ML20151G823: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
#REDIRECT [[IA-88-114, Forwards List of Plant Open Items Resulting from ACRS Subcommittee 750218 & 19 Meetings & List of Actions Requested from Review Branches for Used in Preparing SER Suppl Prior to Next ACRS Meeting]]
{{Adams
| number = ML20151G823
| issue date = 03/24/1975
| title = Forwards List of Plant Open Items Resulting from ACRS Subcommittee 750218 & 19 Meetings & List of Actions Requested from Review Branches for Used in Preparing SER Suppl Prior to Next ACRS Meeting
| author name = Skovholt D
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR)
| addressee name = Schroeder F
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR)
| docket = 05000275, 05000323
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = FOIA-88-114, FOIA-88-138
| document report number = NUDOCS 8804200153
| package number = ML20151G141
| document type = INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL MEMORANDUM, MEMORANDUMS-CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 13
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-
(
Distribution:y" Docket FileV E 2 d m5 LWR l-3 Reading IMR l-3 File Docket Hos. 50-275 /                              CMom and 50-323
[ns DPAllison VHWilson F. Schroeder, Acting Director for Division of Technical Review, NRR D. J. Skovbolt, Assistant Director for Quality Assurance & Operations, RL DIABID CANYON PRE ACRS SER SUPPLEMEN'IS We are preparing to issue SER supplement (s) on Diablo Canyon prior to the next ACRS Subconsnittee meeting. The supplement (s) will address questions raised at the last Subcomittee meeting as well as open items previously listed in the SER.
We received a great many questions from the ACRS Subconnittee at the last meeting on February 18-19. ihese questions are listed in Enclosure No. 1 along with references to their locations in the transcript and the mesting summary. The ACRS Subcocnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many of these items as practical prior to the next Subcommit-tee meeting.
The actions requested from the TR/RL review branches are listed. The appropriate branches to respond are listed in each case, based on our preliminazy evaluation of the questions. You may conclude that different branenes should respond in some cases. Copies of the transcript and
$!$                  meeting summary will be delivered to tha appropriate review branches to aid you in this determination and to minimize possible misinterpretations.
While the Subconnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many items as possible, he did not specify which items should have a written response. Thic approach will expedite the next meeting and yet gives us the opportunity of choosing the best method of responoe in each case. The written responses will be included in an SER Supplement. For the others we will make a verbal response at the next meeting. In addition  l
.                    to the recent questions from ACRS there are several open items identified  j in the SER. These items and their status are listed in Enclosure No. 2. j l
1 1
J
                                        /
8804200153 000414 PDR FOIA STEWARTOO-114        PDR s't
 
                    .                                                                            (
F. Schrooder D. J. Skovholt                                                          The critical path item in this review is resolving the design basis earthquake issues. The latest schedule change request., which is in the approval chain, leads to a July full consnittee meeting in the following manners f                              SER Supplement Input to LPM                              05/16/75*
SER Supplement Published                                05/30/75                    ,
ACRS Subcomunittee Meeting                              Mid-June ACRS Full re=mittee Meeting                              07/11/75
                                *This is not scheduled, but is necessary to meet the schedule.
It is recognized that the geology / seismology input cannot be ready until later.
r
  !                      Ed Case has requested that we attempt to minimize the impact on fuel loading by requesting the ACRS to consider the Diablo Canyon application less the seismology / geology issues one teonth earlier than the schedule                      ,
described above. We plan to request the ACRS, at the next meeting, to                          l consider this request. In order to support the earlier ACRS meeting, we will need to meet, approximately, the following uchedule for those items which can be resolved prior to resolution of the design basis earthquake issues:
SER Supplement Input to LPM                            04/10/75 SER Supplement Published                                05/04/75
                                .ACRS Subcommittee Meeting                              Mid-May                      1 j
"                                ACRS Full Committee Meeting 06/06/75
      ;                    we plan to move forward with a 5/4/75 SER Supplement less geology / seismology and be prepared to meet with the ACRS in June. To this end, we request that you review the items in Enclosures 1 & 2 and determine which items                        ,
can be responded to in the supplement.                                                        I y  ., t C.,
:.d by R. C. D nmi'N R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light Water P,eactors Group 1 Division of Reactor Licensing
 
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Diablo Canyon Open Items Resulting Frcrn ACRS Subcommittee Meeting of February 18 & 19, 1975
: 2. Diablo Canyon Open Items From Safety Evaluation
                      .e ric . *  . RLgWR l-3 _ AL2          1-3    _RL:              ._ L
                    ,,,,,,,,,,    DPAllWon:cis      ODParr        .
                                                                      ,,,,JtC x        g, oav,,      3/,b{ /75      3/ 7[/',7 5      ,,,, .,,,3/;1.715... __      ___
r.,  uc.m < m,,. ,.m acu na                          *v........-ee............m..
 
