ML21099A272

Generation Station, Units 1, 2, 3 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Emergency Plan, Revision 69

ML21099A272
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	04/09/2021
From:	Shields C Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-08254 - CS/lh
Download: ML21099A272 (387)

Text

10 CFR50.54(q) 10 CFR50,Appendix E 102-08254 April 9, 2021 CS/lh [aj P.O.

vereenerating Box52034 station Phoenix,Az 85072 MailStation7868 Tel: 623-393-3525 ATTN Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001

Subject:

PaloVerdeNuclear Generation Station (PVNGS)

Units 1,2,and3 and Independent SpentFuelStorage Installation Docket Nos.50-528,50-529,50-530 and72-44 License Nos.NPF-41,NPF-51 andNPF-74 PVNGSEmergencyPlan, Revision 69 Pursuant to10CFR50.54(q) and10CFR50Appendix E,Section V,Arizona Public Service Company(APS) isforwarding a copyofthePVNGS Emergency Plan, Revision 69,effective March 30,2021,andsummaries ofthe10CFR50.54(q) analyses for this plan revisionAPS hasevaluated thechanges incorporated inthis revision, and determined thechanges donot reduce theeffectiveness oftheEmergency Plan andthePlan continues tocomply with the standards of10CFR50.47(b) andtherequirements ofAppendix E to10CFR50.

Inaccordance with10CFR50.4(b), copies arebeing forwardedto the NRCRegion IV Administrator andtheResident Inspector. No commitments arebeing made totheNRCby this letter.Should youhaveanyquestion regarding thissubmittal, please contact me at (480) 737-5876.

Sincerely, Shields, Shields, Charlotte cD'93'r'@"esd89")

( ) Date:

Charlotte DN:cn=Shields, (205896) 2021.04.0907:19:22

-07'00' Charlotte Shields Emergency Preparedness Manager CS/Ih cc:S.A.MorrisNRCRegion IVRegional Administrator M.S.HaireNRCBranch Chief ofResponse Coordination C.A.PeabodyNRCSenior Resident Inspector forPVNGS PVNGS Emergency Plan, Revision 69 Summaryofthe10CFR50.54(q)

Analysis ofEmergency Plan Revision 69

Enclosure 1

PVNGS Emergency Plan,Revision 69

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGEIOF383 Revision 69 signed Digitally byAlvarado Mayra (211332)

Alvarado, Origlilator:

. . Mayra (11332) DN:cn Alvarado, Date:2021.03.25 Mayra 17:09:18 (211332) 07'00' byWilliams, ToddB(205663)

Williams r Todd Digitally signed DN:cn=Williams, ToddB(205563)

Reason: Ihave reviewed this document iteViCWor: Date: 2021.03.25 19:38:45 -07'00' ds, Shields,CharlotteDziogit8""6')signed by Shie Charlotte DN:cn=Shields, Charlotte (z05896)

Approval: Date: 2021.03.25 21:20:52 -07'00' Effective Date: M

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE2OF383 Revision 69

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE3OF383 Description ofChanges Page(s) Description AlI ChangedRevision 68toRevision 69throughout 3 Updated Description ofChanges 10 Added definitionflar Follow UpNotification 11 Added definition II)r Initial Notilleation 23 Capitalized definedterm Initial Notification andadded "notifications to"for clarity 35 Capitalized defined term Initial Notification anddeleted reference tofollow for u> elarity 37 Replaced "additional information" with "Follow UpNotifications" clarity fl)r 38 Capitalized defined term -

Initial Notification anddeleted reference tofollow u)for clarity 38 Capitalized defined term -

Initial Notification anddeleted reference tofollow u)for elarity 52 Rewritten tocapitalize Initial Notification(s)" andreplace "warning points" with "auencies" 52 Added newparagraph for Follow Up Notitleations 60 Added clarity ll>rShelter recommendations made bythe state orthe station.

75 Capitalized defined term Initial Notilleation I10 Changed Raddose toUnifled RASCAIInterface (URI)

I10 Changed Raddose toURI I10-1 Il Added the Dose Assessment model descriptor ilarURI 11I Changed Raddose toURI I1I Changed 60' bullet from expected arrival time atvariousdownwind distances toPlume Ex osure Duration (Release duration + Plume travel time) 11I Changed 7d' bullet from Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent to Child Thyroid Committed DoseEtuivalent III Changed 80' bullet from calculate deposition estimates atvarious downwind locations tocalculate deposition dose estimates atvarious downwind locations at96hours.

11I Changed 90' bullet from Report maximum integrated values andrates atthe Site Boundary, 2 miles, 5 miles, and10miles forTEDE,Thyroid Committed DoseEquivalent, external EDE,andground deposition toReport maximum peak exposure rate andcommitted dose atthe SiteBoundary, 2 miles, 5miles, andI0miles forT EDE, Child Thyroid Committed DoseEquivalent, external EDE,and eround de7osition

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE4 OF383 Page(s) Description I1I ChangedIlthbullet from provides Raddose Protective Action Recommendations basedonradiological Protective Actual data. Action Recommendations arederived from Plan Imergency Implementing Procedures toURIprovides graphical representation PAGsin ofexceeded given sectors based data.

onradiological Protective Actual Action Recommendations arederived from Plan 12.mergencyImplementing Procedures I13 Added reference Section l 1asanadditional toE.3andE.4

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE5OF383 TABLEOFCONTENTS SECTION PAGE Description of Changes. .3 INTRODUCTION .8 1.0 DEFINITIONS ANI) ABBREVTATIONS. .8 2.0 SCOPE AND APPl.ICABll.1TY. .19 3.0

SUMMARY

OFTllE PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl.AN. .19 4.0 ORGANIzATIONAL CONTROL OFEMERGENClES. .20 4.1 NORMALORGANIzATIONS. .20 4.2 TilE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIzATION. .20 4.3 NON-1ICENSEE SUPPORT .34 4.4 COORDINATION WITll PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. .34 4.5 INSTlTUTlf OF NUCI.EAR POWER OPliRATIONS (lNPO). .40 4.6 IETTERS OFAGREEMENT (LOAs). .40 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDIflONS ANDCl.ASSlFICATIONS. .49 5.1 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. .49 5.2 BASISFORPAI.0 VIRDENUCIEARGENERATING STATION (PVNGS)

CI.ASSl FICATION CRITERIA. .50 6.0 EMERGliNCY Ml ASURES .51 6.1 EVINTASSESSMENT .51 6.2 CIASSlFICATION AND DECLARATION .51 6.3 NOTlFICATION. .52 6.4 MOBll17ATION. .52 6.5 CONSEQUI NCEASSISSMENT. .53 6.6 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS .55 6.7 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS .55 6.8 AIDTO AFFICTEDPERSONNEl. .61 6.9 MEDIARElATIONS. .63 7.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. .67 7.1 EMERGENCY CENTl?RS .67 7.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS. .71 7.3 ASSESSMENT EQUlPMENT .80 7.4 PROTECTIVE FACILI flES AND EQUIPMENT .84 7.5 FIRST AIDMEDICAlFACll ITIES .84 7.6 DAMAGliCONTROLEQUIPMENT AND SUPPlIES. .84 7.7 PROMPTNOTIFICATION SIRENSYSTEM .84 8.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS .85 8.1 ORGANIzATIONAl. PREPAREDNESS. .85

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE6OF383 TABLEOFCONTENTS SECTION PAGE 8.2 ORGANIzATION FORMAINTAINING EMERGENCY PRl?PAR1iDNESS .94 8.3 REVll?W AND UPDATING OFTilEEMl?RGENCY PIAN .95 8.4 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORYOFliMERGENCY EQUlPMENT AND SUPPlIES. .95 9.0 RECOVERY .96 9.1 R1iCOVl?RY ORGANIzATION .96 9.2 RECOVliRY EXPOSURI CONTROl .97 9.3 RE-ENTRY .97 10.0AGREEMENT I.ETTERS. .98 10.1OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE Pl.AN FORPAlO VERDENUCI.EAR GENERATING STATION. .99 11.0REFERENCED INTERFACING EMERGENCY PLANS. 102 12.0MAPS 103 13.0EMERGENCY PIAN IMPl.EMENTING PROCEDURES. 110 14.0lD1iNTIFICATION OF EMERGl(NCY KlTSBY GENERAl, CATEGORY. 110 15.0ACClDENTDOSEPROJECTION AND SOURCE TERM ESTIMATION. .110 15.1DOSEASSl?SSMENT MODEI.. .110 16.0CROSSRIFERENCE TONUREG0654. .112 17.0CORPORATE EMERGENCY SUPPORT 118 18.0PUBlICINFORMATION 118

18.1INTRODUCTION

. 118 18.2ACTIVATION ANDOPERATION 118 18.3STAFFING AND 1OCATION. 119 18.4PUBLICINFORMATION AND EDUCATION. .119 19.0DEVElOPMENTAl. RElliRiiNCl?S. 120 TABIESAND FIGURES TABIE 1 MINIMUMSlill T STAlFINGFOREMERGENCIES .41 FIGURE1 ONSH1FT EMERGENCY ORGANl7ATION. .42 FIGURE2 TECIlNICAl SUPPORT CENTER ORGANIzATION. .43 FIGURE3 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ORGANIzATION. .44 FIGURE4 EMl?RGENCY OPERATIONS FACll.1TY ORGANizATION. .45 FIGURE5 JOINTINFORMATION CENTERORGANIzATION .46 FIGURE6 ONSITE/OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIzATION INTERFACI . .47

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE7 OF383 TABLEOFCONTENTS SECTION PAGE FIGlJRE7 STATE COUNTY& I.OCAl EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Cl(NTI?R ORGANIzATION. .48 FIGlJRE 8 NOTll ICATION Al,ERT Nl?TWORK (NAN). .64 FICiURE 9 NAN NOTlFICATION FLOW. .65 IIGl!RE 10 COMMUNICATIONS IEADINGTO PROTliCTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR) .66 TABIE 3 EMERGENCYRESPONSE FACIIITYCOMMUNICATIONS. .79 FIGlJRE II POPUl.ATION EVACUATION ROUTESECTIONS AND EVACUATION ROUTING. 103 FlGURE12 DEMOGRAPilYWITlilN Till? PI,UME EXPOSURE PATIIWAY EMERGENCY PI.ANNINGzONE 104 FIGURE13 SITEEXCIUSIONAREABOUNDARY AND PROPERTY BOUNDARY. 106 FIGURE14 INGESTION EXPOSURE PATIlWAY EMERGENCY PI.ANNING70NE 107 FIGURI? 15 RECEPTION AND CARECENTliRS. 108 FIGlJRE 16 PROMPTNOTlFICATION SYSTEMSIRIEN IOCATIONS. 109 APPENDICES APPENDIXA ClASSll ICATION GUIDANCEAND EAITECIINICAI, BASIS

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE8OF383 INTRODUCTION Palo Verde Nuclear (ienerating Station (PVNCiS) isajointly-owned three-unit Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) power station operated byArizona Public Service (APS). Thestation islocated in Maricopa County, South ot'Wintersburg, Arizona.

THEPVNGSEMERGENCY PLAN:

• Describes the organization formed andfacilities availabletomanage emergency situations;

• Classifies emergencies according toseverity ofconsequences;

• Dellnes andassigns responsibilities for emergency response actions;

• Outlines courses ofaction andprotective measures tomitigate theconsequences ofan accident andtosafeguard station personnel and the public;

• Presents ageneral post-emergency plan andorganization torestore the plant toa normal operating status;

• Dellnes methods andprocesses toinform the public.

Theaccidents which might occur atPVNGSare analyzed inChapter 15ofthe PVNGSUFSARin terms ofseverity ofconsequence. TheIndependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI),which isstationary andcentrally located within the PVNGSexclusion area boundary, is analyzed inthe Cask UFSARandsatisfies the requirements for off-normal radiologicaldose. The PVNGS UFSAR analyzed accidents reflectthe design characteristics ofa Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and are addressed byPVNGSlimergency Operating Procedures (liOPs) andlimergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPlPs). Postulated events concerning the ISISIareencompassed bythescheme of EAlsdesignated for PVNGS.

1.0DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 1.1DEFINITIONS Thefollowing aredefinitions oftermscommonly used inthis Emergency Plan.

An instrumentation system designed todetect abnormal arearadiation levels andactivate corresponding station alarms.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE9 OF383 Assessment Actions Areactions performed during orafter anincident, toobtain andprocess information necessary to determine the character andmagnitude ofthe incidentandtoimplement specine emergency measures.

CDEis the dose equivalent toorgansortissues ofreferencethatwill bereceived from anintake of radioactive material byan individual during the 50-year periodfollowing theintake.

CEDEisthe sumofthe products of the weighting applicable 11tctors toeach ofthe body organs or tissues that areirradiated andthe CDE to these organsortissues.

Controlled Area An area outside ofthe Restricted Area but inside the Site Boundary access that eanbelimited by the licensee for anyreason.

Corrective Actions Measures taken toterminate anemergency situation atornearthe source ofthe problem.

TheCounty EOCislocated atthe Maricopa County Department ofEmergency Management (MCDifM) IIeadquarters at5630 E.McDowell Road,P hoenix,Arizona, and is the primary point through which the C hairman, Maricopa County Board ofSupervisors/designeeexercises coordination over county emergency response actionsconducted within thel?P7.

M DDEis the dose equivalent atatissue depth ofIem(1000 mg/cm2), which applies toexternal whole-body exposure.

Ilose EguivalentiDE.1 DEisthe product ofthe absorbed dose intissue, qualityfactorandall othernecessary modifying factors atthe location ofinterest. Theunits ofdose equivalentarethe remandSievert (Sv).

M EDEis the sumofthe products ofthe dose equivalent toeach organ ortissue anda weighting factor applicable toeach ofthe bodyorgans ortissues thatareirradiated.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE10OF383 EAl.s are theplant-specific indications, conditions orinstrument readings thatareutilized to classifyemergency conditionsdenned inthe PVNGSEmergency Plan.

Theindividuals within thePVNGS organization designated torespond toanemergency.

Exclusion AreaBoundary An area surrounding the reactor inwhich the reactor licenseehas the authority todetermine all activities,including exclusion or removal ofpersonnel andproperty from thearea.

h Theagreed upondata that isprovided toanoffsite agency toaid inthe protective action decision-making process that isconducted bythe ORO.

EulLP.a.ttigipatipn Fullparticipation whenused inconjunction with emergency preparedness exercisesfor a particular sitemeansappropriate offsite local andState authorities andlicensee personnel physically and actively take part intesting their integrated capability toadequately assess andrespond toan accident ata commercial nuclear power Iull plant. participation includes testing major observable portions ofthe onsite andoffsite emergency plans andmobilization of State, localand licensee personnel andother resources insufficient numbers toverify the capability to respond tothe accident scenario.

IIostileAction An acttowards a nuclear power plant oritspersonnel thatincludes the useofviolent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidates the licensee toachieve anend.This includes attackbyair, land, orwaterusing guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, orother devices used to deliverdestructive force. Other acts that satisfythe overallintent maybeincluded. IIostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude acts ofcivildisobedience orfelonious actsthatare notpart ofa concerted attack onthe nuclear power plant.Nonterrorist-based EAlsshould beused toaddress such activities,(e.g., violent acts between individuals inthe owner controlled area).

A complex designed andconstructed fortheinterim storageofspent nuclear fuel andother radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. ThePVNGSISFSI islocated approximately 605feet northeast ofthe PVNGSPower PlantProtected Area.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE11OF383 Initial Notification Therequired 15-minute notincation madebythe utilitytothe designated offsite agencies.

TheIP7isthe fifty-mile radius area (Figure 14), centered onthe verticalaxis ofthe Unit 2 Containment Building for which protective actions for the general population, flirmers, dairy farmers. ranchers, food processors anddistributors are planned.

hip.lailt Thearea located within the connnes ofthe PVNGSPower Plant Protected Area.

M Combined PVNGS/state/county function; located at600North Verrado Way, Building A,Buckeye, Arizona. TheJICisresponsible for issuingnews information during anAlert orhigher level emergency classineation.

M An individual licensed under 10CFRpart 55tooperate and control PVNGS.

Thecollection ofonsite programs andprocedures which prescribes how PVNGS iscontrolled, operated, maintained, andtested tomeetthe requirements ofapplicablelicenses, standards, codes, andguides. It establishes effective management practices.

Offsite Anyposition orarea notlocated withinthe confines ofthe Site Boundary.

Offsite Relocation Area Thelocation where contaminated PVNGSevacuees aredecontaminated, which islocated atthe Buckeye Airport.

Theemergency Offsite Response Organization for state andlocal governments described inthe Offsite Imergency Response Plan forthePalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE12OF383 TheOffsite Emergency Response Plan for PaloVerde Nuclear Generating Station istheState of Arizonal Maricopa County Plan for governmental response toemergencies atPVNGS. ThePlan setsforth speciHe responsibilities andprocedures local for s tate, andnon-governmental organizationsresponsible for o ffsiteemergency operations and protection ofthe affected population.

Theemergency response positions onshift asdesignated inTable I,Minimum ShiftStaffing for Emergencies. Typically, positions required byplant technicalspeci0cations, fire protection program, securityplan andthe radiological emergency plandesignated torespond intheinitial phase ofanemergency.

Onsite Anyposition orarea located within the confinesof the SiteBoundary.

Theaugmented PVNGSemergency response organizationused tostaff the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Emergency Center, Operations Facility, JointInformation Center, etc.

Table I,Minimum Shift Staffing for Emergencies denotes the required augmented positions.

OwnerControlled Area Thearea owned bythe licensee andlocated within the conGnes ofthe SiteBoundary asshown in Figure 13. Site Exclusion AreaBoundary andProperty Boundary.

Pa.rtlaLParticipation Partialparticipation whenused inconjunction with emergency preparedness exercisesfor a particular site means appropriate offsite authorities shall actively takepartinthe exercise sufficient totestdirection andcontrol functions; i.e.,(.a) protective action decisionmaking related to emergency actionlevels, and(b) communication capabilities amongaffected Stateandlocal authorities andthe licensee.

P1MLP!3!E!1LLi.E Theboundary enclosing the area ownedbythe licensee andcorresponding tothe SiteBoundary.

ThePlume Exposure Pathway EPzisthe ten-mileradius area, centered onthe vertical axis ofthe Unit 2 Containment Building, forwhich protectiveactions areplanned.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE13OF383 Persons forwhomprotective actions arebeing, orwould be,implemented.

An instrumentation system designed todetectabnormal radiation levels inprocess andeffluent pathways, andtoactivate appropriate alarms.

Protective Actions Emergency measures takento avoid orreduce radiation dose. These commonly include sheltering, evacuation, andprophylaxis.

M Theprojected dosetoindividuals that would warrant consideration ofprotective action againstan accidental release ofradioactive material.

Pfotected AteatsLLPM An area,located within the PVNGSl?xclusion Area Boundary encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich access iscontrolled per10CFR73.55. ThePVNGS Power Plant Protected Areaand the ISFSI Protected Area are twoProtected Areas locatedwithin the PVNGS Owner Controlled Area.

RecoveryActions Arepost-emergency actions torestore the station toanormal operating condition.

Restricted Area An area access towhich isimited bythelicensee for the purpose ofprotecting individuals against undue risksfrom exposure toradiation andradioactive materials.

Site Boundary Theboundary ofa reactor sitebeyond which the land orproperty isnotowned,leased. orotherwise controlled bythe licensee.

TheState EOCislocated atthe DEMAlleadquarters andisthe primary point through which the Governor/designee exercises overall controlandcoordination ofgovernmental offsite emergency response operations.

M TheTOCisco-located with the State EOC.TheTOCisthe offsite location that provides foroverall control ofradiological technical operations.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE14OF383 TEDE is thesumofthe Deep-Dose Equivalent (for exposures) external CEDE(for andthe internal exposures).

UnrestrictedArea Anarea access towhich, isneither limited norcontrolledlicensee.

bythe Vital Area An area withinthePVNGSPower PlantProtected encompassed Area byadditional physical barriersandtowhich access iscontrolled per10CFR73.55. Vital equipment contain areas considered vital tothe operationofthe plant.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE15OF383 1.2 ABBREVIATIONS The following are abbreviations ofterms commonly used atPVNGS.

ADEM -

Arizona Division ofEmergency Management AzD1IS -

(Arizona) Department ofllealth Services ADV -

Atmospheric DumpValve APS -

Arizona Public Service Company ASU -

Arizona State University BOP -

Balance ofPlant BPD -

Buckeye Police Department CDE -

Committed Dose Equivalent CEDE -

Committed Effective DoseEquivalent CEDMCS -

Control Element Drive Mechanism System Control CEO -

Chief Executive Officer ClT -

Core Exit Thermocouple CFR -

Codeof1ederal Regulations CNO -

Chief Nuclear Ofilcer CR -

Control Room CR -

Condition Report CRS -

Control RoomSupervisor CTMT -

Containment DDE -

Deep-Dose Equivalent DE -

DoseEquivalent DEMA -

(Arizona) Department ofEmergency Affairs andMilitary DIIS -

Department ofIIomeland Security DOE -

Department ofEnergy DPS -

(Arizona) Department ofPublic Safety EAI -

Emergency Action Ievel EAS -

Emergency Alert System EC -

1mergency Coordinator EDE -

Effective DoseEquivalent

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE16OF383 EDG -

Emergency Diesel Generator EMT -

Emergency Medical Technician ENS -

limergency Notification System EOC -

Emergency Operations Center EOD -

Emergency Operations Director EOl -

Emergency Operations Facility EOP -

Emergency Operating Procedure EPA -

Environmental Protection Agency EPABX -

lilectronic Private Automatic Branch Exchange IPD -

Electronic Personal Dosimeter EPIP -

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EP/ -

limergency Planning zone ERDS -

Emergency ResponseData System ERFDADS -

limergency Response Facility Data Acquisition & Display System ERF -

Emergency Response Facility ERO -

Imergency Response Organization ESF -

Ingineered Safety Features FEMA -

Federal Emergency Management Agency FPS -

Fire Protection System FSS -

Fire Suppression System FTS -

Federal Telecommunications System FW1.B -

Feed-water 1.ine Break GPM -

Gallons perMinute IIP -

IIealth Physics IIPN -

llealth Physics Network HPSI -

Iligh Pressure Safety Injection I& C -

Instrumentation andControl INPO -

Institute ofNuclear Power Operations IP/ -

Ingestion Pathway zone ISFSI -

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE17OF383 JiC -

Joint Information Center JPIP -

Joint Public Information Procedure KI -

Potassium lodide I.AN -

Local AreaNetwork I.CO -

I.imiting Condition for Operation I.OAF -

Loss ofAllFeed IOCA -

Loss ofCoolant Accident I.PSI -

I ow Pressure Safety Injection I.WR -

1ight Water Reactor MCDEM -

Maricopa County Department ofEmergency Management MCPI -

ManagementCounterpart 1.ink MCSO -

Maricopa CountySheriffs Office MSLB -

MainSteam Line Break NAN -

Notification AlertNetwork NATM -

Nuclear Administrative andTechnical Manual NOAA -

National Oceanic andAtmosphericAdministration NRC -

Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS -

Nuclear Steam Supply System NWS -

National Weather Service OBE -

Operating Basis Earthquake ODCM -

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual OSC -

Operations Support Center PAD -

Protective Action Decision PAG -

Protective Action Guide PAR -

Protective Action Recommendation PASP -

Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program PBX -

Private Branch Exchange PI -

Plant Information PIO -

Public Information Officer PMCI -

Protective Measures Counterpart Link

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE18OF383 PSIG -

Pounds PerSquare InchGauge PVAR -

Palo Verde Action Request PVNGS -

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station PWR -

Pressurized Water Reactor QSPDS -

Qualified Safety Parameter Display System RAC -

Radiological Assessment Coordinator RACOMM -

Radiological Assessment Communicator RCS -

Reactor Coolant System REAT -

Radiological limergency AssistanceTeam RFAT -

Radiological Field Assessment Team RMS -

Radiation Monitoring System RP -

Radiation Protection RPC -

Radiological Protection Coordinator RPM -

Radiation Protection Monitor RPS -

Reactor Protection System RSCl, -

Reactor Safety Counterpart 1,ink RSP -

Remote Shutdown Panel RVIMS -

Reactor Vessel 1,evel Monitoring System SGTR -

Steam Generator TubeRupture SIM -

(Control Room) Simulator SPDS -

Safety Parameter Display System SM -

Shift Manager STA -

Shift Technical Advisor STSC -

Satellite Technical Support Center SWMS -

Site WorkManagement System TEDE -

Total Effective Dose Equivalent Tl.D -

Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TOC -

Technical Operations Center TSC -

Technical Support Center UFSAR -

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE19OF383 UPS -

Uninterruptible Power Supply VOlP/SAT -

Voice OverInternet Protocol Satellite Back-up 2.0SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY This Emergency Plan isapplicable toPVNGS. Specifle procedures toimplement the EmergencyPlan arelisted inSection Emergency 13.0, Plan Implementing Procedures.

There are also various supporting andcomplementing emergency plans, including thoseof Federal Agencies, the State ofArizonaand Maricopa County.

3.0

SUMMARY

OF THE PVNGS EMERGENCY PLAN TheEmergency Plan isdesigned to adhere toNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) emergency planning regulations andguidelines applicable tocommercial nuclear power stations.TheEmergency Plan isbased upon NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (1EMA)guidance ascontained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Revision 1, "Criteria forPreparation andEvaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power P lants", and EPA guidance as contained in EPA400-R-92-001, "Manual ofProtective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" October, 1991Radiological emergency planning for the PVNGShas been coordinated with state andlocal emergency response agencies.

TheState ofArizona andlocal government agencies whomaybeinvolved inemergency response operations areaware ofthe emergency response measures described inthe PVNGSEmergency Plan andareadvised ofchanges ormodifications tothese measures resulting from plan reviews, audits, drillsand/or exercises along with changes to Regulatory guidance.

Both the Offsite Emergency Response Plan for PVNGSandthe PVNGSEmergencyPlan contain clear-cut dellnitions ofareas ofauthority andresponsibility. TheDEMA, acting under thedirection andauthority ofthe Governor, isresponsible foroverall coordination ofoffsite governmental emergency operations. ThePVNGSEmergency Organization is responsible for onsite emergency operations andfor providing timelyandaccurate plant status information tooffsite emergency authorities. TheArizona Department ofIIealth Services (AzDIIS) has been assigned technical (radiological) responsibility for governmental response within Arizona. Emergency operations withinthe Plume Exposure Pathway EP/arethe responsibility ofMaricopa County.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE20OF383 4.0 ORGAN1zATIONAL CONTROLOFEMERGENCIES Inthe event ofanemergency. the normal station operational is organization supplemented with anorganization specificallydesigned torespond toemergency Depending situations.

onthe severity ofthe emergency, the Emergency Organization mayconsistofanon-shift emergency response organization, orof anaugmented emergency organization.

response This section describes the On-shift, Onsite andOffsite Emergency Organizations.

4.1NORMAl, ORGANizATIONS TheIxecutive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Ofilcer,reports tothe &

APSPresident Chief Ixecutive Officer.The Executive Vice President & Chief NuclearOfilcer hasthe overall responsibility andauthority for the operation andtechnical supportofPVNGS.

TheExecutive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer andthe nuclearorganization have the overall responsibility andauthority toensure that all activitiesassociated withAPS' nuclear facilities arecarried outwith the highest standards of safety andensuring the station isoperated inaccordance with (lAW) the licenses granted bytheNRC,the Technical Specifications, andthe requirements and commitments stated intheUFSAR.

Theonsite station organization isdivided into fourmain groups which tothe report Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer.

Each group isdivided into subordinate departments andsections. Thefour groups areas follows:

• Nuclear Site Operations a Regulatory Affairs Oversight andPerformance Improvement

• Operations Support

• Engineering 4.2TlIEEMERGENCYRESPONSE ORGANIzATION

[Ref. INPOIERI,l13-10, Recommendation 5g,IER1.2 11-39, Recommendation 31 TheEmergency Response Organization (ERO) consists ofpersonnel inthe staffing Control Room/STSC,Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical (TSC),

Center Support Imergency Operations Iacility (EOF) andthe Joint Information Center(JIC).

ThePVNGSEROissupported bydesignated facilities asdescribed inSection 7.0, Emergency Facilities andEquipment. Theon-shift emergency responseorganization is augmented atdeclaration ofanAlert orhigher emergency classification level.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE21OF383 Inthe event a member ofthe EROminimum staff becomes incapacitated oris otherwise unavailable, theyshall bereplaced assoonasreasonably possible. Operating unit staff who are IROmembers aregoverned byPVNGSTechnical Speci0cation 5.2 andits exceptions.

4.2.1 ON-SillFT EMERGENCY ORGANIzATION PaloVerde Nuclear Generating Station on-shift emergency organization is sufficient to permit the required mitigation response andeffectively implement the Emergency Plan asrequired in10CI R50Appendix E.

Table Iofthe Emergency Plan renects the resultsofthe Palo Verde On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing andCapabilities analysis asrequired by10CIR 50Appendix E. The Palo Verde On-ShiftEmergency Response Organization Staf0ng andCapabilities analysis isretained asCorrespondence

1. 090-05063 (RCTSAI 4164598).

TheOn-shift Emergency Organization (Figure l)consists ofthe following positions:

4.2.I.1Emergency Coordinator (EC)

[Ref. INPO IERII 13-10, Recommendation 5i1 Theaffected unitShift Manager (SM) ordesignee initially assumes the responsibilitiesof the ECand responsible direction and is for coordination ofthe response. Members ofthe normal shift organization assume emergency positions tocarry outactions asdescribed below.

TheEChas the responsibility andauthority toimmediately and unilaterallyinitiateemergency actions.including providing notification andProtective Action Recommendations (PAR) togovernmental agencies responsible for implementing offsiteemergency measures.

TheECisalso responsible for communication ofplant status and radiological conditions including doseprojection results asappropriate.

Procedures provide for accelerated calls andverbal notification tothe NRCusing the Emergency Notification System (ENS) ofSecurity-based events considered tobeacredible imminent threat orIlostile Action.

Theaffected unitShift Manager mayberelieved asECbyanother qualified EC.AtanAlert orhigher emergency classi0cation level, the ECdirects the Security Director toinitiatecallouts tothe IROin

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE22OF383 accordance with the associated implementing procedure. Uponarrival ofthe designated EC-TSC,the EC-STSC conducts abriefingandis relieved asthe Emergency Coordinator.

Atthe onset ofanincident, the EChas the following responsibilities:

a Notitleationofoffsite emergency response agencies andoffsite emergency organizations (non-delegable duty untilrelievedby EOD)

• Making protectiveaction recommendations asnecessary tooffsite emergency response agencies (non-delegable duty until by relieved EOD) a Classilleation ofemergency events(non-delegable)

• Determination ofthe necessityfor site evacuation a Authorizationfor emergency workers toexceed 10CFR20 exposure limits a Activation ofonsite and offsite EROorganizationslor analertor higher emergency classification level 4.2.I.2Control RoomSupervisor TheControl RoomSupervisor (CRS) located in the unit controlrooms, reportstothe EC.TheCRSperforms initial assessment andevaluation ofanyabnormal oremergency conditions.After the ECdeclaresan emergency, the CRSmaintains thenormal dutiesof directing the Nuclear Operators andassisting theEC.

4.2.I.3FireTeam TheFire Team(minimum of5 individuals) reports tothe CRSand is maintained onsite atalltimes. TheI.eader ofFire Protection Department isresponsible for ensuring sufficient members ofthe Fire TeamareEmergency Medical Technician (EMT) qualified and available atall times.

4.2.I.4FireTeamAdvisor TheFire TeamAdvisor isa Iicensed Nuclear Operator thatsupports theFire Teamduring a fire. TheFire TeamAdvisor should haveno collateral duties thatinterfere with theability tosupport the FireTeam.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE23OF383 4.2.1.5 Control RoomOperators TheControl RoomOperators reporttothe CRSandconduct thesafe andproper operation ofthe unitatalltimes,andrespond toemergency conditions, asnecessary.

4.2.1.6 Radiation Monitoring Technician The Radiation Monitoring Technician reports tothe Radiation Protection Monitor (RPM) andestablishes a response inthe area Radiation Monitoring office andconducts in-plant area surveysas necessary.

4.2.I.7RadiationProtection Monitor (RPM)

TheRadiation Protection Monitor (RPM) isanANSI3.1 Senior Radiation ProtectionTechnician thatresponds tothe STSCandreports tothe EC.TheRPMconducts offsite dose calculations until relieved.

TheRPMauthorizes exposures upto 10CFR20I imits,recommends potassium iodide administration to theECand directs in-plant, onsite andoffsite Radiation MonitoringTeams.

4.2.I.8STSCCommunicator TheSTSCCommunicator isfilled byanAuxiliary Operator. Upon direction from the the I C, STSCCommunicatormakes the Initial l Notifications tostate andlocal agencies andnotifications tothe ERO.

4.2.I.9 Emergency Notification System (ENS) Communicator TheENSCommunicator isfilledbyanindividual knowledgeable of the plant (e.g.,RO,SRO,STA,previously licensed individual, etc.)

and keeps anopenline ofcommunications with the NRC, asrequested. This communicator should nothave anyother E-Plan collateralduties(or other duties that interfere with thecommunicator function).

4.2.1.10 Security Director TheSecurity Director initially reportstotheShift Manager/EC andthen reports tothe ECinthe TSC.TheSecurity Director (assumedbythe on-shift Security Section Ieader) providesfor continued personnel accountability, site access control andrequests offsite emergency assistance, upondirection from theEC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE24OF383 4.2.1.11 Security Force TheSecurity Force reports tolocations asdirected bythe Security Director andassists inperforming assigned duties.

4.2.I.12 Shift Manager TheShift Manager isalso theEC-STSC until relieved bythe EC-TSC.

Following turnover, the Shift Manager reports tothe EC.TheShift Manager performsinitial classification anddeclaration ofan emergency, maintains control ofunit operations, andmitigates accident conditions.

4.2.I.13 Shift Technical Advisor TheShift Technical Advisor (STA) responds tothe Control Roomor STSCofthe affected unit andreports tothe EC.Theaffected unitSTA advises the EConactivities that impactthe safe operation ofthe unit, andindependently verillesemergency classilleations, astime permits.

Forevents classified asanAlert or higher emergency classification level, the affected unit STAactivates ERDS.

4.2.I.14 Shift Technical Advisor (Unaffected Unit)

Theunaffected unit STAassesses coredamage, and provides electrical andmechanical technical support relievedby the TSC. TheSTA until also monitors various data displays throughout the course of the emergency andprovides assistance tothe Control Room personnel.

4.2.I.15 Technicians Technicians report tothe ECandif necessary, maybeassigned to Emergency Repair orSurvey teams. TheChemistry Technicians, Maintenance Technicians (Mechanics, Electrical, Instrument and Control) respond tothe OSCfor assignment.

4.2.1.16 Operations Advisor TheOperations Advisor responds tothe STSCandreports tothe EC.

TheOperations Advisor provides technical andoperational adviceto the EC-STSC. Following TSCactivation, the Operations Advisor maintains the flow ofinformation between the EC-TSC andControl Room.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE25OF383 4.2.1.17 Survey/Environmental Teams A Survey/Environmental Teamis113rmed andresponds tothe OSC, upon request from theRadiation Protection Monitor (RPM). Theteam performs radiological monitoring activitiesandatleast onemember of the teamis a Radiation ProtectionTechnician.

4.2.I.18 Emergency Repair Teams The Emergency Repair Teamconducts repairs andmayconsist of Chemistry andMaintenance Technicians, Plant Operators anda Radiation Protection Technician andreports tothe EC.

4.2.2TECIINICAI, SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ORGANIzATION(ONSITE)

TheTSCOrganization (Figure 2) is located onsiteandconsists ofthe following positions.

4.2.2.1Emergency CoordinatorTSC (EC-TSC)

TheEC-TSCresponds totheTSC and is responsible fordirection and coordination ofthe onsiteEmergency Organization.

4.2.2.2Emergency Coordinator (EC) Technical Assistant Thel?C Technical Assistantresponds tothe TSC and reports tothe EC.

TheECTechnical Assistantmakes announcements over the Site Evacuation andPublic Address systems as directed by the EC-TSC.

TheECTechnical Assistanthas nocounterpart inthe on-shift Emergency Organization.

4.2.2.3Maintenance Manager TheMaintenance Manager responds tothe TSCandreports tothe EC.

TheMaintenance Manager coordinatesthe repair anddamage control forall plantsystems anddirects the emergency response activitiesof the Emergency Repair Teams. TheMaintenance Manager directs the OSCManager toform anddispatch anyteamthat isrequired and maintains communication withthe OSCconcerning repair teamefforts.

4.2.2.4Engineering Manager TheEngineering Manager responds tothe TSCandreports tothe EC.

TheEngineering Manager directssystems analysis, engineering,

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE26OF383 establishes contact with the NSSSvendor andarchitect engineer to discuss issues.technical status ofthe plant asneeded. TheEngineering Manager directsanyprocedure development asrequired bythe emergency andmaintains liaison with the Engineering Director inthe EOF.

4.2.2.5 Mechanical Engineer The Mechanical Engineer responds tothe TSCandreports tothe Engineering Manager. TheMechanical Engineer assumes the dutiesof Technical Support Mechanical from theSTAinthe STSCandprovides mechanical engineering analyses.

4.2.2.6 OperationsManager TheOperations Manager responds tothe TSCandreports tothe EC.

TheOperations Manager follows proceduresthat the Control Roomis using, andkeeps the ECinformed ofthe operational impact ofevents in progress. TheOperations Manager receives technical andoperational input from theOperations Advisor and maintains the now of information between theTSCandControl Room.

4.2.2.7Radiation Protection Coordinator TheRadiation Protection Coordinator (RPC)responds tothe TSCand reports tothe E C. The RPC provides overall control and direction of inplant monitoring teamsand radiological controls. The Radiation Protection Coordinator relieves the RPMofthese responsibilities. The RPCmaintains communications with theRadiation Protection Group Iead, the RPM(prior toCommand andControl transfer) andthe Radiological Assessment Coordinator inthe EOF.TheRPCis responsible for recommending waystoreduce the radiological consequences ofthe event with the support ofEngineering.

4.2.2.8Security Director TheSecurity Director responds tothe TSCandreports tothe EC.The on-shift Security Section I.eader assumes the duties andresponsibilitie asthe Security Director. TheSecurity Director requests emergency offsite assistance upon direction ofthe ECanddirects the onsite security force inthe areas ofpersonnel accountability, access control, sitesecurity, evacuation, medical transportation, andpersonnel and equipment security control.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE27OF383 4.2.2.9 Reactor Analyst TheReactor Analyst responds tothe TSCandreports tothe Engineering Manager. TheReactor Analyst assumes responsibilities from the STA.TheReactor Analyst performs detailed analyses ofcore physics andheat transfer parameters toassess reactor core statusandto evaluate the integrity offuel cladding.

4.2.2.10 Radiation Protection Support Technician The Radiation Protection Support Technician responds tothe TSCand reports to theRadiation Protection Coordinator. TheRadiation Protection Support Technician performs habitability surveys ofthe TSC.

4.2.2.11 Administrative Staff TheAdministrative Staff responds tothe TSCand assists the TSC Emergency Organization in all matters requiring clerical support.

4.2.2.12 Chemistry Coordinator TheChemistry Coordinator responds to the TSC and reports tothe Engineering Manager. TheChemistry Coordinator provides analysis andevaluation ofcoolant samples andair samples toaid in determination ofreactor core conditions andrelease potentials, and provides chemical analyses for evaluation ofplant systems.

4.2.2.13 ERFCommunicator TheERFCommunicator responds tothe TSCandreports tothe Emergency Coordinator Technical Assistant. TheERFCommunicator maintains communications with the ERFCommunicators intheOSC, EOFand JiC. This position also monitors ERFDADS data displayed through Pl,provides information tothe Emergency Coordinator Technical Assistant regarding the overall emergency activities and maintains PlantStatus electronic media display and/or statusboards.

4.2.2.14 Electrical Engineer TheElectrical Engineer responds tothe TSCandreports tothe Engineering Manager. TheElectrical Engineer provides electrical engineering analyses andassumes the duties ofTechnical Support Electrical from the STAinthe STSC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE28OF383 4.2.2.15ENSCommunicator TheENSCommunicator responds tothe TSCandreports tothe Operations Manager. TheENSCommunicator maintains continuous phone communications with theNRC, when requested.concerning operationalevents andreactor plantstatus. TheENSCommunicator monitors ERDS.

4.2.3OSCORGANIzATION TheOSCOrganization (Figure3)islocated onsiteandconsists ofthefollowing positions.

4.2.3.1 OSCManager TheOSCManager responds tothe STSClor a briefing andreports to the EC.Iollowing the briefing, theOSCManager responds totheSC, O

coordinates available resources andupondirection from the Maintenance Manager inthe TSC. assembles anddispatches emergency teams.

4.2.3.2Radiation Protection GroupLead TheRadiation Protection Group Leadreports totheOSCManager and provides overall controlanddirection ofin-plant monitoring teamsand radiological controls.

4.2.3.3 Repairs Coordinator TheRepairs Coordinator ensures thatMaintenance Technicians and Repair Teams aredispatched atthedirection oftheOSCManager. The Repairs Coordinator reports tothe OSCManager.

4.2.3.4Repair Teams Teamsareformed if emergency repairoperations arenecessary. The teamsmayconsist ofChemistry Technicians, Maintenance Technicians (Mechanical Electrical,Instrumentation andControl), orRadiation Protection Technicianasrequired toaddress conditionsandPlant Operators.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE29OF383 4.2.3.5RFAT Driver TheRFATDriver responds tothe RFATvehicles andserves asadriver for the RFATvehicle.

4.2.3.6 Radiation Protection Technicians Radiation Protection respond Technicians totheOSCandreport tothe Radiation Protection GroupLead. Asrequired, the RPTechnicians may be assigned toRepair orSurvey/Environmental Teams.

4.2.3.7 Chemistry Technicians ChemistryTechnicians respond tothe OSCandreport tothe Radiation Protection Group Iend.Asrequired ChemistryTechnicians maybe assigned toRepair or Survey Teams, ortoconduct sampling activities.

4.2.3.8Mechanics Mechanics respond totheOSC and report tothe Repairs Coordinator.

Mechanics maybeassigned torepair teams asneeded.

4.2.3.9 Electricians Electricians respond totheOSCandreportto the Repairs Coordinator.

Electricians maybeassigned torepair teamsasneeded.

4.2.3.10 I&CTechnicians l&CTechnicians respond tothe OSCandreport tothe Repairs Coordinator. l&CTechnicians maybeassigned to repair teams as needed.

4.2.3.11 ERFCommunicator TheERFCommunicator responds tothe OSCandreports tothe OSC Manager. TheERFCommunicator maintainscommunications withhis counterparts inthe TSC,IOF,and JIC,and provides information tothe OSCManager regarding theoverall emergency activities.

4.2.3.12 Administrative Staff TheAdministrative Staffresponds tothe OSCandassists the OSC Emergency Organization inall matters elerical requiring support.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE30OF383 4.2.4EOFORGANIzATION TheEOFEmergency Organization isillustrated inFigure 4.Theinteritices between theOnsite andOffsite Emergency Organizations areshown inFigure 6.

4.2.4.1 EmergencyOperations Director TheEmergency Operations Director (EOD) isincommand of emergency operations andisresponsible for:

e Overall coordination ofonsite andoffsite emergency functions.

a Interilicing with federal/state/county emergency response agencies.

• Communication ofplant status updatesandradiological release data includingdose projection results asappropriate toNRC, State/County EOCs, TOC,and JICpersonnel.

a Notilleation ofstate and county agencies concerning recommended protective actions.

• Directs administrative,technical, andlogistical support tostation emergency operations.

e Ensuring continuity ofemergency organization resources.

a Establishing a recovery organization when appropriate.

Uponthe assumption ofthis position. theEOD accepts from the EC-STSC,the following non-delegable offsite organizational responsibilities:

e Notification ofoffsite emergency management agencies.

e Making protective action recommendations asnecessary to offsite emergency management agencies.

4.2.4.2Assistant Emergency Operations Director TheAssistant Emergency Operations Director(AEOD) responds tothe EOFandreports tothe EODtoassist with duties andresponsibilities as assigned.

4.2.4.3Radiological Assessment Coordinator TheRadiological Assessment Coordinator responds tothe EOFand reports tothe EOD.TheRadiological Assessment Coordinator is the principal liaison ofthe emergency response organization with the AzDIIS. TheRadiological Assessment Coordinator receives and

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE31OF383 evaluates dose projection information from the EOFStafT andprovides protective action recommendations tothe EOD.

4.2.4.4 Engineering Director TheEngineering Director responds tothe EOFandreports tothe EOD.

TheEngineeringDirector evaluates projected occurrences, coordinates engineering analysis withthe TSC,recommends corrective actions and ensures the equipment status board isupdated.

4.2.4.5Security Manager TheSecurity Manager responds totheEOFandreports tothe EOD.

TheSecurity Manager provides security overall support and coordinates closely with the Director Security inthe TSC.TheSecurity Manager also provides support tofacilitatearrivalsofoffsite personnel.

4.2.4.6 ERFCommunicator TheERFCommunicator responds tothe EOFandreports tothe Engineering Director. TheERFCommunicator maintains communications with hiscounterparts in theTSC. OSC,andJIC. This position also monitors ERFDADS datadisplayed through provides PI, information tothe Engineering Directorregarding the overall emergency activities andmaintains Plant Status boards.

4.2.4.7Radiological Assessment Communicator TheRadiological Assessment Communicator responds tothe EOF and reports tothe Radiological Assessment Coordinator. TheRadiological Assessment Communicator communicates with radiological assessment personnel atthe TSCanddirects theactivities ofthe onsite/offsite Survey/Environmental Teams.

4.2.4.8DoseAssessment IIealthPhysicist TheDoseAssessment Ilealth Physicist responds tothe EOFandreports tothe Radiological Assessment Coordinator toperform radiological dose projections andother calculations orevaluations asdirected.

4.2.4.9 Administrative Staff TheAdministrative Staffassists theEmergency Organization inall matters requiring clericalandlogistical support.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE32OF383 4.2.4.10 IlPN Communicator TheHPNCommunicator responds tothe EOFandreports tothe Radiological Assessment Coordinator. TheIIPN Communicator will maintain anopen line with theNRCupon request.

4.2.4.11 NANCommunicator The NANCommunicator responds totheEOFandreports tothe AEOD. TheNAN Communicator makes offsite notifications once the EOI isactivated and relieves theSTSCCommunicator ofthis responsibility.

4.2.4.12 Information Services (IS) Manager TheInformationServices Manager responds tothe EOFandreports to the AEOD.TheInformation Services Manager ensures that IT equipment located inthe EOF remains ingood working order and provides assistance toEOFpersonnel with ITequipment operation whenneeded.

4.2.4.13 RFATTeam TheRFATTeams respond totheRFATvehicle parking area andreport tothe Radiological Assessment Communicator in theEOF.

4.2.4.14 Offsite Technical Representative TheOffsite Technical Representativerespondstothe State EOC in Phoenix andreports tothe AEOD.TheOffsite Technical Representative interfaces with stateresponse agency personnelat the State EOC,provides up-to-dateinformation onplant status,and clarifies howplant systems operate, viabrienngsandface-to-face contact with EOCstaff.

4.2.5JICORGANI7,ATION TheJiCOrganization (I igure 5)islocated andconsists offsite ofthe following positions.

4.2.5.1 JICManager TheJiCManager isthe PVNGSrepresentative that oversees public information activities atthe JICincluding preparation ofmedia

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE33OF383 statements, media briellngs andthe flow ofinformation tothe Rumor Control Unit. TheJICManager approves thetechnical content of media statements andcoordinates through stateandcounty for any additional support needed inthe JIC, toinclude Access andFunctional Needs/Multicultural services.

4.2.5.2 Spokesperson Coordinator The Spokesperson Coordinator isthe PVNCiS representative inthe flC who coordinates the Spokespersons andadvises andprepares materials forthe Palo Verde Spokespersoninthe preparation for media briellngs.

4.2.5.3Palo Verde Spokesperson ThePalo Verde Spokesperson isthe representative within the JIC organization authorized tospeak about actual emergency conditions at PVNGS.

4.2.5.4ERFCommunicator TheERFCommunicator istheJIC Palo Verderepresentative that provides anynecessary technicalexplanations tothe JICManager and the Palo Verde Spokesperson. TheJICERF Communicator interfaces with the ERFCommunicator inthe EOF.The ERF Communicator, maintains communications with his counterparts in the TSC,OSC,and EOF,andprovides information tothe JICSpokesperson Coordinator andthe Palo Verde Spokesperson regarding theoverall emergency activities.

4.2.5.5Research/Writing Coordinator TheResearch/Writing Coordinator develops public information material for the JIC. Uponfinalization ofmedia statements, the Research/Writing Coordinator distributes printed copies inthe JIC, auditorium, andtothe DEMArepresentative whoisresponsible for distribution tothe media.

4.2.5.6RumorControl/Public Inquiry TheRumorControl/Public Inquiry isoperated bythe Arizona Public Service Customer Care Center(CCC) Operators andaugments State Public Inquiry andRumorControl initiatives.CCCOperators provide information from approved media statements transmitted tothe CCC from the JIC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE34OF383 4.2.5.7 Video/Photo Coordinator TheVideo/Photo Coordinator operates audio/video equipment atthe JIC,including the EECAuditorium. TheVideo/Photo Coordinator maintains copies ofmedia briefings for archives.

4.3NON-1,1CENSEE SUPPORT Support from outside PVNGS consists oflocal service companies, institutions agencies, INPO,and contractor support.

4.3.1IOCAISERVICES SUPPORT Inemergency situations, PVNGS mayneed supplementary assistance from outside companies andservice agencies. Such assistance mayinclude transportation of injured and/or contaminatedpersonnel, medical treatment andhospital facilities for station personnel, andfire suppression assistance.

4.3.2CONTRACTSUPPORT Contract support mayinclude theNuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) supplier, the Architect Engineer, dosimetry, laboratory contractors, anddecontamination andradwaste disposal ilrms. PVNGShas arranged for selected contract support ilrms toprovide this assistance upon request.

4.4COORDINATIONWITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Foracomplete discussion ofauthority, assigned responsibilities, capabilities, and activation andcommunication arrangements refer tothe Offsite EmergencyResponse Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. PVNGSpersonnel coordinate emergency operations with state/ county government Emergency Operations Centers. Thestate, county, andcity Emergency Operations Center Organization isshown inFigure 7.

Safeguards andsecurity teamresponse are described inthe PVNGSSecurity Plan andits implementing procedures.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE35OF383 4.4.1STATEOF ARIzONA TheGovernor ofthe State ofArizona isresponsible for stategovernment operations. Thegovernor's decision authority isassumed bya successor inhis/her absence in accordance with the succession stipulated inthe Arizona Revised Statutes. Title 26,Chapter 2,Article I Ileads ofstate departments andagencies are responsible for the accomplishment ofemergency andrecovery tasksassigned bythe governor orhis/her authorized representative.

Inadditionto the support outlined inthe I.etters ofAgreement, the Offsite Emergency Response Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stationprovidesfor the following support functions for PVNGSinthe event ofanemergency fromthe indicated agencies. Also, mutual aid compacts andagreements between theState andother government and private entities defined inthe Offsite Emergency Response Plan multiply theresources available toPVNGS inanemergency.

4.4.1.1 Arizona Departmentof Emergency andMilitary Affairs TheArizona Department ofEmergency andMilitary Affairs(DEMA) isassigned tocoordinate the cooperative effort ofall non-technical governmental agencies, includingthe Federal government, Arizona State government andits political subdivisions, andprovides the necessary direction and control of state personnel and equipmentfor offsite response actions during radiological emergencies. Itisreferred tointhe Offsite Emergency Response Plan forPVNGS asthe Operations Directorate.

4.4.I.2 Arizona Division ofEmergency Management TheArizona Division ofEmergency Management (ADEM) isa division ofthe DEMAandis located onthe Papago Military Reservation at5636 East McDowell Road,Phoenix, Arizona. The Director, ADEM, provides advice andassistance tothe governor concerning emergency preparedness, operations andrecovery. The director isresponsible for coordinating the emergency planning, operations andrecovery effortsofstate agencies andpolitical subdivisions onthe governor's behalf. Thedirector isthe designated Policy Chief foroffsite government response toa radiologicalincident atPVNGS.

ADEMreceives Initial Notillcations from PVNGSandcoordinates the collection, analysis anddissemination ofinformation during anincident atthe Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). This is process

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE36OF383 conducted inconsort with the PVNGS,Maricopa County Dept. of Emergency Management (MCDEM),Arizona Department ofllealth Services (AzDilS) andother federal,state,local, TribalNation and volunteer agencies.

ADEM coordinates with AzDIIS andMCDEMtoensure monitoring of evacuees for possible radioactive contamination andsupervision and monitoring ofanydecontamination efforts.ADEMoversees requests for and coordination offederal technicalsupport andexchanges offield data and accident assessment information with PVNGS.

An emergency classification ornotification mayrequire governmental orprivatesector emergency organizations tocommit resources toonsite atthe requestof the PVNGS. Emergency resources mayinclude, but arenotlimited to, law enforcement, firefighting.medical support and ground orair services. Assistance mayberequested from other state govemments andprivate sector resources instates adjoining Arizona.

These resources mayinclude medical capabilities, emergency response equipment, andemergency response personnel. The state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) PolicyChief orthe Arizona Department of Health Services (AzDilS) Technical Operations Director will initiate requests.

4.4.1.3 Arizona Department ofIIealth Services TheDirector, Arizona Department ofllealth Services ( A7Di lS) is responsible for providing technical support inresponseto a radiological incident andprovides protective actionrecommendationsto the SEOC Policy Group andGovernor/designee. TheAzDIIS Directordesignates a Technical Operations Director tocoordinate public health support, response, andrecovery operations forAzDIIS staff. Arizona statutes require that the Emergency Response Plan bebinding onother governmental agencies andtherefore, Section 10.0 does notlist separate letters ofagreement with all agencies.

A7DilS isthe agency with primary offsite responsibility for carrying outradiological emergency assessment actions, coordinating the technical offsite agency response andproviding protective action recommendations tothe Governor/designee. Itisreferred tointhe Offsite Emergency Response Plan forPVNGSasthe Technical Operations Center, the Radiological Emergency Assistance Team Center, andthe Radiological Emergency Assistance Team1ab.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE37OF383 AzDHSprovides for collection andanalysis ofdata from theplant, Held radiation surveys andsample collection. AzDHSrepresentatives share information with EOFstaff regarding Geld teamlocations, field data andprotective actiondecisions andcollects datatoassess the accident, project dose andproject plume. PVNGSprovides AzDHS j with Follow UpNotifications andinfl>rmation concerning plant conditions during declared emergencies.

AzDHS lield monitors conduct radiation surveys todetermine ambient radiation levels, track the plume andcollect environmental and il)odstuff samples for analysis anddispatches a mobile laboratory to Buckeye Airport during the emergency (plume) phase for rapid evaluationof air samples.

AzDIIS conducts "just-in-time" radiological andprovides training equipment for alternate personnel prior tobeing deployed inresponse toa HAB incident.

4.4.1.4Arizona Department ofPublic Safety TheDepartment ofPublic Safety (DPS) provides law enforcement support for ADEMandMCSO.DPSalso serves asthe 24-hour point of contact for the State ofArizona inthe event of anemergency atthe PVNGS.

4.4.2MARICOPACOUNTY Maricopa Countyis the only county within the10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning zone. Portions offour other counties (La Paz,Pinal,Yuma, and Yavapai) areincluded inthe 50-mile Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPX.TheChairman of theMaricopa County Board ofSupervisors isresponsible for decisionmaking atthe county Maricopa level. County Department andAgency directorsareresponsible forthe ofemergency accomplishments andrecovery tasks assigned bythe DirectorofMCDEM.

4.4.2.1Maricopa County Department ofEmergency Management TheDirector, Maricopa County Department ofEmergency Management (MCDEM) provides technical andprofessional input to the Maricopa County Administrative Officer concerning planning, response andrecovery activitiesinthe event ofanemergency. The director isalso responsible for thecoordination ofemergency planning, response andrecovery activitieswith other Maricopa County agencies aswell asmunicipal entities.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE38OF383 Maricopa County Department ofEmergency Management receives l Initial Notifications ofemergency measures, from PVNGSandprovides public warning, for reception the implementation andcare center operation.

4.4.2.2 MaricopaCounty Sheriff's Office TheMaricopaCounty Sherift's Office (MCSO) receives Initial Notilleations from PVNGSona24-hour basis.TheMaricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) performs the Emergency Public Warning (alerting andpublic information), evacuation control andreentry, public protective action implementation, reception andcare center security and support (KI transport andimpound security), just intime radiological training andsupport state agriculturaloperations offood control.

MCSOprovides coordinated onsite/offsite direction andcontrol in accordance with the Maricopa County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). TheEOPauthorizes the Sheriff torequest assistance whenan incident isbeyond the ability of the Ofilee toresolve andworks under the Incident Command System (ICS) when responding toPVNGS Hostile Action Based (I-IAB) incidents.

MCSOis responsible for the initial andon-going assessment ofthe situation todetermine if terrorism isinvolved or responsible for the IIABincident. Ifandwhenthis determination is made. the Iederal Bureau ofInvestigation (I Bl) will benotified.

4.4.3FEDERAl, GOVERNMENT 4.4.3.1Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

TheNRCisresponsible for licensing andregulating nuclear facilities andmaterials. These responsibilities include protecting the public health andsafety, protecting the environment, andprotecting and safeguarding materials andnuclear plants inthe interest ofnational security. TheNRCIncident Response Plan objectives aretoprovide for protection from the effects ofradiological incidents that mayoccur at licensed facilities orwhich involve licensed materials. Inaddition to fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities, it isexpected that the NRCwill provide technical assistance andrecommendations.

TheNRCactsasthe lead federal agency regarding technical matters during anuclear incident, with the Chairman ofthe Commission asthe

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE39OF383 senior NRCauthority for all response aspects. TheChairman can transfer control ofemergency response activities whendeemed appropriate.

Incident Response Centers have been established ateach ofthe four NRCregional offices andatNRCIleadquarters tocentralize and coordinate NRC'semergency response. Each NRCRegion isprepared tosend a teamofqualitled specialists toanaccident scene. ForSite Area and General Emergencies, a NRCRegion IVsite teamis expected to be dispatched toPVNGS with arrival infour toeight hours following notifleation. Oft1cespace, telephones, andother equipment isprovided tor NRC personncI atthe T SC, EOFandJiC.

4.4.3.2Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Bythe National Response Framework, FEMAis responsible for the overall coordination of a multi-agency Federal response toasignitleant radiological incident.The primary role ofFEMAistosupport the states bycoordinating the deliveryof federal non-technical assistance. FEMA coordinates state andtribal requests forfederal assistance, identifying which federal agency canbest address specific needs. Ifdeemed necessary, FEMA will establish a nearby Federal ResponseCenter from which it willmanage its assistance activities.

4.4.3.3USDepartment ofEnergy (DOE)

TheDOEhas agreed toprovide radiological assistance upon request, andhas radiological monitoring equipment andpersonnel resources that itcanassemble anddispatch tothe scene ofa radiological incident.

Following a radiological incident, DOEoperates asoutlined inthe Federal Radiological Monitoring andAssessment Plan (FRMAP).DOE hasthe responsibility toestablish the Federal Radiological Monitoring andAssessment Center (FRMAC),which would provide comprehensive post-accident radiological monitoring andassessment.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE40OF383 4.4.3.4Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI)

Support from the FBIisavailable through its statutoryresponsibility, based inPublic Iaw andthe UScode, andthrough a memorandum of understandingfor cooperation with the NRC.Notification totheFBIof emergencies in which they would have aninterestwill bethrough the provisions ofthe PVNGSSecurity Plan, orbythe NRC.

4.4.3.5 National Weather Service (NWS)

NWS provides meteorological information during emergency situations, ifrequired. Data available will includeexisting and forecasted wind directions, wind speeds, andambient airtemperatures.

4.4.3.6Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

TheEPAcanassistwith field radiologica; monitoring, sampling, and nonplant related recovery and reentry guidance.

4.5INSTITUTE OF NUCLEARPOWEROPERATIONS (INPO)

INPOaids nuclear utilities inobtaining resources beyond their usual capabilitiesduring recoveryfromanemergency. Asoneofits roles.

INPOwill assist affected utilities by applyingtheresources ofthe nuclear industry tomeetthe needs of anemergency.

4.61,ETTERS OF AGREEMENT(IOAs) ofAgreement I.etters (1OAs) are notnecessary with federal andstate agencies thatare required legally torespond toanemergency; however. agreements arenecessary if an agencyisexpected toprovide assistance notrequired bylaw. Written agreements have beendeveloped which establish the extent ofoperations between PVNGSandother organizations support which have anemergency response roleconsistentwith this plan.

Theseagreements identify the emergency measures tobeprovided. the mutually accepted criteria forimplementation, andthe arrangements for exchange ofinformation. PVNGS hasobtained1OAswith private contractors andothers whoprovide emergency support services.

I.OAs,asa minimum, state that the cooperating organization willprovide their normalservicesinsupport ofanemergency atPVNGS.Ietters ofAgreement are inSection referenced 10andthe actual letters aremaintained onGle.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE41OF383

.NIAJOR nit Shared Site Site Staffing FLN( TIONAl AREA POSIIlON/FL N(TIONTITIE Staffing/l Staffing .lotals Shift Nianager Emergency Coordinator I 3 Control RoomSupervisor l 3 Plant Operations and Contiol RoomOperators 2 6 Assessment of Iire TeamAdvisor I I Operational Aspects Auxiliary Operators 4 12 Radiation ProtectionMonitor I I Shift Technical Advisor 2 2 STSCCommunicator (Covered by SeeAO abov e

Notifications Affected Unit)

Communications ENSCommunicator I I Cheniistry Technician (OSC) 2 2 Electrical Technician (OSC) 3 3 Niechanical Technician (OSC) 2 2 I&CTechnician (OSC) I I RFATDriv er(Water ResFacility) l I Support Staff Radiation Protection Technician (USC) 3 3 Radiation Monitoring Technician I I RMcrRPTechnician (OSC) I I SuneyQualified Position (OSC) 1 1 Security Section I.eaderDirector (TSC) 1 1 (not committed toarmed response)

Iire Suppression Plant Fire Department. Emergency Medical Rescue Operations and Technicians (Atleast 2 Fire Team 5 5 FirstAid Niembers areEMTqualified)

Site Access Controland Plant Security

. Staffine '

per Staffing per Personnel Accountabihty Plan Security Plan Security TOTAl S 8/l'nit

= 24 26 Shared Total 50 AUGMENTATIONSTAFFING NormalIlours OffIlours NIajor Functional Position litle ON SIIII/I.60 NIINI Area .. ,

I'ES 120 NIINl:TES Emeruency Direction and IEuereenev Coordinator (TSC) l l Control Euereenev O)erations Dir(EOF) I I Technical SuortElectrical (TSC) 1 1 Plant System Engineerine Technical Su)ort Mechanical (TSC) 1 1 Repair andCorrective Reactor Analyst (TSC) l l Actions 6 Immediate 6 Radiation Protection Technicians During Normal Protective Actions (OSL ..

I liours Eauineerine Director (EOF) I I Communications NAN Communicator (EOF) I l Offsite Support 45Minutes Fire Fire Suppression Ottsite Department from time of.

rec uest Offsite Support Rescue Operations andFirst Offsite.

Ambulance 45Minutes Aid from time of.

retuest TOTAIS 13 13 TABLE I MINIMUM SiliFT STAFFINGFOREMERGENCIES

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE42OF383 CONTROLROOM/STSC EMERGENCY COORDINATOP (FC)

Conro. Roorn Urm Snift Radalion GTT Seconty Dnectoa Gotwrv>3or T.rm>cal Advisor Protection Monlo' Cornmunicator1 .  :

j....--.3 CR Opeiators j Rad+abon l j Manitoring  ;

! Teennician : Conunumcator ...................

FireT*>arr l L....--....-J . ........,

Radiation j ope,ation Aww

Monitonog Toms Gl.ift Te.1u,iw Aivisor itjraaffected Jniti l MC Managerj t

.......3 j

Peraa T.:ans l DashedboxdenotesPositions notphysically locatedultheCR Augnwr,'ed traEra FIGURE1 ONSIIIFT EMERGENCY ORGANIzATION

G i Engineer M MT

ocrc1rar l OGC Reacto

.. ............, on-,a Repen Teams * ,

(OSC< C.Nr>4 i-................' COCJ'2' FIGURE2 TECllNICAl,SUPPORT CENTERORGANIzATION

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE44OF383 OPERATIONS SUPPORTCENTER(OSC)

OSCMariatjei ERF Adnunistrative Communicator Support RadProtection Repairs GroupLead Coordinator

> 4 RPTechnicians Mochanice Chemistry Evectricians Technicans I& C Technicans

i. TeamMembers.

