ML20155F887

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Safety Evaluation Concluding That Internal Smoke Seals for Conduits Passing Through Fire Barriers from One Fire Area to Another Consistent W/Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 & Acceptable,Per Util 880203 Submittal
ML20155F887
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 03/24/1988
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20151H280 List:
References
FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8810130410
Download: ML20155F887 (16)
v • d • e


Text

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ENCLOSilRE 1 SAFETY EVALUATION INTERNAL CONDUIT SMOKE SEALS

~INSTIELED AT APPENDIX R FIRE BARRIERS '

BO5 TON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-293 1.0 INTR 00VCT!0N i By letter dated February 3. 1988 (8Eco 88-017), the licensee provided their crtteria for installina smoke seals inside electrical conduits that pass j through fire barriers N one fire area to another. The licensee provided these criteria to answer staff concerns discussed during a meeting between BEco and the steff on November 24, 1987.

2.0 EVALUATION Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 requires, among other things, that openings and other penetrations in rated fire barriers separating redundant trains of the safe shutdown systems and equipment shall be closed and sealed in a manner that maintains the required fire reting of the barrier. Specific requirements for fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification are contained in Section

!!!.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. Although Appendix R is silent as to requirements for sealing inside electrical conduits. BTP 9.5-1 does contain specific guidance concerning such seals in Section C.5.a.(3). That guidance provides thati "Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration. Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material to prevent the l passage of smoke and hot gases. Fira barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should be qualified by test  ;

to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions."

l The criteria that the licensee has submitted conforms to the above guidance and subsequent guidance contained in Generic Letter 86-10, i The licensee's criteria for seals inside conduits Specifies the following: I

1. Only those barriers that separate redundant safe shutdown equipment I will be evaluated for smoke seals. I l
2. Smoke seals are not required if automatic fire suppression is provided on both sides of a fire barrier, 4

l 0910130410 000907 PDR FOIA JOHNGON00-190 PDR l

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f 2

3. Smoke seals are not required on one side of a fire barrier if automatic j fire suppression is provided on the other side.
4 Smoke seals are not required if the passage of smoke does not ,1eopardize the operation of redundant safe shutdown equipment.
5. Smoke seals are not required if the quantity, nature and location of combustibles are such that snoke generation is not a threat.
6. Smeke seals are net required in conduits with a nominal size less than  !

3-inches in diameter if the conduit runs more than 10 linear feet before teminating. '

7. Conduits greater than 4-inches in diameter will be sealed internally with smoke tight fire seals at the barrier.

S. Conduits 3 to 4-inches in diameter will be sealed internally at the >

barrier, or at the first opening on both sides of the barrier, or on one '

side of the barrier where it has been detemined that only one smoke seal is necessary. (

9. Conduits with a nominal size less than 3-inches in diameter will be sealed on any side of the barrier where the conduit terminates at smoke i

, damageable safe shutdown equipment within a 10 foot linear run from the '

barrier. If termination does not occur at damageable safe shutdown equipment within a 10 foot linear run, the decision to seal the conduit j shall be based on evaluation for Numbers 2 through 6 above, i

10. Smoke seals are fabricated of non-combustible materials and are essentially air tight so as to preclude passage of significant amounts of smoke. In addition certain hardware components are acceptable in lieu of smoke seals. Acceptable hardware components include:

, non-louvered and non ventilated boxest

  • outlet boxes;
  • key card boxes (readers);

GA! tronics boxes.

