ML20247H831

Proposed Tech Specs Re ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements & Trip Setpoints

ML20247H831
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/25/1989
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20247H806	List: ML20247H801 ML20247H831
References
NUDOCS 8905310339
Download: ML20247H831 (25)

Text

-.__--- -.-. --_-- _ _ _ _ __ _ _ ,

r-f ...

f ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 L

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-326 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-03)

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-37 Unit 2 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-23 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-37

{

l 1

8905310339 890525 t' PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PNU  !

l

n

_ N gI i

l e

O u M>

I f T * *

• e C 0 0 2 0 0 r A 2 2 2 2 J d n

2 E

e 4 4 h L '

t BS .

AE 3 3 3 3 g CD '

n IO , , , , i LM 2 2 2 2 2 w N P o O P , , , , , l .

I A 1 1 1 1 1 l r T oe A fi T l N pr E ua M n n n t e U w w w r R SE o o o as a T MLL d d d ti S UEB t p p t t s N MNA ud m m ud ud r I I NR h r u u h r h r ee NAE sa p p sa sa h v M I HP /o / /o /o t e

)

d E MCO 2b 1 3W 2b 2b h T gc e S u Y M -

ni i h n S A n rw i

N P w u t n no n d ,

n O w O f od w n o I S o & o t o do C T LP d eu d ei

( A EI t p p H s gh t tt U NR ud m mC sasd ud na 3 T NT h r u u rA ot r h r ec

- C A sa p p ll ya sa mi 3 A HO / a / / r ono / o ef 3

E CT 1b 1 2 A 1vab 1b l i pd E

R U m mo L T o i m B A g ee A E S n F n n bh T F .L w w w t OE o " o o o Y NN d d d tf T N t p p t t o E

F LA AH ud h r m

u m

u "A h r ud ud h r s

i n A TC sa p p T sa sa o S O /o / /A / o / o ni TF 2b 1 2b 2b D O 3 E S ot i e E tl R

E W ap cm E

N Z d io w re f c I ro ag i G n n eL oa g cg N e ne ee t - Bt l n en E t v wn vn ae l e i pi uid oi oredb sii prb wr d u no wV ss er d

d swo kDtt r mD r es o io e l l c- auu nu- u es df Dt h al a ri h T p m

iP rT p a o m F e r

t o a S co l ocs u t r if Bt o d u Mrtdu yP r

h s re d n osenP eonP R S s an a h r nMsh a ftMa an E o t e o co o at n oa n i o W vL SG L e T it de wt se l i O k - t e I t r ph rv pd rpv it P - g N aamt ai ieami xc 9 sa U tt uior SSP wbD ret ur TFSPD uu :F AS

. . . it O 6 1 2 h u L To A S N S O . . .

O .  :

I T

e f g L a E T

C .

O N 7 N U *

• F *

• SE , E a w wD w F[go" f %

E } g.a" "- -

---

,,,,---,--,.,,--,,,,---,,--,,,.---,---,-,-,w-- -

h

.5 y '

q q

.i d  % ,

4.4 r ,#

o

~

9 k  ;.

.i F F-kN N b, %4 4q + 3 5.

.( x as O L

h Y N(

Q t

.h Y

I h

si 4

& t{eg n

M .'t i 91 , ,f f

~

l, N.= L't-4 l i

k N j M  ;

i 4

l

.y -

_Nl .

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION 21 - uith the eg_3;7 25 gpgpagtg ch3mmg3 eme ,g : tsem tag T,t g fu,M. provide f Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION mav llowing conditions are satisfied: ~

kllA el a. The inoperable chann *

/eu,w d pla .n the tripped cordition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

l'M 21 b. The Min' annels OPERABLE requirements et; however, ditional channel may bt bypassed for up to

'e* turveience testi ;;n per Sper!*!r , rs

• 2.:.

ACTION 22 -

With less than the Minimum Nu"mber of Channels OPERABLE, declare.

the interlock inoperable and verify that all affected channels of the functions listed below are OPERABLE or apply the appropriate R16

- ACTION statement (s) for those lunctions. Functions to be evaluated are:

a. Safety injection Pressurizer Pressure

b. Safety Injection High Steam Line Flow Steam Line Isolation High Steam Line Flow g Steam Dump (k c. Turbine Trip Steam Generator Level High-High Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Level High-High ACTION 23 - With the numbt:

>f OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STAN0BY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 haurs; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hou;s for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. lR67

' ACTION 24 -

With the number cf OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY -

within following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 25 -

With theofnumber Number Channels, of OrERABl!

resto e ti ct onels one less than the Total inoperab'e channel to OPERABLE R16 status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or u .are the aosociated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-23 gendmentNo.yg,63 3

(_____,_____-_--------- - - - - - - - - - ^ ' ^ ' ~ ~ '

. c .

keflacemm/ kedbn A/ d Kj/, 3,3 3 A C 7 D W .2 / -

MNb /e.u f$$n & W/Au:wem

/Vu n A<< o / CAwmu4 OP6 Male, cdc4n 7We as.roukd d auc h .