(
(
            ~
F. Schroeder 3-                                                            I D. J. Skovholt cc        W. Mcdonald, CPS R. Maccary L. Shao K. Kapur J. Knight W. Weinbrecht H. Denton                                                                    -
W. Ganmill
  '                            C. Stepp R. Hoffman R. McMullen                                                                                !
E. Markee J. Fairobent                                                                            l G. Hulman E. Rawkins M. Fliegel lj B. Grimes                                                                              l1 L. Soffer V. Stallo T. Ippolito D. Mcdonald D. Ross T. Novak L. Phillips R. Todesco
$                                C. Iong D. Fischer 1
V. Benaroya R. Bellamy            '
G. Lainas                                                                                l W. Milstead                                                                              I 1
R. Vollmer                                                                              i A. Garland                                                                              l I
1 I
1 or rica w
                                                                                                                .s.
g W e N A bl( k cats >
r.,  Au:.us (ac,. p.sn Arcu creo
* v. .. .ov a = = = = =r r ai via e or rie si i.n.e s.....
 
[                            [
DiCWSURE NO.1 DIABW CANYON OPDJ ITDiS RESULTDG FROM ACRS SUBCOt0ETTEE MELTI?E OF I'EBRUARY 18 6 19, 1975 1
 
                                                                                                                        ?
.                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,      i
!                                                                                                                                                                                                            L a
e
* I 3
ITD1 TRANSCRIPT                                                                      MELTIIE SLM4ARY DESCRIPTION                                            ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUE E
'                                                                                              PAGE PACE
: 1. 160-161                                                                          10            Will the turbine valves close reliably                  Applicant    APCSB inform 1 on loss of power during an earthquake.                              cormient to LPi
: 2. 162                                                                              10            Justify in detail 0.4g in light of                      Applicant E  SAB re ponse i
apparent discrepancies.                                Staff                          m, 4
l      3. 162                                                                              10            What would be peak accelerations                        Applicant &  SAB res;ons.
with other cinrent trethods.                            Staff
: 4. 162                                                                              10            What would be the effect on the                        Applicant E  SAB E SIIA rv ;;onse plant of a small magnitude earth-                      Staff qudke with high accelerations.
.      5. 163                                                                              10            When the peak acceleration has been                    Applicant &  SAB response
'                                                                                                            detennined would it be possible                        Staff to derive a confidence level for it.
1      6. 163                                                                              10            What are the naximum observed and                      Applicant E  SAB response predicted intensities at this site                      Staff and the peak accelerution resulting frun these.                                                                            7
: 7. 164                                                                                10          Provide USGS open file report                          Applicant E  SAB provide to 74-272 to ACRS.                                        Staff        LPM i      8. 165                                                                              -            If any additional interpretations                      Applicant E  SAB response of data exist provide and/or                            Staff I                                                                                                            describe to ACRS.                                              ,
l
 
Enclosure No. 1 DESCRIPTION                                        ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUESTED ITDi    'GANSCRIPT                                                        MEETIIG
 
==SUMMARY==
 
PAGE                                                            PAGE 10                          Consider the possibility that the                  Applicant E  SAB E SEB
: 9.        165                                                                                                                                                            response newer earthquakes do more to the                  Staff stnicture than the original design, Reservations on using Parkfield earthquake.
11                          What kind of errors can arise in                  Applicant &  SEB response
: 10.      165 seismic design analysis.                          Staff Wint are the errors going from 1                  Applicant E  SEB response
: 11.      166                                                                11 dimensional seismic model to                      Staff finite element analysis.
11                            Why do the tuo new spectra provide                Applicant E  SAB response
: 12.      166 adequate assurance.                              Staff Staff      SEB respone,e
: 13.      166                                                                11                            How does the staff decide what constitutes an adequate audit on seismic design.
3 Response of instruments and equip-              Applicant    SEB/I D /IrcCSB 169                                                                11 1 84 ment to higher accelerations at                                response 172 173                                                                                              higher frequencies.
332 12                              Full scale shaking of structures.              Applicant    SEB renIonr.e
: 15.      196 204
 