Ropmir asneeded q

RFATDnver J

FIGLRE3 OPERATIONS SttPPORT CENTERORGANizATION

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE45OF383 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY(EOF)

EMERGENCY OPERATlONS DIRECTOR Radio:ogical Assist Emergency Secunty Assessment Engineeing Directc Operations Director Manager Coordinator OcseAssessment ERF Hea?th Physiast Communicator Administrative Staff HPN Communicator NAN Communicator Radiological Assessment Communicater

!SManager j RFATTeams j u..................*

Offsite Technical Representative FIGtRE4 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITYORGAN1zATION

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE46OF383 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER(JIC)

Manage atC f 4 4 -

V deo hoto Research/

Wr;trg .

Coordinaor ocrdanator I l

/ '

ho I

! Care Customer I

l Cer*.e l /

l ao Verde l Spokesperson 5po6espersor Coo-dinator I l I l l I m Communcator l 5tate 5pokesperson I l I l I C, l Spo6esperson I l I I I Oher l Spokespersons N - - - - -

/

5 ,IOINTINFORMATIONCENTERORGANizATION FIGl!RE

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE47OF383 I

I I COUNTY

@ I I

I EMERGENCY I ' OPERATIONS' s I '

CENTER '

s s j I

I GTATE niirwrvFani*rs nFPARTMFNT JOINT I EqR gC3 INFORMATION g CENTER I I ' '

I I s I

I s I

I s EMERGENCY

' I I

OPERATIONS l I

FACILITY l I I I I L---------------- I

---

q I @ I I

I TECHNICAL I I SUPPORT I I CENTER I I I I I I I I I I I I OPERATIONS l j SC P9PTOcRpT CONTROL ROOM I

! I i I i I L----------------------------------g FIGilRE6 ONSITE/OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIzATIONINTERFACE

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE48OF383 overnor o Arizona SEOCPolicy Chief AzDHSDirector AzDA Director Policy Group HEOC Agriculture Command Center l

1 Technical Operations Operations Director MaricopaCounty Plans Technical - - --

MCEOC OperationsCenter Logistics MCSOEOR RFATForward Finance & Admin City ofBuckeye RFATCenter AzDHSEOF Liaison FlGl!RE7 STATE,COlINTY& 1,OCAI EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER ORGANizATION

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE49OF383 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONSAND CLASSIFICATIONS 5.1 EN1ERGENCY CONDITIONS Emergency classification isdivided into four classification levels. Emergency Action I.evels (EALs), based onindications available inthe control roomandcorrelated tothe emergency classilleations, areprovided tothe operator.

TheEAlswere discussed andagreed upon byPalo Verde andstate andcounty governmental authorities, andapprovedbythe NRC. EAl s arereviewed with the State andlocal governmental authorities onanannual basis.

PVNGShas andmaintainsthe capability toassess, classify, anddeclare anemergency condition within 15minutes after the availability ofindications toplant operators that an EAl. has been exceeded. Uponidentincation ofthe appropriate emergency classiBeation level the emergency condition will be promptly declared.

Thefour emergency classificationlevels are described in the following sections:

EllERGENCYCl,ASSIFICATION1,EVEl,DESCRIPTIONS There arethree considerations related toemergency elassification levels. These are:

l)Thepotential impact onradiological safety, either asknown now orascanbe reasonably projected:

2)Howlar the plant isbeyond itspredeGned design, safety, andoperating envelopes; and 3)Whether ornotconditions thatthreaten health areexpected tobeconfined to within the site boundary.

TheTCsdeal explicitly withradiological safety impact byescalating from levels corresponding toreleases within regulatory limits toreleases beyond EPAProtective Action Guideline (PAG) plume exposure levels.

M Events areinprogress orhave occurred which indicate apotential degradation ofthelevel ofsafety ofthe plant orindicate a security threat tofacility protection has been initiated.

No releases ofradioactive material requiring offsiteresponse ormonitoring areexpected unless further degradation ofsafety systems occurs.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE50OF383 ALERT Events areinprogress orhave occurred which involve anactual substantial orpotential degradation of thelevelofsafety ofthe plant ora security event involves that probable life threatening risktositepersonnel ordamage tosite equipment becauseof IIOSTIl I ACTION. Anyreleases areexpected tobelimited tosmall fractions oftheEPAPAG exposure levels.

Events areinprogress orhaveoccurred which involve actual orlikelymajor titiluresof plant functions needed for protection of thepublic orIIOSTII E ACTIONthat results in intentional damage ormalicious acts:I) toward sitepersonnel orequipment thatcould lead tothe likelyfailureofor; 2) that preventeffective access to,equipment needed forthe protection ofthe public.Anyreleases arenotexpected toresult inexposurelevels which exceed EPAPAGexposure levels beyond the site boundary.

M Events areinprogress orhave occurred which involve actual orIMMINENTsubstantial core degradation ormelting with potentialfor loss of containment integrity orIIOSTllE ACTIONthat resultsinanactual loss ofphysical control of the Releases facility. canbe reasonably expected toexceed EPAPAGexposure levels offsite for morethan the immediate sitearea.

5.2 BASISFORPALOVERDENUCLEARGENERATINGSTATION (PVNGS)

CIASSiFICATION CRITERIA EMERGENCYACTIONIEVELS(EAI s)

Thesite specificimplementation ofthe guidance wasapproved bytheNRCina safety evaluation dated September 8,2016 andincorporated into Appendix A ofthe PVNGS Emergency Plan Revision 59andinthe Emergency Preparedness Implementing Procedures.

Palo Verde Generating Station's Emergency Classification andEmergency Action I.evel (EAl.) scheme isbased onthe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Amendment No.198toRenewed FacilityOperating Iicense No.NPF-41,Amendment No.198to Renewed IacilityOperating Iicense No.NPI-5IandAmendment No.198toRenewed Facility Operating 1.icense No.NPF-74 forthe Palo Verde Generating Units Station, 1,2, and3.respectively. Theamendments consist ofchanges tothe emergency actionlevel (EAI.) scheme inresponse toa Palo Verde Generating Station application dated October 9,2015, assupplemented byletter dated May12,2016.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE51OF383 Theamendments revised Palo Verde Generating Station's EAL scheme based onthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance documentNI?l Revision 99-01. 5,"Development of Emergency Action Levels forNon-Passive toonebased Reactors," onNEl99-01, Revision 6.NEI99-01, Revision 6,which wasendorsedbytheNRCbyletter dated March 28,2013 (Agency-wide Documents AccessandManagement System Package Accession No.MI 13091A209).

6.0EMERGENCY MEASURES This section establishesthe methodology ofemergency andisthe response basis forthe EPIPs whichdefine the emergency actions tobetaken during Emergency anemergency. measures followasequential process which contains the definable following elements:

• Event Assessment

• Classification andDeclaration

• Notification

• Mobilization

• Consequence Assessment

• Protective Actions

• Corrective Actions 6.1EVENTASSESSMENT Initial recognitionofemergency conditionsshouldnormally occurintheControl Room.

Emergency conditionsmaybeindicated by instrument alarms, readings orreports to the Control Room. The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) provide should initial evaluation of the indicatorsandnotify the Shift Manager (SM).TheSMevaluates theconditions against the established EALstodetermine ifanEAIhas been reached orexceeded.

6.2CI,ASSIFICATION AND DECI,ARATION An emergency shallbeclassitled anddeclarediftheSM 11nds thata specificEALhas been reached.exceeded, orif the SMdetermines that isimminent it thatthespecific EAL set-point willbereached orexceeded.

Whenthe SMdeclares anemergency totheControlRoompersonnel,anannouncement will bemadeover theunit public address andthe system. other ControlRoomsand Security will benotilled.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE52OF383 Forthose abnormal situations potentially involving morethan oneunit,the Unit1SMis responsible for initiallyclassifying anddeclaring the emergency andassuming the position of IC.Exceptions are considered for selected security events.

6.3NOTIFICATION Initial Notifications aremade tostate andlocal agencies andtheNRCinaccordance with establishedprocedures. Theprocedures include ameansofmessage verification.

The l InitialNotifications declaration tostate andcounty oftheemergency. TheNotifleation agencies aremadewithin Alert Network 15minutes (NAN) isa ofthe communications linkfor notitleations tooffsite agencies. 8and9).

(Figures Thelicensee shall notify the NRC immediately afternotification ofthe appropriate State orlocal agencies andnotlaterthan one hour the after time the licensee declaresoneofthe Emergency Classes.

InitialNotillcation ofstate andcounty agencies consists ofthe mutually following agreed toinformation:

e Plant identification a Emergency Classification (or termination)

• Date andTimeofClassification (ortermination) a Current Emergency Action I.evel

• Wind speed anddirection a Authentication

• Current release status

• Protective Actions Recommendations (if any)

Follow UpNotifications areprovided tothe predesignated offsite agency. Thedata transmitted ismutually agreed upon andused forthe purpose ofaidinginthedecision-making process thattakes place offsite.

6.4MOHll,IzATION Theemergency organization for anUnusual Eventconsists ofnormalshiftpersonnel.

Augmentation ofthis organization mayoccur atthediscretionoftheEC.During normal station work hours, notilleation ofonsite EROmayoccur viaPAannouncement, emergency evacuation system and/or mobile devices.

During off-hours, notification ofEROisaccomplished the byactivating automated callout system. A manual system isalso available if theautomated systemisnotavailable.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE53OF383 ForanUnusual Event classification, on-shift personnel respondtotheemergency andthe event is directed from the affected unit Control Room/ STSC. Command ofthe situation remains there with the on-shift Emergency Coordinator (EC)untiltermination/recovery or reclassification toahigher level emergency occurs. Foreventsaffecting all three units, command andcontrol isinUnit 1 APS/Palo Verde Communications provides media interface during anUnusual Event.

Inthe event of an Alert orhigher classification level, the ECorders on-shift the activation ofthe TSC,OSC, EOF, andJIC. Theonsite EROis directed bythe EC-TSC. TheEODin the EOFprovides overall coordination ofthe event anddirection oftheERO.

6.5CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT Assessment actions will continue throughout the emergency. Continued assessment may result inreclassification ofthe emergency andalteration ofemergency response actions.

Priority will begiven tocontinuing assessment actions thatresult in:

• Protective Action Recommendations for the health and safety ofthe general public a Protective Actions for onsite personnel

• Maintaining control ofthe plant a Resolving anemergency situation

• Corrective actions toreduce the consequences ofanemergency 6.5.1 Assessment Action for Control ofPlant Operations Theexistence ofanyemergency condition causes increased monitoring ofControl Roominstrumentation tomonitor trends ofappropriateparameters, particularly the indicated values that triggered the emergency andthosethatmayberelated.

Additional monitoring equipment maybeused the toassess nature ofthe emergency condition. A Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) display console isinthe Control Roomandisaccessible toControl Roompersonnel.

6.5.2Environmental Assessment forProtection oftheIlealth& Safety ofthePublic PVNGShas the responsibility toperform a preliminaryassessment ofthe offsite consequences ofanincident. Environmental AssessmentforProtection ofthe Health andSafety ofthe Public isperformed byPVNGSusing twomethods:

a DoseAssessment a Environmental Surveys

PVNGS EMERGENCY PiAN REVISION69 PAGE54OF383 Dose Assessment isperformed bytrained personnel usingcomputer generated dose projections orother approved methodologies based onplant parameters and/or site eftluent release data. Theinitial assessment will beperformed within 30 minutes of thedeclaration ofanyemergency classification. liPIP's provide recommendations for protective action recommendations whenindicated bydose assessment results.

Environmental Surveyswill beinitiated asa minimum following the declaration of Alert orhigher. An Environmental Teamwill bedeployed within 30minutes to support these surveys. Environmental Teamsmeasure dose rate readings andnoble gasandiodineconcentrations.

PVNGSmaintains fully equipped and dedicated vehicles tosupport Environmental Teams. Air monitoringequipment has the capability todetect under field conditions. radioiodine concentrations inair aslow asI-7microcuries per cubic centimeter.

PVNGSdeploys Survey Teams offsite at least until AzDHShas mobilized its Radiological Emergency Assistance Team (REAT). Approximately three(3) hours isestimated for REATdeployment. Iong-term offsite assessments and dose tothe public (ingestion pathway EPz) arethe responsibility ofAzDilSandsupported by Federal resources.

Radiological data developed byeither ofthese techniques is used toassess appropriateness ofClassification andProtective Action Recommendations.

Environmental assessment issupported bya permanent meteorological installation which continuously indicates andrecords wind speed direction andtemperature differentials. Meteorological data maybeobtained from the National Weather Service. This system isdescribed insection 7.3.1 I 6.5.3In-plant Radiological Controls During the course ofanemergency, elevated radiation orcontamination levels may beexperienced. It maythen benecessary toimpose additional radiological controls beyond the controls established bythe normal in-plant radiological controls program.

In-plant radiological controls inanemergency situation maydiffer from normal radiological control activities inthe following aspects:

• Maintaining strict access control into affected plantareas

= Availability anduseofaugmented dosimetry

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE55OF383

• Additional useofportable radiation monitoring devices. particularly high range monitoring devices, il3rmonitoring contamination andarea radiation levels a Increased availabilityanduseofprotective clothing andrespiratory devices

• Increased air sampling for the purpose oflimiting the number ofpersons subject toexposure a Increased whole body counting andother bio-assays Initialassessment ofthe need tor in-plant radiological controls maybebased on plantreadings, RMS readings,in-plant EPDreadings andsystem status reports.

Additional information concerning in-plant radiological conditions maybegained during the debriefing ofpersonnel deployed with Emergency Repair andSurvey Teams.

6.5.4Reactor CoreDamage Assessment Initialassessment ofthe status of the reactor core isperformed bythe STA.Initial assessment ofcore conditions isbased on readings ofControl Room instrumentation andassessment ofSPDS data.

PriortoTSCactivation, the STAinthe STSC provides additional capabilityfor assessment ofreactor core damage.

Whenthe TSCisactivated, the Reactor Analyst assesses core conditions underthe direction ofthe Engineering Manager. Information isobtained fromthe SPDSand criticalparameter values from ERFDADS.

Palo Verde's Core Damage Assessment program wasdeveloped based onthe Combustion Engineering Owners Group Task Development 4 67, ofthe Comprehensive Procedure Guidelines for CoreDamage Assessment.

6.6CORRECTIVEACTIONS PVNGSprocedures contain stepsfor preventive and/or corrective actionstoavoid or mitigate serious consequences ofanincident. These steps are contained in AOP, EOP, and other procedures.

plant 6.7PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ofprotective A range actions has been developed foremergency workersandthe public.

Theguidelines for emergency workers are consistent with E PA emergency andworker lifesaving activity protective actionguides.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE56OF383 Protective actions areemergency measures taken during andafter anemergency sothat onsite personnel andthe general public are alerted andactions areinitiated flarthe protection oftheir healthandsafety. Protective actions areinitiated if radiation orairborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined values orwhensituations threaten the health andsafety ofonsite personnel orthe general public.

Theresponsibility for thedetermination ofProtective Actions forWorkers andthe General Public is implemented asfollows:

• Protective actions for onsite personnel andvisitors arethe responsibility ofthe PVNGSEmergency Coordinator.

• Protective Actions forEmergency Workers operating under the State orCounty Emergency Plan aretheresponsibility ofthe AzDIIS. Measures for the protection of these Emergency Workers are detailed inthe Offsite Emergency Response Plan for PVNGS.

• Protective Measures for the General Public are directed bythe Governor ofArizona andimplemented byMaricopa County. It is the responsibility ofPVNGStoprovide Protective Action Recommendations forthe Evacuation and/or Shelter ofthe General Public within theI0Mile EP7inaddition to a recommendation for Potassium lodide whenappropriate. PVNGSincoordination with the State ofArizona (ADEM and AzDIIS) along withMaricopa County have formulated a protective action strategy consistent with the guidance contained within "NDRE(i 0654, Supplement 3,Criteria for Preparation andEvaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness inSupport ofNuclear Power P lants, (inidance for Protective Action Strategies, November 201I.

Measures for the protection ofthe general public aredetailed inthe Offsite Emergency Response Plan for PVNGS.

6.7.1PROTECTIVEACTIONFORONSITEPERSONNEl, Protective actions foronsite personnel mayinclude alerting, personnel assembly, accountability, andevacuation aswell assecurity procedures, access control, monitoring anddecontamination. Protective actions mayalso betaken for onsite personnel foremergencies such as11res or natural disasters where personnel safety isthreatened.

6.7.I.1Ilostile Action Onsiteprotection ofemployees during ahostile action involves a combination ofrestricted movement, movementtosafe locations, and siteevacuation depending onthe nature ofthe hostile event and advance warning. Site procedures provide specifle actions totake duringhostile actionbased events.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE57OF383 6.7.1.2Alerting Unit personnel are alertedbyanaudible signal andanannouncement over the unit public addresssystem. Site personnel arealerted by activation ofanaudible signal followed bypublic address system announcements. Evacuation/accountability isassured inhigh noise workareas bythe useofaudible alarms, flashing lights, and/or administrative measures.

The PVNGS Site Warning Siren/Public Address System of consists electronic sirenswith four distinct sounds: (I) assembly signal,(2) evacuation signal. (3) firesignal, and(4) all-clearsignal.These signals areintroduced prior toinitial site access andareavailable ona phone recording. The emergency signal canbeactivated from the Control Room,and the TSC.

6.7.1.3Assembly Personnel assembly ismandatory atthe Site Area Emergency orhigher level classification. Assembly of site personnel outside ofthe Protected Areas isaccomplished byall personnel reporting todesignated assembly areas. Assembly maybeinitiated atanytime site management deems i t appropriate for personnel safety reasons.Inthe case ofahostile actionthreatorevent. designated assembly points will beannounced via thePublic Address System. The designated assembly points mayinclude onsiteassembly points oroffsite mustering points.

Assembly mayalso beused asa tool toinitiate theTwo-Man Rule during Security events.

6.7.I.4Accountability Personnel accountability within the Protected Areais mandatory atthe Site Area Emergency. Accountability maybeinitiated atother timesat the discretion ofthe ECtosupport worker safety.

Accountability ofpersonnel within theProtected Areas isaccomplished within 30minutes ofthe declaration ofSite AreaEmergency orhigher, andmaintained continuously thereafter. using ProtectedArea(s) boundary access controlasdescribed inthe PVNGSSecurity Plan.If there arestation personnelwhoareunaccounted for,the Unit Evacuation System andsitewide page areused tolocate them. or,in extreme cases (fire,toxicgasrelease, exp:osions, structuraldamage,

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE58OF383 trained etc.), search andrescue personnel aredeployed tosearch forand assistthe missing personnel.

6.7.1.5 Evacuation Thedecision toevacuate non-essential personnel ismadebythe l?C.

Nonessential personnel mustbeevacuated inthe event ofa Site Area Emergency orGeneral Emergency. Ilowever. incertain situations it may bedesirable toevacuate earliertoenhance worker protection.

6.7.I.6Security andAccess Control PVNGS Security personnel atSecurity Access Control Pointsare instructed to admit only emergencypersonnel anddesignated County, StateandNRC personnel. Special onsite security measures have been developed tofacilitate rapid access byemergency response personnel.

Incase ofa Securitycontingency eventsuch asa direct armed attack, Security's response actions may beprimarilyfocused onthe Security event andtake precedence over emergency response duties.

6.7.I.7Monitoring andDecontamination Personnel aremonitored forcontamination atthe SecurityAccess Points asthey depart the Power Plant Protected Area byportal monitors. Personnel located outside the Power Plant Protected Area are monitored asrequired byradiological conditions.If decontamination of personnel isrequired, they aredecontaminated bytrained personnel.

Onsite emergency personnel aremonitored forcontamination attheir respective emergency stations. Decontamination ofonsite emergency personnel isconducted atonsite decontamination facilities.

6.7.1.8Protective Equipment andSupplies A variety ofprotective equipment isavailable onsite tominimize radiological exposures, contamination problems andGrefighting hazards.

6.7.I.8.1 Respiratory Protection Equipment Respiratory protection equipment includes full face canister respirators, self-contained breathing apparatus andair-fed respirators. Radiation Protection personnel determine when the useofrespiratory protection equipment isappropriate

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE59OF383 andselect the correct type ofequipment for conditions expected tobeencountered.

6.7.1.8.2 Protective Clothing Protective clothing ismaintained onsite for routineuseand is available for useduring emergencies.

6.7.1.8.3 Thyroid Blocking Agent Thel?C isthe only individual whomayauthorize the voluntary useofpotassium iodide (Kl) for emergency personnel. The EC-TSC authorizes the useofKIwith the advice of the Radiation Protection Coordinator. Theuseof Klis based onthe potential for r oronthe elease, magnitude ofanactual release, ofiodine. Klisdistributed to emergency workers when itsuseisauthorized.

6.7.1.8.4 Emergency Dosimetry Dosimetry islocatedin close proximity toall emergency centers andavailable forissue toemergency personnel as necessary byRadiation Protection personnel.

6.7.2OFFSITEPROTECTIVEACTIONS Protective Actions for the General Public inresponse toradiolouical emereencies include sheltering orevacuation of the and public issuance the ofPotassium lodide basedonconsideration ofthe relative benefits ofeach action. Theaction which affords thehigher level ofdose avoidance, whenoffsite doses areexpected to exceedProtective Action Guides, ispreferred. Ilowever. other suchas litctors duration.

release mobilization time oradverse weather areimportant considerationsaffecting offsite protective action recommendations. Evacuation sections route andevacuation routing areshown inF:gure 11 It isthe ofPVNGStomakeProtective responsibility Action Recommendations, the Governorofthe StateofArizona tomakeProtective Action Decisions and MaricopaCounty toimplement the Protective Action Decision. The communications flow path associated with Protective Action Recommendations is illustrated inFigure 10.

Thecurrentlivacuation TimeEstimate isused toassist informulating protective bythe actions offsite authorities. PVNGShas perfl>rmed anEvacuation Time asrequired Estimate by10CFR50, Appendix 1 PVNGSwill

. estimate EP7

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE60OF383 permanent resident population changes during the years between decennial censuses using U.S.Census Bureau data. State andlocal government population data isused ifavailable.These estimates shall occur nomorethan 365days apart andthe resultsprovided tostate andlocal emergency management agencies for factoring into protectiveactions asneeded. 1.icensees shallmaintain these estimates availablefor NRCinspection during the periodbetween censuses and shall submit these estimates tothe NRCwith anyupdated ETEs. Ifatanytime during the decennial period, the population increases sothat the ETEfor the2-mile zoneor5-mile zone, includingall affected ERPAs,orfor the entire EP/,increases by25percent or 30minutes, whichever isless, for the scenario with the longest ETE,the ETEanalysis will beupdated toreflect the impact ofthat population increase.

6.7.2.1Protective Actions fortheGeneral Public Thebasis fordeveloping andproviding Protective Action Recommendations isEPA-400, "Manual ofProtective Action Guides andProtective Actions For Nuclear Incidents." Protective action recommendations forthe general public consider the time required fi>r notificationofoffsite authorities, for public alerting andfor implementation of protective actions. in thecase o facore melt situation,evacuation ofatleast a two-mile radius around the plantsite andatleast five miles downwind for affected sectors isrecommended.

A Shelter recommendation maybemadebythe State for impediments toevacuation. A Shelter recommendation maybemade bythe station if release conditions dictate.Governmental officials will also beadvised toconsider the useofPotassium lodide (Kl) asa protective measure.

Whenevacuation isordered, the Offsite Emergency Response Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station provides, asa minimum, for evacuation by22.5 degree sectors considering first the sector inwhich thecentral axis ofthe plume islocated andthen the adjacent sector on each side.Implementation ofprotective actions 11)r the general public is described inthe Offsite Emergency Response Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. Timeestimates forevacuation within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning zone aremaintained in the Bles ofEmergency Preparedness Department. Thedemography within thePlume Exposure Pathway isshown inFigure 12.

Offsite authorities receive animmediate notification 11)r:

• Change inemergency elassincation a Change inthe release status

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE61OF383

= Change inProtective Action Recommendations

• Change inthe ProtectiveAction zone 6.7.3 CONTAMINATION CONTROLMEASURES 6.7.3.1 Plant Site Specine area limits havebeen established forcontrol ofcontamination within the PVNGSflicility. Thebasis fortheselimits isthat contamination shall becontrolled sothat hazardstopersonnel are minimized andcompliance with personnel exposure limits and (internal external) isassured. Asnecessary, Contamination Areas areestablished andposted. Details ofcontamination control measures foronsite personnel and equipment are contained inthePVNGSRadiation Protection Program.

6.7.3.2 Offsite Criteria andmeasures forcontamination inoffsite control areas are detailed inthe Offsite Imergency Response Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.

6.8AIDTO AFFECTEDPERSONNEL 6.8.1EllERGENCYPERSONNELDOSECRITERIA Emergency workers carry electronicalarming dosimetersinaddition to Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (Tl.Ds). Dosimeters arereadatintervals dependent upon radiation levels inaccordance with PVNGSNuclear Administrative andTechnical Manual Procedures. Inadditiontoself-readout capability,the dosimeters arecapable ofalarming ondose ordose rate.

Emergency dosimetry isprovided ona24-hour basisbyRadiation Protection personnel. Every effort ismadetominimize emergency worker doses throughthe useofprotective equipment andsupplies andbyminimizing exposure time.

Emergency exposures above administrative guidelines areauthorized bythe Radiation Protection Monitor (RPM), Radiation Protection Coordinator ortheEC.

TheRPMorRadiation ProtectionCoordinator mayauthorize exposures uptothe 10CFR20limits, andthe ECauthorizes exposures above 10CFR20limits, in accordance with procedures. Emergency worker dosecriteria arebased onthree categoriesofactions: sampling under accident lifesaving conditions, actions,and corrective/protective actions.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE62OF383 TheECisnotified ofaccidental oremergency dose inexcess ofoccupational limits. Decisions toaccept doses inexcess ofoccupational limits inlife-saving situations are ona voluntary basis.

6.8.2 DECONTAMINATION AND FIRSTAID Provisions exist toassist personnel whoareinjured andwhohave received high radiation doses, orwhohave been contaminated. Decontamination materials and portable first aid kits areavailable atstrategic locationsthroughout thestation and offsite. There are personnel trained inGrst aidanddecontamination procedures. In addition, onsite decontamination areas equipped with decontamination facilities, supplies, andother specialized equipment arelocatednear the access control point ontheI40 ft.elevation in the Auxiliary Building ofeach unit. Personnel found to beexternally contaminated are decontaminated. Where contamination oflarge, open wounds is involved, personnel are transportedtoBanner University Medical Center orBanner Estrella Medical Center. Contaminated PVNGSevacuees are decontaminated atthe Offsite Relocation Area.Waste fluids andwastes from decontamination ofpersonnel ormaterial are collected and handled asradioactive wastes inaccordance with the PVNGSNuclear Administrative andTechnical Manual, except atthe offsite relocation where radioactive wastes area, arehandled under guidance the of AzDIIS.

6.8.3MEDICAI, TRANSPORTATION Injured/externally contaminated personnel whorequire medical attention are transported toBanner University Medical Center orBanner Estrella Medical Center byanavailable onsite oroffsite air orground ambulance.

6.8.4MEDICAITREATMENT Letters ofagreement fortreating externally contaminated patients existfor Banner University Medical Center andBanner EstrellaMedical Center.

Treatment ofindividuals injured mayoccur attheonsite medical facility during normal working hours orbyEMTqualified personnel onweekends orbackshift.

Serious injuries mayrequire thepatient tobetransferred tothe nearest offsite treatment facilityappropriate tothe injury.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE63OF383 6.9 MEDIA REIATIONS Provisions for media relations during the courseofanemergency inthe aredetailed Joint Public Information Procedure.WhenanUnusual Eventisdeclared, newsmedia relations areconducted fromAPS/PaloVerde Atthe Communications. orhigher Alert classification level, the Joint Center Information isactivated at600North Way, Verrado Building with A, Buckeye, Arizona, inaccordance theguidelines oftheJoint Public Information Procedure. ThePublicInquiry Centeratthe StateEOCandtheRumor Control Center attheAPS Customer Care Centerrespondtopublic inquiries.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE64OF383 PVNGS Umt1 Umt2 Room Control Control Room.=

STSC STSC Umt3 EOF Room Control SISC DPS MCSO DEMA MCDEM GOVERNMENT ORGANIzATIONS FIGURE8 NOTIFICATIONAl,ERT NETWORK(NAN)

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE65OF383 NORMALWORKINGHOURS PVNGS DPS DEMA MCDEM MCSO Dinrict AzDHS Director Director OnScene Commander Dutc and and Conunander 05cer Operational Operational Response Response Agencies &

Agencie',

BPD OFF-Dm HOURS PUJGS DPS MCSO DEMA A2DHS MCDEM Duty Duty Duty Omeer O5cer OEcer BPD FIGURE9 NANNOTIFICATIONFLOW

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE660F383 Onshit Onsite andOsite Organization Organization activated activated CONTROl. ROOM pop (STSC) l - -

l l l liADIATii)N PROTECTION gm m,g4, l M()NITOR ,.c ~

l mygy l renttr>Fc r@dTFrTlr' (()()RDINATOR IMIR(il NCY l<'Th)AtDUk'E FoR fFC'T l l l

~

COORDINATOR 1 Rh)/"Gh'll-(IT ) t .)

l l l l SillFT -

IMlR(iENCY l TFCllNICA[. l OPIRATlUNN l 3jyyjgogg l l)ETERU/%F%' D1RE('TOR I'ROTEC E At'Tl0%

Tli Ridi)UMEAI itThI%

l l ..

l . .

l NAN

~

COM ATM l COMMNl('ATOR l l

,r ~3 AIAKEN O/'/N///;

NOl//:l('AlloN V/ANAN L j FIGURE10 COMMUNICATIONS 1,EADING TO PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR)

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE67OF383 7.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT This section describes emergency response facilities,onsiteandoiTsite communications system links, assessment equipment andfacilities. 11rst aid andmedical facilities, anddamage controlequipment.

7.1EMERGENCY CENTERS 7.1.1 CONTRO1 ROOM (CR)

TheCRisinthe Control Building onthe 140-foot levelandis designed tobe habitable duringDesign Basis Accidents. The which CR, includes the Shift Manager's contains full office, plant instrumentation, ERFDADS/SPDS, a Qualified SPDS display. and communication linksasdescribed in Table 3and Section 7.2, andtechnicaldrawings. Protective breathing apparatus, emergency radiological monitoring equipment, andprotective clothing arestored inthe emergency kitoutside the CR.

7.1.2REMOTESllUTDOWNPANEl ROOM (RSP)

An emergency requiring the evacuation ofthe CR results inshutdown controlfrom the RSP.TheRSPhas tworedundant andindependent setsofplant controls. Each redundant control area hasits own Radio Console and administratively dedicated phone line. aswell asEPAl3X telephone andsound-powered phone asdescribed in Table 3andSection 7.2.

7.1.3SATELLITETECIINICAL SUPPORTCENTER(STSC)

Itprovides directtechnical support tothe CRpersonnel inthe areas of:

= Engineering andtechnical analytical support

= Reactor analyticalsupport

= Radiological analytical support An ERFDADS/SPDS display andvarious communications equipment, as described inTable 3 andSection 7.2,areavailable inthe STSC.

7.1.4OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER(OSC)

TheOSCisthe entire 140' level ofthe Auxiliary Building andOperations Support Building ofeach unit.Emergency equipment required isstored inemergency kits inthe OSC.TheOSCalso includes the Radiation Protection area which provides a

decontamination facility,a fixed radiological counting facility, andaccess tothe

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE68OF383 station's radiation protection records andforms. TheOSCserves asthe point of origin for Environmental Teams andRepair Teams. Variouscommunications links, asdescribed inTable 3andSection 7.2, areavailableinthe OSC.

Inthe event theOSCbecomes uninhabitable, anunaffected OSCmaybeused unit as an alternate OSC.

7.I.5TECIINICAL St!PPORT CENTER(TSC)

TheTSCis the II)cal point 113ronsite emergency operations directing andft)r and assisting the Control Roomduring unitemergency conditions.

Keystation management andtechnical personnel arestationed atthe TSCduringthe emergency toprovide the guidance required foraccidenttermination and mitigation.

TheTSCisstaffed andactivated during anAlert, Site AreaEmergency,orGeneral Emergency andislocated belowgrade immediately southwest ofBldg. "D"inside the Protected Area.

TheTSCiscentrally located within tenminutes walking time fromtheCRofeach ofthe three Palo Verde units. Thefunctionspertl)rmed inthe TSCinclude:

• Manage onsite emergency response

• Direct in-plant radiological protection activities

• Direct emergency maintenance

• Direct personnel accountability andsite security e Coordinate safety andhazards controlthrough the Control Room and the Onsite Fire Dept.

a Perform engineering andtechnical analyses for control roomsupport a Perfl3rm reactor analyses for controlroomsupport e Provide I& C technical support

• Coordinate computer technical support

• Provide chemistry technical support TheTSChasERFDADS/SPDS computer terminals, which CRparameters display il)reach unit,the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS), thestation meteorological system, andother parameters. Capability existsinthe TSCtorapidlyretrieve plant documents, drawings, procedures andplans. TheTSC(when activated) isthe central location 11)r thereceipt andanalysis ofin-plant radiological monitoring data. TheTSChasvarious communications links asdescribed available inTable 3

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE69OF383 andSection 7.2. TheTSChas shielding andventilation toensure habitability tollowing design basis accidents.

TheTSCcontains anarea with a microwave andrefrigerator, conference room,an emergency supply storage area, andanarea reserved for NRCpersonnel. TheTSC contains equipment required ll>r emergency response. TheTSCisalso equipped with an airborne radiation monitor.

Inthe event theTSCbecomes uninhabitable, the TSCcommand function will operate outof the affected unit's STSC(Unit I,if multiple units areimpacted) and the support staff will berelocated toanOSC.

7.I.6EMERGENCYOPERATIONS FACII,ITY(EOF)

TheEOFislocated approximately 20miles east ofPVNGSat600North Verrado WayBuilding A, Buckeye, Arizona.

TheEOFis the focal point flarcoordination ofonsite andoffsite emergency response activities. Management andtechnical personnel assigned tothe EOFare responsible for protective action recommendations, liaisonwith offsite governmental organizations andresponse flicilities, andoverall coordination ofthe Emergency Organization.

TheEOFhasspace allocated for housing emergency personnel and space forNRC, FEMAandstate/county emergency personnel. TheEOFhas various communications links available asdescribed inTable 3andSection 7.2. TheEOF isstaffed andactivated flaranAlert orhigher level emergency classineation. The EOFalso hasERFDADS data displayed through PIcomputer capability. The capability exists inthe EOFtorapidly retrieve plant documents, drawings, procedures andplans.

7.I.7A1,TERNATIVE FACII,ITY TheEEC-EOF isdesignated asthe Alternative Facility forstaging ofERO personnel. inthe event ofa Security orIlostile Action Based threat orevent. The EEC-EOF mayalso serve asa re-location area for TSCandOSCpersonnel. The Alternative Facility has the capability tocommunicate with the Control Room, Security andthe EOF. TheEOlmayalso beused asanAlternate facility for any event where siteaccess isnotpossible i.e. Beyond Design Bases External Event (BDBEE) orFI.EX event.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE70OF383 7.I.8JOINTINFORMATIONCENTER(JIC)

TheJIC,located at600North Verrado Way, Building A.Buckeye, Arizona serves asthe primary point fordissemination ofinformation tothe newsmedia representatives foranAlertorhigher emergency classification level.

Provision ismadeatthe JICtoallow media personnel tocommunicate with their base facilities. State,countyandfederal agency officialsshare office space with the staff at the JIC.

Thecommunications links available atthe JICaredescribed inTable 3andSection 7.2.

7.I.9PALOVERDEAND APS EXTERNAI COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTVIENTS Palo Verde Communications and APS External Communications are responsible for developing mediastatementsand coordinating media briefings during Unusual Event elassifications.AtAlertandhigher classitleation level, the JICassumes the responsibility forthis function.

AtAlert or Site Area Emergency classifications involving non-radiological events, Palo Verde Communications will work with the JICtocoordinate plant visits andbriefings. PaloVerde Communications is equipped with EPABX telephones andfax machines for onsite and offsite communications.

STATEEMERGENCY 7.I.10 OPERATIONS CENTER(STATE EOC)

TheState liOC istheprimarypoint from which the Governor/designee exercises overall coordination ofoffsite emergency response operations through the ADEM.

TheState liOC atADEMIIeadquarters islocated inPhoenix at5636 East McDowell Road. ofthe Staffing State EOCconsists ofauthorized representatives of:

• Office ofthe Governor

• Arizona DepartmentofEmergency andMilitary Affairs (DEMA)

• Arizona DivisionofEmergency Management (ADEM) a Arizona DepartmentofIIealth Services (AzDIIS)

• Arizona DepartmentofPublic Safety (AzDPS)

• Arizona DepartmentofTransportation (ADOT)

• Arizona DepartmentofEconomic Security (AzDES)

• Maricopa CountyDepartment ofEmergency Management (MCDEM)

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE71OF383

• PVNGS(Utility Technical Representative)

• Others (as notified/required).

PVNGS communications links with ADEM are described inTable 3.

7.I.11 TilE MARICOPA COLNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)

TheMaricopa County EOCisthe focal point ofthe local government emergency response activity. Itislocated at5630 E.McDowell Road, Phoenix. Emergency response actions of the Maricopa County Sheriff'sIIealth Offlee, Department and Department ofTransportation, together with emergency response actions of volunteer agencies, are coordinated bytheMCDEMatthe County EOC.

COMMUNICATIONS 7.2 SYSTEMS ThePVNGS communications system isdesigned toensure the reliable, timely flow of information andaction directivesbetween all parties designated and empowered to mitinate emereencies. Toensure the reliabilityof the communications systems, the following provisions have been designed into these systems:

• Redundancy

• Alternative radio communications

• Telephone ring downcircuits (voice anddata) tooffsite emergency organizations, to preclude delays duetosystem overload

• Routine useofmanyofthe systems, which lowers the probability of undetected system failures Communication systems aretested atthe frequency specitled by10CFR50Appendix E, asa minimum. Onsite emergency telephone lines aredivided amongthree onsite EPABX switches. Each EPABXswitch isprovided with a backup battery for reliability.

This system will function during emergencies asit does during normal operations.

Telephones have the capability oftrunk access (via local provider) and the APSowned privatecommunications system which provides direct dial capabilities tothe entire APS voice system via the company owned private communications system. ThePVNGS telephone EPABXSystems through which all PVNGStelephone calls pass, areequipped with uninterruptible power supplies (battery chargers andbatteries) anddedicated priority switching toensure the reliability ofthe telephone system. ThePVNGSIPABXsarethe primary links for PVNGSphones. There arealso administratively dedicated lines forthe CR.STSC,TSC, EOF,andOSC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE72OF383 TheCR,TSC,andOSCeach have dedicated phone linesthatcanbeused toconnect between any twoofthe facilities.

Inaddition, each ofthese lacilitiescanusethese dedicated lines toconnect tothe following dedicated phones for the EOFpositions:

listed

• Radiological AssessmentCoordinatorEnvironmental Assessment Iine

• Radiological Assessment CoordinatorControl RoomLine

• Engineering Director Technical 1.ine

• EngineeringDirector OSCIine

• Radiological Assessment Communicator TSCIine Each ofthe phones onthe dedicated lines also functionsasa normal in-plantPVNGS phone. These linesarediscussed inmore detail inthe applicable subsections thatfollow.

TheEC/EODLine, Maintenance Iine, and Radiological Iine areadministratively dedicated lines that arealso availablefor use inanemergencyand arediscussed inthe subsections that follow. Thephones listed below consist ofsingle lineandmulti-line phones. Themultiline phones areequipped with a power failline anda PBXline.

7.2.1CONTROl, ROOM1,INE TheControl Room1ine has adedicated primaryline providing communications links with conference capability between theControl Room, the TSC,the Unit STSC,the EOF,the OSC,andthe RSP.

7.2.2ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT 1,INE TheEnvironmental Assessment Iine has adedicated primary andbackup line providing communications links with conferencecapability between the TSC, EOF.the Control Roomandthe RSP.

7.2.3 EC/EODIINE TheEC/EODline has aseparate dedicated primary linewith conference capability amongthe EOF,TSC,the Unit, andthe RSP.

This line provides a communications linkbetween theECs. Italsopermits three-wayconversations between the EC-TSC, EODandthe Shift Manager.

PVNGS EMERGENCY P1AN REVISION 69 PAGE73OF383 7.2.4EOFLINE TheEOFLine hasadedicated primary line providing communications links with conference eapability between the EOF,the Control Roomthe TSC,the Unit STSC, theOSC,andthe RSP.

7.2.5MAINTENANCE CONTROILINE TheMaintenance Control Line has a dedicated primary lineproviding a communications linkwithconference capabilitybetween the TSC,OSC, Control Room,andRSP.

7.2.6OSC1,INE TheOSC1ine hasanadministratively dedicated primary line providing communications linkswithconference capability between the OSC,the Control Room,the TSC,the UnitSTSC, the EOF, andthe RSP.

7.2.7RADIOLOGICALLINE TheRadiological Linehasadedicated primary line providing communications links with conferencecapability between the RP Office. TSC,the Unit.

STSC,the OSC, and theRSP.

7.2.8STSCLINE TheSTSCLine has adedicated primary lineproviding communication linkswith conference capability between the U nitSTSC. t heC ontrolRoom, the TSC, the EOF.the OSC.andthe RSP.

7.2.9TECHNICALLINE TheTechnical Iine hasadedicated primary providing line communications links with conference between capability the TSC,the Unit STSC. the EOF,the RSP, andthe Control Room.

TSCIINE 7.2.10 TheTSCLine has anadministratively dedicated primary lineproviding communications linkswithconference capabilitybetween the TSC,the EOF,the Control Room,the UnitSTSC,the OSC,andthe RSP.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE74OF383 7.2.11REMOTESIIUTDOWN PANEL(RSP) LINE TheRSPLine has anadministratively dedicated primary lineproviding communications links with conference capability between the TSC,theEOF,the Control Room,the Unit STSC,andthe OSC.

7.2.12NRC EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM(ENS)

TheNRC ENS isa Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) telephone that connects PVNGS with the NRClleadquarters Operations Center.NRC IIeadquartershas thecapability topatch intheRegion IVofficeonthisline.

Itisto beused forreporting emergencies. Commercial telephonelinesareavailable as backup communications. Transmittal ofoperations related data should beonthis system. Thepurpose ofthis line is toprovide reliable communicationswiththe NRC.TheENSphones arelocated ateach Unit the andthe STSC, T SC, EOF.

7.2.13NRCHEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK (HPN)

TheNRCIIPN isa Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) telephone that connects PVNGSwith the NRCIIeadquarters Operations Center. TheIIPN is designed toprovide health physics andenvironmental information tothe NRCin the event ofanemergency. Other commercial telephone lines areavailable as backup communications. The IIPN phones arelocated inboththe TSCandEOF.

7.2.14NRCIOCAI AREANETWORK(LAN)

TheNRChasadata link available aspart ofthe FTSnetworkin the EOl andTSC.

Thelines aretested byPVNGSandmaintained bythe NRC.

7.2.15NRCMANAGEMENTCOUNTERPART IINK(MCPI,)

TheMCPLisadedicated NRCcommunication linkbetween theNRCintheIOF, TSCandNRCIleadquarters personnel. Thelines byPVNGSand aretested maintained bythe NRC.

7.2.16NRCPROTECTIVEMEASURES COUNTERPART IINK(PMCI )

ThePMCIisadedicated NRCcommunication linkbetween theNRCinthe EOF.

TSC. andNRCHeadquarters personnel. Thelines are byPVNGSand tested maintained bythe NRC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE75OF383 NRCREACTOR 7.2.17 SAFETYCOUNTERPART LINK(RSCL)

TheRSCLisadedicated NRCcommunication linkbetween theNRCinthe EOF, TSC,andNRC1leadquarters personnel. Thelines aretestedbyPVNGSand maintained bytheNRC.

7.2.18 EOD/CEO (FIBEROPTIC)

TheEOD/CEO circuitis optic a fiber link between the EOl/JICandthe APS Executive1 loor Corporate.

7.2.19 NOTlFICATION ALERT NETWORK (NAN)

NAN is thatprovides a communications a system link fromtheUnit STSCs and EOFtoDEMA, MCDEM, MCSO andDPS.

NAN'sprimary function istoprovide acommunications link fornotificationsto offsite agencies.Inthe event ofNAN failure, a channel ontheAPSCorporate l radio system orthecommercial phone lines is used tomakeInitialNotifications.

OPERATIONS 7.2.20 #1(VOIP/SAT)

TheOperations #1circuit isa VOIP/SAT ring-down line with connectionsto DEMA, EOF,Unit STSCsandthe TSC.

OPERATIONS 7.2.21 #2(VOIP/SAT)

TheOperations #2circuit isa VOIP/SAT ring-down line with connections to DEMA, the EOF,Simulators andthe TSC.

OPERATIONS 7.2.22 #3(VOlP/SAT)

TheOperations #3eircuit isa VOlP/SAT ring-down line with connections to DEMA, the EOF,STSCs andthe TSC.

OPERATIONS 7.2.23 #4(VOlP/SAT)

TheOperations #4circuit isa VOlP/SAT ring-down line with connections to l)EMA,the EOF,STSCs, andthe TSC.

PUBLICINFORMATIONRING-DOWNCIRCUIT#1 7.2.24 ThePl#1circuit isanintercom link from the EOFtothe JlC.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE76OF383 7.2.25PUBLICINFORMATION RING-DOWN CIRCUIT#2 ThePI#2eircuit isanintercom linkbetween the EOFtothe JIC.

7.2.26 CELLUI AR PHONE ERO Responders assigned toeach STSC. theTSC,andthe EOFhave acompany provided cellular phone toprovide anadditional independent line of communication. Inaddition, each STSC,the TSC.andthe EOFhave a cellular phone toprovide anadditional independent lineofcommunication.

7.2.27 FACSIMII E TRANSMISSION Facsimile transmission provides "hard copy" communications to:

• TSC(through PVNGSEPABX) e EOF e Ring-down Facsimile Machine Circuits #1(Fiber Optic) and#2(llardwire) linkthe EOF,TSC,STSCs, JIC, DEMA, andAPSCorporate Offices.

7.2.28 PVNGSRADIOSYSTEM PVNGSoperates a trunked radio system, withseparate talkgroups available for departments such asOperations, Security, FireProtection, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, the Water Resources facility, etc. This system includes base station consoles atvarious locations andemergency flicilities throughout the site. Someofthe radios used during emergencies areportable radios atvarious site locations, mobile radios inthe RFATvehicles, andbase station consoles atthe TSC,EOF,Unit OSCs,Unit, andUnit Control Rooms. PVNGSFire Protection also maintains radios that areused tocontact the air ambulance service toprovide landing instructions.

7.2.29 TELEPIIONE RINGDOWNCIRCUITS These voice circuits serve asaprimary communications link for providing technical inflarmation tooffsite agencies, public information communications, and the communication ofprotective action recommendations tooffsite authorities.

7.2.30 RADIOLOGICALEMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TEAM (REAT) RADIO SYSTEM TheAPSCorporate 800MII7Radio system provides a communications link between the State andState deployed field monitoring teams. Field monitoring information will betransmitted over the radiosystem. TheState's EOl

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE77OF383 representative has access tothe 800M1Izradio system from the EOF.1lardcopy ofdata istransmitted via FAX from the EOFtoRl?AT Forward.

7.2.31 MOBILE DEVlCES Mobile devices areprovided tokey members ofthe emergency response organization. This provides a reliablemeans ofcontact with keymembers 24hours aday, 7 days a week.

7.2.32 AREA PAGING SYSTEM Thearea pagingsystem provides a reliable means ofnotifying andproviding instructions topersonnel. Access tothis systemisthrough the l?PABX system telephones byuseofdedicated numbers.

7.2.33 ALARMS Audible alarms areaquick andeffective means ofcommunicatingemergency warnings. Thealarm systems aredescribed inthe followingsections.

7.2.33.1 Emergency Evacuation Alarm System/Public Address System/Area Paging System TheEmergency Site livacuationAlarm System consists of pole-mounted electronic outdoor warning sirens.They arelocatedoutside each power block andareprovided toalert personnel within the securityboundaries ofPVNGS.These sirens areinitiated froma siren command module ineach unit'scontrolroom. A microphone is provided topermit announcements over this system.

Accountability/evacuation isassuredinhigh noise workareas (>95 dB) byuseofaudible alarms, flashing lightsand/or administrative measures.

ThePublic Address (PA) System consistsofsirens andspeakers that servetoalert personnel within a unitarea. TheEmergency Evacuation Alarm System consoles inthe controlroomsareused tosend announcements tothe PA system. Telephones located inside and outside ofthe power block mayalso send announcements PA tothe system. ThePublic Address Systemalso has voice capability using microphone ineach control andiscross-connected unit, tothe Area Paging System topermit site-wideannouncements.

There are distinct signalsprovided forassembly, evacuation, Breand all-clear.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE78OF383 NATIONALOCEANICAND ATMOSPHERIC 7.2.34 ADMINISTRATION (NOAA) WEATHERBROADCASTS Weather broadcasts canbemonitored for "weather alert" information atCR,TSC and EOF.

7.2.35 AUTOMATED CALLOUT An automated callout system isused tocall outemergency response personnel.

Thesystem can alsobeactivated from anytouch tonetelephone with offsite access capability.The servers are located offsite attwodifferent remote locations andcan place multiple calls simultaneously. Telephone numbers tobecontacted and notification messages are pre-programmed onthe system. lfproper acknowledgment doesnot occur, the system periodicallyredials the number.

7.2.36 ADDITIONALOFFSITECOMMUNICATION LINKS Communication Links inAddition to Those DescribedAbove Include:

= Public Infl>rmation Unlisted Dial-up Telephone CircuitDEMAtoJiC e Ilighspeed internet connections -

JIC a Public Infl>rmation Unlisted Dedicated Dial-up Facsimile Machine Circuit #2 -

DEMAtoJIC

• PVNGSEmergency Alert System (EAS) Ring-downTelephone Circuit -

hardwire from MCDEMandMCSOtoAM Broadcast Station KTAR and to FM Broadcast Station KPKX

= Public Information Unlisted Dedicated Dial-up Telephones -

JIC (4 general circuits)

• Public Information Unlisted, Receive-only Telephone Circuits -

JIC(6 circuits

• Public Infl)rmation Media Dial-up Telephone Circuits -

JIC(30 circuits) a Unlisted Dedicated Dial-up Facsimile -

DEMA(EOC) toMCDEM

• Public Infl)rmation Unlisted Dial-up Telephone Circuit -

JICtoMCDEM a DEMABusiness Dial-up Telephone -

DEMAgeneral use(24 circuits), DEMA Public Inquiry (3circuits)

• Public Infl>rmation Unlisted Dial-Up Facsimile Machine Circuit -

MCDIM to JIC

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE79OF383 Facility Communication andDataLinks EOFIine Maintenance Iine OSCIine RSPline Control Room STSCLine Technical Iine TSCI.ine Radio Station Base ENS ERFDADS Fax Control RoomI.ineEnvironmental Line ECI.ine EOFIine OSCI.ine Radiolouical line Technical Iine TSC I.ine SISL.

NAN Line RSP line O)s!l O)s//3 Cellular Phone ERFDADS Fax Radio Station Base Control Room Iine Environmental IineSTSCIine EOFIine Maintenance Line OSCIine Radioloeical I.ine EC/EODLine Technical I.ine RSPl.ine ENS

.fechnical Support O)snI Oas f;2 O)srt3 Lenter O3s:4 Radio BaseStation IIPN LAN (NRC)

MCPL(NRC) PMCL (NRC) RSCL(NRC) IRFDADS Fax Cellular Phone Operations SupportControl RoomLine EOF Line Maintenance I.ineSTSCIine Center Radioloeical l.ine TSCLine RPSLine Control RoomIine Environmental I,ine ECEODLine OSCI.ine STSCLine Technical Line TSCIine RSPLine IIPN(NRC) ENS(NRC) IAN Emergency EOD/CEO I.ine Operation IacilityMCPI. (NRC) PMCI. (NRC) RSCI (NRC)

NAN Iine O3s//I O)s :/2 O)s//3 O3s!:4 Public Info//I Public Info /:2 Cellular Phone ERFDADS via PI Fax Radio Base Station REATRadio Joint Information WDUO & Ph WC Ph M'o !2 N Lenter EOFIine Remote Shutdown onhO 0001 ne n ronnwntal ne ne Sound-powered Panel )hone Maintenance I.ineOSCI.ine Radiological line STSC I.ine Technical I.ine TSC1.ine Radio BaseStation NAN Line O3st/l O3s!/2 O3s t/3 DEMA O3s//4 Fax REATRadio RadioBase Station DPS NAN I.ine Radio BaseStation MCDEM NAN Iine Radio BaseStation MCSO NAN Iine Radio BaseStation TABI,E 3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACII,iTYCOMMUNICATIONS

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE80OF383 7.3ASSESSMENT EQLIPMENT This onsiteoffsite sectiondescribes and facilities andmonitoring equipment used for initial andcontinuing assessment.

7.3.1 ONSITE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Onsite equipment isdescribed below.

7.3.1.1 GEOPlIYSICAL DATA M

ThePVNGS meteorology atmospheric transport anddiffusion assessment program has been established using the guidance of NUREG-0654and Regulatory Guide 1.23,Rev. 0.ThePVNGS meteorological tower has the followinginstrumentation: temperature, differentialtemperature (between top andbottom sensors),

precipitation dewpoint,wind speed. andwind direction. Display of meteorological indications is available inthe Control Roomon ERFDADS.METdata isavailable inthe TSC,the Units STSC,andthe EOF.Inthe event the PVNGSmeteorological monitoring system is unavailable, National Weather Service broadcasts canbemonitored from the Control Rooms,EOF,andTSC.Meteorological data canbe obtained from the National Weather Servicein the event that PVNGS instrumentation isinsufncient oroutofservice during anemergency.

W Information isobtained from passive andactive instruments giving absolute peak ground acceleration inthreemutually orthogonal directions.Thesystem determines whether operating basis orsafe shutdown maximum accelerations areexceeded inanyofthree directions.Recorded information isavailableinthe Unit IControl Room.

7.3.I.2 RADIATIONMONITORINGSYSTEMS(RMS)

TheRadiation Monitoring System isdivided into three basicgroups of detector systems.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE81OF383 Process monitors provide information toControl Roomoperators to assure proper functional performance ofthe monitored system, provide flirthe early detection of radioactive leakage intonon-radioactive systems, provide continuous remote i ndication and recording of airborneradioactivity levels inareas where personnel have routine access, and provide a means ofprocess sample collection.

M The Eftluent Monitoring System provides continuous sampling, recording and indications ofgaseous activity levels and, asa minimum, provides continuous representative sampling ofparticulate and radioiodine activity levelsatprincipal eftluent discharge points, provides for monitoring, alarm a nnunciation, andautomatic closure of the gaseous wastedischarge valve tomaintain releases from the waste gasdecay tanks belowODCM limits,provides radiation level indication andalarm annunciation toControl Roomoperators whenever Technical Specification limits are approached or exceeded, and provides ameansfor collection of samples for laboratory analyses at eflluent points.

M Thearea monitoring system immediately notifies plant personnel entering orworking innon-radiation orlow-radiation areas of abnormally high orincreasing radiation levels toprevent inadvertent overexposure, andinforms Control RoomOperators ofthe occurrence andlocation ofabnormal radiation levelincreases innon-radiation or low-radiation areas.

SYSTEMMONITORS 7.3.I.3 These monitors detect and/or control problems within plantsystems and include pressure detectors, heat detectors, heat risedetectors, orsimilar devices designed tomonitor plant parameters. Manyofthese detectors arecapable ofinitiating control actions toprevent andmitigate damage orrelease ofradioactive material.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE82OF383 7.3.1.4FIREPROTECTION SYSTEM TheFire Protection System (FPS) andFire Suppression System (FSS) detect, contain, andextinguish tires inthe unit. TheFPSfor each unit hasmonitoring, detection, alarm, suppression, andextinguishing facilities specilleally selected toprotect the area orequipment from damagebyGre. A computer terminal isprovided inthe Control Room ofeach unitfor incoming FPS/FSS alarms (including identification of affected areas andsuppression actions initiated bythe FSSsystem).

7.3.I.5RADIOACTIVITY ANALYSIS I.iquid samples are drawn inthe individual Units via theNuclear Sampling System. A built-insample bombisineach primarysample sink. Containment air samples are taken via Containment AirMonitor XJSQBRU000I**INTCPM.

Grab samples aredrawnand diluted asnecessary, procedural utilizing direction tominimize operator dose. Thegrab samples areanalyzed in the radiochemistry laboratory via a gamma energy analytical detector SyStem.

Inthe event the affected unit cannot perform theanalysis, backup analysis isdone i n one of the unaffected units. The Arizona Department ofIIealth Services is equipped todoisotopic analysis asanoffsite backup toPVNGScapabilities.

7.3.I.6PORTABLESltRVEYINSTRltMENTS These instruments provide flexibilityandbackup capability for radiation measurements inareas notserved byinstalled monitors, or where installedmonitors maybeinoperative.

7.3.1.7EMERGENCYRESPONSE FACILITY DATAACQlISITION AND DISPl,AY SYSTEM(ERFDADS)

TheERFDADSprovides a centralized location within theCRfor display ofplant parameters from which the safety statusofoperations canbeassessed.

Displays ofdata, including graphical displays, available ondemand include plant temperatures, pressures, andflow rates; equipment and valve status,i.e.,on,off, open, closed; process andarea RMSreadings; meteorology system data; andin-core parameters.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE83OF383 Inaddition tothe above parameters, the SPDSportion ofERFDADS contains a graphical display which provides immediate indicationof deviation from safe operating values. Fromthis display, additional specific data conceming the system inquestion isaccessed ondemand.

TheERFDADSisdesigned toinclude thedata acquisition system requirements ofNUREG-0696. ERFDADS displays are availableat each Unit Control Room,each Unit STSCandthe TSC.ERFDADS displays are available inthe EOFvia PIdisplays.

7.3.I.8QUAI IFIED SAFETYPARAMETERDISPLAYSYSTEM (QSPDS)

TheQSPDS isdesigned toprovide indications todetect the approach to,the existence of, and the recovery from inadequate core cooling.It also provides a minimum setofseismically qualiGed parameters from which abnormal plant operating conditions maybequickly assessed.

7.3.1.9EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM(ERDS)

TheERDSisadirect electronic transmission system toNRC Operations Center. Thesystem isintended toprovide tothe NRC,ona near real-time basis, selected parameters from plant computer systems whose values indicate thecondition ofthe plant during anemergency condition ofAlert orhigher. ERDSis testedquarterly toverify system availability andoperability.

Anyhardware orsoftware changes that affectthe transmitted data points identified inthe ERDSdata point library,mustbesubmitted to the NRCwithin 30days after changes arecompleted. IIardware or software changes that could affect the transmission ll>rmat and computer communication protocol tothe ERDSmustbeprovidedto the NRCassoonaspracticable andatleast 30days prior tothe modification.

7.3.2OFFSITESYSTEMSAND EQUIPMENT TheOffsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) refers tothe location ofthe radiological environmental monitoring sampling stations, aswell as Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TI D)stations. Environmental samples routinely collected andanalyzed include: water, vegetation, fl>odproducts andmilk. Backup andcross-checkenvironmental surveillance areperformed byA/.DIIS.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE84OF383 7.4PROTECTIVE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Control Roomshielding andventilation allow personnel habitability during Design Basis Accident conditions. TheTSChas shielding andventilation similartothe CR Ilar habitability during anincident. Communications equipment, respiratory protection equipment andprotective clothing areavailable in, ornear the CR, STSC,TSC,and OSC.

Portableradiation monitoring instrumentation islocated near theunit RPIslands.

7.5FIRSTAID MEDICAI FACILITIES A 11rst aid treatment center ismaintained onsite. Inaddition, anEMSresponse kitis maintained inthe Fire Brigade lockers in the140-foot corridor building. Firstaid treatment ofinjured individuals is administered bytrained personnel. Advanced medical care,if required, isobtained bytransporting the individuals toanoffsite medical facility.

7.6DAMAGECONTROLEQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Fire hose stations, extinguishers andhydrants are strategically located throughout the station foruseinfire. PVNGSmaintains self-contained breathing apparatus storage areas throughout station tobeused for firefighting, entry into airborne radioactivity areas, or entry into toxic gasareas.

7.7PROMPTNOTIFICATION SIRENSYSTEM PVNGSmaintains the Prompt Alert andNotification Systems asapproved byFEMAin the PVNGSAlert andNotitleation System FEMA (ANS) 350Report.

ThePrompt Notifleation SirenSystem consists ofhigh sound output sirens located throughout the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning zone. Its operation isatthe discretion ofthe stateandcounty governmental agencies responsible for notification andalerting ofthe public. This system alerts the people within the10-mile EP7tomonitor radio orTV emergency broadcasts forspecific information regardingthe situation atPVNGSand/or protective actions. This system is operated from anyofthe four control point locations:

• Maricopa County Emergency Operations Center

• Arizona Department ofPublic Safety

• Maricopa County Sheriff's Office

• Building "E"(maintenance andtesting only)

Normally thesirens areactivated from the Maricopa County Emergency Operations Center orfrom the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Thesystem istested periodically to ensure its readiness.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE85OF383 Inthe ofa failure event ofthe Prompt Notification System, a FEMAapproved backup notification method isavailable andisimplemented byOffsite Response Organizations.

8.0MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8.1 ORGANIzATIONAL PREPAREDNESS Theemergency preparedness program consists of(1) EROtraining, (2) drills and exercises, and(3) regular emergency plan review andevaluation bypersonnel and management.

8.1.1 TRAINING TheEmergency Response Training Program ensures that personnel whoareinthe emergency response organization arefamiliar with the contents andresponses in Emergency the Plan andassociated implementing procedures. TheEmergency Preparedness Manager isresponsible forensuring that the Emergency Response TrainingProgram meetsthe requirements ofthePlan.

Personnelassigned keyduties inthe Emergency Response Organization receive training initial andannual continuing training.

Newpersonnel orexisting EROmembers assignedto fill anEROposition in whichthey have notpreviously qualified, complete initial and continuing training for thatposition.

Emergency Preparedness Training isdeveloped using a process similar tothat describedwithin the Nuclear Training DepartmentAdministrativeProcedures or approved other training program guidance.

Asnecessary, additional continuing trainingofindividuals should beconducted whensignillcant changes tothe Emergency Preparedness Program occurs as determined the by Emergency Preparedness Manager and theN uclear Training l)epartment1.eader.

TheEmergency Response Training Program includes specifictraining and where indicates. applicable, qualification requirements forkeymembers ofthe Emergency Organization.

Evaluatedtraining drillsandevolutions providefor critiques inorder toidentify weakordeficient areas. Weaknesses ordellciencies that areidentified are corrected.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE86OF383 Trainingforthe Emergency Preparedness Staff iscompleted inaccordance with Emergency Preparedness Department processes.

8.1.1.1 Site Access Training forEmergency Preparedness Personnel requiring unescorted access into theProtected Area(s) receive general instructions onthe Emergency Plan prior toreceiving unescorted access. Reinforcement ofthe actions totake inthe eventof an emergency are conveyed throughout the via year periodic updates (e.g.. department meetings, electronic display signs, posters and security badge information cards).

8.I.I.2 Specialized Training for KeyEmergency Organization Personnel Specialized training isprovided annually tokeypersonnel involvedin emergency response actions. This special trainingincludes instruction andreview inthe technical and practicalaspects ofemergency response actions.

Inaddition totraining, drillsand exercises are conducted todevelop andmaintain emergency responseskills. Specialized training for designated EROposition categories is listed below.

Ikganinition Initial training toprovide forclassification andnotification processes andrequirements. Continuing training toprovide program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

Shift Personnel Initial training toprovide accident identilleation, appropriate procedural responses andsupport organization activity oncriteria. Continuing training provides program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

Initial training toprovide foremergency radiological monitoring procedures, techniques andemergency communications. Continuing training toprovide program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE87OF383 Fire Control Teams (Fire Brigades) PVNGSutilizes a fulltime onsite Fire Department. Fire personnel aretrained intire andmedical emergency response in accordance with the Fire Protection Program.

Additionally. they areprovided training radiological in basic control concepts. Continuing training toprovide program/procedure/equip change and industry events updates.

M Initial training provides for emergency radiological andindustrial safety,communications. Continuing training toprovide program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

First AidandRescue Teams PVNGSutilizes a full time onsite Fire Department. Fire personnel are trained infire andmedical emergency response inaccordance withthe Fire Protection Program. Additionally, they are provided training in basic radiological control concepts. Continuing Training toprovide program/procedure/equipment change andindustryevents updates.

M Initial training ofmedical support personnel in addition toFire Department personnel provided with basic radiological control concepts. Onsite medical staff, excluding administrative support personnel, receives training similar incontent tothatwhich is provided tooffsite hospitals. Continuing Training toprovide program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

Someheadquarters support personnel respond tothe Joint Information Center. These personnel receive training initial prior toqualilleation.

Continuing training isprovided onanannual basis.

Security Personnel Imergency response training isincorporated into the initialMember of the Security Force training received bynewsecurity force members during initial qualifications. Additional initial training isprovided to Security members assigned tostaff positions within theEmergency Response Facilitiesinsupport ofEmergency Preparedness. The additional training includes lines ofcommunication with offsite support

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE88OF383 organizations aswell aslogisticssupport. Continuing training to provide program/procedure/equipment change andindustry events updates.

