ML20151G823
| ML20151G823 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1975 |
| From: | Skovholt D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Schroeder F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G141 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-114, FOIA-88-138 NUDOCS 8804200153 | |
| Download: ML20151G823 (13) | |
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Distribution:y" Docket FileV E 2 d m5 LWR l-3 Reading IMR l-3 File Docket Hos.
50-275 /
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[ns and 50-323 DPAllison VHWilson F. Schroeder, Acting Director for Division of Technical Review, NRR D. J. Skovbolt, Assistant Director for Quality Assurance & Operations, RL DIABID CANYON PRE ACRS SER SUPPLEMEN'IS We are preparing to issue SER supplement (s) on Diablo Canyon prior to the next ACRS Subconsnittee meeting. The supplement (s) will address questions raised at the last Subcomittee meeting as well as open items previously listed in the SER.
We received a great many questions from the ACRS Subconnittee at the last meeting on February 18-19.
ihese questions are listed in Enclosure No. 1 along with references to their locations in the transcript and the mesting summary. The ACRS Subcocnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many of these items as practical prior to the next Subcommit-tee meeting.
The actions requested from the TR/RL review branches are listed. The appropriate branches to respond are listed in each case, based on our preliminazy evaluation of the questions. You may conclude that different branenes should respond in some cases. Copies of the transcript and meeting summary will be delivered to tha appropriate review branches to aid you in this determination and to minimize possible misinterpretations.
While the Subconnittee Chairman requested that we respond in writing to as many items as possible, he did not specify which items should have a written response. Thic approach will expedite the next meeting and yet gives us the opportunity of choosing the best method of responoe in each case. The written responses will be included in an SER Supplement.
For the others we will make a verbal response at the next meeting.
In addition l
to the recent questions from ACRS there are several open items identified j
in the SER.
These items and their status are listed in Enclosure No. 2.
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8804200153 000414 PDR FOIA STEWARTOO-114 PDR s't
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F. Schrooder D. J. Skovholt The critical path item in this review is resolving the design basis earthquake issues. The latest schedule change request., which is in the approval chain, leads to a July full consnittee meeting in the following manners f
SER Supplement Input to LPM 05/16/75*
SER Supplement Published 05/30/75 ACRS Subcomunittee Meeting Mid-June ACRS Full re=mittee Meeting 07/11/75
- This is not scheduled, but is necessary to meet the schedule.
It is recognized that the geology / seismology input cannot be ready until later.
r Ed Case has requested that we attempt to minimize the impact on fuel loading by requesting the ACRS to consider the Diablo Canyon application less the seismology / geology issues one teonth earlier than the schedule described above. We plan to request the ACRS, at the next meeting, to consider this request.
In order to support the earlier ACRS meeting, we will need to meet, approximately, the following uchedule for those items which can be resolved prior to resolution of the design basis earthquake issues:
SER Supplement Input to LPM 04/10/75 SER Supplement Published 05/04/75 1
.ACRS Subcommittee Meeting Mid-May j
ACRS Full Committee Meeting 06/06/75 we plan to move forward with a 5/4/75 SER Supplement less geology / seismology and be prepared to meet with the ACRS in June. To this end, we request that you review the items in Enclosures 1 & 2 and determine which items can be responded to in the supplement.
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., t C., :.d by R. C. D nmi'N R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Light Water P,eactors Group 1 Division of Reactor Licensing
Enclosures:
1.
Diablo Canyon Open Items Resulting Frcrn ACRS Subcommittee Meeting of February 18 & 19, 1975 2.
Diablo Canyon Open Items From Safety Evaluation
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F. Schroeder 3-D. J. Skovholt cc W. Mcdonald, CPS R. Maccary L. Shao K. Kapur J. Knight W. Weinbrecht H. Denton W. Ganmill C. Stepp R. Hoffman R. McMullen E. Markee J. Fairobent l
G. Hulman lj E. Rawkins M. Fliegel B. Grimes l1 L. Soffer V. Stallo T. Ippolito D. Mcdonald D. Ross T. Novak L. Phillips R. Todesco C. Iong D. Fischer V. Benaroya R. Bellamy G. Lainas W. Milstead R. Vollmer i
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DiCWSURE NO.1 DIABW CANYON OPDJ ITDiS RESULTDG FROM ACRS SUBCOt0ETTEE MELTI?E OF I'EBRUARY 18 6 19, 1975
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ITD1 TRANSCRIPT MELTIIE SLM4ARY DESCRIPTION ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUE E l
PACE PAGE 1.
160-161 10 Will the turbine valves close reliably Applicant APCSB inform 1 on loss of power during an earthquake.
cormient to LPi 2.
162 10 Justify in detail 0.4g in light of Applicant E SAB re ponse apparent discrepancies.
