IR 05000334/2011003

IR 05000334-11-003, 05000412-11-003; 04-01-2011 - 06-30-2011, Beaver Valley Power Station, NRC Integrated Inspection Report and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion

ML112140011
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/02/2011
From:	Darrell Roberts Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Harden P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
BELLAMY RR
References
EA-11-160 IR-11-003
Download: ML112140011 (42)

Text

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION. NRC INTEGMTED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2011003 AND 0500041212011003, AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Harden:

Enforcement Policy.

lf you contest any of the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for lour denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the RegionalAdministrator Region l; the Director, Officp of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of the cross-cutting aspect of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region 1 and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Beaver Valley Power Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with lnspection Manual Chapter 0305.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report 50-41212011-001, which described the details associated with defective diesel generalor fuel injection pump supply lines resulting in the Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being declared inoperable. This issue constituted a violation of NRC requirements, in that FENOC operated with both EDGs inoperable without immediately taking actions to restore an EDG to operable status in August 2, 20II On June 30, 2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 21, 2011, with members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and iecords, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one (1) NRC-identified finding (Green) and one (1) self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). One finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is tieating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC's accordance with Technical Specifications (TS). However, the NRC concluded that the cause of the inoperability, incorrectly assembled compression fittings on replacement fuel injection pump supply lines, was due to an inadequate vendor design change and therefore, did not represent a perfoimance deficiency on the licensee's part. The NRC noted that FENOC took immediate action to ensure availability of at least one EDG, deolared the EDG inoperable in a timely manner, and effectively implemented the TS required action statement to immediately initiate action to restore operability. The NRC's risk evaluation determined the issue to be of very low safety significance. Based on these facts, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Direcior,-Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy and refrain from issuing enforcement for the violation.

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rulps of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be availaple electronically for public inspection in the NRC public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accEssible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.qovlreadino-rmiadams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperatton Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.

SincerelY,

,^M%"

Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000334/201 1003; 050004121201 1003 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I==

50-334, 50-412 DPR-66, NPF-73 05000334/201 1 003 and 050004121201 1003 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operatin$ Company (FENOC)

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Shippingport, PA 15077 April 1,2011through June 30, 2011 D. Werkheiser, Senior Residqnt Inspector E. Bonney, Resident Inspectdr C. Crisden, Emergency Preparedness Specialist T. Moslak, Health Physicist T. Ziev, Reactor Engineer R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

TABLE Of REPORT DETAILS Summarv of Plant Status:

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent R{wer. On April 7, the unit was down-powered Io 82 percent for planned waterbox cleaninp, then commenced a planned shutdown for ieplacement of a power range nuclear instrument (\\l-+21 The unit commenced a startup on April 16, and retuined to full power on April 21. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period shut down in a rd[ueling outage. On April 8, the unit commenCed a start-up. On April 10, the unit reachep leVo reactor power and performed a required shutdown in response to an AFW system l{ak, prior to synchronization. The unit restarted on April 10, and returned to full power on,$Rril 14. The unit was down-powered to 94 percent on npiit 26for a reheater drain control vaMl repair and returned to full power on April 27. The unit remaine.d at 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period'

1.

REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigatirig Systems, Barrier Integrity [R]

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a.

Inspection Scope (2 samples: hot weather Seasonal Susceotibilitv power system readiness)

Station (BVPS) design features and risk significant mitigating systems from adverse weather effects due to su weather. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program database, experience, and the Updated Final Safety of adverse weather conditions to the licensee was appropriately identifying and resolving weather-related equipment blems.

The inspectors evaluated BVPS design featg res and FENOC's imPlementation of The inspectors reviewed the Beaver Valley FENOC's implementation of procedures to Analysis Report (UFSAR), to determine the which the site is susceptible, and to verify tl procedures to address issues that could imp systems. The inspectors reviewed FENOC':

ct offsite alternating current (AC) power procedures and programs which discussed b.

the operation and availability/reliability of offi ite and alternate AC power systems during adverse weather. The inspectors verified th t communication protocols between the transmission system operator and FENOC e isted, and the appropriate information would be conveyed when potential grid stre s and disturbances existed. The inspectors also verified that FENOC's procedures cont ined actions to monitor and maintain the availability/reliability of offsite and onsite po weather conditions.

er systems prior to and during adverse Findinqs No findings were identified.

Enclosure

1 R04 Equipment Alionment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Svstem Walkdowns (71111.04O)

a.

Inspection Scope (3 samPles)

The inspectors performed three partial alignment inspections during conditions of increased safety significance, unavailable during maintenance or adverse uding when redundant equipment was itions. The partial alignment inspections were also completed after equi was recently returned to service after significant maintenance. The inspectors partial walkdowns of the following systems, including associated electrical d bution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned perform its intended safety functions:

. Unit 2, April 25,'A' train component water (CCW) during 'B' CCW heat exchanger cleaning;

. Unit 2, June 22, temporary air system line-up during'B' station air b.

.2 Complete Svstem Walkdown (7 1 I 11.04S)

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

a.

The inspectors completed a detailed review the alignment and condition of the Unit 2

'A'train low head safety injection (LHSI)

. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the system to verify that the critical porti such as valve positions, switches, and with procedures, and to identify any breakers, were correctly aligned in accorda discrepancies that may have had an effect operability.

The inspectors also reviewed outstanding deficiencies did not significantly affect the tenance work orders to verify that the I system function. ln addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the engineer and reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment nt problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents revi during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

compressor maintenance; and

. Unit 1, June 24, 1-2 emergency diesel g$nerator (EDG) fuel oil transfer pump (FOTP) system during 1-1 EDG fuel oil tr]ansfer pump (FOTP) testing.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Enclosure

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Quarterlv Sample Review (71111.05O)

a.

lnspection Scope (5 samPles)

The inspectors reviewed the conditions of fire areas listed below, to verify compliance with criteria delineated in Admin Procedure 1 l2-ADM-1900, "Fire

's control of transient combustibles protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and ty, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory s for any fire protection impairments.

Documents reviewed are listed in the ent:

Protection," Rev. 23. This review included and ignition sources, material condition of

. Unit 1, Auxiliary Building General Area ({ire Area PA-1A);

. Unit 2, Cooling Tower Pump House (Fire Area CTP-1);

o Unit 2, Auxiliary Boiler Area (Fire Area SpB-1);

. Unit 2, South Office Shops Building Railviray Bay (Fire Area SOB-2); and

. Unit 2, South Office Shops Building (Fire Area SOB-3).

b.

a.

.2 Findinos No findings were identified.

Annual Fire Drill Observation (71111.05A)

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors observed personnel ce during a fire drill involving a simulated fire at the Unit 1 'B' System Station Service (SSST) on April 19, to evaluate the readiness of station personnel to and fight fires. The inspectors observed the fire brigade members using protective breathing apparatus and entering the fire ing, turnout gear, and self-contained in a controlled manner. The inspectors also observed the fire fighting equipment to the fire scene to evaluate whether sufficient equipment was available to control and extinguish the simulated fire.

The inspectors evaluated whether the plant fire hose lines were capable of reaching the fire area and whether hose u was adequately simulated. The inspectors observed the fire fighting and communications between fire brigade members. The inspectors verified that the drill scenario was followed and observed the post drill critique to evaluate if any drill weaknesses were discussed.

drill objectives were satisfied and that Findinqs No findings were identified.

Enclosure

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a.

Inspection ScoPg (1 samPle)

The inspectors reviewed a sample of i the common intake structure'D' cubicle equipment for Unit 2.

This review was conducted to evaluate F related systems from internal flooding of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, related documents. The inspectors examined the b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

.1 Annual Sample Review (71111.07A)

a.

Inspection Scgoe (1 samPle)

lntroduction: A Green, self-revealing non-ci

"Procedures", was identified in that the Unit maintained in chemicalwet layup, contrary failed to maintain corrosion inhibitors in the flood protection measures for equipment in ining safety-related service water protection of the enclosed safety-The inspectors performed a walkdown I flooding evaluations, and other related nd equipment and conditions to ensure RSS Heat Exchangers HXs were not station procedures. Specifically, FENOC HXs, resulting in significant HX the 'B' RSS HX during a service water full that they remained consistent with those ted in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the A ent.