                                                                                              ~
Enclosum No.1 ADDRESSED 10 ACTION REQUESTED ITI    TPANSCRIPT HI!G
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION PAGE      PAGE Seismic Scram Questions.                Applicant &    Eigineering,
: 16. 206          13 Staff 2G8                                                                            Reactor  Safety 'E.
Telfoni Respon 215          14 219 286-286      17-H4 14-#1      Effect of turbine building fitr on      Applicant E    ICEESB E APCSB
: 17. 237                                                                            Response 239                      safety related witchgear and diesel    Staff 243                      generators (possibly following an earthquake) 243-248      14-#2      What is the sensitivity of the plant    Applicant      RSB, CSB Io.                                                                                    ICESB, AR'S B to the following type of event: a safety related service, such as                        infornal corments component cooling water, is on line                    to IRi using one of the redundant trains.
The train in service fails and the backup component fails to take over as it is supposed to. What are the                                  S consequences and how much time is available to correct the situation.
This is not for a LOCA analysis, etc.
since the backup component is assumed to work under those conditions.
: 19. 248-250      15-#3      Staff mview applicant's analysis of      Staff
                                                                                ~
CSB & APCSS the Effect of prolonged total loss                      response of AC power.
 
  . . .      - ._    .-      . _ _ . .              _  -      -    =    . _ . _ .      -                                            -    .
:T t                                                    *                                  ,
Enclosum Ib.1 DESCRIFFION                                      ADDRESsw 'ID ACfION PIQUlhTED ITDi      TPAISCRIPT            MIrfING SUMARY PAGE                  PAGE 15-#4      Heat transfer during small IDCA.                  Applicant S  CSB E APCSB
: 20.        251-262                                                                                            response              '.
Staff 289 15-#5, 6  Intake stnicture sump pumps                      Applicant    APCSB response
: 21.        262 263                                capability of pumping adequately
                    ?c8                                during high waves. Criteria for design of pumps.
Seismic adequacy of auxiliary salt                Staff        SEB ms ponse
: 22.        263-268                  15-#5                                                                                                          -
water pipes buried in gruind, attached to buildings and circulating water conduit.'.                -
                                        )          -
16-#7    Flooding qualification of cables                  NA,          EIECSB inform 1 ~
: 23.        269-271                                                                            h conmena to LPM to auxiliary salt water pumps.                            t Hot shutdown panel.                              NA            EIECSB info ml .
24        272-275                  16-#8
                                                                                                            ,          connents to LPF3 16-#1    Effect of phosphate buildup on                    Applicant 6    APCSBJasrd          e
;        25.        275-283                                                                              Staff ' ,
turbine valve closum.                                      ,      ;  ^
Availability of statistics and infor _ ' s'Applicat 6          SEB, FTD rcfO ns'e < ,
: 26.        275-283                  16-#1 mation on pour plant equipnent                    Star                          ~
(especially turbine stop valves)                      .
functioning during seismic dis-                                            -
turbance'such as 1971 San Fe:mando and 1964 Alaska earthquakes.                      i          _
a
                                                                                    ,-    ,.  - . . ~                          ,    -      ,
 
_.                  - -.      - _-  -._ - - _ _ .                          . .  .= ..
t I        -
4
                                                                                                                    -                    t s          .
Enclosure No. 1                                                                                              -
MELTI!G
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIFFIG1                          ADDRESSII) TO  ACITON RIT)UESTED ITDi    7EANSCRIPT PAGE                PAGE                                ,
27,              284                          17-#2  Steam genemtor design envelope        Staff          SEB L MEB    m m LOCA reaction forces and jet                      msponse forces and seismic loading.
17-#3  Mxleling of mactor coplant pump ~    Staff          SEB & MEB
: 28.                284 under seismic loading.                              respcnse Itu many diesels am mquired for      Staff          E,IECSB                '
: 23.                314-315                    -
safe shutdown.
18      Questions about mliability of        Staff          E,IECSB
: 30.                315-318 326                                electric power.                                      msponse 327                                                                                                      .
19    Vulnerability of plant to mal-        Staff          APCSB response
: 31.                328-331 functions or failures in diesel fuel oil system (seems sane as Item 18 above).                                                7 332-350                    19    Irckout of power to ECCS valves.      None          EISCcB infornal
: 32.                                                                                                        carents to LIM
: 23.                354-355                      20-#2 Degree of ccupliance with 1974        Applicant      MTEB response ASME Section XI.
24                  355-359                      20-#3 Overheating and loss of c:>ntairment  Applicant 6    EIECSB S CSB penetmtion integrity, perhaps due    Staff          msper.se to failum in ncm safety related and/or non seismic electrical systems.
l l
i
 