Aes/ wad < p/AAd7Zo#

comp {y wi fdemp byem//e, a reyw'<emm -fr f o/ -feeida don 3. 7.I.2.

I i'

l L - - _ _ -- _ _ -

c )

e p s m

. un 0 pe

• . v 1

5 s0 e ni s . t gh i er t0 l 1 nc vd l +- o+

aa 0 i

re o v S

re .

d n v5

.y 0 E wnr 5 rb i

21 a 2. 5.y a U

L e e oao a or 7 ae l 7 l l l rpt t u 9 ae A b b rsa h ' 9 d d S V a a a ot i r t m( +i + h T

N E c c nt e i y (

t e t e I L i i l l f ee nn wa . g si m t wi si m t wi O B p p omg l

A gi l t l t P A p p u se i s os os T W td N. sp vtd vtd E O A A %rm l p ) l n S L t t 7 t a oe 2 p 0 oo 0 oo l n L o o 1 se nt vm 11 m 6 vc 6 vc P A N N 1i s 0t i .

u 8 e 8 e I 1>p 40 s 40 s R )

T s i t )

N n pn O

i o d me l I

p n uv d d l

T t o pi r n n f A e c o o T e nd c c N gh S e e e e E s ve s s M nc I i n t U aa S 0 ri 5

) R r e .

db 0 d l 5 r . .

t e

T S

wnr l ru 1 5 u e e oao a (a ot n

N T l l rpt t(

a a I N b b rsa h o h i

t M I

O a a a r e t mg h h t c c t C

n o

E T

S P

T E

i i l

p p l

nt e v iwa nn o f ee b l y

(i gp s si y t wa siy t wa t

t omg a se A. l l l l

&4

( Y S p p u td N i

s9 ose os e d S A A %rm 1 l p .) vtd vtd e P 8t a oe 3 p l l t

- N I t t 1 se e vm 0 oe 0 oe n 3 O R o o nt e 21 m 6 vm 6 vm i e I T N N i u 8 8 3

T 1i s S 0t 1>p 40t i

40t m

e A l E U p L

B T

C m

A A i T e E

R E g e t nr t

nr b U a T M t sof i o io of t o

A E A l o

rp ot e p

t e s F v t em em n

o O r aSi Si in Y

T c i E d e r ee T

e e T , n E

i g t H n ngeg geg e o F o c U easa as a i A

S L

r r

e t

S u

• r d r

Gt nt l ol opo t nt l ol tl a

c n ow a r l opo D

E i o t o al w e M a o s eVsV e g VsVe i

f R d t B el Rf i

t r- t e a nl Rf c E

E a ew u e w m n ia e gDny o i a o e N

R u no o F d o w d ny pi E t el k e o a i as di as s I

G T

A A c G - c n ewR d t f ml s eml s ooeo h oeo N

E D W

c av me l

l a i a

F LoF t u o t l

NRL SNRL l l al B M y- h V r c E i ee n re" R S a d

a if T

E F l a m t tL a S r

o f

o a r 6' EW v of S ab i u t . . o . . h n

i s l s L ab c I

N Y u o ne R n t it I

. t a

pp i i m xe sYP O k 9 ss t e

U A a u aa . t ru urR I M A MW S S F . o .

s L L TP APEO 6 l 1 2 it A I J h N

O X

U . . . . .

NSSO T I

T C

A a b c d. e f. g IL a E

N T U

F 6

7. O

• N

$@52f E ]

• Tt" o QgQ"Ey'P_ h

. . L.

4' .

dK 1r D .$

s! (F a v Q .*(

4

),3.k 34 h 4

3  !

m n a$

M d y

'O IA DI 41 y ii 2 d ~g k N' i

.s .

,x bl 5%

• 4 b

y :m 1 L

sh %a 1

W  %

b4 h

1 d;4 $

de i -

Q .

e g

H a t

CE u IC o l

ND MAE LR 44 4 4 g

NLI 4 n

, , i IIU 3 3 EQ - 3 7 33 3 3 3 l

e SVE , , , u ERR 2 2 2 2 f

DU ) 22 2 2 2 e OS ,

s , , , r M 1 t 1 1 1 n 1 1 .

1 1 1 d e n N m 2 O e I

T r e i h A u t T L q N LA e g

E EN r

.M NOT . E n i

U NI S e G . . . w R ATE Q c A. R o T HCT M M A. M A. A.

