05000334/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers in Chemical Wet Layup |
| Description | A Green, self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified in that the Unit 2 Recirculation Spray System (RSS) Heat Exchangers (HXs) were not maintained in chemical wet layup, contrary to station procedures and industry guidance. Specifically, FENOC failed to maintain place corrosion inhibitors in the RSS HXs, resulting in significant HX corrosion, which led to degraded flow through the B RSS HX during a service water full flow test. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program under CR 11-90430. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC\'s regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors determined that the finding was not similar to the examples for minor deficiencies contained in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The finding is more than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstones. The finding is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and is also associated with the Structure Systems and Components (SSC) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. In accordance with IMC 0609.04 (Table 4a), Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a loss of operability, nor was it a degradation of a radiological barrier, control room barrier, hydrogen igniter, or an open pathway. The cause of this NCV relates to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Control, in that FENOC personnel did not coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, FENOC did not coordinate work activities to complete the chemical wet layup condition to support long-term equipment reliability of the Unit 2 RSS HXs. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000334/2011003 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Moslak D Werkheiser R Bellamy C Crisden E Bonney T Ziev |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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