8.I.I.3 Training forParticipating Agencies Radiological orientation trainingprogram ismadeavailable tooffsite support organizationsandemergency services personnel. Additional training isavailable upon request andmayinclude but arenotlimited to:

• Basic Radiation Protection

= Concept ofOperations

• PVNGS Overview TheOffsite Response Organization isresponsible for maintaining offsite training records.

8.1.2EXERCISES PVNGSconducts drillsandexercises overa wide range ofaccident conditions that tests a major portion ofthe basic elements existing within the emergency plan and supporting organizations. Exercises shalltest the adequacy of timing andcontent ofimplementing procedures andmethods. test emergency equipment and communications networks, test the publicnotification system, and ensurethat emergency organization personnel arefamiliar with their duties.

Thescenarios for the drills andexercises arediverse andinclude a wide spectrum ofradiological conditions andevents including hostile actions. Thescenarios used overthe eight-year cycle will besufBciently varied toensure thatessentially all of the emergency action levels areincluded inperformance enhancing drills or exercises. Tothe extent practical, initiating conditions andfailed equipment should bevaried tominimize preconditioning ofthe emergency response organization.

Nomorethan oneEAL should beshared with the previous exercise oranypractice drill orexercise leading uptothe biennial exercise. Drill scenarios should notbe used foranybiennial exercise within twoyears. Tothe extent practical,scenario should beheld inconildence from the participating EROteammembers until after the exercise. While anEROteammaybeaware ofthe nature ofthe upcoming drills (i.e.

hostile action based exercise).the specific elements ofthe drill should be held inconfidence andthe initiatingevent varied sothe sameconditions arenot used fromthe practice toevaluated exercise.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE89OF383 Joint participation exercises between PVNGSandthe olTsite response agencies are conducted toensure the appropriate integrationofthe emergency plans and identify areas ofweakness andopportunities forimprovement. A post drill or exercise critique isconducted toaid inthe identification ofweaknesses and improvement opportunities. Consistent withNRCandFEMAregulation, a full participation exercise isconducted onceevery twoyears. PVNGS,the State of Arizona (ADEM and AzDIIS) andMaricopa County will jointly exercise their emergency plans. Thefull participation biennialexercise isevaluated bythe NRC andFEMA and isused indetermining reasonableassurance that PVNGSandthe supporting offsite emergency plans canprotect the health andsafety ofthe public, plant staff andemergency workers.Thebiennial exercises arevaried overthe eight-year period (starting with the year ofthe Grst hostile action exercise in2015) toinclude the following:

a Ilostile action directed atthe plant site involving the integration ofoffsite resources with onsite response: (See RCTSAl 2831902 andcontact Reg.

Affairs for anychange tothiscommitment.)

• An initial classification of, orrapid escalation to,a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency:

• No radiological release oranunplanned minimal radiological release that requires the site todeclare a Site AreaEmergency, but does notrequire declaration ofa General Emergency.

• Ingestion Pathway Exercise PVNGSwill submit the scenario used for the biennial exercise to theNRCin accordance with 10CI R50.4 sixty (60) daysbefore itsuseina full scale biennial exercise. Thescenario will beheld inconfidence until after the exercise is completed. PVNGSwill maintain adequate records todemonstrate theexercises andscenarios used over the eight-year exercisecycle.

Each biennial exercise conducted byPVNGSwill include the opportunity to demonstrate the following keyskills:

• Timely classification ofevents:

• Timely notincation ofoffsite authorities:

• Assessment ofradiological releases onsiteandoffsite:

• Development ofprotective action recommendations:

• Dissemination ofinformation tothe public via media channels:

• Engineering assessment, repair plan development, andrepair ofcritical equipment under emergency conditions:

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE90OF383 a Mitigative action implementation:

= Protection ofworkers during emergency response, including medical care:

a Response tooperational transients while implementing the emergency plan:

• Coordination with offsiteresponse organizations.

Each biennial exercise atPVNGS will include the following elements ata minimum:

• Eventclassification.

• Timely notification ofoffsite authorities.

• PARdevelopment (development ofPARsinvolving public evacuation or sheltering isrequired only inexercisesthat include a General Emergency).

• Radiological assessment.

• Shift staff response toaccident transients orother events that meetEAIcriteria while implementing the emergency plan.

a EROresponse andERFactivationfollowing declaredemergencies.

a Integration oflicensee response with OROs toinclude briefings, coordination ofworker protection, and, asappropriateto the scenario, coordination ofpublic protective actions, radiological release monitoring, andoffsite response tothe site.

• Communications thatsupport response between onsite and offsiteERFs.

a Dissemination ofinformation tothe public via media channels and press brienngs.

= Development andimplementation ofradiological orphysical protection (i.e., in response tohostile action) protective actions for onsite workers asappropriate tothe scenario.

a Operational andengineering assessment ofaccident sequences.

e Accident mitigation through the simulated repair ofequipment.

o This mustinclude mechanical, electrical, and/or instrumentation and control activities.

o Thescenario should bedesigned toallow somerepairs tobesuccessful, but mustprovide theopportunity todemonstrate mitigation planning andrepair execution.

• Radiological control activitiesmustsupport somerepair teams.

Inaddition tothe biennial exercise, PVNGSconducts apartial scale off year exercise that involves anintegrated testing ofthe keyemergency response facilities.Theoff year exercise mayalso bea full scale exercise notevaluated by

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE91OF383 FEMAorNRC.During the offyear exercise, the offsiteresponse organization will beencouraged toparticipate inorder tomaintain keyEROskills between the onsite andotTsite organization.

The principal functional areas ofemergency response include activities such as management andcoordination ofemergency response, accident assessment, event classilleation, notification ofoffsite authorities, andassessment ofonsite and offsite impact ofradiological releases, protective actionrecommendation development, protective action decision making, plant system repair andmitigative action implementation.

During routine drills, activation ofall ofthe PVNGSemergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), andthe Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) would notbenecessary, PVNGSmayuse these drills forthe opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised operating staff inall instruction, participating facilities would have the opportunity toresolve problems (successpaths)rather than have controllers intervene, andthe drills mayfocus onthe onsite exercise training objectives inlieu ofabroader set.

ThePVNGSEROshall beprovided the opportunity todevelop andmaintain key emergency skills in response response following to the scenario elements during the conduct ofbiennial exercises over the course ofthe eight-year exercise cycle:

= Response tohostile action, including interface with IIEAs.

o Ilostile action scenarios should realistically include collateral damage that mayoccur (e.g., loss ofoffsite power andloss ofuseofcertain onsite facilities andareas).

o Engineering assessment, repair plan development, andsimulatedrepair of critical equipment damaged byhostile action afterthe active attack,but before the site isfully secured byI.I.EAs.

o Prioritization ofrepair teamdispatch andprotection inthe aftermath of hostile action through coordination with sitesecurity andI.I.EAs to determine whenthe site issecure enough toallow limited movementof personnel.

• Response toonescenario withnoradiological releaseoranunplanned minimal radiological release that does notrequire evacuation orsheltering ofthe public.

= Response toscenarios with radiological releases thatrequire evacuation and/or sheltering ofthe public.

a Response toa scenario thatbegins with a Site AreaEmergency orGeneral Emergency, or escalates rapidly (within 30 minutes) toa Site Area Emergency orGeneral Emergency.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE92OF383 e Thesuccessful simulated repair ofsimulated damaged equipment toprevent or mitigate core damage, reactor pressure boundary and/or loss, containment loss.

= Demonstration of the ability tomitigate anaccident caused byhostile action or other through initiators, the simulated useofequipment. procedures, and strategies developed incompliance with 10CFR50.54(hh)( 1)and10CFR 50.155.

AllPVNGS EROteams(not necessarily each individual) shallbeprovided the opportunity todevelop andmaintain keyemergency response skills within the scope oftheir duties during each exercise cycle.Additionally, the ERO(not necessarily each ERO team) shall beprovided opportunity the todemonstrate key skills inresponseto the following scenario elements indrillsorexercises during each exercise cycle.Drills areconsidered tobeperformance-enhancing experiences drills, functional drills, (exercises, tabletop drills, mini-drills, that etc.)

reasonably simulate the interactions between appropriate ERFsand/or individuals that would beexpected tooccur during emergencies.

a Allfunctions ineach ERF(e.g., all ERFs that are responsible for dose assessment perform those duties inresponse toa radiologicalrelease).

a Useofalternative facilities tostage theERO forrapid activation during hostile action.

a Real-time staffingoffacilities during off-hours(i.e.. 6:00 p.m.to4:00 a.m.).

Somedrills orexercises should beunannounced.

• Providing medical care for injured.contaminated personnel (every twoyears).

• Response toessentially I00percent ofinitiating conditions identitled inthesite emergency plan implementing procedure forclassification ofemergencies.

e Response toactual industry event sequences appropriate forthe nuclear plant technology (e.g.,BWRorPWR).

a Alllicensee EROteamsmustbeprovided theopportunity todemonstrate key skills within the scope oftheir duties.

= Useofprocedures developed inresponse toanaircraft threatandin compliance with 10CFR50.54(hh)( I).

• Useofthe strategies associated with 10CFR50.155 tomitigate spent fuelpool damage scenarios (all strategies, such asmakeup, spray, andleakage control, but notevery variation ofagiven strategy).

= Useofthe strategies associated with 10CFR 50.155 tomitigate reactor accidents andmaintain containment (7strategies for pressurized water reactors, but notevery variation ofagiven strategy).

Following exercises anddrills, a critiqueisheld toidentify deficiencies, weakness, andimprovement opportunities. Deficiencies andweaknesses willbecorrected and

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE93OF383 improvement opportunities will beincorporated asdeemed appropriate bythe Emergency Preparedness Manager. Critiques shall usethe Palo Verde Condition Reporting process for capturing items identified during drillsandexercises.

Remedial exercises will berequired ifthe emergency plan isnotsatisfactorily tested duringthe biennial exercise, such that NRC, inconsultation with FEMA, cannot ilndreasonable assurance that adequate protective measures canbetaken in the event ofa radiological emergency. Theextent ofstate andcounty participation inremedial exercises mustbesufficient toshow that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements ofthe plan notproperly testedin the previous exercise.

8.I.3DRIIIS Drills for the emergency organization areconducted periodically totest response andfamiliarity with implementing procedures and methods, totest emergency equipment, andtoensure that members of the emergencyorganization arefamiliar with their duties anddevelop andmaintain keyskills.

Instructional emergency drillsareconducted as scheduled, with emphasis placed upon orderly implementation ofactivities prescribed within the Emergency Plan andits implementing procedures.

Drill performance iscritiqued bythe emergency response organization involved andpersonnel acting as drillcontrollers who may offeron-the-spot corrections to erroneous performance. Each controller is assigned a specificarea forevaluation andreceives written drillinstructions. Written evaluations ofdrill performance are provided toappropriate management personnel. Follow-up action isthen taken by the responsible Department I.eaders toupgrade areas where shortcomings are noted: they report their progress tothe Emergency Preparedness Manager.

Following all drills, adrill controller critique isheld andall aspects ofdrill performance arediscussed. AII significant deficiencies areincorporated into action items andtasked tothe affected department.

Certain drills(i.e., fire, andmedical emergency), andtests (i.e..communications andnotification), arecoordinated with offsiteparticipating agencies. The Emergency Preparedness Manager hasoverall responsibility for meeting all drill requirements. Specific tasks maybedelegated tooperating departments.

Communications links andnotification procedures with offsite state andcounty agencies aretested periodically using asimulated emergency message transmitted offsite forsubsequent fan-out alerting bystate/county authorities. NRC

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE94OF383 communications links aretested inaccordance with 10CFR50,Appendix E.

Communications tests also evaluate the understanding ofthecontent ofthe messages.

Fire drills areconducted inaccordance with the Fire ProtectionProgram and PVNGS UpdatedFinal Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Ilealth Physics (IIP) Drills areconducted semi-annually, andmaybeinconnection with exercises orEnvironmental Monitoring Drills. These drillsinvolve response to,and analysis of, simulated elevated radioactivity inairborne samples anddirect radiation measurements inthe plant.

Medical EmergencyDrills with Offsite Medical Facilitiesinvolving treatment ofa simulated externally contaminated person are conducted annually with provision for participation byanoffsite ground orair ambulance.

Environmental Monitoring Drills are conducted annually forboth onsiteand offsite Environmental Teampersonnel. These drills includecollection andanalysis ofappropriate media, sample e.g., vegetation, soil, and air, communications, and record keeping. Since PVNGSislocated in a desert area andthere arenonearby bodies of water, liquid environmental samples are notcollected oranalyzed during Radiological Monitoring orIIealth Physics drills. These drillsarecoordinated with offsite organizations where appropriate.

8.I.4SCENARIOS Drill andexercise scenarios arewritten toallow acertain amount of free play for decision making. Controllers areinstructed atpre-drill andpre-exercise briefings astowhich portions ofthe scenario permit free play andwhich portions require strong controller management. TheEmergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for overall drill andexercise control.

ORGANizATIONFORMAINTAININGEMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS 8.2 TheExecutive Vice President Nuclear & Chief Nuclear Of11cer hasoverall responsibility andauthority for allnuclear activities, including emergency response planning. The Emergency Preparedness Manager has been assigned the responsibilitytodevelop and maintain a coordinated PVNGS,Iederal, State, andlocal government emergency preparedness program. TheEmergency Preparedness Manager participates inmeetings, seminars,andconferences that areaimed atmaintaining acurrent andaccurate Emergency andcurrent Plan, knowledge ofregulations andguidelines. TheEmergency Preparedness Manager isresponsible for the Emergency Plan, andimplements Plan revisions and updates.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE95OF383 8.3REVIEW AND UPDATINGOF TllEEMERGENCY PLAN The Emergency Plan isreviewed annually andupdated asneeded. Theupdate takes into account changes identified bydrills andexercises. TheEmergency Preparedness Manager maintains documentation substantiating the annual review.Special attention isdevoted to reviewing PVNGS/governmental agency interfaces, updating ofTsite response agreements.

maintaining effective communication channels, and,ona quarterly basis, ensuring up-to-date contact and notification lists. liaisonwith state andlocal agencies ensures uniform updating. Independent audits/reviews byindividuals whohave nodirect responsibility for the implementationof the Emergency Preparedness Program areconducted atleastonce every 24months usingthe performance-based option permitted by10CFR50,Appendix Eand10CFR50.54(t), ormore frequently whennecessary tomeetthese regulations.

TheEmergency Preparedness Manager is responsible for ensuring that EPIPs areupdated andrevised asnecessary.

Emergency Plan revisions andchanges are conducted inaccordance with PVNGS Administrative Policies andProcedures. Plan changes will bereviewed for anyreduction ineffectiveness per10CFR50.54 (q).

Therevised Emergency Plan andprocedures are handled in accordance with document control procedures. Changes tothe Emergency Plan andprocedures areapproved bythe Emergency Preparedness Manager, ordesignated alternate, a nd transmitted tothe Executive Vice President Nuclear andChief Nuclear Ofilecr,and to the OffsiteSafety Review Committee. Changes tothe Emergency Plan shallbesubmitted tothe NRCwithin 30days ofsuch changes.

8.4MAINTENANCEAND INVENTORYOF EMERGENCYEQUIPMENT AND SUPPl,1ES Quarterly inspections ofthe operational readiness ofemergency equipment andsupplies areconducted byPVNGS.Deficiencies noted during inspections arecorrected. Theuseof inspection procedures with checklists andfollow-up actions ensures that equipment is ready foruse. Sufficient reserves ofinstruments/equipment aremaintained toreplace those undergoing calibration orrepair. Calibration ofequipment isconducted atintervals setforth inthe UFSAR.Inaddition, planned useofcommunications. first aid, firefighting, andradiation measuring equipment during scheduled drills further ensures the availability andoperability ofemergency equipment.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE96OF383 9.0 RECOVERY Recovery operations include long termpost-emergency efforts thatfollow a major incident.

These operations are performed bystation personnel, contract expertsandspecialists, and qualified engineers under the direction ofthe recovery organization. Post-accident recovery actions aredesigned toidentify the extentofplant damage. prepare specific plans and programs forstation repairand restoration, implement recovery plansandprograms, and return the plant to a normal operating status.

Thefollowing plant status conditions serveasgeneral guidelines fordecisions onthe initiation ofpost-emergency recovery efforts:

a Radiation levels arestable ordecreasing with time

• Releases ofradioactive materials to the environment have ceased orarecontrolled within permissible license limits

• Fire orsimilar emergency conditions nolonger constitute a hazard tothe plant orstation personnel a Measures have been successfully tocorrect orcompensate instituted tormalfunctioning equipment.

Based onconsideration ofthese criteria,aswell asother pertinent items,the EODdetermines whentoactivate the recovery organization. Manpower andequipment resources supporting the individual functional segments oftherecovery organization may vary according tothe severity ofdamage andspecille situational needs.

Intering into recovery will notnecessarily resultinde-escalation ofthe emergency classification inthat, the loss ofa tission product barrier maynotberecoverable until recovery iscomplete. Entering into recoverydenotes the plant isstable andfurther degradation isunlikely. Repair andrestoration ofplant systems willbeneeded tofully exit the recovery phase.

9.1RECOVERYORGANIzATION Theresponsibilities andfunctions ofthe Recovery Organization Managers are summarized asfollows:

• TheRecovery Manager has overallcorporate responsibility for restoring thestation to a normal operating configuration.

• TheStation Operations Manager manages day-to-day inplantoperations and, during recovery, isresponsible for ensuringthat repairs andmodifications optimize post-recovery plant operational effectivenessandsafety.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE97OF383

• TheNuclear Support Manager ll>cusesnecessary engineering, design, andconstruction resources onthose aspects ofplant recovery requiring redesign, modification, ornew construction; directs andcoordinates NSSSandBalance-of- Plant (BOP) engineering and construction/repair work.

• The Radiological Services Manager develops plans andprocedures toprocess and control liquid. gaseous, andsolid wastes tominimize adverse effects onthe health and safety of the public and station recovery personnel. In addition, the Radiological Services Manager coordinates the activitiesofstaff Radiological Engineers and radiation protection personnel engaged inwastetreatment operations.

• TheTechnicalSupport Manager provides analyses, plans, schedules, andprocedures indirect support of plant operations.

• TheQuality Assurance Manager assures that the overall conduct ofrecovery operations ispertl)rmed in accordance with corporate policyandrules andregulations governing activities which affect public health andsafety.

• ThePlanning/Scheduling Manager prepares plans andschedules, andtracks/expedites recovery operations.

• TheAdministrative/I.ogistics Managersupplies administrative. logistic, communications, andpersonnel support il)r the recovery operation.

• PVNGSCommunications coordinates the flowof media information concerning recovery operations.

9.2RECOVERYEXPOSURE CONTROI, TheRecovery Manager, via the Recovery Organization, isresponsible for evaluating the advisability of initiating recovery andreentry. Infl)rmation onexisting conditions, interviews with employees evacuated duringthe emergency, regulatoryexposure guidelines, andcounsel from recognized experts are u sed t oII)rmulatedecisions onreentry andrecovery.

During recovery operations, actions arepreplanned tolimit exposures. Access toareas is controlled andexposure topersonnel documented. Estimates oftotal population dose are available if anyreleases arerequired oroccur during recovery operations.

9.3RE-ENTRY Ifa site evacuation isordered, re-entry tothe site iscontrolled inaccordance with established procedures. Respiratory protection equipment, protective clothing, andthyroid blocking agent aremaintained onsite it)rthe useofindividuals remaining orarriving onsite beft)re, during, orafter the emergency.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE98OF383 10.0 AGREEMENT LETTERS This section lists the entities with which written agreements aremaintained referring tothe concept ofoperations developed between Federal, andlocal State, agencies andother support organizations having anemergency response role withinthe EPX. Written agreements are maintained in the files ofthe Emergency Preparedness Department. Thebasis ofthe agreements listed below:

• 1,etter ofAgreement from National Weather Service (NWS),Weather Forecast Office (WFO)

TheNWSprovides general weather forecasts, weather severe andnood warnings, transport anddispersion plume forecasts, andlocalizedweather il>recasts. TheNWSalso provides broadcasts oftonealarmed andencoded public emergency messages onNOAA Weather Radio. ifavailable, a meteorologist will bedetailed tothe Arizona Emergency Operations Center (EOC) orMaricopa County EOCorthe PV EOfandWFOPhoenix will coordinate with Department ofEnergy meteorologists assigned tothe Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center (FRMAC) tosupport the state, county and PVNGSemergency efforts.

• Letter ofAgreement fromInstitute ofNuclear Power Operations (INPO)

Coordinates technical information from PVtothenuclear industry and government agencies, coordinates the procurement andshippingofequipment andsupplies,locates personnel with technical expertise. facilitatesindustryvendor and commercial supplier support, obtains technical information andoperatingexperience on plant components and systems, andprovides anINPOliaison tofacilitate interface.

• Westinghouse Electric Company, 11C Emergency Response Plan, Revision 6 Westinghouse Electric Company IIC Emergency Response Plan outlines how Westinghouse will respond should PVNGSrequest theirsupport during anemergency.

• Ietter ofAgreement fromBanner IIealth Banner Health isanonprofit corporation that operatesBanner Istrella Medical Center (Bil/BEMC) and Banner University Medical CenterPhoenix (Bil/BUMCP). Under the agreement with Banner IIealth, Bll/BEMC andBll/BUMCP provide hospital treatment for victims ofradiological andhazardous materials incidentsincluding contaminated individuals from PVNGS, maintains response capacity asasupport facility, andmakes appropriate personnel available for training andparticipation inmedical drills and exercises.

• Letter ofAgreement fromCity ofPhoenix FireDepartment Provides fire suppression, Emergency MedicalServices (EMS), Ilazardous Materials (llAzMAT) andother technical services whenrequested attheir discretion andmaintains

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE99OF383 a contingency inplace toprovide services for >24hours ifnecessary.Phoenix Fire Department coordinates the valley-wide Fire Department Automatic AidAgreement.

• 1etter ofAgreement fromAirEvaeair ambulance service AirEvac provides transportation for victims ofradiological materialsaccidents including contaminated individuals andmakes appropriate personnel availablefor trainingand participation in medical drillsandexercises.

• Ietter ofAgreement from Native air ambulance service Native American AirAmbulance provides transportation for victimsofradiological materials accidents including contaminated individuals andmakes appropriate personnel available fortraining andparticipation inmedical drillsandexercises.

a Ietter ofAgreement fromTonopah Valley Fire District Tonopah Valley Fire District providesback-up fire protection,haz-mat decontamination assistance, masscasualty Emergency Medical System (EMS), wildland firesuppression andtechnical rescue assistance toPVNGS. The initial response includes a Basic Life Support (BLS) fire engine and/or a BLSsquad with atleast2 persons. Tonopah also allows storage ofPVNGSfirefighting resources atTonopah fire station341

• Ietter oftnderstanding fromSalt River Project SRPagrees tohave SRPpersonnel assigned tothe PVswitchyard for>5days site access training andprovide SRPemployees with site evacuation andemergency planning info.

10.1OFFSITEEMERGENCYRESPONSE PLAN FORPALOVERDE NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATION Inaddition tothe support outlined inthe Letters ofAgreement, theOffsite Emergency Response Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stationprovides forthe following support functions for PVNGSinthe event ofanemergency fromthe indicated agencies.

Also, mutual aid compacts andagreements between theStateandother government and private entities dellned inthe Offsite Emergency Response Plan multiply theresources available toPVNGSin anemergency.

10.I.1 TheMaricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) performs thefollowing:

Emergency Public Warning:

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE100OF383 Wheninitial notilleation is a Site Area Emergency orGeneral Emergency.

a Warning message preparation a Activation ofsiren system

• Dissemination ofwarning using theEASand/or Media Alert System a Implementation ofprotective actions required if

• Backup Route AlertingbyMCSOresponse vehicles Denial ofentry into evacuated areas andpatrolevacuated areas todetermine effectiveness.

Control ofevacuee and access trafficoncounty andfilrm roads isthe responsibility ofMCSO, which coordinates with Arizona Department ofPublic Safety (AXDPS) it)r trafflemovementfrom county/farm roads tostate highways andtoInterstate-MCSOwill

10. provide securitywithin the evacuated area.

Based onthe location ofthe Reception and Care Center(s) (RCC), MCSO,A7 DPSorlocal jurisdiction lawenforcement will provide RCCsecurity andcrowd controlasnecessary.

MCSOorlocal lawenli>rcement will provide temporary impound security for contaminated vehicles andpersonal effects while theRCC is operational.

MCSOwill transport Kltodesignated ReceptionandCareCenters.

MCSOandA7 DPSmayassist the A7 Department ofAgriculture in enfl)rcing produce andfood project check points andembargos.

MCSOconducts "just-in-time" radiological training andprovides equipment li>r alternatepersonnel prior tobeing deployedinresponse toa Ilostile Action Based event.

MCSOprovides coordinated onsite/offsitedirection andcontrol inaccordance with theMaricopa County Emergency OperationsPlan (EOP). TheEOPauthorizes the Sherifftorequest assistance whenanincident isbeyond theability ofthe Ofilee to resolve andworks under the Incident Command System (ICS) whenresponding to PVNGS1lostile Action Based (IIAB) incidents.

MCSOisresponsible li>rthe initial andon-going assessment ofthe situation to determine ifterrorism isinvolved orresponsible ti>rtheIIABincident. 1fandwhen thisdetermination ismade. the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) will be notified.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE101OF383 DPSprovides 10.I.2 traffic controlon portions ofevacuation routes comprising state highways andmaintains denial ofreentry into evacuated areas.

MCSO andA7 DPSwill jointlycoordinate access tothe boundaries ofthe evacuated area based onwhether the access points areoncounty/farm roads or state highways orInterstate-10.

TheAz DPS RemoteMobile Investigation Unit (RMU) canworkincontaminated areas and is available for24-hour use.

10.I.3 TheState ofArizona provides thefollowing support toPVNGSinan emergency:

Monitoring ofevacuees for possible radioactive contamination andsupervision and monitoring ofanydecontamination effort.

Requests for andcoordination of federal technical support.

Exchanges field data andaccident assessment information with PVNGSfrom Field Monitors.

Anyelassification ornotificationmayrequiregovernmental orprivate sector emergency organizations tocommit resources onsite at the requestof the Ilicility.

Emergency resources may include, but arenotlimited law to, enforcement, firefighting. medical supportandground orair services.Assistance maybe requested from other stategovernments andprivate sector resources instates adjoining Arizona. Theseresources mayinclude medical capabilities, emergency response equipment, andemergency response personnel. TheState Emergency Operations Center PolicyChief (EOC PC) orTechnical Operations Director (TOD) will initiate requests.

TheArizona Department ofIIealth Services (AzDIIS) provides for collectionand analysis ofdata from the plant,field radiation surveys andsample collection.

A7DIIS representatives shareinformation with EOfstaff regarding fleld team locations, 11eld data andprotective action decisions andcollects data toassess the accident. project dose andproject plume.

AzDIISAeld monitors conduct radiation surveys todetermine ambient radiation levels, track the plume andcollect environmental andfoodstuff samples for analysis anddispatches a mobile laboratory toBuckeye Airport during the emergency (plume) phase forrapid evaluation ofair samples.

DEMAcoordinates thecollection, analysis anddissemination ofinformation during anincident atPVNGS. This process isconducted inconsort with the

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE102 OF383 PVNGS,MCDEM, AzDIIS andother federal state, Tribal local, Nation and volunteer agencies.

ForIIABincidents where Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) receive pre-incident intelligenceinformation, applicable OROswill contact thePVNGS Security Central Alarm Station orSecurity Director.

General response capabilitiesfor a IIABincident areasfollows:

a PVNGS: Armory; pre-established unit locations: personnel a MCSO:SWAT Teams; armored vehicles; personnel

= A7 DPS: SWAT Teams; armament asnecessary; helicopterandExed wing aircraft e National Guard/ Military: ground forces andaircraft asnecessary a AzDIIS conducts "just-in-time" radiological training andprovides equipment for alternate personnel prior to being deployed in response toa HAB incident.

10.I.4Maricopa County provides thefollowing support:

• Emergency Public Warning a Warning message preparation e Activation ofsiren systems a Dissemination ofEASwarning messages

• Provides direction andcontrol for county level activities

• Installation ofevacuation route signs oncounty andfarm roads and installation ofbarricades andsigns for entry control ofevacuated areas.

a Coordinates RCCoperations andregisters evacuees.

• Thecounty directs thyroid protection operations for county emergency workers.

11.0 REFERENCED INTERFACINGEMERGENCYPLANS e ofArizona/Maricopa State County Offsite Emergency Response PlanPVNGS e National Response Framework, Third Edition

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE103OF383 12.0 MAPS 1

...u.-  ::

. ,sa

'. ** . . , i .,

3

..,:. , ,:,..S ... o,/ C;7f. ~

d' s;

/ -

v. '

-ji u.. m m .. ,

op

"=

.. '.; .. ,./

e v.. ... . - ~;. '

.,..v.. .

v y

.- - /

f;f '

1 .a,7. 7 3 y .. -

yy, ,

.-r .%R.e.~ :

f

.2 ,o..o r

3' 'wr y gl.

m

'hi '. ,.. 5

,.. . /

a . < ..

g.;.- -

o s

2 w-o , , ....

j

?ffl

).Lm.,,,2:

3 g..,,. .*

,j

m. .

rmcx w. ,

9 3

T ;,~3 s

...- 3.. -

10 'O LS 17 & '"35 ^4 '3 '2* '

m

, ' ,d.m rA; ..

C.

...... .. , m ,

i. .

s.. a C

.. .- , , 7,p3 -

jj,/ *'

c ,.. , ,

l 'l j'1',* .' -

, ,, ,, 4@/

no -

,- , .v. .

c.

qt -

., :3 t -

3  :

a.,recu

/' , .

ra

~

~..

.p'^

as lM

m. : .

7 u.

.n.

3- c .

m:> - -

^*:

-= -

..p.-. -

FIGURE11 POPULATIONEVACUATIONROUTESECTIONSAND EVACUATIONROUTING

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE104OF383

'4 o .,e

. . we -.. e.

3,*f, = m... .e.

e A t ., .-

j, i.p3 -

g

't .

W

^4 .- . f.. .v. -, .

y .

.! /.

f Q

.:yLY -. e.. .. C / ^

N '-

-.=.

.--.o.. g

. e

4. ..

y i -.

4! a M

.. , . , r 1

o **

a r

.. . , '.. 3, .

' ^~ '

, '.f .  ; **

-- * ', ., e

.hgi. .g' 1 - -

1 ( -'j j J., .

^ "" .

(i y '

'e 4., ,

ew a ,

,'c ,

^ '

j  :

t

• ". / o e....,a

'b N .. J ey

. 13 yeo*.

.3.

g .

. .mr

^

• YAi*

4 1 ) '

. ,, g, .s

. .a

. . L t

t : .

l '

N *a . "o J J "

@ '" ': J  ; '

1,1%

s

^

• 1bW meanara c ,

e.,es i 7.**:,  : ,

W.

.w

',",7.T ..,,,, . -

. '.?^. ,

, l .eor a..:.

+

' ' . ,v ...D > '

D I3"

• J > m .w.

• • • 9 l a'

/ ' . .

'.:.p

- ,,.w-

• M l l omvt

,v .Vb'I I

.t

/

/

~

).c 3.a S*

^>'

,d

/,,#

j,* . .

r ',.J' v..,

c'-

a

, ".e."' ,' '

. , A.

/'/,.J.. // *., ,

/ '

/ /

f"f# f K N

/ ...

,/ / J nea m*e,

/ /

,' / 4<>g g

.' /  %,@'

FIGLRE 12 DEMOGRAPIlYWITlllN TllEPLUMEEXPOSl!RE PATlIWAY EMERGENCYPLANNINGzONE PAGE1OF 2

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE105OF383 Palo Verde Population Surveyl November 2020 Sector1 2 0-2 0-5 0-10 Miles 3 4 5 Miles 6 7 8 9 10 Miles A O 138 13B 726 104 300 1,268 186 92 160 94 103 1,903 B 0 43 43 164 440 185 832 129 67 231 82 19 1,360 C 0 8 8 93 150 444 695 354 61 47 70 35 1,262 D 0 0 0 95 123 278 496 434 174 0 47 309 1,460 E 0 0 0 38 48 152 238 299 72 22 189 49 869 F 0 0 0 0 242 121 363 86 58 14 12 33 566 G 0 0 0 0 79 66 145 0 160 78 5 0 388 11 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 34 28 68 J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 K 0 0 0 0 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 I, 0 3 3 O 21 11 35 0 0 0 0 0 35 M O 31 31 0 0 31 62 24 8 0 0 0 94 N 10 0 10 4 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 14 P 14 0 14 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 14 Q O 23 23 0 O 8 31 12 11 16 49 248 367 R 0 21 21 7 238 117 383 8 34 30 512 55 1,022 Mile 24 267 291 1130 1451 1713 4585 1532 737 601 1094 879 9427 Ring Total Students Staff Total ArlingtonSchool 286 40 326 Palo Verde School 444 85 529 Ruth Fisher School 584 68 652 Tonopah Iligh School 581 96 677 Crossroads Academy 28 4 32 Winters Well 481 47 528 Total 2404 340 2744 I Source: MaricopaCounty DepartmentofEmergency ManagementPopulation Survey Summary forCalendar 2020.

Year FlGURE12 DEMOGRAPHYWITHINTlIEPl,UME EXPOSlRE PATlIWAY EMERGENCY P1ANNINGzONE PAGE2OF 2

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE1060F383

/ 1, ,. ,

e [

,' c pm.

..,l 3 -,-

~

!Pc. ,-

N '.:  ;^..,

. ,vg-v ^

..t.y 1 ..y

.f .

.2 / -

r n a -

.a 4-==

fy -.....v a c.;

i -

e 7 -

p 3

's e.2.

x P

f,g

,/ i ;

%g.

p f'Q -

tw g

l r=- f ;c.%

a i .

ff -'C L %, ,'

~

~

,.'O p

c T/ " '

y ,.

~

j n .

//

Q- .,gg A'

7 .,

E ,.

m- [

, o.9

'1...

^::.; y ;,

y

/ CT1#' ;f-,, QLq,,h c:

y

. 5P1'

. g a'. a .

3 ......-..

1"',... 5%

'^

t t ,

- ^.

, ~-K ;T - ----

-1C J', .

e.. .

G m,. -- - . ---- .

a ,... v s

. LEGEND

,,,.. .f ,

pa

.-,,,y. ---.-

i f . N ----- *--

j n

/ :7

jcy .-

'=' .. .,..

FIGURE13 SITEEXCIUSIONAREABOLNDARYANDPROPERTYBOLNDARY

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE107OF383 19 y.,n,..r1>'-' Pah>verac3osmci.,rgeno runningzone 1 r

/ r .

~pg

. i.

y y y

.C.v. "f'P

'ws '

g. '

.L.-  :

(

'C~m m f )~9'ri

., c.y s = =..,

l~~N.

m 4x:dc -2 y :.- ,i

.~

f ,

.y wv= .'

)

( ,

y a

,. . t . j ;;. ......

i '. , .  :

toL ,, , l...

l l.

t n

l.

yx M

^

, L

./  ::. ,

/' ,

..a..

X x

'~- -

/

/ ,

/ l -

=

w FIGURE14 INGESTION EXPOSUREPATllWAYEMERGENCYPLANNING zONE

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE108 OF383

'~~ (

g

)--LT.* ......-a f ja .J '

E.- -T I , . ..,

..2- . - .

. n....w, s

W bhrt .

[7-.4 o

l. ^ ..s -

... +

a q f,>" .

j . .. L 'L l ..,

• • ^

2 ,. ,

0... ...,

l ..

.A,

> . -s ....

l

.J..-.. ' t s

.,r'tJg. . f, g Q

d .

• ,j M A R I C 'q,$. P

'"P' 2

sea.Crty A

gm .. m .. .

o rarsane

.% [

.,,m,..- hem A'airy P 14--Mrl r.2 PROjN,@ - -

. i.g,

'. a.,.1..,

. =C i.' .

s huan ,

' n , w ,w.4. radal

. ..,A.-.-.--.-.4 '

L 's, i ...,.. i N " '?'.

!. j

' ~ - -

3,.e ., c. 1 '. '.., -

l u s:  ; .,

---wy

),

Uj y on ,

,l >

~*. % .

m. ....

, ,m..

's '

i, .

l ...... v '

ys  ? l , ,

m

. . v g -...-

z- -

l , . ..

m

's r

.,,y, m

gf f ,

."lc -

3

?

"m.3 Q

j q ..

l .. ,

! t

/'

/ ,.. .

l ,

.;..' (',

w an-

?. ^

• - '.. a

-y C

~ -

2 j f; '

! ---i - / ,

1.Wickenburg Iligh School 2. Youngker Iligh School 3. Desert EdgeIligh School 1090 S.Vulture Mine 3000 S.Apache Road 15778 W.YumaRoad Road Buckeye, Az 85326 Goodyear, Az 85338 Wickenburg, Az 85390 FIGURE15 RECEPTIONANDCARECENTERS

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE109 OF383

. A PaloVerde Generating Station Sirens 73 e f3o A

s . , .

f- -L , w , g "

io 4 -

..-v. , R wo# B

': / .

g g*

C

=

~ '

"Nj ,

J ,a UCKEYE

/

f s  ; n ,.

c m: x

=

p /

g , .

.9 -

M

.@.C

@( ^.A j., i A

.p

"* w D

s. -

g

• i=

so .

+  :;

10 9, 8 7 6 5 /

T; m

^

,,,g=

3 -

? at nr - > .

g

@g '

=2= g sit,

• * ~

~

~ "

4 I .

7a '/,g, so.

x a i . i = .., , .. .

• g, .

^

, 'A 1-="""ra ,k  %

g L

) ,

r '

's

^-'

c,s 3.C

j.' 1 ,

^

-g ,

s. .

e.u.3

)b

.-,g ,

^

ssoi ovasso

@ +w

. v.

carwa

..' *.) '

l' e P

.......'.- L

• • j

. . .l..-

.*f..... .-....

.^2 So30EMcDowliRoacPo-n.A285008 :602;273-1411 ready.maricopa.gov FIGURE16 PROMPTNOTIFICATION SYSTEMSIRENI,OCATIONS

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE110OF383 13.0 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTINGPROCEDURES Designator Title Plan Section EP-0900 EROPosition Checklists 4 EP-0901 Emergency Classification 5,6 EP-0902 Notification 6,7 EP-0903 Accident Assessment 67 EP-0904 ERO/ERF Activation andOperation 4.7 EP-0905 Protective Actions 6,15 EP-0906 Termination and Recovery 5,9 40AO-97724 Deliberate Acts Against PVNGS 6 14.0 IDENTIFICATION OF EMERGENCY KITSBY GENERAL CATEGORY Medical lInits TSC Offsite Facility' (1-3)

Kit EquipmentOSC STSC RFA'IAmbulance 1lospitals Near

, . EOF Evacuation RP Decon Island Protective X X X X Equipment Communications X X Equipment X X X Radiological Monitoring X X Equipment ljmergency 5upplies X X X X X X 15.0 ACCIDENTDOSEPROJECTIONAND SOURCETERM ESTIMATION Themethod usedfor dose projection atPVNGSis the UnifiedRASCALInterface (URI) computer softwareprogram, which runso nseveral computersthroughout thep lant.

15.1 DOSEASSESSMENT MODEl, PVNGSuses asite-specific versionoftheURIdose assessment computer software. The TheURIsoftware meetsthe requirementsofNURIG 0654,Appendix 2,anduses a straight-line Gaussian model nearthe point release andthe 1.agrangian-Gaussian model lorfurther distances. Calculations canbeperformedusing multiple releasepoints or accident types from multiple units.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGEI1IOF383 Fuel inventory isbased onthe isotopes recommended inNUREG1228 Source Term Estimation During Incident Response toSevere Nuclear Power PlantAccidents andthe light water reactor core isotope specific inventories inNUREG1940 RASCAl4:

Description ofModels andMethods, adjusted for the site-specitle core thermal power.

Dose conversion factors arebased onICRP26/30 except that thyroid doses are adjusted tochild CDE Thyroid doses.

TheURIdose assessment software isdesigned to:

• Estimate source terms based onhigh range Containment radiation monitors, effluent process radiation monitors, andsteamline radiation monitors under anticipated accident conditions.

a Estimate source termsusing alternate monitors ordefault values whenthe primary instruments areoff-scaleor inoperable.

= Estimate source terms based on grab sample results andback-calculation using field monitoring teamdata.

a Estimate atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during andimmediately following anaccidental airborne radioactive release using actualorestimated meteorology.

a Adjust atmospheric diffusion rates based onatmospheric stability.

• Report plume dimensions, position, andPlume Exposure Duration (Release duration

+ Plume travel time).

• Calculate TEDE,Child Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent, committed EDEfrom inhalation, external EDEdue toplume exposure. andexposure to ground deposition atvarious downwind locations.

a Calculate deposition dose estimates atvarious downwind locations at 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.

= Report maximum peak exposure rate andcommitted dose atthe Site Boundary, 2 miles, 5miles, and10miles for TEDE.Child Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent, external EDE,and ground deposition.

• Report effluent release rate data andplume ground level airborne concentration.

e URIprovides graphical representation ofexceeded PAGsingiven sectors based on radiological data. Actual Protective Action Recommendations arederived from Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE112OF383 16.0 CROSS REFERENCE TO NUREG0654 Cross reference between NUREG-0654 andthePaloVerde Nuclear Station (ienerating Emergency Plan.

A. Assignment ofResponsibility(Organization Control)

A.l.a Section 4.2,4.3, 4.4, 4.5.

4.6 A.1.b Section 4.0 A.1.e Figure 1,2, 3, 4,5,6,7 A.1.d Section 4.2.1 1, 4.2.2.1, 4.2.4.1 A.1.eSection 4.2.1, Figure 9, Table 1 A.2.a N/A A.2.b N/A A.3 Section 10.0. 10.1 A.4 Section 4.2, 4.2.4.1, Table 1 B. Onsite Emergency Organization B.1 Section 4.l. 4.2 B.2 Section 4.2.1 1 B.3 Section 4.2.1 1,4.2.2.1, 4.2.4.1 B.4 Section 4.2.1.1, 4.2.2.1, 4.2.4.1 B.5 Section 4.2, Figure 1,2,3,4,5,Table 1 B.6 Section 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, Figure1,2,3,4,5,6 B.7 Section 4.2.

B.7.a Section 4.2.4.1, 4.2.4.5, 4.2.4.8 B.7.b Section 9 B.7.c Section 4.2.4.1 B.7.dSection 4.2.5, 18.1, 18.2.18.3 B.8 Section 4.5, 4.6& 10.0 B.9 Section 4.3.1, 6.8.3, 6.8.4,10.0 C. Emergency Response Support andResources C.l.a Section 4.2.1 1,4.2.2.1, 4.2.4.1 C.l.bSection 4.4.3 C.1.c Section 7.1 & 7.2, Table 3 C.2.a N/A C.2.b Section 4.2.4.15

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE113OF383 C.3 Section 7.3.1.5 C.4 Section 4.5,4.6, 10.0 D. Emergency Classification System D.1 Appendix A D.2 Appendix A D.3 N/A D.4 N/A E. Notification Methods andProcedures E.1 Section 6.3,Figure 8, 9 E.2 Section 4.2,6.4 E.3 Section 1 1,6.3 E.4 Section 1 1,4.4.1.3, 6.3 E.4.a Section 4.4.1.3,6.3 E.4.b Section 4.4.1.3,6.3 E.4.c Section 4.4.l.3,6.3 E.4.dSection 4.4.1.3,6.3 E.4.eSection 4.4.1.3,6.3 li.4.f Section 4.4.1.3.6.3 E.4.gSection 4.4.l.3,6.3 E.4.h Section 4.4.1.3.6.3 E.4.i Section 4.4.1.3,6.3 1.4.j Section 4.4.1.3,6.3 E.4.k Section 4.4.l.3.6.3 li.4.1 Section 4.4.1.3,6.3 E.4.m Section 4.4.1.3.6.3 li.4.nSection 4.4.1.3.6.3 li.5 N/A E.6 Section 6.7.2,7.7, 10.1 1,10.1.4 E.7 Section 10.1.1,10.1.4 F. Emergency Communications F.1.a Section 6.3.7.2, 7.2.19, Figure 7.2.29, 3 8,9,Table F.1.b Section 7.2,7.2.20. 7.2.21, 7.2.22, 7.2.23Table 3

F.I.cSection 7.2,7.2.12, 7.2.13

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE114OF383 1.1.d Section 7.2, Table 3 F.l.e Section 4.2, 6.3,6.4, 7.2.31, 7.2.35 F.l.f Section 7.2, 7.2.12, 7.2.13, 7.2.28 F.2 Section 7.2 F.3 Section 7.2. 8.1.3 G. Public Education andInformation G.1 Section 18.4 G.2 Section 18.4 G.3.aSection 7.1.8, 18.2 G.3.b Section 7.1.8, 18.2 G.4.a Section 4.2.5.3, 18.3, 1igure 5 G.4.bSection 4.2.5.4, 18.3, Figure 5 G.4.c 4.2.5.5, 6.9, 18.3, Figure 5 G.5 18.4 II. Emergency Facilities andEquipment 11.1 Section 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5 11.2 Section 7.1.6 II.3 N/A 11.4 Section 6.3, 6.4,Table 1 H.5.a Section 7.3.1 1 11.5.b Section 7.3.1.2, 7.3.1.6 11.5.cSection 7.3.1.3 II.5.d Section 7.3.1.4 II.6.aSection 7.3.1.1 11.6.bSection 7.3.2 I-1.6.c Section 7.3.1.5 H.7 Section 7.3.2 11.8 Section 6.5.2, 7.3.I.1 II.9 Section 7.1.4, 7.4, 14.0 11.10Section 8.4 II.1 1 Section 14.0 11.12 Section 4.2.4.7, 4.2.4.9, 6.5.2, 4.2.4.14, 7.1.6 1.Accident Assessment

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE115OF383 1.1 Appendix A I.2 Section 7.3.1.2, 7.3.1.5 1.3.a Section 15.0 1.3.b Section 15.0 I.4 Section 15.0 I.5 Section 4.4.1.3, 6.5.2, 7.11,7.1.3, 7.1.5, 1,7.3.1.7, 7.3.1 7.1.6, 7.3.l.9 1.6 Section 15.0 1.7 Section 6.5.2 1.8 Section 6.5.2,15.0 1.9 Section 6.5.2 I.10 Section 6.5.2,15.0 1.1 1 N/A J. Protective Response J.1.a Section 6.7, 7.2.33 J.1.b Section 6.7, 7.2.33 J.1.e Section 6.7.1,7.2.33 J.1.dSection 6.7.1,7.2.33 J.2 Section 6.7.1.5,12igure11 J.3 Section 6.8.2 6.7.1.7, J.4 Section 6.8.2 6.7.1.5, J.5 Section 6.7.1.3, 6.7.1.4, 7.2.33.1 J.6.a Section 9.3 6.7.1.8.1, J.6.b Section 6.7.1.8.2.

9.3 J.6.c Section 6.7.1.8.3, 9.3 J.7 Section 6.3, 6.7.2,Iigures8,9,10 J.8 Section 6.7.2 J.9 N/A J.10.aSection 6.8.2,7.3.2,Figure 11,Figure 12,Figure 15 J.10.b Section Figure 12 J.10.cSection 7.7, Iigure 16 J.10.dN/A J.10.eN/A J.10.f N/A

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE116OF383 J.10.g N/A J.10.h N/A J.10.i N/A J.10.j N/A J.10.k N/A J.10.1N/A J.10.mSection 6.7.2, 6.7.2.1 J.1 1 N/A J.12 N/A K. Radiological Exposure Control K.1.a Section 6.7, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4 K.l.bSection 6.7, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4 K.l.c Section 6.7, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4 K.1.dSection 6.7, 6.8.2, 7.5 K.1.e Section 6.7, 6.7.1.7, 6.8.2 K.1.fSection 6.7, 6.8.3 K.l.gSection 6.7, 6.8.4, 7.5 K.2 Section 6.5.3, 6.8.1 K.3.aSection 6.5.3, 6.7.3.1, 6.81,6.7.1.S.4 K.3.bSection 6.8.1 K.4 N/A K.5.a Section 6.8.1, 6.8.2 K.5.bSection 6.8.2 K.6.a Section 6.7.3.1 K.6.b Section 6.7.3.1 K.6.c Section 6.7.3.1. 9.0 K.7 6.8.2 I. Medical andPublic IIealth Support I.1 Section 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4 l2 Section 6.8.2, 6.8.4. 7.5 I3 N/A 1.4 Section 6.8.3

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE117OF383 M. Recovery andReentry Planning Operations andPost-Accident M.l Section 9.0, 9.2, 9.1, 9.3 M.2 Section 9.1 M.3 Section 9.1 M.4 Section 9.2 N. Exercises and Drills N.1.a Section 8.1.2 N.1.b Section 8 1.2 N.2.a Section 8.1.3 N.2.bSection 8.1.3 N.2.c Section 8.1.3 N.2.d Section 8.1.3 N.2.e.1 Section 8.1.3 N.2.e.2 N/A N.3.a Section 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8.1.3, N.3.bSection 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8.1.3, N.3.cSection 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8.1.3, N.3.d Section 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8 1.3, N.3.eSection 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8.1.3, N.3.1 Section 8.1.2, 8.1.4 8.1.3, N.4 Section 8.1.2, 8 1.4 8.1.3, N.5 Section 8.I.2, 8.1.3, 8.1.4 O. Radiological Emergency Training

Response

0.1 Section 8.11 O.1.a Section 8.1l.3 0.1.b N/A 0.2 Section 8.11,8.11.2, 0.3 Section 8.1l.2 O.4 Section 8.1l 0.4.a Section 8.1l.2 0.4.b Section 8.1l.2 0.4.c Section 8.11.2 0.4.dSection 8.1l.2

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE118OF383 O.4.e Section 8.11.2 0.4.f Section 8.11.2 0.4.g Section 8.1 1.3 0.4.h Section 8.1 1.2 0.4.iSection 8.11.2 O.4.jSection 8.1 L.2 0.5 Section 8.1 1 P. Development, Responsibility for thePlanning Effort: Periodic Review and Distribution ofEmergency Plans P.1 Section 8.1l P.2 Section 8.2 P.3 Section 8.2 P.4 Section 8.3 P.5 Section 8.3 P.6 Section 11.0 P.7 Section 13.0 P.8 Section 16.0,Table ofContents P.9 Section 8.3 P.10 Section 8.3 17.0 CORPORATEEMERGENCYSUPPORT TheEODwill requestandcoordinaterequired support.

18.0 PUBLICINFORMATION

18.1 INTRODUCTION

Thepurpose ofthis section istobriefly summarize responsibilities, the operation and staffingofthe PaloVerde Communications,APSExternal Communications Department andthe JointinformationCenter A detailed (JIC). Joint Information Public Procedure is provided.

18.2 ACTIVATIONANDOPERATION Thepurpose ofthe Palo Verde APSExternal Communications, Communications Department andthe JICistoprovide information about atPVNGStothe anemergency

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE119OF383 newsmedia andthe general public. AtanUnusual Event, Palo Verde Communications andAPSExternal Communications Department provide the media interface for the site.

AtanAlert orhigher classilleation level,the JICisactivated andassumes responsibility for thepublic information function.

18.3 STAFFING AND IOCATION Palo Verde Communications Department personnel arelocated atPVNGSandthe APS External Communications Departmentpersonnel arelocated atthe APSCorporate IIeadquarters,400 N. 5thStreet,Phoenix, Az.

TheJICislocated at600 North VerradoWay, Buckeye, Az.TheJICstaffconsists of APS/PVNGS andgovernment public information andsupport personnel. PVNGS coordinates andreleases inti)rmation with government authorities. Each principal organization represented atthe JIC has a designated spokesperson that hasaccess toall necessary information. JICprocedures are designed toallow the timely exchange of information amongspokespersons.

PUBlICINFORMATIONAND EDUCATION 18.4 PVNGS,DEMA, AzDHS, andMCDEMjointly conducts publicinformation seminars andmeetings asneeded orrequested with local groups within the 10-mile EP7.Local groups maybeinvited toparticipate indrills andexercises to maintain emergency preparedness and to testspecific segments ofemergency plans and procedures that are affected by,ormayaffect, 10-mile EPzresidents.

PVNGS,along with State ofArizona andMaricopa County, jointlyprepare and release, public information materials toresidents ofthe10-mile EP7. Using postoffice distributionmethods that ensure maximum distribution, the public information material issentouttoresidents within the 10-mile EPXannually. Thepublic information material outlines insimple terms,the station's various classifications ofemergencies, summarizes the emergency plan developed tosafeguard the general public, reviews appropriateprotective actions including Potassium lodide (KI), andidentifies public emergency alertstations. Theinformation also contains material onradiation, contacts for additionalinformation andameansfor advising governmental authorities about special needsofresidents ofthe EP7.

Emergency andprotective information isalso provided tothe transient population within the PVNGSIO-mile EP7. Information isposted insurrounding establishments thatmay include butisnotlimited tolocal businesses, stores, schools, churches, post ofl1ces, truck andrecreational stops, vehicle parks.

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE120 OF383 An annual media dayis jointly conducted between PVNCiS andOfTsiteAgencies in order toinform media personnel with PVNCiS emergency preparednessandresponse, basic nuclear power plantoperation, basicradiation protection, andthe means to disseminate public emergency information.

19.0 DEVELOPMENTAL REFERENCES 1 10CFR50.47(B) "Emergency Plans"

2. 10CFR50.54(q), "Conditions ofIicenses," Emergency Plans

3. APPENDIXETO 10CFR PART 50"EmergencyPlanning andPreparedness for Production andlltilization Facilities,"

4. NLJRE(i 0578,TMl-2 1essonsLearned Task Force: Status ReportandShort-Term Recommendations: July, 1979

5. NLJRECi 0737,Clarif icationofTMIAction Plan Requirements: November, 1980

6. 10CFR20,Standards for Protection againstRadiation

7. 10CFR50,Domestic licensing ofProduction and l!tilization Facilities

8. Nl!RI G-0654 /FEMA-REP-1,Revision 1"Criteria for Preparation andEvaluation of Radiological Emergency Response PlansandPreparedness in Support ofNuclear Power Plants"

9. NLJRE(i 0654,Supplement 3,Criteria forPreparation andEvaluation ofRadiological 1mergency Response Plans andPreparedness inSupport ofNuclearPower Plants, Guidance forProtective Action Strategies, November 201) "

10. EPA400-R-92-001, Manual ofProtective Action Guides andProtectiveActions for Nuclear Incidents: October, 1991 11 Reg. Guide 1.97, Revision 2,instrumentation for 1.ight-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants toAssess Plant andEnvirons Conditions During andFollowing anAccident; December, 1980 12.NllREG-0696, Functional Criteria for 1mergency Response 1981 Facilities, 13.NlJREG/CR 7002, Criteria for Development ofEvacuation TimeEstimate Studies, published inNovember 2011

14. NLJREG1394, Emergency Response DataSystem (ERDS) Implementation, Revision 1, June 1991 andthe relatedGeneric Ietter9301,Emergency ResponseData System Test Program, March 3,1993

PVNGS EMERGENCY P1AN REVISION69 PAGE121 OF383 15.NRCRegulatory Issue Summary 2005 02Clarifying the Process for Making Emergency Plan Changes, February2005 14,

16. Regulatory Guide I.219, Guidance onMaking Changes toEmergency Plans forNuclear Power Reactors.

17.NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, "Interim StaffGuidance -

Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants

18. NRCInformation 13ulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness andResponse forSecurity Based Events 19.Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 99-01, Revision 6,"Methodology for Development of Emergency Action 1evels," endorsed bythe ll.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRCorthe Commission)by letter dated March 28,2013 (Thaggard, M.,iJ.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Susan Perkins-Grew, Nuclear Energy Institute,"ll.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review and ndorsementI of NEl 99-01, Revision6, dated November, 2012 (TACNo.D92368)," dated March 28,2013. [ADAMS Accession No.MLl2346A463J.

20. NRCletter dated September 8,2017, PaloVerde Nuclear Generating Station, l!nits I,2, and3 Issuance ofAmendments toRevise Emergency Action Ievels toa Scheme Ilased onNuclear Energy institute NEl99-01, Revision 6 (CAC NOS.MI6803, MF6804 and MI6805. This letter provided Amendment No.198torenewed FacilityOperating I.icense No.NPF-41, Amendment No.198toRenewed Facility Operating I,icense No.

NPF-51 andAmendment No.198toRenewed FacilityOperating I.icense No. NPF-74 for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, lJnits I,2,and 3, respectively. The amendments consist orchanges tothe emergency action level (EAl.) scheme including the NRCapproved Safety Evaluation 21 10CFR50.I55, "Mitigation ofbeyond-design-basis events"

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 OF383 PAGE122 Appendix A Classification Guidance andEALTechnical Basis

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE123 OF383 APPENDIX A CIASSl FICATIONGUIDANCEAND EAITECIINICAL BASIS TABI,E OFCONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE. .3 2.0 DISCUSSION .3 2.1 Background .3 2.2 Fission ProductBarriers. .4 2.3 Fission Product Barrier Classification Criteria .4 2.4 EALOrganization .5 2.5 Technical Bases Information. .7 2.6 Operating ModeApplicability (ref. 4.1.6) .8 3.0 GUIDANCEON MAKINGEMI?RGENCY CIASSlFICATIONS. .9 3.1 General Considerations .9 3.2 Classification Methodology .11

4.0 REFERENCES

.14 4.1 Developmental .14 5.0 DEFINITIONS,ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS. .15 5.1 Definitions (ref.

4.11except asnoted) .15 5.2 Abbreviations/Acronyms .20 6.0 PVNGS-TO-NEl-99-01 Rev. 6,EAl,CROSS-REFERENCE .23 7.0 ATTACllMENTS. .26 Attachment I Emergency Action 1evel Technical Bases. .27 Category.R.- Abnormal RadRelease/Rad Effluent .27 Cateeory E Independent Spent Fuel Installation Storage (ISFSI) .67 Category.t -

Cold Shutdown /Refueling SystemMalfunction. .70 Category 11 llazards andOther Conditions Affectine PlantSafety. 108 Categoryji -

Systems Malfunction. 149 Cateeorv F Fission Product Barrier Deeradation. 198 Attachment 2 Fission Product Barrier Loss/PotentialIoss andBases.

Matrix .203 Attachment 3 Safe Operation & Shutdown RoomsTables R-2& ll-2 Bases. .256 Attachment 4 Palo Verde Safety System Iist. .260 2of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE124OF383 PURPOSE Thisdocument providesanexplanation andrationale each filr Emergency Action Ievel (EAl )

includedin the EAL Upgrade Project fl>rPalo Verde NuclearGenerating Station (PVNGS).

Decision-makers responsible for implementation ofEP-0901, Classifications, mayusethis document asa technical reference insupport ofEAl interpretation. This information mayassist the Emergency Coordinator inmaking classifications,particularly those involvingjudgment ormultiple events. Thebasis inti)rmation mayalso beuseful intraining andfor explaining event classifications tooffsite officials.

Theexpectation isthat emergency classifleations aretobemadeassoonasconditions arepresent andrecognizable for the c lassitleation, butwithin15minutes orless inallcases ofconditions present. Useofthis document for assistance is notintended todelay theemergency classification.

Because the infl)rmation ina basis document can affect emergency classillcation decision-making (e.g.. the Emergency Coordinator refers toitduring anevent), the NRCstaff expects that changesto the basis document will beevaluated inaccordance with the provisions of10CFR50.54(q).

2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 Background

EAlsarethe plant-specille indications, conditions orinstrument readngs that areutilized to classify emergency conditions defined inthePVNGSEmergency Plan.

In1992, the NRCendorsed NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology forDevelopment oflimergency Action I.evels.asanalternative toNUREG-0654 EAlguidance.

NEl99-01 (NUMARC/NESP-007), Revisions 4 and5,were subsequently issued flarindustry implementation. Enhancements over earlierrevisions included:

a Consolidating the system malfunction initiating conditions andexample emergency action levels which address conditions thatmaybepostulated tooccur during plant shutdown conditions.

• Initiating conditions andexample emergency actionlevels that fullyaddress conditions that maybepostulated tooccur atpermanently Defueled StationsandIndependent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSls).

a Simplifying the flssion product barrier EAlthreshold fora Site Area Emergency.

Subsequently. Revision 6ofNEl99-01 incorporated resolutions tonumerous implementation issues including the NRCl?Al Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). Using NEl99-01, Revision 6, 3of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE125 OF383 Methodology for the Development ofEmergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, November 2012 (ref. 4.1.1 L PVNGSconducted anEAL implementation upgrade project that produced the EAl.sdiscussed herein.

2.2 Fission Product Barriers Fission product barrier thresholds represent threats tothe defense indepth design concept that precludes the releaseof radioactive fission products tothe environment. This concept relies on multiple physical barriers, any oneofwhich. ifmaintained intact, precludes the release of significant amountsofradioactive fission products tothe environment.

Manyofthe EAlsderived from the NEl methodology arefission product barrier threshold based.

That is,the conditions that define the EAl sarebased uponthresholds that represent the lossor potential loss ofoneormoreofthe three 11ssion product barriers. "I.oss" and"Potential I.oss" signify the relative damage andthreat ofdamage tothe barrier. A "Ioss" threshold means the barrier nolonger assures containment ofradioactive materials. A "Potential Loss" threshold implies anincreased probability ofbarrier lossanddecreased certainty ofmaintaining thebarrier.

Theprimary Assion product barriers are:

A. Fuel ClaEl'C.J. TheFCBarrier consists ofthe cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.

B. W TheRCSBarrier includes the RCS primary side andits connections uptoandincluding the pressurizer safety andrelief valves andother connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

C.ContainmenUC).M D TheCTMTBarrier includes the containment building and connections uptoandincluding the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier alsoincludes the main steam, feedwater andblowdown lineextensions outsidethe containment building uptoandincluding theoutermost secondary side isolationvalve.

Containment Barrier thresholds areused ascriteria for escalation ofthe emergency classification level (ECL) from Alert toa Site AreaEmergency ora General limergency 2.3 Fission Product Barrier Classification Criteria Thefollowing criteria arethe bases forevent classificationrelated tofission product barrier loss or potential loss:

Alert:

Anyloss oranypotential loss ofeither Fuel Clad orRCSbarrier 4 of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE126 OF383 Site Area Emereeney Ioss or potential loss ofanytwobarriers LL11eraLEnggg11c1 I.oss ofanytwo barriers andloss orpotential loss ofthe third barrier 2.4 EAL Organization ThePVNGSEAIschemeincludes the following features:

• Division ofthe EALsetinto three broad groups:

o EALsapplicable undera.ny plant operating modesThis -

group would bereviewed bythe EAL-useranytimeemergency classification is considered.

o EAl.s applicableonlyunder hotoperating modesThis -

group would only be reviewed bytheEAL-user whenthe plant isin1 Power-Operation, 2 Startup, 3 -

IlotStandby or4 Ilot Shutdown mode.

o IAl.s applicableonly under cold operating modes -

Thisgroup would only be reviewed bytheEAI-user whenthe plant isin5 -

Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling or Defueled mode.

Thepurpose ofthe groups istoavoid review ofhot condition EAI.s when the plant is ina cold condition andavoid review ofcold condition EAlswhenthe plant isina hot condition. This approach significantly minimizesthe totalnumber ofEAlsthat mustbereviewed bythe userfor a given plant condition, reduces user reading burden thereby, and, facilitatestimelyidentification of the EAl. that applies tothe emergency.

• Within each group. assignment ofEALstocategories andsubcategories:

Category andsubcategory titles areselected torepresent conditions thatare operationally significant tothe EAI.-user. ThePVNGSEAI categories arealigned toand represent theNII99-01"Recognition Categories." Subcategories are used inthe PVNGSscheme asnecessary tofurther divide the EAIsofa category into logical sets ofpossible emergency classification thresholds. The PVNGSEAl. categories andsubcategories arelisted below.

5of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE127OF383 EAL Groups, Categories andSubcategories EAlGroup/Category EAl Subcategory M

R Abnormal Rad Levels/Rad liffluent 1 Radiological Eftluent 2 Irradiated FuelEvent 3 Area Radiation Levels II Ilazards andOtherConditions Affecting 1 Security Plant Safety 2 Seismic Event 3 Natural orTechnological Ilazard 4 -

Fire 5 -

IlazardousGas 6 -

ControlRoomEvacuation 7 -

EmergencyCoordinator .ludgment E ISFSI 1 Confinement Boundary HotConditions:

S System Malfunction 1 Ioss ofEmergency AC Power 2 Ioss of Vital DCPower 3 Iossof Control RoomIndications 4 RCSActivity 5 RCSIeakage 6 RPSFailure 7 IossofCommunications 8 Containment Failure 9 Ilazardous EventAffecting Safety Systems F 1ission ProductBarrier Degradation None ColdConditions:

C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System 1 RCSLevel Malfunction 2 IossofEmergency AC Power 3 RCSTemperature 4 Loss ofVital DCPower 5 Loss ofCommunications 6 Ilazardous EventAffecting Safety Systems Theprimary tool fordetermining the emergencyclassification isthe level l?Al. Classification Matrix. Theuserofthe 1Al. Classification may(but Matrix isnotrequiredto) consultthel?Al.