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance with the Unit 2'B'train RSS HX conducted in March and April 2011, in with 2CMP-1 3RSS-E-21 A-B-C-D-1 M,

," Rev. 7. The review included an

"Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger assessment of the testing methodology and consistency with Electric Power Research lnstitute document NP-7552, Exchanger Performance Monitoring tter 89-13, "Service Water SYstem Guidelines," December 1991, and Generic Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equ

" The inspectors reviewed maintenance results, related condition reports and 'B'

against applicable acceptance criteria.

Service Water System fullflow test results b.

Findinqs violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, corrosion, which led to degraded flow flow test.

Descriotion: On February 24, during a 'B'

discovered degraded flow through the 'B'

'B' RSS HX during the full flow test was test. The required SW flow rate through 30.13.138, "Train 'B' Seryice Water System

)gpm, which resulted in a failed surveillance

'B' RSS HX was 5731 gPm Per 2OST-service water (SW) fullflow test, Unit 2 HX. The as-found SW flow through the Full Flow Test". On March 4th, the'B' RSS and cleaning. The inspection identified a HX was removed from service for i Enclosure

I significant amount of corrosion products blo(king ftow in the fower end bell of the vertically-mounted heat exchanger. The corfosion products were removed from the end bell andhydrolazing was performed on the $W piping during the 2R15 outage in Aprilto restore system function.

The RSS HXs were originally placed in wet in November of 2008. Procedure 2OM-30.4.T, "Placing Recirc Spray HXs into corrosion inhibitors are required to maintain review of the four RSS HXs determined that Chemical Wet Layup", established that HXs in wet layup. A maintenance

'B'and 'D' RSS HXs in November 2008, the'A'and 'C' RSS HXs were last placed in wet layup in October 2009, per 2OM-30.4.T.

EPRI NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger Performa Monitoring Guidelines," allows use of the periodic maintenance method to comply heat exchanger testing methodology.

Water treatment is one of three periodic m methods used by FENOC to ensure adequate RSS HX performance. E NP-7552 states that "improper water treatment can result in accelerated

, resulting in component reliability concerns." The work management process not utilized to establish a periodic wet layup chemical profile. Sampling chemical test and addition to maintain the of the RSS HXs was not Performed to the correct chemical concentration existed to ensure the selected maintenance method generated recurring work orders 200450991 inhibitors were last added to the was effective. FENOC subsequently and 200450994 to correct the issue and cladding, reactor coolant system and conta releases caused by accidents or events'

ensure allfour RSS HXs are maintained in proper chemical wet layup condition.

Analvsis: The failure to maintain the RSS in chemicalwet layup is considered a performance deficiency. Traditional t does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or potential for impacting NRC's regulatory function, and was not the result of any wil violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors determined that the finding was similar to the examples for minor E, "Examples of Minor lssues". The deficiencies contained in IMC A612, finding is more than minor because it the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity the equipment performance attribute of the cornerstones. The finding is associated wi Mitigating Systems cornerstone to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to undesirable consequences and is also associated with the SSC and barrier aftribute of the Barrier IntegritY cornerstone to provide reasonable that physical design barriers (fuel ln accordance with IMC 0609.04 (Table 4a ment) protect the public from radionuclide Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the finding determined to be of very low safetY significance (Green) because the finding d not result in a loss of operability nor was it a degradation of a radiological barrier, control pathway.

barrier, hydrogen igniter, or an open The cause of this NCV relates to the tting aspect of Human Performance, Work Control, in that FENOC personneldid not te work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, FENOC did chemicalwet layup condition to support HXs. H.3(b)

coordinate work activities to complete the equipment reliability of the Unit 2 RSS Enclosure

Enforcemen!: TS 5.4. 1, "Procedures",

that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained as recom in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33.

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 10 requires, part, chemical and radiological control procedures to maintain water quality within bed limits and the limitations on concentrations of agents that may cause ive attack or fouling of heat-transfer surfaces. Contrary to the above, FENOC fa to maintain the RSS HXs in chemical wet layup in accordance with station res and EPRI NP-7552, which resulted in significant fouling of the B RSS HX. Beca this deficiency is considered to be of very low safety significance (Green), and was into the corrective action program (CR 11-90430), this violation is being treated as n NCV, consistentwith Section2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 0500041 1003-1, Failure to Maintain Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers in hemicalWet LayuP)

1R1 1

.1 a.

Licensed Operator Requalification Prooram Resident Inspector Quarterlv Review (71111 Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

71111.11)

.11O)

The inspectors observed one sample of 1 licensed operator simulator training and drill on June 29. The inspectors evaluated operator performance regarding command and control, implementation of annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating Procedures, compliance, and emergencY Plan i technical specification review and

. The inspectors evaluated the licensee staff training personnel to verify identified, and that conditions adverse to corrective action program for resolution.

deficiencies in operator performance were lity were entered into the licensee's inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator appropriately led the plant control room. The inspectors verified that the training eva training objectives had been achieved.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

adequately addressed that the applicable 1R12 Maintenance Rule lmplementation (71111 -1 a.

Inspection Scope (3 samPles)

The inspectors evaluated Maintenance (MR) implementation. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR ino. characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk of SSCs, SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required 10 CFR 50.65 and the licensee's program for MR implementation. For the selected the inspectors evaluated whether category (aX1) and (a)(2) performance also reviewed. Documents reviewed performance was properly dispositioned for monitoring. MR System Basis Documents are listed in the Attachment.

. On April 2, Unit 2, 'A'train solid state documented in CR 11-92245; system 48 volt power supply failure, Enclosure

b.

1R13 a.

1R15 On April 25, Unit 1 and 2, maintenance le program health "EquiPment Performance" yellow cornerstone, in CR 11-92375: and On April 27, Unit 2, emergencY diesel maintenance rule (aXl ) evaluation due to goalfailure, documented in CR 1 3.

Findinos No findings were identified.

(71111.13)

Inspection Scope (4 samPles)

The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and of four activities, and evaluated their effect on overall plant risk. This review conducted to ensure compliance with applicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50 inspection are listed in the Attachment.

a)(4). Documents reviewed during the o On April 14, Unit 1, planned entry into

. On April 15, Unit 2, risk evaluation for wo 200451815; risk for transformer breaker work; addition to'A'and'C'RSS HXs Per

. On May 24, Unit 1, planned maintenat

. On May 26-27, Unit 2, PRA review for during 'A' intake structure bay outage; and ne-driven auxiliary feedwater pinhole steam leak repairs.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Operabilitv Evaluations (7 1 1 1 1.15)

a.

lnspection ScoPe (6 samPles)

The inspectors evaluated the technical of selected immediate operability determinations (lOD), prompt operability nations (POD), or functionalitY assessments (FA), to verifY that of operability were justified. In addition, the inspectors verified that technical (TS) limiting conditions for operation requirements were properly addressed'

measures worked and were adequately con the Attachment.

measures implemented to ensure the Documents reviewed are listed in b.