S N

CN U

n N a M N N N l

l r l oe I F l O fi

)

d MS ET i

e S

/ pr l

v ua e

u TN SE N r

u 0 t e n YM 4 r i

t SE R

LI O s 7

n as ti ET I s n NI NA S 4 r o OU NR R R ee C RR

(

I Q TE AB l A. t R R R hv AR HI CL l

a N R n t e 2 U TE A ( o t c h

CC C R ai 3

4.

AN A v e F -

dw h

EL o e E RL b t ,

L UI a C' nn B TE L eo

'. A AV EK 1 mi T ER . . . et NC e A Y . .

l a FU NE e A. A. pc S AH S S N . N N A A. A. mi Y HC SS S N N T

E C G if i

J ed F

A N b o m

S n

o Z r s o t e D r i

- o h E e t R t a nt E - t c - r e o a r u e

- g if E

N W e S d n d s

r a t o I r t r e r s o t a G o a r a G a l cn N t w e o g o r td r o i o E d: t B o aae V fi e n rom s

a t - a l n B i t r ei e u e w ne sd ng e n eLi d r ce o F wg ed wa s ed T ee el nw eo k e i e ot d m pp c n eo dt Dh dl e Gng ai sm GL mw ao eL

- l a i B M n f a

dwkoa FL y-rsR S tl uo t hV rd h S t o g l aa Sd uV a t etd l

srd an eae / g ec rT i g Di l c a

cg o

a<E f t o e o i n t - o o iuW ith

s. O vo SL I o ni kvd V DSS Sl T Sl i s l k h w I e . t pp is s a co eP r rum x r F 9 .o N nv I a i s 9 g el U i e . t tl ArP O .e L M at S S TP 6L 1 2 6D 1 2 o

3 sf A

S i N S h r O . . . . .

O . To I c d e f g L a b.

T C  :

N . E U 7 T F

• O

~

N mgSE,Eq ,

<h a [N ygSE" fg t

4 * . ~E"

[  : , ,

8

r

,.4 #

?s t f E*N

.'e t1r  ; t 5 k'b et

% 4

\.

hS N yj *

~ .E tv V

d=d 6

~Y c4 Y w x k

i"i '5 8

%l s

Y N

Y usdl 4 M -

. ,t ,

N 4 i  ; q k.k i

• 4 ,

j

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - ~ -

T *

• C 4 3 6 6

• A 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 2

)

s

- - t n

E e L m BS e AE 3 3 r CD  :

3 3 i 3 IO , , u q

LM 2 2 2 2 e P 2 2 P , , , ,

r A. 'l 1 1 1 d N 1 1 O

n

- I a T

A s T

n N n n o n E SE e e i w g g t o M MLL c

_ U UEB d R MNA 2 . .

n t p T INR m m u ud m S t t f h r NAE s s u N IHP / / g sa '

p I MCO 2 2 2 /o /

2 n 2b 1

)

M n

. i t

E d T e a e S . g i u Y . n . t n S ne n . i n i

S eg g

em gt n w t N LP i o n

o I O EI NR ms

.t m'

m2

.s .

d t p C T NT t t I ud m

( A A sy h r u U HO sy S sa p 3 T CT 1

/n / n /o /

1 2a 2 a

- C l 1b 1 3 A l a

3 E (

R E U S n.

e L T .L n v n B A OE e e o w A E NN c g b o T F N .

a d LA t p m m Y AH 1 ud m t t h r T TC s s e u E O /

sa p F TF 2 2

/ e /o /

A 3 3 S 2b O 3 S

, D E

R r E n e -

E o e N n t

a n n n i

s n ee e ne ee I

G i o t a

W rp om ip b m vn t v wn vn' N R t u ii uidoi sii-

. t u ru rb oredb E E T i a t c

nw eo oP uP Dr kDtt r prb mD r M T - u c- auu nu- u A t A GL n n rTp arihTp iPrTp W i - t e t e o m l ocs m a o D n c .w rv rv tdu Bt o du m

E I i mo ai ai onP Mrtdu E t tL t r osenP eonP F a t r Ma nMsh a ftMa l S - SD SD n o at n oa T a mc l tse it d e wtse n

I N

Y u R n oi t g ne . rpv t r ph r v pd rpv i v .

I ami aamt ai U A a uo ae .t ur ieami I M AL ML

. i ttuior ret ur L L i i SSPD SSPwbD TFSPD A I N X O U . . .

I A a b. c d e f

T C

N U .

F 6 MgS ! >* [s 4 - m ,g T$ >"o E ot 5 2 P m*

4EE m y ;m"

,r

' 9 4

4 _

~ ~

. - . - - - + .

l  :.- ..-

[

4 .

i r .