Staff m,
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162 10 What would be peak accelerations Applicant &
SAB res;ons.
with other cinrent trethods.
Staff 4.
162 10 What would be the effect on the Applicant E SAB E SIIA rv ;;onse plant of a small magnitude earth-Staff qudke with high accelerations.
5.
163 10 When the peak acceleration has been Applicant &
SAB response detennined would it be possible Staff to derive a confidence level for it.
1 6.
163 10 What are the naximum observed and Applicant E SAB response predicted intensities at this site Staff and the peak accelerution resulting frun these.
7 7.
164 10 Provide USGS open file report Applicant E SAB provide to 74-272 to ACRS.
Staff LPM i
8.
165 If any additional interpretations Applicant E SAB response of data exist provide and/or Staff I
describe to ACRS.
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. Enclosure No. 1 ITDi
'GANSCRIPT MEETIIG
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUESTED PAGE PAGE 9.
165 10 Consider the possibility that the Applicant E SAB E SEB newer earthquakes do more to the Staff response stnicture than the original design, Reservations on using Parkfield earthquake.
10.
165 11 What kind of errors can arise in Applicant &
SEB response seismic design analysis.
Staff 11.
166 11 Wint are the errors going from 1 Applicant E SEB response dimensional seismic model to Staff finite element analysis.
12.
166 11 Why do the tuo new spectra provide Applicant E SAB response Staff adequate assurance.
13.
166 11 How does the staff decide what Staff SEB respone,e constitutes an adequate audit on seismic design.
3 1 84 169 11 Response of instruments and equip-Applicant SEB/I D /IrcCSB ment to higher accelerations at response 172 173 higher frequencies.
332 15.
196 12 Full scale shaking of structures.
Applicant SEB renIonr.e 204
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. Enclosum No.1 ITI TPANSCRIPT HI!G
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION ADDRESSED 10 ACTION REQUESTED PAGE PAGE 16.
206 13 Seismic Scram Questions.
Applicant &
Eigineering, Staff Reactor Safety 'E.
2G8 Telfoni Respon 215 14 219 286-286 17-H4 17.
237 14-#1 Effect of turbine building fitr on Applicant E ICEESB E APCSB 239 safety related witchgear and diesel Staff
Response
243 generators (possibly following an earthquake)
Io.
243-248 14-#2 What is the sensitivity of the plant Applicant RSB, CSB to the following type of event: a ICESB, AR'S B safety related service, such as infornal corments component cooling water, is on line to IRi using one of the redundant trains.
The train in service fails and the backup component fails to take over as it is supposed to.
What are the S
consequences and how much time is available to correct the situation.
This is not for a LOCA analysis, etc.
since the backup component is assumed to work under those conditions.
19.
248-250 15-#3 Staff mview applicant's analysis of Staff CSB & APCSS the Effect of prolonged total loss
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response of AC power.
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,1 Enclosum Ib.1 ITDi TPAISCRIPT MIrfING SUMARY DESCRIFFION ADDRESsw 'ID ACfION PIQUlhTED PAGE PAGE 20.
251-262 15-#4 Heat transfer during small IDCA.
Applicant S CSB E APCSB Staff response 289 21.
262 15-#5, 6 Intake stnicture sump pumps Applicant APCSB response 263 capability of pumping adequately p
?c8 during high waves. Criteria for design of pumps.
22.
263-268 15-#5 Seismic adequacy of auxiliary salt Staff SEB ms ponse water pipes buried in gruind, attached to buildings and circulating water conduit.'.
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269-271 16-#7 Flooding qualification of cables NA, EIECSB inform 1 ~
to auxiliary salt water pumps.
h conmena to LPM t
24 272-275 16-#8 Hot shutdown panel.
NA EIECSB info ml.
connents to LPF3 25.
275-283 16-#1 Effect of phosphate buildup on Applicant 6 APCSBJasrd e turbine valve closum.
Staff ',
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26.
275-283 16-#1 Availability of statistics and infor _ ' s'Applicat 6 SEB, FTD rcfO ns'e <,
mation on pour plant equipnent Star
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functioning during seismic dis-(especially turbine stop valves) turbance'such as 1971 San Fe:mando and 1964 Alaska earthquakes.
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s Enclosure No. 1 ITDi 7EANSCRIPT MELTI!G
SUMMARY
DESCRIFFIG1 ADDRESSII) TO ACITON RIT)UESTED PAGE PAGE 27, 284 17-#2 Steam genemtor design envelope Staff SEB L MEB m
m LOCA reaction forces and jet msponse forces and seismic loading.
28.
284 17-#3 Mxleling of mactor coplant pump ~
Staff SEB & MEB under seismic loading.
respcnse 23.
314-315 Itu many diesels am mquired for Staff E,IECSB safe shutdown.
30.
315-318 18 Questions about mliability of Staff E,IECSB 326 electric power.
msponse 327 31.