(LCO) requirements and UFSAR design In addition, the inspectors reviewed com On March 31, Unit 2, pressurizer safety and acceptability as documented in CR ve [2RCS-RV551C]

1-92159:

gasket evaluation thickness as On April 4, Unit 1 evaluation of river documented in CR 11-92133; piping below nominal On May 3, Unit 2, stroke time for'B'a dump valve outside accePtance range as documented in CR 11-94053; On May 9, Unit 1, 'B'quench sPraY

[1 QS-P-1 B] comPrehensive test acceptance criteria not meet evaluation documented in CR 11'94414; Enclosure

On June 8, Unit 1, IOD regarding net emergency diesel generators as

. On June 22, Units 1 and 2,licensee 1 Kalsi Engineering Valve and Actuator b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

1 R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

a.

lnspection ScoPe (2 samPles)

The inspectors reviewed the following risk significance. The permanent screenings were reviewed against the UFSAR and the TS. The inspectors verified design documentation were consistent with as credited codes and standards, and described in the package were a temporary modifications were implemented Procedure, 1 l2-ADM-2028, "Temporary verified the post-modification testing was system and components oPerated Documents reviewed are listed in the Atta

. On March 26, Unit 2ECP 09'0771 on 2SWS-184; and

. On April 4, Unit 2 ECP-11-0179, d b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinq (71111'19)

a.

lnspection ScoPe (7 samPles)

The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance tests (PMT) adequately equipment was satisfied given the scope of was restored. In addition, the inspectors verify consistency with the design and inspectors witnessed the test or reviewed tt demonstrated restoration of affected safety conditions adverse to quality were entered i resolution. Documents reviewed during the

. On March 25, Unit 2,WO 2Q0450628 a

[2CHS-160];

suction for fuel oil transfer for in CR 11-96157; and 1 evaluation regarding the MOV/AOV software.

nent and temporary modifications based on and associated 10 CFR 50.59 design basis documentation, including the that attributes and parameters within the licensing and design bases, as well down the systems to verify that changes implemented. The inspectors verified the accordance with Administrative (ADM)

tions," Rev. 6. The inspectors also sfactorily accomplished to ensure the with their intended safety function.

to maintain a packing follower retainer of BV-DC-SWBD 2-1 alarm.

to determine whether the Post-that the safety-related function of the work, and that operability of the system ted the applicable acceptance criteria to bases, as well as TS requirements. The data to verify results adequatelY nctions. The inspectors also verified that the corrective action Program for spection are listed in the Attachment.

rebuild of loop fill header relief valve Enclosure

On April 3, Unit \\WO 200451094 On April 6, Unit 2, WO 200452432 On April 10, Unit 2, non-destructive exa to 2FWE-940 connection Per WO 2011 On April 15, Unit 1, WO 200451486 testing and performance after detector On April 17, Unit 1 adjustment of PRNI and o On May 5, Unit 1 'C'charging pump b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R20 Refuelino and Outaoe Activities (71111'20)

.1 Unit 2 Refuelinq Outaoe (2R15)

a.

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors observed selected outage safety functions (e.9. reactor decay heat and containment integrity) were properly ma procedures. The inspectors evaluated performance, communications, and instrum procedures and/or observed selected activi outage. The inspectors verified activities and verified required acceptance criteria conditions adverse to quality identified were identified as required by the licensee's reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The o Final containment walkdown and close<

. Reactor start-ups (April 8 and April 10)

o Balance of plant walkdown during powe The inspectors also observed selected restart readiness of Unit 2, following restart readiness review meeting was

"Restart Readiness for Plant Outages,' Rev.

in part, was to assure that the plant's personnel were ready for startup and safe, activities.

The inspectors observed the reactor trip response to an AFW header leak as Section 4OA3.1). lnspectors also observed o

o a

ascension following the repair to the AFW Enclosure

,B'

HX retesting after lower-end cleaning;

-MOV-1 55-2 testing after maintenance; ination and pressure test after weld repairs Range Nuclear Instrument (PRNI) N42 during outage 1POAC4; 42trip set points post-detector replacement; replacement and vent valve installation, samples total)

to determine whether shutdown

, spent fool pool cooling, tained as required bY TS and Plant performance attributes including operator accuracy. The inspectors reviewed associated with the Unit 2 refueling performed in accordance with procedures met. The inspectors also verified that performance of selected outage activities corrective action program. Documents pectors also evaluated the:

inspection; heat-up; ascension.

review activities associated with of the 2R15 refueling activities. The as required by NOBP-OM-4O10, 4, on March 30. The purpose of the review, condition, programs/processes, and operation after completion of outage shutdown on April 10 (return to Mode 3) in in NRC Event Notification 46744 (see subsequent reactor start up and power later in the evening on APril 10.

b.

.2 a.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Unit 1 Maintenance Outaoe (1POAC4)

Insoection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors reviewed licensee during a planned maintenance outage following a Unit 1 shutdown on April 10, to the failed Power Range Nuclear lnstrument (PRNI-42) detector and to other plant related issues. The inspectors approved procedures, conduct of outage reviewed compliance to TS requirements of key safety functions.

risk evaluations, configuration control, and Documents reviewed during the inspection maintenance outage, the inspectors listed below:

. Reactor Shutdown and Shutdown risk e

. Startup Readiness Review (April 15) anr r Reactor Startup (April 15) and Criticality o Plant Startup

. Power Ascension b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinq (7 1111.22)

a.

Inspection Scooe (6 samples: 1 isolation routine)

listed in the Attachment. During this FENOC's control of the outage activities Scheduling April 16)

1 leak rate, 1 in-service testing and 3 The inspectors witnessed the performance or reviewed test data for the eight following Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and nce Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or were being tested as required by TS, the UFSAR, and procedural requirements. The inspectors also verified that the licensee established proper test conditions, that no uipment pre-conditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria were

. On April 2, Unit 2, 2BW-1'47 '11, Sl Valve Integrity Test; Charging System Containment Penetration

. On April 6, Unit 2, 2OST-30.138, Train Service Water System Full Flow Test; On April 10, Unit 1, l05T-6.24, Water Balance lnventory; On April 11, Unit 2, 2OST-24.9, Generated Reactor Cooling SYstem Trip Test of Turbine Driven AFW; On April 12, Unit 1, lRST-3.4, Incore ysis of Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio; and On May 26, Unit 2,2OST-24.4, Steam Quarterly Test.

Auxiliary Feed PumP l2Fal\\,lE-P221 o

a a

Enclosure

1EP2 a.

1 EP3 a.

b.

maintenance and testing procedure, and test records, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

design report to ensure FENOC compliance with design report commitments system maintenance and testing. A sample of condition reports (CRs)

to the ANS was reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The i interviewed FENOC corporate staff to discuss system performance and upgrades.

accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure The inspection was conducted in 1114, Attachment 2. Planning Standard, 10 CFR 50.47(bX5) and the related as reference criteria.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used (71114.03)

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Gornerstone: Emergency Preparedness lnspection Scooe (1 samPle)

An onsite review was conducted to assess Beaver Valley ANS. During the inspection, (71114.02)

maintenance and testing practices of the inspectors reviewed the ANS tttgvvvlrvrr vvvyv t I The inspectors conducted a review of Beav{r Valley's ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying aird augmenting the ERO. The review was performed to ensure the readiness of key licpnsee staff to respond to an emergency event and to ensure FENOC's ability to actir/ate their emergency response facilities in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed thg Beaver Valley Emergency Plan, duty roster, and iugmentation data. The inspectors als{ reviewed a sampling of ERO responder's traininfrecords to ensure training and qualilications were up to date. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Insfiection Procedure71114, Attachment 3.

Planning Standard, 10 CFR 50.47(bX2) and]related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criterial b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Enclosure

1EP4 a.

1 EPs a.

(71114.04)

Inspection Scooe (1 samPle)

Since the last NRC inspection of this area in April2010, FENOC implemented various revisions to the Beaver Valley Plan. FENOC had determined that, in made to the Plan, and its lowertier accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), these implementing procedures, had not resulted i any decrease in effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. Although no action level (EAL)changes were reviewed during this inspection, a sample of plan changes, including the changes to lowertier emergency plan ting procedures, was evaluated for any potential decreases in effectiveness of the Vafley Emergency Plan. However, in an NRC Safety Evaluation RePort this review by the inspectors was not and does not constitute formal NRC of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in 50.sa(q) were used as reference criteria.

Findinos No findings were identified.

ir entirety. The requirements in 10 CFR (71114.45)

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors reviewed a sampling of self procedures and reports to assess FENOC's ability to evaluate their preparedness (EP) Performance and program. The inspectors reviewed a pling of CRs from SePtember 2009 through May 2011 initiated by FENOC from self-assessments, and audits. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.54(t)

it reports and nuclear oversight audits.

with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, This inspection was conducted in Attachment 5, Planning Standard, 10 CFR

.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as criteria.

b.