4 .w . . . .

i

', i

, u - _. a ._

h

.w e_.- _ -

. \. %

DM N C y E . ..

h w e~ e.

wQ . A N a

_._._.4

.t . . . _ . . -

-.3' 4f._

l _ . . . . . . . . I l

' t i . . . . . . , . . _

. . _ . . _ . . ~ .

h

____ p . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _

K . =..._...._..__.__ _ _ _ . - . _ - . . . . _ _ _ _ . _

. k_ . .. . _ . . . _ . . . _ . . _ . _ _ . -

o ._.

4 .

Y.

._h.._.___.___._.__..__..._............

Rsg ..

_-g..._.

-_.4_ - - . . .

a

!!' _m.A.

i. i.

7 ._ t .-

4 _ . _ _

__H....___..__....__._._.._.___.

-l ,

1 w

l .

._ u y . ._ .. 8 j .

t -_ __..

1 i_ . . . .

• {%_.

6 j l  ! h }

e i ,

._.._1_____.__,

I 'N' __ s b_ - _ .. A __

. . - - . . _ . . . . . ._ _..._...u_. . _ . . . . .

- _. ... _~._ . . .

R _ .. . . g.

_3' .

1 i u ,

y -

t .. . . , . . ,. ,, , _ _ . . . .

j i

4...

f, , 4 . 4 . . . . . _ . . , . _ . . _ ,

I f i a

.-c-4_-4

. __ ... _ . . _, .. .... ._ I

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)-

' ACTION 21 -

Num Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION mas ceed j provided t lowing conditions are satisfie

/fcp/se,e f - a .- The inoperable chann p -

in the tripped condition 44 y within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

b. The M m Channels OPERABLE requiremen et; however ,

additional channel may be bypassed for up to rs fc. ;w. cillar,x in tir.;; pa Ep;ci ficaticr 1. 2.2.1.1.

R2 ACTION 22 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, declare the interlock inoperable and verify that all affected channels of the functions' listed below are OPERABLE or apply.the appropriate ACTION statement (s) for those functions. Functions to be evaluated are:

a. Safety Injection Pressurizer Pressure

b. Safety. Injection High Steam Line Flow Steam Line Isolation High Steam Line Flow Steam Dump

c. Turbine Trip Steam Generator Level High-High Feedwater Isolation Steam Generator Level High-High ACTION 23 - With the number of 0PERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1. R55l ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total .

Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 25'- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the associated valve inoperable i and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.5.

i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 gendgent]40.g i

.. . I

a Ae)/aeemmf Ad n A/ dj Wh4 3.3-3 i

'5 A'crzwV .2 / -

lM/A /e.u f45,,176 #Auem M.,& s csus omsau, '

sdc4n de a.uoesAd sunxky dedwa A- pu y hopc~//e, and campyl wiM the .4&7z04 ,

A o/ .f a/Aa 6., 3. 7 /.2.

reputam f

en +-

l eh i ve o gc iv na v5 ae 0 ri .y S r dr 21 a E 5 d l nr r

' U L l e

l e wao opt a oe 7 ae 9 d A t n +h S V b

a b

a rsa r r h oi t e T c c at e t mb si m N E iy ( r i i nnn wa . u t wi I L l l ee l gt l t P

O B p p f mg se A. i(

os A p p ou td N s vtd T W A A rm l p 2' l n E O %t a 0oo S L oe 1 L t.

t' o

7 se 1 nt vmi 1 6 vc 8 e P A N N >I s > 40s I 0t >~

)

R s T )

t p 1

• N n m O

i o u -

I d p d T p n ) n A t e

o pn o T S c

e me c e

eh s uv E gc pi s M na I r

) U S 0 nd 5 ae d

e R

T r

nr l 5 e

ve s 1 u e e l

in (e n

S N T l l wao o pt (

a a ri 4 a i

t I N b a

b rsa h '

db r A h n

I a r r e t ru M O c c at e v i y t

o E P ot siy C T T i

l i

l nnn ee o wa . t( D t wa l

( S Y

E p p f mg b

a se l

A.

o mg E l ose l

S p p ou 4

S P

A A

%t a rm 1 td l

oe N (i gp s M vtd l

3 N 0 oe O

I R

t o

t o

8 se 1 nt e

e vm i n 6 vm 6 0

s 3 I T N N i

s9 8 i 8

>I s S p . A

- 5 T

A Ot 3

40t 4 L U ' 21 B T m A C >>_ o T A A

E R

F t nr t U io i T sof A

E "a

rp ot e t F t em n aSi Y c o T ,

r T S

T E

i g

i t R eeg 'e e n g F o r c

u E eas a a A L Gt nt e S t S

n r

ow t h'J d r

l ol l a r l opo o D

E i o t o al d w

t e I a o

eVsV s e g V R t r- B E a ew t u e a el Rf nl Rf E R u no e w i a o ia N E t el o F d n e Dny w g dny k e ias dias I T c G - c n ew G A A l a do t a f ooeo ml s eml s h oeo N