328-331 19 Vulnerability of plant to mal-Staff APCSB response functions or failures in diesel fuel oil system (seems sane as Item 18 above).
7 32.
332-350 19 Irckout of power to ECCS valves.
None EISCcB infornal carents to LIM 23.
354-355 20-#2 Degree of ccupliance with 1974 Applicant MTEB response ASME Section XI.
24 355-359 20-#3 Overheating and loss of c:>ntairment Applicant 6 EIECSB S CSB penetmtion integrity, perhaps due Staff msper.se to failum in ncm safety related and/or non seismic electrical systems.
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l Enclosum flo.1 ADDRESSED TO ACTION REQUESTED
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ITDi
'IPNISCRIFr MELTING StMMRY DESCRIPTIO!!
PAGE PAGL 35 358-359 Mom generally, can non safety systens Applicant &
APCSB & EIECSA' impair the pmper functioning of Staff msponse.
f safety systems (see our ISAR question 9.1).
What measums are satisfactory for Applicant E EIECS3 36.
360-377 21 Staff response diagnosing the severity and course df accidents.
37.
376-378 22-#6 ths staff reviewed similarities and Staff SEB, CSB, MEB, diffem nces between Indian Point, San PffEB response Onofre and Diablo Canyon and is Diablo Canyon acceptable (water hanmer, feed-water rupture and containment liner bulge).
38.
378-379 22-#7 Does the staff feel one can rule out Staff RSB respor.se 7 slug flow and/or water br er effects for a IDCA downstmam of the steam generator as concluded in a Westinghouse topical. What is the review status of the topical.
Staff review of insulation used and effect Staff APCSE response t
39.
380 22-#8 on contairnent sunp.
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I Enclosure No. 1 ITDi TFN;SCRIFr MEETItG
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTIOri AvonESSED TO ACTIOff REQUESTr'D i
l PAGE PACE 40.
381 22-#9 Contaiment purge valve limits in NA QAB informal,
coments to 1
Tech Specs.
41.
381 22 #9 Contaiment purge valve design to NA.
CSB infon:al close under accident conditions.
coments to LPM 47.
383-384 22-#10 Possibility of filin Steam line bruk
,hging a nnin steam isolation valve.
NA
/PCSB infornal coments to LPM r
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ENC'DSURE NO. 2 DI.O'.". 'Ril0N SPD! ITL".s FPCM SAFLT( EVAWATION FIPORT Action Item
- Description Status Requested 1.
Meteorology Reviewed 6 Accepted SAB SER Input 2.
Tsunami Amiting Applicant Response (s 4/1/75) 3.
Geology / Seismology Ongoing Problem 4.
Pipe Break Outside Containmnt Awaiti.y Applicant Response (N 4/1/75) 5.
Seismic Qualification of Category Ongoing Problem I Electrical Equipnent 6.
Seven Grid Fuel Assembly Tests Under Generic Review 7.
Single Pod Burst Tests Under Generic Review 8.
Ibel Surveillance Awaiting Applicant Comitment M
(s 4/15/75) 9.
Uncertainties In Therml Hydraulic Under Generic Review Design 10.
Subco. p t Pressure Analyses Amiting Applicant Respcnse ($ 4/1/75) 11.
lockout of Electric Power to ECCS Staff Position Answer ACRS Valves Established and Questions (See 1
Ibcumented )
12.
ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria Under Generic Review. Expect Applicant's Revised Analysis July '75 or later.
13.
Physical 6 Electrical Separation In See Item 5 Above Solid State Protection System l
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f Enclosure No. 2 Action taatus Requested Iter
- Dw.riptivi Reviewd 2nd EICSB Verify l'4.
Ph'/sical Sepamtion In Process Accepted Subject On Site Visit Ar.alog Systern To Verification On' And Provide Site Visit SER Input Under Generic 15.
AWS Review IE.
Environrental Qualification of See Iten 5 Above See Item 5 Above Category I Electrical Equirrent APCSB Review AAB Complete 17.
Consequences Of Fuel Cask Drop Cunplete. AAB Review. APCSB Review In Progmss S AAB Pmvide SER Input 18.
Cose Reduction In Case Of RHR 1Aak Review Cceplete 6 AAB S ET3B Tcllowing A LOCA Acce:tedSubject Pmvide SER ToApplicagtCon-Input fimirg 15 F Temperature Rise.
Awaiting Applicant's Confirnation.
(s 4/15/75) 19.
QA Ccmitnent To Recent WASH Under Review QAB Complete Review And Doctments Provide SER Input Oil Teminal Under Informal AAB Conplete Review By AAB Tb Inforval
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Ensure SER Review Conclusions Are Still Valid
- Iten numbers are taken fror list of open items, Diablo Canyon SER Supplenent No.1 of January 31, 1975, Section 22.
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