Findings No findings were identified.

lEPO Drifl Evaluation (71114,00)

a.

Inspection ScoPe (1 samPle)

The inspectors observed an emergency Red Team mini-drill and Unit 1 licensed-operator simulator evaluation a drillon June 29. Senior licensed-operator performance regarding event cl and notifications was specifically evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the

.based scenario that involved multiple, safety-related component failures plant conditions that would have warranted emergency plan activation, facility activation, and escalation to the event classification of Site Area Emergency FENOC planned to credit this evolution toward Emergency PreParedness Performance ( DEP) l nd icators, Enclosure

therefore, the inspectors reviewed the ble event notifications and classifications credited, and properly evaluated to determine whether theY were consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (

) 99-02, Rev. 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline." The worksheets regarding the performance reviewed licensee evaluator acceptability, and reviewed other crew and operator evaluations to ensure adverse itions were appropriately entered into the Corrective Action Program. Other following:

.

112-ADM-1111, Rev.4, "NRC EPP utilized in this inspection include the Indicator Instructions;"

I 12-ADM-11 1 1.F01, Rev. 3, "Emergency Classifications/Notifications/PARS

"

Performance Indicators EPP-I-1a/b, Rev. 14, "Recognition and 1l2-EPP-l-2, Rev. 35, "Unusual Event;"

of Emergency Conditions;"

.

112-EPP-l-3, Rev.33, "Alert;"

.

112-EPP-!-4, Rev. 33, "Site Area

.

112-EPP-l-5, Rev.34, "General Findinqs No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFEW o

o b.

2.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety [PSI 2RS05 Radiation Monitorinq lnstrumentation (7 112 lnspection Scope (1 samPle)

05)

Reactor Building Supplemental Leak Monitor, RM-1VS-110

. Auxiliary Building Exhaust Monitor, RM-1

. Reactor Building SCLRS Noble Gas Mor Liquid Effluent Monitors:

. Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor, RM-1LW-

. Contaminated Drains Effluent Monitor, R o Component Cooling Water Monitor, RM-and Release System (SCLRS)

111 RM-1-VS-1 12 1LW-116 RW-101 b.

In Unit 2, the walkdown included portions of Gaseous Effluent Monitors:

following monitors:

. Ventilation Vent Monitor, 2HVS-RQ101

. Supplemental Leak Collection and Relt System (SCLRS) Monitor, 2HVS-RQl 09 Liquid Effluent Monitors:

. Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor, Calibration and Testinq Proqram Through record reviews, the inspector were properly calibrated, and that the that the effluent monitoring instruments source checks and functionaltests had been routinely performed. The inspector points are established in accordance with that the effluent monitor alarm set Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

The inspector reviewed contamination sa results (per 10 CFR Part 61) used to cha racterize difficu lt-to-measure to determine if the calibration sources in the plant's source term.

were representative of the radioisotopes fou Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspector reviewed selected Condition (CRs), system health rePorts, and various Nuclear Oversight reports to eva the licensee's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems for the monitoring instrumentation.

lncluded in this review were CRs related to worker and radiation Protection technician errors to determine if an pattern traceable in the maintenance or use of radiation instruments was evident.

Findinqs See finding in section 4OM.3 Enclosure

2RSO6 a.

(71124.06)

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

During the period June 20 - 23, the conducted activities to verify FENOC was properly maintaining the gaseous and liquid processing systems to ensure that radiological releases were properly monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure. lmplementation of these contained in the 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, procedures.

Effluent Report Reviews was reviewed against the criteria licensee's ODCM, and the licensee's The inspector reviewed the 2009 and 2010 Reports to verify that the effluents program Radiological Effluent Release implemented as required by the ODCM.

lncluded in this review were the results of ground water protection program, the inclusion of Carbon-14 dose contributions, current land use census, and verification that no significant changes were made to Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and liquid the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

release system configurations, as specified i and ODCM descriptions.

Samplino and Analvsis Walkdowns and Observations The inspector walked down the major comp{nents of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and liquid release systems to verify the system cfnfigurations.complied with the FSAR description, to evaluate equipment material $ondition, and determine the status of system upgrades.

The inspector reviewed the most current Uni 1 and Unit 2 liquid and gaseous effluent monitor monthly source checks, quarterly fu ctional test results and 18-month calibration records to verify that instrumentation and as ociated pumps/isolation valves or fans/isolation dampers, respectively, were o erable.

The inspector reviewed the air cleaning systfms surveillance test results for the High Efficiency particulate Absolute (HEPA) anO {harcoal filtration systems installed in Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspector confirmed that th$ air flow rates were consistent with the FSAR values and the filtration system test r{sults met the acceptance criteria.

The inspector reviewed the relevant samplinp/analytical procedures and observed a technician collect a weekly air sample from tfre Unit 2 Decontamination Building ventilation system (2RMO-RQ301B) and an lyze the sample on a gamma spectrophotometer. The inspector confirme{ tnat the technician.complied with the procedural requirements in taking the gas s{mple and the sample was appropriately analyzed.

Enclosure

FENOC licensee properly calculated the inspector confirmed that no performance

programs to verify that the accuracy of other samples were operating reliablY.

used for counting effluent The inspector confirmed that procedures been established and alternative

, if normal effluent monitors become sampling equipment is readily available for unavailable.

Dose Calculations The inspector reviewed monthly, quarterly, a gaseous effluents performed during the past annual dose projections for liquid and 2 months to verify that effluent was processed and released in accordance with requirements and to ensure that dose from effluent releases. The (criteria contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50) was exceeded for these re The inspector observed a technician a liquid discharge permit (No. 5823) for releasing the steam generator condensates nk (2SGC-TK23B). The insPector it 1 and Unit 2 to evaluate the adequacy of reviewed other liquid discharge permits for dilution flow, radioactive content, set point ustment on liquid waste monitor 2SGC-RQ100, and overall accuracy of the data.

Ground Water Protection Program The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify accuracy Performance Indicators (Pl) listed below the data recorded from July 2010 through June 201 1. The inspectors reviewed Licen Event Reports, condition rePorts, portions of various plant operating logs and and Pl data develoPed from monthlY operating reports. Methods for compiling reporting the Pls were discussed with L To verify the accuracy of the Pl data cognizant engineering and licensing pers reported during this period, Pl definitions guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 99-02, "Regulatory used for each data element.

lndicator Guideline," Revision 6, were The inspector verified that FENOC is continqing to implement the voluntary NEI/Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative. The insppctor reviewed monitoring well sample results, trending data, and decommissioning records, maintained per 10 CFR S0.7S [g), to evaluate procedural corfnpliance and to identify off normal results.

b. Findinos No findings were identified.

4.

oTHER ACTIVITIES [OAl 4OA1 Performance lndicator Verification (7 1151)

a.

Inspection Scope (9 samples total)

Enclosure

. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant

. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Cornerstone: Mitiqatinq Svstems (2

. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety System lFailure [MS05];

Cornerstone: Barrier lnteqritv (4 samples)

Cornerstone: Emeroencv Preparedness (3 Activity [B101]

Leak Rate [8102]

mples)

The inspectors reviewed data for EP Pls, o Drilland Exercise Performance;

. ERO Drill Participation; and

. ANS Reliability.

The inspectors reviewed the Pl data and its documentation from the second quarter of 2010 through the first quarter of data.

11 to verify the accuracy of the reported Findinos No findings were identified.

Problem ldentification and Resolution (711

- 2 samples total)

Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure71152, "ldentification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equi failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors a daily screening of items entered into FENOC's corrective action program. This was accomplished bY reviewing summary lists of each CR, attending meetings, and accessing FENOC's computerized CR database.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors reviewed a selected number CRs related to the implementation of work management at the station and on issues related to the completion of and 11-91287 as a problem identification surveillance tests documented CR 11-895 b.

