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| - direction (a number of walls also have horizontal bond beams with reinforcing steel). The licensee's analysis employed finite element orthotropic plate bending models. The reduction in the wall rigidity | | - direction (a number of walls also have horizontal bond beams with reinforcing steel). The licensee's analysis employed finite element orthotropic plate bending models. The reduction in the wall rigidity |
| - was accounted for by using Rranson's equation. In the horizontal direction, if the moment exceeded the unreinforced allowable moment, the section was assumed to be cracked and unable to transmit any load (i.e., the element stiffness in the horizontal direction is set to zero, contribution from grout cores or joint reinforcement was neglected). Rased on the discussion in Appendix B of the TER and the review of sample calculations, the licensee's plate analysis approach is found to be acceptable. | | - was accounted for by using Rranson's equation. In the horizontal direction, if the moment exceeded the unreinforced allowable moment, the section was assumed to be cracked and unable to transmit any load (i.e., the element stiffness in the horizontal direction is set to zero, contribution from grout cores or joint reinforcement was neglected). Rased on the discussion in Appendix B of the TER and the review of sample calculations, the licensee's plate analysis approach is found to be acceptable. |
| : 2. In a letter dated December 31, 1985, the licensee informed the staff that three walls in the cable spreading room (194.17, 194.?1 and 194.22) will not qualify for the tornado depressurization loads without considerable modification. Such a modification would require extensive relocation of safety-related cable and conduit to provide access for the structural modification. This would recuire a station outage, involve a lengthy construction schedule, and raise concerns about the extensive interruptions to safety systems. | | : 2. In a {{letter dated|date=December 31, 1985|text=letter dated December 31, 1985}}, the licensee informed the staff that three walls in the cable spreading room (194.17, 194.?1 and 194.22) will not qualify for the tornado depressurization loads without considerable modification. Such a modification would require extensive relocation of safety-related cable and conduit to provide access for the structural modification. This would recuire a station outage, involve a lengthy construction schedule, and raise concerns about the extensive interruptions to safety systems. |
| The above walls only affect safety-related components in the cable spreading room (CSR). The alternate shutdown system backs un the affected components assuming a fire in the CSR. Since a masonry wall collapse is no more damaging than a fire, safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained. Therefore, in lieu of modifyino these walls, the licensee has made procedural chances which require the in Miation of a plant shutdown upon receipt of a tornado alert from the area load dispatcher. The procedure advises the operators that shutdown via the alternate shutdown process may be required. | | The above walls only affect safety-related components in the cable spreading room (CSR). The alternate shutdown system backs un the affected components assuming a fire in the CSR. Since a masonry wall collapse is no more damaging than a fire, safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained. Therefore, in lieu of modifyino these walls, the licensee has made procedural chances which require the in Miation of a plant shutdown upon receipt of a tornado alert from the area load dispatcher. The procedure advises the operators that shutdown via the alternate shutdown process may be required. |
| In addition, the licensee also noted that the critical load, a tornado, is a unidirectional load which would cause a failure away from CSR. The walls are qualified as is to withstand all other design basis loads (i.e., seismic). Thus, even in the event of wall failure, the safety-related components in the CSR would be expected to remain essentially intact. Based on the above discussion, the staff finds the licensee's approach acceptable. | | In addition, the licensee also noted that the critical load, a tornado, is a unidirectional load which would cause a failure away from CSR. The walls are qualified as is to withstand all other design basis loads (i.e., seismic). Thus, even in the event of wall failure, the safety-related components in the CSR would be expected to remain essentially intact. Based on the above discussion, the staff finds the licensee's approach acceptable. |
|
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212C2921999-09-16016 September 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Code Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20209C4731999-07-0707 July 1999 Addendum to SE on Proposed Transfer of Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20196H2451999-06-29029 June 1999 SER Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative in Relief Request PRR-13,rev 2.Staff Determined That Proposed Alternative Provides Insufficient Info to Determine Adequacy of Scope of Implementation ML20209A8901999-06-28028 June 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-573 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K3431999-06-15015 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water System Piping for Plant ML20207E7471999-05-27027 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Request Re Reduction of IGSCC Insp of Category D Welds Due to Implementation of HWC to License DPR-35 ML20206M1971999-05-11011 May 1999 SER Accepting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in ASME Code Class 3 Salt Svc Water Piping at Plant ML20153D3901998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting 970707 Request to Use Guidance in GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water Sys Piping for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20237E2251998-08-26026 August 1998 Suppl & Revs to SE for Amend 173 for Pigrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J3741998-03-19019 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Evaluate Elevated Tailpipe Temp on Safety Relief Valve SRV 203-3B ML20217D6431997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Class 3 SSW Piping for Pilgrim ML20137D0511997-03-20020 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Third 10 Yr Interval ISI Program & Requests for Relief ML20134K2621997-02-10010 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee one-time