Technical BasesDocument inordertoobtainadditional informationconcerning the EAlsunder classificationconsideration. Theusershould consult Section 3.0 andAttachments 1& 2ofthis document forsuchinformation.

6of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE128 OF383 2.5 Technical Bases Information EAltechnical bases are providedinAttachment 1for each EAIaccording toEAl.group (Any, Ilot,Cold), EAl eategory (R, C,1I, S,E andF) andEAlsubcategory. A summary explanation of each category and subcategory isgiven atthe beginning ofthe technical basesdiscussions ofthe EALsincludedin the category. Foreach EAL,the following information isprovided:

CatWD'1stlerA [ille W

initiating.conditiotula Site-specille description ofthegeneric IC given inNEl99-01. Rev. 6.

M Each EAL is assigned a unique tosupport accurate communication ofthe identifier emergency classification toonsite andoffsite personnel. Fourcharacters define eachEAL identifier:

1 First character Corresponds (letter): tothe EAIcategory asdescribedabove (R,C,II, S,E orF) 2.Second character (letter):

Theemergency elassification(G, S,A orU)

G = General Emergency S= Site AreaEmergency A = Alert U = Unusual Event 3.Third character Subcategory (number): number within the givencategory.

Subcategories are sequentially numbered beginning with the number one(1). If does acategory nothave a subcategory, thischaracter isassigned thenumber one(1).

4. Fourth character (number):Thenumerical sequence ofthe EAL withintheEAL subcategory. Ifthe subcategoryhas only oneEAL, it isgiven the number one(1).

W Unusual Event (U). Alert Site (A), AreaEmergency (S) orGeneral Emergency (G) h Exact wording oftheEAl,asit appears intheEAl Classif ication Matrix 7of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE129OF383 Oneor more ofthe following plant operating conditions comprise themodetowhich each EAI is applicable: I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby,4 -

IlotShutdown,5 Cold Shutdown. Refueling, 6 -

DEF -

Defueled, orAny. (See Section2.6 for operating modedellnitions)

Definitions:

IftheEALwording contains a dellned term,the dellnitionofthe termis inthis included section.

These dellnitions canalso be found inSection 5.1 Basis:

A basis section that provides PVNGS-relevant information concerning theEAIaswell asa description ofthe rationale for theEAL as provided inNEl99-01. Rev. 6.

W Site-specific source documentation from whichthe EAL isderived 2.6 Operating ModeApplicability (ref. 4.1.6)

REACTIVI FY  % RATED COI.DIEG MODE TITI.E CONDITION TilERMAI. TIMPERATURE (kerr) POWER"" (oF)

I PowerOperation > 0.99 > 5 N/A 2 Startup > 0.99 <5 N/A 3 Standby Ilot < 0.99 N/A > 350 4 Shutdown Ilot 0" < 0.99 N/A 350> Tcom > 210 5 ColdShutdown d" < 0.99 N/A 5 210 6 Refueling'd N/A N/A N/A (a) Excluding decay heat.

(b) All reactor vessel head closurebolts fully tensioned.

(c) Oneormorereactor vesselhead elosure bolts lessthanfullytensioned.

8of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE130OF383

7. Defueled Allfuel assemblies have been removed from Containment andplaced inthespent fuelpit andthe SFPtransfer canal gatevalve isclosed.

Themodeineffect atthe time that anevent orcondition occurred, andprior toanyplant oroperator response, isthe m ode thatdetermines whether or not an IC is applicable. Ifa nevent o rcondition occurs, andresults in a mode change bell>rethe emergency is declared, the emergency classilleation level isstill based onthe mode that existed atthe time that the event orconditionwasinitiated (and notwhenit wasdeclared).Once a different modeisreached, anyneweventorcondition, not relatedtothe original event orcondition, requiring emergency classificationshould beevaluated against the ICsandEALsapplicable tothe operating mode atthe time ofthe newevent or condition. Forevents that occur inCold Shutdown orRefueling, escalation isvia EAlsthat are applicable inthe Cold Shutdown orRefueling modes, evenif HotShutdown (or a higher mode) is entered during the subsequent plant response. In particular, the tission product barrierEAIsare applicable only toevents that initiate inthe Hot Shutdown mode orhigher.

3.0 GUIDANCEONMAKINGEMERGENCYCI ASSIFICATIONS 3.1General Considerations Whenmaking anemergency elassification, the Emergency Coordinator mustconsider all infl>rmation having a bearing on the proper of assessmentanInitiating Condition (IC). This includes theEmergency Action I.evel(EAl )plus the a ssociated Operating Applicability, Mode Notes and theinfl3rming basis information. Inthe Recognition Category Fmatrices.EALs arebased onloss or potentialloss ofFission Product Barrier Thresholds.

3.1IClassification Timeliness NRCregulations require the licensee toestablish andmaintain the capabilitytoassess, classify and declare anemergency condition within 15minutes after theavailability ofindications toplant operators thatanemergency action level hasbeen exceeded andtopromptly declare the emergency condition assoonaspossible ilallowing identification ofthe appropriate emergency classification level.TheNRCstaff hasprovided guidance onimplementing this requirement inNSIR/DPR-lSG-01,Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants (ref.4.I.9).

Whenassessing anEAI that specitles a time duration for the off-normal condition,the "clock" for theEAl time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classificationprocess "clock."

3.I.2 Valid Indications AIIemergency classification assessments shall bebased upon valid indications,reportsor conditions. A valid indication, report, orcondition, isonethat hasbeen verifiedthrough appropriate 9 of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE131OF383 means suchthat there isnodoubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or thereport's accuracy. For example, verification could beaccomplished through aninstrument channel check, response onrelated orredundant indicators, ordirect observation byplant personnel.

Thevalidation ofindications should becompleted inamanner thatsupports timely emergency declaration.

3.1.3 Imminent Conditions ForICsandEAIsthat have a stipulated timeduration (e.g., 15minutes, 30minutes, the etc.),

Emergency Coordinator should not wait untilthe applicable time haselapsed,but should declare the event assoonasit isdetermined that the condition has exceeded, orwilllikelyexceed, the applicable time. Ifanongoing radiological releaseis detected andthe release starttime is unknown, itshould beassumed that the releaseduration specified inthe IC/EAl hasbeen e xceeded, absent data tothe contrary.

3.1.4 Planned vs.Unplanned Events A planned work activity that results inanexpected event orcondition which meetsorexceeds an EAl. does notwarrant anemergency declaration provided that: 1) theactivityproceeds asplanned and2)the plant remains within the limits imposed bythe operating license. Such activities include planned workto manipulate, test, repair, maintain ormodify a system orcomponent. Inthese cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation andexecution of thework will ensure that compliance ismaintained with all aspects operating provided of the license thatt he activity proceeds and concludes as expected. Events or conditions of this typemay be subject tothe reporting requirements of10CFR50.72 4.1.4).

(ref.

3.1.5 Classincation Based onAnalysis Theassessment ofsomeEAIsis based onthe results ofanalyses that arenecessary toascertain whether a specific EAl threshold has been exceeded (e.g.,dose assessments, chemistry sampling, RCSleak ratecalculation, etc.). Forthese EAIs,the EAlwording orthe associated basis discussion willidentify the necessary analysis. Inthese cases, the15-minute declaration period startswith theavailability ofthe analysis resultsthat showthe threshold tobeexceeded (i.e.,thisis the time that the EAl information isfirst available). TheNRCexpects licensees toestablish the capability toinitiate andcomplete EAl-related analyses within a reasonableperiod oftime (e.g.,

maintain the necessary expertise on-shift).

3.1.6 Emergency Coordinator Judgment While the EAl.s have been developed toaddress a full spectrum ofpossibleevents andconditions which maywarrant emergency classification, aprovision for classificationbased on operator/management experience andjudgment isstill necessary. TheNEl99-01 EAlscheme 10of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE132OF383 provides the EmergencyCoordinator with the ability toclassify events andconditions based upon judgment usingEAI.s that areconsistent with the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) definitions (refer toCategory II). TheImergency Coordinator will need todetermine ifthe effects orconsequences ofthe event orcondition reasonably meetorexceed a particular EC1definition. A similar provision isincorporated inthe Fission Product Barrier Tables; judgment maybeused to determine the status ofa fissionproduct barrier.

3.2 Classification Methodology Tomakeanemergency classitleation, the user will compare aneventorcondition the (i.e., relevant plant indications andreports) to an EAI (s) anddetermine ifthe EALhasbeen metorexceeded.

Theevaluation ofanIAl mustbeconsistent with the relatedOperating ModeApplicability and Notes. IfanEAI hasbeen metorexceeded, the associated ICis likewise met,the emergency classification process "clock" starts andthe ECL mustbedeclared inaccordance with plant procedures nolater than fifteen minutes after the process "clock" started.

Whenassessing anEALthat specitles a time duration forthe off-normal condition, the "elock" for the EAltime duration runs concurrently with the emergency elassification process "clock."For a full discussion ofthis timing requirement, refer toNSIR/DPR-ISG-01 (ref.4.I.9).

3.2.1 Classilleation ofMultiple Events andConditions Whenmultiple emergency events orconditions arepresent, the userwill identify all metor exceeded EAl s. The highest applicable ECL identitled isdeclared. For example:

• If anAlert IAl. anda Site Area Imergency EAIaremet,whether at one unitorattwo differenta Site units, AreaEmergency should bedeclared.

There isno"additive" effect from multiple EAl.s meeting the sameECL.Forexample:

• IftwoAlert EAlsare met,whether atoneunit orattwodifferent units. anAlert should be declared.

Related guidance concerning classification ofrapidly escalating events orconditions isprovided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification ofNRCGuidance for Emergency Notifications During Ouicidv Changing Events (ref. 4.I.2).

3.2.2 Consideration ofModeChanges During Classification Themodeineffect atthe time that aneventorcondition occurred andprior toanyplant oroperator response, isthe modethat determines whether ornotanICis applicable. aneventorcondition If occurs andresults ina modechange before the emergency isdeclared, the emergency classification level isstill based onthe modethat existedatthe time that theeventorcondition wasinitiated (and IIof262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE133OF383 not when itwasdeclared). Oncea different modeisreached, anyneweventorcondition, not related tothe original event orcondition, requiringemergency classification shouldbeevaluated against the ICsandEAIsapplicable tothe operating modeatthe time ofthe neweventor condition.

Forevents thatoccur in Cold Shutdown orRefueling, escalation isvia EAl.s thatareapplicable in the Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes, evenifIlot Shutdown (or ahigher mode) isentered during the subsequent plant response. Inparticular,the fission product barrier EAl.s areapplicable onlyto events thatinitiateintheIlot Shutdown modeorhigher.

3.2.3 Classil1cationofImminent Conditions Although EAI,sprovide specille thresholds, the Emergency Coordinator mustremain alert toevents orconditions thatcould lead tomeetingor exceeding anEAIwithin a relativelyshortperiod of time achange (i.e., inthe ECLisIMMINENT). If,inthe judgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator, meeting anEALis IMMINENT, the emergency classification should bemadeasif the EALhas been met.While applicable toall ECLs, thisapproach is particularly important atthehigher emergency classification levels since it provides additional timefor implementation of protective measures.

3.2.4 Emergency Classification Ievel Upgrading andDowngrading An ECLmaybedowngraded whenthe event orcondition that meetsthe highest ICand EAIno longer existsand other site-specific downgrading requirements downgrading the are met. If ECIis deemed appropriate,the newECLwould thenbebased ona lower applicable IC(s) and EAL(s).

TheECImayalso simply be terminated.

Asnoted above, guidance concerning classification ofrapidly escalating eventsorconditions is provided inRIS2007-02 (ref. 4.I.2).

3.2.5 Classit1cationofShort-I ived Events Event-based ICsandIAlsdefine a variety ofspecine occurrences that have potential oractual safety significance.Bytheir nature, someofthese events maybeshort-lived and,thus,over before the emergency classification assessment canbecompleted. If anevent occurs thatmeetsorexceeds anEAL,the associated ECLmustbedeclared regardless ofits continued atthe presence time of declaration. Examples ofsuch events include anearthquake ora failure ofthe protection reactor system toautomatically trip the reactor followed bya successful manual trip.

3.2.6 ClassificationofTransient Conditions Manyofthe ICsand/or EALsemploy time-based criteria. These criteria willrequirethat the IC/EAI conditions bepresent fora defined period oftime before anemergency declaration is I2of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE134OF383 warranted. Incases where notime-based criterion isspecified, itisrecognized that sometransient conditions maycause anEAltobemet for abrief period oftime (e.g.,a fewseconds toa few minutes). The following guidance should beapplied tothe classilleationofthese conditions.

Ininstanceswhere anEAl isbriefly met during anexpected (normal) plant response, anemergency declaration isnotwarranted provided that associated systems andcomponents areoperating asexpected andoperator actions are performed inaccordance with procedures.

Ifan operator takes prompt manualaction toaddress acondition andthe action issuccessful incorrecting the condition prior tothe emergency declaration, then the applicable EALis notconsidered metand the associated emergency declarationis not required. Forillustrative purposes, consider the following example:

AnATWSoccurs andthe high pressureECCS systems fiiil toautomatically start. Reactor vessel level rapidly decreases andthe plant enters aninadequate core cooling condition (a potential loss ofboth the fuel clad andRCSbarriers). Ifanoperator manually starts ahigh pressure ECCSsystem inaccordance with anEOP step andclears the inadequate core cooling condition priortoanemergency declaration, then the classification should bebased onthe ATWSonly.

Itisimportant tostress thatthe15-minute emergency elassification assessment period (process clock) isnota"grace period" during which aclassification maybedelayed to allow the performance ofa corrective actionthat would obviate the need toclassify the event. Emergency classification assessments mustbedeliberate andtimely, with noundue delays.The provision discussed above addresses onlythose rapidly evolving situationswhenanoperatoris able totake a successful corrective action tothe prior Emergency Coordinator completing the review and steps necessary tomake the emergency declaration. This provision isincluded toensure thatany public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification aretruly warranted bythe plant conditions.

3.2.7 After-the-Fact Discovery ofanEmergency Event orCondition Insomecases,anEAImaybemetbut the emergency classificationwasnotmade atthe time ofthe event orcondition. This situation canoccur whenpersonnel discover that aneventorcondition existed which metanEAl., but noemergency wasdeclared andthe event orcondition nolonger exists atthe time ofdiscovery. This maybeduetothe event orcondit:on notbeing recognized at the time oranerror thatwasmadeinthe emergency classification process.

Inthese cases,noemergency declaration iswarranted; however, theguidance contained in NUREG-1022 (ref. 4.I.3) isapplicable. Specifically, the event should bereported tothe NRCin 13of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE135OF383 accordance with 10CFR50.72 (ref.4.1.4)within onehour ofthe discovery oftheundeclared event orcondition. Thelicensee shouldalsonotify appropriate Stateandlocal agencies inaccordance with the agreed uponarrangements.

3.2.8 Retraction ofanEmergency Declaration Guidance onthe retraction of anemergency declaration reportedtothe NRCis discussed in NUREG-1022 (ref. 4.I.3).

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Developmental 4.I1 NEl99-01, Revision6,Methodologyfi>r the Developinent ofEinergency Action Levels forNon-Passive Reactors,ADAMS Accession Number MI12326A805.

4.I.2RIS2007-02, ofNRC (inidance Clarification fi>r Emergency Notifications during Ouickly Changing Events,February 2, 2007.

4.l.3 NUREG-1022, EventReporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and50.73 4.I.410CFR50.72, Inunediate Notification Requirements fi>r Operating Nuclear Power Reactors 4.I.510CFR50.73, LicenseEvent Report Systein 4.I.6 Technical SpecificationsTable II-1, Modes 4.I.7Procedure 40EP-9EOl0, LM-Containinent Evacuation andClosure. Appendix 249 4.I.8 Procedure Writers Manual PVNGSPlant Procedure Writers Manual 4.I.9NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim StaffGuidance, Emergency I'lanning fi>r Nuclear Power Plants 4.110 PVNGSEmergency Plan 4.111 Procedure 40DP-9//30, Reduced Inventory Operations 4.112 Procedure 20DP-0SK49, Security Integrated Response Plan (Proprietary Infi>rmation) 4.2 Implementing 4.2.1 Procedure, IP-O901, Classifications l4of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE136 OF383 4.2.2 PVNGS-TO-NEl 99-01, Rev. 6,EALCROSS-REFERENCE 4.2.3 PVNGSEAL Matrix 5.0 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 5.1 Definitions (ref. 4.I.1except asnoted)

Selected terms used inInitiating Condition and Emergency Action Ievel statements aresetinall capital letters (e.g.,

AlI CAPS). Thesewords aredefined termsthat have specille meanings as used inthis document. Thedellnitions ofthese terms areprovided below.

Alert Events areinprogress, orhave occurred, which involve anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant or a security eventthat involves probable life threatening risktositepersonnel ordamage tosite equipment because ofhostileaction. Any releases areexpected tobesmall fractions oftheEPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Confinement Boundary Thebarrier(s) between spent fuel andthe environment oncethe spent fuel isprocessed for dry storage. Asrelated tothe PVNGSISI Sl,ConGnement Boundary is defined asthe Transportable Storage Canister (TSC) for theNAC-UMSandNAC-MAGNASTOR storage systems.

Containment Closure Theprocedurally defined actionstaken tosecure containment andits associated structures, systems andcomponents asa functional barriertoAssion product releaseunder shutdown conditions.

Asapplied toPVNGS,Containment Closure isestablished whenthe requirements ofprocedure 40EP-9EOl0, 1.M-Containment Evacuation andClosure, Appendix 249, forcontainmentclosure aremet(ref. 4.1.7).

Emergency Action 1,evel A pre-determined. site-specine, observable threshold for anInitiatingCondition that, whenmetor exceeded, placestheplant ina given emergency classificationlevel.

Emergency Classification Ievel Oneofa setofnames ortitles established bythe USNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for grouping off-normalevents orconditions according to(I) potentialoractual effects or consequences, and(2) resulting onsiteandoffsite response actions.Theemergency classification levels, inascending order ofseverity, are: Unusual Event (UE).Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) andGeneral Emergency (GE).

I5of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE137OF383 EPA PAGs Environment Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines.TheEPAPAGsareexpressed in terms of dose commitment. IRemTEDEor5 RemCDEThyroid. Actual orprojected offsite exposures excess i n of the E PAPAGs requires PVNGStorecommend protective actions forthe general public to offsite planningagencies.

Explosion A rapid, violent andeatastrophic fliilureofapiece ofequipment duetocombustion, chemical reaction oroverpressurization. A release ofsteam(from high energy lines orcomponents) oran electrical component fliilure(caused byshort circuits, grounding. arcing, etc.) should not automatically beconsidered anexplosion. Such events require a post-event inspection todetermine ifthe attributes ofanexplosion arepresent.

Faulted Thetermapplied toa steamgenerator that has a steam orfeedwater leak onthe secondary sideof sufficient size tocause anuncontrolled drop insteam generator pressure orthe steamgenerator to become completely depressurized.

Fire Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such as slipping drive beltsor overheated electrical equipment donotconstitute fires.

Observationof name is preferredbut is NOTrequired iflarge quantitiesofsmoke andheat areobserved.

Fission Product Barrier Threshold A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold indicatingthe loss orpotential loss ofa fission product barrier.

Flooding A condition where wateris entering a roomorarea than faster installedequipment iscapable of removal. resulting ina rise ofwaterlevel within the roomorarea.

General Emergency Events areinprogress orhave occurred which involve actual orimminent substantial core degradation ormelting with potential for lossofcontainment orhostile integrity actions thatresult inanactual loss ofphysical control ofthe facility.Releases canbereasonably expected toexceed EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for morethan the immediate site area.

Ilostage A person(s) held asleverage againstthe station toensure that demands will bemetbythe station.

16of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE138OF383 IIostile Action Anact toward PVNGSorits personnel that includes the useofviolent force todestroy equipment, take hostages and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve anend. This includes attack air, by land. or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, orother devices used todeliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy theoverall intent may be included. IIostile action should notbe construed toinclude acts ofcivil disobedience orfelonious actsthat are notpart ofaconcerted attack onPVNGS.Non-terrorism-based EAIsshould beused toaddress such activities (i.e., this mayinclude violent actsbetween individuals inthe owner controlled area).

IIostile Force Oneormoreindividuals whoareengaged inadetermined assault, overtly orbystealth and deception, equipped with suitableweapons capable ofkilling, maiming, orcausing destruction.

Imminent Thetrajectory ofevents orconditions is such that an I(Al. will bemetwithin a relatively short period oftime regardless ofmitigation orcorrective actions.

Impede(d)

Personnel access toaroomorarea ishindered toanextent that extraordinary measures are necessary tofacilitate entry ofpersonnel intothe affected room/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such asSCBAs, that isnotroutinely employed).

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

A complex that isdesigned andconstructed for the interim storage ofspent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.

Initiating Condition (10)

An eventorcondition that alignswith the deGnition ofoneofthe four emergency classification levels byvirtue ofthe potential oractual effects orconsequences.

Intrusion Theactofentering without authorization. Discovery ofa bombinaspecified area isindication of intrusion into that area bya hostile force.

Maintain Take appropriate action tohold the value ofanidentified parameter within speciGed limits.

I7of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE139OF383 Projectile Anobject directed toward aNuclear Power Plant that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability. orpersonnel safety.

Plant orISFSI Protected Area Anarea. located within the PVNCiSExclusion AreaBoundary, encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich access is controlled per10CFR73.55. ThePVNGSPower Plant Protected Area and the ISFSI Protected Area are two Protected Areas locatedwithin the PVNGSOWNER CONTROlIEDAREA(ref 4. I10)

RCSIntact TheRCSshould beconsidered intactwhen theRCS pressure boundary isinitsnormal condition for the cold shutdown modeofoperation(e.g., nofreezeseals ornozzle dams. pressurizer manway andsafeties installed).

Reduced Inventory Plant condition whenfuel isinthe reactor andReactor vessel Coolant System level isless than or equal tothe 111foot elevation (ref.

4.111).

Refueling Pathway Thereactor refueling pool, fuel storage poolandfueltransfercanal comprise the refueling pathway.

Ruptured Thecondition ofa steamgenerator inwhich primary-to-secondary leakage of sufficient is magnitude torequire a safety injection.

Restore Take the appropriate action required toreturnthe ofanidentified value parameter tothe applicable limits.

Safety System A system required for safe plant operation,cooling downthe plant and/or placingit inthe cold shutdown condition. including theECCS.These aretypicallysystems classinedassafety related (as defined in10CIR 50.2).

Those structures, systems andcomponents arerelied that upon toremain functional during and following design basis events toassure:

1)Theintegrity ofthe reactor coolant boundary:

pressure 18of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE140OF383

2) Thecapabilitytoshut downthe reactor andmaintain it ina safeshutdown condition;

3) The capability toprevent ormitigate the consequences ofaccidents which could result in potential offsiteexposures.

Security Owner Controlled Area(SOCA)

An area encompassed by physical barriers towhich access iscontrolled. (ref 4.I12).

Security Condition Anysecurity event aslisted in the approved security contingency planthatconstitutes a threat/compromise tosite security. threat/risk tosite personnel, ora potential degradation tothe level ofsafety ofthe plant. A security condition does notinvolve a hostile action.

SiteAreaEmergency Events areinprogress orhave occurred whichinvolve actualorlikely major failuresofplant functions needed forprotection ofthe public orhostile actions that resultinintentional damage or malicious acts: (I)toward sitepersonnel orequipment that could lead tothe likely failureofor:(2) thatprevent effective access toequipment needed for the protection ofthe public. Anyreleases are notexpected toresult inexposure levels which exceed EPAProtective Action Guidelines exposure levels beyond thesite boundary.

SiteBoundary Theboundary ofa reactor sitebeyond which theland orproperty isnotowned, leased. orotherwise controlled bythe licensee (ref.4.I10).

lnisolable An open orbreached system line thatcannot beisolated, remotely orlocally.

Unplanned A parameter change oranevent that isnotI) the result ofanintended evolution or2) anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter change oreventmaybeknown or unknown.

Unusual Event Ivents areinprogress orhave occurred which indicate a potential degradation inthe level ofsafety oftheplant orindicate a security threat tofacility protection has been initiated.No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response ormonitoring areexpected unless further degradation ofsafety systems occurs.

19of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE141OF383 Valid An indication, report,orcondition, isconsidered tobevalid whenit isverified by(1) aninstrument channelcheck. or(2) indications onrelated orredundant indicators,or(3) bydirect observation by plant personnel, such that doubt relatedtothe operability.

indicator's the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy isremoved. Implicit inthis definition isthe need for timely assessment.

Visible Damage Damage toa componentor structure that isreadily without observable measurements, testing, or analysis. Thevisual impactof the damage is tocause sufficient concern regarding the operability or reliability ofthe affectedcomponent orstructure.

5.2 Abbreviations/Acronyms OF Degrees Fahrenheit o

Degrees AC .Alternating Current AOP .AbnormalOperating Procedure ATWS .Anticipated Transient Without Scram CET Core Exit Thermocouple CDE Committed Dose Equivalent ClR Code ofFederal Regulations CR .Control Room CSFST Critical Safety Function Status Tree CTMT Containment DBA .Design BasisAccident DC .Direct Current DEF Defueled DG .Diesel Generator EAl. .Emergency Action I.evel ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ECl. .Emergency Classification Ievel EOC .Emergency Operations Center EOl .Emergency Operations Facility 20of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE142OF383 EOP .Emergency Operating Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPABX Electronic Private Automatic Branch Exchange ERG .Emergency Response Guideline EPIP .Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ESF .lingineered Safety Feature ESW Emergency Service Water FAA .Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau ofInvestigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GE General Emergency IC InitiatingCondition IPEEE Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (Generic Ietter 88-20)

Keff Effective Neutron Multiplication Factor ICO .Limiting Condition ofOperation 1,ER .Licensee Event Report IOCA Loss of CoolantAccident LWR Iight WaterReactor MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration/Multi-Purpose Canister mR, mRem, mrem, mREM milli-Roentgen Equivalent Man MSL MainSteam Line MW Megawatt NEl .Nuclear Energy Institute NESP National Environmental Studies Project NPP .Nuclear Power Plant NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NORAD NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command (NO)UE .NotiBeation ofUnusual Event OBE Operating Basis Earthquake 21of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE143OF383 OCA Owner Controlled Area ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ORO .OtTsite Response Organization OSC Operations Support Center PA Protected Area PAG Protective Action Guideline PPS .Plant Protection System PRA/PSA Probabilistic RiskAssessment/Probabilistic Safety Assessment PWR Pressurized Water Reactor PSIG Pounds per Square Inch Gauge R .Roentgen RCC Reactor Control Console RCS Reactor Coolant System Rem,rem,REM Roentgen Equivalent Man RepCET Representative Core Exit Thermocouple RETS Radiological Efiluent Technical Specif ications RFAT Radiological 1ieldAssessment Team R(P)V .Reactor (Pressure) Vessel RVI.IS .Reactor Vessel 1.evelIndicating System RVIMS .Reactor Vessel 1.evel Monitoring System RWI,IS Refueling Water I.evel Indicating System RWT .Refueling Water StorageTank SAR Safety Analysis Report SBO Station Blackout SBOG Station Blackout Generator SCBA .Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus SG Steam Generator SI .Safety Injection SIAS Safety Injection Actuation System SOCA Security Owner Controlled Area 22of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE144OF383 SPDS Safety ParameterDisplay System SRO Senior ReactorOperator STSC .Satellite TechnicalSupport Center SUT Transformer Startup TEDE Effective Total DoseEquivalent TOAF TopofActiveFuel TSC .Technical Center Support UlSAR Updated FinalSafety Analysis Report WOG .Westinghouse Owners Group 6.0 PVNGS-TO-NEl-99-01 Rev.6,EAl, CROSS-REFERENCE This cross-reference isprovided association and tofacilitate location ofaPVNGSEAl.within the NEl99-01IC/EALidentification scheme. Furtherinformation regarding the development ofthe PVNGSEALsbased ontheNElguidance canbefound in theEALComparisonMatrix.

PVNGS NEl 99-01, Rev.6 EAI 10 Example EAI RUl1 AUI 1,2 RUl.2 AUl 3 RU2.1 AU2 1 RAl 1 AAl 1 RAl.2 AAl 2 RA1.3 AAl 2 RAl.3 AAl 3 RA2.1 AA2 1 RA2.2 AA2 2 RA2.3 AA2 3 RA3.I AA3 1 RA3.2 AA3 2 RSl.1 ASI 1 RSl.2 ASI 2 23of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION69 PAGE1450F383 PVNGS Rev.6 NEl99-01, EAL IC ExampleEAL RSl.3 ASl 3 RS2.1 AS2 1 RGl l AGl 1 RGl.2 AGl 2 RGl.3 AGl 3 RG2.1 AG2 1 CUl1 CUl 1 Cl)l.2 cut 2 CU2.1 CU2 1 CU3.1 CU3 1 Cll3.2 CU3 2 CU4.1 CU4 1 CU5.1 CU5 1 23 CAl 1 CAl l CAl.2 CAl 2 CA2.1 CA2 'l CA3.1 CA3 1,2 CA6.1 CA6 1 CSll CSl 3 CGI 1 CGl 2 FAl1 FAl 1 FSl1 FSl 1 1:G1 1 FGl l llUl1 llUl l2 3 HU2.1 IlU2 1 HU3.1 1lU3 1 11U3.2 IIU3 2 24of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE146OF383 PVNGS Rev.6 NEl99-01, EAL 1C ExampleEAL HU3.3 HU3 3 IlU3.4 IlU3 4 HU4.1 11U4 1 IlU4.2 IIU4 2 IlU4.3 IlU4 3 HU4.4 IIU4 4 HU7.1 HU7 1 llAl 1 HAl 1,2 HA5.1 HA5 1 IlA6.1 llA6 1 IIA7.1 llA7 1 IlSl l llSl 1 llS6.1 llS6 1 HS7.1 HS7 1 IlG7.1 HG7 1 SUll SUI 1 SU3.1 SU2 1 SU4.1 SU3 1 SU4.2 SU3 2 SU5.1 SU4 1.23 SU6.1 SU5 1 SU6.2 SU5 2 SU7.1 SU6 1,2.3 sus.1 SU7 l2 SAl 1 SAl 1 SA3.1 SA2 1 SA6.1 SA5 1 25of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE147OF383 PVNGS NEl99-01, Rev.

6 EAL IC Example EAI SA9.1 SA9 1 SSI.1 SSI 1 SS2.1 SS8 1 SS6.1 SS5 1 SG11 SG1 1 SG1.2 SGS 1 EUl.1 EUl 1 7.0ATTACIIMENTS Attachment 1 Emergency Action Ievel Technical Bases Attachment 2 Fission Barrier Product 1.oss/Potential I.oss Matrix andBasis 3 Safe Attachment

& Shutdown Operation RoomsTables R-2 & 1l-2Bases Attachment 4 Palo Verde System Safety 1ist 26of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE148OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases EAl,Group: ANY (EAIs inthiscategory are applicable toanyplantcondition, hotorcold.)

ManyEAlsarebasedon actual orpotential degradation product of11ssion barriers because ofthe potential elevated for offsite radioactivity release. Radioactivity through release degradation of product fission barriersisnotalways apparent via non-radiological symptoms. Therefore, direct indication ofelevatedradiological effluents orarea radiationlevels are appropriate symptoms for emergency classification.

Atlower abnormal levels, radioactivity releases maybeindicative ofa failureofcontainment systemsorprecursorstomoresignificant releases. Athigher release rates.offsite radiological conditions mayresultwhich require offsite protective actions. Elevated area radiation levels inplant mayalso beindicativeofthe failure ofcontainmentsystems orpreclude access toplant vital equipmentnecessarytoensure plant safety.

Eventsofthiscategorypertain tothe following subcategories:

I Radiologicallifiluent l)irect indication ofeffluent radiation monitoring systems provides arapid assessment mechanism todeterminereleases inexcess ofelassifiable limits. Projectedoffsite doses, actual offsite field measurementsormeasured release rates via sampling indicatedoses ordose rates above classifiable limits.

2. Irradiated FuelEvent Conditionsindicative ofa loss ofadequate shielding ordamage toirradiatedfuel maypreclude access plant tovital areas orresult inradiological releasesthat emergency warrant classilleation.

3. Area RadiationI.evels Sustainedgeneral area radiation levels which maypreclude access toareasrequiring continuous occupancy also warrant emergency classification.

27of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE149OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity > 2times the ODCMlimits for 60 minutes orlonger EAL:

RUl.1 Unusual Event Reading onanyTable R-1ef0uentradiation monitor> column "UE"for > 60minutes (Notes l.2.3)

Note1 TheEntergency ('oordinatorshoulddeclare theevent pronaptly upondetermining that time linlit hasbeen exceeded.orwill beexceeded.

likely Note2:Ifan ongoing release iscetected andthe release start time is unknown. assumethat the release duration has exceededthe specified time limit.

Note3:Iftheeftluent flow pastaneffluent monitor isknown tohave stopped. indicating that the path release is isolated.

the e ffluent monitor readingis no longer VALlD for c lassification purposes.

Table R-1 Effluent Monitoring Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Plant Vent I.ow RL-I43 Ch I I.04E-02 I.22E-03 p(1/ce pli.ec Plant Vent Iligh Rlf-144 ('l1 I 1.04E00 1.04E-01 p(1/ce p(iec FuelBuilding Low Rit-145(bl, l.13E-02 p(i/ce Rl.i-I46Ch I 3.50E+00 3.50E-01 p(iec,.

p(i.ee Fuel Building High T 50E01 Rl!-I46 Ch2 p(i/ce ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None 28of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE150OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Basis:

Thecolumn"UE" gaseous releasevalues inTable R-Irepresent twotimes theappropriate ODCM releaseratelimits associated with thespecified monitors (ref.I,2).

This ICaddresses apotential decrease inthe level ofsafety ofthe plantasindicated bya lowlevel radiologicalrelease that exceeds regulatory commitments for anextended period oftime (e.g.,an uncontrolled release). Itincludes any gaseous radiological monitored release, orunmonitored.

Nuclear power plants incorporatedesign features intended tocontrol the release ofradioactive effluentstothe environment. Further,there areadministrative controls established toprevent unintentionalreleases andtocontrol andmonitor intentional releases. Theoccurrence ofan extended, uncontrolled radioactive release tothe environment isindicative ofdegradation inthese featuresand/or controls.

Radiological effluent EAIsarealso included toprovide a basis for classifyingevents and conditionsthat cannotbereadily orappropriately classified on the ofplant basis conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological eflluent EAl,s morefully addresses the spectrumpossible of accident events andconditions.

Classificationbased oneffluent monitor readings assumes thatarelease path tothe environmentis established.Ifthe effluent flow past anef0uent monitor isknown tohave stopped due toactions to isolate the release path, then theeffluent monitor reading isnolonger validfor classification purposes.

Releases should notbeprorated oraveraged. Forexample, a release exceeding 4 times release limitsfor30minutes does notmeetthe EAI..

This EAI addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releasesfrom monitored gaseous effluentpathways.

Escalationofthe emergency classi0cation levelwould bevia ICRAI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2and3

2. I.etter102-05894-DCM/CJS, Dated 9/l5/08, PVNGSUnits I,2,3,andISFSI Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530, and72-44 Proposed PVNGSEmergency PlanChange toImplement NEl 99-01, Revision 5, Emergency Action Ievels (I Attachment Al,s) IRadiological Calculations

3. NEl 99-01. AUI 29of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE151OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadLevels/Rad EfiTuent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiating Condition: Release ofgascous radioactivity greater than2timestheODCMlimits for 60minutes orlonger.

EAL:

RUl.2 Unusual Event Sample analysis for a gaseous release indicates aconcentration orrelease > 2 x ODCMlimits rate for 60minutes

> (Notes 1,2)

NoteI Thelimergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded. orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:Ifanongoing release iscetected andthe release start time is unknown. assumethat the duration release has exceeded the specitled time limit.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

This ICaddresses a potential decrease inthe level ofsafety ofthe plantasindicatedbya lowlevel radiological release thatexceeds regulatory commitments foranextended periodoftime (e.g., an uncontrolled release). Itincludes anygaseous radiological release, monitoredorunmonitored, including those for which aradioactivity discharge permit isnormally prepared.

Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended tocontrol therelease ofradioactive efiluents tothe environment. Further, there areadministrative controlsestablished toprevent unintentional releases andtocontrol andmonitor intentional releases.

Theoccurrence ofan extended uncontrolled radioactive release tothe environment isindicativeofdegradation inthese featuresand/or controls.

Radiological effluent EAlsarealso included toprovide a basis for classifying eventsand conditions that cannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basisofplant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological effluent EALsmorefully addresses the spectrumpossible of accident events andconditions.

30of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE152 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnicalBases Releases should notbeprorated oraveraged. Forexample, exceeding a release release 4times limitsfor 30 minutes does notmeetthe EAl This EAladdresses uncontrolled gaseous releases that are bysample detected analyses or environmental surveys, particularly onunmonitored pathways.

Escalation ofthe emergency elassifleation levelwouldbevia ICRAl PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1.Offsite DoseCalculation ManualPalo Venle Generating Nuclear Station 1,2and3 Units

2. NEI99-01. AUI 31of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE153OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I -

Radiological EiTIuent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dose greater than 10mremTEDEor50mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RAl.1 Alert Reading onanyTable R-1ef0uentradiation monitor> column "AI.ERT" for > 15minutes (Notes 1,2.3,4)

NoteI TheEmergency Coordinator shoulddeclare the event promptly upon determiningthat timelimit has been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:lfan ongoing release iscetected andthe releasestart time isunknown. assume that the duration release has exceededthe time specilled limit.

Note3:Iftheeffluent flowpastaneffluent monitor isknowntohave stopped. indicating that the path release is the isolated. e ftluent monitor reading longer is no VAllD for classification purposes.

Note4:Ihepre-calculated eflluent monitorvalues presented inEAls RA1. l RSl .1andRGl.1

. should beused for emergency classitlcation assessments until theresults from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Plant VentIow Rij-l43Ch I I.04E-02 l.22E-03 p(i ec p( i/ec Plant Vent liigh Rl!-144Ch I 1.04E 00 1.04E-01

tt i/ce p(icc,.

FuelBuilding Iow Rl!-I45(h1 1.13E-02 pl1/CC Rl!-146Ch I 3.50E +00 3.50E-01 FuelBuilding Iligh s( .

icc p(iec 3.50E0 1 Rl!-I46Ch2 p(i/ce ModeApplicability:

All 32of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE154OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAl address gaseous radioactivity releases, that forwhatever reason, cause effluentradiation monitor readings corresponding tosite boundary doses that exceed either:

• 10mRemTEDE

• 50mRemCDEThyroid Thecolumn "Al.ERT" gaseous etfluentrelease values inTable R-1correspond toealculateddoses of1%(10%ofthe SAEthresholds) ofthe EPA Protective Action Guidelines (TEDE orCDE Thyroid) (ref. 1).

This ICaddresses arelease ofgaseous radioactivity that results in projected oractual offsite doses greater than orequal tol%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored andun-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude represent anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant asindicated bya radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g.,

a signitleant uncontrolled release).

Radiological eflluent EAIsarealso included toprovide abasis for elassifying events and conditions that cannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis ofplant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological effluent EAlsmorefully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetat1%ofthe EPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile the 50mremthyroid CDE was established inconsideration ofthe1:5 ratio ofthe EPAPAGfor TEDEand thyroid CDE.

Classification based oneffluent monitor readings assumes that arelease path tothe environmentis established. lfthe effluent flowpast aneffluent monitor isknown tohave stopped duetoactionsto isolate the release path, then theeffluent monitor reading isnolonger valid for classification purposes.

Escalation ofthe emergency classificationlevel would bevia ICRSI 33of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE155OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l 1.etter102-05894-DCM/CJS, Dated PVN(iS 9/l5/08, 1,2,3,andISFSI Units Docket Nos.

50-528,50-529, 50-530, ami72-44, PVNGS Proposed Plan Emergency toImplenient Change NEl 99-01, Revision5, Emergency Action (EAIs)

Ievels IRactiological Attaclunent Calculations

2. NEI99-01 AA I 34of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE156 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent Initiating Condition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resultinginoffsitedose greater than 10mremTEDEor50mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RAl.2 Alert Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 10mremTEDEor50mremthyroid CDEatorbeyond the SITEBOUNDARY (Note 4)

Note4:Thepre-calculated effluentmonitor values presented in s RAl.LRSl1andRGl.I l?Al should beused for emergency classification assessments untilthe results from a dose using assessment meteorology actual are available.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SITEBOUNDARY Theboundary ofa reactor site beyond which theland orproperty is not owned. leased, orotherwise controlled bythe licensee.

Basis:

This ICaddresses a releaseofgaseous radioactivity thatresults inprojectedoractualoffsite doses greaterthan orequal toI%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored andun-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude representanactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe l evel of of safety plant the as indicatedby radiological a releasethat significantlyexceeds regulatory limits (e.g.,a significant uncontrolled release).

Radiological efAuent EAIsarealso included toprovide abasis forclassifyingevents and conditions that cannot bereadily orappropriately classifiedonthe basis ofplantconditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth condition plant andradiological effluentEAIsmorefully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetat1%ofthe EPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile the50mremthyroid CDEwas established inconsideration ofthe1:5 ratio ofthe EPAPAGfor TEDEand thyroid CDE.

Escalation ofthe emergency classineation level would bevia ICRSI 35of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE157OF383 ATTACIIMENTI IAl Technical Bases PVNGS Basis Reference(s):

l Procedure EP-0903, Assessment Accident

2. NEI99-01AA I 36of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE158OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efiluent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dose greater than10 mrem TEDEor50mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RAl.3 Alert Field surveyresults indicate EITllER of the following atorbeyond the SITEBOUNDARY:

a Closed window dose rates> 10mR/hr expected tocontinue for > 60minutes

• Analyses offield survey samples indicate thyroid CDE 50mremfor

> 60minutes of inhalation.

(Notes I.2)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator shoulddeclare the eventpromptly upon determining that timelimithas been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:Ifanongoing releaseiscetectedandthe releasestarttimeisunknown assume the that releasedurationhas exceededthe specifiedtime limit.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SITEBOUNDARY Theboundary ofa reactor sitebeyond which the land orproperty is not owned,leased, orotherwise controlledbythe licensee.

Basis:

Procedure EP-0904 ERWERF ActivationandOperation, provides guidance foremergency orpost-accident radiological environmental monitoring (ref. I).

This ICaddresses a release ofgaseous orradioactivity that results inprojected oractual offsite doses greaterthan orequal toI% ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored andun-monitored releases.

Releases ofthis magnitude represent anactual orpotential substantialdegradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant asindicated bya radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits(e.g.,a signillcant uncontrolled release).

Radiological effluent EAlsarealso included toprovide a basis for classifying events and conditions thatcannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis ofplant conditions alone.

37of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE159OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological EALsmorefully eflluent addresses the spectrum of possible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdoseis set at1%ofthe EPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile CDEwas 50mremthyroid the established inconsideration oftheI:5 ratio EPAPAGfor ofthe TEDEandthyroid CDE.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification would level beviaICRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1.Procedure liP-0904, l?RO/1?RF Activation andOperation

2. NEI99-01. AA l 38of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE160OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I -

Radiological EiTIuent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dose greater than 100mremTEDEor500mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RSl.1 Site AreaEmergency Reading onanyTable R-1ef0uentradiation monitor> column "SAE"for > 15minutes (Notes I, 2.3,4)

NoteI TheEmergency Coordinator shoulddeclare the event promptly upon determiningthat timelimit has been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:lfan ongoing release iscetected andthe releasestart time isunknown. assume that the duration release has exceededthe time specilled limit.

Note3:Iftheeffluent flowpastaneffluent monitor isknowntohave stopped. indicating that the path release is the isolated. e ftluent monitor reading longer is no VAllD for classification purposes.

Note4:Ihepre-calculated eflluent monitorvalues presented inEAls RA1. l RSl .1andRGl.1

. should beused for emergency classitlcation assessments until theresults from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Plant VentIow Rij-l43Ch I I.04E-02 l.22E-03 p(i ec p( i/ec Plant Vent liigh Rl!-144Ch I 1.04E 00 1.04E-01

tt i/ce p(icc,.

FuelBuilding Iow Rl!-I45(h1 1.13E-02 pl1/CC Rl!-146Ch I 3.50E +00 3.50E-01 FuelBuilding Iligh s( .

icc p(iec 3.50E0 1 Rl!-I46Ch2 p(i/ce ModeApplicability:

All 39of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE161OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAl address gaseous radioactivity releases,that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings corresponding tosite boundary doses that exceed either:

• 100mRemTEDE

• 500mRemCDEThyroid Thecolumn "SAE"gaseous effluent release value in Table R-Icorresponds tocalculated doses of 10%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guidelines (TEDE orCDEThyroid) (ref. 1).

This ICaddresses arelease ofgaseous radioactivity that results inprojected oractualoffsite doses greater than orequal to10%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored andun-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude are associatedwith the failure of plant systems needed for the protection ofthe public.

Radiological eftluent EAlsarealso included toprovide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis of plant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological effluent EAl.s more fully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetat10%ofthe EPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile the 500mremthyroid CDE wasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5 ratioofthe EPAPAGfor TEDEandthyroid CDE.

Classification based oneffluent monitor readings assumes that a release path totheenvironment is established. Ifthe effluent flow past anefiluent monitor isknown tohave stopped duetoactions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading isnolonger valid forclassification purposes.

Escalation ofthe emergency classilleation levelwould bevia ICRGl PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Ietter 102-05894-DCM/CJS, Dated 9/15/08,PVN(iS Units 1,2,3,and/SFSI Docket Nos. 50-528,50-529, 50-530, and72-44 Proposed PVN(iS Emergency Plan Change tolinplement NEl 99-01, Revision 5, Etnergency Action Ievels (EAls) Attaclunent I Radiological Calculations

2. NEl99-01, ASl 40of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE162OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efiluent Subcategory: l-Radiological Effluent InitiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resultinginoffsitedose greater than 100mremTEDEor500mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RSl.2 Site AreaEmergency Dose assessment usingactual meteorology indicates doses > 100mremTEDEor500mrem thyroid CDEatorbeyond the SITEBOL JNDARY (Note 4)

Note4:Thepre-calculated eflluentmonitor values presented in liALsRAl.I.RSl.1andRGl.1 should beused for emergency classification assessments untilthe results from a dose using assessment actualmeteorology are available.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SITEBOLJNDARY Theboundary ofareactor site beyond which theland or property isnot owned,leased, orotherwise controlled bythelicensee.

Basis:

This lCaddresses a releaseofgaseous radioactivity thatresults inprojectedoractual offsite doses greater thanorequal to10%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored andun-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude areassociated with the failure of plant systemsneeded for the protection ofthe public.

Radiological effluent EAlsarealso included toprovide a basis forclassifyingevents and conditions thatcannot bereadily orappropriately classifiedonthe basis ofplant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological ef0uent EAIsmorefully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetat10%oftheEPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile the 500mremthyroid CDE wasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5 ratio ofthe EPAPAGfor TEDEandthyroid CDE.

Escalation ofthe emergency classilleation level would bevia ICRG1.

41of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE163OF383 ATTACIIMENTI IAl Technical Bases PVNGS Basis Reference(s):

l Procedure EP-0903, Assessment Accident

2. NEI99-01ASI 42of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE164OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dosegreater than100 mrem TEDEor500mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RS1.3 Site AreaEmergency Field surveyresults indicate EITlIER of thefollowing atorbeyond the SITEBOUNDARY:

a Closed window dose rates> 100 mR/hr expected tocontinue for > 60minutes

• Analyses offield survey samples indicate thyroid CDE 500 > mremfor 60minutes of inhalation.

(Notes I.2)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordimitor should declarethe eventpromptly upon determining thattime limithas been exceeded.

orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:Ifanongoing iscetected release andthe release time start isunknown assume the that duration release has exceeded the specified time limit.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SITEBOUNDARYTheboundary ofa reactor site beyond which the land orpropertyis not owned leased, orotherwise controlled bythe licensee.

Basis:

Procedure EP-0904 EROGRFActivation andOperation, provides guidance il>r emergency orpost-accident radiological environmental monitoring (ref. I).

This ICaddresses a releaseofgaseous radioactivity that results inprojected oractualoffsite doses greater thanorequal to10%ofthe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored andun-monitored releases.Releases ofthis magnitude areassociated withthe failure of plant systemsneeded forthe protectionofthe public.

Radiological effluent EAI.s arealso included toprovide a basis for classifying and events conditions thatcannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis ofplant conditions alone.

43of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE165OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnicalBases Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological EALsmorefully eflluent addresses the spectrum of possible accident events andconditions.

TheTliDE doseis set at10%ofthe EPAPACi ofI,000 mremwhile CDE 500mremthyroid the wasestablished inconsideration ofthe1:5 ofthe ratio EPAPACiforTEDEandthyroid CDE Escalation ofthe emergency classification would level beviaICR(il.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1.Procedure liP-0904, liRO/liRF Activation andOperation

2. NEI99-01 ASI 44of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE166OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efiluent Subcategory: l -

Radiological EiTluent InitiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dose greaterthan 1,000 mremTEDEor5,000 mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RGl.1 General Emergency Reading onanyTable R-1ef0uentradiation monitor> column "GE"for > 15minutes (Notes 1, 2.3,4)

NoteI TheEmergency Coordinator should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:lfan ongoing release iscetected andthe releasestart time isunknown. assume that the duration release has exceededthe time specilled limit.

Note3:Iftheeftluent flowpastaneffluent monitor isknowntohave stopped. indicating that the path release is the isolated. e ffluent monitor reading longer is no VAllD for classification purposes.

Note4:Ihepre-calculated efiluent monitor values presented inEAls RA1. 1.RSl .1andRG1.1should beused for emergency classification assessmentsuntil theresults from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE Plant VentIow Ch 1 Ril-143 1.04E-02 1.22E-03 p(i ec p( 1/ec Plant Vent Iligh Ch 1 Rl!-144 1.04E 00 1.04E-01 itt 1/ce p(1cc,.

FuelBuilding Iow (h1 Rt!-145 ,

1.13E-02 pl1/CC Ch 1 Rt!-146 3.50E +00 3.50E-01 p(iec plicc FuelBuilding IIigh 3.50E0 I Ch2 Rl!-146 p(1/ce ModeApplicability:

All 45of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE167OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAl address gaseous radioactivity releases,that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings corresponding tosite boundary doses that exceed either:

• I000 mRemTEDE

• 5000 mRemCDEThyroid Thecolumn "GE"gaseous efiluent release values in Table R-Icorrespond tocalculated doses of 100"4 ofthe EPAProtective Action Guidelines (TEDE orCDEThyroid) (ref. I).

This ICaddresses arelease ofgaseous radioactivity that results inprojected oractualoffsite doses greater than orequal tothe EPAProtective Action Guides ( PAGs). It includes bothmonitored and un-monitored releases.Releases ofthis will magnituderequire implementation ofprotective actions for the public.

Radiological eftluentEAlsarealso included toprovide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis of plant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological effluent EAl.s more fully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetatthe EPAPAGof1,000 mremwhile the 5,000 mremthyroid CDE was established inconsideration ofthe1:5 ratioofthe EPAPAGfor TEDEandthyroid CDE.

Classification based oneffluent monitor readings assumes that a release path totheenvironment is established. Iftheeffluent llowpast aneflluent monitor isknown tohave stopped duetoactions to isolate the releasepath, then theeffluent monitor reading isnolonger valid forclassification purposes.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I I.etter 102-05894-DCM/CJS, Dated 9/I5/08, PVNGSUnits I,2,3,andISFSI Docket Nos. 5()-

528,50-529, 50-530, and72-44 Proposed PVNGSEmergency Plan Change tolinplement NEl 99-01, Revision 5, Einergency Action Levels (EALs) Attaclunent I Radiological Calculations

2. NEI 99-01, AGI 46of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE168OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resultinginoffsite dose greater than 1,000 mremTEDEor5,000 mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RGl.2 General Emergency Dose assessment usingactual meteorology indicates doses > 1,000 mremTEDEor5,000 mrem thyroid CDEatorbeyond the SITEBOUNDARY (Note 4)

Note4:Thepre-calculated eflluent monitorvalues presented in liALsRAl.I.RSl.1 andRGl.1 should beused for emergency classification assessments untilthe results from a doseassessmentusingactual meteorology are available.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

E BOliNDARYTheboundary S/'/ -

ofa reactor site beyond which theland or property isnotowned, leased,orothenvise controlled bythe licensee.

Basis:

This ICaddresses a release ofgaseous radioactivity thatresults inpro;ectedoractualoffsite doses greaterthan orequal tothe PA I Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude willrequire implementation ofprotective actions forthe public.

Radiological efiluent EALsarealso included toprovide a basis forclassifying events and conditions thatcannotbereadily orappropriately classifiedonthe basis ofplant conditions alone.

Theinclusion ofboth plant condition andradiological ef0uent EALsmorefully addresses the spectrum ofpossible accident events andconditions.

TheTEDEdose issetatthe EPAPAGofI,000 mremwhile the 5,000mremthyroid CDEwas establishedinconsideration ofthe 1:5 ratio ofthe IPA PAGfor TEDEand thyroid CDE.

47of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE169OF383 ATTACIIMENTI Technical l?Al Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l Procedure EP-0903 AccidentAssessment

2. NIil 99-0LAG I 48of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE170OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: I-Radiological Effluent initiatingCondition: Release ofgaseous radioactivity resulting inoffsite dosegreater than 1,000 mremTEDEor5,000 mremthyroid CDE EAL:

RGl.3 General Emergency Field surveyresults indicate EITllER of thefollowing atorbeyond the SITEBOUNDARY:

a Closed window dose rates > 1,000 mR/hr expected tocontinue il)r

> 60minutes

• Analyses offield survey samples indicate thyroid CDE > 5,000 mremflar 60minutes of inhalation.

(Notes I.2)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordinatorshoulddeclare the eventpromptly upon determining that time limithas been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note2:Ifanongoing iscetected release andthe release time start isunknown assume the that duration release has exceededthe specified time limit.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SITEBOUNDARYTheboundary ofa reactor site beyond which the land orpropertyis not owned.

leased,orotherwise controlled bythe licensee.

Basis:

Procedure EP-0904. ERO/ERF Activation andOperation, provides guidance liar emergency orpost-accident radiological environmental monitoring (ref. I).

This ICaddresses a releaseofgaseous radioactivity that results inprojected oractual offsite doses greaterthan orequal tothe EPAProtective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes monitored both and un-monitored releases. Releases ofthis magnitude will require implementation ofprotective actions forthe public.

Radiological eftluent EAl.s arealso included toprovide a basis It>r classifying and events conditions thatcannot bereadily orappropriately classified onthe basis ofplantconditions alone.

49of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE171OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Theinclusion ofboth plant andradiological condition EALsmorefully effluent addresses the spectrum of possible accidentevents andconditions.

TheTEDEdoseis set atthe EPAPAGofI,000 mremwhilethe CDEwas mremthyroid 5,000 established inconsideration oftheI:5 ratio oftheEPAPAGforTEDEandthyroid CDE.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure EP-0904, ERO/ERF Activation andOperation

2. NEI 99-01, AGI 50of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE172OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated Fuel Event initiatingCondition: UNPLANNED loss ofwaterlevel above fuel irradiated EAl,:

RU2.1 Unusual Event UNPIANN1iDwaterlevel dropin the REFUElING PATllWAY asindicated bylowwaterlevel alarm (PCN-E02) orlevelindication (installed plant indicator/camera orRWI,IS)

AND UNPIANNEDalert alarm onanyofthe following corresponding radiation monitors:

= RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area

= RU-17 Incore Instrument Area (when installed)

• RU-19 NewFuel Area a RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area

• RU-33 Refueling Machine Area (when installed)

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

UN/'/ANNEDA parameter change oraneventthat isnot1) the ofanintended result evolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameterchange orevent may be known orunknown.

REFUELING PATlIWAY- Thereactor refueling pool, fuel storage poolandfuel transfer eanal comprise therefueling pathway.

Basis:

Thelowwaterlevel alarminthis EAl,refers tothe Fuel Pool lowlevelalarm (procedure 40Al-9PCOI. Fuel PoolCooling andCleanup I.ocal Alarm Panel PCN-EO2 Responses) (ref. I).

I)uring thefuel transferphase ofrefueling operations, the fuel eanal transfer isnormally in communication with thefuel storagepool andthe refueling pool inthe Containment isin communication with thefuel transfercanal whenthe fuel transfer isopen.

tube A lowering inwater level inthe fuel S FP, transfer eanal orrefueling pool istherefore sensedbythe SFPlowlevel alarm.

(ref.I 2).

51of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE173OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases TheSFP is locally monitored inthe Fuel I3uilding byLevel indicators PCN-LIT-3/5 onPCNEO2.

These levelindicating transmitters also initiatelocal panel alarms via levelswitches PCN-I SHL-3/PCN-1 SI-5on low andlowlowSFPlevel respectively. Thealarms arealso located onPCNE02 andannunciate a general Control Roomalarm onwindow "FUELPOOICLGSYSTRBI "

indicating analarm isin on the local panel.

Level isalso indicated inthe Control Roomvisually via digitalcamera feedandinthe back panel areaonpanel PCN-E015 bya digital levelindicator.This Control Roomindication does nothave associated annunciation.

Technical Specillcation 1C03.7.14 (ref. 3) requires atleast 23ft ofwaterabove the Fuel Storage Pool storage racks. Technical Specilleation I CO 3.9.6(ref. 4)requires atleast 23ft ofwaterabove theReactor Vessel Hange inthe refueling pool. During refueling, this maintains sufficient water level inthe fuel transfer canal, refueling pool andSFP toretainiodine Assion product activity inthe water inthe eventofa fuel handling accident.

Thelisted radiation monitors arethose expected toseeincreased arearadiationlevels asa result ofa lossofRElUElINGPATlIWAYinventory (ref. 2).Increasing radiation indications onthese monitors inthe absence ofindications ofdecreasing REFUElING PATllWAY level are not classinable under this EAl TheAlert

. alarms aresetvery low(3X normal background) andwould promptly alert operators ofany increase inarea radiation (ref.5).

Whenthe spent fuel pool andreactor cavity areconnected, there could existthe possibility of uncovering irradiated fuel. Therefore, this EAl is applicable forconditions inwhich irradiated fuel isbeing transferred toandfrom the reactor vessel andspent fuelpool.

This ICaddresses adecrease inwaterlevel above irradiated fuelsufficient tocause elevated radiation levels. This condition could bea precursor toamoreserious eventandis also indicative of a minor lossinthe ability tocontrol radiation levels within the plant. Itistherefore apotential degradation inthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

A waterlevel decrease will beprimarily determined byindications from availablelevel instrumentation. Other sources oflevel indications mayinclude reports from plant personnel (e.g.,

from a refueling crew) orvideo camera observations (ifavailable). A significant drop inthe water level mayalso cause anincrease inthe radiation levelsofadjacent areas thatcanbedetected by monitors inthose locations.

Theeffects ofplanned evolutions should beconsidered. Iorexample, a refuelingbridge area radiation monitor reading mayincrease duetoplanned evolutions such aslifting ofthe reactor 52of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE174OF383 ATTACl lMENT1 l?Al Technical Bases vesselhead or movement ofa fuel assembly. Note that EAL isapplicable this only incases where theelevated reading isduetoanunplanned loss ofwaterlevel.

A drop inwater level above irradiatedfuel within the maybeclassified vessel reactor inaccordance with Recognition Category C duringthe Cold Shutdown andRefueling modes.

IEscalationofthe emergency classification level would beviaICRA2.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40Al-9PC01, /:uel Pool Cooling andCleanup LocalAlarm PCN-EO2 Panel Responses 2.Procedure 40AO-97723. Loss ofSFPLevel orCooling 3.Technical Speci Acation 1.CO.7.14, 3 Fuel Storage Pool WaterLeve/

4. Technical Specification ICO 3.9.6, RefitelingWater Level Fuel Assemblies

5. Design Basis ManualRadiation Monitoring System

6. NIll 99-01, AU2 53of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE175OF383 ATTACIIMENT I I?Al, TechnicalBases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated Fuel Event Initiating Condition: Significant lowering ofwater level above, ordamage to,irradiated fuel EAl,:

RA2.1 Alert Uncovery ofirradiated fucI inthe REFUEI.ING PATIIWAY ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

REFUELING PATHWAYThereactor refueling pool.fuel storage poolandfuel transfer canal comprise the refueling pathway.

Basis:

This ICaddresses that events have caused imminent oractual damage to anirradiated fuel assembly, ora significant lowering ofwaterlevel withinthe spent fuelpool. These events present radiological safety challenges toplant personnel andareprecursors toa release ofradioactivity to the environment. Assuch. they represent anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

This EAI. applies toirradiated fuelthatislicensed drystorage for uptothe point thatthe loaded storage cask issealed. Once sealed.damage toa loadedcask causing loss ofthe CONIINEMENT BOUNDARY isclassilled inaccordance with ICEUI.1 Escalation ofthe emergency would bebased oneither Recognition Category R orC ICs.

This l?AI. escalates fromRU2.I inthatthe lossoflevel,inthe affected portion ofthe REFUIIING PATIIWAY,is ofsufficient magnitude tohave resultedinuncovery ofirradiated fuel.indications ofirradiated fuel uncovery mayinclude direct orindirectvisual observation (e.g., reports from personnel orcamera images), aswell assignillcant changes inwaterandradiation orother levels, plant parameters. Computational aidsmayalso beused (e.g., a boil-offcurve). Classification ofan event using this EAI. should bebased onthe totality ofavailable indications,reports and observations.

54of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE176OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases While anarea radiation monitor could detectanincrease ina dose duetoa lowering rate ofwater level insome portion ofthe REFUElING PATIIWAY,the reading maynotbeareliable indication ofwhether ornot the fuel isactually uncovered.Tothedegree readings possible, should be considered incombination with other available indications ofinventory loss.

A drop inwaterlevel above irradiated fuelwithin the reactorvessel maybeclassified inaccordance Recognition Category C during theCold modes.

andRefueling Shutdown Escalation ofthe emergency classification level bevia would ICRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-97723. Loss ofSFPLevel orCooling

2. NEl99-01. AA2 55of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE177OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efiluent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated Fuel Event initiatingCondition: Significant lowering ofwater level ordamage above, fuel to,irradiated EAl,:

RA2.2 Alert Damage toirradiated fuelresulting ina release of from radioactivity thefuel by asindicated high alarm onanyofthe lollowing:

a RlJ-16 Containment OperatingI evel Area

• RU-I7 Incore Instrument Area (when installed) a RU-19 NewFuel Area

= RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area

= Rlf-33 Refueling Machine Area(when installed) e RU-37/38 Containment PurgeExhaust Area

• RU-I43 Plant Vent a RU-145 Fuel Building Vent ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

Thespecilled radiation monitors arethose expected toseeincreasearearadiation levels asa result ofdamage toirradiated fuel (ref. I,2).

This ICaddresses eventsthat have caused actual damage toanirradiated assembly, fuel ora significantlowering ofwaterlevel withinthe spent fuel pool.

These radiological present events safetychallenges toplantpersonnel andareprecursors ofradioactivity toa release tothe environment. Assuch. they represent anactual orpotential degradation substantial ofthe level of safetyofthe plant.

This IAl applies toirradiated fuel that islicensed for dry uptothe storage point that loaded the storage caskissealed. Oncesealed, damage toa loaded caskcausing loss CONUlNI ofthe Ml NT BOUNDARY is classifiedinaccordance with EUII 56of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE178 OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Escalation of theemergency would bebased oneitherRecognition CategoryR orC ICs.

This EAl. addresses a releaseofradioactive materialcausedbymechanical damagetoirradiated fuel.Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping ofanassembly, orbinding ordropping a

heavy load ontoanassembly. A rise inreadings onradiationmonitors should beconsidered in conjunction with in-plant reports orobservations ofa potential damaging fuel event(e.g.,

a litel handling accident).

Escalation ofthe emergency classilleation level would beviaICRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Design Basis ManualRadiation Monitoring System 2.Procedure 40AO-9//22. Fuel Damage

3. NEl 99-01, AA2 57of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE179OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,TechnicalBases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated Fuel Event Initiating Condition: Significant loweringofwaterlevelabove, ordamage to,irradiated fuel EAl,:

RA2.3 Alert Spent fuel pool level 5 125ft. (1evel 2)

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

IorPVNGS, I.evel 2,which corresponds to10ft.above thetopof the fuelracks inthe SFP(9ft.

based oninstrument indication margin), isanindicatedlevel of125ft. (ref. 2).

This ICaddresses eventsthat have caused imminentoractualdamage toan irradiated fuel assembly, ora signincant lowering ofwaterlevel withinthespent luelpool. These events present radiological safety challenges toplant personnelandareprecursors toa release of radioactivity to the environment. Assuch, they representanactualorpotential substantial degradation of the level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Escalation ofthe emergency would bebased oneitherRecognition Category R orC ICs. Spent fuel pool waterlevel atthisvalue iswithin thelowerendofthe levelrange necessary toprevent significant dose consequences from directgamma radiation topersonnel performing operations in the vicinityofthe spentfuel pool.This condition a significant reflects lossofspent fuel pool water inventory andthus it isalso a precursor ofthe toa loss ability toadequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored inthepool.