4c.42

.1 a

b.

.2 and resolution (Pl&R) sample for a detailed revlew.

Enclosure

The inspectors reviewed FENOC's fullappa cause and monitored the corrective action review board assessment for CR 11 76. The inspectors reviewed cause determination and assessed FENOC's of condition, operability determination, and prioritization and timeliness of corrective to prevent recurrence. Documents reviewed for this inspection are located in Attachment.

Findinqs and Observations No findings were identified.

In general, FENOC has identified trends in addressed the trends within their CAP and management and has aPProPriatelY taken by the work management group to communicate and provide guidance to improvements to and effectiveness of the station. FENOC continues to focus on management implementation. The inspectors have recently observed challeng in completing work activities due to insufficient staff resources, particularly tion and controls staff, during outages at other fleet stations. FENOC plans to their resource-sharing plans to minimize this impact. The inspectors will continue to this area and assess the actions.

effectiveness of planned and in-progress Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

The inspectors reviewed a regarding various radiation selected number CRs related to issues and deficiencies monitors that important to safe operation and used in

, the inspectors focused on corrective The inspectors reviewed cause determ and assessed FENOC's extent of condition, prioritization, and timeliness of actions. Documents reviewed for this inspection are located in the b.

Findinqs and Observations One finding was identified. The inspectors observed a significant number of out-of-service radiation monitors documented in radiation monitor track logs in the control room for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. These were accounted for by FENOC in their and 09-68196), however a number of emergency response assessments.

actions for the Unit 1 and 2 RSS HX RQ100A, B, C, Dl, however other actions function assessment (CR 10-86918 and identification and resolution (Pl&R) sample The inspectors reviewed FENOC's prompt monitor logs, action plans, and completed prompt function assessments (CR 10-8691 corrective actions are stilloutstanding and these out-of-service monitors were not lntroduction: A Green, NRC-identified actions to correct long-standing radiation not accomplished in a timely manner, in LP-2001. Specifically, FENOC failed to r [RM-1RW-100A, B, C, D and 2SWS-other monitors related to FENOC's prompt 196) were reviewed as a Problem a detailed follow-uP review.

assessment, control room radiation actions for the selected monitors'

been extended. Also, a number of for safe operation.

(FlN) was identified in that plans and ritor system instrument deficiencies where nce with FENOC CAP Procedure NOP-and return to service radiation monitor Enclosure

instruments for Unit 1 and 2 RSS HX [RM-1 RQ100A,B,C,D], in a timely manner, requi challenges to assessing radiation detection This issue was entered into the licensee's 91673 and 1 1-89700.

Discussion: A review of FENOC's prompt fu Unit 2 RSS HX radiation monitors have 2006, respectively, due to failing to meet requirements during surveillance testing.

sample lines to clog with debris and mud.

CRs 06-00509,07-05648, and 09-68196. F condition has been observed on Unit 1 Alternate methods for detection (alternate (i.e. 1 l2-EPP-lP-2.7, Liquid Release Estima Engineering changes were developed and i flow issue and return the monitors to service multiple groups to coordinate and complete These issues have been long-standing with extended and delayed due to design, parts, monitors have not yet been returned to their recovery plans and has made affecting the recovery of the RSS HX mon Analvsis: Traditional enforcement does not actual safety consequence or the potential was not the result of any willful violation of determined that the finding was not similar contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Exa than minor because it affects the Public Rad associated with the attribute of plant eq monitors) attribute of the Public Radiation protection of public health and safety from into the public domain as a result of routine In accordance with IMC 0609'04 (Table 3a)'

Characterization of Findings," the finding

"Public Radiation Safety Significance very low safety significance (Green) becr the effluent program or cause any public The cause of this NCV relates to the cross resolution, Corrective Action Program, in corrective actions to develop and implement deficiencies. [P.1 (d)]

Enforcement: Enforcement action does not did not involve a violation of a regulatory refocused their radiation monitor action plan Enclosure 100A,8,C,D and 2SWS-maintenance of alternate monitoring and nd assessment during accident situations.

action program under CR(s) 11-assessments revealed that Unit 1 and out of service since September 2007 and UFSAR river and service water flow low flow is due to the susceptibility of the issues were originally documented in inspector review identified this 2003.

) and methods for estimating releases

) were identified and implemented.

plemented in an attempt to correct the low The recovery of these monitors require actions.

corrective actions that have been urce, and scheduling issues. The FENOC has reevaluated and modified progress towards completing the ECPs because the issue did not have an impacting NRC's regulatory function, and requirements. The insPectors the examples for minor deficiencies of Minor lssues". The finding is more ion Safety cornerstone. The finding is and instrumentation (process radiation cornerstone to ensure adequate re to radioactive materials released lian nuclear reactor oPeration.

Phase 1 - Initial Screening and evaluated using IMC 0609 Appendix D, ination Process" and determined to be of the finding was not a failure to implement to be exceeded.

aspect of Problem, ldentification, and FENOC personnel did not take timely ions for long-standing radiation monitor because the performance deficiency

. FENOC has revised and nd continues to take action to return the

40A3 (7 1 153 - 2 samples total)

The inspectors performed one event inspection activity. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the I lnformation attached to this report.

Plant Event Review Inspection Scope (1 samPle)

For the plant event below, the inspectors and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and eva performance of mitigating systems.

The inspectors communicated the plant eve to regional personnel and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC

, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," for consideration of additional inspection activities. The inspectors reviewed FENOC's follow-up actions corrective actions were im plemented to the events to assure that appropriate with their safety significance.

Documents reviewed during the inspection listed in the Attachment.

.

Unit 2: On April 10, control room initiated a manual reactor trip while performing TS required shutdown due low water level (25%) on the'A'steam reaching the pre-established trip criteria for water level. The TS required shutdown was in resPonse to an weld leak at 2FWE-940, an auxiliary not affect steam generator water levels.

feedwater header line. This weld leak After the manual reactor trip, water level to lower due to shrink and reached 20.5o/o level, and caused an atic actuation of the steam driven y recovered and stabilized steam auxiliary feedwater pump. Operators q

.1 to the NRC via Event Notification resident inspectors. Operators responded appropriately and mitigating systems as designed. The licensee documented this issue in CR 11-92597 11-92603 and is conducting a root cause evaluation. This issue was also under NRC OpESS FY2009-02, "Negative Trend and Recurring Events lnvolving Findinqs No findings were identified.

Systems."

.2 Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (

sample)

generator water levels. This event was M67744 and was directly observed by b.

ll lnoDerable" On March scheduled 25, while Beaver ValleY, Unit 2 shut down in Mode 6 (refueling),

Train'A' EDG which included replacing maintenance was performed on Enclosure

the twelve fuel injection pump supply lines new fuel injection pump supply lines procured from the EDG vendor. During post maintenance testing of the Train 'A' EDG, the supply line to the number four injector replaced with its original supply line due minute). Several additional fuel supply minor leakage and the required post Train'A' EDG was completed to a smallfuel leak (approximately 6 drops line fittings were tightened to eliminate signs maintenance testing and endurance run of satisfactorily. After successful post mai testing, the Train'A'EDG was declared operable by the licensee and the T

'B' EDG was subsequentlY declared inoperable and removed from service for ne maintenance.

Approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> later the vendor in the licensee of its recommendation to remove all of the new fuel injection pump lines previously installed on the Train

'A' EDG due to concerns over the adequacy the assembly method of the fuel line compression fittings. Based on this vendor mendation, the licensee immediately declared Train'A' EDG inoperable. Since approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, during which time EDG trains were inoPerable for action was immediately taken to restore one to operability as required by TS 3'8.2.8, licensee was inadvertentlY in a condition prohibited by TS. When the li determined that both EDG trains were inoperable, they entered TS 3.8.2.8, initi actions to restore one EDG to operable status, and evaluated the issue for and appropriately issued LER 50-Supply Lines Provided by the Diesel Diesel Generator Being lnoperable,"

41212011 -001, "Defective Fuel lnjection Engine Manufacturer Results in an dated May 19, 2011. This LER reported Beaver Valley, Unit 2 had been in a condition that was prohibited by TS 3.8.2.8, trains of EDG are inoperable while in Mode requires immediate action if both operations.

