ML20085D931

Responds to Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-4.Licensee Does Not Consider Continued Operation of Plant W/Valve HIC-27V in Failed Shut Condition to Be in Noncompliance W/Tech Specs

ML20085D931
Person / Time
Site:	Saxton File:GPU Nuclear icon.png
Issue date:	03/29/1965
From:	Layman W SAXTON NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL CORP.
To:	Price E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20083L048	List: ML20085C449 ML20085C452 ML20085C455 ML20085C458 ML20085C461 ML20085C464 ML20085C467 ML20085C472 ML20085C477 ML20085C480 ML20085C483 ML20085C490 ML20085C500 ML20085C501 ML20085C504 ML20085C508 ML20085C513 ML20085C517 ML20085C540 ML20085C543 ML20085C546 ML20085C583 ML20085C586 ML20085C590 ML20085C592 ML20085C602 ML20085C605 ML20085C616 ML20085C620 ML20085C622 ML20085C625 ML20085C628 ML20085C630 ML20085C633 ML20085C634 ML20085C637 ML20085C805 ML20085C809 ML20085C826 ML20085C835 ML20085C840 ML20085C844 ML20085C904 ML20085C913 ML20085C966 ML20085C973 ML20085D041 ML20085D048 ML20085D052 ML20085D059 ... further results
References
FOIA-91-17 NUDOCS 9110170275
Download: ML20085D931 (8)

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SAXTCM NUCliAR EXPERIMENT ~) CORPORATIO o ~. e...t

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SYSTEM GENERAL P U B LIC UTt.lTICS 3

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l vs Mr. Et,er h. Pr.ee,.hre ctor

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R U.S. Atcc.lc Energy Joca:ission wasninc.on, D.J.

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Ref erence : Your letter buhJJR 50-.146 of Jana.ry 14, 1961, O.s to

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Dear Mr. Prieea Tuis letter is in reply to tne reference letter in whien you state "It conaacts in full ecc.pliance with appears that certain of your acttvities were notWe nave assumed that you have reference to cond corgiltion i 3 of y our license".

3.B since ABC Pccility I/icens) No. DP h...as no condition % B an it is 3.8 which incorporates the technical spacifications into tne license.

Your unceret.anding a ec,rrect that Saxton does not consider tne continued operauon of the plant witn v..ve r(IC.27 / in the failed ar.ut corgiition to be inWe non-ccc.pliance w" tn tne tecnrai% cpecati,:,ations.

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tne asic poin:, of concern nere snould oc not tne interprv.at:.on of tne spec:.f cat ons e tne true 1:nplications of an moperable charging system cet re.,:.er on. of ete minin ) r.tng tr.e period follocag the failure of the valve to to tne t.n.ty of tc.e pl ut.

opea 5,.ncr. :or.siterec m ret; imp'.ic.ticas first and then reviewec tne technics, spec.:icat ons to ::us lette: is a safety analysis of tne particulur speration r p4ssible non-ccrapliance caring tne specific it. closure 2 in quest.an perti;.ent to tne suo,$ect o eleven haar perloc on October 13,1;/64.

Ecise,re 2. to this letter is a pfety alpala ?! a nypothetica". cnarging In this analysis it crediole reactor plant con;itions.

systec frilure A er :ne worst is to is con:2 ec

..~t the saf est ae+ 1on to follow after c. - enargirg syster f-:. Lure I

cont;.a.e pla:c. apr tion at pc <ar wn11e repairing the enargirg sjstem. -

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me to were initially no boron in the system that it uculd not be necessary to inject boric acid for at least four hours after the lose of fjow accident had occurred.

Supplement #1 to change request #o went further by assianing that the charging eyetect was out of service aM showed that the safety injection systata could be used to borate the reactor.

A furthcr arAlysis of this loss of flow accident shows that from a charging systec standpsiat it is safer to have the accident occur from an at power concition than frcan a reactor hot shutdown cond! tion. Tnis is true because the reactor decay heat woulc lengthen tne time before it would be necessary to add boron and the Xenon present provides additional shutdown margin and would lengthen the tino before it would be necessary to add boron.

To summarise, when considering the loss of coolant flow accident it is safer to keep the reactor plant at power and repair an inoperative charging systs than to shut the plant down to conduct repairs to the charging system.

5.

Unesntrol.3 ed Heat Lctraction by Steam Plant Valve or Rapture Prem a erArging systect standooint it would be safer to have this accident while at power rather than with the reactor shutdown. If the uncontrollad heat extraction were within the ability of the reactor to maintain main coolant tetperature witheat an overpower scram it would be an incorrect action to shut down the reactor lausediat e(v. Tne f$ rst action shoald be to attescpt to stop the uncontrolled neat extraction by shutting tne steam generator main steam stop valve, 'the steam generator blowdown valves c.nd the feed valve (all remotely opt rated irun the reactor contml rocan). If the heat extraction could not be stopped by this action $t wauld stop shortly thereafter as the steam generator steamed dry.

If tne sa:ne accident were to occur from an unborated hot shutdown sondition or if the accident wore severe enough to cause an overpower scrare frust unborated power In this case if operation an uncontrolled cooldown would be a more serious accident.

cooldown could not be stopped the safety injection ps:tpa should be turned on, the pressurizer heaters should be turned off, pressurizer spray valve opened and pressurizer power operated relief valve shoald be opened intemittently to lower main fy these actions boron would be introduced rapidly into the coolant system pressure.

reactor to give shutdown margin. No credit can be taken for the charging system in this severe accicent because of the small charging rate of the system and the time delays necessary to send a man off to manually valve in boric acid to the charging Tne accident would be over before boric acid could be introduced into the

systen, reactor 'cy the charging system.

Tc suncarize, the charging system has not been described as an estergency safety device and it would give no additional protection in this severe but unlikely When considering the uncontrolled heat extraction accident framt a charging accident.

system standpoint it is safer to keep the reactor plant at power while repairing an inoperative cnarging systern than to shut the phnt down to conduct repairs to the charging syste.

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h. e A et, ci.se cont 10ered, the severity of t:4e accident analyzed d e not in0rensej Q conth.ue: operi.ticr, of t..e reactor plant.

T. t.ae Oct.tr&ry, in tra cf t r.e f:ur c't es tr:e a;;1 cent wo.;16 De less severe frac. pawtr operi. tion t%:. frau tr,e j

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5%rm Atx>t3 (Rev. May 14,2Mn N Ae and retura.

For signatwea Fw sery %

TO (Name sad man) tulitALS M MAA KS HAM amto" 2 m.,_

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.ae vani n A=xs WITH ENERCEMDir LTR DTD 1/18 /65, TO SAXTON NUCLEAR 4

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EXPERIhmiaL wkP, 6,uwa, Fun. AAxm pn6 sthiti i

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