E W

D c me av l

i a

F o L t l NRL SNRL B M y- u o t E i ee re h V r d E t tL n f ar S a Fl a S o o E f t . .

a T a m r iu o I Yu o ne .

i t pp s l s is W v o S ab O k L ab N R n t it I a i m xe P s U Aa u aa . t ru ur 9 s L

I M L

A MW S S TP AP F . o . .

O 6 L 1 A I 2 N X S O U . . . . .

S I

T Aa b c d e f g

D .

C L a , -

N U .

F 6 .

7

,m$5* $g  %* y g ,E 5 o?@d" 'zo. d

?

- il

y l!:

A Inu.4 A Wld 22-V

=

-[ %.

_. r, m s +-

._ t _

..__.1 w

Ng \ c

. M -

aGtg Q4 cl M .w1 .

. , . _Q lw

- - ~ . . .S k A r

!.3 9

,J . . _.

, wv y;

. _. 3 q

! l

-.9

.._ _. .A y IA i 1

T T

3. 9 -

• T

,.t Y

t 4 i'N .. . _ . .. .- __.. . . . .... .- .._ _ .. - . .. .. . . ,

l, . ._. .-._,g s6 ... . .

5%.. . - . . . . . _. . . . . .

-..e .e..e . ay ..un . e e eg.G w m. a .eae =5M .* -u.4- . .

g5,p. .m.,. qw wgw 4g,p. g.g9.,,g,.

I j . . . . . .

. tQ . . . _ _ . . _ . . _ , . _ .. _ . ._....._ _ _. ...

i ,

4 _ . . . . _. . . .

. . L _ .._. . . _ _ __...... _ _

i is v l . "1EN .9 ._ ._.__ _ . .. . . . . _ . ._ _ . . __.__ _ .

' Q. 4 . . .

1 i 4 '

. .k . i g_..._____.___.._.___.___..__ l s .

- w _ a .- . . . .. - . .-.. . _ . . .... -.- - . .- . . . .. . -.. . - . . .. .

3 ,

94 i l

-I t ,

! 4 l > , .

l

, i

!- [  !

. . . - .s.. . \

o g

n i

l HS o CI u I f HE . e WCD '

r NE 44 4 4 '4 RAR t OLI , , , , ,

s FLU 3 3 33 3 SEE IQ 3

• 3 3 1 e

EVR 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 h DR ) t OU , s , , . , , , , ,

MS 1 t 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 g n n e i N m w O e o I r l T i l A u o T q f

N - L e i

E LA r p b EN u U NOT e .

E . . t R NIS c A 'A A r T ATE n G A.. . . a S HCT Q a N. R M A MN M N N t N CN s I U l

l P MS F i e

)

e O h ET v t d

e TN r G SE u N g u YM N 's C n n SE O i R LI I A' i r

t NI ET S T u n OU NA T d

A o I Q NR l C TE AB l A. -

d

( AR HI R a R N R RR R R R e U CL ( m t 2

TE CC A

C e o n e

3 AN v R m 4

EL A

b o F l e

RL a " p E UI m L TE L B AV EK 1

"C . .

i A ER NC e A A A. A e T FU NE e .

. ' A. b S AH S S N N. SS S N. N Y HC N T o R

T C t E

F E s A J S N i n T. s n D r o r o E e i o i R t t t t E a c - a - e a E

N W r e

u r e s g c r

S d d a i I t r n r r t f

_ G o a r a e a s o l i N t w e o G o r td r o c

_ E a d t B g B o aae V e

_ r t e a l n e s rom p e u e w ne ei ng n eLi dr s wg n o wa e n F d sd T ee ew k

ew oa ed ot s ed d m l G o c n e dt i e dl G ng ai a

_ L a i Fo tl Dh t o e an rT c m-l a uo S uV g l g aw i i

_ B M yR hV t h a etd ec n

_ eo r eE S rd Sd t srd Di h

_ tL n f arW f aa e l eae / g c T S - o o inO vo t o vd o ith I o e

_ I l i s l P k SL k a V DSS SL t N ne . t pp i s r U iv I a i m F 9s 9 g s ae . t ru .o . . .e . . . i L ML S S TP A 6L 12 6D 1 2 3 h A S T

_ N S - '

O . . . .

D . .

I c d e. f g L a b  :

T E C T N .