Enclosum flo.1 ADDRESSED TO  ACTION REQUESTED
                  'IPNISCRIFr          MELTING StMMRY DESCRIPTIO!!
)        ITDi PAGE              PAGL Applicant &  APCSB & EIECSA' 358-359                -          Mom generally, can non safety systens                    msponse.
35                                                                                        Staff f
impair the pmper functioning of safety systems (see our ISAR question 9.1).
What measums are satisfactory for          Applicant E    EIECS3
: 36.        360-377              21                                                      Staff          response diagnosing the severity and course df accidents.
Staff          SEB, CSB, MEB,
: 37.        376-378              22-#6        ths staff reviewed similarities and                        PffEB response diffem nces between Indian Point, San Onofre and Diablo Canyon and is Diablo Canyon acceptable (water hanmer, feed-water rupture and containment liner bulge).
Staff        RSB respor.se
: 38.        378-379              22-#7        Does the staff feel one can rule out                                      7 slug flow and/or water br er effects for a IDCA downstmam of the steam generator as concluded in a Westinghouse topical. What is the review status of the topical.
APCSE response
: 39.        380                  22-#8        Staff review of insulation used and effect Staff on contairnent sunp.
1 l
 
___ -_= _ . _ .      -    -      -.                                          _- -                                                                                                              .                              ____. _ _ _ _    ..  .. _      - .
I i
I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            !                Enclosure No. 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ,
AvonESSED TO ACTIOff REQUESTr'D                                i
    ;                ITDi    TFN;SCRIFr                            MEETItG
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTIOri PACE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        l PAGE Contaiment purge valve limits in    NA            QAB informal ,                                    ,
: 40.      381                                                                22-#9                                                                                                                                                                                                                    1 Tech Specs.                                        coments to Contaiment purge valve design to    NA.            CSB infon:al
: 41.      381                                                                22 #9                                                                                                                                                                                          coments to LPM close under accident conditions.
: 47.      383-384                                                            22-#10                                                                                                                                    Possibility of filin Steam line bruk
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,hging a nnin steam isolation valve. NA            /PCSB infornal coments to LPM i
1 l
6 1
1 1
a l
4
 
(-                          .        (
ENC'DSURE NO. 2 DI.O'.". 'Ril0N SPD! ITL".s FPCM SAFLT( EVAWATION FIPORT                          ,
Action Description                                    Status                  Requested Item
* Meteorology                                    Reviewed 6 Accepted    SAB SER Input 1.
: 2.              Tsunami                                        Amiting Applicant    .
Response (s 4/1/75)
: 3.              Geology / Seismology                            Ongoing Problem
: 4.              Pipe Break Outside Containmnt                  Awaiti.y Applicant Response (N 4/1/75)
: 5.              Seismic Qualification of Category              Ongoing Problem I Electrical Equipnent
: 6.              Seven Grid Fuel Assembly Tests                Under Generic Review
: 7.              Single Pod Burst Tests                        Under Generic Review
: 8.              Ibel Surveillance                            Awaiting Applicant Comitment M                                                                      (s 4/15/75)
: 9.              Uncertainties In Therml Hydraulic            Under Generic Review Design                          ,
: 10.              Subco. p t Pressure Analyses                Amiting Applicant Respcnse ($ 4/1/75)
: 11.              lockout of Electric Power to ECCS            Staff Position          Answer ACRS Valves                                      Established and        Questions (See  1 Ibcumented              Enclosure 1) l
: 12.              ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria              Under Generic Review. Expect Applicant's Revised Analysis July '75 or later.
: 13.              Physical 6 Electrical Separation In          See Item 5 Above Solid State Protection System l
l 1
 