58of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE180OF383 ATTACIIMENTI Technical l?Al Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

102-06728. dated l 1.etter JulyII.2013.

andAdamsAccession

1. l3199A033.

Response

to fi>rldditional Inforntation fi>r Request the Integrated ITNGSOverall Plan inResponse to March12,2012, Conunission OrderModifiing Iicense Regard with toReliable I:uel Spent Ievel Pool Instrumentation (OrderNumberEA-12-051) 2.livaluation 4512970

3. NIEI 99-01 AA2 59of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE181 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated IuelEvent Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool levelatthetopofthe fuel racks EAl,:

RS2.1 Site AreaEmergency Spent fuel pool level 5 I16ft. (I,evel 3)

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

liorPVNGS, Ievel 3.which corresponds to0 ft.abovethetopof the fuel racks inthe SIP,is an indicated level ofI16ft. (includes a Ift.IO inchesinstrument indication error margin) (ref.2).

This EAl. addresses a signincant loss ofspent fuelpoolinventory controland makeup capability leading toIMMINENTfuel damage. This condition major entails failures ofplant functions needed forprotection ofthe publicandthus warrant a SiteAreaEmergency declaration.

Itisrecognized that thisICwould likely notbemetuntil after well another SiteArea Emergency IC wasmet;however, itisincluded toprovide classification diversity.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification levelwould beviaICRGIorRG2.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Letter 102-06728, datedJuly 11,2013 andAdams Accession#13199A033, Response toRecptest fi>r Infi>rmation Additional fi>r the I TNGS Overall Plan Integrated Response i n to March 12, 2012 Conunission Order Modifiing License with RegardtoReliable Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation (OrderNumber EA-12-051) 2.Evaluation 4512970 3.NEI99-01. AS2 60of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE182 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad Efi1uent Subcategory: 2 Irradiated Fuel Event Initiating Condition: Spent fuel pool level cannot berestoredtoatleast the topofthe fuel racks for 60minutes orlonger EAL:

RG2.1 General Emergency Spent fuel pool level cannot berestored toatleast I16ft.(1evel3)for> 60minutes (Note I-)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator should declare the event determining promptlyupon thattime limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill likelybeexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

ForPVNGS, I.evel 3,which corresponds to0 ft. above thetopofthefuel racks in theSFP, isan indicated level ofI16ft. (includes a Ift.IO inches instrumentindication error margin) (ref.2).

This EAI addresses a significant loss ofspent fuel pool inventory controlandmakeupcapability leading toa prolonged uncovery ofspent fuel. This condition will leadtofuel damage and a radiological release tothe environment.

Itisrecognized that thisICwould likely notbemetuntil well after another General Emergency IC wasmet;however, itisincluded toprovide elassification diversity.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 1etter 102-06728. dated July 11,2013 andAdamsAccession #13199A033, Response toRequest fi>rAdditional Infi>rmation fi>r the PVNGS Overall IntegratedPlaninResponse toMarch 12, 2012 Conunission Order Modifiing Iicense with Regard toReliable Spent Fuel PoolI.evel Instrumentation (Order Nmnher EA-12-051)

2. Evaluation 4512970 3.NEI99-01, AG2 61of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE183 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad EfiTuent Subcategory: 3 AreaRadiation I,evels initiating Condition: Radiation levels thatIMPEDEaccess toequipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown orshutdown EAL:

RA3.1 Alert Doserates > 15mR/hr inEITIlERof the following areas:

a Control Room

• Central Alarm Station (CAS) (bysurvey)

ModeApplicability:

AII Definition(s):

None Basis:

Areas thatmeetthis threshold includetheControl Roomand the Alarm Station (CAS).

Central The Radiation Monitoring System monitorstheControl Roomfor area radiation(ref. I).If unavailable local radiation surveys canbeperformed. TheCASisincluded inthis because of its' EAl importance to permitting access toareasrequired to safe assure plant operations.

There isnopermanently installed CASarea radiationmonitorthat maybeused toassess this EAI.

threshold. Therefore this threshold mustbeassessed vialocalradiation survey for theCAS(ref. I).

This ICaddresses elevatedradiation levels incertain plant suf0cient rooms/areas topreclude or impede personnel fromperforming actions necessary tomaintain normalplant operation,orto perform a normal plantcooldown andshutdown. Assuch, it anactual represents orpotential substantial degradation ofthelevel ofsafety ofthe TheEmergency plant. Coordinator should consider the cause oftheincreased radiation levels anddetermineif another ICmaybeapplicable.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification levelwould bevia Recognition Category R,C orF ICs.

62of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE184OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l DesignBasis Manuai -

Radiation System Monitoring

2. NEI99-01AA3 63of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE185OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: R Abnormal RadIevels/Rad EfiTuent Subcategory: 3 AreaRadiation Ievels initiatingCondition: Radiation levels IMPEDEaccess that toequipmentnecessary fornormal plant operations, cooldown orshutdown EAL:

RA3.2 Alert An UNPLANNED eventresults inradiation levels that prohibit orIMPEDEaccess toanyTable R-2rooms(Note 5)

Note5:lftheequipment inthelisted roomwasalreadyinoperable orout-of-sen ice before the eventoccurred. thenno emergency classilleation iswarranted Table R-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms Room ModeApplicability Control Building 10011. ClassDCEquipment RoomC 4,5 Control Building 100ft. ClassDCEquipment RoomD 4,5 ModeApplicability:

4 Ilot Shutdown, 5 Cold Shutdown Definition(s):

/UPEDE(D) -

Personnel access toa roomorarea ishindered toanextent that extraordinary measures arenecessary tofacilitate entry ofpersonnel intothe affectedroom/area (e.g.,requiring useofprotective equipment, suchas SCBAs, thatisnotroutinely employed).

UNPIANNEDA parameter change oraneventthat isnotI) the ofanintended result evolutionor 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameterchangeorevent maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

Ifthe equipment inthe listed roomwasalready inoperable, orout-of-service,before the event occurred, then noemergency shouldbedeclared since theevent willhave noadverse impact beyond already that allowed byTechnical Specifications atthe time oftheevent.

Thelist ofplant rooms with entry-related modeapplicability identified those specify rooms that contain equipment whichrequire a manual/local action asspecified inoperatingprocedures used for 64of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE186 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases normal plant operation, cooldown andshutdown. Roomsorareas inwhich actions ofa contingent oremergency nature would beperformed (e.g.,

anaction toaddress anoff-normal oremergency condition suchas emergency repairs, corrective measures oremergency operations) arenot included. Inaddition, the list specifiesthe plantmode(s) during which entry would berequired for each room(ref. 1).

This ICaddresses elevatedradiation levels incertainplant rooms/areas sufficient topreclude or impede personnel from perti3rming actions necessary tomaintain normal plant operation, orto perform a normal plant cooldownand shutdown. Assuch, itrepresents anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level of safety ofthe plant.

TheEmergency Coordinator should consider the cause ofthe increased radiation levels and determine if another ICmaybeapplicable.

ForRA3.2, anAlert declaration iswarranted ifentry into the affected room/area is, ormaybe, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effectatthe time ofthe elevated radiation levels.

Theemergency classification isnotcontingent upon whether entry isactually necessary at thetime ofthe increased radiation levels. Access shouldbe considered asimpeded if extraordinary measures are necessary tofacilitate entry ofpersonnel intothe affected room/area(e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring useofnon-routine protectiveequipment, requesting anextension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).

Anemergency declaration is notwarranted ifanyofthe following conditions apply:

• Theplant isinanoperating modedifferent thanthe modespecified for the affected room/area (i.e.,entry i snot required duringoperating the mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). Forexample, the plantisinModeIwhenthe radiation increase occurs andthe procedures used fornormal operation,cooldown andshutdowndo not require entry into the affected roomuntil Mode4.

• Theincreased radiation levels area result ofa planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibilityofaroomorarea (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).

• Theaction for which room/area entry isrequired isofanadministrative orrecord keeping nature (e.g.. normal rounds orroutine inspections).

• Theaccess control measures areofaconservative orprecautionary nature andwould not actually prevent orimpede a required action.

Escalation ofthe emergency classineation levelwould bevia Recognition Category R,C orU ICs.

65of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE187OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases NOTE: EAL RA3.2modeapplicability hasbeenlimited applicable tothe modes in identined Table R-2 SafeOperation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas. operating Ifduetoplant procedure orplant conngurationchanges, applicable the plant modesspecified inTable R-2arechanged, acorresponding change toAttachment 3'Safe & Shutdown Operation Areas Tables R-2 & II-2 Bases' andtoEAL RA3.2modeapplicability isrequired.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Attachment 3 Safe Operation & Shutdown Areas R-3& I-i-2 Tables Bases 2.NEl 99-01, AA3 66of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE188 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases EAlGroup: ANY (EAIs inthis category areapplicabletoanyplant hot condition, orcold.)

An independentspent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)isa complex isdesigned that andconstructed fortheinterim storage of spent nuclear fuel andother radioactive materials associated with spent fuel A significantamount ofthe storage. material radioactive contained a canister within must escape packaging its andenterthe environment for theretobea significant effect environmental resulting from anaccident involving the dry storageofspent nuclear fuel.

A Notification ofUnusual Event is declared onthe basisofthe ofanevent occurrence ofsufficient magnitude thata loaded cask conGnementboundary is damaged orviolated.

67of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE189OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases Category: ISI SI Subcategory: Confinement Boundary initiatingCondition: Damage toa loaded caskCONFINEMENT BOUNDARY EAl,:

EUl.1 Unusual Event Damage toa loaded canisterCON1 INEMENT BOUNDARYasindicated byanon-contact radiationreading onthesurface ofa loaded spent fuel cask greaterthan anyTable E-1dose limit.

Table E-1Concrete CaskDose I,imits NAC-UMS(Casks 1-152) NAC-MAGNASTOR (Casks > 153) 100mrem/hr (y+ q)onthe side ofthe -

10mrem/hr (q) onthe verticalconcrete cask surfaces 100mrem/hr (y+ q)onthe topofthe cask -

240 mrem/hr (y)onthe verticalconcrete 200mrem/hr (y q)atthe

+ airinlets or surtlices outlets -

900mrem/hr (y+ q)onthe topsurface ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

CONFINEMEAT BOUNDARYThebarrier(s) between spent fuel andthe environment once the spent fuelprocessed is fordry storage.related As to theP VNGS ISFSL Conlinement Boundary is defined asthe Transportable Storage Canister (TSC) for the NAC-UMSandNAC-MAGNASTOR storage systems.

/NDEl'ENDEATS/'EAT /d!EL STORAGE INS~lA/IATION (ISFSI)-

A complex that isdesigned andconstructed for theinterimstorage ofspent nuclear fuel andother radioactive materials associated with spent fuelstorage.

Basis:

ThePVNGS ISFSI utilizes the NAC-UMS andNAC-MAGNASTOR dryspent fuelstorage system for dryspent fuel storage.Serial numbers areembossed inthe side ofeach concrete cask aswell as printedonthe metallic labelplate affixed toeach cask. NAC-UMSserial numbers areI-152.

NAC-MAGNASTOR numbers serial are153 andgreater. Thesystem consists ofa Transportable Storage Canister (TSC) andconcrete VerticalConcrete Cask (VCC). TheTSCisthe 68of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE190 OF383 ATTACHMENT I EAlTechnical Bases CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY. TheTSCiswelded anddesigned toprovide confinement ofall radionuclides under normal, off-normal andaccident conditions (ref.1,2,and3).

Confinement boundary is dellned asthe barrier(s) between areas containingradioactivesubstances andthe environment. Therefl3re, damage toa continement boundary mustbea confirmed physical breach between the spent fuel andthe environment for the TSC.

Thevalues shown represent 2times the limits specitled inthe respectiveISFSI Certificateof Compliance (CofC)Technical Specification for radiation externaltoa loaded TSCfor a NAC-UMSorNAC-MAGNASTORcanister (ref. I,2)

This ICaddresses anevent that results indamage tothe CONIINEMENTBOUNDARYofa storage cask containing spent fuel.It appliesto irradiated fuel thatisheensed for dry storage beginning atthe point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Theissues ofconcern arethecreation ofa potential oractual release pathtothe environment, degradation ofoneormorefuel assemblies duetoenvironmental factors andconfiguration changes which couldcause challenges inremoving the cask orfuel from storage.

Theexistence of'damage" isdetermined byradiological survey.The ISFSI C ofC technical specification multiple of"2times," which isalso used inRecognition Category R ICRUl,isused here todistinguish between non-emergency andemergency conditions.The emphasis for this classilleationisthe degradation inthe level ofsafety ofthe spentfuelcaskand notthe magnitudeof the associated dose ordose rate. Itisrecognized that inthe case ofextremedamage toa loaded cask, the factthatthe "on-contact" dose rate limitisexceeded maybedeterminedbased on measurement ofa dose rate atsomedistance from the cask.

Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICsIIUI andHA1.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I l!SNRC Certificate ofCompliancefi>r NACInternational's l!MSSpent l'uelStorage CasksNo.

1015, Amendment 5 ,Appendix A,Technical Specifications fi>r the NAC-liMS System

2. liSNRC Certificate ofCompliancefi>r NACInternational's MAGNASTOR Spent Fuel Storage Casks No.103lAmendment 7,Appendix A.Technical Specifications the fi>r MAGNASTOR system.

3. NEI99-01, E-HUI 69of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE191OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases EAlGroup: Cold Conditions (RCS temperature 5 2100F); EAI.s inthis category areapplicable onlyin one ormorecold operating modes.

CategoryC EAIsaredirectly associated with coldshutdown orrefueling system safety functions.

Given thevariability ofplant configurations (e.g., systems out-ol-service for maintenance, containmentopen, reduced AC power redundancy, time since shutdown) during these periods, the consequencesofanygiven initiating event canvarygreatly. Forexample a loss ofdecay heat removalcapability that occurs attheend ofanextended outage hasless significance than a similar lossoccurringduring the ilrst weekafter shutdown. Compounding these events isthe likelihood thatinstrumentation necessary for assessment may also beinoperable. Thecold shutdown and refueling system malfunction EAIsarebasedon performance capability tothe extent possible with given consideration toRCSintegrity, containmentclosure and fuelclad integrity for the applicable operatingmodes (5Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling, D Defueled).

Theevents ofthis category pertain tothe following subcategories:

I RCS1.evel RCSwaterlevel isdirectly related tothe ofadequate status core cooling and, therefore, fuel clad integrity.

2. IossofEmergency AC Power I.ossofemergency plant electrical power cancompromise plant safety system operability including decay heatremoval andemergency cooling core systems which may necessary be to ensure 11ssion productbarrierintegrity. This category includes ofonsite loss andoffsite power sources for4.16KV AC emergency buses.

3. RCSfemp.erature Uncontrolledorinadvertent temperature increases orpressure areindicative ofapotential loss of safetyfunctions.

4. IossofVital DCPower Iossofemergency plant electrical power cancompromise plant safety system operability including decay heatremoval andemergency core cooling systems which maybenecessary toensure ilssion 70of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE192 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I Technical l?Al, Bases productbarrier integrity. Thiscategory includes loss toordegraded ofpower voltage onthe125V DCvital buses.

5.Ioss ofCommunications Certain events that degrade plant operatorability toeffectively communicate with essential personnelwithin orexternal to theplant warrant emergency classification.

b.

Certain hazardous natural andtechnological events mayresult damage invisible toordegraded performance ofsafety systemswarranting classification.

71of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE193 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?AL Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Maltimetion Subcategory: l RCSLevel initiating Condition: UNPLANNl?D loss ofRCSinventory for15minutes orlonger EAl,:

CUl.1 Unusual Event UNPLANNl?D loss ofreactor coolant results inRCSwaterlevel lessthan a required lower limit for 15minutes

> (Notes 1,10)

Note 1 TheEmergency (oordimitor shoulddeclare the event promptlyupon determiningthattimelimit hasbeen exceeded. orwill beexceeded.

likely Note10: Variations inRCSboron concentration.

temperature and Containment Temperaturefrom thoseused inRWLIS calibrationwillinduceindication Refer errors. toOperator .-issistance l'rogram Spretalsheet.xls.

Ril'l.IN ModeApplicability:

5 Cold

- Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

UNPIANNEDA parameter change oraneventthat isnotI)the of an intended evolution result or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter change or event maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

With the plant inCold Shutdown, RCSwaterlevel isnormally maintained above thepartial drain condition of10%pressurizer level(II7ft. RWI.IS W.R.) (ref. 1).IIowever, ifRCSlevel isbeing controlled below the pressurizer partial drain setpoint, orif level isbeing maintained ina designated band inthe reactor vesselitisthe inability tomaintain level above the lowendofthe designated control band duetoa loss ofinventory resulting from aleak inthe RCSthat isthe concern.

With the plant inRefueling mode. RCSwaterlevel isnormally maintained atorabove the reactor vessel 0ange (Technical Specification ICO3.9.6 requires atleast 23ft.ofwaterabove the topof the reactor vessel flange intherefueling pool during refueling operations) (ref.2).

Procedure 400P-97716, RCSDrain Operations, provides direction regarding variationsinRCS boron concentration. temperature andContainment Temperature fromthose used inRWI IS calibration will induce indication errors. which areaddressed byacontrolled program, Operator Assistance Program RWI,IS Spreadsheet.xis (ref. I).

72of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE194OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases This 10addresses the inability torestoreandmaintain waterlevel toa required minimum level(or thelower limit ofa level band), ora lossofthe ability tomonitor RCSlevel concurrent with indicationsofcoolant leakage. Either ofthese conditions isconsidered tobea potential degradation ofthe levelofsafety of theplant.

Refueling evolutions that decrease RCSwaterinventory are carefully planned andcontrolled. An UNPLANNED event that results in waterlevel decreasing below a procedurally required limit warrantsthe declaration ofanUnusual Event duetothe reduced waterinventory that isavailable to keep thecore covered.

This EAL recognizes that the minimumrequired RCSlevel canchange several times during the course ofa refueling outage asdifferent plant configurations andsystem lineupsareimplemented.

This EAL ismet ifthe minimum specified for the level, current plant conditions, cannotbe maintained for 15minutes orlonger. Theminimum level is typicallyspecitled inthe applicable operatingprocedure butmaybespecilled inanothercontrolling document.

The15-minute threshold duration allowssufficient time for prompt operator actions torestore and maintain the expectedwaterlevel. Thiscriterion excludes transient conditions causing a brief lowering ofwaterlevel.

Continued loss ofRCSinventory mayresult inescalation tothe Alert emergency classification level via either ICCA1orCA3.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 400P-9// I6, RCSDrain Operations 2.Technical Specilleation LCO3.9.b, Refueling Water LevelFuel Assemblies 3.NEI99-01, CUI 73of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE195 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I Technical I?Al, Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: l RCSLevel InitiatingCondition: UNPIANNl?Dloss ofRCSinventory for orlonger 15minutes EAl,:

CUl.2 Unusual Event RCSlevel cannot bemonitored AND EITIlER

• UNPl.ANNIED increase inanyTable C-1 sump/tank level ofRCSinventory duetoloss a Visual observationofUNISOl ABLE RCS leakage TableC-1 Sunns/Tanks a ContainmentSumps

= ReactorCavitySump a Auxiliary Building Sumps a CVCSHoldup Tank a ReactorDrainTank a RefuelingWater Tank e EtuimentDrain Tank ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

//NISOLABLE -

An open orbreached systemlinethatcannot beisolated. orlocally.

remotely liNPLANNEDA parameter changeoraneventthat isnotl)the result ofanintended or evolution 2)anexpected plant response toa transient.

Thecause ofthe change parameter oreventmaybe known orunknown.

Basis:

InCold Shutdown mode,the RCSwill beintact normally andstandardRCSlevel monitoring meansareavailable.

Inthe Refuelmode,the RCSis notintactandreactorvessel levelmaybemonitored bydifferent means,including the abilitytomonitor visually.

level 74of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE196OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Inthis EAL, allwaterlevel indication isunavailable andthe RCSinventory loss mustbedetected byindirectleakage indications (Table C-1). Level increases mustbeevaluated against other potential sources of leakage such ascooling watersources insidethe containment toensure theyare indicative ofRCSleakage. If the make-up ratetothe RCSunexplainably rises above the preestablished rate,a loss ofRCSinventory maybeoccurring even ifthe source ofthe leakage cannot beimmediately identitled. Visual observation ofsigniilcant leakagefrom systems connected tothe RCSthat cannot beisolated could also beindicative ofa loss ofRCSinventory (ref. 1,2).

This lCaddresses the inability torestore andmaintain waterlevel toa required minimum level (or thelower limit ofa level band), ora loss ofthe ability tomonitor RCSlevel concurrent with indications ofcoolant leakage. Either ofthese conditions is considered tobeapotential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Refueling evolutions that decrease RCSwaterinventory are carefullyplanned andcontrolled. An UNPIANNEDevent that results inwaterlevel decreasing below a procedurallyrequired limit warrants the declaration ofanUnusual Event duetothereduced waterinventory thatisavailable to keep the core covered.

This EAl. addresses acondition where allmeans todetermine level have been lost.Inthis condition, operators maydetermine that aninventory lossisoccurring by observing changes in sumpand/or tanklevels (Table C-1). Sumpand/or tank levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources ofwaterDowtoensure they areindicative ofleakage from theRCS.

Continued ofRCSinventory loss mayresult inescalation tothe Alert emergencyclassification level viaeither ICCA1orCA3.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40AO-9//O2, Excessive RCSLeakrate 2.Procedure 400P-9//16, RCSDrain Operations

3. NEl99-01. CU1 75of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE197OF383 ATTACIIMENT I Technical l?Al, Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/RefuelingSystem Malftmetion Subcategory: l RCSIevel initiatingCondition: I,oss ofRCSinventory EAl,:

CAl.1 Alert loss ofRCSinventory asindicated byRCSlevel < 101ft.6 in.

(RWIISNRRCN-II-752A/RCN-IR-752)

ModeApplicability:

5 Cold

- Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

None Basis:

RCSwaterlevel, asindicated onRWI.IS narrowrange(RCN-l.I-752A or RCN-IR-752), of101ft 6 in.,corresponds to2 inches abovethe RCSliotI.egcenterline andisthe lowest level for continued operation ornormal shutdowncooling(SDC) (ref.

I).

Theinability torestore andmaintain level reaching after thissetpointinfers a failure ofthe RCS barrier.

This ICaddresses conditions that toa loss areprecursors ofthe ability toadequately coolirradiated fuel a precursor (i.e., toachallenge tothefuel barrier).

clad This condition represents apotential substantialreduction inthe level ofplantsafety.

Iorthis liAIa lowering

, ofRCSwaterlevel below101ft.6 in. indicatesthat operator actions have notbeen successful inrestoring andmaintainingRCSwaterlevel. Theheat-up rate ofthe coolant will increaseasthe available water isreduced.

inventory A continuingdecrease inwaterlevel will lead tocore uncovery.

Although related, this I?Al isconcerned withthelossofRCSinventory andnotthe potential concurrent effects onsystems neededfordecayheat removal (e.g., lossofa Decay Removal IIeat suction point).An increase inRCStemperature causedbya loss ofdecay heat removal capability is evaluated under ICCA3.

76of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE198OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases IfRCSwater then level continuestolower, escalation toSite would AreaEmergency bevia IC CSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 400P-9//, l6, RCSDrain Operations 99-01.

2. NIII CAl 77of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE199 OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: l RCSI,evel initiating Condition: I,oss ofRCSinventory EAl:

CAl.2 Alert RCSlevel cannot bemonitoredfor 2 15minutes (Note I)

AND EITIlER

• UNPI.ANNI D increase inanyTable C-1 Sump/Tanklevel duetoa loss ofRCS inventory a Visual observationofUNISOIABIERCS leakage Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator should declare theeventpromptly upondetermining that time limit has been exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

TableC-1 Sum3s/Tanks e Containment Sumps

• Reactor Cavity Sump a Auxiliary Building Sumps e CVCSIloldup Tank

• Reactor Drain Tank

• Refueling Water Tank a Et ui.mentDrain Tank ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

(/N/SO/JB/E -

An open orbreached system linethat cannot beisolated, remotelyorlocally.

(IN/'/ANNED -

A parameter changeoranevent that isnotI) the result ofanintendedevolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient.

Thecause ofthe parameter change oreventmaybe known orunknown.

Basis:

InCold Shutdown modethe RCSwill normally beintact andstandard RCSlevel monitoring meansareavailable.

78of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE200OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Inthe Refuel mode, the RCSisnotintact andRCSlevel maybemonitored bydilTerent means, including the ability tomonitor levelvisually.

Inthis EAl,all RCS water level indication would beunavailable for greater than 15minutes and theRCSinventory loss must bedetected byindirectleakage indications (Table C-l). Ievel increases mustbeevaluated against other potentialsources ofleakage such ascooling watersources insidethe containment toensure they are indicativeofRCSleakage. Ifthemake-up ratetotheRCS unexplainably rises above thepre-established rate, a loss ofRCSinventory maybeoccurring even ifthe source oftheleakage cannotbe immediately identined. Visual observation ofsignificant leakage from systems connected tothe RCS that cannot beisolated could also beindicative ofa loss ofRCSinventory (ref. 1.2).

This ICaddresses conditions that areprecursors to a loss ofthe ability toadequately cool irradiated fuel(i.e.,a precursor toa challenge tothe fuel clad barrier). This condition represents a potential substantial reduction inthe level ofplant safety.

Iorthis IAL,the inability tomonitor RCSlevel maybecaused byinstrumentation and/or power orwaterlevel failures, dropping below therange ofavailableinstrumentation. Ifwaterlevel cannot bemonitored, operators maydetermine thataninventory loss isoccurring byobservingchanges in sumpand/or tank levels. Sumpand/or tank levelchanges mustbeevaluated against other potential sources ofwaternow toensure they are indicative ofleakage from the RCS.

The15-minute duration for theloss oflevel indication waschosen because itis half ofthe EAl.

duration specified inICCSI Ifthe RCSinventory level continues tolower, then escalation toSite AreaEmergencywould bevia ICCSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-9//O2, Excessive RCSLeakrate 2.Procedure 400P-97/ I6. RCSDrain Operations

3. NEI99-01. CAl 79of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE201OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: l RCSIevel initiating Condition: I,oss ofRCSinventory affectingcore decay heatremovalcapability EAl,:

CSl.1 Site AreaEmergency RCSlevel cannot bemonitoredfor > 30minutes (Note I)

AND Coreuncovery isindicated byanyofthe following:

e UNPl.ANNEl) increase inanyTableC-1 sump/tank level ofsufGcient magnitude to indicate core uncovery a RU-33 > 9,000 mR/hr (when installed) e Erratic l?xcore Monitor indication NoteI TheImergency Coordinator should the declare eventpromptly upon determining that limit time hasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

TableC-1 Sumas/Tanks e Containment Sumps e Reactor Cavity Sump

= Auxiliary Building Sumps e CVCSIloldup Tank

• Reactor Drain Tank

• Refueling Water Tank a E ui3ment DrainTank ModeApplicability:

5 Cold

- Shutdown, 6 Reflieling Definition(s):

UVPLANNEDA parameter changeoraneventthat isnotl)theresult ofanintended evolution or 2)anexpected plant response Thecause toa transient. ofthe parameter change maybe orevent known orunknown.

Basis:

InCold Shutdown mode,the RCSwill normally beintact andstandard RCSlevel monitoring means areavailable.

80of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE202OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Inthe Refueling mode,the RCSisnotintact andRPVlevel maybemonitored bydiiTerent means, including the ability tomonitor level visually.

Thebottom ofthe RW1,lS indication is99'7" If level lowers less than99'7"then level would not beable tobemonitored. IfRW1.IS is notinservice then whenRVLMSis< 21% plenum level (Detector #8) level would not beable tobemonitored.

Inthis EAl-all RCSwaterlevel indication would beunavailable for greaterthan 30minutes and theRCSinventory lossmustbedetected byindirect leakage indications (Table C-1). Ievel increases mustbeevaluated againstother potential sources ofleakage suchascooling water sources insidethe containment toensure they are indicative ofRCSleakage. ifthemake-up rate tothe RCS unexplainably rises above the pre-established rate, a loss ofRCSinventory maybeoccurring even ifthe source ofthe leakage cannot beimmediately identined. Visual observation ofsignificant leakage from systems connected tothe RCSthat cannot beisolatedcould also beindicative ofa loss ofRCSinventory (ref.1,2).

Sumportank level increases should beofa magnitude that correlates toa volume sufficient to indicate fuel has been uncovered oruncovery isimminent.

TheReactor Vessel inventory loss maybedetected bythe refuelingmachine area radiation monitor orerratic Excore Monitor indication.

Aswaterlevel inthe reactorvessel lowers, the dose rate above the corewillrise. The dose rate due tothis core shine should result inup-scaled (10,000 mR/hr) refueling machine area radiation monitor (RU-33) indication.A threshold value of90%ofscale hasbeen selected asan on-scale indicator (ref. 3,4).

Post-TMI accident studiesindicated that theinstalled PWRnuclear instrumentation will operate erraticallywhenthe core isuncovered andthat this should beused asatool for making such determinations (ref. 5).

This ICaddresses a signincant andprolonged loss ofreactor vessel/RCS inventory control and makeup capability leading toIMMINENTfuel damage. Thelost inventorymaybeduetoa RCS component fililure,a lossofconfiguration control orprolonged boiling ofreactor coolant. These conditions major entail failures of plant functions needed for protection ofthe public andthus warrant a Site AreaEmergency declaration.

Iollowing anextended lossofcore decay heat removal andinventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling anda further reduction inreactor vessel lfRCSlevel level. cannot be restored,fuel damage isprobable.

Slof262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE203OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases The30-minute criterion istiedtoa readily recognizable event time start the (i.e., totallossofability tomonitor level) andallows sufficient time tomonitor, assess andcorrelate reactor andplant conditions todetermine if coreuncovery hasactually occurred (i.e.,

toaccount for accident various progression andinstrumentation uncertainties). It also allows suffleient timeforperformance of actionstoterminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/orrestorelevel monitoring.

Theinability tomonitor RCSlevel may becaused byinstrumentation and/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range ofavailable instrumentation. If waterlevel cannot be monitored. operators maydeterminethat an inventory loss is occurring byobserving changes in sumpand/or tank levels. Sumpand/or tank level changes mustbeevaluated against other potential sourcesofwaterilow toensure they areindicative ofleakagefrom the RCS.

This EALaddresses concems raised byGeneric Letter 88-17, Loss ofDecayIIeat Removal,SECY 91-283.Evaluation ofShutdown andLowPower Risk Issues, NUREG-1449, Shutdown andLow-Power Operation atConunercial Nuclear Power Plantsin the United States, andNUMARC91-06.

Guidelines for Industr y Actions toAssess Shutdown Management.

Escalation ofthe emergency classineation level would bevia ICCG IorRGI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40AO-97702, Excessive RCSLeakrate 2.Procedure 400P-9// I6,RCSDrain Operations

3. UFSARTable I1.5-1. Continuous Process andEfiluent Radiation Monitoring

4. UlSARSection 1I.5.2.1.5.4, Refueling Area Monitor

5. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC ),1980, Analysis of~lhreeMile Island-Unit 2 Accident, NSAC-I

6. NEl99-01, CSI 82of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE204OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Mallunction Subcategory: l RCSIevel initiatingCondition: IossofRCSinventory affectingfuelclad integrity with containment challenged EAL:

CGl.1 General Emergency RCSlevel cannot bemonitored for2 30 minutes (Note 1)

AND Core uncovery isindicated byanyofthe following:

• UNPLANNED increase inanyTable C-1 sump/tank level ofsufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery

• RU-33 > 9,000 mR/hr (when installed)

• Erratic Excore Monitor indication AND AnyContainment Challenge indication,Table C-2 Note1 Thelimergency Coordinator should declarethe eventpromptly upon determining that time limit hasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note6:lfCONTAINMENT Cl.0StjRIE isre-established prior toexceedingthe30-minute timelimit declaration ofa GeneralEmergency isnotrequired.

Table C-1 Sum s/Tanks

• Containment Sumps

• Reactor Cavity Sump

• Auxiliary Building Sumps

• CVCSIloldup Tank

• Reactor Drain Tank

• RefuelingTank Water

• EtuiamentDrain Tank Table C-2 Containment Challence Indications

• CONTAINMENT CI.OSURE notestablished (Note 6)

• Containment hydrogen concentration 2 4.9%

• Unalanned riseincontainment aressure 83of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE205OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases ModeApplicability:

5 Cold

- Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

CON1AINAIENT CLOSl IRE Theprocedurally dellned actionstaken tosecurecontainment andits associatedstructures. systems and components asa functionalbarrier product toilssion release under shutdown conditions.

Asapplied toPVNGS,Containment Closure is establishedwhen the requirements ofprocedure 40EP-9EOl0. LM-Containment Evacuation and Closure, Appendix for 249, containment closure aremet.

(INPLANNED A parameter change oranevent that isnotI)the resultofanintended evolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter change orevent maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

InCold Shutdown mode,the RCSwill normally beintact andstandard RCSlevel monitoring meansareavailable.

Inthe Refueling mode,the RCSisnotintact andRPVlevel maybemonitored bydifferent means, including the ability tomonitor levelvisually.

Thebottom ofthe RWI ISindication is99'7" Iflevel lowersless than 99'7"then level would not beable tobemonitored. IfRWI ISis notinservice then whenRVIMS is < 2I% plenum level (Detector #8) level would notbeable tobemonitored.

Inthis EAI., all RCSwaterlevel indication would beunavailable for greaterthan 30minutes and the RCSinventory loss mustbedetected byindirect leakageindications (TableC-1). Ievel increasesmustbeevaluated against other potentialsources ofleakage such ascooling watersources insidethe containment toensure theyareindicative ofRCSleakage. Ifthemake-up ratetothe RCS unexplainably rises above the pre-established a loss rate, ofRCSinventory maybeoccurring even if thesource oftheleakage cannot beimmediately identitled.

Visual observation ofsignificant leakage from systems connected tothe RCSthat cannot beisolated could alsobeindicativeofa loss ofRCSinventory (ref. 1,2).

Sumportank level increases should beofa magnitude thatcorrelates toa volumesufficientto indicatefuel has been uncovered oruncovery isimminent.

84of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE206OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases TheReactor Vessel inventoryloss maybedetected bythe refueling machine area radiation monitor orerraticExcore Monitor indication.

Aswaterlevel inthe reactor vessel lowers. the dose rate above the core will rise.Thedose ratedue tothiscore shine should result in up-scaled (10,000 mR/hr) refueling machine area radiation monitor (RU-33) indication. A threshold value of90%ofscale hasbeen selected asanon-scale indicator(ref.3,4).

Post-TMI accident studies indicate that the installedPWRnuclear instrumentation will operate erraticallywhenthe core isuncovered and thatthis should beused asatool for making such determinations (ref. 5).

Three conditions are associated with achallenge to Containment integrity:

1.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE notestablished The status ofContainment closure istracked ifplant conditions change that could raise the risk of a 11ssion product release asa result ofa loss ofdecay heat removal (ref. 6).Ifcontainmentclosure is re-established prior to exceeding the 30minute core uncovery time limit then escalation toGEwould notoccur.

2. Containment hydrogen > 4.9% The4.9%

hydrogen concentration threshold represents the IIydrogen Recombiners Function FailureIndication (ref. I1) and is theacceptance criteria for the PVNCiS Safety Function Status Check for IOCA, Containment Combustible Gas Control (ref.7, 8,10,). PVNGSis equipped with a Ilydrogen ControlSystem (IICS) which serves tolimit orreduce combustible gasconcentrations inthe containment. The HCSis an engineered safety feature with redundant hydrogen recombiners, hydrogen mixing system, hydrogen monitoring subsystem anda backup hydrogen purge subsystem. TheIICS is designed tomaintain the containment hydrogen concentration below 4%byvolume (ref. 8).

Twocontainment hydrogen monitors have a range of0%to ICM(ref. 8,9). Since the hydrogen monitoring system maybeoutofservice inModes 5 and alternative 6, means of determining hydrogen concentration mayberequired ifthe Emergency Coordinator believes conditions exist that maycause hydrogen generation inside containment.

3.UNPIANNEDrise incontainment pressure -

Anunplanned pressure riseincontainment while incold shutdown orrefueling modes canthreaten Containment Closure capability and thus containment potentially cannot berelied upon asabarrier tofission product release.

This ICaddresses the inability torestore andmaintain reactor vessel level above the topofactive fuelwith containment challenged. This c onditionrepresents actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation ormelting with potential for lossofcontainment integrity. Releases canbereasonably expected toexceed EPAPAGexposure levelsoffsite for morethan the immediate site area.

85of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE207OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Following an extended lossofcore decay heat removal andinventory makeup, decay heat will cause reactor coolant boiling anda further reduction inreactor vessel level. IfRCSlevel cannot be restored, fueldamage isprobable.

With CONTAINMENT CIOSURE notestablished, there isa high potential fora direct and unmonitored release ofradioactivity tothe environment. IfCONTAINMENT ClOSUREis reestablished prior toexceeding the30-minute time limit, then declaration ofaGeneral Emergency isnotrequired.

Theexistence ofanexplosive mixture means, ata minimum, that the containment atmospheric hydrogen concentration issufficient tosupport a hydrogen burn (i.e.,atthe lower deflagration limit).A hydrogen burn willraise containment pressure and could result incollateral equipment damage leading toa loss ofcontainment integrity. Ittherefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.

Inthe early stages ofa core uncovery event. it isunlikely that hydrogen buildup duetoacore uncovery could result inanexplosive gasmixture incontainment. lfall installed hydrogen gas monitors areout-of-service during anevent leading tofuel cladding damage, it maynotbepossible toobtain acontainment hydrogen gasconcentration reading asambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access. During periods wheninstalled containment hydrogen gasmonitors are out-of-service, operators mayusethe other listed indications toassesswhether or notcontainment ischallenged.

The30-minute criterion istied toa readily recognizable event start time (i.e.,thetotal lossofability tomonitor level) andallows sufncient time tomonitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions todetermine ifcore uncovery has actually occurred (i.e..toaccount for various accident progression andinstrumentation uncertainties). also It allows sufficient time forperformance of actions toterminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.

Theinability tomonitor RCSlevel maybecaused byinstrumentation and/or power failures,or waterlevel dropping below the range ofavailable instrumentation. lfwaterlevel cannot be monitored, operators maydetermine that aninventory loss isoccurring byobserving changes in sumpand/or tank levels. Sumpand/or tank level changes mustbeevaluated against other potential sources ofwaterflow toensure they are indicative of leakage from t he R CS.

This EAl. addresses concerns raised byGeneric Ietter 88-I 7,Loss ofDecay fleat Removal; SECY 91-283, Evaluation ofShualown andIowPower Risk Issues; NUREG-1449,Shualown andLow-86of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE208OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases PowerOperation at Commercial Nuclear PowerPlants inthe United andNUMARC91-06, States:

Guidelinesfi>r Industry Actions toAssess Shutdown Manageinent.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-9//02. Excessive RCSIeakrate 2.Procedure 400P-97/I6, RCS Drain Operations 3.UFSARTable I1.5-l, Continuous Process andEfiluent Radiation Monitoring

4. UFSARSection I I.5.2.I.5.4, Refueling AreaMonitor

5. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center(NSAC), 1980, Analysis of'Ihree Mile Island Unit2Accident, NSAC-1

6. Procedure 40EP-9EOl0, IM-Containment Evacuation andClosure, Appendix249

7. Procedure 40DP-9AP08, /,oss ofCoolantAccident Technical Guideline

8. UFSARSection I .2.4.2, Additional PVNGSEngineered Safety Features

9. UFSARTable 6.2.5-l, Combustible GasControl System DesignParameters

10. Procedure 40EP-9EO03, /oss of Coolant Accident 1I Nuclear Fuel Management Analysis CalculationTA-13-C00-2000-001, EOPSetpoint Document 12.NEI99-01, CGI 87of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE209OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: 2 Ioss ofEmergency AC Power initiating Condition: Ioss ofall but oneAC power source toemergency busesfor 15minutes orlonger EAL:

CU2.1 Unusual Event AC power capability, Table C-3,toemergency 4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4reducedto a single power source for2 15minutes (Note I)

AND Anyadditional single power source will result inloss failure ofall ACpower toSAFETY SYSTEMS Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator should declaretheeventpromptly upon determining that limit time hasbeen exceeded. orwill beexceeded.

likely Table C-3 AC Power Sources Offsite:

• SUT(normal)

• SUT(alternate)

• SBOG #1(if already aligned)

• SBOG#2 (if aligned) already Onsite:

a

• DGA

• DGB ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling, D Defueled Definition(s):

SAFETYSYSTEM A system -

requiredfor safe plant operation, cooling downtheplant and/or placing itinthe cold shutdown including condition, the ECCS. These aretypicallysystems classined assafety-related (as defined in10 Cl R 50.2):

Those structures, systems andcomponents that arerelied upontoremain during functional and following design basis events toassure:

88of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE210OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases 1)The integrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary; 2)Thecapability toshut downthe reactor andmaintain itina safe shutdown condition; 3)Thecapability toprevent ormitigate the consequences ofaccidents which could result in potential offsite exposures.

Basis:

Ioremergency classification purposes, "capability" means that anAC power source isavailable to andcapable ofpowering theemergency bus(es) within 15 whether min, ornotthe buses are currentlypowered from it.

Thecondition indicated bythis EAl isthedegradation ofthe offsite andonsite power sources such thatanyadditional single failure would result in a loss ofall AC power tothe emergency buses.

4.I6KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 are the emergency (essential) buses. PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-S04 supplies power toTrain B safety related loads.

Each bushastwo normal sources ofoffsite power. Each source is fromoneofthree 13.8 KV Startup Transformers (SUT) normal via i ts and alternative ESF Service Transformer NBN-X03 and thealternate supply toPBB-SO4 orNBN-X04. Transformer NBN-X03 isthe normal supply tobus PBA-S03 andthe alternate supply toPBB-SO4; Transformer NBN-X04 isthenormalsupply tobus PBB-SO4 andthe alternate supply toPBA-S03 (ref. I).

Inaddition. PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 each have anemergency diesel generator(DG A & IXiB) which supply electrical power tothe busautomatically inthe eventthat the preferred source becomes unavailable (ref.1).

Additional alternate offsiteAC power sources arethe tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #1& SBOG#2). Ilowever, these sources canonly becredited ifalready aligned, thatis,capable ofpowering oneormoreemergency buswithin 15minutes. Each SBOGisratedat approximately 3.4 MW andcansupply the shutdown SAFETYSYSTEMloads inModes 5.6 and Defueled.

This coldcondition EAL isequivalent tothe hot condition EAL SAII This ICdescribes asignificant degradation ofoffsite andonsite AC power sources such thatany additionalsingle titilure would result ina loss ofall AC power toSAFI TY SYSTEMS. Inthis condition,the sole AC power source maybepowering one,ormorethan one,train ofsafety related equipment.

89of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE21IOF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Wheninthe cold shutdown, refueling. ordefueled mode, this condition isnotclassilled asanAlert becauseofthe increased time availabletorestore another power source toservice.Additional time isavailable due to the reduced core decay heat load andthe lower temperatures andpressures in variousplantsystems. Thus, when inthese modes, this condition isconsidered tobea potential degradationofthe level of safety ofthe plant.

An "ACpower source" isasource recognized inAOPsandEOPandcapable ofsupplying required power toanessential bus. Some examples ofthis condition arepresented below.

• A loss ofall offsite power with a concurrent failureofall but oneemergency powersource (e.g.,anonsite diesel generator).

a A loss ofall offsite power andloss ofall emergency power sources (e.g.,

onsite diesel generators) with asingle trainofemergency buses being fed from anSBOG.

• A loss ofemergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with train a single of emergency buses being fedfrom anoffsite power source.

Iifteenminutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient or momentary losses ofpower.

Thesubsequent loss ofthe remaining single power source would escalate the eventtoanAlertin accordancewith ICCA2.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Drawing 13-E-MAA-001 MainSingle Line Diagram

2. lflSAR Section 8.3.1, AC Power Systems 3.Procedure 40AO-97712 Degradecl Electrical Power

4. (11SARSection 1.2.I0.3.9. Alternate AC Power System

5. NEI99-01, ClJ2 90of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE212OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: 2 I.oss ofEmergency AC Power Initiating Condition: Iossofall offsite andall onsite AC power toemergency buses for I5 minutes orlonger EAL:

CA2.1 Alert I.ossofall offsite andall onsite AC power capability toemergency 4.16KV buses PBA-S03 and PBB-SO4 for2 15minutes (Note I)

Note1:TheEmergency Coordinator should theevent declare promptly that upondetermining time limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling D Defueled Basis:

Foremergency classification purposes, "capability" meansthat anAC power sourceis available to andcapable ofpowering the emergency bus(es) within 15min, whetheror not thebuses are currently powered fromit.

4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 arethe emergency (essential) buses. PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-SO4 supplies powertoTrain B safetyrelated loads.

Each bushastwonormal sources ofoffsite power. Each source isfromoneofthree 13.8 KV Startup Transformers (SUT) via itsnormal andalternative ESFServiceTransformer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04. Transformer NBN-X03isthe normal supply tobusPBA-S03 andthe alternate supply to PBB-S04: Transformer NBN-X04isthe normal supply tobus PBB-SO4 andthe alternate supply to PBA-S03 (ref. 1).

Inaddition. PBA-S03 andPBB-S04 each have anemergency diesel generator (DCi A & D(iB) which supply electrical power tothebusautomatically inthe eventthat the preferred source becomes unavailable (ref.1).

Additional alternate offsiteAC power sources include, but to,the notlimited tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOCi #I& SBOCi #2).IIowever,these sources canonly be credited ifalready aligned, that capable is, ofpowering oneormoreemergency buswithin I5 91of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE213OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases minutes. Each SBOG israted atapproximately 3.4 MW andcansupply theshutdownSAFETY SYSTEMloads inModes 5,6 andDefueled.

This cold condition EAl is equivalent tothe hot condition loss ofall AC power offsite EAISSII This ICaddresses a total loss ofAC power compromises that the performance ofallSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycorecooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heatremoval andtheultimate heatsink.

Wheninthe cold shutdown. refueling. or defueled mode, thiscondition notclassined is asa Site AreaEmergency because ofthe increased time available torestore anemergency bustoservice.

Additional time isavailable duetothe reduced core decay heat loadandthelower and temperatures pressures invarious plant systems. Thus, when in these modes condition this anactual represents orpotential substantial degradation ofthe of safety ofthe level plant.

Fifteenminutes wasselected asa threshold toexcludetransient ormomentary power losses.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification levelwould bevia IC CSI orRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Drawing 13-E-MAA-00I . MainSingle LineDiagram

2. UFSARSection 8.3.1, AC Power Systems

3. Procedure 40AO-9// I2, Degraded Electrical Power

4. UFSARSection 1.2.10.3.9. Alternate AC Power System 5.NEI99-01, CA2 92of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE214OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Maltimetion Subcategory: 3 RCSTemperature InitiatingCondition: UNPIANNEDincrease inRCStemperature EAl,:

CU3.1 Unusual Event UNPLANNEDincrease inRCStemperature to> 210oF ModeApplicability:

5 Cold

- Shutdown, 6 Reilieling ModeApplicability:

UNPLANNEDA parameter change oraneventthat is not 1) the resultofanintended evolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient.

Thecause ofthe parameter change orevent maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

Several instruments arecapable ofprovidingindicationofRCStemperature with respecttothe Technical Specification cold shutdown temperaturelimit (210oF,ref. These include cold 1). leg (Tem) temperature indications. hotleg (Thot)temperature indicationswithRCPs running, Cl(Ts andSDC1leat Exchanger inlet temperatureindications (ref. 2,3).

Ilowever, ifShutdown Cooling (SDC) Ilow then islost, the normal temperatureelements used to monitor RCStemperature arenotaccurate ofRCStemperature.

indicators TheCliTs are the design instruments for these conditions. Forsomeperiods oftime theCETsmaynotbeavailable. The current practices concerning determiningtimetoboilcan beusedi n e the valuation oftheseEAl.s.

Without CETindication andwith a lossofSDCflow the following gcidanceshould beused (ref.

4):

a Usethe predetermined "time toboil"dataforevaluating these EAI.s.This approachreflects the relatively small numerical difference between the typicalTechnicalSpecilleationcold shutdown temperature limitof2100F andthe boiling temperatureofRCSwaterwith the plantMode5or6.

in 93of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE215OF383 ATTACllMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases

= Alternately, the Control RoomstaiT mayusea procedure oruser aid todetermine whenRCS temperature will likely exceed 210oF given the actual plantconditions (e.g..using a heat-up curve).

This ICaddresses anUNPl.ANNED increaseinRCStemperature above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limitandrepresents apotential degradation ofthelevel of of safety plant.

the Ifthe R CS is not intactand CONTAINMENT Cl.OSURE i snotestablished during this event, the Emergency Coordinator should also refer toICCA3.

A momentary UNPlANNEDexcursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit whenthe heat removal function is available doesnotwarrant aclassification.

This EAl,involves a loss ofdecay heat removal capability, oranaddition ofheat tothe RCSin excess ofthat which cancurrently beremoved, such that reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specified in Technical Specilleations.

During this condition, there isnoimmediate threat offueldamage because the core decay heat load hasbeen reduced since the cessation ofpower operation.

During anoutage, the level inthe reactor vessel will normally bemaintained atorabove the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below thereactor vessel flange are carefully planned andcontrolled. A loss offorced decay heat removal atreduced inventory may resultinarapid increaseinreactor coolant temperature depending onthe time after shutdown.

Escalation toAlert would bevia ICCAlbased onaninventory lossorICCA3based on exceeding plant configuration-specillc time criteria.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Technical Specifications Table 11-1, Modes

2. Procedure 400P-9//O3 , Reactor Startup

3. Procedure 40ST-9RC01, RCSandPressurier IIeatup andCooldown Rates

4. Safety Analysis Operational Data Book

5. NEl99-01, CU3 94of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE216OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: 3 RCSTemperature InitiatingCondition: UNPIANNEDincrease inRCStemperature EAl,:

CU3.2 Unusual Event 1.ossofall RCStemperature and RCS levelindicationfor 2 I5minutes (Note 1)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator should declare the eventpromptly upon that determining time limithasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown. 6-Reft:eling Definition(s):

None Basis:

Several instruments arecapable ofproviding indicationofRCStemperature with respect tothe Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit (210oF,ref. These include cold 1). leg (Teow)temperature indications, hot leg (Thot) temperatureindications with RCPs running, CETs andSDC1leat Exchanger inlet temperature indications(ref.

2,3).

Several instruments arecapable ofproviding indicationofRCSlevel including pressurizer level, RWlIS,RVl,MS andlocal monitor (gauge glass) (ref.4).

This EAl. addresses theinability todetermine RCStemperature andlevel andrepresents apotential degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant. If theRCSis notintactandCONTAINMENT ClOSUREisnotestablished during this event, the EmergencyCoordinator should also refer toIC CA3.

This EAl. reflects a condition where there has been loss a signincant ofinstrumentation capability necessary tomonitor RCSconditions andoperators wouldbeunable tomonitor keyparameters necessary toassure coredecay heatremoval. During this there condition, isnoimmediate threat of fueldamage because thecore decay heat load hasbeen reducedsincethecessation ofpower operation.

95of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE217OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al, Technical Bases Iifteenminutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient ofindication.

losses ormomentary Escalation toAlert would bevia ICCAlbased onaninventoryorICCA3based loss onexceeding plant configuration-speci0c timecriteria.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Technical SpecificationTable I 1- l Modes 2.Procedure 400P-9/103, Reactor Startup

3. Procedure 40ST-9RC01, RUSand Pressurier Heatup andCooldown Rates

4. Procedure 400P-9// Ib RCSDrain Operations

5. Nl?I 99-01, CU3 96of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE218OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: 3 RCSTemperature initiatingCondition: Inability tomaintainplant incold shutdown EAl,:

CA3.1 Alert UNPIANNEDincrease inRCStemperature to> 2100F for> Table C-4duration (Note 1)

OR UNPl.ANNED RCSpressure increase

> 10psia (This criteriondoes notapply during water-solid plant conditions)

Note1:TheEmergency Coordimitorshould declare the eventpromptly upon determining thattime limit hasbeen exceeded. orwilllikely beexceeded.

Table C-4: IIeat-u DurationThresholds CONTAINMENT R(S Statues CI,OSURE Status IIcat-up Duration Intact(but not REDUCED N/A 60 minutes.*

INVENTORY Notintact Established 20minutes.*

OR REDUCED INVENTORY NotEstablished 0 minutes.

• Iran RCSheat removalsystem isinoperationwithin this time frame andRCStemperature is beine reduced, theE AI isnot anlicable.

ModeApplicability:

5-Cold Shutdown, 6-Refeeling Definition(s):

COALilNMENT CLOSl iRE-Theprocedurally denned actions taken tosecure containment andits associatedstructures. systems andcomponents asa functional barrier tofission product release under shutdown conditions.

Asapplied toPVNGS,Containment Closureisestablished whenthe requirements ofprocedure 40EP-9EOl0, I.M-Containment EvacuationandClosure, Appendix 249,for containment closure aremet.

97of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE219OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases UNPLANNED . A parameter change oraneventthat isnot1) the result ofanintended evolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter change orevent maybe known orunknown.

RFDUCED IATEATORY -

Plant condition whenfuel isinthe reactor vessel andReactor Coolant System levelisless than or equal tothe 1IIfoot elevation.

Basis:

Several instruments arecapable ofproviding indication ofRCStemperature with respecttothe Technical SpeciAcation cold shutdown temperature limit (2100F, ref. I). These include cold leg (Teou) temperature indications, hotleg (Tst) temperature indications with RCPsrunning, CETsand SDCIIeat Exchanger inlet temperature indications 2, (ref. 3).

However, if Shutdown Cooling (SDC) flow islost, then the normal temperature elements used to monitor RCStemperature arenotaccurate indicatorsof RCS temperature. TheCETsare the design instruments for these conditions. Forsomeperiods oftime the CETs maynotbeavailable. The current practices concerning determining time toboil canbeused the in evaluationofthese EAI.s.

Without CETindication and with a loss ofSDC flow the following guidance should beused (ref.

4):

= Usethe predetermined "time toboil" data forevaluating these EAI.s. This approachreflects therelatively small numerical difference between the typical Technical Specilleation cold shutdown temperature limitof2100F andthe boiling temperature ofRCS water with the plantin Mode 5 or 6.

• Alternately, the Control Roomstaff mayusea procedure oruser aid todetermine when RCS temperature will likely exceed 2100F given the actual plant conditions (e.g.,usinga heat-up curve).

RCSpressure instruments RCAPI-103, RCC-PI-105, RCD-PI-106 andRCB-PI-104 arecapable of measuring pressure toless than 10psia (ref. 3).

This ICaddresses conditions involving a loss ofdecay heat removal capability oranaddition of heat tothe RCS excess in ofthat which cancurrently beremoved. Either condition represents an actualpotential or substantial degradation of the l of evel safety plant.

of the A momentary UNPIANNID excursion above the Technical Specincation coldshutdown temperature limit whenthe heat removal function isavailable does notwarrant aclassineation.

98of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE220OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases TheRCS Ileat-up DurationThresholds table addresses anincrease inRCStemperature when CONTAINMENT ClOSt JREisestablished but theRCSisnotintact. orRCSinventoryisreduced (e.g.,mid-loopoperation). The20-minute criterion wasincluded toal:ow timefor action operator to addressthe temperature increase.

TheRCS1leat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses anincrease inRCStemperature with theRCSintact. Thestatus of CONTAINMENT ClOSlJRE isnotcrucial inthis condition sincethe intactRCSisproviding a highpressure barriertoa fission product release. The60-minutetime frame should allow sufficient time to address the temperature increase withouta substantial degradation inplant safety.

Finally,inthe case where there isanincrease in RCS temperature, the RCSisnotintactorisat reduced inventory andCONTAINMENT Cl,OSlJRE isnotestablished,noheat-up duration is allowed (i.e..

0 minutes). This isbecause 1) the evaporated reactor coolant directly maybereleased intothecontainment atmosphere andsubsequently tothe environment. and is 2)therereduced reactorcoolant inventory above the topofirradiated fuel.

TheRCSpressure increase threshold provides a pressure-based indication ofRCSheat-upinthe absence ofRCStemperature monitoring capability.

Escalationofthe emergency classincation level would bevia ICCSIor RSl PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Technical Specincation Table 1 1-1,Modes

2. Procedure 400P-9//O3, Reactor Startup 3.Procedure 40ST-9RC01, RCSandPressurier /leatup andCooldown Rates

4. Safety Analysis Operational Data Book 5.NEl99-01, CA3 99of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE221OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malftmetion Subcategory: 4 Ioss ofVital DCPower initiatingCondition: I,oss ofVital DCpower for 15minutes orlonger EAl,:

CU4.1 Unusual Event Indicated voltage is< I12VDCon vital DCbuses requiredbyTechnicalSpecifications lor > 15 minutes (Note l)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordimuor shoulddeclare the event promptlyupondetermining that time limit hasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6-Refueling Definition(s):

None Basis:

Thepurpose ofthis EAl. istorecognize a lossofDCpower compromisingthe ability tomonitor andcontrol the removal ordecay heat during cold shutdown orrefueling operations. This EAl is intended tobeanticipatory inasmuchasthe operating crewmaynothave necessary indication and controlofequipment needed torespond tothe loss.

Thevital DCbuses arethe following 125VDCClass IEbuses (ref.

I):

Train A: Train B:

• PKA-M41

• PKB-M42

. PKC-M43

• PKD-M44 There arefour, 60cell, lead-calcium storage batteries (PKA-Fl 1,PKC-I13,PKB-Fl2 and PKDFl4) thatsupplement the output ofthe battery chargers.They DCpower supply tothe distributionbuses whenAC power tothe chargers islostorwhentransientloads exceed the capacity ofthe battery chargers (ref.1).

All fourofthe125VDC buses supply inverters for 120VAC PNbus power aswell ascontrol power for varioussafety related systems. Each battery isdesigned tohavesufficientstored energy to 100of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE222OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases supplythe required emergency loads for 120minutes following a loss ofAC power tothechargers (ref.2).

Minimum DCbus voltage isI12VDC(ref. 3).

This EAL isthe cold condition equivalent ofthehotcondition loss ofDCpower EALSS2.1 This ICaddresses a loss ofvital DC power which compromises theability tomonitor andcontrol operable SAFETYSYSTEMS when the plant isinthe cold shutdown orrefuelingmode.Inthese modes, the core decay heat load has been significantly reduced andcoolant systemtemperatures andpressures arelower; these conditions increase the time available torestore DCbusto a vital service.Thus, this condition isconsidered to beapotential degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant.

As used inthis EAL,"required" means the vital DC buses necessary tosupport ofthe operation in-service,oroperable, train ortrains ofSAFETYSYSTEM equipment. Forexample, if A is Train out-of-service(inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenance workandTrain B isin-service (operable),then a lossofVital DCpower affecting Train B would require the ofan declaration Unusual Event. A loss ofVital DCpower toTrain A would not warrant anemergency classification.

Fifteenminutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient ormomentary power losses.

Depending upon theevent, escalation ofthe emergency classification would bevia level ICCAIor CA3,oranICinRecognition Category R.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Drawing 01-E-PKA-0Ol , MainSingle Iine Diagram 125V DC Class IE and12001CVital Inst Power Systent

2. UlSARSection 8.3.2, DCPower Systems 3.Calculation 01-EC-PK-D207, DC Battery Siing andMinintum Voltage 4.NEl99-01, CU4 101of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE223OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 IAl,Technical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Malfunction Subcategory: 5 I.oss ofCommunications InitiatingCondition: 1,oss ofall onsite oroffsite communicationscapabilities EAl,:

CU5.1 Unusual Event 1.ossofall Table C-5onsite communication methods OR 1oss ofall Table C-5Offsite Response Organization (ORO) methods communication OR Loss ofall Table C-5NRCcommunication methods TableC-5 Communication Methods System Onsite ORO NRC PBX X X X Plant Page X Two-Way Radio X FTS(ENS) X Telephone Ringdown Circuits (NAN) X Cellular Phones X X ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6-Refceling, D Defueled Definition(s):

None Basis:

Onsite andNRCcommunications offsite include oneormoreofthe listed systems inTable C-5 (ref.1.2).

102of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE224OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases L PBX Onsiteemergency telephone lines are divided amongthree EPABXswitches.

onsite Each EPABX switchisprovided with abackup battery for reliability.

This system will function during emergencies asit doesduringnormal operations. Telephones have thecapabilityoftrunk access (via local provider) andtheAPSownedprivate communications system which provides directdial capabilities tothe entireAPSvoice system via the company owned private communications system. ThePVNCiS telephoneEPABXSystems through which all PVNCiS telephone calls pass areequipped withuninterruptible power supplies (battery chargers andbatteries)anddedicated priority switching toensurethe ofthe reliability telephone system. The PVN(iS EPABXsarethe primary links forPVNCiS phones.There arealso administratively dedicatedlines for the CR.STSC,TSC,EOFand OSC.

2.Plant(Area) Paging Thearea paging system provides a reliable meansofnotifying and providing instructions toonsite personnel.Access tothis system isthrough theEPABXsystem telephones byuseofdedicated numbers.

3.Two-Way Radios PVNCiS operates a trunked radio system, with talk separate available for departments such groups asOperations, Security, Fire Protection, Radiation Emergency Protection. Preparedness, the Water Reclamation Facility. etc.This system includes basestationconsoles atvarious locations and emergency facilities throughout the site. Someofthe radiosusedduring emergenciesare portable radiosatvarious site locations,mobile radios inthe RIAT vehiclesandbase station consoles atthe TSC, EOF,Unit OSCs,Unit STSCsandUnit ControlRooms. PVNCiS FireProtection also maintainsradios that are used tocontact the airambulance service toprovide landing instructions.

4.FTS(ENS)

TheNRCEmergency Notification System (ENS) isanFTStelephone used for ofilcial communications with NRCHeadquarters. TheNRCIIeadquarters has the capability topatch into theNRCRegional offices. Theprimary purpose ofthis phone istoprovide a reliable method for the initial notification ofthe NRCandtomaintain continuous communications with the NRCafter initial notification. ENStelephones are located inthe ControlRoom. TSCandEOF.

103of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE225OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases 5.Telephone Ringdown Circuits (NAN)

These voice circuits serve asa primary communications link providing for technical information to offsiteagencies,public information communicationsandthe communication ofprotective action recommendations tooffsite authorities.

6.Cellular Phones Each STSC,the TSCandEOFhave a cellular phone toprovide additional independent lines of communication.

This EAI isthe cold condition equivalent of the hot conditionEAlSU7.1 This ICaddresses a signilleant loss ofonsiteoroffsite communications capabilities. While nota directchallenge toplant orpersonncI safety, thisevent warrants prompt notifications toOROsand theNRC.

This ICshould beassessed only whenextraordinary meansare being utilizedtomake communications possible (e.g.,

useofnon-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofonsite information via individuals ormultiple radio transmission points, individuals being sent tooffsite locations, etc.).

Thefirst EAl. condition addresses a totalloss ofthe communications methods used insupport of routine plant operations.

Thesecond EAI. condition addresses a total lossofthe communications methods used to notify all OROsofanemergency declaration. TheOROsreferred tohere arethe State andMaricopa County EOCs.

Thethird condition addresses atotal ofthe loss communications methods used tonotify the NRC of anemergency declaration.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I PVNGSEmergency Plan, Section 7.2Communications Systems

2. UFSARSection 9.5.2, Communication Systems 3.NEl99-01, CU5 104of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE226OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Category: C Cold Shutdown/Refueling System Maltimetion Subcategory: 6 Ilazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems Initiating Condition: Ilazardous event affecting a SAFETYSYSTEMneeded forthecurrent operating mode EAL:

CA6.1 Alert Theoccurrence ofanyTable C-6hazardous event AND EITIIER

• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in atleast onetrainofa SAFETYSYSTEMneeded for the current operating mode

= The event has caused VISlBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed for the currentoperating mode Table C-6 Ilazardous Events

• Seismic event (earthquake) a Internal orexternal FlOODINGevent

• winds Iligh ortornado strike

• FIRE

• EXPl.OSION a Other events with similar hazard characteristics asdetermined bythe Shift Manager ModeApplicability:

5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Reflicling Definition(s):

EXPLOS/ON- A rapid. violent andcatastrophic ofa piece failure ofequipment duetocombustion.

chemical reaction oroverpressurization. A release ofsteam(from high lines energy orcomponents) oranelectrical component failure (caused byshort circuits,grounding, arcing, should etc.) not automatically beconsidered anexplosion. Such events require apost-event todetermine inspection if theattributesofanexplosion arepresent.

105of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE227OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases F/RE Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such asslipping drivebelts oroverheated electrical equipmentdonotconstitute Gres. Observation ofDame ispreferred butis NOTrequiredif large quantities ofsmoke andheat are observed.