O U 7 N F * *

- NgQ2I ' gZ to wh ,E" E E{O E ,- m[r

- l l

' il s

&9*Ay"" b .9 $

& &-As%

O(

.g,.e-... , .

'.e 3%

• p

,.. .w a +ea .

t . A* .'.g..  !.

j .

!- 4

.. t ]

4  !

g n%. -

1 a.. ._ 2... g _ g

-s y s b

_. . N- .

~

1

g. 4.-Q.. 9.

._....N...

N * -

_q g ..y

--m.4e W-*" ,_ie

• 9 N 7 g . _ . . . - . , _ _ _ . _ . . .. _ _ .

2 M_L.. _ . . _ . . - . _ _ _ _ t_.__...._.__...._........._. . . . _ _ . ._ ___.._._ .

. o _

l .

-,. . .r . .. _. . .. ..

. em,+_. .. _e ._

! nN _

i t O

' t

• g . _ _ . .._.v.._..._._._..__. . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ . . . .. _ .. ... .. _ . . _ . . . _ _....__. _._.. _ _ _ ..

i

- k._ MJ g - . . _ _ _ _.- -. . ... _ . . . . . . _ .. . _ . _ .__ ._ _ _ .

i l I

__ . _ . -. b _. _ _. . _ _ . . . _ . . _ . - . _ - . . _ . . . . ._ __ -_ . . _ . __._... _. .

l

\ . ., __ . . _ _ _ _ . . . __ . . . . . _ . _ . _ ,

i *-*.*a.--. -_ee. 44in.-a=..** #a ==e

== .... - . = * . - - - . -ai.W-* .e .em.**==-=e+.** . * * ~ = * * * . - =..

.+ . , e.w 4 .e...ee.

s s

._t.

%. M ........_.___..__._._._..___......__...-.__ . . . . _ . . _ . . ... _. . . . . . . . __.. _ . _..

.. . _ _ o. ...

9 kt a

4_4% .

t g

s,,,, ..- ,. - . . . . . _ . .

i .

_ _%g s

__ { ._

k. . . . _ . _.. ._ . _ . _ . . _ . . . . . .. _.._.

e

. .- ._e. .b .

.. ., . . _ ...._e. . - . .

.,.e. .. ,w ,. e_-

m .

g .

l

{ .

_.___-__--__m_.-______m._ _ _ _ _ --_

,. ,-.7- _ - . - --- . - , . - . - - , . - . . . - - - - . . - -

' :h ' -

1' N  ;

. e ;.

~.\ -

ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-03)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ADDITION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AUTOMATIC SUCTION TRANSFER LOGIC TIME DELAY REQUIREMENTS 9

a i

i i

l

)

M.

.; * . ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change

. Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 technical specifications (TSs) to revise Tables 3.3-3,

" Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," 3.3-4,

" Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints," and 4.3-2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements." The proposed changes  !

facilitate the addition of requirements for the logic time delays -

associated with the automatic auxiliary feedwater (AFW) suction transfer. -

Specifically, the following changes are made:

1. A " Functional Unit" 6.h is added to each of the above tables to.

include requirements for the AFW suction transfer time delays.

2. The current wording of Table 3.3-3, Action 21, is deleted in its entirety and replaced with a new action appropriate for the AFW suction transfer pressure switches and time delays.

3. The " Action" and " Minimum Channels Operable" for Table 3.3-3, Item 6.g, are revised to. reflect the new Action 21 described above.

4. The wording of Table 4.3-2, " Functional Unit," 6.g, is revised to correct an inadvertent omission from a previous license amendment.

Reason for Change By letter dated November 17, 1987, TVA submitted proposed .

TS change 87-40. This change revised the AFW suction-pressure, low-trip setpoint and allowable value of Table 3.3-4, Item 6.g, for both units for the turbine-driven AFW pump.

The logic time delays associated with the automatic AFW suction transfer were discussed in the TS 87-40 submittal. TVA identified that the time delays were added to the logic sequence to prevent spurious actuation because of signal noise. This minimizes the potential for the detrimental effects of raw water injection into the steam generators. This design feature is based on economic concerns. At the time, TVA concluded that the time delays should not be included in the TSs because the equipment did not' meet the criteria specified in the NRC policy statement on TS content as published in the February 6, 1987, edition of the Federal Register. The inclusion of the logic time delays was discussed with NRC during their review of TS 87-40. During these discussions, it was concluded that, because the logic timers are an integral part of the actuation sequence for automatically transferring AFW suction, it was appropriate that these be included in the TSs. TVA committed to add the logic timers to the TSs in a November 23, 1988, letter to NRC. NRC recognized this commitment in their December 30, 1988, letter approving TS 87-40. Change 1 described above satisfies this commitment.

i 1

The deletion of the current wording of Action 21 of Table 3.3-3 is made to facilitate the generation of a new action appropriate for the AFW suction transfer pressure switches and time delays. Action 21 is not currently applied to any entry in Table 3.3-3. As such, its deletion is considered an administrative change. The new action is proposed to better reflect the significance of an inoperable AFW suction transfer pressure switch or logic timer.