f.
                    .                                                    f Enclosure No. 2                                                                                                                          Action taatus                Requested
    .      Iter
* Dw.riptivi Reviewd 2nd            EICSB Verify l'4 .        Ph'/sical Sepamtion In Process                                    On Site Visit Accepted Subject Ar.alog Systern                                                  And Provide To Verification On' Site Visit            SER Input AWS                                        Under Generic
: 15.                                                    Review See Iten 5 Above      See Item 5 Above IE.          Environrental Qualification of Category I Electrical Equirrent APCSB Review          AAB Complete
: 17.          Consequences Of Fuel Cask Drop                                    Review. APCSB Cunplete . AAB Review In Progmss      S AAB Pmvide SER Input Review Cceplete 6      AAB S ET3B
: 18.        Cose Reduction In Case Of RHR 1Aak                                Pmvide SER Tcllowing A LOCA                          Acce:tedSubject ToApplicagtCon-        Input fimirg 15 F                            ,
Temperature Rise.
Awaiting Applicant's Confirnation.
(s 4/15/75)
Under Review          QAB Complete
: 19.        QA Ccmitnent To Recent WASH                                      Review And Doctments                                                        Provide SER Input Under Informal        AAB Conplete
  .                      Oil Teminal
              ~                                                      Review By AAB Tb      Inforval Ensure SER            Review
  *                                          -                        Conclusions Are Still Valid
                *Iten numbers are taken fror list of open items, Diablo Canyon SER Supplenent No.1 of January 31, 1975, Section 22.
t.
I 1
l l
l}}

Latest revision as of 04:04, 11 December 2021

Forwards List of Plant Open Items Resulting from ACRS Subcommittee 750218 & 19 Meetings & List of Actions Requested from Review Branches for Used in Preparing SER Suppl Prior to Next ACRS Meeting
ML20151G823
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/24/1975
From: Skovholt D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Schroeder F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20151G141 List:
References
FOIA-88-114, FOIA-88-138 NUDOCS 8804200153
Download: ML20151G823 (13)


Text

-

(

Distribution:y" Docket FileV E 2 d m5 LWR l-3 Reading IMR l-3 File Docket Hos. 50-275 / CMom and 50-323

[ns DPAllison VHWilson F. Schroeder, Acting Director for Division of Technical Review, NRR D. J. Skovbolt, Assistant Director for Quality Assurance & Operations, RL DIABID CANYON PRE ACRS SER SUPPLEMEN'IS We are preparing to issue SER supplement (s) on Diablo Canyon prior to the next ACRS Subconsnittee meeting. The supplement (s) will address questions raised at the last Subcomittee meeting as well as open items previously listed in the SER.

We received a great many questions from the ACRS Subconnittee at the last meeting on February 18-19. ihese questions are listed in Enclosure No. 1 along with references to their locations in the transcript and the mesting summary. The ACRS Subcocnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many of these items as practical prior to the next Subcommit-tee meeting.

The actions requested from the TR/RL review branches are listed. The appropriate branches to respond are listed in each case, based on our preliminazy evaluation of the questions. You may conclude that different branenes should respond in some cases. Copies of the transcript and

$!$ meeting summary will be delivered to tha appropriate review branches to aid you in this determination and to minimize possible misinterpretations.

While the Subconnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many items as possible, he did not specify which items should have a written response. Thic approach will expedite the next meeting and yet gives us the opportunity of choosing the best method of responoe in each case. The written responses will be included in an SER Supplement. For the others we will make a verbal response at the next meeting. In addition l

. to the recent questions from ACRS there are several open items identified j in the SER. These items and their status are listed in Enclosure No. 2. j l

1 1

J

/

8804200153 000414 PDR FOIA STEWARTOO-114 PDR s't

. (

F. Schrooder D. J. Skovholt The critical path item in this review is resolving the design basis earthquake issues. The latest schedule change request., which is in the approval chain, leads to a July full consnittee meeting in the following manners f SER Supplement Input to LPM 05/16/75*

SER Supplement Published 05/30/75 ,

ACRS Subcomunittee Meeting Mid-June ACRS Full re=mittee Meeting 07/11/75

  • This is not scheduled, but is necessary to meet the schedule.