The issue was considered within the I enforcement process because there was no performance deficiency identified and ion Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612, Appendix B, "lssue Scrbening" directs of this issue in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. The inspectors used Operations, to evaluate the significance of Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1 - Reactor violation. The inspectors concluded that the violation is more than minor and best racterized as Severity Level lV (very low safety significance) because it is similar to Policy Section 6.1, examPle d.1.

Additionally, the inspectors assessed the associated with the issue by using IMC nificance Determination Process." The it using Checklist 4 of IMC 0609, Appendix 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations inspectors screened the issue, and eva G, Attachment 1. The inspectors also the licensee's risk evaluation of the event. Based on these reviews, this issue (Green).

screen as very low safety significance Because it was not reasonable for the to either have declared the Train 'A' EDG the inadequate assembly of the fuel ned no performance deficiencY existed. Thus, the NRC has decided to with the Enforcement Policy and refrain ise enforcement discretion in accordance issuing enforcement action for the violation.

(EA-1 1-160). Further, because licensee s did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment closed.

or the NRC's Action Matrix. This LER is inoperable at an earlier time or to have fore injection pump supply line fittings, the NRC Enclosure

40A5

.1 Other The inspectors reviewed the final report (

assessment of Beaver Valley conducted in inspectors also reviewed the final report for conducted February 2011. The inspectors issues identified were consistent with NRC determine if INPO identified any significant follow-up.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Nuclear Station Fuel Damaqe Event" The inspectors assessed the activities and readiness to respond to an event similar to damage event. This included (1) an conditions that may result from beyond des on strategies related to the spent fuel pool, April 19th, 2011) for the INPO plant ruary 2011 on May 17'n,2011. The the maintenance, chemistry, and radiolog protection technical training programs lNPO accreditation team evaluation of these reports to ensure that anY ves of FENOC performance and to issues that required further NRC taken by the licensee to assess its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fuel of the licensee's capability to mitigate basis events, with a particular emphasis required by NRC Security Order Section to in severe accident management

.2 guidelines, and as required by 10 CFR 50'5 capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO)

possible for the site Inspection Report 05000334/4 12-2011008 (

of this inspection activity.

8.5.b issued February 25,2002, as comm

); (2) an assessment of the licensee's

, as required by 10 CFR 50.63 and station design bases; (3) an of the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and externalflooding events, as req ired by station design bases; and (4) an assessment of the thoroughness of the wa and inspections of important which were performed bY the equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood licensee to identify any potential loss of of this equipment during seismic events I I I 31 0328) documented detailed results On May 18, 2011, the inspectors completed a review of the licensee's severe accident management guidelines (SAMGS),

ted as a voluntary industry initiative in the were available and updated, (2) whether 1990's, to determine (1) whether the r place to controland update its SAMGS, ning of personnel on the use of SAMGS, the licensee had procedures and processes (3) the nature and extent of the licensee's and (4) licensee personnel's familiarity with The results of this review were provided to NRC task force chartered bY the a near-term evaluation of the need for

.3 Executive Director for Operations to cond Enclosure

agency actions following the Fukushima Daiiphifuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Beaver Valley Power Station were provided in an Attachment to a memorandum to the Chief, Reactor tnspectiQn Branch, Division of lnspection and Regional Support, dated May 27,2011 (ML111470361)'

Manaqement Meetinqs 2010 Annual Assessment Discussion On April 28, Ronald Bellamy, NRC Branch Qniet for Beaver Valley, discussed Beaver Valley performance for 2010 with Mr. P. Harden, Site Vice President, prior to the public annual assessment meeting.

On May 10, Commissioner Magwood, ied by his staff and Mr. J. Clifford, NRC Region I Deputy Director of Reactor toured Beaver Valley Power Station and rden, Site Vice President, and other senior discussed station performance with Mr. P.

members of FENOC.

On May 20, an exit meeting was conducted th Mr. R. Brosi, Director of Performance lmprovement, and other members of the observations of the insPection.

Valley staff to discuss the results and

.4 Emerqencv Preparedness Mr. R. Brosi, Director of Performance Valley staff to discuss the results and On May 20, an exit meeting was conducted lmprovement, and other members of the observations of the insPection.

On June 3, an exit meeting was conducted to discuss the results of the Tl.

Mr. R. Lieb, Director of Site Operations On June 23, an exit meeting was conducted other members of the Beaver Valley staff to Radioactive Effluent inspection.

Quarterlv Inspection RePort Exit with Mr. P. Harden, Site Vice President, and the results and observations of the On July 21,the inspectors presented the baseline inspection results to Mr. D.

Murray, Director of Performance and other members of the licensee staff.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary of the inspection period.

rmation was not retained at the conclusion

4046

.1

.2

.3

.5

.6

.7 ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION Enclosure

Licensee personnel M. Banko R. Brosi S. Buffington G. Cacciani D. Canan W. Cress G. Cramer D. Eckleberry R. Fedin J. Gallagher D. Gibson M. Helms R. Lieb J. Matsko J. Mauck C. McFeaters D. Murray A. Oduho L. Renz J. Saunders F. Schaffner B. Sepelak H. Szklinski R. Thompson B. Tuite Other Personnel L. Ryan Senior Radiation tion Technician Emergency Preparedness Staff Nuclear Staff Nuclear Operations Site Vice President Fleet Oversight Speci Director, Site Plant Engineering Compliance Engineer Operations Manager Director Performance provement System Radiation Engineer Environmental Specia pervrsor Emergency Preparedness Supervisor, Regu Compliance Staff Nuclear Speci Emergency Preparedness Senior Chemistry T Manager Regulatory pliance I nspector, Pennsylvania t of Radiation Protection A-1 SUPPLEMENTAL KEY POINTS OF Chemistry Supervisor Director, Design Engineer Design Analysis Eng Radiation Protection Supervisor, Emergency Radiation Protection Staff Nuclear Specia ORMATION lmprovement Laboratory Manager Attachment

A-2 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooen/Closed 050004122011003-01 NCV Failure to Maintain Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanlers in ChemicalWet Layup. (Section 1 R07)

05000334, 41212011003-02 FIN Failure [o timely correct Radiation Monitor deficiericies. (Section 40.42.3)

LER Defectirle Fuel lnjection Pump Supply Lines Provide[ by the Diesel Engine Manufacturer Results in an Emergency Diesel Generator Being lnoper{ble. (Section 4OA3.2)

Tl Followlp to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel D{mage Event. (Section 4OA5.2)

Tl Avaihbflity and Readiness lnspection of Severe Acciderft Management Guidelines (SAMGS).

(Sectiofl 4OA5.3)

Closed 050004121201 1001-00 05000334, 41212515/1 83 05000334, 4121251 51 184 Attachment

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures 1/2OM-35.4A.A, Voltage Schedule Guidance, Rev.