The revisions of the " Action" and " Minimum Channels Operable" for Table 3.3-3, Item 6.g. are effectively administrative changes to implement the new Action 21 described above. The wording change to the " Functional Unit," 6.g. of Table 4.3-2 is an administrative change to correct an inadvertent omission created in SQN license amendments 29 (Unit 1) and 18 (Unit 2) dated May 5, 1983. This change will make the wording of Table 4.3-2, Item 6.g, consistent with the items in Tables 3.3-3 and 3.3-4.

Justification for Change As described in SQN Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 10.4.7.2, the AFW system supplies sufficient feedwater to the steam generators to remove primary system stored and residual core energy in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply. The preferred sources of water for the AFW pumps are the two nonseismic condensate storage tanks (CSTs). A trained essential raw cooling water (ERCW) header supply is available to each motor-driven A1M pump as a seismic, unlimited backup water supply.

The turbine-driven AFW pump has both trains of ERCW available as a backup water source.

As was detail-ed in the November 17, 1987, TS 87-40 submittal, the pressure switch setpoints and the logic time delays were evaluated in an engineering calculation entitled " Auxiliary Feedwater System Pressure Switch Setpoints" (provided in enclosure 2 of the TS 87-40 submittal) to ensure that adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the AFW pumps was maintained during the suction transfer sequence.

For the motor-driven AFW pumps, the combination of a 4-second time delay and an analytical pressure switch setpoint limit of 0.0 pounds per square inch gage (psig) was shown to ensure adequate NFSH on pages 4 through 17 of the calculation. Similarly for the turbine-driven pump, the combination of a 5.5-second time delay (for each timer) and an analytical pressure switch setpoint limit of 10.93 psig was shown to ensure adequate NPSH on pages 18 through 25. These time delays were recognized by the NRC in the December 30, 1988, safety evaluation for TS 87-40. Accordingly, the 4- and 5.5-second values are added to Table 3.3-4 as the " Trip Setpoint" values for the motor-driven and turbine-driven AFW pumps, respectively.

.- . Al10 percent tolerance is applied to the " Trip.Setpoint" to obtain the Table 3.3-4>"A11owable Values." The 10 percent tolerance is acceptable to-

, ' ensure' adequate NPSH to the AFW pumps. Any negative tolerance is

acceptable from a safety standpoint because this would initiate suction L swapover earlier. The positive tolerance is found to be acceptable by F

quantifying ~the. conservatism in the calculated available NPSH for'the pumps.

As. described on page 15 of the calculation, the available NPSH for the motor-driven pumps is calculated assuming a water level in the supply.

header that would not be reached until 7.9 seconds. Therefore, over 3 seconds of margin exists for the motor-driven AFW pump time delay of 4.0 seconds.

Similarly, the available NPSH for the turbine-driven pump is calculated assuming a water level that would not be reached until 15.8 seconds (calculation page 22). Therefore, over 4 seconds of margin exists for the

' turbine-driven AFW pump time delay of 5.5 seconds (when accounting for two timers in series).

The changes to Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2 are made for completeness of the logic time delay requirements. The entries in Table 3.3-3 reflect that there is one timer for each motor-driven pump and two timers for the turbine-driven pump. The actuation of one timer is sufficient to initiate ERCW flow to an AFW pump, assuming no failures. The " Applicable Modes" are made consistent with the suction pressure switches of Item 6.g.

The additions to Table 4.3-2 are consistent with surveillance intervals for other timers. Again, the " Modes in Which Surveillance Required" is made consistent with Item 6.g.

It is important to note that the AFW suction transfer logic timers are currently tested periodically. SQN Maintenance Instruction (MI) 13.1.2, "Setpofnt Verification and Calibration for System 3 Time Delay Relays," is periodically. performed as preventive maintenance. MI-13.1.2 calibrates the timers to the setpoints added to Table 3.3-4. As such, the addition of the suction swapover logic time delays to the TSs is effectively an administrative change to reflect that the time delays are an integral part of the swapover sequence.

