ML20134E395

Application for Amend to License NPF-1,consisting of License Change Application 126,revising Tech Specs to Allow Entry Into Operational Modes W/Selected Equipment Out of Svc

ML20134E395
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	08/16/1985
From:	Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20134E389	List: ML20134E386 ML20134E395 ML20134E401
References
TAC-59561, NUDOCS 8508200191
Download: ML20134E395 (4)

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l PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY EUGENE WATER & ELECTRIC BOARD AND PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Operating License NPF-1 Docket 50-344 License Change Application 126 This License Change Application requests modifications to operating License NPF-1 for the Trojan Nuclear Plant to allow entry into operational modes with selected equipment out-of-servico.

l PORTLAND CENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By hf br*

@ rl. D. Withers Vice President Nuclear Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August 1985.

p-Notary Public of Oregon l

My Comission Expires: /U"8'I ,

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I 8500200191 B50816 PDR ADOCK 05000344 p PDR

r LCA 126  :

Page 1 of 3 l

l LICENSE CHANGE APPLICATION j The following changes to Facility Operating License NPF-1 are requested 1 (proposed replacement pages are provided as Attachment 1).  ;

This LCR revises specific Trojan Technical Specificationa (TTS) to allow relief from LCO 3.0.4. The TTS listed below have been revised to depict '

LCO 3.0.4 as not applicable: l

1) 3.2.4 - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio

2) 3.3.3.5 - Remote Shutdown Instrumentation

3) 3.9.7 - Crane Travel-Fuel Building

4) 3.9.9 - Containment Ventilation Isolation System

5) 3.9.11 - Storage Pool Water Level i

6) 3.4.6.1 - RCS Leakage l

7) 3.6.4.1 - Hydrogen Analyzers

8) 3.6.4.2 - Electric Hydrogen Recombiners

9) 3.6.4.3 - Hydrogen Vent System

10) 3.6.4.4 - Hydrogen Mixing System l

! 11) 3.9.2 - Instrumentation f I

l SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The revisions to Items 1 through 5 above conform with the W - STS (NUREG-0452, Revision 5, draft). The proposed changes to TTS 3.9.7 and 3.9.11 do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, nor do they reduce a margin of safety since control of loads over the spent fuel pool and water level in the spent fuel pool are irrelevant to entry into -

OPRRATIONAL MODES. The proposed change to TTS 3.9.9 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, nor does it reduce a  !

margin of safety since closing the appropriate valves serves the same l

purpose as having the Containment ventilation isolation system OPERABLE.

The proposed change to TTS 3.2.4 does not increase the probability or 4 consequences of an accident, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, nor does it reduce a margin of safety because the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is still restricted to the same extent as

is required in the present TTS to ensure DNB and linear heat generation i

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8 LCA 126 Page 2 of 3 limits are met. The proposed change to TTS 3.3.3.5 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, does not create the possi-bility of a new or different kind of accident, nor does it reduce a margin of safety since operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation is not dependent on entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE and the duration of inoperability remains unchanged. This reasoning is identical to that provided for Items 6 through 10 below. Based on the above discussion and i since those changes fall within existing regulatory guidanco, a signifi-  !

cant hazard is not created.

l Changos to Items 6 through 10 are proposed for consistency. If a compo- ,

nent is declared inoperable in a system governed by those TTS while in l Mode 1, Plant operation may continue for up to 30 days. During this 30-day period, if an unrelated reactor trip occurs that requires repairs in Modo 5, the Plant could not return to operation because of LCO 3.0.4.

This is the caso even if the original 30-day limit had not expired. Had j the unrelated reactor trip not occurred, Plant operation could have continued for 30 days with the component inoperable.

Not allowing the Plant to return to operation following the unrelated reactor trip is too restrictive. The ACTION statements already limit the duration of continued operation. This change allows the Plant more operational flexibility while ensuring that ACTION statement time limits are met. The probability or consequences of an accident are not increased. This chango does not croato the possibility of a new or j different kind of accident, nor does it involvo a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the duration that equipment can be out-of-service remains unchanged. Therefore, a significant hazard does not i exist.

The change to Item 11 above clarifles LCO 3.9.2 to allow entry into Mode 6 with a sourco range monitor inoperable. As presently written, LCO 3.9.2 precludes detensioning of the reactor vessel head if a sourco range monitor is inoperable due to LCO 3.0.4. This is too restrictive.

Detensioning of the reactor vessel head does not increase the potential for a positive reactivity change. Thereforo, the operability of sourco rango monitors is irrelevant to head detensioning. An inoperable sourco range monitor can result in an unwarranted delay in the commencemer.t of refueling. Revision of LCO 3.9.2 as proposed would allow head detension-ing, but would still restrict CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. This chango does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident sinco head detensioning does not cause CORE ALTERATIONS or positivo reactivity changes. This chango doos not create the possibility ,

of a new or different kind of accident, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety sinco detensioning of the reactor vossol head is unrelated to sourco range monitor operability. Since the intent l of LCO 3.9.2 is unchanged, a significant hazard does not exist.  ;

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i LCA 126 Page 3 of 3 ,

I SAFETY /ENVIRONIEENTAL EVALUATION t.

Safety and environmental evaluations were performed as required by 10 CFR 50 and the Trojan Technical specifications. This review determined that an uneen ewed safety question does not exist since Plant l operations remain consistent with the Updated FSAR, adequate surveillance is maintained, and there is no conceivable impact upon the environment.

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