1 I2OM-53C.4A.35.1, Degraded Grid, Rev. 7 NOP-WM-2001, Work Management Rev.11 Conditions Reports 11-88241 10-81176 Section 1R04: Equipment Alisnment Procedures 2OM-15.3.B.1, Valve List-2CCP, Rev. 16 2OM-11.3.B.1, Valve List-2SlS, Rev. 12 Drawinqs voND 1 0800-RM-041 5-001 voND 10080-RM-0411-041 Condition Reports 11-92336 11-94045 Section 1R05: Fire Protection 10-81 175 Procedures 1/2 ADM-1900 Pre-Fire Plans l PFP-AXLB-768 Calculation

'10080-8-085, Rev. 14 Condition Reports 11-92600 11-95411 11-94375 11-91 Section 1R06: Flood Protection Calculations 8700-DMC-3443, Rev. 2 Condition Reoorts 11-92449 REVIEWED I Readiness Process, 08-42553 08-35334 07-31091 1t2 ADM-1902 2PFP-CTP1 Attachment

A-4 Other BVPS-2 UFSAR BVPS Unit 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 2DBD-30 Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Procedures 2OM-30.4.T, Placing Recirc Spray Hxs into Chemicfl Wet Layup, Rev.O 2OST-30.138, Train B Service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 28 Condition Reports 11-90096 11-90430 11-90899 11-90901 11-91513 11-92251 Procedures 1t2 ADM-2033 Condition Reports 11-92841 11-91436 Other BV Unit BV Unit 11-92189 1 1-90787 11-92644 11-90721 11-91 1 1-90643 11-91018 02-00350 11-92570 11-91026 02-00277

11 Other NOTF 600464500 wo200451815 1R11:

Red Team Mini-Drill Scenario, Rev.0 Procedures NOP-ER-3004, FENOC Maintenance Rule P NOP-ER-21 01, Engineering Program Management, NOBP-LP-4012, NRC Performance Indicators, Rev Other Maintenance Rule Quarterly Program Health wo200452790 NOTF 600673949 Condition Reports 11-92375 11-92245 11-88460 07-31 wo200450994 Rev. 1 Rev.3

2011-1 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for tfie week of April 11,2011, tfie week of May 23,2011, Rev. 1 Revs.1,2,and3, Attachment

A-5 Section 1Rl5: Operabilitv Evaluations Procedures l OST-1 3.02,'B' Quench Spray pump surveillance tQst 2OST-47.3M, Quarter Valve Strokes 2OST-30.138, Train 'B'service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev' 28 Condition Reports 11-89270 11-94426 Drawinos 2006.51 0-001-025, Rev D, Calculations 8700-DMC-3395, Rev.0 Other 2SVS-PCV1 01 B stroke-time history BV1 Shift Operations Logs dated May 9,2011 Clearance 1W09-1 3-QS-003 Section 1Rl8: Plant Modifications Condition Reports 1 1-91800 ECP 11-0179-000 ECP 09-0771 EER 600672192 Other NOTF 600672192 ECP 11-0179-000 Section 1 R19: Post-Maintenance Testinq Procedures Procedures U2 CMp.1-2-002, PR Neutron Flux Detector ReplaQement and Post Installation Tests, Rev. 3 1-CMP-1-02-003 1 CMP-2N1-OVRPWR.SPI l RST-2.10, Alignment of Power Range lnstrumentation for Startup after Mid-cycle detector replacement, Rev.0 1 t2-Ml-75-Packing-1 M, Valve Packing Instruction, Rpv. 10

%-CMP -M-75-039, Repai r Rockwel l-Edwards U n ivalves, Rev. 4 2OST-30.138, Train B Service Water System Full Flow Test, Rev. 28 BVBP-SITE-0053, Post-Maintenance Test Requirenfents, Rev. 1 Work Orders 20045:z86 200432097 200451486 200452F32 '200452432 20A403244 200451094 200450356 200400196 200451765 Attachment

Condition Reports 11-92952 11-92170 11-90096 11-92251 Other 11-92224 1 1-90760 A-6 I 11-917tr7 BetaLab report M11110 for weld crack evaluation BV2 Shift operations logs dated April 3, 2011 ECP 11-005-003 Section {R20: Refuelinq and Outaqe Activities Procedures 2MSP-13RS-SUMP, Unit 2 Containment Sump Cloqe-out'

Condition Reoorts 11-92146 11-92219

[ 1-91659 11-91365 11-92177 11-92238 ft t-otssz 11-91115 11-92229 11-91910 11-91483 11-92442 11-91883 111-91392 11-92467 11-91746

[ 1-91390 Other 1POAC4 Work Project Schedule dated March 30, 2q11 BV1 Shift Operations logs dated March 16,20, & 26, 2011 BV1 PRNI detector current plots from plant computdr, dated March 16,2Q11 operational Decsion Making lnterface for unit 1 PR4'll-42' dated March 26' 201'l WO 200399672, QC inspection of Unit 2 containmeflt sump Section 1 R22: Surveillance Testinq Condition Reports 11-91918 11-92143 11-95443 11-911$0 Procedures 1l2ADM'1107, Alert Notification System (Sirens) Mfintenance and Testing, Rev. 11 Other Elaver Valley Nuclear Facility Design Report, Emerpency Warning Notification System, March 1, 1984 Supplement to the Beaver Valley Power Station Emprgency Warning Notification System 1 1-91905 11-92001

- 1't quarter 2011 Design Report Various Siren and Maintenance Tests, 4th quarter Procedures 1 12-ADM-1101, Emergency Response Organization 112-ADM-1102, BVPS Emergency Notification T

, Review and Trending, Rev. 2 Attachment

Chanoe Evaluations BV-2010-064-00 Bv-2010-069-00 BV-2010-033-00 BV-2010-029-00 BV-2010-044-00 BV-2010-044-00 BV-2010-038-00 1 12-EPP -lP-1. 7, Emergency Response 112 OST-57.1, Emergency Beeper Notification Other Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency ERO Roster Procedures NOP+P$O02, Evaluation of Changes to 10 CFR 50.54(q), Rev. 2 NOP-LP-4003, Evaluation of Changes, Test and (ERO) Teams, Rev. 20

, Rev. 15 Plan Plans and Supporting Documents Rev.6 BV-2010-030-00 BV-2010-067-00 BV-2010-039-00 BV-201 BV-201 BV-201 12-00 EPS: C Other BVRM-EP-5003, Equipment lmportant to Response, Rev.2 Quarterly Report, 1" quarter 2010 Quarterly Report, 2nd quarler 201(

MS-C-1 O-11-24, Fleet Overiignt RuOit Report, ttovelnOer 12,2010 through Decemb_e_r 15, 2010 BV-PA-10-01, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigl'Jt Quarterly Report, 1 quaner zulv BV-pA-10-02, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigfit Quarterly Report, 2* quarter 2010 BV-pA-10-03, Beaver Valley Nuclear Fleet Oversigl.{t Quarterly Report, 3'quarter 2010 lp-SA-10-217, Integrated Pe*ormance Assessment and trending, 1't six months of 2010 lp-SA-1 i-041,Integrated Performance Assessment and trending, 2no six months of 2010 lp-SA-1 1-176,Integrated Performance Assessment and trending, 1'tquarter.2011 SN-SA-10-160, 2010 Beaver Valley Emergency Redponse Organization Red Team Mini Drill#1 MS-C-99-1 1-24,FleetOversightAudit Report, Noveinber 11,2009 through December 16,2009 SN-SA-10-284, Beaver Valley Power station Emerg$ncy Response Organization Blue Team during Mini-Drill #3, JulY 22,2010 SN-SA-10-285, Beaver Valley itower station Emerg$ncy Response Organization Green Team during Mini-Drill #4, August 12, 2010 Condition Reports 103020 11-94455 09-64018 10-87068 11-87868 10-86883 10-86905 11-94392 10-76036 11-937$6 09-69009 09-68905 no-A1n6n 1n-A2226 Procedures:

112-ODC-1.01, ODCM: Index, Matrix, and History of 1 12-ODC-2.01, ODCM: Liquid Effluents 1 12-ODC-2.02, ODCM: Gaseous Effluents Changes Attachment

A-8 Proc$d 112-ODC-3.03, ODCM: Controls for RETS and ure & Source Term lnPuts Program 1 -HPP-4.02.008, SA-9/SA-1 0 Noble Gas Monitors 1 l 2-HPP -4.02.002, Effluent Mon itors 1 -HPP -4.02. 0 1 0, SPI NG-4 Particulate, lodine, and Gas Monitor