The deletion of the current wording of Table 3.3-3, Action 21, is acceptable because there are no entries in the table to which the action applies. The new wording is selected to create an action that provides an appropriate response to the inoperability of an AFW suction transfer pressure switch or logic timer. Currently, the TSs require that an inoperable AFW suction transfer pressure switch be returned to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or otherwise a plant shutdown must be initiated (Table 3.3-3. Action 20). As seen on FSAR Figure 10.4.7-10, the inoperability of a given pressure switch or logic timer affects only its associated AFW pump, not the entire AFW system. From this, it is

t . .

concluded that the inoperability of a piece of equipment that is attendant to one AFW pump does not warrant a forced shutdown of the plant. Instead, it is more prudent to declare the affected AFW pump inoperable and comply with the associated actions of specification 3.7.1.2. This type of action for inoperable instrumentation is consistent with Table 3.3-3, Action 25, for the main steam line isolation valves; Table 3.3-6, Action 27, for reactor coolant system leakage detection; and Table 3.3-6, Action 28, for the containment purge isolation system. The remaining changes are administrative in nature. The first two revise the action and minimum channels operable of Table 3.3-3, Item 6.g, to implement the new action described above. The other corrects an inadvertent omission made in an earlier license amendment. License amendments 29 (Unit 1) and 18 (Unit 2) incorrectly delcted " Pressure-Low" from the description of Item 6.g in Table 4.3-2.

Environmental Impact Evaluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact ,

previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as i modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing i Board, supplements to the FES, Environmental Impact Appraisals, or in I any decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. ,

l

2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.

i

I <

4

( ....

' . . *** : .i l .-

, s

.l

- 1 l

ENCLOSURE 3 )

l' i l

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-3C' AND .50-328

'(TVA-SQN-TS-89-03)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS t

5 k

i

I

,)

^ '

ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

As described in SQN FSAR, Section 10.4.7.2, the AFW system supplies sufficient feedwater to the steam generators to remove primary system stored and residual core energy in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply. The preferred sources of water to the AFW pumps are the'two nonseismic CSTs. A seismic, unlimited backup water source is provided by connection to the ERCW. ERCW flow is automatically initiated to th" AFW pumps upon receipt of a low suction-pressure signal (FSA'. Figure 10.4.7-10).

The addition of the suction swapover logic time delays to the TSs is effectively an administrative change to reflect that the time delays are an integral part of the swapover sequence. The timers are currently calibrated periodically in accordance with MI-13.1.2.

MI-13.1.2 calibrates the timers to the values established in engineering calculation " Auxiliary Feedwater System Pressure Switch Setpoints." Calibration to these values ensures that adequate NPSH is maintained to the AFW pumps during the suction transfer sequence.

Since this proposed TS' change is essentially administrative in nature and does not affect the AFW suction transfer to its qualified water source, the proposed change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The deletion of the current wording of Table 3.3-3, Action 21, is administrative in nature because the action is not applied to any item listed in Table 3.3-3. As an administrative change, it will not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

The new wording for Table 3.3-3, Action 21, is selected to create an action that provides an appropriate response to the inoperability of an AFW suction transfer pressure switch or logic timer. A forced plant shutdown resulting from the inoperability of a suction transfer pressure switch or logic timer that affects only one AFW pump is considered to be excessive.

The new wording provides consistency with the AFW system actions of specification 3.7.1.2 and removes the potential for unnecessary plant transients and shutdowns. As such, this proposed change will not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated ,

accident.

i

... o 4

l The remaining changes are administrative in nature. The first j revises the action and minimum channels operable for Item 6.g of Table 3.3-3 to implement the new action described above. The second  ;

inserts text that was inadvertently omitted by a previous license 1 amendment. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased by these proposed administrative changes.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

As oe.acribed above, the proposed TS change is made to reflect that  !

the logic time delays are an integral part of the automatic AFW I suction transfer and is effectively administrative in nature. The l proposed changes reflect that the timer settings currently in use for SQN and that the surveillance requirements are consistent with other time delay relays listed in the TSs. Other tabular entries are consistent with those for the AFW suction pressure switches, which are part of the same control loop. The remaining changes are either administrative in nature or reduce the potential for unnecessary plant transients and shutdowns. The function and operation of the automatic AFW suction swapover sequence, as well as the AFW system, are not affected by this change. As such, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated is not created.

-(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.  :

The primary function of the AFW system is to provide sufficient heat l removal capability for heatup accidents following reactor trip to remove the decay heat generated by the core and prevent reactor .

1 coolant system overpressurization. The proposed additions to Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 are administrative in nature and do not affect the AFW system's ability to fulfill its design function.

The proposed changes merely reflect that the logic time delays are an integral sequence from the CSTs to ERCW. The revised action for inoperable AFW suction transfer pressure switches and logic timers provides a more prudent response in that unnecessary plant transients and shutdowns are avoided. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin of safety.

(

l

- _ - _ - - _ _ _ _