog nozzles.

Originally, Wilco (Wilson and Cousins Company) manufactured these nozzles, which are now manufactured by the A. Burks Pump Company. They are designated

as Model HN-4-L and are approved by Factory Mutual Insurance Company for fire

hose station use. The testing performed by Factory Mutual included a

hydrostatic test at 6,895 Kpa (1000 psi) and an operational test at pressures

up to 2,069 Kpa (300 psi).

Though the licensee does not track the installation of fire nozzles, it is

estimated that both nozzles had probably been in service for several years.

The nozzles consist of a stationary inner casing attached to the fire hose

fitting. An outer shell is threaded onto this inner casing. The outer shell

is twisted to adjust or start/stop flow. In both of the failures, the inner

casing separated at the third land for the inner casing-outer shell thread.

No indications of imminent failure were present in either failure. An

examination of the threaded area on some disassembled nozzles did not reveal

indications of cracking.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

CQL~

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: C. Ogle, RII

(803) 383-4571 W. Orders, RII

(803) 383-4571 P. Madden, NRR

(301) 504-2854 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

At.dchment

IN 94-31 April 14, 1994 Page I of I

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

90-68, Stress Corrosion Cracking 04/14/94 All holders of 01 or CPs

Supp. 1 of Reactor Coolant Pump for pressurized water

Bolts reactors.

94-30 Leaking Shutdown Cooling 04/12/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Isolation Valves at for nuclear power reactors.

Cooper Nuclear Station

94-29 Charging Pump Trip during 04/11/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

a Loss-of-Coolant Event for pressurized water

Caused by Low Suction reactors.

Pressure

92-51, Misapplication and 04/12/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. I Inadequate Testing of for nuclear power reactors.

Molded-Case Circuit

Breakers

94-28 Potential Problems with 04/05/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Fire-Barrier Penetration for nuclear power reactors.

Seals

94-27 Facility Operating 03/31/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Concerns Resulting from for nuclear power reactors.

Local Area Flooding

94-26 Personnel Hazards and 03/28/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Other Problems from for nuclear power reactors.

Smoldering Fire-Retard- ant Material in the

Drywell of a Boiling- Water Reactor

93-17, Safety Systems Response 03/25/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Rev. I to Loss of Coolant and for nuclear power.

Loss of Offsite Power

OL = Operating-License

CP = Construction Permit