}-HPP -4.02.020, DRMS, Process Monitoring 2-HPP -4.02.021, D RMS, Effl uent Mon itoring Su bs 1/2-ENV-05.04, Radioactive Waste Discharge 112-HPP-3.06.006, Batch Radioactive Waste tion-Liquid Authorization-Gas 112-ADM-1730, Laboratory Quality Assurance and strument Quality Control Program NOP-OP-3202, FENOC Radiochemistry Quality Program NOP-OP-4705, Response to Contaminated Spi Mon Unit-1:

t tytsp-+S.O1C-1, RM-VS1 12 Reactor Bldg / SLCRS ftadiation Monitor Calibration lMSp-43.18-1, RM-LW104 Liquid Waste Effluent Rqdiation Monitor Calibration 1 MSP-43.21 -1, RM-1 GW-1 08A Gaseous Waste Pa(iculate Calibration lMSP-43.231, RM-1LW-1 16 Channel Functional Te$t 1 MSP-43.61 C-1, RM-VS-1 12 Reactor Bldg/SLCRS [onitor calibration 1 OST-43.7, Noble Gas Monitors RM-1VS-109111 0, IGW-109 Functional Test 1 OST-43.9D, RM-1 GW-1 08 Channel Functional Te$t lOST-43.9F, RM-1LW-104 High Range Channel Functional Test lOST-43.9E, RM-1LW-104 Low Range Channel Fuitctional Test 1 OST-43.9H, RM-1 RW-1 00 Liquid Effluent Monitor Channel Functional Test 1 OST-43.91/J, RM-1 VS-1 01 A/B Gaseous Effluent tvfionitor Functional Test 1 OST-43.91(1, RM-1VS-1 07 Gaseous Effluent Monitor Functional Test Unit-2:

zusp-+e. g6A-1, 2HVS-RQl 1 01, Ventilation Vent R{diation Monitor Test 2MSp-43.33-t, 2HVS-RQ1109, BICID Elevated Relefse Gas Monitor Calibration 2MSP-43.39-1, 2SGC-RQl 1 00, Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor Calibration 2OST -43.2, 2RMF-RQt301 A/B, Fuel Building Exhaulst Monitor Functional Test 2OST-43. 3, 2SGC-RQl 1 00, Liquid Waste Effluent tt{onitor Functional Test 2OST-43.5, 2MSS-RQ101 NBIC Noble Gas Monitof channelTest 20sT-43.9A, 2HVS-RQ101 A/B Ventilation Vent Fuhctional Test 2OST-43.8, 2HVS-RQI109C Elevated Release wRqM Functional Test 2OST-43.98, 2RMQ-RQ301 A/B Decon Bldg Efflueipt Monitor FunctionalTest 2OST-43.9C, 2HVL-RQl112A/B Condensate Polishing Bldg Effluent RM Test 2OST-43.9D, 2RMQ-RQ303 A/B Waste Gas Ventilaftion Monitor FunctionalTest Air Cleaninq Svstem Testinq:

Unit 1:

W-f eW-01-16-06/07, Unit 1 A/B SLCRS HEPA an[ Charcoal Filter Efficiency and Flow Test BV-1BW-01-16-08, Unit 1 Main Filter Charcoal San'iple - A SLCRS BV-2BW-o1-16-11, Unit 1 Main Filter Charcoal Sanr'iple - B SLCRS Attachment

A-9 Unit 2:

BV-2BW-01-16-06/07, Unit 2 A/B SLCRS HEPA Charcoal Filter Efficiency and Flow Test BV-2BW-01-16-08, Unit 2 Main Filter Charcoal BV-2BW-01-16-11, Unit 2 Main Filter Charcoal Nuclear Oversiqht Reports:

Audit MS-C-10-08-02, First Energy Multi-Site Beaver Valley Fleet Oversight Fourth Quarter 2010 Field Observations:

8V3201 14154 8V220093821 Other Documents:

Monthly, Quarterly, and Annual Liquid & Gaseous E Unit 2 from January 2011 through May 2011 2010 Radioactive Effluent Release Report System 43, Radiation Monitoring Systern Health 50.75 (g) Decommissioning Records RETS Dose Proiection for June 2011 Unit 1 Boron Recovery/Liquid Waste System I and Environmental Audit First Quarter 2011 Reports 8V320103932 Dose Assessments for Unit 1 and 1" Quarter 2011

- 50.59 Evaluations ple - A SLCRS ple - B SLCRS Inter-laboratory Comparison Program Results 201 0 4th Quarter 2010 RETS Cross Check Program Resufts Condition Reports:

11-96782 11-95363 11-95716 11-95774 1 1-93037 11-92949 11-szete 1 1-e50I1 11-94121 11-92214 Rev.5 2011 1 1-94365 1A-85877 1/2 ADM - 1111, NRC EPP Performance lndicator Other Performance Indicator data - 2nd quarter 2010 to 1't Condition Reports 07-05648 07-26618 07-31 350 08-38146 09-53803 09-53854 09-6021 8 09-60782 09-60852 09-63257 09-63273 10-71353 11-71984 1 0-79691 10-80659 10-81046 10-81305 10-81680 0-82077 1-89204 1-90598 1-90801 1-90958 1-90962 1-90966 1-91287 1-92447 1 1-93608 1 1-94038 1 1-94089 11-94165 11-94167 11-94168 11-95701 Attachment

lOST-30.12A & B, Service Water Full-Flow Test I

lOST-33.10H, 1B Service Station Transformer anO lRfS Transformer 38 Deluge Valve Test l MSP-1.04, Solid State Protection System Testing, firain 'A'

NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program NOP-WM-4300, Order Execute Process I

Work Orders 2ooqsazaa 200456670 200385515 200449533 200400261 Other AVpS Maintenance Strategy, Update and Status ; 2Q07,2009, 2010, 201 1 BVPS Radiation Monitor lnstrument Action Plan, 20'f l CR1 1-89576, CARB Package for April 12,2011 l A-10 Procedures

%-ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program EPP l-1a, TAB 1.3.4 Containment Bypass Event Notification M5296 oDcM, %-oDc-3.03 NUREG-1022 Surveillance and Periodic Test Program Change for 2MSP-01-04-l & 2MSP-01*05-1, dated Feb 10,2009 Engineering Change Packages 02-0186, 05-0385, q8-650, 09-0131, 09-01 32, and 11-0256.

Section 4OA3: Event ResPonse Condition Reports 11-95539 11-94109 11-92597 11 Other BV2 AFW PlD, 10080-RM-424.3, Rev. 9 BV2 steam generator water level plots from plant i computer, dated APril 10, 2011 BV2 shift operations logs, dated April 9 & 10,2011 Event notification#46744 dated April 10,2011 Event Review Team Package for April 10,2011 trip, dated April 10, 2011 10,2011 Sequence of Events recorder output for BV2 dated Attachment

ADM ANS BCO BVPS CAP ccw CFR CR DEP EAL EDG EP ERO FA FEMA FENOC FOTP FSAR HEPA HX rMc roD IP tsr LCO LER LHSI MR MSP NEI NO NRC OD ODCM OST PI PI&R POD PMT PRNI RSS SAMG SBO SLCRS ssc SSST LIST OF AC Administrative Procedure Alert and Notification SYstem Basis for Continued Beaver Valley Power Station I

Corrective Action Program Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report(s)

Department of Environmental Problem ldentification and Prompt Operability Determi Post Maintenance Testing Power Range Nuclear I Recirculation Spray SYstem Severe Accident Station Blackout Supplemental Leak Structures, Systems, and System Station Service T Department of Environmental Protection Emergency Action Level Emergency Diesel Generator i

Emergency Preparedness Emergency Response Organilation Functionality Assessments Federal Emergency Manage$ent Agency First Energy Nuclear Operatirig Company Fuel OilTransfer PumP Final Safety Analysis RePort High-Efficiency Particulate Ail Heat Exchanger Inspection Manual ChaPter tmmediate Operability Deterniination Inspection Procedure I

lnservice lnspection Limiting Conditions for Operations Licensee Event Report Low Head Safety lnjection i Maintenance Rule Maintenance Surveillance Pafkage Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Oversight Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operability Determinations Offsite Dose Calculation ManUal Operations Surveillance Test I

Performance Indicator Guidelines and Release System ponents Attachment

SW TS UFSAR A-12 Service Water Technical Specification Updated Final Safety Analysi$ Report Attachment