Request to Defer Insp of N2A & N2B safe-end Welds,Per GL 88-01 ML20129H3901996-10-30030 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Re Facility IPE Submittal for Internal Events & Internal Flood ML20129F4031996-09-27027 September 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief ML20059C3751993-12-29029 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption & Approving Alternative DAC Values for Use in Place of Generic Value for Radionuclides Specified in App B to 10CFR20.1001 - 20.2402 ML20058G2781993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting IST Program Relief Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) & Approving Alternatives Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(iv) ML20056F5301993-08-11011 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to Reg Guide 1.97, BWR Neutron Flux Monitoring. Criteria of NEDO-31558, Acceptable for Current BWR Operating License & Const Permit Holders ML20127P5431993-01-25025 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 145 to License DPR-35 ML20126F8121992-12-23023 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Facility Design W/Respect to RG 1.97 ML20244C2901989-06-0606 June 1989 Draft Safety Evaluation of Util Compliance W/Atws Rule (10CFR50.62) Re Alternate Rod Injection & Recirculation Pump Trip Sys.Alternate Rod Injection Sys Not in Compliance W/Atws Rule Re Diversity ML20235V7341989-03-0303 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Revised Temp Profile,Per GE EAS-98-0887, Drywell Temp Analysis for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20154P6611988-09-28028 September 1988 SER Approving Rev 3 to Plant Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) ML20151D0551988-07-18018 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20151E2041988-07-15015 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Incorporation of Reactor Protection Sys Circuitry Into Tech Specs & Deletion of 6- Month Channel Functional Test ML20154J9101988-05-17017 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Technical Evaluations & Acceptance Criteria Re Fire door-to-frame,frame-to-wall & Anchor Bolt Irregularities ML20155F8871988-03-24024 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Internal Smoke Seals for Conduits Passing Through Fire Barriers from One Fire Area to Another Consistent W/Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 & Acceptable,Per Util 880203 Submittal ML20236Y3991987-11-10010 November 1987 SER Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1, Part 1 Re Equipment Classification.Salp Input Encl ML20236V3081987-10-28028 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Acceptance of Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Updated Through Rev 1 on Interim Basis. App D to Technical Evaluation Rept EGG-PHY-7725 Encl ML20235M1611987-09-30030 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870708 Proposed Change to Tech Specs Concerning LPCI Subsystem Testing ML20236Y3591987-07-22022 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Modify Standby Liquid Control Sys Tech Specs,Per Requirements of ATWS rule,10CFR50.62.C.4.SALP Input Also Encl ML20206G8141987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util Requests for Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements for Surface & Volumetric Exam of RHR Sys HX Nozzles & Exam of 100% Required Vol for nozzle-to-vessel Welds.Requests Granted W/Listed Conditions ML20215H9581987-03-17017 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Tech Spec Change Re Control Room High Efficiency Air Filter Sys.Salp Input Encl ML20212L8941987-01-15015 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Vacuum Breaker Analysis Performed to Predict Impact Velocities & Resulting Stresses ML20236Y3501986-09-0303 September 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 850813 Response Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 on post-trip Review.Salp Input Encl ML20212N8401986-08-22022 August 1986 SER Supporting Util Response to Item 1.C of NRC Re No Specific Time Limit Necessary on Containment Purging & Venting During Reactor Operation ML20155F8931986-08-20020 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831116 Request for Four Exemptions from 10CFR50,App R,Section Iii.G.Level of Fire Safety in Listed Fire Zones Equivalent to Safety Achieved by Compliance W/Requirements ML20206L9511986-08-12012 August 1986 Safety Evaluation on Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,.3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 Re Maint & Test Procedures for safety-related Equipment & on-line Functional Testing of Reactor Trip Sys.Responses Acceptable ML20205C0621986-07-31031 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1, Post-Trip Review. BWR Parameter List Encl ML20236Y3361986-07-10010 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831107 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2 on post-trip Review & Data & Info Capability ML20199L2541986-07-0101 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 96 to License DPR-35 ML20206D1741986-06-0606 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Reevaluation & Testing Requirements in Items 2(b) & 3 Concerning Masonry Wall Design ML20203N3801986-04-30030 April 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 840625,1204,06,850521 & 1011 Responses to Generic Ltr 86-04 Concerning Recombiner Capability Requirements of 10CFR50.44(c)(3)(ii).Facility Does Not Require Recombiner Capability ML20236Y3711986-04-0101 April 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Testing of Reactor Trip Sys & All Other safety-related Components,Respectively. SALP Input Also Encl ML20137V7621986-02-12012 February 1986 SER Supporting Partial Relief from Generic Ltr 84-11 Re Performance of Visual Exam of Reactor Coolant Piping ML20135E5211985-09-11011 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting post-trip Review Program & Procedures ML20134H3571985-08-13013 August 1985 Safety Evaluation Granting 821203,0804,831201,840628 & 850212 Relief Requests from ASME Code Requirements of Inservice Insp Program,Except for Items B9.10-B9.40 & C5.10-C5.32 Re Pressure Retaining Welds ML20140G1431985-07-0505 July 1985 Interim Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-36 Re NUREG-0737 Tech Specs ML20129C6901985-05-16016 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Re Dcrdr.Supplemental Rept Addressing Concerns Identified Necessary to Meet Requirements of NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 ML20206K6161985-03-13013 March 1985 SER Supporting Proposed Tech Spec Change to Permit Temporary Increase in Main Steam Line High Radiation Scram & Isolation Setpoints to Facilitate Testing of Hydrogen Addition Water Chemistry.Related Documentation Encl 1999-09-16