It is recognized that the geology / seismology input cannot be ready until later.

r

! Ed Case has requested that we attempt to minimize the impact on fuel loading by requesting the ACRS to consider the Diablo Canyon application less the seismology / geology issues one teonth earlier than the schedule ,

described above. We plan to request the ACRS, at the next meeting, to l consider this request. In order to support the earlier ACRS meeting, we will need to meet, approximately, the following uchedule for those items which can be resolved prior to resolution of the design basis earthquake issues:

SER Supplement Input to LPM 04/10/75 SER Supplement Published 05/04/75

.ACRS Subcommittee Meeting Mid-May 1 j

" ACRS Full Committee Meeting 06/06/75

we plan to move forward with a 5/4/75 SER Supplement less geology / seismology and be prepared to meet with the ACRS in June. To this end, we request that you review the items in Enclosures 1 & 2 and determine which items ,

can be responded to in the supplement. I y ., t C.,

.d by R. C. D nmi'N R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light Water P,eactors Group 1 Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Diablo Canyon Open Items Resulting Frcrn ACRS Subcommittee Meeting of February 18 & 19, 1975
2. Diablo Canyon Open Items From Safety Evaluation

.e ric . * . RLgWR l-3 _ AL2 1-3 _RL: ._ L

,,,,,,,,,, DPAllWon:cis ODParr .

,,,,JtC x g, oav,, 3/,b{ /75 3/ 7[/',7 5 ,,,, .,,,3/;1.715... __ ___

r., uc.m < m,,. ,.m acu na *v........-ee............m..

(

(

~

F. Schroeder 3- I D. J. Skovholt cc W. Mcdonald, CPS R. Maccary L. Shao K. Kapur J. Knight W. Weinbrecht H. Denton -

W. Ganmill

' C. Stepp R. Hoffman R. McMullen  !

E. Markee J. Fairobent l G. Hulman E. Rawkins M. Fliegel lj B. Grimes l1 L. Soffer V. Stallo T. Ippolito D. Mcdonald D. Ross T. Novak L. Phillips R. Todesco

$ C. Iong D. Fischer 1

V. Benaroya R. Bellamy '

G. Lainas l W. Milstead I 1

R. Vollmer i A. Garland l I

1 I

1 or rica w

.s.

g W e N A bl( k cats >

r., Au:.us (ac,. p.sn Arcu creo

  • v. .. .ov a = = = = =r r ai via e or rie si i.n.e s.....

[ [

DiCWSURE NO.1 DIABW CANYON OPDJ ITDiS RESULTDG FROM ACRS SUBCOt0ETTEE MELTI?E OF I'EBRUARY 18 6 19, 1975 1

?

. , i

! L a

e

  • I 3

ITD1 TRANSCRIPT MELTIIE SLM4ARY DESCRIPTION ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUE E

' PAGE PACE

1. 160-161 10 Will the turbine valves close reliably Applicant APCSB inform 1 on loss of power during an earthquake. cormient to LPi
2. 162 10 Justify in detail 0.4g in light of Applicant E SAB re ponse i

apparent discrepancies. Staff m, 4

l 3. 162 10 What would be peak accelerations Applicant & SAB res;ons.

with other cinrent trethods. Staff

4. 162 10 What would be the effect on the Applicant E SAB E SIIA rv ;;onse plant of a small magnitude earth- Staff qudke with high accelerations.

. 5. 163 10 When the peak acceleration has been Applicant & SAB response

' detennined would it be possible Staff to derive a confidence level for it.

1 6. 163 10 What are the naximum observed and Applicant E SAB response predicted intensities at this site Staff and the peak accelerution resulting frun these. 7

7. 164 10 Provide USGS open file report Applicant E SAB provide to 74-272 to ACRS. Staff LPM i 8. 165 - If any additional interpretations Applicant E SAB response of data exist provide and/or Staff I describe to ACRS. ,

l

Enclosure No. 1 DESCRIPTION ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUESTED ITDi 'GANSCRIPT MEETIIG

SUMMARY

PAGE PAGE 10 Consider the possibility that the Applicant E SAB E SEB

9. 165 response newer earthquakes do more to the Staff stnicture than the original design, Reservations on using Parkfield earthquake.

11 What kind of errors can arise in Applicant & SEB response

10. 165 seismic design analysis. Staff Wint are the errors going from 1 Applicant E SEB response
11. 166 11 dimensional seismic model to Staff finite element analysis.

11 Why do the tuo new spectra provide Applicant E SAB response

12. 166 adequate assurance. Staff Staff SEB respone,e
13. 166 11 How does the staff decide what constitutes an adequate audit on seismic design.