The staff agrees with the licensee that smoke seals insts' led inside electrical
conduits in accordance with the above criteria will give reasonable assurance 4

that smoke will not be transmitted from one fire area to another via electrical conduits in sufficient quantities to damage redundant safe shutdown systems or components, l i

, i

! 3.0 CONCt.U$10N I

On the basis of the above Evaluation, we conclude that the internal conduit ,

j smoke seals installed by the licenste in accordance with the criteria l 1 described in their letter of February 3.1988 (BEco 88 017) are consistent  !

with BTP 9.51 and, therefore. acceptable for the pu poses Ascribed above and i

in their letter. I

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  • ?. UNITE 0 STATES ' '

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, cc h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

? l W ASHING TON. D. C. 20555 s]

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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWED STATION LAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM CONTROL ROOM UPGPA0E - CARPET

, By letter dated January 14, 1986, the Boston Edison Conpany (licensee) requested aporoval for the installation of carpeting in the control room at the Pilgrim facility. In terms of the licensee's Fire Protection Program for Pilgrim, concerns were raised that the carpet might represent a sionificant '

increase fire hazard from the dooint of overall flamability and the potential for smoke oroduction, if ionited, i i

a In the January 14,19M letter, the licensee stated that based on results of smJ 4 fire testSAon the proposed carpet *Jo+4. demonstrated that it represents no 4<.k u,,eg is,Mdin fh s** /"/m ~

greater fire hazard than the r=&Alrear0VEd*that it will replace.

Specifically, the Critical Radiant Flux was determined to be .58 watts oer t.

square centimeter as determined by the test method in ASTM E-649, which l u ,.... u... % . W 4e. + /'"t*j

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T enables the cerpet to be considered as a Class I interior fin (sh.'d*he^ smoke i

+5D e, \ *. s > a s oyet-s *7 "* ' " d 7 '

develooment rating of^th+-wpet-wa+-4Memin: ?t

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n inras . u.stJoue.e s-44no .raGo.

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by tk tett eth d h-A$rf14-t-1962. This-<ogeees-te a !bs4 ;moke= l de ve l opmaat-of-44 for-v i ny M s be stee,--4-i l e . We conclude that the installation 1 of the carrot will not significantiv decrease the level of fire safety in the l

control room it? therefore, represents an acceptable deviation from Section i C.7.b of RTP CME 9 9.5-1.

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, DISCUSSION ISSUES ..

i 1 Justification fer Continued Operation i

. e leak before break e crack propagation -

e structural integrity

2. Discuss the issues believed to allow the facility be considered i unique, as well as plant specific actions.
3. Discuss the qualifications of the inspection team to be used e IES 82-03 i

e IEB 83-02 e performance in the round robin a basis for using teams t

l 4 Discuss the availability of inspection teams e their training  ;

e timing of inspections )

) i l

S. Discuss occupational exposure issues l

I e expected ORE -

I e advantages and disadvantages of Jecantamination '

e influence on inspector availability I

i S. Discuss the length of time required to perfom the UT inspection i e as described in the 50.54(f) letter j e benefits gained by perfoming partial inspections a following a forced shutdown e ability to perfom the inspection should an 1

outage of great 1r than ten days occur i

7. Discuss comitments regarding leakage 1 J

4 e proposed actions in addition to T/S .

4 e floor and equipment drains I e sensitivity of measurenent devices e feasibility of identifying leakage during outages

. - s i

l _ _ . . . . - . . - -_

G/p '

<3

, . BRUNSWICK

- Details regarding previous inspections

- Plant specific features

e Recire piping P!t. GRIM

- Commitment on leakage limits  !

- Hydrote'st in 1983 e leakage measured i e how was it conducted e applicability to pipe crack issue  ;

- Previous inspections (including round robin)  ;

e crite'ria as compared to IEB 83-02 e technique e what tems were used

- Impact on proposed integrated program 3 Breakdown of Costs - additional detail l l

e direct and indirect: l j e replacement power cost Qualification of automated UT i

l QUAD CITIES 2 & DRESDEN 3  !

l l

Use of !HSI on old operating plant I l

e radiation exposure i o effectiveness e potential adverse impact on deep cracks

- Realism of the assumed sequence: six weeks to inspect Dresden 3; resumption of operation for four weeks s I I l BROWNS FERRY 3

. I

[ - Impact other activities may have on SF 3 Shutdown  !

1 i e BF 1 -

  • e Wattsbar e Sequoyah I

i J

J

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