F/.OOD/NGA condition where waterisentering aroomorarea titsterthan equipment installed is capable ofremoval, resulting in a rise ofwaterlevel within theroomorarea.

SAFE'/T SYSTEMA systemrequired for safeplant operation, cooling downthe plantand/or placing itinthecold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typically systems classified assafety-related (asdefined in 10CFR50.2):

Those structures, systems andcomponentsthat arerelied upon toremain functional duringand following designbasis events toassure:

(1)Theintegrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2)Thecapability toshut downthe reactor andmaintainit in a safeshutdown condition; (3)Thecapability toprevent ormitigate theconsequences ofaccidents whichcould resultin potential offsite exposures.

F/SIBIE DAMAGE Damage toacomponent orstructure thatisreadily observable without measurements, testing, oranalysis. Thevisual impact ofthe damage issufficient tocauseconcern regarding the operability orreliability ofthe affectedcomponent orstructure.

Basis:

Refer toAttachment 4 for a listofPalo Verde SAFETYSYTEMS(ref. 5).

This ICaddresses a hazardous eventthat causes damage toa SAFETYSYSTEM, ora structure containing SAFETYSYSTEMcomponents, needed for thecurrent operating mode. This condition significantlyreduces the margin toa loss orpotential loss ofa fission product barrier andtherefore represents anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Thefirst conditional addresses damage toa SAFETYSYSTEMtrain that isinservice/operation since indicationsfor itwill bereadily available. Theindications ofdegraded performance should be signi0cant enough tocause concern regarding the operability orreliability ofthe SAFETY SYSTEMtrain.

Thesecond conditional addresses damage toa SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent thatisnotin service/operation orreadily apparent through indications alone,ortoa structure containing 106of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE228OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will makethis determination based onthetotality of available event and damage report information. This isintendedtobea brief assessment not lengthy analysis orquantification ofthe requiring damage.

• Thesignificance ofseismic events arediscussed under EAl IIU2.I. 7Cl4A, Annunciator SEISMIC OCCURRENCE will illuminateif the seismic instrument detects motion ground inexcess oftheseismic EVI NT trigger threshold (ref.1).

• Internal FIOODINGmaybe caused byevents suchascomponent failures,equipment misalignment, oroutage activity mishaps.

a Iligh winds inexcess ofdesign (105 mph) ortornado strikescancause significant structural damage (ref. 4).

a Areas containing functions andsystems required forsafe shutdown ofthe plant are identitled byfire area (ref.2).

a An explosion thatdegrades the performance ofa SAFETY SYSTEM train orvisibly damages a SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent orstructure would beclassilled under thisEAl.

a This cold condition EAIisequivalent tothe hot condition EAl. SA9.I Escalationofthe emergency classilleationlevel would bevia ICCSIorRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-9772 1 Acts

, ofNature

2. UFSARTable Quality 3-2.I, Classification ofStructures, Systems andComponents

3. l!FSAR Section 2.4.2.2.1, Offsite Flood Design Considerations

4. UFSARSection 2.3.I.2.3. Extreme Winds 5.Attachment 4 -

Palo Verde Safety Systems

6. NEl 99-01, CA6 107of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE229OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases EAlGroup: ANY (EAI sinthis category areapplicable toanyplant condition,hotorcold.).

IIazards arenon-plant. system-related events that candirectly orindirectly plant affect operation, reactor plantsafety orpersonnel safety.

I Security Unauthorized entry attempts into the Plant Protected Area, bombthreats, sabotageattempts and actual securitycompromises threatening loss orphysical control ofthe plant.

2.Seismic Event Natural events such asearthquakes have potential to cause plant structure orequipment damage of sufficientmagnitude tothreaten personnel orplantsafety.

3.W Other natural andnon-naturally occurring events that cancause damage toplant facilities include tornados. FIOODING, hazardous material releases andevents restricting site accesswarranting classification.

4.Iire Fires canpose significant hazards topersonnel andreactor safety. Appropriatefor classilleation are tireswithin the Plant Protected Area orwhich mayaffect operability ofequipment needed for safe shutdown 5.Ilazardous Gas Toxic. corrosive,asphyxiant orilammable gasleaks canaffect norma) plantoperations orpreclude access toplant areas required tosafely shutdown the plant.

6.Control RoomEvacuation Events thatareindicative ofloss ofControl Roomhabitability. Ifthe Control Roommustbe evacuated, additional support for monitoring andcontrolling plant functions isnecessary through theemergency response facilities.

7.m TheEAl,sdefined inother categories specify the predetermined symptoms oreventsthat are indicativeofemergency orpotential emergency conditions andthus warrant classification. While 108of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE230OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases these EALs have been developed toaddress full the ofpossible spectrum conditions emergency which maywarrant classillcation andsubsequent implementation Plan, Emergency ofthe a provision for classilleation ofemergenciesbased experience onoperator/management andjudgment isstillnecessary.The EAI.s of this categoryprovide the Coordinator Emergency thelatitude to classityemergency conditions consistent with theestablished classilleation criteria based upon Emergency Coordinatorjudgment.

I09of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE231OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al, Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards Subcategory: I Security Initiating Condition: ConArmed SECURITY CONDITION orthreat EAl,:

Ill1.1 t!nusual Event A SECURITY CONDITION that does notinvolve a IIOSTIl E ACTIONasreported bythe Security Shift Supervision OR Notincation ofa credible security threat directed atthe site OR A validated notincation from the NRCproviding information ofanaircraft threat ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

SECURI7 YCONDI770N- Anysecurity event aslisted inthe approvedsecurity contingency plan thatconstitutes a threat/compromise tosite security, threat/risktosite personnel. or a potential degradation tothe ofsafety level ofthe plant. A security condition doesnotinvolve a hostile action.

//GS/7/E WC/70N An acttoward PVNGS orits personnel thatincludesthe useofviolent force to destroy equipment, hostages take and/or intimidate the l icensee to achievean end.This includes attackbyair, land, orwaterusing guns, explosives, projectiles, orother vehicles, devices used to deliverdestructive Other force. acts that satisfy theoverall intentmaybeincluded. Ilostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude acts ofcivil disobedience orfeloniousacts that arenotpart ofa concerted attack onPVNGS.Non-terrorism-based EAl,sshould beused toaddress such activities this (i.e., mayinclude violent acts between individuals inthe ownercontrolled area).

Basis:

This EAL isbased onthePVNGS Security Plan, 7'raining aiuIQualificationPlan,Safi>guartis Contingency Plan andIndependent Spent Fuel Storage InstallationSecurity Prograin (ref. l).

I10of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE232OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases This ICaddresses events that pose a threat toplant personnel orSAFETYSYSTEMequipment and thusrepresent a potential degradationin the level ofplant safety. Security events which donotmeet oneofthese EAI s are adequately addressed bythe requirements of10CFR73.71 or10CIR 50.72.

Security events assessed asIlOSTII.E ACTIONS are classifiable under ICsllA landIISI Timely andaccurate communications between the Security Shift Supervision andthe Control Room isessentialfor proper classification ofasecurity-related event. Classitleation ofthese events will appropriate initiate threat-related notifications toplant personnel andOffsite Response Organizations.

Security plans andterminology arebased on theguidance provided byNEI03-12, Te/nplate the for Security Plan, Training andQualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan andIndependent Spent l'uelStorage Installation Security Prograin.

Thefirst threshold references the Security Shift Supervision because these are the individuals trainedtoconfirm that a security eventis occurring orhas occurred. Training onsecurity event confirmation andclassi0cation iscontrolled duetothe nature of Safeguards and10CFR2.39 information.

Thesecond threshold addresses thereceipt ofa credible security threat. The credibility ofthe threat isassessed inaccordance with the PVNGSSecurity Plan.

Thethird threshold addresses the threat from the impact ofanaircraft ontheplant. TheNRC IIeadquarters Operations Ofl1cer (1I00) will communicate tothe licensee if thethreat involves an aircraft.

Thestatus andsize ofthe plane mayalso beprovided byNORADthroughthe NRC.

Validation ofthe threat isperformed inaccordance with the PVNGSSecurity Plan (ref. 1).

Emergency plans andimplementing procedures arepublic documents; therefore, EALsshould not incorporate Security-sensitive information. This includes information that maybeadvantageousto a potentialadversary such asthe particulars concerning a specille threat orthreat location. Security-sensitiveinformation should becontained innon-public documents such asthe PVNGSSecurity Plan (ref.1).

Escalation ofthe emergency classi0cation level would bevia ICIIA I PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I.PVNGSSecurity Plan. Training andQualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent I'uel Storage Installation Security Prograin (Safeguards) 2.NEl99-01, IIUl II1of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE233OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards Subcategory: I Security initiating Condition: Ilostileaction within theSECURFI Y OWNERCONTROlIEDAREA orairborne attack threat within 30minutes EAL:

IIAl.1 Alert A IlOSTILE ACTIONisoccurringor has occurred within the SEClRITYOWNER CONTROIIEDAREAasreported by the Security Shift Supervision OR A validated notincation from NRCofanaircraft attack threatwithin 30minutes ofthe site ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

ilOSTll.E ACTION An acttoward PVNGS orits personnel thatincludes the useofviolent force todestroy equipment, takehostages and/or intimidate the licenseetoachieve anend. This includes attackby air,land, orwater using guns,explosives, projectiles,orother devices used vehicles, to deliverdestructive force.Other actsthatsatisfy the overall intentmaybeincluded. Ilostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude actsofcivil disobedience orfelonious actsthatare not part ofa concerted attack on PVNGS. Non-terrorism-based EAl,sshould beused toaddresssuch activities this (i.e., mayinclude violent b acts etween individuals intheo wner c area).

ontrolled SECURITY OWNERCONTROIIID AREA An area -

encompassed byphysical barriers towhich access iscontrolled.

Basis:

This ICaddresses the occurrence ofa IIOSTIIE ACTIONwithin the SECURITYOWNER CONTROl.I.ED AREAornotification ofanaircraft attack threat.

This eventwill require rapid response andassistance duetothe possibilityofthe attack progressing tothePIANT PROTECTED AREA, orthe needtoprepare the plant andstaff for aircraft a potential impact.

Timely andaccurate communications between the Security ShiftSupervision andthe Control Room isessential for proper class:ficationofa security-related event(ref. 1).

I12of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE234OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Securityplans andterminology arebased onthe guidance provided byNEl03-12, Template for the Security Plan, Training andQualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency PlanandIndependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program.

Astime andconditions allow. these events require a heightened state ofreadinessbythe plant staff andimplementation ofonsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation, dispersalorsheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness ofOffsite Response Organizations (OROs),

allowing them tobebetter prepared should it benecessary toconsider further actions.

This ICdoes notapply toincidents that are accidental events, acts ofcivil disobedience, or otherwise are nota IIOSTll E ACTION perpetrated bya IlOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash ofasmall aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types ofevents isadequately addressed by other EAls,orthe requirements of10CFR73.71 or10CFR50.72.

TheGrst threshold isapplicable foranyHOSTILE ACTION occurring, orthathasoccurred, inthe SECURITYOWNERCONTROlIEDAREA.This includes any action directed against anISFSI thatislocated outside the PIANT PROTECTED AREA.

Thesecond threshold addresses the threat from the impact ofanaircraft onthe plant andthe anticipated arrival time iswithin 30minutes. Theintent ofthis EAlisto ensure that threat-related notifications aremadeina timely manner sothat plant personnel andOROs are ina heightened stateofreadiness. This EA1. ismetwhenthe threat-related information hasbeen validated in accordance with security procedures.

TheNRCIleadquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate tothe licensee ifthe threat involves anaircraft. Thestatus andsize ofthe plane maybeprovided byNORADthroughthe NRC.

Insomecases, itmaynotbereadily apparent if anaircraft impact within theSECURF1 Y OWNER CONTROLIEDAREAwasintentional (i.e.,

a IIOSTlLE ACTION). Itisexpected, although not certain,that notification byanappropriate Federal agency tothe site would elarifythis point. Inthis case, theappropriate federal agency isintended tobe NORAD, FBI, FAAorNRC.Theemergency declaration, including onebased onother ICs/EAlshould s, notbeunduly delayed while awaiting notification bya Federal agency.

113of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE235OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Emergency plans andimplementing procedures arepublic therefore documents; EAlsshould not incorporateSecurity-sensitive information. This includes information maybeadvantageous that toa potential adversary, such asthe particulars concerning a specille threat Security-location.

orthreat sensitive information should becontained innon-public documents such PVNGSSecurity asthe Plan (ref. 1).

Escalation ofthe emergency classif1eation level would beviaICIISl.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 PlNGSSecurity Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Sufi>guards Plan Contingency aiul Independent SpentFuel Storage Installation Security Program (Safi>guards)

2. NEI 99-01, IIA l I14of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE236OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards Subcategory: l Security Initiating Condition: IlostileAction within thePLANTPROTECTED AREA EAl,:

HSl.1 Site AreaEmergency A IIOSTll.E ACTIONisoccurring or has occurredwithin the PlANTPROTECTED ARlA as reported bythe SecurityShift Supervision ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

IIOSTll,I ACTION An acttoward PVNGSorits personnel that ine:udes the useofviolent il)rce todestroy equipment. takehostages and/or the intimidate licensee toachieve anend. This includes attackby air,land, orwaterusing guns, projectiles, explosives, vehicles, orother devicesused to deliverdestructive force.

Other actsthat satisfy theoverall intent may be included. Hostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude acts ofcivildisobedience orfelonious acts that arenotpart ofa concerted attack onPVNGS. Non-terrorism-based EAl.s should beused toaddress such activities this (i.e., mayinclude violent acts between individualsinthe ownercontrolled area).

PI.ANT PROTICTEDAREA An area, -

located within the PVNGSExclusion Area Boundary, encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich access iscontrolled per10CFR73.55.The PVNGS Plant Protected Area andthe SIProtected I SI Areaare twoProtected located Areas withinthe PVNGSOWNERCONTROl1ED AREA.

Basis:

This ICaddresses the occurrence ofa HOSTILEACTIONwithin the PROTECTED AREA.This event will require rapidresponse andassistance duetothe possibility for damage toplant equipment.

Timely andaccurate communications between theSecurity Shift Supervision andthe Control Room isessential for proper class:fication ofasecurity-related event (ref. 1).

115of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE237OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Securityplans andterminology arebased onthe guidance provided byNEl03-12, Template the fi>r SecurityPlan, Training andOualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan andIndependent Spent I'uelStorage Installation SecurityProgram.

Astime andconditions allow. theseevents require a heightened state ofreadiness bythe plantstaff andimplementation ofonsite protective measures (e.g.,

evacuation, dispersal orsheltering).

The SiteAreaEmergency declaration willmobilizeOffsite Response Organization (ORO) resourcesand have them available todevelop and implement public protective actions inthe unlikely event that theattack issuccessful inimpairing multiple safety functions.

This ICdoes notapply toa IlOSTILE ACTION directed atanISFSI PROTECTED AREA located outsidethe PlANT PROTECTED AREA; such anattackshould beassessed usingICHAI It also does notapply toincidents thatareaccidentalevents, acts ofcivil disobedience, orotherwise are nota HOSTILE ACTIONperpetrated bya HOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crashofa small aircraft,shots from hunters,physicaldisputes between employees, etc. Reporting ofthese types ofevents isadequately addressedbyother EALs,or the requirements of10CFR73.71 or10 ClR 50.72.

Emergency plans andimplementing procedures are public documents; therefore, EAIsshould not incorporate Security-sensitive information.This includes information that may beadvantageous toa potentialadversary, such asthe particulars concerning aspecific threat or threat location. Security-sensitiveinformation should becontained innon-public documents such asthe PVNGS Security Plan (ref.I).

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 PVNGS Security Plan, TrainingandOualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel StorageInstallationSecurity Prograin (Safi>guards)

2. NEI99-01, IISI I16of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE238OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al, Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards Subcategory: 2 Seismic Event initiating Condition: Seismic event greater than OBl?levels EAl,:

IIU2.1 Unusual Event Seismic event > OBEasindicated on Control PanelA-J-SMN-COl ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

Iive Iorce Balance Accelerometer unitsareinstalled withinUnitI structures andoneisinstalled in the Free Field area south ofUnit 1 Peak ground motion acceleration of0.10g horizontalorvertical isthe Operating Basis liarthquake for PVNGS(ref. I).OBEis detected andanalyzed byFree Iield Accelerometer Sensor #6 (AJSMNXT0006) only.

Annunciator 7Cl4A,SElSMIC OCCURRENCE,will illuminate ifthe seismic instrument detects ground motion inexcess ofthe seismicEVENTtrigger (ref.

threshold 1,2).

Unit IControl Panel A-J-SMN-COI provides bothredl(VINT andyellow "OBE"I.ED indications (ref.I,2). Peak acceleration levels canalso bedetermined usingthe graphic user interface display screen (ref.4).

Procedure 40AO-97721. Acts ofNature. provides theguidance should the OBEearthquake threshold beexceeded andanyrequired response (ref.

actions 3.4).

Toavoid inappropriate emergency classification resulting fromspurious actuation ofthe seismic instrumentation orfelt motion notattributable toseismicactivity, anoffsite agency (USGS, National Iarthquake Information Center) canconfirm anearthquake that hasoccurred inthe area of the plant.Such confirmation shouldnot,however, preclude atimely emergency declaration based onreceipt ofthe OBEalarm. TheNEICcanbecontacted bycalling the number listed inprocedure I17of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE239OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases 40AO-9zz21 Select option #1andinform the analyst youwish toconfirm recent seismic activity inthe vicinity of PVNGS. lfrequested, provide the analyst with the following PVNGSUnit I coordinates: 33" 23' 23"north latitude, I12" 5l'43"westlongitude (ret. 5).Alternatively, near real-time seismic activity can beaccessed via the NEICwebsite:

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eartlujuakes/ihfiiarchives.php This ICaddresses a seismic event that results inaccelerations atthe plant sitegreater than those specined for anOperating Basis Earthquake (OBE). An earthquake greater than anOBEbut less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake(SSE) should have nosignificant impact onsafety-related systems, structures andcomponents,however, sometime mayberequired for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-event conditionof the plant(e.g., performs walk-downs andpost-event inspections). Given the time necessary toperform walk-downs and inspections andfully understand anyimpacts. this event represents apotential degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant.

Event verification with external sources should notbe necessary during orfollowing anOBE.

Earthquakes ofthis magnitude should bereadily felt byonsite personnel andrecognized asa seismic event (e.g., lateral accelerations inexcess of0.10g).The Shift ManagerorEmergency Coordinator mayseek external verincation ifdeemed appropriate (e.g.. a calltothe lJSGS, check internet newssources, etc.); however, the verification action mustnot preclude a timely emergency declaration.

Depending upon the plant modeatthe time ofthe event, escalation ofthe emergency elassification level would bevia ICCA6orSA9.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UlSARSection 2.5.2.7, Operating Basis Earthquakes 2.Procedure 40Al-9RK7C. Panel CO7C Alarm Response 7Cl4A Seismic Occurrence

3. Procedure 40AO-9772 1 Acts

, ofNature

4. Procedure 79IS-9SM01 ,

Analysis of Seismic Event 5.UlSARTable 2.1-1, Containment Building Centerlines

6. NEl99-01, Ill12 II8of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE240OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards Subcategory: 3 Natural orTechnology Ilazard initiating Condition: Ilazardous event EAl:

IIU3.1 tnusual Event A tornado strike withinthe Pl.ANT PROTI CTEDAREA ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

PLAATPROTECTED AREA An area, located withinthe PVNGS AreaBoundary, IExclusion encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich access iscontrolled per10CFR73.55. ThePVNGS Plant Protected Area andthe ISFSI Protected Area aretwoProtected Areaslocated withinthe PVNGSOWNERCONTROlIED AREA.

Basis:

Response actions associated with a tornadoonsite isprovided inprocedure40AO-97721, Acts of Nature (ref.I).

Ifdamage isconfirmed visually orbyother in-plantindications, the eventmaybeescalated toan Alert under EAl. CA6.1 orSA9.1 A tornado striking (touching down) within the PIANTPROTECTED AREAwarrants declaration ofanUnusual Event regardless ofthe measured wind speed atthe meteorologicaltower.A tornado isdefined asa violently rotating column of air incontact with the ground extendingthe and from base ofa thunderstorm.

This ICaddresses hazardous events thatareconsidered torepresent a potential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

EAI. IIU3.1 addresses a tornado striking(touching down) within the PI.ANT PROTECTED AREA.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification levelwould bebased on ICsinRecognition Categories R,I S orC.

I19of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE241OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases PVNGS Basis Reference(s):

l Procedure 40AO-97721 ActsofNature

2. ifFSAR Section 2.3.I.2.3, Winds Extreme

3. NEl99-01 IIlf3 120of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE242OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther ConditionsAffecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 3 Natural orTechnology Ilazard Initiating Condition: Ilazardous event EAl,:

11U3.2 tnusual Event Internal roomorarea Fl.OODING of a magnitude sufficient torequire manual orautomatic electricalisolation ofa SAlliTYSYSTEM component needed for thecurrent operatingmode ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

FLOOD/NG A condition where waterisentering a roomor area faster than installedequipmentis capable ofremoval. resulting ina rise ofwaterlevelwithinthe room orarea.

SAFETYSYSTEMA system -

for required safeplantoperation.cooling down the and/or plant placing itinthe cold shutdown including condition, theECCS. These are typically systems classifiedassafety-related (as definedin10CFR50.2):

Those structures, systems andcomponents arerelied that upon toremain functional during and following design basis events toassure:

(1)Theintegrity ofthe reactor coolant boundary:

pressure (2)Thecapability toshut downthe reactorandmaintainitina safe shutdown condition; (3)Thecapability toprevent ormitigate the consequencesofaccidents which could resultin potentialoffsite exposures.

Basis:

This ICaddresses hazardous that events areconsideredtorepresent a potential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

This EAl. addresses Fl.OODING ofa building roomorarea that results inoperators isolating power toa SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent duetowater levelorother wetting concerns.

Classineation isalso required ifthe waterlevelorrelatedwetting causes anautomatic ofa isolation SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent fromits power source(e.g.a breaker orrelay trip).

Towarrant 121of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVlSION69 PAGE243OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 IAl Technical Bases classilleation, operability oftheaffected mustberequired component byTechnical Specilleations for the current operating mode.

Escalation ofthe emergency elassifleation level would onICsinRecognition bebased Categories R,I S orC PVNGSHasis Reference(s):

1 NEl99-01IIU3 122of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE244OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 3 Natural orTechnology IIazard initiatingCondition: Ilazardous event EAl,:

HU3.3 Unusual Event Movement ofpersonnel within the Pl,ANT PROTECTED AREA isIMPEDEDduetoanoffsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., anoffsitechemical spill ortoxic gasrelease)

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

/MPEDE(D) -

Personnelaccess toa roomorarea ishindered toanextent that extraordinary measures arenecessary tolacilitate entry ofpersonnel into the affected room/area (e.g., requiring useofprotective equipment suchasSCBAs,that isnotroutinely employed).

PLANTPROTECTED AREA An area, locatedwithin the PVNGSExclusion AreaBoundary, encompassed byphysicalbarriers andtowhich access is controlled per10 CFR 73.55. ThePVNGS Plant Protected Areaandthe ISFSI Protected AreaaretwoProtected Areas located within the PVNGSOWNERCONTROIIEDAREA.

Basis:

Asused here, the term"offsite" ismeanttobeareas external tothe PVNGSPl,ANT PROTECTED AREA.

This ICaddresses hazardous eventsthat areconsidered torepresent a potentialdegradationofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

This EAI.addresses a hazardous materials eventoriginating atanoffsite location andofsufficient magnitude toimpede themovementofpersonnel within the PI.ANTPROTECTED AREA.

Escalation ofthe emergency classificationlevelwould bebased onICs inRecognition Categories R.F,S orC.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl 99-01, IlU3 123of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE245OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions AffectingPlant Safety Subcategory: 3 Natural orTechnology IIazard initiatingCondition: Ilazardous event EAl,:

HU3.4 Unusual Event A hazardous event that results in onsite conditions toprohibit sufficient the plant staff from accessing the site viapersonal vehicles (Note 7)

Note7:ThisEAl.does notapply toroutine traffleimpediments suchasfog. ice.

snow. orvehicle breakdowns or accidents.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

This ICaddresses hazardous events that areconsidered a potential degradation ofthe torepresent level ofsafetyofthe plant.

This EAI addresses a hazardous event that causes anonsiteimpediment tovehicle movement and significantenough toprohibit theplant staff from accessing thesite using personal vehicles.

Examples ofsuch aneventinclude site FIOODINGcaused bya hurricane,heavy rains, up-river waterreleases, damfailure, etc., oranonsite train derailment blockingtheaccess road.

This EAI.is notintended apply toroutine impediments such snow,ice.

asfog. orvehicle breakdowns oraccidents, but rather tomoresignificant conditions such asthe IIurricane Andrew strikeonTurkey Point in1992, the flooding around theCooper during Station the Midwest floods of1993, orthe flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in201I Escalationofthe emergency classification level would bebased onICsinRecognition Categories R.F.SorC.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I.NII99-01. IlU3 124of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE246OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 4 Fire Initiating Condition: FIREpotentially degrading thelevel ofsafety oftheplant EAl,:

HU4.1 Unusual Event A FIREisnotextinguished within 15 minutes of anyofthe following IIREdetectionindications (Note I):

• Report from thefleld (i.e-visual observation)

• Receipt ofmultiple (more than 1)f1re alarms orindications a Field verificationofa single firealarm AND TheFIREislocated within anyTable ll-1 area Note1:TheEmergency Coordimitor should declare the eventpromptlyupon determining that limit time hasbeen exceeded.

orwill likely beexceeded.

Table H-1 Fire Areas

• Containment e Auxiliary 13uilding a Control Building e Diesel Generator Building

= Diesel Generator Fuel OilStorage Tanks a Fuel Building a Main Steam Support Structure

• Refueling Water T ank e Essential Spray PondSystem e Condensate Storaue Tank ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

F/RE Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such asslipping belts drive oroverheated electricalequipment donotconstitute fires.

Observation offlame ispreferred butis NOTrequired iflarge quantities ofsmoke andheat areobserved.

I25of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE247OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Basis:

The15minute requirement begins with a crediblenotification that a Bre isoccurring, orreceipt of multiple validfire detection system alarms orfield validation ofa single fire alarm.Thealarm isto bevalidated using available Control Roomindications oralarms toprove that itisnotspurious, or byreports from the field. Actual Beld reports mustbemade within the15minute time limit ora classification mustbemade.

Table Fire II-1 Areas arebasedon UFSAR Table 3.2-I Quality Classineation ofStructures, Systems andComponents. Table ll-I Fire Areasinclude those structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown ofthe plant (SAI ETYSYSTEMS) (ref. I).

This ICaddresses the magnitude andextentof FIRES that maybeindicative ofa potential degradationofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

ForEAI. IIU4.1 the intent ofthe 15-minute durationis to size the FIREandtodiscriminate against small FIRIS that are readily extineuished (e.g.,smoldering waste paper basket). Inaddition to alarms, otherindications ofa FIRE could bea drop Gre i n main pressure, automatic activation ofa suppressionsystem, etc.

Uponreceipt, operators will takeprompt actions toconfirm thevalidity of aninitial fire alarm, indication, orreport. ForEAl. assessment purposes, the emergency declaration clockstarts atthe time thattheinitial multiple alarms, indication, orreport wasreceived andnot the timethat a subsequent verification action wasperformed. Ifonly a single indication isavailable tothe Control Roomstaff, the emergency declaration clock atthe starts time a tield report isgiven that validates theexistence.Similarly, theHre duration clock alsostartsatthe time ofreceipt oftheinitial multiple alarms, indication orreport.

Depending uponthe plant modeatthe time ofthe event, escalation ofthe emergency classification level wouldbevia ICCA6orSA9.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARTable 3.2-l, Quality Classification ofStructures, Systems andComponents

2. NEl99-01. IIU4 I26of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE248OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting PlantSafety Subcategory: 4 Fire initiating Condition: FIREpotentially degrading the level ofsafety oftheplant EAl,:

HU4.2 Unusual Event Receipt ofa single fire alarm (i.e., no other indications ofa IIRE)

AND Thefire alarm isindicating a FIREwithin any Table II-1 area AND Theexistence ofa FIREisnotverified within 30 minutes ofalarm receipt(Note I)

Note1:TheEmergency Coordinator should the declare eventpromptly upon determining that timelimit hasbeen exceeded.

orwill likely beexceeded.

Table H-1 Fire Areas a Containment e Auxiliary Building a Control Building a Diesel Generator Building a Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks

• Fuel Building a Main Steam Support Structure a Refueling Water Tank a Essential Spray Pond System a Condensate Storaue Tank ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

FIRE Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such asslippingdrive belts oroverheated electricalequipment donotconstitute fires. Observation offlame ispreferred but is NOTrequired iflarge quantities ofsmoke andheat are observed.

I27of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE249OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Basis:

The30minute requirement begins uponreceipt ofa single valid lire detectionsystem alarm. The alarm istobevalidated using available Control Roomindications oralarms toprove that itisnot spurious,orbyreports from thelield. Actual field reportsmustbemade within the 30minute time limitora classificationmust bemade.lf a ilreisverifiedtobeoccurring byfield report, classilleation shallbemadebased onEAlIIU4.1 Table H-1Fire Areas are based on UFSAR Table 3.2-1 Quality Classilleation ofStructures, Systems andComponents. Table ll-1 Fire Areas include those containing structures functions and systems required for safeshutdown ofthe plant (SAl ETY SYSTEMS) (ref. I).

This ICaddresses the magnitude andextent of FIRES that maybeindicative ofa potential degradationofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

This EAL addresses receipt ofa single llrealarm andthe existence ofa FIREisnotverilled (i.e.,

proved ordisproved) within 30-minutes ofthe alarm. Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actionstoconfirm the validityofa single flrealarm. ForEAL assessment purposes,the 30-minute clock atthe starts time thatthe initial alarm wasreceived andnotthe time that a subsequent verification action wasperformed.

A singlefirealarm. absent otherindication(s) ofa FIRE,maybeindicative of equipment failure or a spuriousactivation andnotanactual FIRE. Forthis reason, timeis allowed toverify additional thevalidityofthe alarm. The30-minute period isa reasonable amountoftime todetermine if an actualFIREexists; however. afterthat time andabsent information tothe contrary, it is assumed thatanactual FIREisinprogress.

Ifanactual FIREisverified bya report from the then field, IIU4.1 isimmediately applicable and theemergency mustbedeclared if the FIREisnotextinguished within15-minutes ofthe report.If thealarm isverilled tobedue toanequipment failureora spurious activationandthis veriflcation occurs within30-minutes ofthe receipt ofthe a larm,then this EALis notapplicable andno emergency declaration iswarranted.

Appendix R to10CFR50,states inpart:

Criterion 3of Appendix A tothis partspecifies that 'Structures, systents aiul components important tosafety shallhe designed andlocated tominimize. consistent with other safety requirements. the p robabilityand effectof fires and explosions.'

l28of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE250OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases When considering the effi>cts of:fire, thosesystems associated withachieving aini inaintaining safe shutdown conditions assuinenu( jor tinportancetosafi>tyhecause dantage totheincan lead tocore dainage resulting f)om lossofcoolant through hoil-off Because firemay afi>ct safi>shutdown systems andbecause theloss offimction ofsystems used tomitigatethe consequences ofdesign hasis accidents under post-fireconditions does notperseimpact public safety, the need tolimit fire damage tosystems required toachieve andmaintain safi>shutdown conditions isgreater than theneedtolimitfire damage tothose systems required tomitigate the consequences of design accidents.

hasis Inaddition, Appendix R to10CFR50,requires, amongother the considerations, useofI-hour 11re barriers for the enclosure ofeable andequipment andassociated non-safety circuitsofone redundant train (G.2.c). Asused inllU4.2, the30-minutes toverify a singlealarm iswell within thisworst-ease I-hour time period.

Depending upon the plant modeatthe time ofthe event, escalation ofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICCA6orSA9.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARTable 3.2-l, Quality Classification ofStructures, Systems and Components 2.NEI99-01, IlU4 129of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE251OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther ConditionsAffecting PlantSafety Subcategory: 4-Fire initiating Condition: FIREpotentially degrading thelevel ofsafety ofthe plant EAl,:

HU4.3 Unusual Event A FIREwithin the PLANTPROTECTED AREAorISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60minutes ofthe initial report, alarm orindication (Note I)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordimuor shoulddeclare the event promptlyupondetermining thattimelimithasbeen exceeded.

orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

F/RE Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such asslipping drive belts oroverheated electrical equipment donotconstitute fires.

Observation of flame is preferred butis NOTrequired if large quantitiesofsmoke andheat areobserved.

INDEPENDEAT SPENTF(iEL STORA(iE INS1/ AILITION (ISFSI) -

A complex that is designed andconstructed for theinterim storage ofspent nuclear fuelandother radioactivematerials associated with spent fuelstorage.

PLAATorISFSI PROTECTED AREA An area,located within thePVNGSExclusion Area Boundary, encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich accessiscontrolled per10CFR73.55.

ThePVNGSPlant Protected Areaandthe ISFSI Protected Area are two Protected Areas located within thePVNGSOWNERCONTROLLED AREA.

Basis:

This ICaddresses the magnitude andextent ofIIRESthat maybeindicative ofa potential degradation of the l of evel safety plant.

of the Inaddition toa FIREaddressed byEAL HU4.IorHU4.2,a FIREwithin thePLANT PROTECTED AREAnotextinguished within 60-minutes mayalso potentially degrade the of level plant safety.This basis extends toa FIREoccurring within the ISFSI PROTECTED AREA.

130of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVlSION 69 PAGE252OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 IAl TechnicalBases Depending upon theplantmodeatthe timeofthe escalation event, ofthe classification emergency level wouldbe via ICCA6orSA9.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 NII99-01 IIU4 131of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE253OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 4 Fire Initiating Condition: FIREpotentially degrading the levelofsafety ofthe plant EAl,:

HU4.4 Unusual Event A FIREwithin the PlANT PROTECTED AREAorISI SlPROTECTED ARl?Athat requires firellghtingsupport byanoffsite fire response agency toextinguish ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

FIRE Combustion characterized byheat andlight.Sources of smoke such asslipping drive belts oroverheated electrical equipment donotconstitute fires.Observation ofGame ispreferred butis NOTrequired iflarge quantities ofsmoke andheat areobserved.

INDEPENDENT SPENTFUElSTORAGE INSTAl IATION(ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned andconstructed for theinterim storage ofspent nuclear fuelandother radioactive materials associated with spent fuelstorage.

PI.ANT orISFSI PROTECTED AREA An area, located within the PVNGSExclusion Area Boundary. encompassed byphysical barriers andtowhich access is controlled per10CFR 73.55.

ThePVNGSPlant Protected Areaandthe ISFSI Protected Area aretwoProtected Areaslocated within thePVNGSOWNERCONTROLLED AREA.

Basis:

This ICaddresses the magnitude andextent ofFIRES that maybeindicative ofa potential degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant.

Ifa FIREwithin the PlANT orISFSI PROTl?CTED AR1iAisofsufficient size torequire a response byanoffsite Grefighting agency (e.g.,

a localtownFire Department), thenthe level of plant safetyispotentially degraded. Thedispatch ofanoffsite firefighting agency tothe site requires anemergency declaration only ifit isneeded toactively support firefighting efforts because the ilre isbeyond the capability oftheOnsite Fire Department toextinguish. Declaration is 132of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE254OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl TechnicalBases notnecessary ifthe agency areplaced resources onstand-by.orsupporting postextinguishment recovery orinvestigation actions.

Depending upon the plant modeatthe timeofthe escalation event, ofthe classification emergency level would bevia IC CA6 orSA9.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEI99-01. IIU4 133of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE255OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting PlantSafety Subcategory: 5-Ilazardous Gases initiating Condition: Gaseous release IMPl?DING access toequipment necessaryfor normal plant operations, cooldown orshutdown EAL:

IIA5.1 Alert Release ofatoxic. corrosive. asphyxiant or0ammable gasinto anyTable II-2rooms AND Entry into the roomis prohibited orIMPEDED (.Note 5)

Note5:Ifthe equipment inthelisted roomwasalready inoperable orout-of-service before eventoccurred, the thenno emergency iswarranted.

classification Table II-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms Room ModeApplicability Control Building 100ft.

Class DCEquipment RoomC 4,5 Control Building 100ft.

Class DCEquipment RoomD 4.5 ModeApplicability:

4 Ilot Shutdown. 5 Cold Shutdown Definition(s):

/MPEDE(D) -

Personnel access toaroomorarea ishindered toanextent thatextraordinary measures arenecessary tofacilitate entry ofpersonnel the into affected room/area(e.g.,requiring useofprotective equipment, such as SCBAs, that isnotroutinely employed).

Basis:

Ifthe equipment inthe listed roomwasalready inoperable, orout-of-service, beforethe event occurred, then noemergency should bedeclared since theevent will havenoadverse impact beyond that already allowed byTechnical Speci0cations atthe time oftheevent.

Thelist ofplant roomswith entry-related modeapplicability identified specify those rooms that contain equipment whichrequire a manual/local action asspecined inoperatingprocedures used for normal plant operation, couldown andshutdown. Roomsorareas inwhichactions ofacontingent oremergency nature would beperformed (.e.g.,

anaction toaddress anoff-normaloremergency 134of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE256OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAL Technical Bases condition such asemergency repairs, corrective measures oremergency operations) arenot included. Inaddition, the specifies list the plant mode(s) during which entry would berequired for each roomorarea (ref. I).

This ICaddresses anevent involving a release ofa hazardous gasthat precludes orimpedes access toequipment necessaryto maintain normal plant operation, orrequired fora normal plant cooldown andshutdown. This condition represents anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

An Alert declaration iswarranted ifentry intothe affected room/area :s, ormaybe,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect atthe time ofthe gaseous release.Theemergency classificationisnotcontingent upon whether entry isactuallynecessary atthe timeofthe release.

Evaluation ofthe ICandEALdonotrequire atmospheric sampling; it only requires the Emergency Coordinator's judgment thatthegasconcentration in the affected room/area issufficient topreclude orsignificantly impede procedurally required access. This judgment maybebased ona variety of factors including anexisting jobhazard analysis, report ofill effects onpersonnel,advice from a subject matter expert oroperating experience with the sameorsimilar hazards. Access should be considered asimpeded extraordinary if measures are necessary tofacilitate entry ofpersonnel into theaffected room/area (e.g.,requiring useofprotective equipment, such asSCBAs, that isnot routinely employed).

An emergency declaration isnotwarranted ifanyofthe following conditionsapply:

• Theplant isinanoperating modedifferent than the modespecified fortheaffected room/area (i.e., entryisnotrequired during the operating modeineffect atthe time ofthe gaseous release). Forexample, the plant isinModeIwhenthe gaseous release occurs and theprocedures used fornormal operation, cooldown andshutdown donotrequire entry into theaffected roomuntil Mode4.

• Thegasrelease isaplanned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility ofaroomorarea (e.g., fire suppression systemtesting).

• Theaction for which room/area entry isrequired isofanadministrative orrecord keeping nature(e.g., normal rounds orroutine inspections).

• Theaccess control measures areofaconservative orprecautionary natureandwould not actually prevent orimpede a required action.

An asphyxiant is a gascapable ofreducing the Icvel ofoxygen inthe body todangerous levels.

Mostcommonly, asphyxiants work bymerely displacing air inanenclosed environment. This 135of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE257OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,TechnicalBases reducesthe concentration ofoxygen below normal the levelofaround 19%,whichcanleadto breathing difficulties, unconsciousness orevendeath.

This EAl. does not apply tofirellghting activities thatautomatically ormanually a ilre activate suppression system in an area.

IEscalationofthe emergency classification levelwould bevia Recognition R,C orF ICs.

Category NOTE:EAl. IIA5.1 modeapplicability has been limited totheapplicablemodesidentified in Table II-2 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas. If duetoplant operating procedure orplant contiguration changes, the applicable plant modesspecifiedinTable I1-2are changed, acorresponding changeto Attachment 3'Safe Operation & Shutdown Areas Tables R-2& I1-2 Bases' andtol?AI IIA5 mode applicability isrequired.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Attachment 3 Safe Operation & Shutdown AreasTables R-3& ll-2 Bases

2. N1il 99-01, IIA5 136of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE258OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 6 Control RoomEvacuation initiating Condition: Control Room evacuation intransfer resulting ofplant control toalternate locations EAL:

IIA6.1 Alert An event hasresulted inplant control being transferred fromthe Control Roomtothe Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP)

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheControl RoomSupervisor (CRS) determines ifthe ControlRoomis uninhabitable andrequires evacuation. Control Roominhabitability maybecaused byfire, densesmoke, noxious fumes, bomb threatinoradjacent totheControl Room,orother life threatening conditions.

Procedure 40AO-9// I8Sinitdown Outside the Control Rooin.provides the instructions for bringing the unit toMode5,Cold Shutdown, ifthe Control Roomhas been determinedto be uninhabitable for anyreason otherthan Gre (Ref. 1).

Procedure 40AO-9// I9Control Rooin Fire, provides theinstructions for bringing the unitto Mode5,Cold Shutdown. ifthe Control Roomhas been determined tobeuninhabitable duetoa fire (Ref. 2).

Inabilitytoestablish plantcontrol from outside the Control Roomescalates this event toa Site Area Emergency per IIS6.

EAI, I This ICaddresses anevacuation ofthe Control Roomthat results intransfer ofplant controlto alternate locations outside the Control Room. Theloss ofthe tocontrol ability the plant from the Control Roomis considered tobeapotential substantial degradation inthe level ofplant safety.

137of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE259OF383 ATTACllMENT 1 Technical l?Al, Bases Following a Control Roomevacuation, control plant ofthe will toalternate betransferred shutdown locations.The necessity tocontrol aplant shutdown fromoutside theControl Room,inaddition to responding tothe event that required the evacuation ofthe Room.

Control will challenges present to plant operatorsand other on-shift personnel. Activationofthe l?ROandemergency response facilities willassist in responding tothese challenges.

Escalation ofthe emergency classifleation level would beviaICIIS6.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l Procedure 40AO-97718. Shutdown Outside the Control Rooin 2.Procedure 40AO-97719. Control Rooin Fire

3. NI?l 99-01. IIA6 138of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE260OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther ConditionsAffecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 6-- Control RoomEvacuation Initiating Condition: Inability tocontrol akey safetyfunction from outside the Control Room EAl,:

IIS6.1 Site AreaEmergency An event has resulted inplantcontrol being transferred fromthe Control Roomtothe Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP)

AND Control ofanyofthe following keysafetyfunctions isnotre-establishedwithin 15minutes (Note 1):

• Reactivity Control (Modes 1,2and 3only) a CoreIIeat Removal a RCSHeat Removal Note1 TheEmergency Coordinator should declare the eventpromptly upondetermining that time limithasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown, 5 Cold Shutdown, 6 Refueling Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheControl RoomSupervisor (CRS) determines iftheControlRoomis uninhabitable andrequires evacuation. Control Roominhabitability maybecaused by dense Gre, smoke, noxious bomb fumes, threat inoradjacent tothe Control orother Room, threatening life conditions.

Procedure 40AO-9// l8,Shutdown Outside the Control Room,provides the instructions for tripping theunit andmaintaining RCSinventory andliot Shutdown conditions from outsidethe Control Roomduetoreasons other thanfire( 1).

Ref.

139of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE261OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Procedure 40AO-97719, Control RoomFire, provides the instructions for tripping theunit and maintaining RCS inventory andIlot Shutdown conditions from outside the Control Roomduetoa fire(Ref. 2).

Theintent ofthis EAL is tocapture events inwhich control ofthe plant cannot bereestablished ina timely manner. The15minute timefor transferstarts whenthe Control Roomisevacuated (when CRSleaves the Control Room, not when procedures 40AO-97718 or40AO-97719 areentered).

Thetime interval isbased onhow quickly control mustbereestablished without core uncovery and/or core damage. Thedetermination ofwhether ornotcontrol isestablished from outside the Control Roomis based onEmergency Coordinator judgment. TheEmergency Coordinator is expected tomake a reasonable. informedjudgment that control ofthe plant from outside the Control Roomcannot beestablished withinthe 15minute interval.

Oncethe Control Roomis evacuated. the objective is toestablish control ofimportant plant equipment andmaintain knowledge ofimportant plant parameters ina timely manner. Primary emphasis should beplaced oncomponents andinstruments that supply protection forand information about safety functions.Typically, these safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shutdown the reactor andmaintain it shutdown), RCSinventory (ability tocool the core) and secondary heat removal (ability tomaintain a heat sink).

This ICaddresses anevacuation ofthe Control Roomthat results intransfer ofplantcontrol to alternate locations andthe control ofa keysafety function cannot bereestablished ina timely manner. Thefailure togain control ofa keysafety function following a transfer of plant control to alternate locations isa precursor toachallenge tooneormorefission product barriers within a relativelyshort period oftime.

Thedetermination ofwhether ornot"control" isestablished atthe remote safe shutdown location(s) isbased onEmergency Coordinator judgment. TheEmergency Coordinator isexpected tomake a reasonable, informed judgment within 15minutes whether ornotthe operating staff hascontrol of keysafety functions from the remote safeshutdown location(.s).

Escalation ofthe emergency classineationlevel would bevia ICFGIorCGI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-97718. Shutdown Outside tlieControl Room

2. Procedure 40AO-97719,Control RoomFire 3.NEl99-01, IIS6 140of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE262OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 7-Emergency Coordinator Judgment initiating Condition: Other conditions exist that inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator warrant declarationofa UE EAL:

IIU7.1 Unusual Event Other conditions existwhich inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinatorindicate that events areinprogress orhave occurred which indicate a potential ofthe degradation level ofsafety of the plant orindicate a security threattoflicility protection has been Noreleases initiated. of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring areexpectedunless further degradation ofsafety systems occurs.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheImergency Coordinator isthe designated onsiteindividualhavingtheresponsibility and authority forimplementing the P lNGS Emergency Plan (ref.

I).TheOperations Shift Manager (SM) i nitially acts i n the c apacity of theE mergency Coordinator andtakes actions asoutlined inthe Emergency Plan implementing procedures (ref. 2).Ifrequired bythe emergency classification orif deemed appropriate bythe Emergency Coordinator, emergency personnel response arenotified and instructed toreport totheiremergency response locations. Inthis the manner. individual usuallyin charge ofactivities inthe Control Roomis responsible for initiating thenecessary emergency response but Plant Management isexpected tomanage theemergencyresponse assoonas available todosoinanticipation ofthe possible wide-ranging responsibilities associated with managing a major emergency.

This ICaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed elsewhere explicitly but that warrant declaration ofanemergency because conditions existwhich bythe arebelieved Emergency Coordinator to11ill under the emergency classification level description foranUnusual Event.

141of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE263OF383 ATTACIIMENT I Technical liAl Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l /TNGSEmergency Plan. Section Emergency 4.2.II, Coordinator

2. Pl'NGS Emergence 4.2.I Plan,Section 12,Shift Manager

3. NI(I 99-01IIU7 142of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE264OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther ConditionsAffecting PlantSafety Subcategory: 7-Emergency Coordinator Judgment initiating Condition: Other conditions exist thatinthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator warrant declarationofanAlert EAL:

IIA7.1 Alert Other conditions existwhich inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator, indicate thatevents areinprogress orhave occurred which involve anactual orpotential substantial degradation of the levelofsafety ofthe plant orasecurity event that involvesprobable lifethreatening risk to sitepersonnel ordamage tosite equipment because ofIlOSTII.E ACTION. Anyreleases are expected tobelimited tosmall fractionsoftheEPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

//OSTILE RT/ON An acttoward PVNGSorits personnel that includes theuse ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take hostages and/or intimidate thelicenseetoachieve an end. This includes attackbyair, land, orwater using guns,explosives, projectiles, vehicles, orother devices used to deliverdestructive force. Other actsthatsatisfy theoverallintent maybeincluded. Ilostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude ofcivil acts disobedienceorfelonious acts thatare not part ofa concerted attack onPVNGS. Non-terrorism-based EAl.sshould beused toaddress such activities this (i.e.. mayinclude violent acts between individuals inthe owner controlled area).

Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator isthe designated onsite individual having the responsibilityand authority forimplementing the Pl'NGS Emergency l'lan(ref.I).

TheOperations Shift Manager (SM) initiallyacts inthe capacity ofthe Emergency Coordinatorandtakes actions asoutlined inthe Emergency Plan implementing procedures (ref. 2).Ifrequiredbythe emergency classification orif deemed appropriate bytheEmergency Coordinator, emergency response personnel arenotified and instructed toreport totheiremergency response locations.

Inthis manner,the individual usually in charge ofactivities inthe Control Roomis responsible forinitiating the necessary emergency response, but Plant Management isexpected tomanage theemergency response assoon as available todosoinanticipation ofthe possible wide-ranging responsibilities associated with managing a major emergency.

143of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE265OF383 ATTACllMENT 1 IAl,Technical Bases This ICaddresses unanticipated conditions explicitly notaddressed elsewhere butthat warrant declarationof an emergency because conditions exist which bythe arebelieved Emergency Coordinator to11111under the emergency classification description level for anAlert.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Pl'NGS Emergency Plan, Section 4.2.1 1,ImergencyCoordinator 2.Pl'NGS Emergency Plan, Section 4.2.1.12, Shift Manager 3.NII 99-01, IIA7 144of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE266OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: II Ilazards andOther Conditions AffectingPlant Safety Subcategory: 7-Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist that inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator warrant declarationofa Site AreaEmergency EAL:

IIS7.1 Site AreaEmergency Other conditions exist which inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator indicate that events areinprogress orhave occurred which involve actual orlikely major illilures ofplant functions needed for protection ofthe public orIIOSTII.E ACTION that inintentional results damage or malicious acts. (1)toward site personnel orequipment that could leadtothe likelyfailure ofor, (2) thatprevent effective access toequipment needed for the ofthe protection public. Any releases arenotexpected toresult inexposure levels which exceed EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levelsbeyond thesiteboundary ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

//OST/LE E T/ON An acttoward PVNGSorits personnel thatincludesthe use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages and/or intimidate thelicenseetoachieve anend. This includes attackbyair, land, orwaterusing guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, orother devices used to deliverdestructive force. Other actsthatsatisfy the overall maybeincluded.

intent Hostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude actsofcivil disobedience orfeloniousacts thatare not part ofa concerted attack onPVNGS. Non-terrorism-based EAIsshould beused toaddress such activities this (i.e., mayinclude violent acts between individuals inthe ownercontrolled area).

Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator isthe designated onsite individualhaving the responsibility and authority forimplementing the PVNGSEmergency Plan (ref. TheOperations 1). Shift Manager (SM) initiallyacts inthe capacity ofthe Emergency Coordinatorandtakes actions asoutlined inthe Imergency Plan implementing procedures (ref. 2). Ifrequiredbythe emergency elassification orif deemed appropriate bythe Emergency Coordinator, emergency response personnel arenotified and instructedtoreport totheir emergency response locations. Inthismanner, the individual usually in charge ofactivities inthe Control Roomis responsible for initiating the necessary emergency response, butPlant Management isexpected tomanage the emergency response assoon as 145of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE267OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases available to dosoinanticipation ofthe possible wide-rangingresponsibilities with associated managing a major emergency.

This ICaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressedexplicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration ofanemergency because conditions existwhich bythe arebelieved Emergency Coordinator to11111under the emergency classification description level a Site for AreaEmergency.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Pl'NGS Emergenci Plan, Section 4.2.1 1ImergencyCoordinator 2./TNGSEmergency Plan. Section4.2.1 12Shift Manager

3. NEI 99-01, IIA7 146of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE268OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: II IIazards andOther Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Subcategory: 7-Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiating Condition: Other conditions exist which inthe judgment oftheEmergency Coordinator warrant declaration ofa General Emergency EAL:

IlG7.1 General Emergency Other conditions existwhich inthejudgment ofthe Emergency Coordinator indicate that events areinprogress orhave occurred which involve actual orIMMINENTsubstantial core degradation ormelting with potential forloss ofcontainment integrity orIlOSTII.E ACTION that resultsinanactual loss ofphysical control ofthe facility.Releases canbereasonably expected toexceed EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levels offsitefor morethan the immediate site area ModeApplicability:

All Definition(s):

//OSTII.E ACTION An acttoward PVNGSorits personnel that includes the useof violent force to destroy equipment, takehostages an&or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. Thisincludes attack by air, land, orwater using guns, explosives, projectiles,vehicles, orother devices used to deliver destructive force.Other acts thatsatisfy the overall intent may beincluded. Hostile action should notbeconstrued toinclude acts ofcivil disobedience orfelonious acts that arenot part ofa concerted attack onPVNGS. Non-terrorism-based EAl,sshould beused toaddress suchactivities this (i.e., mayinclude violent acts between individuals inthe owner controlled area).

/MM/NENT Thetrajectory ofevents orconditions issuch that anEAl. willbemetwithin a relativelyshort period oftime regardless ofmitigation orcorrective actions.

Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator isthe designated onsite individual having the responsibility and authority for implementing the PVNGSEmergency Plan (ref. I).

TheOperations Shift Manager (SM) initially acts inthe capacity ofthe Emergency Coordinator andtakes actions asoutlined inthe Imergency Plan implementing procedures (ref. 2). Ifrequired bythe emergency elassification orif deemed appropriate bythe Emergency Coordinator, emergency response personnel arenotified and instructed toreport totheiremergency response locations. Inthis manner, the individual usually in charge ofactivities inthe Control Roomis responsible forinitiating the necessary emergency 147of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE269OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases response, but Plant Management isexpected tomanage the emergencyresponse assoonas availabletodo so inanticipation ofthe possible wide-ranging responsibilities associated with managing a major emergency.

Releasescanreasonably beexpected toexceed EPAPAGplume levels exposure outside theSite Boundary.

This ICaddresses unanticipated conditions notaddressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration ofanemergency because conditions exist which arebelieved bytheEmergency Coordinator to11111under the emergency classification leveldescription for a General Emergency.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Pl'NGS Emergency Plan, Section 4.2.1 IEmergency Coordinator 2.Pl'NGS Emergency Section Plan, 4.2.1.12Shift Manager 3.NEl99-01, IIA7 148of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE270OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl,Technical Bases EAlGroup: Ilot Conditions (RCS temperature > 2IO"F): EAIsinthis category areapplicable only inone or more hot operating modes.

Numerous system-related equipment failure events thatwarrant emergency classification have been identitledinthis category. They may pose actual orpotential threats toplantsafety.

Theevents ofthis category pertain to thefollowing subcategories:

1 [alss ofEn1ergacilcIAClown Ioss ofemergency electrical power cancompromise plant safety system operability including decay heatremoval andemergency core cooling systems which maybenecessary toensure fission product barrier integrity.This category includes loss of onsite and offsitesources for4.16KV AC emergency buses.

2.I.oss ofVital DC Power I.ossofemergency electrical power cancompromise plant safety system operability including decay heatremoval andemergency core cooling systems which maybe necessary toensure Assion product barrier integrity.This category includes loss ofvital plant 125VDC power sources.

3.I.oss ofControl RoomIndications Certain events thatdegrade plant operator ability toeffectively assess plant conditions within the plant warrant emergency classilleation. 1osses ofindicators areinthis subcategory.

4.RCSActivity I)uring normal operation, reactor coolant fission product activity isvery low.Small concentrations offission products inthe coolant areprimarily from the fissionoftrampuranium inthe fuelclad or minor perforations inthe clad itself. Anysigni0cant increase from these base-line levels (2%5%-

clad failures)isindicative offuel failures andiscovered under the FissionProduct Barrier Degradation category. Ilowever, lesser amountsofclad damage mayresult incoolant activity exceeding Technical Specification limits. These fission products will beeirculated with the reactor coolant andcanbedetected bycoolant sampling.

149of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE271OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl,Technical Bases 5.h Thereactorvessel provides a volume forthe coolant that covers the reactor core. Thereactor pressurevesseland associated pressure piping (reactor coolant system) together provide a barrierto limitthereleaseofradioactive material should the reactor fuel clad integrity fail.Excessive RCS leakagegreaterthan Technical Specineation limits indicates potential pipe cracks that may propagatetoanextent threatening fuel RCSandcontainment clad, integrity.

6.RPSFailure This subcategoryincludes events related tofailure ofthe Reactor Protection System (RPS) to andcomplete initiate reactor trips. Inthe plant licensing basis, postulated failures ofthe RPSto complete areactortrip comprise aspecineset ofanalyzed events referred toasAnticipated TransientWithout Seram (ATWS) events. ForEAl elassification, however, ATWSisintended to meananytrip failureevent that does notachieve reactor shutdown. IfRPSactuation fails toassure shutdown.

reactor positive control ofreactivity is atrisk and couldcause a threat tofuel clad,RCS andcontainment integrity.

ofCommunications 7.1.oss Certaineventsthat degrade plant operator ability toeffectively communicate with essential personnelwithin orexternal tothe plant warrant emergency classification.

8.Containment Failure Failure ofcontainment isolation capability (under conditions inwhich the containment isnot currently challenged) warrants emergency classincation. Failure ofcontainment pressure control capability alsowarrants emergency classification.

9.

Variousnaturalandtechnological events thatresult indegraded plant safetysystem performanceor signincantvisibledamage warrant emergency classification under this subcategory.

150of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE272OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al, Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: I I.oss ofEmergency AC Power initiating Condition: Iossofall offsite AC power capability toemergencybusesfor 15minutes orlonger EAL:

SUl.1 Unusual Event Ioss ofall offsite AC power capability, Table S-1, toemergency 4.16KV busesPBA-S03 and PBB-SO4 for 15minutes

> (Note I)

NoteI TheEmergency Coordinator should declarethe event promptly that upondetermining time limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill beexceeded.

likely Table S-1 AC Power Sources Offsite:

• SUT(normal) a SUT(alternate)

• SBOCi #1AND SB0(i#2(if already aligned)

Onsite:

a D(i A

• DCi B ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

The4.16KV AC System provides the power requirements foroperation andsafe shutdown ofthe plant.Theessential switchgear arebuses PBA-S03 andPBB-S04 (ref.

1).

Thecondition indicated bythis EAl,is the degradation ofall offsite AC powersourcessuchthat anyonly onsite AC power capability exists for 15minutes orlonger.

4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 arethe emergency (essential) buses.

PBA-S03supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-SO4 supplies power B safety toTrain related loads.

151of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE273OF383 ATTACHMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Each bus has two normal sources ofolTsite power. Each source isfrom oneofthree 13.8KV Startup Transil>rmers (SUT) via its normal andalternative ESFService Transformer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04. Transformer NBN-X03 is the normal supply tobusPBA-S03 andthe alternate supply to PBB-SO4; Transformer NBN-X04 isthe normal supply tobus PBB-S04 andthe supply alternate to PBA-S03 (ref. 1).

Additional alternate offsiteAC power sources arethe tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #1& SBOG #2). However, these sources canonly becredited ifalreadyaligned, thatis.capable ofpowering oneormore emergency bus within 15minutes. TheSBOGscanonly be credited ifthey arerunning inparallel since theyarenotrated tosupply all theSAFETYSYSTEM loads.

PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 each have anonsite emergency dieselgenerator (DGA & DG B)which supply electrical power tothe busautomatically in the event thatthe preferred source becomes unavailable (ref. l).

This ICaddresses a prolonged lossofoffsite power. Theloss of offsite power sources renders the plant morevulnerable toa complete loss ofpower toACemergency buses. This condition represents a potential reduction inthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Foremergency classificatinn purposes, "capability" means thatanoffsite AC power source(s) is available tothe emergency buses,whether ornotthe buses arepowered from it.

Fifteen minutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transientormomentary losses ofoffsite power.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICSAl PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Drawing 13-E-MAA-001, Main Single Iine Diagram

2. UFSARSection 8.3.1,AC Power Systems 3.Procedure 40AO-97712, Degraded Electrical Power

4. UFSARSection 1.2.10.3.9,Alternate AC Power System

5. NEI99-01, SUI 152of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE274OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: I I.oss ofEmergency AC Power initiating Condition: Ioss ofallbutoneACpower source toemergency busesfor15minutes orlonger EAL:

SA1.1 Alert AC power capability, Table S-1,toemergency 4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4reducedto a single power source 2 15minutes (Note 1) lor AND Anyadditional singlepower sourcefailurewill result inloss ofall AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS Note1:TheEmergency Coordinator should the declare eventpromptly upon determining that time limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill likely beexceeded.

TableS-1 AC Power Sources Offsite:

e SUT(normal)

• SUT(alternate) a SBOG#1AND SBOG#2(if already aligned)

Onsite:

a DGA e DGB ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 3 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

SAFETYSYSTEMA system -

required for safe plant operation, cooling downtheplant and/or placing itinthe cold shutdown condition,including the ECCS.These aretypicallysystems classilledassafety-related (as definedin10CFR50.2):

Those structures, systems andcomponents that arerelied upontoremain functional during andfollowing design basiseventstoassure:

l)Theintegrity ofthe coolant reactor pressure boundary; 153of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE275OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases

2) The capability toshut downthe reactor andmaintain it ina safeshutdown condition; 3)The capability toprevent ormitigate the consequences ofaccidents which could result in potential offsite exposures.

Basis:

Foremergency classification purposes, "capability"means thatanAC power source isavailable to andcapable ofpowering theemergency bus(es) within 15 whether min, ornotthe buses are currently powered from it.

The4.16KV AC System provides thepower requirements for operation andsafe shutdown ofthe plant.Theessential switchgear arebusesPBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 (ref.1).

Thecondition indicated bythis EAL isthe degradation ofthe offsite andonsite power sources such thatanyadditional single failurewould resultina loss ofall ACpower tothe emergency buses.

4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 arethe emergency (essential) buses. PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-SO4 supplies power toTrain B safety relatedloads.

Each b us has two normal sources of offsitepower. Each source is from oneof three 13.8 KV Startup Transformers (SUT) via normal i ts andalternative ESl Service Transformer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04. Transformer NBN-X03 isthe normal supply to bus PBA-S03 and the a supply lternate to PBB-S04: Transformer NBN-X04 isthe normal supply tobusPBB-SO4and thealternate supply to PBA-S03 (ref. I).

Inaddition, PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 each have anemergency diesel generator (DG A & DG B) which supply electrical power tothe busautomatically inthe event thatthepreferredsource becomes unavailable (ref. I).

Additional alternate offsite ACpower sources arethe tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #I& SBOG#2). Ilowever,these sources canonly becredited if alreadyaligned, thatis.capable ofpowering oneormoreemergency buswithin 15minutes. TheSBOGscanonly be credited if they arerunning inparallel sincethey arenotrated tosupp':y allthe SAFETYSYSTEM loads.

Ifthe capability ofa second source ofemergency buspower isnotrestored within 15minutes, an Alert isdeclared under this EAl..

154of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE276OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases This ICdescribes a significant degradation ofoffsite andonsite AC power such sources thatany additional single failure would result ina loss ofallAC power toSAFITY SYSTEMS. Inthis condition,thesole AC powersource maybepowering one,ormorethan ofsafety one,train related equipment. This IC provides anescalation path from ICSlf l An "ACpower source"is a source recognized inAOPsandEOPsandcapable ofsupplying requiredpower toanemergency bus.Someexamples ofthis condition arepresentedbelow.

• A loss ofall offsitepowerwith a concurrent failureofall but oneemergency powersource (e.g.,anonsite dieselgenerator).

• A loss ofall offsitepower andlossof all emergency power sources (e.g.,

onsite diesel generators) with a single train ofemergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.

• A loss ofemergency power sources (e.g.,onsitediesel generators) with train a single of emergency buses being fed from anoffsite power source.

Fifteenminutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient or momentary losses ofpower.

Escalationofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICSSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Drawing 13-E-MAA-001 , MainSingle Iine Diagram

2. if FSARSection 8.3.I, AC Power Systems 3.Procedure 40AO-97712, Degraded ElectricalPower

4. if FSARSection I.2.10.3.9, Alternate AC Power System

5. NEI99-01, SAI 155of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE277OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 1-I.oss ofEmergency AC Power Initiating Condition: 1,ossofall offsite power andall onsiteAC powertoemergency buses for 15minutes orlonger EAL:

SSl.1 Site AreaEmergency I.ossofall offsite andall onsite AC power capability toemergency 4.16KV buses PBA-S03 and Pl313-S04 li)r 2 15minutes (Note1)

Note1:TheEmergency Coordinatorshould theevent declare promptly that upondeterminingtime limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 IlotShutdown Definition(s):

None Ilasis:

Foremergency classification purposes,"capability" means anACpower that source isavailable to andcapable ofpowering the emergency bus(es) within 15min,whether ornotthebuses are currently powered from it.

The4.16KV AC System provides the power requirements for andsafe operation shutdownof the plant.Theessential switchgear arebuses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 (ref.

1).

4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 aretheemergency (essential) buses.PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-SO4 supplies powertoTrainB safety related loads.

Each bushas twonormal sources ofoffsitepower. Each sourceisfromoneofthree 13.8KV Startup Transii)rmers (SUT) viaits normalandalternative ESFServiceTransfi)rmer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04. Transformer NBN-X03 isthenormal supply to busPBA-S03 and alternate the supply to PBB-SO4; Transii)rmer NBN-X04 isthe normal supply tobusPBB-SO4 andthe alternatesupply to PBA-S03 (ref. 1).