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217E3021999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station.With ML20212C2921999-09-16016 September 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Code Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216F3511999-09-0808 September 1999 ISI Summary Rept for Refuel Outage 12 at Pnps ML20216E6881999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20210R3401999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20209C4731999-07-0707 July 1999 Addendum to SE on Proposed Transfer of Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209H8251999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Commission with Evaluation of & Recommendations for Improvement in Processes Used in Staff Review & Approval of Applications for Transfer of Operating Licenses of TMI-1 & Pilgrim Station ML20209E6191999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196H2451999-06-29029 June 1999 SER Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative in Relief Request PRR-13,rev 2.Staff Determined That Proposed Alternative Provides Insufficient Info to Determine Adequacy of Scope of Implementation ML20209A8901999-06-28028 June 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-573 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209B9861999-06-23023 June 1999 Rev 13A to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR for Cycle 13 ML20217N9061999-06-21021 June 1999 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period of 970422-990621 ML20195K3431999-06-15015 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water System Piping for Plant ML20195G8231999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Pnps.With ML20207E7471999-05-27027 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Request Re Reduction of IGSCC Insp of Category D Welds Due to Implementation of HWC to License DPR-35 ML20206M1971999-05-11011 May 1999 SER Accepting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in ASME Code Class 3 Salt Svc Water Piping at Plant ML20206J6611999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20205L0221999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20207J5471999-03-0909 March 1999 Training Simulator,1999 4-Yr Certification Rept ML20207F9401999-03-0101 March 1999 Long Term Program Semi-Annual Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207H5451999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196E2151998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept.With ML20206Q2741998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20197J3591998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20195C9951998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20154K0721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20153D3901998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting 970707 Request to Use Guidance in GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water Sys Piping for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20197C5011998-09-0404 September 1998 Rev 12C,Pages 4 & 5 to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20197C5471998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 12C to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20151W8231998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20237E2251998-08-26026 August 1998 Suppl & Revs to SE for Amend 173 for Pigrim Nuclear Power Station ML20237A9941998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236U8201998-07-13013 July 1998 Rev 12B to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR (Cycle 12) ML20236P0151998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20249A3741998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.W/Undated Ltr ML20247H2081998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207B7601998-03-31031 March 1998 Final Rept, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Site-Specific Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedenss Prompt Alert & Notification System Quality Assurance Verification, Prepared for FEMA ML20216G3911998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J3741998-03-19019 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Evaluate Elevated Tailpipe Temp on Safety Relief Valve SRV 203-3B ML20248L2241998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station ML20202G5251998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236M8511997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept ML20198L7701997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20203D6101997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20202D5761997-11-0808 November 1997 1997 Evaluated Exercise BECO-LTR-97-111, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station1997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20217D6431997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Class 3 SSW Piping for Pilgrim ML20217H5621997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J4131997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20210J3321997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 1999-09-08
[Table view] |
Text
,
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+ e UNITED STATES
[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%...../ SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO MASONRY WALL DESIGN, IE BULLETIN 80-11 30STON EDIS0N COMPANY PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET N0. 50-293
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The NRC issued IE Bulletin 80-11 on May 8, 1980, requiring power reactor licensees to identify and describe the functions of all masonry walls at their nuclear facilities which are in proximity to or have attachments from safety-related piping or equipment such that wall failure could affect a safety-related system. Licensees were also required to re-evaluate the adequacy of these walls to perform their intended functions under postulated
, loads and to submit a written report upon completion of their re-evaluation programs. ,
The Boston Edison Company (licensee) responded to the IE Bulletin and subsequent NRC requests for additional information concerning Pilgrim Unit 1 in numerous submittals and meetings beginning on July 14, 1980 and ending on December 31, 1985. The findings in this Safety Evaluation are based on the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report (TER-C5506-158) prepared by Franklin Research Center (FRC) as a contractor to the NRC.