3 Response of instruments and equip- Applicant SEB/I D /IrcCSB 169 11 1 84 ment to higher accelerations at response 172 173 higher frequencies.

332 12 Full scale shaking of structures. Applicant SEB renIonr.e

15. 196 204

~

Enclosum No.1 ADDRESSED 10 ACTION REQUESTED ITI TPANSCRIPT HI!G

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION PAGE PAGE Seismic Scram Questions. Applicant & Eigineering,

16. 206 13 Staff 2G8 Reactor Safety 'E.

Telfoni Respon 215 14 219 286-286 17-H4 14-#1 Effect of turbine building fitr on Applicant E ICEESB E APCSB

17. 237 Response 239 safety related witchgear and diesel Staff 243 generators (possibly following an earthquake) 243-248 14-#2 What is the sensitivity of the plant Applicant RSB, CSB Io. ICESB, AR'S B to the following type of event: a safety related service, such as infornal corments component cooling water, is on line to IRi using one of the redundant trains.

The train in service fails and the backup component fails to take over as it is supposed to. What are the S consequences and how much time is available to correct the situation.

This is not for a LOCA analysis, etc.

since the backup component is assumed to work under those conditions.

19. 248-250 15-#3 Staff mview applicant's analysis of Staff

~

CSB & APCSS the Effect of prolonged total loss response of AC power.

. . . - ._ .- . _ _ . . _ - - = . _ . _ . - - .

T t * ,

Enclosum Ib.1 DESCRIFFION ADDRESsw 'ID ACfION PIQUlhTED ITDi TPAISCRIPT MIrfING SUMARY PAGE PAGE 15-#4 Heat transfer during small IDCA. Applicant S CSB E APCSB

20. 251-262 response '.

Staff 289 15-#5, 6 Intake stnicture sump pumps Applicant APCSB response

21. 262 263 capability of pumping adequately

?c8 during high waves. Criteria for design of pumps.

Seismic adequacy of auxiliary salt Staff SEB ms ponse

22. 263-268 15-#5 -

water pipes buried in gruind, attached to buildings and circulating water conduit.'. -

) -

16-#7 Flooding qualification of cables NA, EIECSB inform 1 ~

23. 269-271 h conmena to LPM to auxiliary salt water pumps. t Hot shutdown panel. NA EIECSB info ml .

24 272-275 16-#8

, connents to LPF3 16-#1 Effect of phosphate buildup on Applicant 6 APCSBJasrd e

25. 275-283 Staff ' ,

turbine valve closum. ,  ; ^

Availability of statistics and infor _ ' s'Applicat 6 SEB, FTD rcfO ns'e < ,

26. 275-283 16-#1 mation on pour plant equipnent Star ~

(especially turbine stop valves) .

functioning during seismic dis- -

turbance'such as 1971 San Fe:mando and 1964 Alaska earthquakes. i _

a

,- ,. - . . ~ , - ,

_. - -. - _- -._ - - _ _ . . . .= ..

t I -

4

- t s .

Enclosure No. 1 -

MELTI!G

SUMMARY

DESCRIFFIG1 ADDRESSII) TO ACITON RIT)UESTED ITDi 7EANSCRIPT PAGE PAGE ,

27, 284 17-#2 Steam genemtor design envelope Staff SEB L MEB m m LOCA reaction forces and jet msponse forces and seismic loading.

17-#3 Mxleling of mactor coplant pump ~ Staff SEB & MEB

28. 284 under seismic loading. respcnse Itu many diesels am mquired for Staff E,IECSB '
23. 314-315 -

safe shutdown.

18 Questions about mliability of Staff E,IECSB

30. 315-318 326 electric power. msponse 327 .

19 Vulnerability of plant to mal- Staff APCSB response

31. 328-331 functions or failures in diesel fuel oil system (seems sane as Item 18 above). 7 332-350 19 Irckout of power to ECCS valves. None EISCcB infornal
32. carents to LIM
23. 354-355 20-#2 Degree of ccupliance with 1974 Applicant MTEB response ASME Section XI.

24 355-359 20-#3 Overheating and loss of c:>ntairment Applicant 6 EIECSB S CSB penetmtion integrity, perhaps due Staff msper.se to failum in ncm safety related and/or non seismic electrical systems.

l l

i

Enclosum flo.1 ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUESTED

'IPNISCRIFr MELTING StMMRY DESCRIPTIO!!