156of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE278OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Inaddition, PBA-S03 andPBB-S04 each have anemergency dieselgenerator (DGA & DG B) which supply electrical power tothebusautomatically inthe event thatthe preferredsource becomes unavailable (ref.1).

Additional alternateoffsite AC power sources include, but notlimited to,the tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #1& SBOG#2). llowever, these sourcescanonly be credited ifalready aligned,that is,capable ofpowering oneormoreemergency buswithin15 minutes. TheSBOGscanonlybe credited ifthey arerunning inparallelsince they arenotrated to supply all the SAIETYSYSTEMloads Theinterval begins whenboth offsite and onsite ACpower capabilityarelost.

This ICaddresses a total loss ofAC power that compromises the performance ofallSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergency corecooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimateheatsink.

In addition, Assion product barrier monitoring capabilitiesmay bedegraded under theseconditions.

This ICrepresents acondition thatinvolves actual orlikely major failures ofplant functions needed forthe protection ofthe public.

Fifteen minutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient ormomentary power losses.

Iscalation ofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICsRG1,IGI or SGl.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Drawing 13-E-MAA-001 , MainSingle Line Diagram

2. UFSARSection 8.3.1,AC Power Systems 3.Procedure 40AO-9//12, Degraded Electrical Power

4. UFSARSection 1.2.10.3.9, AlternateAC Power System

5. Procedure 401(P-9EO08, Blackout

6. NI?I 99-01, SSI 157of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE279OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: I I.oss ofEmergency AC Power initiating Condition: Prolonged lossofall offsite andall onsiteACpower toemergency buses EAl,:

SGl.1 General Emergency 1.oss ofalloffsite andall onsiteAC power capability toemergency 4.16KV busesPBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 AND EITIlER e Restoration ofatleast oneemergency bus in< 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> isnotlikely(Note I) a RepCETreading > 1200"F Note I TheEmergency Coordinator should the declare time eventpromptly upondeterminingthat limithasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation. 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAL isindicated bythe extended loss offsite ofall andonsite ACpower capability to 4.16KV emergency buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 either forgreater then thePVNGSStation Blackout (SBO) coping analysis time (4hrs.) (ref.

8)orthathasresulted inindicationsofan actual loss of adequate core cooling (Rep CET 1200> 01)(ref.

6, 7).

Foremergency classification purposes, "capability" meansthat anAC power source is available to andcapable of powering the emergency bus(es),

whethernotthe or buses currently are powered from it.

The4.16KV AC System provides the powerrequirements foroperationandsafe shutdown ofthe plant.Theessential switchgear arebuses PBA-S03andPBB-SO4 1).

(ref.

4.16KV buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 arethe emergency buses.

(essential) PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loads andPBB-SO4 supplies power toTrain B safety related loads.

Each bushastwo normal sources ofoffsite power.Each source isfromoneofthree 13.8 KV 158of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE280OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases StartupTransformers (SUT) viaitsnormal andalternative ESFService Transformer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04.Transil)rmer NBN-X03 isthe normal supply tobusPBA-S03 andthe alternate supply to PBB-SO4;Transil)rmer NBN-X04 is thenormal supply tobusPBB-SO4 andthe alternate supply to PBA-S03 (ref. 1).

Inaddition, PBA-S03 and PBB-SO4 each have anemergency diesel generator (DGA & DGB) which supply electricalpower to thebusautomatically inthe event that the preferred source becomes unavailable (ref. I).

Additional alternate offsite AC power sources include,but nolimited to,the tworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #1& SBOG #2). TheSBOGs canonly becredited ifthey are running inparallel since they arenotratedto supply all the SAFETYSYSTEMloads.

RepCET(Representative Core ExitTemperature) is a ealculated temperature value generated by theQualitled SafetyParameter Display System (QSPDS). TheQSPDS CETprocessing function generates a representative temperaturebased ona statistical analysis ofthermocouples monitoring thereactor coolant temperature atthe topofselected fuel assemblies.

This ICaddresses a prolonged lossofall power sources toAC emergency buses. A loss ofall AC power compromises the perfl)rmanceofall SAFETYSYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary 11)r emergency core cooling,containment heat removal/pressure control,spent fuel heatremoval andthe ultimate heat sink.A prolonged loss ofthese buses will lead toa loss ofoneor morefission product barriers.Inaddition, ilssionproduct barrier momtoring capabilities maybe degraded under theseconditions.

TheEALshould require declarationofaGeneral Emergency prior tomeeting the thresholds forIC FGl This will allow additional time forimplementation ofoffsite protective actions.

Escalation ofthe emergency classificationfrom SiteArea Emergency will occur if it isprojected thatpower cannot berestored toatleast oneACemergency busbythe endofthe analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond thistime. plant responses andeventtrajectory aresubject togreater uncertainty andthere is anincreased likelihood ofchallenges tomultiple tission product barriers.

Theestimate for restoring atleastoneemergency busshould bebased ona realistic appraisal ofthe situation.Mitigation actions witha lowprobability ofsuccess should notbeused asa basis for delaying a classification upgrade. Thegoal istomaximize the time available toprepare for and implement. protective actions fl)r the public.

TheEAl will also require a General Emergency declaration ifthe loss ofAC power results in parameters that indicate aninabilitytoadequately remove decay heat from the core.

159of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE281OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases PVNGS Basis Reference(s):

l Drawingl3-E-MAA-001 MainSingle Line Diagram

2. l!FSAR Section 8.3.I AC Power Systems

3. liOP Setpoint Document TA-13-C00-2000-001 4.40AO-977 I2,Degraclect Electrical Power

5. ljFSAR Section 1.2.10.3.9 Alternate AC Power System

6. Procedure 40DP-9APl3, Blackout Technical (inicleline

7. Procedure 401?P-9EO09. Functional Recoverv

8. CoreDamage Assessment l!serManual

9. Evaluation 4578373. Station Blackout Coping Analysisfi>r Margin Coverv toCore 10.NEI99-01 SGI 160of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE282OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: I Ioss ofEmergency AC Power initiating Condition: I,oss ofall emergency AC andvital DCpower sourcesfor15minutes or longer EAL:

SGl.2 General Emergency I.ossofall offsite andall onsite AC power capability toemergency 4.16KV busesPBA-S03 andPBB-S04 for 2 15minutes AND I.ossof125VDCpower based onbatterybusvoltage indications < I12VDConboth vital DCbuses PKA-M4land PKB-M42 for2 15minutes (Note l)

Note 1 TheImergency Coordinator should the declare eventpromptly upon determining that time hasbeen limit exceeded.orwill likelybeexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAIisindicated bythe lossofalloffsiteandonsite emergency ACpower capabilityto 4.16KV emergency buses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 for greater than 15minutes incombination with degraded vitalDCpower voltage. This EAI. addresses operating experience from theMarch 201I accident atFukushima Daiichi.

Foremergency classification purposes,"capability" means that anAC power sourceisavailable to andcapable ofpowering the emergency bus(es)within 15 whether min, ornotthebuses are currently powered from i t.

The4.16KV ACSystem provides the power requirements for operation andsafeshutdown ofthe plant.Theessential switchgear arebuses PBA-S03 andPBB-SO4 (ref. 1).

161of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE283OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases The4.16KV buses PBA-S03andPBB-SO4 arethe emergency (essential) buses.

PBA-S03 supplies power toTrain A safety related loadsandPBB-SO4 supplies power toTrain B safety related loads.

Each bushastwo normal sources ofoffsite power. Each source isfrom oneofthree13.8 KV Startup Transil)rmers (SUT) via itsnormal andalternative ESFService Transil3rmer NBN-X03 or NBN-X04. Transfl3rmer NBN-X03 isthe normal supply tobus PBA-S03 andthealternatesupply to PBB-SO4; Transil3rmer NBN-X04 isthe normal supply tobusPBBS04 andthe supply alternate to PBA-S03 (ref. I).

Inaddition, PBA-S03 andPBB-S04 each have anemergency dieselgenerator (DGA & DGB) which supply electricalpower tothebus automatically inthe event that thepreferred source becomes unavailable (ref.l).IIowever, these sources can only becredited if already aligned, that is, power oneormoreemergency buswithin 15 minutes.

Additional alternate offsiteAC power sources include, butnotlimited to,thetworedundant 13.8KV SBOgasturbine generators (SBOG #1& SBOG #2). llowever, these canonly sources be credited ifalready aligned, thatis,capable ofpoweringone or more emergency buswithin 15 minutes. TheSBOGscanonly becredited if they are running in parallel since they are notratedto supply all the SAFETYSYSTEMloads.

Thevital DCbuses arethe II)llowing125VDCClass IEbuses (ref.6):

Train A: Train B:

. PKA-M41

• PKB-M42

. PKC-M43

• PKD-M44 Forthis EAl credit isonly taken forbuses PKA-M41andPKB-M42 asthesearetheTrain A and Train B buses thatprovide safety system control power.

There arefour, 60cell, lead-calcium storage batteries (PKA-Fl 1,PKC-Fl3,PKB-Fl2 and PKDFl4) that supplement the output ofthe battery chargers. They supply DCpower tothe distribution buses whenACpower tothe chargers islost orwhentransient loadsexceed the capacity ofthe battery chargers (ref.6).

Allfour ofthe 125VDC buses supply inverters for 120VACPNbuspower aswellascontrol power it)r various safety related systems. Each battery isdesigned tohave sufficient stored energy to supply the required emergency loads for 120minutes following a loss ofACpower tothe chargers (ref.7).

Minimum DCbus voltage isI12VDC(ref. 8).

162of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE284OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases This 10addresses a concurrent andprolonged lossofboth emergency AC andVital DCpower. A lossofall emergency AC power compromises the performance ofall SAFETYSYSTEMS requiringelectric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling,containment heat removal/pressure control, spentfuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink. A loss DC ofvital power compromises the ability tomonitor andcontrol SAFETYSYSTEMS. A sustained lossof both emergency AC andvital DCpowerwill leadtomultiple challenges toAssionproduct barriers.

Fifteenminutes wasselected as a threshold toexclude transient ormomentary powerlosses.

The 15-minute emergency declarationclock begins atthe point whenboth EAI thresholdsaremet.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Drawing 13-E-MAA-00I MainSingle Line Diagram

2. UFSARSection 8.3.I AC Power Systems 3.Procedure 40AO-9zzl2, Degraded ElectricalPower

4. UFSARSection 1.2.10.3.9. Alternate AC Power System 5.Procedure 40DP-9APl3, Blackout Technical Guideline

6. Drawing 01-E-PKA-001, Main S ingle Line Diagram 125V DC Class IE and120VAC Vital Inst Power 8.'vste/n

7. UFSARSection 8.3.2, DCPower Systems

8. Calculation 01-EC-PK-0207 DC,Hattery Sicing andMinimum Voltage

9. NEI99-01, SGS 163of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE285OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 2-I.oss ofVital DCPower initiatingCondition: I,ossofall vitalDCpower for15minutes orlonger EAl,:

SS2.1 Site AreaEmergency 1oss of125VDCpower basedon battery bus voltage indications < I12VDConboth vitalDC buses PKA-M4land PKB-M42for 15 minutes (Note

> I)

Note1 TheImergency Coordimuor shoulddeclare the event promptlyupondetermining thattime limit hasbeen exceeded.orwill likelybeexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup.

3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Thevital DCbuses arethe following 125VDCClass IEbuses (ref.

I):

Train A: Train B:

. PKA-M41 a PKB-M42

. PKC-M43

• PKD-M44 Forthis EAL credit isonly takenfor buses PKA-M41andPKB-M42 asthesearetheTrain A and Train B buses that provide safety system control power.

There arefour, 60cell, lead-calcium storage batteries (PKA-I I1,PKC-Fl3, PKB-Fl2 and PKDFl4) thatsupplement the output ofthe battery chargers. They supplyDCpower tothe distributionbuses whenAC power tothe chargers islost orwhentransient loads exceedthe capacity ofthe battery chargers (ref. l).

Allfour ofthe125VDC buses supply inverters for 120VACPNbuspower aswellascontrolpower for varioussafety related systems.Each battery is designed tohave sufficient stored energy to supply the required emergency loads for120minutes following a lossofAC power tothechargers (ref.2).

164of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE286OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Minimum DC busvoltage is112VDC(ref. 3).

This ICaddresses a lossofvital DCpower which compromises theability tomonitorandcontrol SAFETYSYSTEMS. Inmodesabove ColdShutdown, this condition involvesa major failure of plant functionsneeded for the protection ofthe public.

Fifteenminutes wasselected as a threshold toexclude transient ormomentary losses.

power Escalationofthe emergency classification levelwould bevia ICsRG1,FGIorSGI.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Drawing 01-E-PKA-OOl . Main SingleIine Diagram 125 I IX'ClassIE anct120VACIital Inst Power S ystem

2. UFSARSection 8.3.2, DCPower Systems 3.Calculation 01-EC-PK-D207 DC Batterv Sizinganct Mininnon I'o!tage

4. NEI 99-01, SS8 165of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE287OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 3-I.oss ofControl RoomIndications initiatingCondition: UNPIANNEDloss ofControl Roomindications for15minutesorlonger EAl,:

SU3.1 Unusual Event An UNPl.ANNED eventresultsin the inability tomonitor oneormoreTable S-2parameters from withinthe Control Roomfor 15 minutes (Note

> I)

Note1 TheEmergency Coordimuor shoulddeclare the event promptlyupondeterminingthat time limit hasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

Note11:Downeomer instruments flow arealso credited forauxiliary feed flowindication.

Table S-2 SafetySystem Parameters

• Reactor power

• RCSlevel

• RCSpressure a CETtemperature

• I.evel inatleast oneS/G a Auxiliary feed flow toatleastoneS/G (Note 1I)

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

//NI'IANNED -

A parameter change oraneventthat isnotl)the result ofanintended evolutionor 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter changeoreventmaybe knownorunknown.

Basis:

SAFETYSYSTEMparameters listed inTable S-2aremonitored inthe Roomthrough Control a combination ofhard controlpanel indicators aswell ascomputer based information systems.The Plant Computer serves asaredundant compensatory indicatorwhich maybeutilized inlieuof normal Control Roomindicators (ref. I,2).

Downcomer ilow instruments arealso credited for auxiliary feed ilow indication.

166of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE288OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical 13ases This ICaddresses the diffleulty associated with monitoring normal plantconditions without the ability toobtain SAFETY SYSTEMparameters from within the Control Room. This condition isa precursor toa more signilleant event andrepresents a potential degradation inthe levelofsafety of theplant.

Asused inthis EAl..an"inability tomonitor" means that values Ilaroneormoreofthe listed parameters cannot bedetermined fromwithin the Control Room. This situation would require a loss ofall ofthe Control Roomsources 11)rthe given parameter(s). Forexample, the reactor power level cannot bedetermined from anyanalog, digital andrecorder source within the Control Room.

An eventinvolving a loss ofplant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-IO22)todetermine ifanNRC event report isrequired. Theeventwould bereported ifit signillcantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. Inparticular, emergency assessments necessary toimplement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures and emergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, orprotective action decision-making.

This EAl isfocused ona selected subset ofplant parameters associated with the keysafety functionsofreactivity control, core cooling andRCSheat removal. The loss of the abilityto determine oneormoreofthese parameters from within the Control Room is considered tobemore significantthan simply a reportable condition. Inaddition, if all indication sources foroneormore ofthe listed parameters are then lost, the ability todetermine the values ofother SAFETY SYSTEMparameters maybeimpacted aswell. Iorexample. ifthe value for reactor vessel level cannot bedetermined from the indications andrecorders ona main control board, theSPDS orthe plant computer. theavailability ofother parameter values maybecompromised aswell.

Fifteen minutes wasselected asa threshold toexclude transient ormomentary losses ofindication.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICSA3.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARSection 7.5, Safety-Related 1)isplay Instrumentation

2. UFSARSection I8.I.D.2, Plant Safety Parameter Display System

3. NEl99-01, SU2 167of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE289OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 3-I.oss ofControl RoomIndications InitiatingCondition: UNPIANNEDloss ofControl Roomindications for orlonger 15minutes with a significanttransient inprogress EAL:

SA3.1 Alert An UNPLANNED eventresults inthe inability tomonitor oneormoreTable S-2parameters from within the Control Roomfor 15 minutes (Note

> 1)

AND Anysignificant transient isinprogress. TableS-3 Note1:TheEmergency Coordimitor should declare the eventpromptly upon determining time that limit hasbeen exceeded,orwill beexceeded.

likely Note11:Downcomer flow instruments arealso credited for auxiliary feed llow indication.

Table S-2 Safety SystemParameters

• Reactor power

= RCS level

• RCSpressure a CETtemperature

• I.evel inatleast oneS/G a Auxiliary feed Gowtoatleast oneS/G (Note 11)

Table S-3 Sionificant Transients

• Reactor trip

• Runback > 25%thermal power

• Electrical load rejection > 25%electrical load

• Reactor power cutback a ECCS actuation ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 HotStandby, 4 Ilot Shutdown 168of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE290OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Definition(s):

UNPIANNED -

A parameter change oranevent that isnotI) theresult ofanintended evolution or 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter change orevent maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

SAFETYSYSTEMparameters listed inTable S-2aremonitored inthe Control Roomthrough a combination ofhard control panel indicators aswell ascomputer based information systems. The Plant Computer serves asa redundant compensatory indicator which maybeutilized inlieu of normal Control Roomindicators (ref. I,2).

Downeomer flow instruments arealso credited for auxiliary feedflow indication.

Signillcant transients arelistedinTable S-3andinclude response toautomatic ormanually initiated ftmetions such asreactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25%thermal power change, electrical load rejections orgreater than 25%full electrical load. reactor power cutbacks orECCS (SI) injection actuations.

This ICaddresses the difficultyassociated with monitoring rapidlychanging plant conditions during a transient without theability toobtain SAFETYSYSTEMparameters from withinthe Control Room.During this condition, the margin toa potential fissionproduct barrier challenge is reduced. Itthus represents apotential substantial degradation inthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Asused inthis EAl., an"inability tomonitor" means that values for oneormoreof the listed parameters cannot bedetermined from within the Control Room. This situationwouldrequire a loss ofall ofthe Control Roomsources for the given parameter(s). Forexample, thereactor power level cannot bedetermined from anyanalog, digitalandrecorder source within the Control Room.

An eventinvolving a loss ofplant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (and associated guidance inNUREG-I022) todetermine ifanNRC eventreport isrequired. Theeventwould bereported ifit significantly impaired the capabilityto perform emergency assessments. Inparticular, emergency assessments necessary toimplement abnormal operating procedures, emergency operating procedures andemergency plan implementing procedures addressing emergency classification, accident assessment, orprotective action decision-making.

This EAI isfocused ona selected subset ofplant parameters associated with thekeysafety functions ofreactivity control,core heat removal andRCSheat removal. Theloss ofthe abilityto determine oneormoreofthese parameters from within the Control Roomis considered tobemore 169of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE291OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases significant than simply a reportable condition. Inaddition, if allindication for sources oneormore ofthe listed parameters are lost, then the abilitytodetermine the values SAFl?TY ofother SYSTI?M parameters maybeimpacted aswell. Forexample, if thevalue for vessel reactor level cannot bedetermined from the indicationsand recorders ona main control the board, SPDSorthe plant computer, the availability ofother parameter valuesmaybecompromised aswell.

Fifteen minutes wasselected as a threshold toexclude transient ormomentary ofindication.

losses Escalation ofthe emergency classification levelwould bevia ICsFSIorICRSI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I if FSARSection 7.5, Safety-Related Display Instrumentation

2. if FSARSection I8.I.D.2, Plant Safety Parameter DisplaySystem 3.NEl 99-01, SA2 I70of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE292OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAL Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 4-RCSActivity Initiating Condition: Reactor coolant activitygreaterthan Technical Specification allowable limits EAL:

SU4.1 Unusual Event Letdown Monitor RU-155D reading > high alarm ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 -

IlotShutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

A reading onthe I.etdown Monitor RU-I55D > high alarm isindicative ofcoolant activity inexcess ofthe Technical Specification RCSactivity limits(ref2).

1, This ICaddresses coolant a reactor activity valuethat exceeds anallowable limit specilled in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor toamoresignificant event and represents a potential degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant.

Escalation ofthe emergency classitleation level would bevia ICsFAIorthe RecognitionCategory R ICs.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Technical Specification 3.4.17, RCSSpecific Activity

2. Calculation 13-NC-CII-31 1,Letdown Line PRMDose Rates 3.NEI99-01, SU3 I71of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE293OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 4-RCSActivity Initiating Condition: Reactor coolant activity greaterthanTechnical Specilleation allowable limits EAL:

SU4.2 Unusual Event Sample analysis indicatesRCSactivity > Technical I.CO Specification 3.4.17 limits ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 -

IlotShutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Thespecific iodine islimited activity toeither< 60pCi/gm DoseEquivalent I-13I ors1.0 pCi/gm DoseEquivalent I-131 for48hrcontinuous

> period. ThespecificXe-133 activity is limited to 5 550pCi/gm DoseEquivalent XE-133 for48brcontinuous

> period.Entry into Condition C of I.CO 3.4.17 meetsthe intent ofthisEAI.(ref2).

1, This ICaddresses coolant a reactor value activity that exceedsanallowable limitspecilled in Technical Specifications. This conditionisaprecursor toa moresigni0cant event andrepresents a potential degradation ofthe ofsafety level ofthe plant.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification level would beviaICsFAIorthe Recognition Category R ICs.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Technical Specification 3.4.I7, RCSSpecific Activity 2.Procedure 40AO-9//22, FuelDamage

3. NEI99-01, SU3 I72of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE294OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 5-RCSLeakage Initiating Condition: RCSleakage for 15minutes orlonger EAl,:

SU5.1 Unusual Event RCSunidentified orpressure boundary leakage > 10gpmfor > 15minutes OR RCSidentitled leakage > 25gpmfor > 15 minutes OR Reactor coolant leakage toa location outside containment > 25gpmfor > 15minutes (Note 1)

Note1 TheImergency (oordinator shoulddeclaretheeventpromptly upon determining that time limit hasbeen exceeded. orwill likelybeexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Manual orcomputer-based methods ofperforming anRCSinventory balance arenormally used to determine RCSleakage. ERFDADS isthe preferred method ofcalculating RCSleak rate.When ERFDADSsoftware isnotavailable, procedural guidance isavailable toperform thebackup and manual RCSinventory balance (ref.1,4,5,6).

Identitledleakage includes:

• Leakage such asthat from pumpseals orvalve packing (except reactor pump(RCP) coolant seal water injection orleakoff), thatiscaptured andconducted tocollection systems ora sumporcollecting tank (leakage intoanintact Reactor Drain Tankis also considered identitled leakage), or 173of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE295OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases

= Leakage intothecontainment atmosphere Iromsources that areboth specifically located and known either nottointerfere with the operation ofleakage detection systems ornottobe pressure boundary leakage, or a RCSleakagethrough a steamgenerator tothe secondary system (ref. 2).

Unidentitled leakage isallleakage (except RCPseal water injectionorleakoff) that isnotidentified leakage (ref.2).

Pressure 13oundary leakageisleakage (except SGleakage) through a nonisolable fault inanRCS component body, pipe orvessel wall, wall (ref. 2)

Reactor coolant leakage outside ofthe containment that isnotconsidered identined orunidentified leakage perTechnical Specifications. Iorexample: leakage via interfacing systems such asRCSto theNuclear Cooling Water System, Essential Cooling Water System,Safety Injection System, or systems directly that seeRCSpressure outside containment such as Chemical & Volume Control System, Nuclear Sampling system Residual a nd IIeatRemoval system (when shutdown in the cooling mode) (ref. 3,4).

Palo Verde specific operating experience isthat a High Pressure Seal Cooler (HPSC)leak tothe Nuclear Cooling Water(NC) System mustbeisolated tocontainment within 15minutesof discovery duetothe locationofthe NCsystem expansion tankandpotential dose concerns onthe Auxiliary Building roof.

This ICaddresses RCSleakage which maybea precursor toa more significant event. In this case, RCSleakage hasbeen detected andoperators, following applicableprocedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak.

This condition isconsidered tobeapotential degradation ofthelevel of safetyofthe plant.

TheGrst andsecond EAl.conditions arefocused ona loss ofmassfrom the RCSdue to "unidentified leakage," "pressure boundary leakage" or"identified leakage" (asthese leakage types aredefined inthe plantTechnical Specincations). Thethird condition addresses anRCSmassloss causedbyanUNISOIABIE leak through aninterfacing system. These conditions thus apply to leakage into the containment, asecondary-side system (e.g.,steamgenerator tube leakage) ora locationoutside ofcontainment.

Theleak rate values for each condition wereselected because they areusually observable with normal Control Roomindications. I.esser values typically requiretime-consuming calculations to determine (e.g., a massbalance calculation). TheGrst condition uses a lower value that reflectsthe greatersignificance ofunidentined orpressure boundary leakage.

I74of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE296OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Therelease ofmass from the RCSduetothe as-designed/expected operation valve ofa relief does notwarrantan emergency classification.An emergency classilleation berequired would if a mass lossiscaused by a relief valve that isnotfunctioning asdesigned/expected (e.g.,

a relief valve sticksopen andthe line ilowcannot beisolated).

The15-minute threshold duration allows sufficienttime for prompt actions operator toisolate the leakage, ifpossible.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification level wouldbevia ICs ofRecognition R orF.

Category PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40ST-9RCO2, ERFDADS (Preferred) Calculation ofRCSWaterIm:entory 2.Technical Specification, l Definitions 1,

3. UFSARSection Intersystem 5.2.5.4, I.eakage

4. Procedure 40AO-9//02. Excessive RCSIeakrate

5. Procedure 40ST-9RC05, Manual Calculation ofRCS Water Inventory 6.Procedure 40ST-9RC08, GAP(Backup) Calculation ofRCS Water Inventory

7. NEl99-01, SU4 I75of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE297OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 6-RPSFailure initiating Condition: Automatic ormanual tripfails toshut downthe reactor EAl,:

SU6.1 Unusual Event An automatic trip didnotshut down thereactor asindicated byreactor power > 5%after any RPSsetpoint isexceeded AND A subsequent automatic trip ormanual tripaction takenatthe reactorcontrolconsoles (B05 or B0l)issuccessful inshutting downthe reactor as indicated byreactor power 5 5% (Note 8)

Note8:A nlanual trip action isanyoperator action.

orsetofactions, which causes thecontrol rodstoberapidly inserted into the coreanddoes notinclude manually drivingin control rodsarinaplementationofboron injection strategies.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheArst condition ofthis EAL identitles the need tocease critical reactoroperations byactuation ofthe automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. A reactortripautomatically is initiatedbythe RPSwhencertain continuously monitored exceed parameters predetermined setpoints (ref.1,4).

Following a successful reactor trip, rapid insertion ofthe control rodsoccurs. Nuclear power promptly drops toa fraction ofthe original power level andthen decays toa levelseveral decades lesswith a negative startuprate. Thereactor power drop continues untilreactorpower reaches the point atwhich the influence ofsource neutrons onreactor power tobeobservable.

starts A predictable post-trip response from anautomatic reactor trip signal should therefore consistofa prompt drop inreactor power assensed bythe nuclear instrumentation anda lowering ofpower into the source range. Iorthe purpose ofemergency classineation a successful triphasoccurred when I76of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE298OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases there issufficient rodinsertion from the trip ofRPStobring the reactor power toorbelow the Power Operation Mode threshold of5%(ref. 2).

5%rated power is the Power Operationmodethreshold. Below 5%,plant response will besimilar tothat observed during a normal shutdown.Nuclear instrumentation canbeused todetermine if reactorpower isgreaterthan 5% power(ref. 1,2).

Iorthe purposes ofemergency classitleation, successful manual trip actions arethose which canbe quickly peril3rmed from the reactor control consoles(B05 orB01). Reactor shutdown achieved by useofother trip actions donotconstitute a successful manual trip (ref. 3).

Following anyautomatic RPStrip signal, procedure 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions (ref.

3)prescribes insertion ofredundant manual trip signals toback upthe automatic RPStrip function andensure reactor shutdown isachieved ifReactivity Control acceptancecriteria are notmet.Even ifthe first subsequent manual trip signal inserts all control rods tothe full-in position immediately afterthe initial failure ofthe automatic trip, the lowest level of classification thatmustbedeclared isanUnusual Event.

Inthe eventthat the operator identines a reactor trip isimminentand initiates a successful manual reactortrip before the automatic RPStrip setpoint isreached, nodeclaration is required.The successful manual trip ofthe reactor before it reaches its automatic tripsetpoint orreactor trip signalscaused byinstrumentation channel failures (without exceeding anRPS trip setpoint) donot leadtoa potential fissionproduct barrier loss andarethus notclassinable under this EAI .

IIowever, ifsubsequent manual reactor trip actions fail toreduce reactor power to or below 5%,the event escalates tothe Alert under EAl. SA6.I Ifbyprocedure. operator actions include the initiation ofanimmediate manual trip following receiptofanautomatic trip signal andthere arenocIcar indications that the automatic trip failed (such asatime delay following indications that atrip setpoint was exceeded), itmaybedifficultto determine if the reactor wasshut downbecause ofautomatic trip ormanual actions. lfa subsequent review ofthe trip actuation indications reveals that the automatic trip did notcause the reactor tobe shutdown, then consideration should begiven toevaluating the fuel for potential damage andthe reporting requirements of50.72 should beconsidered for thetransient event.

This ICaddresses a failureoftheRPStoinitiate orcomplete anautomatic ormanual reactor trip thatresults in areactor shutdown andeither asubsequent operator manual action taken atthe reactorcontrol consoles oranautomatic trip is successful inshutting down the r eactor. This event is a precursor toamoresignificant condition andthus represents a potential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

I77of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE299OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases Following the failure onanautomatic reactor trip.

operators will promptly initiate manual actions at the reactor control consoles toshutdown the (e.g.,

reactor initiate amanual reactor trip). Ifthese manual actionsare successful inshutting downthe reactor, core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within thecapabilities ofthe plant's decay heatremoval systems.

Ifaninitial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manual action at another location(s) onthe reactor control consoles toshutdown the reactor (e.g., initiatea manual reactor trip)using a different switch). Depending upon several 111ctors.the initial orsubsequent effort tomanually trip the reactor,or a concurrent plantcondition, maylead tothe generation ofan automatic reactor trip signal. If a subsequent manual orautomatic trip issuccessful inshutting downthe reactor. core heat generation will quickly falltoa level within the capabilities ofthe plant's decay heat removal systems.

A manual action atthe reactor control consoles isany operator action, orsetofactions, which causes thecontrol rods toberapidly inserted intothecore (e.g., initiatinga manual reactor trip).

This action does notinclude manually driving incontrolrods orimplementation ofboron injection strategies.Actions taken atback-panels orother locations within the ControlRoom,oranylocation outside the Control Room,are notconsidered tobe"at the reactor control consoles."

Theplant response tothe failure ofanautomatic ormanual reactor trip will varybased upon several factors including the reactor power level prior tothe event, availability of the condenser, performance ofmitigation equipment andactions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken atthe reactorcontrol conso:cs arealso unsuccessful in shutting downthe reactor. then the emergency classificationlevel will escalate toan Alert via IC SA6.Depending upon the plant response, escalation isalso possible via ICIA1 Absent the plant conditions needed tomeeteither ICSA6orFA1,anUnusual Event declaration isappropriate for this event.

Should a reactor trip signal begenerated asa result ofplant work(e.g., RPSsetpoint testing), or instrument Illilure the following classincation guidance should beapplied.

• lfthe signal causes aplant transient thatshould have included anautomatic reactor trip and theRPSfails toautomatically shutdown thereactor. then this ICandthe EAIsare applicable andshould beevaluated.

• Ifthe signal does notcause a plant transient andthe trip failure isdetermined through other means(e.g., assessment oftest results), then thisICandthe EAl.s are notapplicable andno classification iswarranted.

I78of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE300OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?AlTechnical Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l Technical Specification 3.3.I , Reactor h:vstent Protection (RPS) Operating Instruntentation 2.Technical Specification Table -lModes I.I,

3. Procedure 40I(P-9I?O01 , Standard PostTrip Actions

4. l!FSAR Section, 7.2.2.2 TripBases

5. Nl?I99-01 Stf5 I79of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE301OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 6-RPSFailure initiating Condition: Automatic ormanual trip fails toshut downthe reactor EAl,:

SU6.2 Unusual Event A manual trip did notshut down the reactor asindicated byreactor pmver > 5%after anymanual tripaction wasinitiated AND A subsequent automatic trip ormanual tripaction takenatthe control reactor consolesor(B05 B0l)issuccessful inshutting downthe reactor as indicated byreactor power 5 5%(Note 8)

Note8:A nlanual trip actionisanyoperatoraction. orsetofactions, which causes the control rodstoberapidly inserted into the core anddoes notinclude manually drivingin control rodsarinaplementationofboron injection strategies.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EALaddresses a failure ofamanually initiated trip inthe absenceofhaving exceeded an automatic RPStrip setpoint andasubsequent automatic or manual tripsuccessful is inshutting downthe reactor (ref. 1).

Following asuccessful reactor trip.

rapid insertion ofthe control rodsoccurs. Nuclear power promptly drops toa fraction ofthe original power level andthen decays toa levelseveral decades lesswith a negative startup rate. Thereactor power drop continues until reactor power reaches the point atwhich the influence ofsource neutrons on reactor power tobeobservable.

starts A predictable post-trip response from anautomatic reactor trip signal should therefore consist ofa prompt drop inreactor power assensed bythe nuclear instrumentation anda lowering ofpower into the source range. Forthe purpose ofemergency classitleation a successful triphas occurred when there issufficient rodinsertion from the manual trip tobring the power reactor toorbelow the Power Operation Modethreshold levelof5%(ref. 2).

I80of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE302OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 EAl,Technical Bases 5%rated power isthe Power Operation modethreshold. Below 5%,plant response willbesimilar tothat observed during a normal shutdown. Nuclear instrumentation eanbeused todetermine if reactor power is greater than 5% power (ref. 1,2).

Forthe purposes ofemergency classification, successful manual trip actions arethose which canbe quickly performed fromthe reactor control consoles (1305 orB01). Reactor shutdown achieved by useofother trip actions donot constitute a successful manual trip(ref.3).

Following the failure ofanymanual trip signal, procedure 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions (ref.3).prescribes insertion ofredundant manual trip signals toback upthe RPStrip function and ensure reactor shutdown isachieved ifReactivity Controlacceptance criteria are notmet.Even ifa subsequent automatic tripsignalorthe ilrstsubsequent manual tripsignal inserts all controlrods to the full-inposition immediately after the initial fliilure ofthe manual trip,the lowest levelof classification that mustbedeclared isanUnusualEvent (ref.3).

Ifboth subsequent automatic andsubsequent manual reactor tripactions inthe Control Roomfail to reduce reactor power below 5 5%following a tililure ofaninitial manual trip, the event escalates to anAlert under EAl SA6.1 This ICaddresses a tililure ofthe RPStoinitiate orcomplete anautomatic ormanualreactor trip thatresults inareactor shutdown andeither a subsequent operatormanual action taken atthe reactor control consoles oranautomatic trip issuccessful inshuttingdown the reactor. This eventis a precursor toamoresignificant condition andthus represents a potential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Following the failure onanautomatic reactor trip, operators willpromptly initiate manual actions at thereactor control consoles toshutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate amanual reactor trip).Ifthese manual actions aresuccessful inshutting downthe reactor, coreheat generation will quickly fall to a levelwithin the capabilities oftheplant's decay heat removal systems.

Ifaninitial manual reactor tripisunsuccessful, operators willpromptly take manual actionat another location(s) onthe reactorcontrol consoles toshutdown the reactor (e.g.,initiate a manual reactor trip) using adifferent switch). Depending uponseveral the factors, initialorsubsequent efforttomanually the r oraconcurrent eactor, plant condition, maylead tothe generation ofan automatic reactor trip signal.lfa subsequent manual orautomatic tripissuccessful inshutting downthe r eactor, core heatgeneration will quickly fall toa level within the capabilities ofthe plant'sdecay heat removal systems.

A manual action atthe reactorcontrol consoles isanyoperator action,orsetofactions, which causes the control rods toberapidly inserted into the core (e.g.,

initiating a manual reactor trip).

181of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE303OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases This action does notinclude manually driving incontrol rodsorimplementation ofboron injection strategies. Actions takenatback-panels orother locations within the Control Room,oranylocation outside the Control Room arenotconsidered tobe"at the reactorcontrol consoles."

Theplant response to the failure ofanautomatic ormanual reactortripwill vary based upon several factors including thereactor power level priortothe event, availability ofthe condenser, performance ofmitigationequipment andactions, other concurrent plant conditions, etc.If subsequent operator manual actions taken atthe reactor controlconso:es arealso unsuccessful in shutting downthe reactor, then the emergency classification level will escalate toanAlert via IC SA6.Depending uponthe plant response. escalation isalso possible via ICIAl Absent the plant conditions needed tomeeteither ICSA6or FAl, anUnusual Event declaration isappropriate for thisevent.

Should a reactor tripsignal begenerated asa result of plant work(e.g., RPSsetpoint testing) or instrument failure,the following classification guidance should beapplied.

Ifthe signal causes a plant transient thatshould have included an automatic reactor trip andthe RPS failstoautomatically shutdown the reactor,then thisICandthe EAl.s areapplicableandshould be evaluated.

Ifthe signal does notcause aplant transient andthe trip failureisdetermined through other means (e.g..assessment oftest resultsL then this ICandthe EAlsarenotapplicable and noclassilleation iswarranted.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Technical Specilleation 3.3.1. Reactor Protection 8:vstem (RPS) Instrumentation Operating 2.Technical Specification Table I.1-1,Modes 3.Procedure 4OEP-9EOO I Standard

, PostTrip Actions

4. UFSARSection 7.2.2.2, Trip Bases

5. NEI99-01. SU5 I82of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE304OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAL Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory 3- RPSFailure Initiating Condition: Automatic ormanual tripfailstoshut downthe reactor andsubsequent manual actions taken atthe reactor control consoles arenotsuccessful in shutting downthe reactor EAI:

SA6.1 Alert An automatic ormanual trip fails toshut down the reactor asindicated byreactor power > 5%

AND Manual tripactions taken atthe reactor controlconsoles (B05 orB0l) arenotsuccessful in shutting downthe reactorasindicated byreactor power > 5%(Note 8)

Note8:A manual trip isanyoperator action action,orsetofactions.which causes thecontrol rods toberapidly insetted into the coreanddoes notinclude manuallydrivingincontrol rodsarin1plementation ofhoron injection strategies.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAL addresses anyautomatic ormanual reactortrip signal thatfails toshut downthe reactor followed bya subsequent manual tripthat failstoshut downthe reactortoanextent the reactor is producing significant power (ref. I,4).

Following a successful reactor trip,rapid insertionofthe control rods occurs. Nuclear power promptly drops toa fraction ofthe original power level andthen decays toa level severaldecades lesswith anegative startuprate. Thereactor power drop continues untilreactor power reaches the point atwhich the influence ofsource neutrons onreactor power startstobeobservable. A predictable post-trip response from anautomatic reactor trip signal should therefore consistofa prompt drop inreactor power assensed bythe nuclear instrumentation anda lowering ofpower into the source range. Forthe purpose ofemergency classification a successful trip has occurred when I83of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE305OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases there issufficient rodinsertion from the manual triptobring thereactor power toorbelow 5%

(ref.2).

5%rated power is the Power Operationmode threshold. Below 5%,plant response will besimilar tothat observed during a normal shutdown.Nuclear instrumentation canbeused todetermine if reactorpower isgreaterthan 5% power (1,2).

Forthe purposes ofemergency classineation, successful manual tripactions arethose which canbe quickly performed from the reactor control consoles(B05 orB01). Reactorshutdown achieved by useofother trip actions donotconstitute a successful manual trip(ref.3).

Escalation ofthis event toa Site Area Emergency wouldbeunder EAlSS6.1 orEmergency Coordinator judgment.

This ICaddresses a failure ofthe RPStoinitiate orcomplete anautomatic ormanual reactor trip thatresults ina reactor shutdown andsubsequent operator manual actions taken atthe reactor control consoles toshutdown the reactor arealsounsuccessful. This condition represents anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe levelofsafety ofthe plant. An emergency declaration is required evenif the reactor issubsequently shutdown byanaction taken awayfrom the reactor control consoles since thisevent entails a significantfailure oftheRPS.

A manual action atthe reactor control console isanyoperator action.orset of actions, which causes thecontrol rods toberapidly inserted into thecore (e.g., initiatinga manual reactor trip).This action does notinclude manually driving incontrolrods orimplementation ofboron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operators would immediately pursue additional manual actions atlocations awayfrom the reactor controlconsole (e.g.,locallyopening breakers). Actions taken atback panels orother locations within theControl oranylocation Room, outside the Control Room,arenotconsidered tobe"atthe reactorcontrol console."

Theplant response tothe failure ofanautomatic ormanual reactor tripwillvary based uponseveral factorsincluding the reactor power level prior tothe event. availabilityofthe c ondenser, performance ofmitigation equipment and actions, other concurrent plantconditions, etc. Ifthe failuretoshut downthe reactor isprolonged enough tocause achallenge tothe core cooling or RCSheat removal safety functions, the emergency classification levelwill escalate toa Site Area Emergency via ICSS6. Depending upon plantresponses andsymptoms. escalation isalso possible via IC Absent FSI the plant conditions needed tomeeteither IC or anAlert SS6 FSl, declaration is appropriate for this event.

I84of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE306OF383 ATTACIIMENT I liAITechnical Bases Itisrecognized that plant responses orsymptoms require mayalso declaration anAlert in accordancewith theRecognition Category F ICs: ICandEAIareincluded this however, toensure a timely emergency declaration.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Technical Specillcation 3.3.1 , 8vstem Reactor Trip ( S)Instrtunentation RI 2.Technical Specilleation Table I 1-1, Modes 3.Procedure 401(P-9IfO01 , Standard PostTrip Actions

4. UlSARSection Trip 7.2.2.2, Bases 5.N1II 99-01, SA5 IS5of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE307OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 2-RPSFailure initiatingCondition: Inability toshut downthe reactor achallenge causing tocore cooling or RCS heat removal EAL:

SS6.1 Site AreaEmergency An automatic ormanual trip toshut fliils down the asindicated reactor byreactor power > 5%

AND All actions toshut downthe reactor byreactor arenotsuccessful asindicated power > 5%

AND EITIlER a RepCET> 12000F

= RCSsubcooling < 24"F ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation Definition(s):

None Basis:

This EAI addresses thefollowing:

a Anyautomatic reactor tripsignal (ref. byamanual 1)followed trip thatiltils toshut down thereactor toanextent thereactor isproducing in energyexcessoftheheatload forwhich thesafety systems weredesigned (EAI SA6.1)and a Indications thateither corecooling isextremely challenged orheatremovalisextremely challenged.

Thecombination offailures ofboth front line andbackupprotection tofunction systems inresponse toa plant transient, alongwith thecontinued ofheat.

production poses threat a direct tothe Fuel Clad andRCSbarriers.

Reactor shutdown achieved byuseofother tripactions inprocedure specified 40EP-9EO0l, Standard Post Trip Actions, (suchasopening NGN-1.03B2andNGN-L10B2 supplybreakers, I86of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE308OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases emergency boration ormanually driving control rods) arealso credited asa successful manual trip provided reactor power can bereduced toorbelow 5%before indications ofanextreme challenge toeithercore cooling orheat removal exist(ref. 2,3).

5%rated power isthe Power Operation modethreshold. Below 5%,plant response will besimilar tothatobserved duringa normal shutdown. Nuclear instrumentation canbeused todetermine if reactorpower isgreater than 5 % power.

Indication ofcontinuing core cooling degradation ismanifested byCETsarereading greaterthan 12000F.

RepCET(Representative Core Exit Temperature) isacalculatedtemperature value generated by theQualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS). The QSPDS CETprocessing function generates a representative temperature based onastatistical analysis ofthermocouples monitoring thereactor coolant temperature atthe topofselected fuel assemblies.

Indication ofinability toadequately remove heat from theRCS is manifested byRCSsubcooling

< 24"F. (ref. 4).

This ICaddresses a failure ofthe RPStoinitiate orcomplete anautomatic ormanual reactortrip thatresults ina reactor shutdown, allsubsequent operator actionstomanually shutdown the reactor areunsuccessful andcontinued power generation ischallengingthe capability toadequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS.This condition will lead tofueldamage ifadditional mitigation actionsareunsuccessful andthus warrants the declaration ofa Site AreaEmergency.

Insomeinstances, theemergency classineation resulting fromthis IC/EAL maybehigher than that resultingfrom anassessment ofthe plantresponses andsymptoms against the Recognition Category I ICs/EALs. This isappropriate inthat the Recognition Category F ICs/EAls donot addressthe additional threat posed bya failure toshut downthe reactor. Theinclusion ofthis IC andEAI. ensures the timely declaration ofa Site AreaEmergency inresponse toprolonged failure toshutdown the reactor.

Escalation ofthe emergency classification level would bevia ICRGIorFGl.

I87of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE309OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?AlTechnical Bases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l Technical Specilleation 3.3.1, ReactorTripSystem Instrumentation (RTS) 2.Technical Specilleation Table 1I-1Modes

3. Procedure401(P-91(O01, Standard Post TripActions

4. Procedure401iP-91iO09, Iunctional Recovery

5. NEI99-01, SS5 I88of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE310OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 IAl,Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 7-IossofCommunications InitiatingCondition: 1,oss ofall onsiteoroffsite capabilities communications EAl,:

SU7.1 Unusual Event 1oss ofall Table S-4onsitecommunication methods OR 1.ossofall Table S-4Offsite Response Organization (ORO) communication methods OR Loss ofall Table S-4NRCcommunication methods Table S-4 Communication Methods System Onsite ORO NRC PBX X X X Plant Page X Two-Way Radio X FTS(ENS) X Telephone Ringdown Circuits (NAN) X Cellular Phones X X ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Onsite andNRCcommunications offsite include oneormoreofthe listed systems inTable S-4 (ref.1.2).

189of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE31IOF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases

1. PBX Onsite emergency telephone linesare divided amongthree onsite EPABXswitches. Each EPABXswitch is provided with a backup battery forreliability.

Thissystem will lunction during emergencies asit doesduring normal operations. Telephones havethecapability oftrunk access (via local provider) andthe APSownedprivate communications system which provides direct dialcapabilitiestothe entire APSvoice system viathe company owned private communications system.ThePVNGStelephone EPABX Systemsthrough which all PVNGS telephone calls pass,areequipped with uninterruptible powersupplies (battery chargers and batteries) and dedicated priority switching toensure the reliability ofthe telephone system.ThePVNGS EPABXs arethe primary linksfor PVNGS phones.

There arealso administratively dedicated lines forthe CR,STSC,TSC, EOFandOSC.

2. Plant JA.rea)Paging Theareapaging system provides a reliablemeansofnotifying andproviding instructions to personnel.

onsite Access tothis system isthrough theEPABX system telephonesbyuseof dedicated numbers.

3. Two-Wav Radios PVNGSoperates a trunked radio system, with separatetalk groups available fordepartments suchasOperations, Security, FireProtection, RadiationProtection, Emergency Preparedness, theWaterReclamation Facility,etc.This system includesbase station consolesat various locations andemergency facilities throughout the Someofthe site. radios used during emergenciesare portable radiosatvarious sitelocations, mobile radios inthe RFATvehicles andbasestation consoles atthe TSC,EOF,Unit OSCs, Unit STSCsandUnit Control Rooms.

PVNGSFire Protection also maintains radios that are used tocontact the air ambulance service toprovidelanding instructions.

4. ITi (JiNS)

TheNRCEmergency Notification System (ENS) isanFTStelephone used forofficial communications with NRClleadquarters. TheNRCIIeadquarters has the capability topatch into theNRCRegional offices.Theprimary purpose ofthis phone istoprovide a reliable methodfor the initial notification ofthe NRCandtomaintain continuous communications with theNRCafter initial notification.ENS telephones arelocated inthe Control TSCand Room, EOF.

190of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE312OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases 5.M These voice circuits serve asa primary communications link for providing technical information tooffsite agencies, public information communications andthe communication ofprotective actionrecommendations tooffsiteauthorities.

6. Cellular Phones EachSTSC,the TSCandEOF have acellularphone toprovide additional independent linesof communication.

This EAI isthe hot condition equivalentof the coldconditionEAICil5.1 This ICaddresses a signilleant lossofonsite oroffsite communications capabilities. While nota directchallenge toplant orpersonncI safety,this event warrants prompt notifications toOROsand theNRC.

This ICshould beassessed only whenextraordinary meansare being utilizedtomake communications possible (e.g.,useofnon-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofonsite informationvia individuals ormultiple radio transmission points,individuals being sent tooffsite locations, etc.).

ThefirstEAl. condition addresses a totalloss ofthe communications methods used insupport of routineplantoperations.

Thesecond EAI. condition addresses a totalloss ofthe communications methods used to notify all OROsofanemergency declaration.TheOROsreferred tohere arethe State andMaricopa County EOCs.

Thethirdcondition addresses atotalloss ofthe communications methods used tonotify the NRC of anemergency declaration.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 PVNGSPlant Rutliological Emergemy Response Plan (RERP), Section 7.2 2.llFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems 3.NEl99-01, Sil6 191of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE313OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 8-Containment Failure Initiating Condition: Failuretoisolate containment orloss ofcontainment pressure control.

EAl,:

SU8.1 tinusual Event EITIIER:

e Anypenetration isnotclosed when required within 15minutes ofa VAlIDisolation signal (Note I)

• Containment pressure > 8.5 psig with< 4350 gpmContainment Sprav flow for> 15 minutes (Note I)

Note1:Thel?mergency Coordinator shoulddeclare the eventpromptly upon determining that time limit hasbeen exceeded.orwill likely beexceeded.

ModeApplicability:

1 Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

FA/JD An indication, report, orcondition, isconsidered tohevalid whenit isverified by(1) an instrument channel or(2) check, indicationsonrelated orredundant indicators,or(3)by direct observation byplant personnel, such doubt that related tothe indicator's operability, thecondition's existence, orthe report's accuracy is removed. Implicitin this dellnition istheneedor f timely assessment.

Basis:

Containment isolations areinitiated bythe Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS), Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), MainSteam IsolationSignal (MSIS) andContainment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) (ref. I,2).

TheContainment Spray System consists oftwoseparate trains ofequal capacity,each capable of meeting thedesign bases requirement. Iachtrain includesacontainment spraypump, spray headers, nozzles. valves andpiping. Therefueling waterstorage tank (RWT) supplies borated water tothe Containment Spray System during the injection phase ofoperation. Inthe recirculation mode 192of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE314OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAl,Technical Bases ofoperation, Containment Spray pumpsuction istransferred from the RWTtothe Containment sumps (ref.3).

TheContainmentpressure high-high setpoint (8.5 psig) isthe pressure atwhich the Containment Spray equipment should actuate andbegin performing its function (ref. 4).Consistent with the design requirement, "one full trainofdepressurization equipment" istherefore defined tobethe availability ofonetrain ofContainment Spray providing a minimum of4350 gpmspray ilow (ref.

5).I.PSI cross-ticcan be credited provided the a lignment can be made w ithin the 15 minute threshold. Iflessthan this equipment isoperating and Containment pressure isabove the actuation setpoint, the threshold ismet.

This EAl. addressesa failure ofoneormore containment penetrationstoautomatically isolate (close) whenrequired byanactuation It also addresses aneventthat signal. results inhigh containment pressure with aconcurrent ofcontainment pressure failure control systems. Absent challenges toanother fission product barrier, either condition represents potential degradation ofthe level ofsafety ofthe plant.

Forthe first condition, the containment isolation signal mustbe generated asthe result onan offnormal/ accident condition (e.g., asafetyinjection orhigh containment pressure): a failure resulting from testingormaintenance does notwarrant classification. The determination of containment andpenetration statusisolated ornotisolated -

should be made in accordance with theappropriate criteriacontained inthe plantAOPsandEOPs. The15-minute criterion isincluded toallow operatorstime tomanually isolate the required penetrations, ifpossible. The second condition addresses a condition where containment pressure isgreater than the setpoint atwhich containment energy (heat) removal systemsaredesigned toautomatically actuate and less than one fulltrain ofequipment iscapable ofoperating per design. The15- minute criterion isincluded to allow operators time tomanually start equipment that maynothave automatically started, if possible. Theinability tostart therequired equipment indicates that containment heat removal/depressurization systems (e.g.,containment sprays) are either lost orperforming ina degraded manner.

This eventwould escalate toa Site AreaEmergency inaccordance with ICFSlif there werea concurrent loss orpotential loss ofeither theFuel Clad orRCS fission product barriers.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I ljlSARSection 6.2.l.5.3.8, Containment Purge System

2. ljFSAR Section 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System

3. ljFSAR Section 6.2.2, Containment Removal Ileat System

4. l jFSAR Table 7.3-1 1A,ESIAS Setpoints andMargins toActuation 193of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE315OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAl Technical Bases

5. Procedure 40EP-9EO01 Standard PostTrip Actions

b. NEI99-01. Sl!7 194of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE316OF383 ATTACIIMENT 1 l?Al, Technical Bases Category: S System Malfunction Subcategory: 9-Ilazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems Initiating Condition: Ilazardous eventaffecting a SAlETYSYSTEMneeded forthecurrent operating mode EAL:

SA9.1 Alert Theoccurrence ofanyTable S-5hazardous event AND EITIIER:

• Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance in atleast onetrainofa SAFETYSYSTEMneeded forthe current operating mode a Theevent eaused has VISIBI.E DAMAGEto a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed for the current operating mode Table S-5 Ilazardous Events

= Seismic event (earthquake) a Internalorexternal Fl.OODING event

• Iligh winds ortornado strike a FIRE

= EXPI.OSION e Other events with similar hazard characteristics asdetermined bythe Shift Manager ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

EXPLOS/ON- A rapid, violent andcatastrophic failure ofapiece ofequipmentduetocombustion, chemical reaction oroverpressurization. A release ofsteam(from highenergylines orcomponents) oranelectrical component failure (caused byshort circuits, grounding, arcing, should etc.) not automatically beconsidered anexplosion. Such events requirea post-eventinspection todetermine if theattributes ofanexplosion arepresent.

195of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE317OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EALTechnical Bases F/RE Combustion characterized byheat andlight. Sources ofsmoke such asslippingdrivebelts oroverheated electrical equipmentdonotconstitute Gres. Observation ofDame ispreferred butis NOTrequiredif large quantities ofsmoke andheat are observed.

F/.OOD/NGA condition where waterisentering aroomorarea titsterthan equipment installed is capable ofremoval, resulting in a rise ofwaterlevel within the roomorarea.

SAFETY SYSTEMA systemrequired for safe plant operation, cooling downthe plantand/or placing it inthe cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These are typicallysystems classified assafety-related (asdefined in 10CFR50.2):

Those structures, systems andcomponentsthat arerelied upon toremain functional during and following design basis events toassure:

(l)Theintegrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) Thecapability toshut downthe reactor andmaintain it ina safe shutdown condition; (3) Thecapability toprevent ormitigate the consequences of accidents which couldresultin potential offsite exposures.

F/SIBIE DAMAGE Damage-toacomponent orstructure that isreadily observable without measurements, testing, oranalysis. Thevisual impact ofthe damage issufficient tocauseconcern regarding the operability orreliability ofthe affected component orstructure.

Basis:

Refer toAttachment 4 for ofPalo a list Verde SAFETYSYSTEMS (ref. 5)

This ICaddresses a hazardous eventthat causes damage toa SAlETYSYSTEM, ora structure containing SAFETYSYSTEMcomponents, needed forthecurrent operating mode. Thiscondition significantly reduces the margin toa loss orpotential lossofa fission product barrier andtherefore represents anactual orpotential substantial degradation ofthe levelofsafety oftheplant.

Thefirst condition addresses damage toa SAFETYSYSTEMtrain that isinservice/operationsince indications for itwill bereadily available. Theindications ofdegraded performance shouldbe signi0cant enough tocause concern regarding the operability orreliability ofthe SAFETY SYSTEMtrain.

Thesecond condition addresses damage toa SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent thatisnotin service/operation orreadily apparent through indications alone, ortoa structure containing 196of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE318OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will makethis determination based onthetotality of available event and damage report information. This tobea briefassessment isintended not lengthy analysis orquantification ofthe requiring damage.

• Thesignilleance ofseismic events arediscussed underEAl IllJ2.I.Annunciator 7Cl4A, SEISMIC OCCURRENCE will illuminateif the seismicinstrumentdetects motion ground inexcess oftheseismic EVI NT trigger threshold (ref.

1).

• Internal FIOODINGmaybe caused byevents suchascomponent failures, equipment misalignment, oroutage activity mishaps.

a Iligh winds inexcess ofdesign (105 mph) ortornado strikes cancause significant structural damage (ref. 4).

a Areas containing functions andsystems required forsafeshutdown ofthe plant are identitled byfire area (ref.2).

a An explosion thatdegrades the performance ofaSAFETY SYSTEM train orvisibly damages a SAFETYSYSTEMcomponent orstructure would beclassilled under thisEAl.

Escalationofthe emergency classificationlevel would beviaICFSIor RSl.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40AO-97721 , ActsofNature 2.ifFSAR Table 3-2.1,Quality Classilleation ofStructures, SystemsandComponents 3.ifFSAR Section 2.4.2.2.1, Offsite Flood Design Considerations 4.ifFSAR Section 2.3.I.2.3. Extreme Winds 5.Attachment 4 Palo Verde Safety Systems

6. NEl99-01, SA9 197of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE319OF383 ATTACIIMENT I IAL Technical 13ases EALGroup: Ilot Conditions (RCS temperature > 210"F): EALsinthis category areapplicable only inone or more hot operating modes.

EAI.s inthis category represent threatstothe defense indepth design concept that precludes the releaseofhighly radioactive fission products tothe environment. This concept reliesonmultiple physicalbarriersanyoneofwhich, ifmaintained intact, precludes the release ofsignificant amounts ofradioactiveEssion products tothe environment. Theprimary fissionproduct barriers are:

A. Buell'lad 10)TheIuel Clad11arrier consists ofthe cladding material that contains the fuel pellets.

W

13. TheRCS 13arrier includes the RCSprimary side andits connections uptoandincluding the pressurizer safety and reliefvalves andother connections uptoandincluding the primary isolation valves.

C.ContainmentiC.FMD TheContainment l3arrier includes thecontainment building and connections uptoandincluding the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier alsoincludes the main steam,feedwater andblowdown lineextensions outside the containment building uptoandincluding the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

Containment 13arrier thresholds areused ascriteria for escalation of the ECI from Alert toa Site AreaEmergency oraGeneral Emergency.

TheEALsinthis category require evaluation ofthe loss andpotential loss thresholds listed in the Essionproduct barrier matrix ofTable F-1(Attachment 2). "Loss" and"Potential Loss" signify the damage relative andthreat ofdamage tothe barrier. "Loss" means thebarrier nolonger assures containmentofradioactive materials. "Potential 1.oss" meansintegrity ofthe barrieristhreatened andcould belost if conditions continue todegrade. Thenumber ofbarriers that arelost or potentially lost andthe following criteriadetermine the appropriate emergency classification level:

Alert:

Anyloss oranypotential lossofeither Fuel Clad orRCS M

Iossorpotential loss ofany two harriers General limesenos Iossofany two barriers andloss orpotential loss ofthird barrier l98of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE320OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Thelogic used for emergency classification based onilssion product monitoring barrier should renectthe following considerations:

• TheFuelClad Barrier andthe RCSBarrier areweighted moreheavily than the Containment Barrier.

a Unusual Event ICsassociated with RCSandFuel Clad Barriersareaddressed under System Malfunction ICs.

• Foraccident conditions involving a radiological release,evaluationofthe fission product barrier thresholds will need tobe performed inconjunction with doseassessments toensure correct andtimely escalation oftheemergency classification. Forexample, anevaluation of the fission product barrier thresholds may result in a SiteArea Emergency classification while adose assessment mayindicate thatan EAl. for General Emergency ICRG1has been exceeded.

a Thefission product barrier thresholds specifled within a scheme renect plant-specific PVNGSdesign andoperating characteristics.

• Asused inthis category, the termRCSleakage encompassesnot just those types defined in Technical Specifleations but alsoincludes the loss ofRCSmassto any location- inside the containment. aninterfacing system, oroutside ofthe containment.The release ofliquid or steammassfrom the RCSduetothe as-designed/expected of a relief valve operation isnot considered tobeRCSleakage.

• Atthe Site Area1mergency level,EAIusers should maintain cognizance ofhow far present conditions are from meeting athreshold that would requireaGeneral Emergency declaration. For example, ifthe 1uel Clad andRCSfission productbarriers werebothlost, then there should befrequent assessments ofcontainment inventory radioactive and integrity. Alternatively, if both theFuel Clad andRCSfission productbarriers were potentially lost,the Emergency Coordinator would havemoreassurance that there wasno immediate need toescalate toaGeneral Emergency.

199of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE321OF383 ATTACIIMENT I l?Al Technical Bases Category: Iission Product Barrier Degradation Subcategory: N/A initiating Condition: Anyloss oranypotential loss ofeitherFuel Clad orRCS EAl,:

FAl.1 Alert Anyloss oranypotential of either Fuel loss Clad orRCS(Table F-1)

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Fuel Clad, RCSand Containment comprise the fissionproductbarriers. Table I-I(Attachment 2) liststhefission product barrier thresholds, bases andreferences.

Atthe Alert classification Fuel level, Clad andRCSbarriers areweightedmore heavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike theContainment loss barrier, orpotential loss ofeither the Iuel Clad or RCSbarrier mayresult intherelocation ofradioactive materialsordegradation of core cooling capability.Note the that orpotential loss loss ofContainment barrier incombinationwith lossor potential lossofeither Fuel CladorRCSbarrier resultsindeclaration ofaSiteArea limergency under EAl.ISlI PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 NEl99-01, FA1 200of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE322OF383 ATTACIIMENT I EAlTechnical Bases Category: Iission Product Barrier Degradation Subcategory: N/A initiatingCondition: I,oss orpotential loss ofanytwobarriers EAl,:

FSl.1 Site AreaEmergency 1.oss orpotential lossofanytwo barriers (Table F-1)

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Fuel RCSand Clad, Containment comprise the fission product barriers. Table I-I(Attachment 2) liststhe fissionproduct barrier thresholds,bases andreferences.

Atthe SiteArea Emergency classification level,each barrierisweighted equally. A Site Area Emergency istherefore appropriateforanycombination ofthe following conditions:

• Onebarrier loss anda second barrierloss lossloss)

(i.e., -

• Onebarrier loss anda second barrierpotential (i.e.,

loss losspotential loss)

• Onebarrier potential andasecond loss barrier potentialloss potential (i.e., losspotential loss)

Atthe SiteAreaEmergency classification level,the ability todynamically assess the proximity of present conditions with tothe respect threshold for a General Emergency isimportant. Forexample.

the existenceofFuel Clad andRCSBarrier loss thresholds inaddition tooffsite dose assessments would requirecontinual assessments ofradioactive inventory andContainment integrity in anticipationofreaching aGeneralEmergency classification.Alternatively, if both Fuel Cladand RCSpotential loss thresholds existed,theI mergency Coordinator would greater have assurance thatescalation toa General Emergency isless imminent.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, FSI 201of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE323OF383 ATTACIIMENT I I?Al, Technical Bases Category: Iission Product Barrier Degradation Subcategory: N/A InitiatingCondition: I,ossofanytwobarriers andloss orpotentialloss ofthirdbarrier EAl,:

FGl.1 General Emergency 1oss ofanytwobarriers AND 1.oss orpotential loss ofthird barrier (Table F-l )

ModeApplicability:

I Power Operation, 2 Startup, 3 Ilot Standby, 4 Ilot Shutdown Definition(s):

None Basis:

Fuel RCSandContainment Clad, comprise the fissionproduct barriers.

Table F-I(Attachment 2) liststhe fissionproduct barrier thresholds, bases andreferences.

Atthe General Emergency classificationlevel each barrierisweighted equally. A General Imergency istherefore appropriate for anycombination ofthe following conditions:

a 1ossofFuel Clad, RCSandContainment barriers a ofFuel 1.oss Clad andRCSbarriers with potentialloss ofContainment barrier a ofRCSandContainment I.oss barriers with potentialloss ofFuelClad barrier a IossofFuel Clad andContainment barrierswith potential ofRCSbarrier loss PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEI99-01, FSI 202of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE324OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Introduction Table F-1lists the threshold conditions that dellne theIossandPotential Loss ofthe three 11ssion product barriers (Fuel Clad, Reactor Coolant SystemandContainment). Thetable isstructured so that each ofthe threebarriers occupies adjacent columns.Each fission product barrier column is further divided into twocolumns; onefor thresholds 1.oss andonefor Potential Iossthresholds.