2.0 EVALUATION The TER contains the details of construction techniques used, technical information revised, acceptance criteria, and technical findings with respect to masonry wall construction at Pilgrim Station. The staff has reviewed this TER and concurs with its technical findings. The following is our sumary of the major technical findings:
1
- 1. The licensee has identified 242 safety-related masonry walls at the Pilgrim Station. Except for 11 walls discussed in Items 2 and 3 below, these walls have been qualified using the licensee's criteria. Those criteria comply with the intent of the staff's (Appendix A of the TER). As discussed on acceptance criteria.
l page 34 and in Appendix B of the TER, the licensee's evaluation l of the wall boundary strengths, which partly relies on statistical analysis of the results of the field testing, is judged to be conservative and, therefore, acceptable. The licensee's two-way cracked plate analysis approach was reviewed in considerable detail by the staff, FRC and FRC's consultants. The Pilgrim walls are reinforced vertically at every other cell, with the cell fully grouted. Joint reinforcement is also installed along the horizontal 8606190665 860606 PDR ADOCK 05000293 ;
G PDR j
- direction (a number of walls also have horizontal bond beams with reinforcing steel). The licensee's analysis employed finite element orthotropic plate bending models. The reduction in the wall rigidity
- was accounted for by using Rranson's equation. In the horizontal direction, if the moment exceeded the unreinforced allowable moment, the section was assumed to be cracked and unable to transmit any load (i.e., the element stiffness in the horizontal direction is set to zero, contribution from grout cores or joint reinforcement was neglected). Rased on the discussion in Appendix B of the TER and the review of sample calculations, the licensee's plate analysis approach is found to be acceptable.
- 2. In a letter dated December 31, 1985, the licensee informed the staff that three walls in the cable spreading room (194.17, 194.?1 and 194.22) will not qualify for the tornado depressurization loads without considerable modification. Such a modification would require extensive relocation of safety-related cable and conduit to provide access for the structural modification. This would recuire a station outage, involve a lengthy construction schedule, and raise concerns about the extensive interruptions to safety systems.
The above walls only affect safety-related components in the cable spreading room (CSR). The alternate shutdown system backs un the affected components assuming a fire in the CSR. Since a masonry wall collapse is no more damaging than a fire, safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained. Therefore, in lieu of modifyino these walls, the licensee has made procedural chances which require the in Miation of a plant shutdown upon receipt of a tornado alert from the area load dispatcher. The procedure advises the operators that shutdown via the alternate shutdown process may be required.
In addition, the licensee also noted that the critical load, a tornado, is a unidirectional load which would cause a failure away from CSR. The walls are qualified as is to withstand all other design basis loads (i.e., seismic). Thus, even in the event of wall failure, the safety-related components in the CSR would be expected to remain essentially intact. Based on the above discussion, the staff finds the licensee's approach acceptable.
- 3. Eloht walls in the radwaste corridor (191.29, 191.37, 193.11, 193.12, 193.5,193.6,193.7, and 193.8) are presently classified as safety related solely because of two safety-related cables which are in the zone of influence of these walls. During the next refueling outage (RF0 #7), these two cables will be re-routed out of the zone of )
influence of these walls in order to meet Appendix R requirements. '
I Upon completion of the above mentioned re-routino, these eight walls will be reclassified as nonsafety-related. The licensee has indicated that it will not attempt to " qualify" these walls for safety-related service in the interim. The staff concurs with the licensee's approach as these walls will not be considered safety-related by the next refueling outape.
- 4. The licensee has modified 88 masonry walls in the Pilgrim Station.
These modifications consist of adding structural steel members
- that act as intermediate supports or boundary reinforcements. The licensee's approach to the wall modifications has been found acceptable as the modified walls comply with the intent of the staff acceptance criteria.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Based on the above findings, the staff concludes that the re-evaluation and testing requirements in Items 2(b) and 3 of IE Bulletin 80-11 have been met for the Pilgrim Station and that there is reasonable assurance that the safety-related masonry walls at Pilgrim will withstand the specific design load conditions without impairment of (a) wall integrity or (b) the performance of required safety functions.
Principal Contributor: N. Chokshi Dated: June 6, 1986 4
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