) ITDi PAGE PAGL Applicant & APCSB & EIECSA' 358-359 - Mom generally, can non safety systens msponse.

35 Staff f

impair the pmper functioning of safety systems (see our ISAR question 9.1).

What measums are satisfactory for Applicant E EIECS3

36. 360-377 21 Staff response diagnosing the severity and course df accidents.

Staff SEB, CSB, MEB,

37. 376-378 22-#6 ths staff reviewed similarities and PffEB response diffem nces between Indian Point, San Onofre and Diablo Canyon and is Diablo Canyon acceptable (water hanmer, feed-water rupture and containment liner bulge).

Staff RSB respor.se

38. 378-379 22-#7 Does the staff feel one can rule out 7 slug flow and/or water br er effects for a IDCA downstmam of the steam generator as concluded in a Westinghouse topical. What is the review status of the topical.

APCSE response

39. 380 22-#8 Staff review of insulation used and effect Staff on contairnent sunp.

1 l

___ -_= _ . _ . - - -. _- - . ____. _ _ _ _ .. .. _ - .

I i

I

! Enclosure No. 1 ,

AvonESSED TO ACTIOff REQUESTr'D i

ITDi TFN;SCRIFr MEETItG

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTIOri PACE l PAGE Contaiment purge valve limits in NA QAB informal , ,

40. 381 22-#9 1 Tech Specs. coments to Contaiment purge valve design to NA. CSB infon:al
41. 381 22 #9 coments to LPM close under accident conditions.
47. 383-384 22-#10 Possibility of filin Steam line bruk

,hging a nnin steam isolation valve. NA /PCSB infornal coments to LPM i

1 l

6 1

1 1

a l

4

(- . (

ENC'DSURE NO. 2 DI.O'.". 'Ril0N SPD! ITL".s FPCM SAFLT( EVAWATION FIPORT ,

Action Description Status Requested Item

  • Meteorology Reviewed 6 Accepted SAB SER Input 1.
2. Tsunami Amiting Applicant .

Response (s 4/1/75)

3. Geology / Seismology Ongoing Problem
4. Pipe Break Outside Containmnt Awaiti.y Applicant Response (N 4/1/75)
5. Seismic Qualification of Category Ongoing Problem I Electrical Equipnent
6. Seven Grid Fuel Assembly Tests Under Generic Review
7. Single Pod Burst Tests Under Generic Review
8. Ibel Surveillance Awaiting Applicant Comitment M (s 4/15/75)
9. Uncertainties In Therml Hydraulic Under Generic Review Design ,
10. Subco. p t Pressure Analyses Amiting Applicant Respcnse ($ 4/1/75)
11. lockout of Electric Power to ECCS Staff Position Answer ACRS Valves Established and Questions (See 1 Ibcumented Enclosure 1) l
12. ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria Under Generic Review. Expect Applicant's Revised Analysis July '75 or later.
13. Physical 6 Electrical Separation In See Item 5 Above Solid State Protection System l

l 1

f.

. f Enclosure No. 2 Action taatus Requested

. Iter

  • Dw.riptivi Reviewd 2nd EICSB Verify l'4 . Ph'/sical Sepamtion In Process On Site Visit Accepted Subject Ar.alog Systern And Provide To Verification On' Site Visit SER Input AWS Under Generic
15. Review See Iten 5 Above See Item 5 Above IE. Environrental Qualification of Category I Electrical Equirrent APCSB Review AAB Complete
17. Consequences Of Fuel Cask Drop Review. APCSB Cunplete . AAB Review In Progmss S AAB Pmvide SER Input Review Cceplete 6 AAB S ET3B
18. Cose Reduction In Case Of RHR 1Aak Pmvide SER Tcllowing A LOCA Acce:tedSubject ToApplicagtCon- Input fimirg 15 F ,

Temperature Rise.

Awaiting Applicant's Confirnation.

(s 4/15/75)

Under Review QAB Complete

19. QA Ccmitnent To Recent WASH Review And Doctments Provide SER Input Under Informal AAB Conplete

. Oil Teminal

~ Review By AAB Tb Inforval Ensure SER Review

  • - Conclusions Are Still Valid
  • Iten numbers are taken fror list of open items, Diablo Canyon SER Supplenent No.1 of January 31, 1975, Section 22.

t.

I 1

l l

l