Theilrst column ofthe table(to the leftofthe FuelCladIosscolumn) lists the categories (types) of tission product barrier thresholds. The lission productbarrier categories are:

A. RCSorSGTube Leakage B. Inadequate Heat Removal C. CTMTRadiation /RCSActivity D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass E. Emergency Coordinator Judgment Each category occupies arowinTable F-Ithus formingamatrix dellned bythe categories. The intersection ofeach rowwith each Ioss/PotentialIosscolumn forms acell inwhich oneormore fission product barrier thresholds appear. lfNEl99-01 doesnotdefine a threshold for a barrier Ioss/Potential Ioss,the cellisleft blank, shaded orotherwise indicated asnothaving a threshold associated with it.

Thresholds areassigned sequential numbers withineachIossandPotential Ioss column beginning with number one. Inthis manner, a threshold canbeidentified byits category title and number. For example, the firstFuel Clad barrier IossinCategory C would beassigned "FCIossC.I," the third Containment barrier Potential IossinCategory D wouldbeassigned "CTMTP-Loss D.3," etc.

If a cell inTable F-Icontains morethan onenumbered threshold, each ofthe numbered thresholds, if e xceeded, signifles a IossorPotential Iossofthe barrier.

Itis notnecessary toexceed all ofthe thresholds ina category before declaring abarrierLoss/Potential Ioss.

Subdivision ofTable F-Ibycategory facilitates association ofplant conditions tothe applicable fission product barrier Loss andPotential Iossthresholds.

This structure promotes a systematic approach toassessing the classificationstatusofthe product fission barriers.

Whenequipped with knowledge ofplant conditions relatedtothe fission product barriers, the EAl -

user first scans downthe category column ofTable locates F-I, the likelycategory andthen reads across the f issionproduct barrierI ossandPotential I.oss thresholds in thatcategorydetermine to if a threshold has been exceeded. Ifa threshold hasnotbeen exceeded. theEAI-user proceeds tothe nextlikely category andcontinues review ofthethresholdsinthe newcategory.

203of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE325OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss MatrixandBases lfthe EAL-user determines thatanythreshold hasbeen bydefinition, exceeded, thebarrier islost or potentially lost -

even if multiple thresholdsinthe samebarrier column only areexceeded, thatone barrierislost or potentially lost.TheEAl-user mustexamine eachofthe three product fission barrierstodetermine ifother barrier thresholds inthe categoryarelostorpotentially lost.

For example, itcontainment radiation is sufficientlyhigh, ofthe a I.oss FuelClad andRCSbarriersand a Potential Loss ofthe Containment canoccur.

barrier BarrierIossesandPotential I.osses arethen applied tothe criterion given in EAl s FGI1,FSl.1 andFAI.1todetermine theappropriate emergency classifleation.

Inthe remainder ofthis Attachment.the Fuel Clad barrierthreshold basesappear by followed first, theRCSbarrier andfinally the Containment barrier thresholdbases.Ineach barrier, thebases are given according category Iossfollowed bycategory Potential I.oss beginningwithCategory A,

then B, E.

204of262

oneno ane o

no oceue ow micae Noe m i o

onai omion a

a 383 ooma

.o u .

nun. oven eue OF oenia ecoe aiaion mm ue onainm e conu e

onamm m

326 wiin Noe oo uncona onainmn ConmmeConamm PAGE Harier TT C

s Re i.

eecue .

R

.'-min.Anmeen A

m i.

oenia o "w

'oomo o

nrie mcae o o oiainmen een om ouie oe i

euie a

oaon meee mieun wa enionm eaae oimon a ane No ow e

oume NoneNone iFR:

o N.AB.

U onamme e

m ooina Cona e

Bases jumen on;nnmeni onamm o

on oniion meen R

oninnei nicnon

,4 o

ae eaine ei e

AN and A A

e a Ano Marix ari um ioae, eaa emam iin canno T e

ooina oenia aie cin ue.'r ucoonee e

Harier Loss .o iB m i

Tireo anien emo oeanon Noneconinon e

RU eiown ue e ucooine o

Poenia Noe eae None meen iniae oo 2

euie R:

eui/c esew o o e iR N ea 69 oinion i

Harier R'

em Wi an i a

• o nu ANR AN RU An a o

o 262 REVSON R

Loss/Poenia of Prouc ATTACHMENT ooaneuie eaae iwion R

e e 205 Reacor

.ow uomane o

i.

eaae R

None u

H mR m

connon e

a o Barrier Tae mnu n auanon omon EH:ue N a

i e

Conaunny mR .

one An o

meeene o

ooinao aie micae R'

Produc o

o aa e

.ow num canno omon o Fission "r emoa e

ooinaooenia R.

in ane oenia '

F Non ucooin coniion Non meeen eaie inicae c

is ea ue Barie PLAN N RU ine a e e

R Ca oanon o

.u iei ooana ue nri Ri EMERGENCY e

Cooinao iion.

R m e o

.ow None mR mR aen None in o

.meuen i

Re.

onainmen u

eui oe coniio micae ie ea PVNGS

, e a An i.

Caeor Remoa o

.eae H ic C

R "'

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION69 PAGE327OF383 ATTACIIMENT2 Fission Barrier Product 1oss/Potential Matrix I.oss andBases Barrier: Fuel Clad Category: A.RCSorSGTubeI,eakage DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 206of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE328OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Loss MatrixandBases Barrier: IuelClad Category: A.RCSorSGTubeIeakage DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I RVLMS< 21%plenum(Detector #8)

Definition(s):

None Basis:

21%plenum onRVLMS(Detector #8)istheminimum RVLMS above indication TopofActive Fuel (TOAF)which correspondsto4 in.above the fuel alignment andisthe plate last indication of inventorycontrol (ref.1,2).

This reading indicatesareduction inreactor vessel waterlevelsuffleient toallowthe onsetofheat-inducedcladdingdamage.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 400P-9zzl 6 RCSDrain Operations, Appendix M

2. NuclearFuel Management Analysis Calculation /A-13-C00-2000-001, EOP Setpoint Document

3. NEI99-01, RCSorSGTubeIeakage Fuel Clad Potential IossI.A 207of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE329OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Barrier Product 1oss/PotentialI.oss Matrix andBases Barrier: IuelClad Category: B.InadequateHeat Removal Degradation Threat: Ioss Threshold:

I RepCETs> 1200 "F Definition(s):

None Basis:

Core Themlocouples Exit area component of Inadequate Core

(.CETs) Cooling Instrumentation and provideanindirect indication offuelcladtemperature by measuring the temperature ofthe reactor coolantthatleaves thecoreregion.

Although cladrupture due tohigh temperature is notexpected forCETreadings less than t the hreshold, temperatures ofthis magnitude signal signiileant superheatingofthe coolant reactor andcoreuncovery (ref. 1).

This readingindicates within temperatures thecore aresufficient toenuse significant superheating ofreactorcoolant.

RepCET(Representative CoreExitTemperature) isa calculated temperature value generated by theQualilledSafety Display Parameter System (QSPDS). TheQSPDS CETprocessing function generatesa representative based temperature ona statistical analysis ofthermoeouples monitoring thereactorcoolant temperatureatthetopofselected fuel assemblies.

PVNGSHasis Reference(s):

1 UFSARAppendix I8B.System 80Generic Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

2. NEI99-01, Inadequate Removal Ileat Fuel Clad Ioss 2.A 208of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE330OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier1oss/Potential IossMatrix andBases Barrier: Iuel Clad Category: B.Inadequate Ileat Removal Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I RepCETs> 700"F Definition(s):

None Basis:

Core Themlocouples Exit (.CETs) area component of Inadequate Core CoolingInstrumentation and provideanindirect indicationoffuel clad temperature by measuring the temperatureofthe reactor coolantthatleaves thecore region. IfRepCETsindicate 700oF subcooling has

> beenlost for at leastsomeregions ofthe core (ref. 700oF 1). asacondition representing apotential qualifies lossof the fuel clad barrier.

This readingindicates a reduction inreactorvesselwaterlevel sufilcient toallow the onset ofheat-induced cladding damage.

RepCET(Representative Core Exit Temperature) isa calculated temperature value generated by theQualilledSafety Parameter Display System (QSPDS). TheQSPDS CETprocessing function generatesa representative temperature based ona statisticalanalysis ofthermocouples monitoring thereactorcoolant temperature atthe topofselected fuel assemblies.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARAppendix I8B. System 80Generic Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation

2. NEl99-01, Inadequate lleat Removal Fuel CladPotential 1.oss 2.A 209of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE331OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Iuel Clad Category: B.Inadequate IleatRemoval DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

2. RCSheat removal cannot be established AND RCSsubcooling < 24oF Definition(s):

None Basis:

Incombinationwith RCSPotential 1.oss B.I. meeting thisthreshold resultsina Site Area Emergency.

Thesteamgenerators (SGs) provide the normal meansofheat transfer from the RCStothe main condenserandultimate heat sink.Procedure 40EP-9EO03, Loss ofCoolant Accident, requires maintenanceofRCSheat removal atall times during a I.OCA. OnceRCSpressure andtemperature arereduced,RCSheat removal canbeprovided byShutdown Cooling (SDC)system. Once the SDCsystem isplaced inservice. the SGheat capability sink isnolonger necessary (ref. I).

IfRCSsubcooling approaches 24oF, the margin tosuperheated conditions isbeing reduced.

Followinganuncomplicated reactor trip,subcoolingmargin should be excess in of50ol Subcoolingmargin greaterthan24oF ensures thetluid surrounding thecore issufficiently cooled andprovidesmarginreestablishing for SI flow should subcooling deteriorate when now SI is secured.Voidsmayexist insomeparts ofthe RCS(e.g.,

Reactor Vessel head) but are permissible aslongascore heat removal ismaintained (ref.

2).RCSsubcooling isdetermined using appropriate CET(naturalcirculation) orThm (forced circulation) temperature indications. Upper head subcoolingindication should notbeused.

Thecombination ofthe threshold conditions indicates thatRCSheat removal isunder extreme This challenge. threshold addresses loss offunctionsrequired for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressureandtemperature andthus a potential loss oftheFuel Clad barrier. This isalso a potential lossoftheRCSbarrier andtherefore results inatleast a Site AreaEmergency.

210of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE332OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential Matrix I.oss andBases This condition indicates anextreme challenge ability tothe RCSheat toremove using the steam generators (i.e., loss of aneffective secondary-side heat sink).

This condition apotential represents lossofthe Iuel Clad Barrier. Inaccordance with there liOPs, accident maybeunusual conditions during which operators intentionally reduce theheat removalcapability ofthe steamgenerators; during these conditions, classilleation using isnotwarranted.

threshold PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40EP-91iO03, /.oss of Coolant Accident 2.Procedure 401iP-9EO09, l:unctional Recoverv 3.N1il 99-01, Inadequate Ileat Removal Fuel Clad 1oss2.B 211of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE333OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct BarrierIoss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: luelClad Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity Degradation Threat: I,oss Threshold:

I Containment radiationRU-148 > 2.IE+05 mR/hr ORRU-149 > 2.4E+05 mR/hr Definition(s):

None Basis:

Thespecified containment radiationmonitor readings (ref. 1) indicate the releaseofreactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative offuel damage, intothe Containment. Thereading isderived assuming theinstantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthe reactor coolant noble gasandiodine inventoryassociated withaconcentration of300pCi/ce dose equivalent I-131 into theContainment atmosphere with containment sprays operating. Thevalues arebased oncalculated readings lifteen minutesaftershutdown. Reactorcoolant concentrations ofthis magnitude areseveral times larger than maximum the concentrations(including iodine spiking) allowed within Technical andaretherefore Specilleations indicative offuel damage (approximately 2-5% cladfailure depending oncore inventoryandRCSvolume).

Monitors used forthis ilssion product barrier loss threshold arethe Containment Iligh Range RadiationMonitors RU-148 andRU-149 (ref.I).

Theradiation monitor reading corresponds toaninstantaneous release ofall reactor coolantmass intothecontainment, assumingthatreactor coolant activity dose equals pCi/gm equivalentI-300 131Reactor coolant above activity thislevel isgreater than thatexpected foriodine spikesand correspondstoanapproximate range of2%to5%fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates thata signilleant amountoffuel claddamage has occurred. itrepresents a lossofthe FuelClad Barrier.

Theradiationmonitor reading inthis threshold ishigher than thatspecilled forRCSBarrier Ioss thresholdC.lsince itindicates a Ioss ofboth the FuelClad Barrier andthe RCSBarrier. Note that a

combination ofthe twomonitorreadings appropriately escalates the ECItoa Site Areal?mergency.

212of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE334OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission ProductBarrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

/.Calculation 13-NC-7Y-216. ofContainnient Determination fomIligh Activities Radiation Monitors

2. NI.I99-01. CTMT Radiation /RCSActivity Iuel Clad 3.A I.oss 213of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE335OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Fuel Clad Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity Degradation Threat: I,oss Threshold:

2. Doseequivalent I-131coolant activity > 300pCi/gm Definition(s):

None Basis:

DoseEquivalent lodine (DEI) isdetermined byprocedure 74ST-9RCO2 ReactorCoolant System SpecificActivitySurveillance Test (ref. l).

Elevated reactorcoolant activityrepresents a potentialdegradation inthelevelofsafety ofthe plant andapotential precursor ofmoreserious problems.Thethreshold dose equivalent I-131 concentration iswell abovethat expected foriodinespikes andcorresponds toabout 2%to5%fuel claddamage. Since condition this indicates thata significant amountof fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss ofthe Fuel Clad Barrier(ref. 2).

This thresholdindicates RCSradioactivity that concentration is than greater 300 pCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 Reactor coolant activity abovethis level isgreater thanthat expected for iodine spikes andcorresponds toanapproximate rangeof2%to5%fuel claddamage. Since this condition indicatesthata significantamountoffuel claddamage has o ccurred, it representsa lossof the Iuel Clad Barrier.

Itisrecognized that samplecollection andanalysis ofreactor coolant withhighlyelevated activity levels couldrequire hours several tocomplete. Nonetheless, a threshold sample-related included is asa backup toother indications.

There isnoPotential Iossthreshold associated with RCSActivity/Containment Radiation.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 74ST-9RCO2. Reactor Coolant System Specific ActivitySurveillance Test

2. NEI99-01, CTMTRadiation /RCSActivity Fuel Clad 1oss 3.B 214of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE336OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Clad I:uel Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

None 215of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE337OF383 ATTACIIMENT2 Iission Barrier Product Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Clad Iuel Category: C.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 216of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE338OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Clad I:uel Category: C.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

None 2I7of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE339OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct Barrier1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Iuel Clad Category: I Emergency

. Coordinator Judgment DegradationThreat: Ioss Threshold:

I Anycondition intheopinion of theEmergency Coordinator that indicates loss ofthe Fuel Cladbarrier Definition(s):

None Basis:

Emergency Coordinator judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant todetermining if theFuelClad barrier islost. Such should include imminent barrier a determination degradation, monitoring barrier capability anddominantaccident sequences.

a imminent barrier deeradation exists ifthe degradation will likely occur within relatively shortperiod oftime based ona projectionofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognition oftheinability toreach safety function acceptance criteria beforecompletion ofall checks.

• Barriermonitorine capabilityisdecreasedifthere isa loss orlack ofreliable indicators.

Thisassessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentation andconsideration ofoffsitemonitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely entrytothe EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (Station Blackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classiGcation declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother factors thataretobeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determining whether theFuel Cladbarrier islost.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, limergency Director Judgment Fuel Clad Ioss6.A 2I8of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE340OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct Barrier1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Iuel Clad Category: E.Emergency Coordinator Judgment DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I Anycondition intheopinion of theEmergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of theFuel Clad barrier Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator judgment thresholdaddresses anyother 11ictors relevant todetermining ifthe Fuel Clad barrier is potentially lost.Such a determination should include imminent barrier degradation, barrier monitoring capability anddominant accident sequences.

a imminentbarrier deeradation existsifthedegradation will likely occur within relatively short period oftime based ona projection ofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognition ofthe inability toreach safety function acceptance criteria completion before ofall checks.

• Barrier monitorine capability isdecreased ifthere isa lossorlack ofreliable indicators.

This assessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentationandconsideration ofoffsite monitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely tothe entry EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (Station Blackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classiGcation declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother factors thataretobeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determining whether theFuel Clad barrier ispotentially lost. TheEmergency Coordinator should alsoconsider whether ornottodeclare the barrierpotentially lostinthe event that barrier status cannot bemonitored.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, Emergency Director Judgment Potential Iuel Clad Loss 6A 219of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE341OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential IossMatrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: A.RCSorSGTubeIeakage Degradation Threat: I,oss Threshold:

I An automatic ormanual ECCS (SIAS) actuation required byEITllER:

• UNISOI.ABI.E RCSleakage a SGtube RUPTURE Definition(s):

UNISO/J R/E An open orbreached systemline that cannot beisolated, remotely orlocally.

RUPTliREThecondition ofasteamgenerator inwhich primary-to-secondary leakage isof sufficient magnitude torequirea safetyinjection.

Basis:

This threshold isbased onanUNISOl.ABI l?RCSleak ofsufficient size torequireanautomatic or manual actuation ofthe Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). This condition clearly represents a lossofthe RCSBarrier.

This threshold isapplicable tounidentitledandpressure boundary leakage, aswell as identified leakage. applicable Iti s also toUNISOLABLE RCS leakage through an interfacing system. The massloss maybeinto anylocation-containment, inside tothe secondary-side (i.e.,

steam generator leakage) tube or outsideof containment.

A steamgenerator withprimary-to-secondary leakage ofsufficient magnitude torequire a safety injectionisconsidered tobeRUPTURED. a RUPTURED If steamgenerator isalsoEAUl.TED outsideofcontainment, the declarationescalatestoaSite Area Emergency since the Containment Barrier1.oss threshold 1.Awill alsobemet.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40EP-9EO01, Reactor Trip 2.Procedure 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident 3.Procedure 40EP-9EO04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.NEl 99-01, RCSorSGTubeI.eakage Reactor Coolant System Ioss 1.A 220of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE342OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: A.RCSorSGTubeIeakage Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I With letdown operation ofthe isolated. standby charging pumpisrequired byEITlIER:

• UNISOl .ABI .ERCSleakage a SGtube leakage Definition(s):

UN/S0/ABLE -

An open orbreached systemline that cannot beisolated, remotely orlocally.

Basis:

This threshold isbased onthe inability tomaintain liquid inventory within theRCSbynormal operationofthe Chemical andVolume Control System (CVCS). The CVCS includes three charging pumps: twocharging pumps arenormally operating with a flow capacity of ~44gpmeach ora total of88gpm(ref. 1).Approximately 10gpmofcharging flow bypasses the RCS due toleakage through theRCPseals: thus,the normal charging lineup delivers 88gpm 10 gpm = 78gpm(ref.

I).A thirdcharging pumpbeing required with letdown isolated isindicative of a substantial RCS leak.

Ifthe standbycharging pumpisstarted inresponse todecreasing pressurizer leveland following ofletdown isolation and/or theleak pressurizerlevel canbesubsequently maintained with just two charging pumps, thisthreshold isnotexceeded.

This threshold isbased onanUNISOLABLERCSleak that results inthe inabilitytomaintain pressurizerlevel withinspecilled limits byoperation ofanormally used charging (makeup) pump, butanECCS(SI) actuationhas notoccurred. Thethreshold ismetwhenanoperating procedure, or operatingcrewsupervision. directs astandby that charging (makeup) pumpbeplaced inservice to restoreandmaintain pressurizerlevel following appropriate system isolation.

This isapplicable threshold tounidentitled andpressure boundary leakage, aswell asidentitled leakage.Itisalso applicable toUNISOLABI E RCSleakage through aninterfacing system. The massloss maybeinto anylocation -

inside containment, tothe secondary-side (i.e.,

steam generatortubeleakage) oroutside ofcontainment.

221of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE343OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product BarrierIoss/Potential Matrix I.oss and13ases lfa leaking steam generator isalso FAULTEDoutside ofcontainmem, the escalates declaration toa Site AreaEmergency since the Containment 13arrier Iossthreshold 1.Awill also bemet.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARSection 9.3.4, Chemical andVolume Control System 2.Procedure 40EP-9EO01, Reactor Trip 3.Procedure 40EP-9EG01,Standard Post TripActions

4. Procedure 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident

5. Procedure 40EP-9EO04, SteamGenerator Tube Rupture

6. NEl 99-01, RCSorSGTubeIcakage Reactor Coolant Potential System I.oss l.A 222of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE344OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: A.RCSorSGTubeIeakage Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

2. Pressurized thermalshock transient inexcess ofthe upper (2000F) subcooling P/Tlimit (Note 9)

AND RCSpressure isrising Note9:A pressurized thermal shock transient isdet1nedas an UNPLANNED overecoling transient which RCS causes togobelow temperature 500"F Definition(s):

UNPIANNED A parameter change oranevent that isnotI) the resultofanintended evolutionor 2)anexpected plant response toa transient. Thecause ofthe parameter changeorevent maybe known orunknown.

Basis:

The"PotentialLoss" thresholdis defined bythe upper subcooling P/Tlimitin combination with increasingRCSpressure which indicates anextreme challenge tothe RCSbarrier due to pressurized thermal shocktransient. (ref. 1, 3).

2, A pressurized thermal shock transient isdefined asanunplanned overcooling transient which causes RCStemperature togobelow 5000F (ref. 4).

This indicates condition anextreme challenge tothe integrityofthe RCSpressure boundary dueto pressurized thermal shockatransient thatcauses rapid RCScooldown while the RCSisinMode 3orhigher hot (i.e., andpressurized).

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40EP-9EO05, Ercess Steam Dematul 2.Procedure 40EP-9EOO9, Functional Recovery

3. Procedure40EP-9EOl0, Standarcl Appetulices Attachinent 2 Figures 4.Procedure 40DP-9API7, Standard Appendices Technical Guideline

5. NEI99-01, RCSorSGTubeIeakage Reactor Coolant System PotentialLossI.B 223of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE345OF383 ATTACIIMENT2 Iission Barrier Product Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Coolant Reactor System Category: B.Inadequate Removal IIeat DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 224of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE346OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: B.Inadequate Heat Removal Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I RCSheat removal cannot be established AND RCSsubcooling < 24oF Definition(s):

None Basis:

Incombination with IC Potential Ioss B.1, meeting threshold resultsin this a Site Area Emergency.

Thesteamgenerators (SGs) provide the normal means ofheat transfer from the RCStothe main condenser andultimate heat sink.Procedure 40EP-9EO03, Loss ofCoolant Accident, requires maintenance ofRCSheat removal atall times duringa I.OCA. OnceRCSpressure andtemperature arereduced,RCSheat removal canbeprovided byShutdown Cooling (SDC). Once the SDCis placedin service,the SGheat sink capability isnolongernecessary (ref.1).

IfRCSsubcooling approaches 24oF, the margin tosuperheated conditions isbeing reduced.

Following anuncomplicated reactor trip,subcooling margin should be excess in of5001 Subcooling margin greater than24oF ensures thetluid surrounding thecore issufficiently cooled andprovides marginreestablishing for SI flow shouldsubcooling deterioratewhen now SI is secured.Voids mayexist insomeparts ofthe RCS(e.g.,Reactor Vessel head) but are permissible aslongascore heat removal ismaintained (ref.

2).RCSsubcooling isdetermined using appropriate CETorThoi temperature indications. Upper head subcooling indication should notbeused.

Thecombination ofthese conditions indicates theultimateheat sink functionisunder extreme challenge.Thisthreshold addresses loss offunctions required for hotshutdown with the reactor at pressureandtemperature andthus apotential lossoftheFuel Clad barrier.This is alsoapotential lossofthe RCSbarrier andtherefore results inatleast a Site AreaEmergency.

225of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE347OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential LossMatrix and13ases This condition indicates anextreme challenge tothe ability toremoveRCSheatusingthesteam generators (i.e., loss of aneffective secondary-side heatsink).

Thiscondition apotential represents lossofthe RCS 13arrier. Inaccordance with EOPs,there maybeunusual accident conditions during which operators intentionally reduce the heatremoval capability ofthe steam during generators:

these conditions, classil1cation using threshold isnotwarranted.

Meeting this threshold results in a Site Area Emergency because threshold this isidentical toFuel Clad 13arrier Potential Loss threshold B.2; both will bemet.Thiscondition a Site warrants Area Emergency declaration because inadequate RCSheat removal infuel mayresult heat-upsufficient todamage the cladding andincreaseRCS pressure tothe pointwhere masswillbelostfromthe system.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Procedure 40EP-9EO03 , Loss ofCoolant Accident 2.Procedure 40EP-9EOO9, Functional Recoven

3. NEI 99-01, Inadequate Ileat Removal RCSIoss 2.B 226of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE348OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct BarrierIoss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:

I Containment radiationRU-148 > 5.0E+04mR/hr ORRU-I49 > 5.6E+04 mR/hr Definition(s):

None Basis:

Containmentradiation monitor readings greaterthan the specilled values (ref.1)indicatethe release ofreactorcoolant tothe Containment. Thereadings assume the instantaneous releaseanddispersal ofthe coolant reactor noblegasandiodine inventory associated with normal operating concentrations (i.e., withinTechnical Specifications) intothe Containment atmosphere.Because of thevery highfuel clad integrity, only small amountsofnoble gases would bedissolved inthe primary coolant.

Thereadings are derived assuming theinstantaneous release anddispersal of thereactorcoolant noble gasandiodine inventory associated with a concentration of60pCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 intotheContainment atmosphere with containment sprays operating. Thevalues are based on calculatedreadings fifteen minutes aftershutdown.

Monitors usedfor this fission product barrier lossthreshold arethe Containment IlighRange RadiationMonitors RU-148 andRU-149 (ref.l).

Theradiationmonitor readingcorresponds toaninstantaneous release ofall coolant reactor mass intothecontainment, assuming thatreactorcoolant activity equals Technical Specilleation allowablelimits.This valueislower than thatspecified for F uel Clad B arrier Iossthreshold C.l since it indicatesa loss oftheRCSBarrier only.

There isnoPotential threshold 1.oss associatedwith RCSActivity /Containment Radiation.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Calculation 13-NC-zY-2I6 Determination ofContainment Activities fiom IlighRadiation Monitors 2.NEI99-01, CTMTRadiation /RCSActivity RCS1oss 3.A 227of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE349OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

None 228of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE350OF383 ATTACIIMENT2 Fission Barrier Product Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Coolant Reactor System Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 229of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE351OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

None 230of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE352OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct Barrier1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor Coolant System Category: I Emergency

. Coordinator Judgment Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:

I Anycondition intheopinion oftheEmergency Coordinator that indicates loss ofthe RCS barrier Definition(s):

None Basis:

Emergency Coordinator judgment thresholdaddresses any other factors relevant todetermining if theRCSbarrier islost.Such a determination should include imminent barrier degradation, barrier monitoringcapability anddominant accidentsequences.

a imminent barrier deeradation exists ifthe degradation will likely occur within relatively shortperiod oftime based ona projectionofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognition oftheinability toreach safety function acceptance criteria before completion ofall checks.

• Barriermonitorine capabilityisdecreasedifthere isa lossorlack ofreliable indicators.

Thisassessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentation andconsideration ofoffsitemonitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely entrytothe EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (StationBlackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classification declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother that factors maybeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determiningwhether theRCSBarrier islost.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, Emergency Director Judgment RCSLoss 6.A 231of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE353OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 IissionProduct Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Reactor CoolantSystem Category: E.Emergency Coordinator Judgment DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I Anycondition intheopinion of theEmergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of RCSbarrier the Definition(s):

None Basis:

Emergency Coordinator judgment threshold addresses any other factors relevant todetermining if theRCSbarrier ispotentially lost.Such adeterminationshould include imminent barrier degradation, barrier monitoring capability anddominant accident sequences.

a M existsifthedegradation will likely occur within relatively shortperiod oftime based ona projection ofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognition ofthe inability toreach safety function acceptance criteria beforecompletion ofall checks.

• Barrjer monitorjng capability isdecreasedifthere isa loss orlack ofreliable indicators.

Thisassessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentation andconsideration ofoffsitemonitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely entrytothe EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (Station Blackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classification declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother that factors maybeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determining whether theRCSBarrier ispotentially lost.TheEmergency Coordinator should also considerwhetherornottodeclare thebarrier potentiallylost inthe event that barrier status cannot bemonitored.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1.NEl99-01, Emergency Director Judgment RCSLoss 6.A 232of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE354OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProductBarrier 1oss/Potential IossMatrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: A.RCSorSGTubeI,eakage Degradation Threat: I,oss Threshold:

I A leaking orRUPTURED SG isFAUITED outside ofcontainment Definition(s):

/GR// ED Thetermapplied

'/ -

toa steam generator that has a steamorfeedwater leak onthe secondary side ofsufficient sizetocause anuncontrolled drop insteamgenerator pressure orthe steamgenerator tobecome completely depressurized.

RUPTUREDThecondition ofa steamgenerator inwhich primary-to-secondary leakage isof sufficient magnitude torequirea safety injection.

Basis:

This threshold addresses a leakingorRUPTURED Steam Generator (SG) that isalso FAUITED outsideofcontainment. Thecondition ofthe whether S G, leaking or RUPTURED, isdetermined in accordance with the thresholdsforRCSBarrier Potential I.oss A.IandI.oss A.I. respectively. This conditionrepresents a bypassofthe containment barrier.

FAUI.TED isadefined termwithin the NEl99-01 methodology: this determination is not necessarily dependent upon entry ordiagnostic into, stepswithin, anEOP.For example, ifthe pressureina steamgenerator isdecreasing uncontrollably (part ofthe FAUlTEDdefinition) and theIAUI.TED steamgenerator isolationprocedure isnotentered because EOPuser rules are dictating of implementation procedure another to address a higher priority condition, the s team generatorisstill considered FAUITEDfor emergency elassineation purposes.

TheFAUI.TED criterionestablishesanappropriate lower bound onthe size ofa steamrelease that mayrequire anemergency classineation.

Steam releasesofthis size arereadily observable with normal Control Roomindications. Thelower bound this for aspect ofthe containment barrier is analogous tothe lower bound criteriaspecined inICSU4for the fuel clad barrier(i.e.,RCSactivity values)andICSU5for theRCSbarrier (i.e.,RCSleak rate values).

233of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE355OF383 ATTACHMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential 1.oss Matrix andBases This threshold also applies toprolonged steamreleases necessitated byoperational considerations such astheforced steaming ofa leaking orRUPTURED steamgenerator directly toatmosphere to cooldown the plant. These type ofcondition willresult ina significant andsustained release of radioactive steamto the environment (and are thussimilar toa FAUl,TED condition). Theinability toisolate the steamflow without anadverse effect onplant cooldown meetsthe intentofaloss of containment.

Steam releases associated withthe expected operation ofa SGAtmospheric DumpValve(s) donot meetthe intent ofthis threshold. Such releases mayoccur intermittently for a shortperiod oftime following a reactor trip asoperators process through emergency operating procedures tobring the plant toastable condition andprepare toinitiate a plant cooldown. This includestheinitial cooldown to5400F toisolate the ruptured SG using Atmospheric DumpValves directed inthe SGTREOP.Steam releases associated with the unexpected operation ofavalve (e.g.,astuck-open safety valve) domeetthis threshold.

Following anSGtube leak orrupture, there maybeminor radiological releases through a secondary-side system component (e.g.,air ejectors, glad seal exhausters, valve packing, steam traps, terry turbine exhaust, etc.).These types ofreleases donot constitute a loss orpotential loss of containment but should beevaluated using the Recognition Category R ICs.

TheECLsresulting from primary-to-secondary (P-to-S) leakage, with orwithout asteam release from the FAUITED SG,aresummarized below.

Affected SGisFAUlTED Outside ofContainment?

P-to-S 1,eakRate Yes No 1,ess than orequal to25gpm Noclassification Noclassification Greater than 23gpm

- Unusual Iventper Unusual Event per SU5. I SU5.1 Requires operation ofthe standby chargingSite AreaEmergency '

AlertperFAI I (makeup) pump( RCSBarrier Potential Loss) perFSI1 Requires anautomatic ormanual ECCS(SIAS) Site Area Emergency Alert perFAII actuation (RC8Barrier Loss) perFSI1 There isnoPotential Iossthreshold associated with RCSorSGTubeLeakage.

234of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE356OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

l Procedure 40EP-9EO01 Reactor

, Trip

2. Procedure40EP-9EO01 , StainlardPost TripActions

3. Procedure40I(P-91?O03, /.ossofCoolant Accident

4. Procedure401(P-91(Ol0 Deinand Excess Steain

5. Procedure40I?P-91?O04. Stearn Generator TubeRupture

6. NII99-01 RCSorSGTube I.eakage Containment I.oss I.A 235of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE357OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Containment Category: A.RCSorSGTubeIeakage DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

None 236of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE358OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Barrier Product Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Containment Category: B.Inadequate Removal IIeat DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 237of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE359OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: B.Inadequate Ileat Removal Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I RepCETs> 12000F AND Functional recovery procedure not effective within 15minutes (Note I)

NoteI TheEmergency Coordinator shoulddeclarethe event promptly upondetermining that time limithas been exceeded.

orwill likely beexceeded.

Definition(s):

None Basis:

CoreExit Thermocouples (CETs) are a component ofInadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation and provideanindirect indication offuel clad temperature bymeasuring the temperature ofthe reactor coolantthat leaves the coreregion. Although clad rupture duetohigh temperature isnotexpected CETreadings fl)r less thanthethreshold, temperatures ofthis magnitude signal significant superheatingofthe coolant reactor andcore uncovery (ref. 1).

The15minute threshold startswhenoperators begin taking procedurally directed functional recovery actions.

IfCETreadings aregreater than 1.200oF (ref. l), the Fuel Clad barrier isalso lost.

RepCET(Representative Core Exit Temperature) isacalculated temperature value generated by theQualilled Safety ParameterDisplay System (QSPDS). TheQSPDS CETprocessing function generatesa representative temperature based onastatistical analysisofthermocouples monitoring thereactor coolant temperature atthe topofselected fuelassemblies.

This conditionrepresents anIMMINENTcore melt sequence which. if notcorrected, could lead to vesselfliilure andanincreased potential for containment fliilure.

Iorthis condition tooccur, there mustalready have been a lossofthe RCSBarrier andthe Fuel Clad Barrier. Ifimplementation ofa procedure(s)torestore adequate core cooling isnoteffective (successful) within 15minutes, it is 238of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE360OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential IossMatrix andBases assumedthat theevent trajectory will likely leadtocore melting andasubsequent challengeofthe Containment Barrier.

Therestorationprocedure is considered "effective" ifcore exit thermocouple readingsardecreasing and/orifreactor vessel level is increasing. Whether ornotthe procedure(s) willbeeffectiveshould beapparent within 15minutes. The1mergency Coordinator should escalatetheemergency classilleation level assoonas itisdetermined that theprocedure(s) will notbeeffective.

Severe accidentanalyses (e.g.,NUREG-1 150) have concluded thatfunction procedures restoration canarrestcoredegradation ina significant fraction ofcore damage scenarios,andthat the likelihoodofcontainment failureisverysmall inthese events. Given it this, isappropriateto provide 15minutes beyond the required entry point todetermineif procedural actionscanreverse thecore meltsequence.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 UFSARAppendix 1SB. System 80Generic Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation 2.Procedure 40EP-9EOO9, Functional Recoverv

3. NEl99-01, Inadequate lleatRemoval Containment Potential Loss 2.A 239of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION69 PAGE361OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Barrier Product Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases Barrier: Containment Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

None 240of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE362OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct BarrierIoss/PotentialLoss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: C.CTMTRadiation/RCS Activity Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I Containment radiationRU-148 > 6.8E+06mR/hr OR RU-149 > 7.8E+06 mR/hr Definition(s):

None Basis:

Containment radiation monitor readings than the values shown greater (ref. 1)indicate significant fueldamage well inexcess ofthat requiredforloss ofthe RCS barrier andthe Fuel Clad barrier.

Thereading isderived assuming the instantaneousrelease and dispersal ofthe reactorcoolant noble gasandiodine inventory associated with 20%clad failureintothe Containment atmosphere with containmentsprays operating.

Thevalues arebased oncalculatedreadings fifteenminutes after shutdown.

Thereadings arehigher thanthat specified forFuel Clad barrier IossC.Iand RCS barrierLoss C.l Containment radiationreadings atorabove the Containment barrier Potential Iossthreshold, therefore,signify a loss oftwo fission productbarriersandPotential Loss ofa third, indicating the need toupgrade the emergency classification toa General Emergency.

Monitors usedfor this product fission barrierlossthreshold arethe Containment Iligh Range Radiation Monitors RU-148 andRU-149 l).

(ref.

Theradiationmonitor readingcorresponds toaninstantaneous release ofall reactor coolant mass intothe containment, assuming that 20%ofthe fuel cladding hasfailed. This level offliel clad failureiswell above that used todetermine the relatedFuel Clad Barrier Loss andRCSBarrier Loss thresholds.

NUREG-1228,Source Estimations During Incident Response toSevere Nuclear Power Plant Accidents,indicates thefuelclad failure mustbegreater than approximately 20%inorder forthere tobea major release ofradioactivity requiringoffsiteprotective actions. Forthis condition toexist, there mustalready have been a loss ofthe RCSBarrier andthe Fuel Clad Barrier. istherefore It 241of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE363OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix 1.oss andBases prudentto treat this conditionasapotential loss ofcontainment would which then ECL escalate the toa General Emergency.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 Calculation 13-NC-7Y -216, Determination ofContainment Activities Radiation Iligh from Monitors

2. NEI99-01, CTMTRadiation /RCSActivity Potential Containment 3.A I.oss 242of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE364OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct Barrier Ioss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass Degradation Threat: Loss Threshold:

I Containment is required isolation AND EITIlER

= Containment integrity has been lost basedon Emergency Coordinator judgment

= UNISOLABLE pathway from Containment tothe environment exists Definition(s):

UN/SOLABLEAn open orbreached system line that cannot beisolated. remotely orlocally.

Basis:

Containment isolations areinitiated bythe Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS) in response toa high containment pressure signal orlowpressurizerpressure belowthe SIASsetpoint (ref.I,2).

A penetration isconsidered isolated with atleast onecontainment isolationvalve closed. This may include a check valveifthere isnoindication that ithasfailed toclose.

These thresholds addressa situation where containment isolation isrequired andoneof two conditions exists asdiscussed below. Users arereminded that theremaybeaccident and release conditions thatsimultaneously meetboth bulleted thresholds.

FirstThreshold -

Containment integrity has been lost,i.e., the actualcontainment atmospheric leak ratelikely exceeds that associated with allowable leakage (or sometimes toasdesign referred leakage). Following therelease ofRCSmassinto containment, containment pressure will fluctuate based onavariety of factors; a loss ofcontainment integrity condition may(or maynot) be accompanied bya noticeable drop incontainment pressure. Recognizing theinherent difficulties in determining a containment leak rate during accident conditions. itisexpected thatthe Emergency Coordinator will assessthisthreshold using judgment andwith dueconsideration given tocurrent plant conditions andavailable operational andradiological data (e.g.containment pressure, readings onradiation monitors outside containment. operating statusofcontainment pressure control equipment, etc.).

243of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE365OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier1oss/Potential IossMatrix andBases Refer tothe middle piping runofFigure 1.Two simplilled examples areprovided. Oneis leakage from apenetration andthe other isleakage from anin-service system valve. Depending upon radiationmonitor locations and sensitivities,theleakage could bedetected byanyofthe four monitors depictedin the figure.

Another example wouldbe a lossorpotential lossofthe RCSbarrier andthe simultaneous occurrence oftwo FAULTED locations ona steamgenerator where onefault islocated inside containment (e.g.,

ona steamor feedwater line) andthe other outside ofcontainment. Inthis case, theassociated steamline providesa pathway for the containment atmosphere toescape toanarea outside thecontainment.

Following the leakage ofRCSmassinto containment anda rise incontainment pressure, there may beminor radiological releasesassociated withallowable (design)containment leakage through various penetrations orsystem components. These releases donotconstitute a loss orpotential loss ofcontainment but should beevaluated using theRecognition Category R ICs.

Second Threshold -

Conditions aresuch that there isanUNISOl ABl.E pathway for the migration ofradioactive material from thecontainment atmosphere tothe environment. Asused here, the term "environment" includes the atmosphere ofaroomorarea, outside the containment, that may, in turn,communicate with the outside-the-plant atmosphere (e.g.,through discharge of a ventilation system oratmospheric leakage).Depending upon avariety offactors, this condition mayormaynot beaccompanied bya noticeable drop incontainment pressure.

Refer tothe toppiping runofFigure 1 Inthis simplified example, the inboard and outboard isolationvalves remained open afteracontainment isolationwasrequired (i.e., containment isolationwasnotsuccessful). There isnowanUNISOI ABIE pathway from the containment tothe environment.

Theexistence ofa illterisnotconsidered inthe threshold assessment. Filters donotremove fission product noble gases. Inaddition,a illter could become ineffective duetoiodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits retention (i.e., ability hasbeen exceeded) orwater saturation from steam/high humidity intherelease stream.

Ieakage between twointerfacing liquidsystems, byitself, does notmeetthis threshold. There must bearelease involved toatmosphere orinto another plant structure outside ofContainment.

Refer tothe bottom piping runofFigure 1 Inthis simplified example, leakage inanRCPseal cooler isallowing radioactive material toenter the AuxiliaryBuilding. The radioactivity would be detected bythe Process Monitor. Ifthere isnoleakage from the closed water cooling system tothe Auxiliary Building oratmosphere, then nothreshold has been met.

244of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE366OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential 1.oss MatrixandBases Following the leakage ofRCSmassinto containment anda riseincontainment there pressure,may beminor radiological releases associated with allowablecontainment leakage through various penetrations orsystem components. Minor releases mayalso occur ifacontainment isolation valve(s) fails toclose but the containment atmosphere escapes toanenclosed These system.

releasesdonotconstitute alossorpotential loss ofcontainment butshould using beevaluated the Recognition Category R ICs.

Thestatus ofthe containmentbarrier during aneventinvolving leakage tube steamgenerator is assessed using Loss Threshold A.I PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I UFSARSection 6.2.I.5.3.8,Containment Purge System

2. UFSARSection Containment 6.2.4, Isolation System 3.NEI 99-01, CTMTIntegrity orBypass Containment Loss 4.A 245of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE367OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Barrier Product 1oss/PotentialLoss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: Loss Threshold:

ofRCSleakage

2. Indications outside ofContainment Definition(s):

None Basis:

Procedure40AO-9zz02, ExcessiveRCSLeakrate, (.ref. 1) toidentify provides instructions and a IOCAoutside isolate ofthecontainment. PotentialRCS leak pathways outside containment include(ref.

1,2):

• NuclearCooling System(such asRCPhigh pressureseal cooler toNCsystem)

• SafetyInjection

• Chemical & Volume Control

• RCSsample lines Palo Verdespecific operatingexperience isthata IlighPressure Seal Cooler (IIPSC) leak tothe NuclearCooling (NC)

Water System must be isolatedtocontainment within 15 minutes of discoverydueto the l ocation ofthe NCsystem expansion tank andpotentialdose concerns onthe AuxiliaryBuilding roof.

RCSIeakage Outside ofContainment RCSIeakRate Yes No Iessthan orequalto25gpm Noclassification Noclassification Greater than25gpm Unusual Event per Unusual Event per SU5.1 SU5.1 Requiresoperation ofthestandby chargingSite Area Emergenev 'Alert

~

perFAI I (makeup)pump( RCSBarrierPotential Loss) per F Sl1 Requiresanautomatic ormanual ECCS(SIAS) SiteAreaEmergency -

Alert perFAI.1 actuation (RCSBarrierI.oss) per FSI.1 246of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE368OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission Product Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Containment sump, temperature. pressure and/or radiation levels will increase ifreactor coolant massisleaking into the containment. If these parameters have notincreased, then thereactor coolant massmay be leaking outside ofcontainment (i.e.,

a containment bypass sequence).

Increases insump.temperature. pressure, flow and/or radiation level readings outside ofthe containment mayindicate that the RCSmassisbeing lostoutside ofcontainment.

Unexpected elevated readings and alarms onradiation monitors with detectors outside containment should becorroborated with other available indicationstoconGrm that the source isa loss ofRCS massoutside ofcontainment. Ifthe fuel cladbarrier hasnotbeen lost,radiation monitor readings outside ofcontainment maynotincrease significantly: however, other unexpected changes insump levels, area temperatures orpressures, flow rates, etc. should besuf0cient todetermine ifRCSmass isbeing lost outside ofthe containment.

Refer tothe middle piping runofFigure I Inthissimplined example,a leak hasoccurred ata reducer ona pipe carrying reactor coolant inthe Auxiliary Building. Depending upon radiation monitor locations andsensitivities, the leakage could bedetected byanyofthe four monitors depicted inthe figure andcause threshold D.1tobemetaswell.

Refer tothe bottom piping runofFigure I Inthis simplified example, leakage in anRCPseal cooler isallowing radioactive material toenter theAuxiliary Building and thenatmosphere. The radioactivity would bedetected bythe Process Monitor. If the Nuclear Cooling System (NC) pump developed a leakthat allowed steamAvater toleak toatmosphere, then this threshold ismet.

Toensure proper escalation ofthe emergency classification, the RCSleakage outside of containment mustberelated tothe massloss that iscausing the RCSIossand/or Potential Loss threshold A.1tobemet.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I Procedure 40AO-9/102. Excessive RCSI.eakrate

2. Procedure 40EP-9E003, /ossof Coolant Accident 3.NEl99-01, CTMTIntegrity orBypass Containment 1oss 247of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE369OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Figure 1:Containment Integrity orBypass Examples vfb) nushM Am.n,..

AuxtharyBuilding

!Effluent l Monitor l

fori Inside Vent NH"'*

Containment l..........Q ,-

Damper j'.(l.j.j..'j -

di 101t01 Openvalve Open valve D.itupel 1' Penetration # f A Th-h" f

,/ Auhoine ff

=

W .-, - . ...

.1,....,....,.,.:-,..,.,.,., o O om

'........9

,- 3;d2jI1.111:Q.

D.2 j

i-Thushcad- A

.. -.- -. ..,:..:.:.,:oe-:-ro-::

.)

k':2 Openealve # Upell '1ti'e RR

. 1sk.m ::.:

1 * .wtol. AB1 1ho,sh.d . . . .

Interface leakage 3, ,..........,

Y:f.J..[-.1f

,v' '

n-.n.-rn.m :Process  !

h ,/'

^

rn.h.ath.n  : Monitor

) ". . . . . . . . . .

l...Q Closed

.:c:..:.- .:.:..-..:..:.: ....:..: .:::.;;.:.:.:.:.:.:. .. .

uoenvalve Openvalve N Punip Cooling i

RCP Seal Cooling 248of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE370OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I Containment pressure> 60 psig Definition(s):

None Basis:

60psig isthecontainment design pressure 1).

(ref.

lfcontainmentpressure exceeds the design there exists a potentialtolose pressure, Containment the Toreach Barrier. this there level, mustbeaninadequate anextended core cooling condition for periodoftime:therefore,the RCSandFuel Cladbarrierswould already belost. Thus.

this threshold isa discriminatorbetweena Site AreaEmergency andGeneral Emergency sincethere isnowa potentialtolosethe third barrier.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 UFSARSection Containment l.2.I2.1, Building 2.NEl99-01, CTMTIntegrity orBypass Containment Potential Ioss 4.A 249of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE371OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct Barrier 1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass Degradation Threat: Potential Loss Threshold:

2. Containment hydrogenconcentration > 4.9%

Definition(s):

None Basis:

Following a design basis accident, hydrogen gasmay be generated inside the containment by reactionssuch aszirconium metal with water,corrosion of materials ofconstruction andradiolysis ofaqueous solution inthecore andsump. (ref.

I,3).

PVNGSisequipped withaContainment IIydrogen Control (IIP) system which serves tolimit or reduce combustible gasconcentrations inthe Containment. TheIlP system isanengineered safety featurewith redundant hydrogen recombiners, hydrogen mixing system, hydrogen monitoring subsystem anda backup hydrogen purge subsystem. TheIIP system isdesigned tomaintainthe Containment hydrogen concentration below 4%byvolume (ref. 1.2). IlP system operation is prescribedbyEOPsif Containment hydrogen concentration should reach 0.7%by volume (minimum detectable) (ref.

3).

ThePVNGSSafety FunctionStatus Check for1,OCA, Containment Combustible GasControl (procedure40EP-9EO03, LossofCoolant Accident), uses 4.9%asanacceptance criterion, which representsthe Ilydrogen Recombiner Function Failure Indication. This value should not be exceeded ifthe hydrogen recombiners areoperating asdesired.

Ifthe PotentialIossthreshold isreached orexceeded, the primary means ofcontrolling Containment hydrogen concentration musthave failed toperform its design function orhas otherwisebeen inadequate inmitigating the hydrogen generation rate. Foreither case, continued hydrogen production mayyield a flammable hydrogen concentration andaconsequent threat to Containment integrity.

Togenerate such levels ofcombustible gas, ofthe loss IuelClad andRCSbarriers musthave occurred.With the Potential Ioss ofthe containment barrier,the threshold hydrogen concentration, therefore.

will likely warrantdeclaration ofa General Emergency.

250of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE372OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Iission ProductBarrier Ioss/PotentialLoss Matrix andBases Two Containment hydrogen monitor indicators(IlPA-Al-9 andHPB-Al-10) with of0%to a range 10%provide indication onControl RoomPanel BO2(ref.2).

Theexistence ofan explosive mixture means. ata minimum, thatthe atmospheric containment hydrogen concentration issufficient tosupport a hydrogen burn (e.g.

atthe deflagration lower limit).

A hydrogen burnwill raise containment pressure andcould result equipment incollateral damage leading toa loss ofcontainment integrity. therefore It apotential represents ofthe loss Containment Barrier.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

1 UFSARSection 6.2.5, Combustible Gas Control inContainment

2. Design Basis ManualHPContainmentIIydrogen Control System 3.Procedure 40DP-9APl4, Functional Technical Guideline.

Recovery Section 15.0Containment Combustible GasControl

4. NEI 99-01, CTMTIntegrity orBypass Containment Potential Loss4.B 251of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE373OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/PotentialLoss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: D.CTMTIntegrity orBypass DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

3. Containment pressure > 8.5 psig with < 4350 gpmContainment Spray flow for2 15minutes (Note1)

Note1 Thelimergency Coordinator should declare theeventpromptlyupondeterminingthattimelimit hasbeen orwill exceeded. likely beexceeded.

Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheContainment Spray System consists oftwoseparate trains of equal capacity,each capable of meetingthedesign basesrequirement. Each trainincludesacontainment spray pump, spray headers,nozzles, valves andpiping. Therefueling waterstorage tank (RWT) suppliesborated water tothe Containment Spray System during the phase injection ofoperation. In thereeirculation mode ofoperation, Containment Spray pumpsuetion istransferred from the RWT to theContainment sumps (ref.

I).

TheContainment pressure high-high setpoint (8.5psig) isthe pressure atwhich theContainment Spray equipmentshould actuate andbegin performingits ftmetion (rer.2).Consistent with the designrequirement, "one full train ofdepressurization equipment" isthereforedefined tobe the ofonetrain availability ofContainment Spray providingaminimum of4350 gpmspray Ilow(ref.

3).Iflessthan this equipment isoperating andContainment pressure isabove the actuation setpoint, thethreshold ismet.

This threshold describes acondition where containmentpressure isgreaterthan the setpoint at which containment energy (heat) removal systems aredesigned toautomatically actuate andless than onefull of trainequipment iscapable ofoperatingper design. The15-minute criterion is includedtoallowoperators time tomanually equipment start that maynothave automatically ifpossible.

started, Thisthreshold represents a potential loss ofcontainment in that containment heatremoval/depressurization systems (e.g., containment sprays but notincluding containment venting areeither strategies) lost orperforming ina degraded manner.

252of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE374OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 Fission Product Barrier Ioss/Potential Matrix I.oss andBases PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I lfFSARSection 6.2.2,Containment lleatRemovalSystem

2. l!FSARTable 7.3-1IA. IfSFAS Setpoints andMargins toActuation

3. Procedure 40I(P-9EOOl , Starulant Post Trip Actions

4. NEI99-01,CTMTIntegrity orBypass Potential Containment 4.C 1.oss 253of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE375OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProductBarrier1oss/Potential Loss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: I Emergency

. Coordinator Judgment DegradationThreat: I,oss Threshold:

I Anycondition inthe opinion oftheEmergency Coordinator that indicates loss ofthe Containmentbarrier Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator judgment thresholdaddresses anyother 11ictors relevant todetermining ifthe Primary Containment barrier islost.

Such adetermination should include imminent barrier degradation, barrier monitoring capability anddominant accident sequences.

a imminentbarrier deeradationexists ifthedegradation will likely occur within relatively short period oftime basedona projectionofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognitionoftheinability toreach safety function acceptance criteria completion before ofall checks.

• Barrier monitorine capability isdecreasedifthere isa loss orlack ofreliable indicators.

This assessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentationandconsiderationofoffsitemonitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely tothe entry EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (Station Blackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classification declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother that factors maybeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determining whether theContainment Barrier islost.

PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, limergency Director Judgment PCIoss6.A 254of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE376OF383 ATTACIIMENT 2 FissionProduct BarrierIoss/PotentialLoss Matrix andBases Barrier: Containment Category: E.Emergency CoordinatorJudgment DegradationThreat: Potential Loss Threshold:

I Anycondition intheopinion of theEmergency Coordinator that indicates potential loss of theContainment barrier Definition(s):

None Basis:

TheEmergency Coordinator judgment addresses anyother threshold 11ictors relevant todetermining ifthe Primary Containment barrier ispotentially lost.Such a determination should include imminent degradation.

barrier barriermonitoring capabilityand dominant accident sequences.

a imminentbarrier deeradation exists ifthedegradation will likely occur within relatively short period oftime based ona projectionofcurrent safety system performance. Theterm "imminent" refers torecognition oftheinabilitytoreach safety function acceptance criteria completion before ofall checks.

• Barrier monitorine capability isdecreased ifthere isa loss orlack ofreliable indicators.

This assessment should instrumentation include operability readings from portable concerns, instrumentationandconsideration ofoffsite monitoring results.

• W leadtodegradation ofall fission product barriers andlikely tothe entry EOPs.TheEmergency Coordinator should bemindful ofthe Loss ofAC power (Station Blackout) andATWSEALstoassure timely emergency classification declarations.

This addresses threshold anyother factors thatmaybeused bytheEmergency Coordinator in determining whether theContainment Barrier ispotentiallylost.TheEmergency Coordinator should consider also whether ornottodeclare thebarrier potentially lost inthe event that barrier status bemonitored.

cannot PVNGSBasis Reference(s):

I NEl99-01, Emergency Director Judgment PCPotential Loss 6.A 255of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE377OF383 ATTACIIMENT 3 Safe Operation & Shutdown RoomsTables R-2& H-2Bases

Background

NEl99-01, Revision 6 ICs AA3andIlA5 prescribe declaration ofanAlert based onimpeded access torooms or areas (due toeither area radiation levels orhazardous gasconcentrations) where equipment necessaryfor normal plant operations, cooldown orshutdown islocated. These areasare intended tobeplant operating mode dependent.Specifically the Developers Notes ForAA3and HA5states:

The'site-specific list ofplant rooms orareas with entn-related modeapplicability identified' should specifj those rooms orareas that contain equipment which require a manual/local action asspecifiedin operating proceduresused fi>r normal plant operation, cooldown andshutdown. Do notinclude rooms orareas inwhich actions ofa contingent or emergency naturewould beperfi>rmed(e.g., anactiontoaddress ano[f-normal or emergency condition such asemergency repairs, corrective measures oremergency operations). Inaddition, the list should specifi' the plant mode(s) during which entrv would berequired fi>reach roomorarea.

Thelist should notinclude roomsorareas fi>r which entry isrequired solely toperfi>rm actions ofanadministrative orrecord keeping nature(e.g., normal rounds orroutine inspections).

Further,asspecified inICHA5:

Thelist need notinclude the Control Roomifadequate engineered safety/design features areinplace topreclude a Control Roomevacuation duetothe release ofahazardous gas.

Such fi>atures may include, but arenotlimited to,capability todraw airfiom multiple air intakes atdiffi>rent andseparate locations, inner andouteratmospheric boundaries, or the capability toacquire andmaintain positive pressure within the Control Roomenvelope.

256of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PlAN REVISION 69 PAGE378OF383 ATTACIIMENT 3 Safe Operation & Shutdown RoomsTables R-2& II-2 Bases PVNGSTable R-2and11-2 Bases A reviewofstation operating procedures identified the modedependent following in-plantactions andassociatedareas that arerequired for normal plant operation, cooldown orshutdown:

Location-Modes -

Modes -

Safe Shutdown Area/Room 1,2 3,4 or5 IPSIPumps A andB SDC Equipment. Shut DownCooling (SDC)

Noentryrequired -

Noenny required Inventory ControlEquipment Inventory Control Equipment Noentryrequired Reactivity Control.

Noentry required Containment Spray Pumps A Containment Pressure Control Shut DownCooling (SDC) andB -

Noenny required -

Noenny required InventoryControl Equipment No entry required Reactivity Control.

No entry required IlPSI Pumps A andB Inventory Control Equipment. Inventory Control Equipment.

Noentry required -

No entry required Reactivity Control. Reactivity Control.

Noentry required -

Noently required Aux.BIdg 120WestElectrical Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

Room Penetration -

Noenny required -

No enny required Aux.BIdg 100East Electrical Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

Room Penetration -

Noenny required -

Noentryrequired Cooling Essential Water Support Equipment for Support Equipment for Pumps IIabitability Control, IIabitability Control, Containment Temperature, Containment Temperature, Control andShutdown Control andShutdown Cooling Cooling Noentry required -

Noentry required ControlBuilding 100foot Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

4160 ClassSwitchgear Room -

Noenny required -

Ennyrequired toaccess A&B die DCequipntent Rooins C andD Modes-4and5 257of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE379OF383 ATTACIIMENT 3 Safe Operation& Shutdown RoomsTables R-2& H-2Bases 1,ocation -

Modes -

Modes -

Safe Shutdown Area/Room 1,2 3,4 or5 Control Building 100 foot Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

Class DCEquipment Rooms -

Noenny required -

Noentry required A& B Control Building 100foot Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

Class DCEquipment Rooms -

Noentryrequired -

Energize 1.TOP Isolation C& D Valves for SDC.Procedure 400P-9zz23. Modes4and 5

Emergency Diesel Generators Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

A&B -

Noentry required -

Noentry required Emergency Diesel Generators Electrical Power. Electrical Power.

DayTank Rooms -

Noentrv required -

Noentn' required EDGBuilding IIVACRoom -

Noentry required -

Noenny required Control Building 160ft -

Noenny required -

Noentryrequired Electrical Cable Spreading Control Building 120ft -

Noenny required -

No ennyrequired EIcetrical Cable Spreading Control Building 80ft -

Noenny required -

Noenny required Essential Chiller Rooms Control Building Battery Noenny required -

Noenny required Rooms B C andD A,

Turbine Building Elevations -

Noenny required -

Noentry required MainSteam Support Structure-Noenny required -

Noenny required I40,120 and100foot elevations Aux.Feedwater PumpRoom Steam Generator Ileat Steam Generator Heat A andB Removal Removal Noenny required -

Noenny required Spray Pond PumpRooms A Support Equipment for Support Equipment for andB IIabitability Control IIabitabilityControl Containment Temperature, Containment Temperature, ControlShutdown and ControlShutdown and Cooling Cooling Noenny required Noenny required 258of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE380OF383 ATTACIIMENT 3 Safe Operation& Shutdown RoomsTables R-2& ll-2 Bases Table R-2 & 11-2Results Tabic R-2& II-2 Safe Operating & ShutdownRooms Room ModeApplicability Control 100 ft. Class DCEquipment Building RoomC 4.5 Control 100ft.Class DC Equipment RoomD Building 4,5 I Procedure 400P-9//O5, PowerOperations

2. Procedure400P-9//23, OntageGOP

3. Procedure400P-9//10, Mode3toMode 5 Operations

4. Procedure400P-9SI01, ShutdownCooling Initiation 259of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE381OF383 ATTACIIMENT 4 Palo Verde Safety System 1.ist SafetySystem A system required for safeplant operation, cooling downthe plant placing and/or itinthe cold shutdown condition. including the ECCS. These aretypically systems assafety classified related (as definedin10CFR50.2):

Those structures, systems and components that arerelied upon toremain functional during and following design basis events toassure:

I)Theintegrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary; 2)Thecapability toshut downthe reactor and maintain itina safe shutdown condition; 3)Thecapability toprevent ormitigate theconsequences ofaccidentswhich couldresult in potential offsite exposures.

TheSAFITY SYSTIMSincluded inthis dennition are those included tosatisfy CriteriaI,2or3 of10CUR50.36(c)(2)(ii). Systems included bythis dennition are:

W a Containment Building

• Auxiliary Building a Diesel Building a Fuel Building

• Spray Pond a Control Building

• MainSteam Support Structure ModeI-4 andMode5 whensteamgenerators arerequired per Technical Specifications Modes1-4

• Reactor Coolant System (RC)

• Safety Injection (SI)

• Refueling Water Tank

• Containment Air1ocks

• Containment Isolation Valves- except whenthe penetration isisolated andoutofservice.

• Containment Spray System (SI) Modes 1-3andMode4 385psia

• MainSteam Safety Valves (SG) ModesI-3 260of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY PIAN REVISION 69 PAGE382OF383 ATTACIIMENT 4 PaloVerde Safety System 1.ist

• Main Steam Isolation Valves (SG) ModeIandModes 2-4exceptwhenelosed and deactivated

• Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (SG)ModeI-4 except whenclosed anddeactivated or isolated byanother valve

• Atmospherie Dump Valves (SG) ModesI-3, Mode4 whenSteam arerelied Generators on for heat removal

• Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF) Modes Mode4 whenSteam 1-3, arerelied Generators on for heat removal

• Condensate Storage Tank (CT)Modes 1-3, Mode4 whenSteam arerelied Generators onfor heat removal

• Essential Cooling Water System (EW)

• Essential Chill Water System (EC)

• Essential Spray Pond System (SP)

• Ultimate lleatSink (SP)

• Control RoomEssential Filtration andVentilation (IU)

• Engineered Safety Ieatures PumpRoomExhaust Cleanup (IIF)

• Diesel Generators (DG)

• Diesel Fuel Oil System (DF)

• DCSources (PK)

• Class Battery Chargers (PK)

• Class Instrument Invertors (PN)

• Distribution Systems (PB,PG,Pll, PKandPN)

• Shutdown Cooling System (SI)Mode4

• Reactor Protection System (RPS)

• Engineered Safety Features ActuationSystem(ESFAS)

• Balance ofPlant Engineered Safety Actuation Features System (BOP-ESFAS)

Modes5and6

• Reactor Coolant System (RC)

• Shutdown Cooling System (SI)

• Diesel Generators (DG) Normally only required onetrain byTS

• Diesel Fuel Oil System (DF) Normallyonlyonetrain requiredbyTS

• DCSources (PK) Normally onlyonetrainrequiredbyTS

• Class Battery Chargers (PK) Normallyonlyonetrain required byTS

• Class Instrument Invertors (PN)Normally onlyonetrain requiredbyTS 261of262

PVNGS EMERGENCY Pl,AN REVISION 69 PAGE383OF383 ATTACIIMENT 4 Palo VerdeSafety I.ist System

• Distribution Systems (PB,PG,PilPKandPN) Normally only byTS required onetrain

• ControlRoom Essential FiltrationandVentilation (IIJ)

• Essential Cooling Water System (EW) supporting Train(s) Cooling Shutdown

• Essential Spray Pond System (SP) supporting Train(s) Cooling Shutdown DG and/or a Ultimate Heat Shutdown Sink (SP) Train(s) supporting DG and/or Cooling 262of262

Enclosure 2 Summary ofthe10 CFR50.54(q) Analysis of EmergencyPlanRevision 69

Description ofChanges Revision 69ofPalo Verde Generating StationEmergency Plan Revision 69 ofPalo Verde Generating Station Emergency Planinvolves the implementation oftheUnified Rascal Interface for dose assessmentandclarification of protective actions recommendation andclarification ofnotifications (initial and follow upnotificationto what agency).

1. 10CFR50.47(b)(1) Assignment ofResponsibility isinvolved thechanges with tofollow upnotification (offsite agencies involved). Section 4.4.1.2, 4.4.1.4, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, Figure 8,Figure 9,andSection 7.2.1.19 ofEPlan.

2. 10CFR 50.47(b)(5) Notification Methods andProcedures isinvolved withtheclarification ofinitial andfollow-up notifications. Definitions inEPlan. Section 1.1, andSection 4.2.1.8 6.3ofEPlan.

3. 10CFR50.47(b)(8) -

EmergencyFacility andEquipment isinvolved intheimplementation oftheUnified Rascal Interface doseassessment Section process. 15ofEPlan.

4. 10CFR50.47(b)(9) -

Accident Assessment isinvolved intheimplementation ofthe Unified Rascal Interface doseassessment process. Section 15ofEPlan.

5. 10CFR50.47(b)(10) -

Protective Responseis involved inthe ofwording clarification in theprotective action section along with theimplementation oftheUnified RascalInterface doseassessment process. Section 6.7.2.1 ofEPlan.